Gomez vs. Palomar 25 SCRA 827, October 29, 1968
Gomez vs. Palomar 25 SCRA 827, October 29, 1968
Gomez vs. Palomar 25 SCRA 827, October 29, 1968
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CASTRO, J.:
This appeal
1
puts in issue the constitutionality of Republic
2
Act 1635, as amended by Republic Act 2631, which
provides as follows:
"To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the
Director of Posts shall order for the period from August nineteen
to September thirty every year the printing and issue of semi-
postal stamps of different denominations with face value showing
the regular postage charge plus the additional amount of five
centavos for the said purpose, and during the said period, no mail
matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-
postal stamps: Provided, That no such additional charge of f ive
centavos shall be imposed on newspapers. The additional proceeds
realized from the sale of the semi-postal stamps shall constitute a
special fund and be deposited with the National Treasury to be
expended by the Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out
its noble work to prevent and eradicate tuberculosis."
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"In the case of the f ollowing categories of mail matter and mails
entitled to f ranking privilege which are not exempted f rom the
payment of the five centavos intended for the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, such extra charge may be collected in cash,
for which official receipt (General Form No. 13, A) shall be issued,
instead of affixing the semi-postal stamp in the manner
hereinafter indicated:
831
" 'Mail under permits, metered mails and f ranked mails not
presented at the post-office window shall be affixed with the
necessary semi-postal stamps. If found in mail boxes without such
stamps, they shall be treated in the same way as herein provided
for other mails.' "
832
I.
Before reaching the merits, we deem it necessary to dispose
of the respondents' contention that declaratory relief is
unavailing because this suit was filed after the petitioner
had committed a breach of the statute. While conceding
that the mailing by the petitioner of a letter without the
additional anti-TB stamp was a violation of Republic Act
1635, as amended. the trial court nevertheless refused to
dismiss the action on the ground that under section 6 of
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, "If before the final
termination of the case a breach or violation of x x x a
statute x x x should take place, the action may thereupon
be converted into an ordinary action."
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief
is that it must be brought "before breach or violation" of the
statute has been committed. Rule 64, section 1 so provides.
Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to treat
an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action,
applies only if the breach or violation occurs after
3
the filing
of the action but before the termination thereof.
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had
been a breach of the statute before the filing of this action,
then indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be
availed of, much less can the suit be converted into an
ordinary action.
Nor is there merit in the petitioner's argument that the
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3 See 3 M. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 138 (6th ed., 1963).
833
II.
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4 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 496 (1937) ; Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955).
5 Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
6 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) : Citizens' Teleph. Co. v. Fuller, 229
U.S. 322 (1913).
7 Madden v. Kentucky, supra, note 6.
8 419 Pa. 370, 214 A. 2d 209, 214-15 (1965), appeal dismissed, Life Assur. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 348 U.S. (1966).
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VOL. 25, OCTOBER 29, 1968 837
Gomez vs. Palomar
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838
"One of the stocks was worth $30.75 a share of the face value of
$100, the other $172. The inequality of the tax, so far as actual
values are concerned, is manifest. But, here again equality in this
sense has to yield to practical considerations and usage. There
must be a f ixed and indisputable mode of ascertaining a stamp
tax. In another sense, moreover, there is equality. When the taxes
on two sales are 'equal, the same number of shares is sold in each
case; that is to say, the same privilege is used to the same extent.
Valuation is not the only thing to be considered. As was pointed
out by the court of appeals, the familiar stamp tax of 2 cents on
checks, irrespective of income or earning capacity, and many
others, illustrate the necessity 17and practice of sometimes
substituting count for weight x x x."
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17 New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 159-160 (1907).
18 Const. art. VI, sec. 23(1).
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19 See Lo Chain v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635 (1946); Rev. Adm. Code, sec.
551.
840
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have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue but, also,
the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental
6
law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction."
Nonetheless, the admonition of Cooley, specially
addressed to inferior tribunals, must even be kept in mind.
Thus: "It must be evident to any one that the power to
declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will
shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due 7regard to duty and official
oath decline the responsibility."
There must be a caveat however to the above Cooley
pronouncement. Such should not be the case, to paraphrase
Freund, when the challenged legislation imperils freedom
of the mind and of the person, for given such an
undesirable situation, "it is freedom that commands a
momentum of respect." Here then, fidelity to the great ideal
of liberty enshrined in the Constitution may require the
judiciary to take an uncompromising and militant stand.
As phrased by us in a recent decision, if the liberty involved
were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard of its
validity of8 governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting."
So much for the appropriate judicial attitude. Now on
the question of awareness of the controlling constitutional
doctrines.
There is nothing I can add to the enlightening discussion
of the equal protection aspect as found in the majority
opinion. It may not be amiss to recall to mind. however. the
language
9
of Justice Laurel in the leading case of People v.
Vera, to the effect that the basic individual right of equal
protection "is a restraint on all the three grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate
instru-
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843
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10 Ibid, 125.
11 Nashville, C. & St. L. Railway v. Browning, 84 L ed 1254, 1258
(1940).
12 Tigner v. Texas, 84 L. ed. 1124, 1128 (1940).
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