The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report

January 30, 2011 | 2253 GMT

CHRIS HONDROS/Getty Images

Protesters wave the Egyptian flag in downtown Cairo on Jan. 30

By George Friedman

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 The Egypt Unrest: Full Coverage

It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening.
Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of
Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan,
which was that he would be replaced by his son Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a
possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see
Mubarak’s succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal’s succession became even less
likely. Mubarak’s failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since
everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little
advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue.

Let’s begin by considering the regime. In 1952, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a military coup that
displaced the Egyptian monarchy, civilian officers in the military and British influence in Egypt. Nasser
created a government based on military power as the major stabilising and progressive force in Egypt.
His revolution was secular and socialist. In short, it was a statist regime dominated by the military. On
Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat replaced him. On Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak replaced him. Both
of these men came from the military as Nasser did. However their foreign policy might have differed
from Nasser’s, the regime remained intact.

Mubarak’s Opponents

The demands for Mubarak’s resignation come from many quarters, including from members of the
regime — particularly the military — who regard Mubarak’s unwillingness to permit them to dictate the
succession as endangering the regime. For some of them, the demonstrations represent both a threat
and opportunity. Obviously, the demonstrations might get out of hand and destroy the regime. On the
other hand, the demonstrations might be enough to force Mubarak to resign, allow a replacement — for
example, Omar Suleiman, the head of intelligence who Mubarak recently appointed vice president —
and thereby save the regime. This is not to say that they fomented the demonstrations, but some must
have seen the demonstrations as an opportunity.

This is particularly the case in the sense that the demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves
and thus far do not appear to have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the
Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979. More important, the demonstrators are clearly united in opposing
Mubarak as an individual, and to a large extent united in opposing the regime. Beyond that, there is a
deep divide in the opposition.

Western media has read the uprising as a demand for Western-style liberal democracy. Many certainly
are demanding that. What is not clear is that this is moving Egypt’s peasants, workers and merchant
class to rise en masse. Their interests have far more to do with the state of the Egyptian economy than
with the principles of liberal democracy. As in Iran in 2009, the democratic revolution, if focused on
democrats, cannot triumph unless it generates broader support.

The other element in this uprising is the Muslim Brotherhood. The consensus of most observers is that
the Muslim Brotherhood at this point is no longer a radical movement and is too weak to influence the
revolution. This may be possible, but it is not obvious. The Muslim Brotherhood has many strands, many
of which have been quiet under Mubarak’s repression. It is not clear who will emerge if Mubarak falls. It
is certainly not clear that they are weaker than the democratic demonstrators. It is a mistake to confuse
the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness. Another way to look at them is that they have bided
their time and toned down their real views, waiting for the kind of moment provided by Mubarak’s
succession. I would suspect that the Muslim Brotherhood has more potential influence among the
Egyptian masses than the Western-oriented demonstrators or Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is emerging as their leader.

There is, of course, the usual discussion of what U.S. President Barack Obama’s view is, or what the
Europeans think, or what the Iranians are up to. All of them undoubtedly have thoughts and even plans.
In my view, trying to shape the political dynamics of a country like Egypt from Iran or the United States is
futile, and believing that what is happening in Egypt is the result of their conspiracies is nonsense. A lot
of people care what is happening there, and a lot of people are saying all sorts of things and even
spending money on spies and Twitter. Egypt’s regime can be influenced in this way, but a revolution
really doesn’t depend on what the European Union or Tehran says.

There are four outcomes possible.

First, the regime might survive. Mubarak might stabilise the situation, or more likely, another senior
military official would replace him after a decent interval. Another possibility under the scenario of the
regime’s survival is that there may be a coup of the colonels, as we discussed yesterday.

A second possibility is that the demonstrators might force elections in which ElBaradei or someone like
him could be elected and Egypt might overthrow the statist model built by Nasser and proceed on the
path of democracy.
The third possibility is that the demonstrators force elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood could win
and move forward with an Islamist-oriented agenda.

The fourth possibility is that Egypt will sink into political chaos. The most likely path to this would be
elections that result in political gridlock in which a viable candidate cannot be elected. If I were forced to
choose, I would bet on the regime stabilising itself and Mubarak leaving because of the relative
weakness and division of the demonstrators. But that’s a guess and not a forecast.

Geopolitical Significance

Whatever happens matters a great deal to Egyptians. But only some of these outcomes are significant to
the world. Among radical Islamists, the prospect of a radicalised Egypt represents a new lease on life.
For Iran, such an outcome would be less pleasing. Iran is now the emerging centre of radical Islamism; it
would not welcome competition from Egypt, though it may be content with an Islamist Egypt that acts
as an Iranian ally (something that would not be easy to ensure).

For the United States, an Islamist Egypt would be a strategic catastrophe. Egypt is the centre of gravity in
the Arab world. This would not only change the dynamic of the Arab world, it would reverse U.S.
strategy since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Sadat’s decision to reverse his alliance with the
Soviets and form an alliance with the United States undermined the Soviet position in the
Mediterranean and in the Arab world and strengthened the United States immeasurably. The support of
Egyptian intelligence after 9/11 was critical in blocking and undermining al Qaeda. Were Egypt to stop
that cooperation or become hostile, the U.S. strategy would be severely undermined.

The great loser would be Israel. Israel’s national security has rested on its treaty with Egypt, signed by
Menachem Begin with much criticism by the Israeli right. The demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula not
only protected Israel’s southern front, it meant that the survival of Israel was no longer at stake. Israel
fought three wars (1948, 1967 and 1973) where its very existence was at issue. The threat was always
from Egypt, and without Egypt in the mix, no coalition of powers could threaten Israel (excluding the
now-distant possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons). In all of the wars Israel fought after its treaty with
Egypt (the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon) Israeli interests, but not survival, were at stake.

If Egypt were to abrogate the Camp David Accords and over time reconstruct its military into an effective
force, the existential threat to Israel that existed before the treaty was signed would re-emerge. This
would not happen quickly, but Israel would have to deal with two realities. The first is that the Israeli
military is not nearly large enough or strong enough to occupy and control Egypt. The second is that the
development of Egypt’s military would impose substantial costs on Israel and limit its room for
manoeuvre.

There is thus a scenario that would potentially strengthen the radical Islamists while putting the United
States, Israel, and potentially even Iran at a disadvantage, all for different reasons. That scenario
emerges only if two things happen. First, the Muslim Brotherhood must become a dominant political
force in Egypt. Second, they must turn out to be more radical than most observers currently believe they
are — or they must, with power, evolve into something more radical.

If the advocates for democracy win, and if they elect someone like ElBaradei, it is unlikely that this
scenario would take place. The pro-Western democratic faction is primarily concerned with domestic
issues, are themselves secular and would not want to return to the wartime state prior to Camp David,
because that would simply strengthen the military. If they win power, the geopolitical arrangements
would remain unchanged.

Similarly, the geopolitical arrangements would remain in place if the military regime retained power —
save for one scenario. If it was decided that the regime’s unpopularity could be mitigated by assuming a
more anti-Western and anti-Israeli policy — in other words, if the regime decided to play the Islamist
card, the situation could evolve as a Muslim Brotherhood government would. Indeed, as hard as it is to
imagine, there could be an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood designed to stabilise the regime.
Stranger things have happened.

When we look at the political dynamic of Egypt, and try to imagine its connection to the international
system, we can see that there are several scenarios under which certain political outcomes would have
profound effects on the way the world works. That should not be surprising. When Egypt was a pro-
Soviet Nasserite state, the world was a very different place than it had been before Nasser. When Sadat
changed his foreign policy the world changed with it. If the Sadat foreign policy changes, the world
changes again. Egypt is one of those countries whose internal politics matter to more than its own
citizens.

Most of the outcomes I envision leave Egypt pretty much where it is. But not all. The situation is, as they
say, in doubt, and the outcome is not trivial.

The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

PETER MACDIARMID/Getty Images

Riot police and protesters clash at the Qasr al-Nil Bridge near Tahrir Square in Cairo on Jan. 28

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the
tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being
overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot
paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the
streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armoured personnel carriers carrying regular
army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the
political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the
public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt,
remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated
with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of
reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have
brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of
many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces —
from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the
demonstrations while they manoeuvre from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the
ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that
end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States,
Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is
proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-
established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for
elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces
stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question
is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their
historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following
for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former
air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s
command in the air force — the most privileged military branch in Egypt — has been appointed prime
minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who
has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that had been vacant for the past 30 years.
Meanwhile, Defence Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, who oversees the Republican
Guard, and Chief of Staff of the armed forces Lt. Gen. Sami Annan, who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a
week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials, are likely managing the political process behind the
scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak
the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely
to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will
tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern
republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military
has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of
political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the
responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the
historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the
military as an ally, and therefore, whether consciously or not, are facilitating a de facto military takeover
of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the
military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we
question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fuelling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos
as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage
the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot
dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking
officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed
forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the
military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.
The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an
Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after
all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross-section that is religiously conservative
and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged
them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well
include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its
foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having
the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the
generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind
them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and
could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain
of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment
rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a
country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all
the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted
rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the
new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed
since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military not only to manage the streets and the
politicians, but also itself.

Mubarak Declines to Run for Re-Election

February 1, 2011 | 2205 GMT

AFP/Getty Images

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo in December 2010

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Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said Feb. 1 he would not seek another term as president in elections
slated for September but that he will complete his current term. In a televised national address, his
second since the Egyptian unrest began the previous week, Mubarak said he would use the remainder of
his term to oversee the transition of power. He also called on the parliament to amend the Egyptian
Constitution’s Article 76 (which narrows the pool of potential presidential candidates) and Article 77
(which allows for unlimited presidential terms). It is currently unclear whether these measures will be
considered.

The opposition immediately rejected the pronouncement. Each political concession offered during this
crisis by the Egyptian political establishment — which until this point had ruled with absolute authority
since the 1950s — has only emboldened the opposition. Unrest is thus likely to continue, which means
the Egyptian military likely will attempt to force Mubarak to step down before the elections. However,
even this will not likely resolve matters, as the need to create a neutral caretaker government until
elections can be held will be the basis for further struggles between the regime and the opposition.

Read more: Mubarak Declines to Run for Re-Election | STRATFOR