Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 164748, Jan. 27, 2006

THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and DR. BENITO TUMAMAO, Schools

DivisionPresent: Superintendent of Isabela, Petitioners, Versus
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY,SR.,
represented by IGNACIA VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY, JR., SUSANA DULAY,
ADELAIDA DULAY, LUZVIMINDA DULAY and CECILIA DULAY,
Respondents.cralaw
  
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s Decision affirming the
RTC’s Decision.

FACTS:
1. The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente, owners of a parcel of land
located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela, with an area of 29,002 square meters. 

2. On August 3, 1981,
a. the Dulays executed a deed of donation

b. over a 10,000-square-meter portion of subject property; then subdivided

c. in favor of the the Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS])

and a TCT was issued represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the
Superintendent of Schools of Isabela.

d. The deed provided, among others, that the subject property is donated
with the intention for school purposes and that the donation to become
effective upon the signing of this document.

3. However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.

4. In 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal
National High School building
a. on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano.
b. sited about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses
Dulay.
 
5. In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994,
a. the spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to them
b. since the land was never used since 1981, a period of more than 13 years.
6. On August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued
Resolution No. 39
a. recognizing the right of the donors to redeem the subject property
1) because of the DECS' failure to utilize it for the intended purpose.
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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 b. It further resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer
needed the donated land because of
1) its distance from the main campus and
b. the failure to utilize the property for a long period of time.

7. On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at the age of 80.
a. His heirs wrote the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Santiago City
1) requesting the approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the
donated property.

b. However the request was denied inasmuch as the city government was not
a party to the deed of donation.

8. On August 31, 1997,

a. the heirs of Dulay, Sr., filed a complaint for
1) the revocation of the deed of donation and
2) cancellation of TCT of the donated property before the RTC against
the DECS Secretary and Dr. Benito Tumamao, the Schools Division
Superintendent.

b. The heirs alleged

a. that there was a condition in the deed of donation for the DECS, as
donee, utilize the subject property for school purposes, that is, the
construction of a building to house the Rizal National High School.

b. that the DECS did not fulfill the condition and

c. that the land remained idle up to the present.

d. that the donation inter vivos was inofficious,

1) since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than what he
could give by will.
 
The DECS, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed
the following defenses:
a. the DECS complied with said condition because the land was being used
by the school as its technology and home economics laboratory;
1) that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany
seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees;

2) the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the
construction of a school building on the subject property.

b. the donation was not inofficious for the donors were the owners of five
other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City;

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 c. the DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made
on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the
amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay Captain,
Jesus San Juan; and

d. the action of the respondents had prescribed.

In their Reply, respondents

a. denied that the donated land was being used as a technology and home
economics laboratory,
1) and that there were no improvements on the property.
2) that rice was planted on the lot was contrary to the intended purpose of
the donation.

b. They denied that the property had been sold to the barangay.

c. While the other properties of the late donor had been sold,
1) the deeds had not been registered, and
2) the tax declarations not yet transferred in the names of the purchasers.
 
On March 6, 2001, the trial ensued.
a. an ocular inspection of the property was conducted by
1) the parties and
2) their respective counsels,
3) including the Presiding Judge.

b. It was confirmed that

1) the land was barren,
2) save for a small portion which was planted with palay.
3) A demolished house was also found in the periphery of the donated lot.

On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision

a. in favor of the heirs of Dulay, the respondents.

b. DECLARED the deed of donation, executed by the late Rufino

Dulay, Sr. and his wife Ignacia Vicente REVOKED.

c. ORDERED the DECS to execute the deed of reconveyance in favor

of the plaintiffs heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.
 
  In revoking the deed of donation, the trial court ruled that
a. the donation was subject to a resolutory condition, namely,
1) that the land donated shall be used for school purposes.

b. It was no longer necessary to determine the intended 'school purpose

because it was established that the donee did not use the land.

c. Moreover, the DECS did not intend to use the property for school purposes
because
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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 1) a school had already been built and established in another lot located in
the same barangay,

2) about two kilometers away from the subject land.

d. Finally, the trial court rejected petitioners' contention that the donation
was inofficious.
 
9. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
a. On July 30, 2004,
1) the CA rendered judgment affirming the lower court’s decision.

3) The CA held
a. that the DECS failed to comply with the condition in the donation,
to use the property for school purposes;

b. that the donation was onerous considering that

1) the donee was burdened with the obligation
a) to utilize the land for school purposes;

2) therefore, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 764

of the New Civil Code did not apply.

c. that a deed of donation is considered a written contract and

1) is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code,
which provides for a 10-year prescriptive period

2) from the time the cause of action accrues.

3) the respondents' cause of action for the revocation of the donation

should be reckoned
a) from the expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the DECS
to comply with what was incumbent upon it.
 
b. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA
denied.
 
c. Petitioners seeked relief from the SC via petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DECS complied with the conditions imposed on the
Deed of Donation.

2. Whether or not the heirs of Dulay has the right to seek the revocation of
the Deed of Donation, if any, is already barred by prescription and
laches.
 

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
HELD:

The Court shall resolve the issues raised by petitioners seriatim.

 
1. The donee failed to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of
donation.

2. The issue of whether or not petitioner DECS was able to comply with the
condition imposed in the deed of donation is one of fact.

There is a question of fact when

a. the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts

b. or when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence

considering mostly
1) the credibility of witnesses,

2) existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,

a) their relation to each other and
b) to the whole and probabilities of the situation.

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

a. only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari, for the simple reason that
1) this Court is not a trier of facts.

2) It is not for the Court to calibrate the evidence on record,

a) as this is the function of the trial court.

b. Although there are well-defined exceptions to the rule,

1) nevertheless, after a review of the records, we find no justification to
depart therefrom.

2) Moreover, the
a) trial court's findings of facts,
b) as affirmed by the CA on appeal, are binding on this Court,

unless
a. the trial and appellate courts
1) overlooked,
2) misconstrued or
3) misinterpreted
a) facts and
b) circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would change the outcome of the case.

The case has been reviewed thoroughly, and we find no justification to

reverse the CA decision.

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
Petitioners, through the OSG, maintain that
a. the condition (to use the property for school purposes)
1) is not limited to the construction of a school building,

2) but includes utilizing it as a technology and home economics laboratory

where students and teachers plant palay, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-
bearing trees.

b. that the donee did not specify in the deed that the property should be used
for the construction of a school building.

c. that the proceeds of the harvest were used and are still being used by the Rizal
National High School for
1) the construction and improvement of its present school site.

d. Moreover, it was verified that there was palay planted on the donated property
during the ocular inspection on the property.
 
In the respondent’s comment on the petition, they dispute petitioners'
contentions, and aver that
a. no evidence was presented to prove that, indeed, palay, mahogany
seedlings and fruit-bearing trees were planted on the property.

b. that when the trial court inspected the subject property, it was discovered to be
1) barren and
2) without any improvement
3) although some portions thereof were planted with palay.

c. Petitioners even failed to adduce evidence to identify the person who planted
the palay.

The contention of petitioners has no merit.

1. As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove
a. that the donated property was used for school purposes
b. as indicated in the deed of donation:

other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants,

a. there is nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the condition
of donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants.

b. the planting of palay can hardly be considered

1) and could not be the school purposes referred to and intended by the
donors when they had donated the land in question.

2. The defendant-appellants’ claim that the land donated is being used as

technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School
is far from being the truth considering that
a. not only is the said school located two kilometers away from the land
donated

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 b. but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land donated
that would reasonably indicate that, classes have been conducted therein.

3. These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report

made by the trial court conclude that the defendant-appellants have failed to
comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.
 
4. In its Order dated March 6, 2001, the RTC reiterated that during the ocular
inspection of the property, it observed that
a. 'the land was barren;
b. there were no improvements on the donated property
c. though a portion was planted with palay
d. and a demolished house built in 1979.
 
5. Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that the
palay found in the property was planted by
a. DECS personnel or
b. at its instance or
c. even by students of the Rizal National High School.

6. No evidence was adduced to prove that

a. there were existing plans to use the property for school purposes.

7. Petitioners even debilitated their cause

a. when they claimed in the trial court that the barangay acquired the property
by purchase,

b. relying on the certification of former Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.

 
The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed when
respondents filed their complaint
1. We reject the contention of the OSG that the respondents' cause of action
is already barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
a. or four years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed of
donation.

b. Such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for
school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988
1) when the DECS utilized another property for the construction of the
school building,

2) the four-year prescriptive period did not commence on such date.

c. Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply with the condition,
and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage.

d. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous

1) because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize
the land donated for school purposes.
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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code,
1) a donation with an onerous cause
2) is essentially a contract and
3) is thus governed by the rules on contract.

We fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court:

xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive period
for the revocation of donation provided under Article 764 of the New
Civil Code and instead apply the general rules on contracts since
Article 733 of the same Code, specifically provided that onerous
donations shall be governed by the rules on contracts.
 
Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written
contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from
a written contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action
accrues.In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of action is
from the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply
with the conditions or obligations of the donation.In the instant case,
however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period
within which the donee can comply with the condition of donation.As
such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary.Said
article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.Indeed, from the
nature and circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it
can be inferred that a period was contemplated by the donors.The
donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a very
long period of time when, in fact, they specifically obliged the
defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated for school purposes
and thus put it in good use. xxx
 
cralawIn Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, a case squarely in
point, we have established that the legal possibility of bringing the action begins
with the expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the donee to fulfill what has
been charged upon it by the donor.Likewise, we held that even if Article 1197 of
the New Civil Code provides that the courts may fix the duration when the
obligation does not determine the period but from its nature and circumstances it
can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule cannot be applied
because to do so would be a mere technicality and would serve no other purpose
than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of
suits.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
cralawAltogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of
donation.Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the purpose specified in the
deed of donation.The property remained barren and unutilized. Even after
respondents sought the return of the property before the courts, petitioner DECS
still failed to draw up plans to use the property for school purposes.In fine,

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
petitioner DECS has no use for the property; hence, the same shall be reverted to
the respondents.
 
cralawWHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 dated July 30, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748
 
SO ORDERED.
 
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.cralaw
Associate Justice
 
 
 

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1. Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay Sr., GR No `64748