GARCIA FULE VS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B.

GARCIA
Virginia Garcia Fule (petitioner) filed before CFI of Calamba, Laguna a Petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. She moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. This was GRANTED.
Preciosa Garcia filed for a motion for reconsideration contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction
There was no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; She
contends that she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix, being the surviving spouse of Amado; and,
Virginia is not an heir but a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
While the MR is pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Virginia as administrator.

Preciosa B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals, primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Virginia’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter
to Us on appeal by certiorari.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, over the same
intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix.

For the first time, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.

Thus, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of
the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

Thereafter, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in
the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and
that the case is still pending before the Court.

VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño(successor of Judge Ericta) from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued.

RULING:

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name
and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of
the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over
the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
"existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the
power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the
court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of
Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes  ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence  rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at
the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property
owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her
amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at
the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule
herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of
his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.