H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission 853 SCRA 174, January 24, 2018

G.R. No. 228087. January 24, 2018.
*

H. VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HL VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HRV VILLARICA
PAWNSHOP, INC. and VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., petitioners, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AMADOR M. MONTEIRO, SANTIAGO
DIONISIO R. AGDEPPA, MA. LUZ N. BARROS-MAGSINO, MILAGROS N. CASUGA and
JOCELYN Q. GARCIA, respondents.
Social Security Commission; Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 (RA No. 9903); Under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), an employer who is
delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS) may
avail of the condonation program provided that the delinquent employer will remit the full amount of the
unpaid contributions or would submit a proposal to
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.

175
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 175
H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission
pay the delinquent contributions in installment within the six (6)-month period set by law. Under
Section 4 of RA No. 9903, once an employer pays all its delinquent contributions within the six month
period, the accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed waived.—Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR,
an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail
of the condonation program provided that the delinquent employer will remit the full amount of the
unpaid contributions or would submit a proposal to pay the delinquent contributions in installment within
the six (6)-month period set by law. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903, once an employer pays all its
delinquent contributions within the six month period, the accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed
waived. In the last proviso thereof, those employers who have settled their delinquent contributions
before the effectivity of the law but still have existing accrued penalties shall also benefit from the
condonation program. In that situation, there is still something to condone because there are existing
accrued penalties at the time of the effectivity of the law. Section 1(d) of the IRR defines accrued
penalties as those that refer to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any delayed
remittance of contribution.
Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 (RA No. 9903); Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 covers those
employers who (1) have existing delinquent contributions and/or (2) have accrued penalties at the time of
its effectivity.—R.A. No. 9903 covers those employers who (1) have existing delinquent contributions
and/or (2) have accrued penalties at the time of its effectivity. Evidently, there is nothing in R.A. No.
9903, particularly Section 4 thereof, that benefits an employer who has settled their delinquent
contributions and/or their accrued penalties prior to the effectivity of the law. Once an employer pays all
his delinquent contributions and accrued penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, it cannot avail
of the condonation program because there is no existing obligation anymore. It is the clear intent of the
law to limit the benefit of the condonation program to the delinquent employers. Also, the provisions of
R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR state that employers may be accorded the benefit of having their accrued
penalties waived provided that they either remit their delinquent contributions or submit a proposal to
pay their delinquencies in installments (on the condition that there

176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
will be no default in subsequent payments) within the “availment period” spanning six (6) months
from R.A. No. 9903’s effectivity.
Statutory Construction; Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language.
—It is the duty of the Court to apply the law the way it is worded. Basic is the rule of statutory
construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply
the same according to its clear language. The courts can only pronounce what the law is and what the
rights of the parties thereunder are. Fidelity to such a task precludes construction or interpretation, unless
application is impossible or inadequate without it. Thus, it is only when the law is ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.
Same; Plain Meaning Rule; Verba Legis; The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory
construction enjoins that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without interpretation.—Parenthetically, the “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in
statutory construction enjoins that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This rule of interpretation is in deference to the plenary
power of Congress to make, alter and repeal laws as this power is an embodiment of the People’s
sovereign will. Accordingly, when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot
deviate from the text of the law and resort to interpretation lest they end up betraying their solemn duty to
uphold the law and worse, violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Civil Law; Obligations; Refund; In cases of monetary obligations, a claim for refund exists only
after the payment has been made and, in the act of doing so, the debtor either delivered excess funds or
there exists no obligation to pay in the first place.—Concomitantly, condonation or remission of debt is
an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces the
enforcement of the obligation, which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to
which the remission refers. It is essentially gratuitous for no equivalent is received for the benefit given.
Relatedly, waiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional

177
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 177
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of
the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it. On the
other hand, refund is an act of giving back or returning what was received. In cases of monetary
obligations, a claim for refund exists only after the payment has been made and, in the act of doing so, the
debtor either delivered excess funds or there exists no obligation to pay in the first place. This right arises
either by virtue of solutio indebiti as provided for in Articles 2154 to 2163 of the Civil Code or by
provision of another positive law, such as tax laws or amnesty laws.
Social Security System; Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 (RA No. 9903); Refund; A plain
reading of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 shows that it does not give employers who have
already settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties the right to a
refund of the penalties paid. What was waived here was the amount of accrued penalties that
have not been paid prior to the law’s effectivity — it does not include those that have already been
settled.—A plain reading of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 shows that it does not give employers who have
already settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties the right to a refund
of the penalties paid. What was waived here was the amount of accrued penalties that have not been
paid prior to the law’s effectivity — it does not include those that have already been settled. The words
“condoned,” “waived” and “accrued” are unambiguous enough to be understood and directly applied
without any resulting confusion. As discussed earlier, the word ‘‘condonation” is the creditor’s act of
extinguishing an obligation by renunciation and the word “waive” is an abandonment or relinquishment
of an existing legal right. On the other hand, the term “accrue” in legal parlance means “to come into
existence as an enforceable claim.” Thus, the phrases “shall be condoned” and “shall likewise have their
accrued penalties waived” under Section 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 can only mean that, at the time of its
effectivity, only existing penalties may be extinguished or relinquished. No further interpretation is
necessary to clarify the law’s applicability.

178
Prospectivity of Laws; Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a
retroactive application.—Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a
retroactive application. It is a basic principle that laws should only be applied prospectively unless the
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. Absent a clear contrary language in the text and, that in every case of doubt, the doubt will
be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Here, R.A. No. 9903 does not provide that, prior to
its effectivity, penalties already paid are deemed condoned or waived. What Section 2 of the law provides
instead is an availment period of six (6) months after its effectivity within which to pay the delinquent
contributions for the existing and corresponding penalties to be waived or condoned. This only means that
Congress intends R.A. No. 9903 to apply prospectively only after its effectivity and until its expiration.
Social Security System; Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 (RA No. 9903); The State stands to
lose its resources in the form of receivables whenever it condones or forgoes the collection of its
receivables or unpaid penalties. Since a loss of funds ultimately results in the Government being deprived
of its means to pursue its objectives, all monetary claims based on condonation should be construed
strictly against the applicants.—Social justice in the case of the laborers means compassionate justice or
an implementation of the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law. And since it is
the State’s policy to “promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to [SSS] members and
their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden,” Court should adopt a rule of statutory
interpretation which ensures the financial viability of the SSS. Here, the State stands to lose its resources
in the form of receivables whenever it condones or forgoes the collection of its receivables or unpaid
penalties. Since a loss of funds ultimately results in the Government being deprived of its means to pursue
its objectives, all monetary claims based on condonation should be construed strictly against the
applicants.
Civil Law; Obligations; Extinguishment of Obligations; Only existing obligations can be extinguished
either by payment, loss of the thing due, remission or condonation, confusion or merger or rights,

179
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 179
compensation, novation, annulment of contract, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, or
prescription.—Logically, only existing obligations can be extinguished either by payment, loss of the
thing due, remission or condonation, confusion or merger or rights, compensation, novation, annulment of
contract, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, or prescription. Interpreting R.A. No. 9903 in
such a way that it extinguishes an obligation which is already extinguished is simply absurd and
unreasonable.
Social Security System; Quasi-Legislative Power; Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the
government.—The SSS (through the SSC) is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of R.A. No. 9903. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of nondelegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory
of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of
greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive
officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations calculated to promote public interest. Stated differently, administrative agencies are
necessarily authorized to fill in the gaps of a statute for its proper and effective implementation. Hence,
the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and
effectuate its policies.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause guarantees that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.—There is a substantial distinction
between employers who paid prior and subsequent to R.A. No. 9903’s effectivity. The equal

180
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. However, the concept of equal protection does not require a universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. In other words, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. Neither is it necessary that
the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Congress is given a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification; especially when social or economic legislation is at issue. Hence, legislative
classification may properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear.
Legislative Power; In enacting a law, it is the sole prerogative of Congress — not the Judiciary —
to determine what subjects or activities it intends to govern limited only by the provisions set forth in the
Constitution.—Correspondingly, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a
way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction
which is repugnant to its terms. In enacting a law, it is the sole prerogative of Congress — not the
Judiciary — to determine what subjects or activities it intends to govern limited only by the provisions set
forth in the Constitution.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners.
Ma. Katrina Nadine G. Juanengo for respondents.

181
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 181
GESMUNDO, J.:

Condonation statutes — being an act of liberality on the part of the State — are strictly
construed against the applicants unless the laws themselves clearly state a contrary rule of
interpretation.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HRV Villarica Pawnshop,
Inc. and Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., (petitioners) seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated February 26, 2016 and Resolution 2 dated November 2, 2016, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 140916, which affirmed the Resolution 3 dated November 6,
2013, and Order4 dated January 21, 2015, of the Social Security Commission (SSC) denying
petitioners’ claim for refund.

The Antecedents

Petitioners are private corporations engaged in the pawnshop business and are compulsorily
registered with the Social Security System (SSS) under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8282,5 otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1997.6
_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R. Dimagiba,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 49-60.
2 Id., at pp. 62-63.
3 Id., at pp. 251-254.
4 Id., at pp. 275-278.
5 AN ACT FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM THEREBY AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1161, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (May 1, 1997).
6 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW, as amended (June 18, 1954).

182
In 2009, petitioners paid their delinquent contributions and accrued penalties with the
different branches of the SSS in the following manner:
On January 7, 2010, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9903, otherwise known as the Social
Security Condonation Law of 2009, which took effect on February 1, 2010. The said law offered
delinquent employers the opportunity to settle, without penalty, their accountabilities or overdue
contributions within six (6) months from the date of its effectivity.8
Consequently, petitioners thru its President and General Manager Atty. Henry P. Villarica,
sent separate Letters,9 all dated July 26, 2010, to the different branches of the SSS seek-
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 325.
8 Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903.
9 Rollo, pp. 86-89.

183
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 183
ing reimbursement of the accrued penalties, which they have paid in 2009, thus:
Amount Claimed

1. Diliman Branch P860,452.6210

2. Manila Branch P1,005,805.2811

3. Caloocan Branch P5,376.3212

4. San Francisco Del Monte Branch P3,119,400.15 13

Invoking Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 and Section 2(f) of the SSC Circular No. 2010-004 or
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9903 (IRR), petitioners claimed that the
benefits of the condonation program extend to all employers who have settled their arrears or
unpaid contributions even prior to the effectivity of the law.14
In a Letter15 dated August 16, 2010, the SSS — San Francisco Del Monte Branch denied
petitioner Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.’s request for refund amounting to P3,119,400.15 stating that
there was no provision under R.A. No. 9903 allowing reimbursement of penalties paid before its
effectivity.16
In another Letter17 dated September 16, 2010, petitioner HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. was
likewise informed that its application for the refund of the accrued penalty had been denied
because R.A. No. 9903 does not cover accountabilities settled prior to its effectivity.18
_______________
10 Id., at p. 86.
11 Id., at p. 87.
12 Id., at p. 88.
13 Id., at p. 89.
14 Id., at p. 86.
15 Id., at p. 94.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 93.
18 Id.

184
In like manner, the applications for refund filed by petitioners H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.
and HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. were both denied in separate letters dated October 4, 2010 19 and
October 15, 2010,20 respectively, for the same reason of being filed outside the coverage of R.A.
No. 9903.21
As a result, petitioners filed their respective Petitions 22 before the SSC seeking reimbursement
of the 3% per month penalties they paid in 2009 essentially claiming that they were entitled to
avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 9903 by reason of equity because “one of the purposes of the
law is to favor employers, regardless of the reason for the nonpayment of the arrears in
contribution;” and that the interpretation of the SSS “is manifestly contrary to the principle that,
in enacting a statute, the legislature intended right and justice to prevail.”
In its Answer23 dated March 14, 2012, the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the petitions for
utter lack of merit. It maintained that petitioners were not entitled to avail of the condonation
program under R.A. No. 9903 because they were not considered delinquent at the time the law
took effect in 2010; and that there was nothing more to condone on the part of petitioners for
they have settled their obligations even before the enactment of the law. The SSS explained that
the term “accrued penalties” had been properly defined as unpaid pen-
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 90-91.

20 Id., at p. 92.
21 Id., at pp. 90-91.
22 Docketed as: SSC Case No. 11-19521-11 (H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security System, Amador M.
Monteiro and Santiago Dionisio R. Agdeppa), SSC Case No. 11-19522-11 (HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security
System and Ma. Luz N. Barros-Magsino), SSC Case No. 11-19523-11 (HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security
System and Milagros N. Casuga) and SSC Case No. 11-19524-11 (Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security System and
Jocelyn Q. Garcia); id., at pp. 95-162.
23 Id., at pp. 163-169.

185
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 185
alties under the IRR and, considering that laws granting condonation constitute acts of
benevolence on the part of the State, they should be strictly construed against the applicant.24

The SSC’s Ruling

In its Resolution25 dated November 6, 2013, the SSC denied all the petitions for lack of merit.
It ruled that petitioners were not entitled to the benefits of the condonation program under R.A.
No. 9903 in view of the full payment of their unpaid obligations prior to the effectivity of the law
on February 1, 2010. As petitioners did not have unpaid contributions at the time the law took
effect, the SSC held that there could be no remission or refund in their favor. The dispositive
portion of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, all four (4) petitions filed by petitioners against the SSS are hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 26

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the SSC in an Order 27 dated
January 21, 2015.
Undeterred, petitioners appealed before the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

In its decision dated February 26, 2016, the CA affirmed the ruling of the SSC. It held that the
intent of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9903 was the remission of the three percent (3%)
per month penalty imposed upon delinquent contri-
_______________
24 Id., at p. 167.
25 Id., at pp. 251-254.
26 Id., at p. 254.
27 Id., at pp. 275-278.

186
butions of employers as a necessary consequence of the late payment or non-remittance of SSS
contributions. The CA found that the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 used the word “unpaid” to
emphasize the accrued penalty that may be waived therein, thus, it presupposes that there was
still an outstanding obligation at the time of the effectivity of the law, which may be
extinguished through remission. It highlighted that lawmakers did not include within the sphere
of R.A. No. 9903 those employers whose penalties have already been paid prior to its effectivity.
The CA added that it would be absurd for obligations that have already been extinguished to be
subjected to condonation.
Citing Mendoza v. People28 (Mendoza), the CA further ruled that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause because there was a substantial distinction between those delinquent
employers who paid within the six (6) month period from the effectivity of the law and those
who paid outside of the said availment period. It underscored that only the former class was
expressly covered by R.A. No. 9903. The CA concluded that petitioners’ stand, that those who
paid prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903 can avail of the condonation and refund, would
open the floodgates to numerous claims for reimbursement before the SSS, which could lead to a
depletion of its resources to the detriment of the public’s best interest. The fallo of the CA’s
ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated November 6, 2013 and the Order dated January 21, 2015 of the Social Security
Commission in SSC Case Nos. 11-19521-11, 11-19522-11, 11-19523-11 and 11-19524-11 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 29
_______________
28 675 Phil. 759, 767; 659 SCRA 681, 686 (2011).

29 Rollo, p. 59.

187
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 187
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution dated
November 2, 2016.30
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
RA NO. 9903 DOES NOT INCLUDE PETITIONERS IN ITS COVERAGE,
CONSIDERING THAT:
1. SECTION 4 OF RA NO. 9903 EXPRESSLY INCLUDES EMPLOYERS,
SUCH AS PETITIONERS, WHO SETTLED (THEIR) ARREARS IN
CONTRIBUTIONS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW AND
THUS, ARE ENTITLED TO A WAIVER OF THEIR ACCRUED
PENALTIES.
2. PRIOR TO RA NO. 9903, EMPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO SETTLE
THEIR ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
PAYMENT OF THE PENALTY, THUS RENDERING IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR PETITIONERS TO PAY THEIR ARREARS WITHOUT PAYING
THE PENALTY.
B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT SSC CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE TERM ‘ACCRUED’ UNDER
THE SSS CONDONATION LAW OF 2009 TO MEAN UNPAID. IF THIS
INTERPRETATION WERE TO BE UPHELD, THOSE WHO HAVE UNPAID
ACCRUED PENALTIES WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN THOSE WHO
DECIDED TO SETTLE BOTH THE ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTION AND THE
ACCRUED PENALTIES. CERTAINLY, THE LAW NEVER INTENDED INJUSTICE. 31
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 62-63.

31 Id., at pp. 21-22.

188
Petitioners argue that the last proviso of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 “clearly extends the
benefit of the waiver” to employers who have settled their arrears before the effectivity of the
law, hence, to allow the refund of the corresponding penalties paid; 32 that the “equity provision”
in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 should be interpreted to include a refund of penalties already paid
if such law is to be given any effect; 33 and that a refund should be allowed because there is no
substantial distinction between employers who paid their accrued penalties before and after the
effectivity of the R.A. No. 9903.34
In its Comment,35 the SSC counters that since petitioners have already paid their unremitted
contributions and accrued penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, there is nothing left
to be condoned or waived; that, at the time of their payment, there was no remission of accrued
penalty yet; that R.A. No. 9903 does not contain a provision allowing the reimbursement of
accrued penalty which was paid prior to its effectivity; that the CA correctly interpreted the term
“accrued penalty” to mean “unpaid” by using the definition provided in Section 1(d) of the IRR;
and that the ruling in Mendoza had already recognized that Congress refused to allow a
sweeping, nondiscriminatory condonation to all delinquent employers when it provided a fixed
period for the availment of the condonation program under R.A. No. 9903.36
_______________

32 Id., at pp. 23-25.
33 Id., at pp. 26-33, 350-353.
34 Id., at p. 25.
35 Id., at pp. 322-335; see Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282, which
states that the [Social Security] Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such
decision, and may be represented by an attorney employed by the Commission, or when requested by the Commission, by
the Solicitor General or any public prosecutors.
36 Id., at pp. 307-319.

189
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 189
In its Comment,37 the SSS avers that the payments made by petitioners before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 9903 are valid payments which cannot be the subject of reimbursement; that
petitioners are no longer considered delinquent employers when R.A. No. 9903 took effect; that
petitioners erroneously interpreted the “equity provision” to include a right to a refund of
penalties paid; and that laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence and should be
strictly construed against the applicant.38

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.
Sections 2 and 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 specifically provide:
Section 2. Condonation of Penalty.—Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS), including those with pending
cases either before the Social Security Commission, courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving
collection of contributions and/or penalties, may within six (6) months from the effectivity of
this Act:

(a) remit said contributions; or
(b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments, subject to the implementing
rules and regulations which the Social Security Commission may
prescribe: Provided, That the delinquent employer submits the corresponding
collection lists together with the remittance or proposal to pay
installments: Provided, further, That upon approval and payment in full or in
installments of contributions due and payable to the SSS, all such pending cases
filed against the employer shall be withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the
case in the event the employer
_______________

37 Id., at pp. 322-335.
38 Id., at pp. 322-333.

190
fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the payment
of any installment under the approved proposal.
x x x x
Section 4. Effectivity of Condonation.—The penalty provided under Section 22(a) of
Republic Act No. 8282 shall be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the delinquent
contributions are remitted by the employer to the SSS: Provided, That, in case the employer fails to
remit in full the required delinquent contributions, or defaults in the payment of any installment
under the approved proposal, within the availment period provided in this Act, the penalties are
deemed reimposed from the time the contributions first become due, to accrue until the delinquent
account is paid in full: Provided, further, That for reason of equity, employers who
settled arrears in contributions before the effectivity of this Act shall likewise have
their accrued penalties waived. [emphases supplied]

On the other hand, Sections 1 and 2 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 state:
Section 1. Definition of Terms.—Unless the context of a certain provision of this Circular
clearly indicates otherwise, the term:
x x x
(d) “Accrued penalty” refers to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any
delayed remittance of contribution in accordance with Section 22(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended.
Section 2. Who may avail of the Program.—Any employer who is delinquent or has not
remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the Program, including the
following:
(a) Those not yet registered with the SSS;
(b) Those with pending or approved proposal under the Installment Payment Scheme of the
SSS

191
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 191
(Circular No. 9-P) pursuant to SSC Resolution No. 380 dated 10 June 2002;
(c) Those with pending or approved application under the Program for Acceptance of
Properties Offered Through Dacion En Pago of the SSS (Circular No. 6-P) pursuant to SSC
Resolution No. 29 dated 16 January 2002;
(d) Those with cases pending before the SSC, Courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving
collection of contributions and/or penalties;
(e) Those against whom judgment had been rendered involving collection of contributions
and/or penalties but have not complied with the judgment, and;
(f) Those who, before the effectivity of the Act, have settled all contributions but with
accrued penalty. [emphasis supplied]

Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR, an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the condonation program provided that
the delinquent employer will remit the full amount of the unpaid contributions or would submit a
proposal to pay the delinquent contributions in installment within the six (6)-month period set by
law.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903, once an employer pays all its delinquent contributions
within the six month period, the accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed waived. In the
last proviso thereof, those employers who have settled their delinquent contributions before the
effectivity of the law but still have existing accrued penalties shall also benefit from the
condonation program. In that situation, there is still something to condone because there are
existing accrued penalties at the time of the effectivity of the law. Section 1(d) of the IRR defines
accrued penalties as those that refer to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any
delayed remittance of contribution.

192
Accordingly, R.A. No. 9903 covers those employers who (1) have existing delinquent
contributions and/or (2) have accrued penalties at the time of its effectivity.
Evidently, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9903, particularly Section 4 thereof, that benefits an
employer who has settled their delinquent contributions and/or their accrued penalties prior to
the effectivity of the law. Once an employer pays all his delinquent contributions and accrued
penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, it cannot avail of the condonation program
because there is no existing obligation anymore. It is the clear intent of the law to limit the
benefit of the condonation program to the delinquent employers.39
Also, the provisions of R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR state that employers may be accorded the
benefit of having their accrued penalties waived provided that they either remit their delinquent
contributions or submit a proposal to pay their delinquencies in installments (on the condition
that there will be no default in subsequent payments) within the “availment period” spanning six
(6) months from R.A. No. 9903’s effectivity.
The Court finds that employers who have paid their unremitted contributions and already
settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties before R.A. No.
9903’s effectivity do not have a right to be refunded of the penalties already paid, which shall be
discussed in seriatim.

Verba legis interpretation
of R.A. No. 9903

It is the duty of the Court to apply the law the way it is worded. 40 Basic is the rule of statutory
construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
_______________
39 Mendoza v. People, supra note 28 at pp. 765-766; p. 688.

40 Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, 661 Phil. 390, 400; 646 SCRA 21, 33 (2011).

193
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 193
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. 41 The courts can only pronounce
what the law is and what the rights of the parties thereunder are. 42 Fidelity to such a task
precludes construction or interpretation, unless application is impossible or inadequate without
it.43 Thus, it is only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or
construe its true intent.44
Parenthetically, the “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction enjoins that
if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.45 This rule of interpretation is in deference to the plenary power of
Congress to make, alter and repeal laws as this power is an embodiment of the People’s
sovereign will.46 Accordingly, when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, courts
cannot deviate from the text of the law and resort to interpretation lest they end up betraying
their solemn duty to uphold the law and worse, violating the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.
Concomitantly, condonation or remission of debt is an act of liberality, by virtue of which,
without receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation,
which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the remission
refers.47 It is essentially
_______________
41 Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati, Br. 61, 331 Phil. 787, 793; 263 SCRA 483, 488 (1996).
42 Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612, 633 (1924).
43 Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 134 Phil. 697, 700; 25 SCRA 754, 756-757 (1968).
44 Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 492 Phil. 303, 313; 452 SCRA 162, 169 (2005).
45 Republic v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 99; 517 SCRA 255, 268 (2007).
46 Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 956; 293 SCRA 141, 149 (1998).
47 Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals, 576 Phil. 110, 133; 553 SCRA 111, 132 (2008).

194
gratuitous for no equivalent is received for the benefit given. 48 Relatedly, waiver is defined as a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him
to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of
its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.49 On the other hand, refund is an act of
giving back or returning what was received. 50 In cases of monetary obligations, a claim for refund
exists only after the payment has been made and, in the act of doing so, the debtor either
delivered excess funds or there exists no obligation to pay in the first place. This right arises
either by virtue of solutio indebiti as provided for in Articles 2154 to 2163 of the Civil Code or
by provision of another positive law, such as tax laws or amnesty laws.51
A plain reading of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 shows that it does not give employers who
have already settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties the
right to a refund of the penalties paid. What was waived here was the amount of accrued
penalties that have not been paid prior to the law’s effectivity — it does not include those that
have already been settled.
The words “condoned,” “waived” and “accrued” are unambiguous enough to be understood
and directly applied without any resulting confusion. As discussed earlier, the word ‘‘con-
_______________
48 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Code of the Philipines, Vol. IV, p. 353, 1991 edition.
49 F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp., 684 Phil. 330, 351; 668 SCRA 302, 322 (2012).
50 See United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938).
51 See Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Central Bank, 121 Phil. 451, 455; 13 SCRA 479, 483-484 (1965).

195
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 195
donation” is the creditor’s act of extinguishing an obligation by renunciation and the word
“waive” is an abandonment or relinquishment of an existing legal right. On the other hand, the
term “accrue” in legal parlance means “to come into existence as an enforceable claim.” 52 Thus,
the phrases “shall be condoned” and “shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived” under
Section 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 can only mean that, at the time of its effectivity, only existing
penalties may be extinguished or relinquished. No further interpretation is necessary to clarify
the law’s applicability.

Prospective application
of R.A. No. 9903

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive
application. It is a basic principle that laws should only be applied prospectively unless the
legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.53 Absent a clear contrary language in the text and, that in every case of
doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.54
Here, R.A. No. 9903 does not provide that, prior to its effectivity, penalties already paid are
deemed condoned or waived. What Section 2 of the law provides instead is an availment period
of six (6) months after its effectivity within which to pay the delinquent contributions for the
existing and corresponding penalties to be waived or condoned. This only means that Congress
intends R.A. No. 9903 to apply prospectively only after its effectivity and until its expiration.
_______________
52 See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W. 2d 711 (2004).

53 Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 640, 646; 256 SCRA 629, 634 (1996).
54 Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 623 Phil. 23, 43; 608 SCRA 107, 128
(2009).

196
Interpretation in favor
of social justice

Even if there is doubt as to the import of the term “accrued penalties,” condonation laws —
especially those relating to social security funds — are construed strictly against the applicants.
Social justice in the case of the laborers means compassionate justice or an implementation of
the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law. 55 And since it is the State’s
policy to “promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to [SSS] members and their
beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden,” 56 Court should adopt a rule of
statutory interpretation which ensures the financial viability of the SSS.
Here, the State stands to lose its resources in the form of receivables whenever it condones or
forgoes the collection of its receivables or unpaid penalties. Since a loss of funds ultimately
results in the Government being deprived of its means to pursue its objectives, all monetary
claims based on condonation should be construed strictly against the applicants. In the case of
SSS funds, the Court in Social Security System v. Commission on Audit 57 had emphatically
explained in this wise:
THE FUNDS contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not only imbued with public
interest, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers’ labors pooled into one enormous trust
fund under the administration of the System designed to insure against the
_______________

55 Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 248, 306; 442 SCRA 573, 636 (2004).
56 Section 2 of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.
57 433 Phil. 946, 952; 384 SCRA 548, 549-550 (2002).

197
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 197
vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers’
property which they could turn to when necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than
the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges against the trust fund be
strictly scrutinized for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep it intact and viable in
the interest of enhancing the welfare of their true and ultimate beneficiaries. [emphasis
supplied]

To this end, the Court upholds and abides by this canon of interpretation against applicants of
the benefits of R.A. No. 9903 as a recognition to the constitutional policies of freeing the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services 58 and affording full protection
to labor.59 It is consistent with the congressional intent of placing a primary importance in helping
the SSS increase its funds through stimulating cash inflows by encouraging delinquent
employers to settle their accountabilities.60 Thus, R.A. No. 9903 shall be understood as not to
include a refund of penalties paid before its effectivity.
It is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of
injustice.61 Simply put, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to
_______________
58 Section 9, Article II of the CONSTITUTION.

59 Section 3, Article XIII, id.
60 See Hearing of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises Joint with Senate
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development (Technical Working Group), May 21, 2009, p.
9; see also Hearing of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Enterprises and Privatization, August 27,
2008, pp. 16-17.
61 Bello v. Court of Appeals, 155 Phil. 480, 491; 56 SCRA 509, 518 (1974).

198
absurd or unreasonable consequences.62 This is to preserve the intention of Congress — the
branch which possesses the plenary power for all purposes of civil government.63
Logically, only existing obligations can be extinguished either by payment, loss of the thing
due, remission or condonation, confusion or merger or rights, compensation, novation,
annulment of contract, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, or prescription.
Interpreting R.A. No. 9903 in such a way that it extinguishes an obligation which is already
extinguished is simply absurd and unreasonable.

Rule-making power
of the SSS

The SSS (through the SSC)64 is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of R.A. No. 9903.65 Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegation of powers from the separation of the
branches of the government.66
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity
of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials,
_______________
62 Secretary of Justice v. Koruga, 604 Phil. 405, 416; 586 SCRA 513, 523-524 (2009).
63 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 675 Phil. 316, 351; 659 SCRA 270, 304-305 (2011).
64 Sections 3 and 30 of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.
65 Section 5 of R.A. No. 9903.
66 Cawad v. Abad, 764 Phil. 705, 723; 764 SCRA 1, 18-19 (2015).

199
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 199
not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.67 Stated differently, administrative agencies are necessarily
authorized to fill in the gaps of a statute for its proper and effective implementation. Hence, the
need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and effectuate its policies.68
In the instant case, Section 30 of the R.A. No. 8282 and Section 5 of R.A. No. 9903 gave the
SSS the power to promulgate rules and regulations to define the terms of social security-related
laws that may have a likelihood of being subjected to several interpretations. This is exactly what
the SSS did when it defined the term “accrued penalties’’ to mean “unpaid penalties” so as to
make it unequivocal and prevent confusion as to the applicability of R.A. No. 9903. More
importantly, since the ascription of the meaning of “unpaid penalties” to “accrued penalties” bear
a reasonable semblance and justifiable connection, it should not be disturbed and altered by the
courts.

Delinquent contributions
and penalties may be paid
separately

There is no existing statutory or regulatory provision which requires the simultaneous or joint
payment of corresponding penalties along with the payment of delinquent contributions.
Consequently, it is possible that a class of employers who have settled their delinquent
contributions but have not paid
_______________

67 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration , 313 Phil.
592, 606-607; 243 SCRA 666, 675-676 (1995).
68 Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563, 584; 527 SCRA 696, 719-720 (2007).

200
the corresponding penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, may exist. As adequately
pointed out by the SSC:69
It is worthy to note that there is no provision in RA 8282, as amended, nor in any SSS
Circular or Office Order that requires employers to settle their arrears in contributions
simultaneously with payment of the penalty. On the contrary, in its sincere effort to be a partner
in nation[-]building, along with the State’s declared policy to establish, develop, promote and
perfect a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the
Philippines, the SSS is empowered to accept, process and approve applications for installment
proposal evincing that employers are not required to settle their arrears in contributions
simultaneously with the payment of the penalty. [emphasis supplied]

The Court finds that the aforementioned assertion of the SSC is not without any legal basis as
Section 4(c) of the R.A. No. 8282 provides:

Section 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS.—
x x x x
(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest, penalty or any civil
liability to SSS in connection with the investments authorized under Section 26
hereof, under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe and approved by the
President of the Philippines; and x x x (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the SSS — through the SSC — is authorized to address any act that
may undermine the collection of penalties due from delinquent employers subject only
_______________
69 Rollo, p. 314, citing SS Circular No. 2011-002 (issued on February 16, 2011).

201
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 201
to the condition in Section 26 of the same law that the potential revenues being compromised
“are not needed to meet the current administrative and operational expenses.” Thus, petitioners’
claim that “a class of employers who simply paid the arrears in contribution but did not settle
their penalties due does not exist”70 is erroneous.

There is no violation of the
equal protection clause

There is a substantial distinction between employers who paid prior and subsequent to R.A.
No. 9903’s effectivity. The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances. 71 However, the concept of equal protection
does not require a universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction;
what it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.72
In other words, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 73 It does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different.74 Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical nicety.75 Congress is given a wide
_______________
70 Id., at p. 25.
71 Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, 680 Phil. 681, 693; 664 SCRA 666, 676 (2012).
72 Bartolome v. Social Security System, 746 Phil. 717, 730; 740 SCRA 78, 91-92 (2014).
73 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 298 Phil. 502, 512-513; 227 SCRA 703, 711-712 (1993).
74 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 158 Phil. 60, 87; 59 SCRA 54, 77 (1974).
75 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 270; 562 SCRA 251, 275 (2008).

202
leeway in providing for a valid classification, 76 especially when social or economic legislation is
at issue.77 Hence, legislative classification may properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.78
Correspondingly, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. 79 In enacting a law, it is the sole prerogative of
Congress — not the Judiciary — to determine what subjects or activities it intends to govern
limited only by the provisions set forth in the Constitution.
Significantly, petitioners have already paid not only their delinquent contributions but also
their corresponding penalties before the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 9903. Because of
this observation, petitioners cannot anymore be considered as “delinquent” under the
purview of R.A. No. 9903 and are not within the class of “delinquent employers.”80 Simply put,
they are not similarly situated with other employers who are delinquent at the time of the law’s
effectivity. Accordingly, Congress may treat petitioners differently from all other employers who
may have been delinquent.
_______________
76 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 577; 446 SCRA 299, 345
(2004).
77 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
78 Anucension v. National Labor Union, 170 Phil. 373, 392; 80 SCRA 350, 373 (1977).
79 Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 416; 724 SCRA 1, 57 (2014).
80 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

203
VOL. 853, JANUARY 24, 2018 203
Verily, this Court cannot — in the guise of interpretation — modify the explicit language of
R.A. No. 9903 in waiving the collection of accrued penalties to also include claims for refund. It
obviously violates the Trias Politica Principle entrenched in the very fabric of democracy itself.
While violation of the equal protection clause may be a compelling ground for this Court to
nullify an arbitrary or unreasonable legislative classification, it may not be used as a basis to
extend the scope of a law to classes not intended to be covered.81 Therefore, R.A. No. 9903,
which waived outstanding penalties, cannot be expanded to allow a refund of those which were
already settled before the law’s effectivity.

Final note

Settling the contributions in arrears within the availment period only entitles delinquent
employers to a remission of their corresponding accrued and outstanding penalties — not a
refund of the penalties which have already been paid. There is nothing in R.A. No. 9903 which
explicitly imposes or even implicitly recognizes a positive or natural obligation on the part of the
SSS to return the penalties which have already been settled before its effectivity.
It is absurd to revive obligations that have already been extinguished by payment or
performance just to be re-extinguished by condonation or remission so that it may create a
resulting obligation on the basis of solutio indebiti. More importantly, there is no violation of the
equal protection clause because there is a substantial distinction in the classes of employers.
Therefore, the Court deems it fitting to deny petitioners’ claim for refund for lack of substantial
and legal basis.
_______________
81 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 351, 362; 389 SCRA 570, 577 (2002), where it was stated that courts may
not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by
the lawmakers.

204
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 26, 2016 Decision and November 2,
2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 140916 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (Acting Chairperson), Leonen and Jardeleza,** JJ., concur.
Martires, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.
Notes.—Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all
persons or things differently situated should be treated differently. (Drugstores Association of
the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs, 803 SCRA 25 [2016])
Necessarily, when the Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the civil
action against Ambassador Hotel for the recovery of civil liability arising from the non-
remittance of Social Security System (SSS) contributions was deemed instituted therein.
(Ambassador Hotel, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 827 SCRA 641 [2017])

——o0o——
_______________
* * Designated additional member per Raffle dated January 15, 2018.

H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission 853 SCRA 174, January 24, 2018

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission 853 SCRA 174, January 24, 2018

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission 853 SCRA 174, January 24, 2018

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 228087. January 24, 2018.

19 Id., at pp. 90-91.

28 675 Phil. 759, 767; 659 SCRA 681, 686 (2011).

30 Id., at pp. 62-63.

39 Mendoza v. People, supra note 28 at pp. 765-766; p. 688.

52 See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W. 2d 711 (2004).

58 Section 9, Article II of the CONSTITUTION.

69 Rollo, p. 314, citing SS Circular No. 2011-002 (issued on February 16, 2011).

* * Designated additional member per Raffle dated January 15, 2018.

You might also like