7 - Heirs of Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan PDF
7 - Heirs of Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan PDF
7 - Heirs of Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan PDF
Land Titles and Deeds; Reconveyance; Prescription; An action to recover possession of a registered
land never prescribes.—An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of
the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that
of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that an action by
the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe.
Same; Same; Same; The rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the
registered owners but extends to the heirs of the registered owners as well.—It is well-settled that the rule
on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the registered owner but extends to the heirs
of the registered owner as well. Recently in Mateo v. Diaz, 374 SCRA 33 (2002), the Court held that
prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary
successors because the latter step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, petitioners, as heirs of Anacleto
Nieto, the registered owner, cannot be barred by prescription from claiming the property.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right has either abandoned or declined to assert
it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible
legal right.—In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to recover registered land covered
by the Torrens System may not be barred by laches. Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of
an imprescriptible legal right. Laches, which is a principle based on equity, may not prevail against a
specific provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as “justice outside legality,” is applied in
the absence of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure. In recent cases, however, the Court
held that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Same; Same; Ejectment; Those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will
vacate the property upon demand; Upon the refusal to vacate the property, the owner’s cause of action
accrues, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession being counted from the date of the demand
to vacate.—This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied
promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon
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demand. The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. Upon the
refusal to vacate the property, the owner’s cause of action accrues. In this case, the first element of laches
occurred the moment respondent refused to vacate the property, upon petitioners demand, on February
23, 1994. The filing of the complaint on December 28, 1994, after the lapse of a period of only ten months,
cannot be considered as unreasonable delay amounting to laches.
NACHURA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 30, 2001, which dismissed the petition for review of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The latter dismissed a complaint to recover possession of a
registered land on the ground of prescription and laches.
The antecedents are as follows:
Anacleto Nieto was the registered owner of a parcel of land, consisting of 3,882 square
meters, situated at Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-24.055 (M).
The property is being used by respondent, Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
constructed an extension of the public market therein.
Upon Anacleto’s death on July 26, 1993, his wife, Sixta P. Nieto, and their three children,
namely, Eulalio P. Nieto, Gaudencio Nieto and Corazon Nieto-Ignacio, herein petitioners,
collated all the documents pertaining to his estate. When petitioners failed to locate the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M), they filed a petition for the issuance of a
second owner’s copy with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan. In that case, petitioners discovered that
the missing copy of the title was in the possession of the respondent. Consequently, petitioners
withdrew the petition and demanded from respondent the return of property and the
certificate of title.
On February 23, 1994, petitioners formally demanded from respondent the return of the
possession and full control of the property, and payment of a monthly 2
rent with interest from
January 1964. Respondent did not comply with petitioners’ demand.
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1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Alicia L.
Santos, concurring; Rollo, pp. 30-39.
2 Records, pp. 70-71.
104
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3 Id.,at pp. 1-4.
4 Records, pp. 32-33.
5 Rollo, p. 24.
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claim that Anacleto Nieto donated the property to it in light of the fact that the title remained
in the name of Anacleto. Nonetheless, the RTC did not rule in favor of petitioners because of
its finding that the case was already barred by prescription. It held that the imprescriptibility
of actions to recover land covered by the Torrens System could only be invoked by the
registered owner, Anacleto Nieto, and that the action was also barred by laches.
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On October 30, 2001, the CA
rendered a Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. According to the CA, the
petition involved6 a pure question of law; hence, petitioners should have filed a petition directly
with this Court.
Accordingly, petitioners elevated the case to this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari, raising the follow-ing issues:
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6 Id., at pp. 37-38.
7 Id., at p. 11.
106
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8 Mateo v. Diaz, 424 Phil. 772, 781; 374 SCRA 33, 40 (2002).
9 Mateo v. Diaz, supra, at p. 782; p. 41; Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
738, 747.
10 Supra.
11 Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, 397 Phil. 955, 969; 344 SCRA 95, 107 (2000).
107
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12 Mateo v. Diaz, supra note 8, at p. 781; p. 40; Quevada v. Glorioso, 356 Phil. 105, 119; 294 SCRA
608 (1998); Dablo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93365, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 618, 628; Bishop v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641; Jimenez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 46364, April 6, 1990, 184
SCRA 190, 198; Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 106; 135 SCRA 427, 429 (1985); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Macalindong, No. L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938.
13 Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals, 415 Phil. 665, 674; 363 SCRA 435, 442 (2001).
14 Mateo v. Diaz, supra note 8, at p. 781; pp. 40-41.
15 De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; Heirs of Juan and Ines
Panganiban v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 151235, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 370, 379-380; Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 19, 34; 267 SCRA 339, 356 (1997).
16 Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 627, 635.
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“(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant17 in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held to be barred.”
We note that the certificate of title in the name of Anacleto Nieto was found in respondent’s
possession but there was no evidence that ownership of the property was transferred to the
municipality either through a donation or by expropriation, or that any compensation was
paid by respondent for the use of the property. Anacleto allegedly surrendered the certificate
of title to respondent upon the belief that the property would be expropriated. Absent any
showing that this certificate of title was fraudulently obtained by respondent, it can be
presumed that Anacleto voluntarily delivered the same to respondent. Anacleto’s delivery of
the certificate of title to respondent could, therefore, be taken to mean acquiescence to
respondent’s plan to expropriate the property, or a tacit consent to the use of the property
pending its expropriation.
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily 18
bound by an
implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. The status of the
possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
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17 Heirs of Juan and Ines Panganiban v. Dayrit, supra note 15, at p. 382.
18 Macasaet v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 625, 635.
109
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19 Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 813, 825; 285 SCRA 34, 43 (1998).
20 Feliciano v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 182, 201.
21 Heirs of Dumaliang v. Serban, G.R. No. 155133, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 343, 356.
110
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dated August 1, 1995, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ORDERED (a) to vacate and surrender peaceful possession of the property to
petitioners, or pay the reasonable value of the property; (b) to pay P1,716,000.00 as reasonable
compensation for the use of the property from 1966 until the filing of the complaint and
P10,000.00 monthly rental thereafter until it vacates the property, with 12% interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid; and (c) to return to petitioners the duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-24.055 (M).
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted.
Notes.—A party’s failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
assert his right over a property warrants a presumption that he has abandoned his right or
declined to assert it. (Cleofas vs. St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., 324 SCRA 223 [2000])
It is settled that any person who occupies a land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper
remedy against him. (Pengson vs. Ocampo, Jr., 360 SCRA 420 [2001])
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. (Rodil Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 79 [2001])