Villanueva - v. - Judicial - and - Bar - Council

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.]
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC,

Compostela-New Bataan, Compostela Valley Province,
petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J : p
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this

Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory
Relief 1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring
five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On
September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13,
Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter 2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment,
Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in
the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner
sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-
inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of
applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a
letter 3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly
noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the
list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening
the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent
judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and
since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was
excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this
Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed
the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the
JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process
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clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates
the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the
requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557 5 should not be merely directory and should be
fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the
position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already
complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution 6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC
7 and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 8 separately submitted their
Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they
essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed
policy does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They
posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent
the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and
declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right
that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five
years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is
performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation of due
process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five
years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary
to first determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The
present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65." 9 As discussed in the case of Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., 10
this Court explained that:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text
of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. 11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the
process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of
guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is
necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by
virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides
that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. 12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through
its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the
matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner
in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper
because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of
candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in
the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. 13 The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of
the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
not a discretionary one. 14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance
of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was
what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC
to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of
the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary
may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates
depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus:
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create
an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or
accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to
subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and
to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in
the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in
the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses the
constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process
would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and
the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the
constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the list of candidates is
subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of
nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is
not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the
conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional
appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second
level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right
to a promotion to second-level courts. 15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not
properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of
sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties'
rights or duties thereunder." 16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach." 17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he
failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in
the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in
the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not
a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been
affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this
Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved. 18 The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC
pursuant to Section 19 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691. 20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction
over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside
procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to
recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC
in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter
as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude
the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies
to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that
the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out
its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree
of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus,
the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration
of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of
uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of
him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy
applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the
function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis
to screen applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a
vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the
applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction;
what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end. 21
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification
of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary." 22 "The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the
right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid." 23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and
its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence. 24 "To ensure the fulfillment of these
standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen
aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees
submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment.
In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more
importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified." 25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of
years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition.
The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven
competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors. The
difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least
five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand,
was rationalized by JBC as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls
squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is
bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for
applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity
and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-
level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court,
is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution.
Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is
merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring
that a member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been
judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for
promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a
judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure.
Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in
place improved procedures and an efficient case management system,
adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the
integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion.
To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a
"record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the
soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and
strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy
of promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to
assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the
bench. 26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only
factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be
appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither
automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The
applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on
their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was
arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist
between lower court judges with five year experience and those with less
than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on
the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended
to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is
valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).
The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus,
the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not
be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch
of the government. 27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, 28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-
level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are
intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and
effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of
publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. 29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed
policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if
it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their
staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof
that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the
Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and
listed the guidelines in determining competence, independence, integrity and
probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have
at least five years of experience as an RTC judge, thus:
RULE 9 — SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A
VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. — In addition to the foregoing
guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating the
merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and
Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of
experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he has
in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia,
impressive scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar
examinations, excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and
independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for
three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and
excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been
duly published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general
circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal
rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published.
Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining
competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should have
amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009
and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the
RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute
should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-
year requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision
requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not
prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the
petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial
vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC. 30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the
completion of the prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or
promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition,
being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC
unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed
policy violates the constitutional provision under social justice and human
rights for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment
opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for appointment
to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons, wish to
apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a
judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is central
in the administration of justice . . . . Applicants who meet the
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the
competition and rigorous screening and selection process. They must
submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and discretion of
respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and
selecting candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all applicants
who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the
questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. 31
(Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established
a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The
petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of RTC
judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be
selected and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is
subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who
shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list of
applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the
petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to
meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of
an injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for,
screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to
the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perform
such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues
various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of
applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the
rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified
applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an
exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should
have been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they
could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless there are
good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering
with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the latter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Court, however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the
publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of
experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial
and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Sereno, * C.J., took no part.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also join the concurring opinion of
Justice Brion.
Brion, J., see concurring opinion.
Peralta, J., I join the opinion of J. Brion.
Villarama, Jr., ** J., is on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, *** J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion
Separate Opinions
BRION, J, concurring:
I concur with the majority's ruling to dismiss the petition and with the
directive to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). I am filing this Separate
Concurring Opinion, however, to reflect my own views on the confluence of
the Court's exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC and its
expanded jurisdiction in determining grave abuse of discretion on the part of
governmental entities and agencies.
Before us is Ferdinand Villanueva's ( Villanueva or petitioner) petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC or respondent) action of excluding him from the list of candidates for the
vacancies in the following Regional Trial Courts: Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
In taking cognizance of Villanueva's petition, the majority applied the
Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
and explained that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are both
available to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 1
A very recent case before this Court involving the JBC (which the
ponencia cited in its earlier draft) is Jardeleza v. Sereno, 2 where the Court, for
the first time since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, nullified an action
by the JBC. In so doing, the Court exercised both its expanded jurisdiction to
review acts of government agencies amounting to grave abuse of discretion,
and its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC.
In Jardeleza, the JBC's act of selectively applying its own rules, which
resulted in the violation of the petitioner (now Justice) Francis Jardeleza's due
process rights, both amounted to a grave abuse of discretion and to a
cause that triggered the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC.
The JBC's grave abuse of discretion necessarily called for the Court's duty to
supervise the JBC — under the circumstances of that case — to make sure that
it would follow its own rules.
Unlike the selective application of the JBC's own rules in Jardeleza, the
JBC's assailed actions in the present case were in accord with the policies it
had long laid down. The application of this policy, according to the Villanueva
petition, violated the Constitution as it disregarded the enumeration of
qualifications of members of the judiciary under Article VIII, Section 7;
violated as well his due process and equal protection rights; and are contrary
to the socio-economic provisions in Article XIII, Section 3.
A reading of Villanueva's allegations shows that he properly alleged that
the JBC committed grave abuse of discretion, but he ultimately failed to prove
his claims. As the majority eventually held, the JBC acted within its power to
prescribe its own policies as part, and in the course, of determining the
constitutional qualifications required of every member of the bench. I agree
with the majority's approach and thus maintain that it properly took
cognizance of the Villanueva petition.
In acting as it did, the Court — while acting pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction (by testing for grave abuse of discretion and finding none) —
effectively and subsequently acted pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over
the JBC. That the Court so acted is not improper as the petition in fact also
validly invoked the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
under its allegations. Note that the petition called for the determination of
whether the JBC's policy contravened constitutional precepts.
In other words, the present petition prima facie claimed the commission
of grave abuse of discretion by the JBC to sufficiently trigger the Court's
expanded jurisdiction. No grave abuse however or any "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment," as claimed, was found. But at the same
time, the allegations likewise brought into question the JBC's actions, which
actions are within the power of the Court to direct under its constitutional
supervisory power over the JBC.
Notably, the Court, in examining whether Villanueva's right to due
process had been violated, ruled that the JBC's failure to publish its policy of
requiring five years of service to qualify for a lower court judge position did
not rise to the level of a grave abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the majority
held that, under the circumstances, these policies should have been published;
it further directed the JBC to publish policies or guidelines that it is or will be
implementing, subject to the approval of the Court.
I agree with the majority's conclusion and directive, and note that the
publication of the JBC's policies is in line with its thrust to "to insure
transparency in its proceedings and promote stability and uniformity in its
guiding precepts and principles," 3 as well as with the Constitutional policy to
promote transparency in government processes. 4
Lest the thrust and full import of the Court's present ruling be lost, let
me stress that the present case gives us the opportunity to address important
questions left unaddressed by the Court's recent ruling in Jardeleza:
May the Court exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over
the JBC separate from the exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction over acts of grave abuse of discretion of
government agencies?
If so, what remedy is available for parties wishing to
secure redress under this legal situation and how can this
remedy be availed of?
To fully address these questions, it is crucial to first fully understand the
nature of certiorari before and after the 1987 Constitution and how the Court
has been using this remedy.
A. Certiorari under the 1987 Constitution
Our use of the remedy of certiorari has evolved and expanded along
with the development of constitutional litigation under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court — in giving due course to (or dismissing) public interest
petitions brought before it — has breathed life to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, an innovation that eventually
has been labeled as its "expanded jurisdiction." At the same time, it
continues to adhere to the practice of judicial review embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1 or what, for clarity, I refer to as the Court's
"traditional jurisdiction."
The Court's exercise of its traditional jurisdiction is rooted in its power of
judicial review which gives the Court the authority to strike down acts of the
legislative and/or executive, constitutional bodies or administrative agencies
that are contrary to the Constitution. The power of judicial review is
part and parcel of the Court's judicial power and is a power
inherent in all courts. 5
To be successfully mounted, the petition before the Court must be
embodied in an actual case, and the following requirements must be complied
with: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. 6
Remedies used to invoke judicial review under the Court's traditional
jurisdiction include declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition. These
remedies mirror the nature of the traditional concept of judicial review — i.e.,
that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a law or act of government
must be within the context of an actual case or controversy brought before
the courts. Thus, the requirements for filing an action for declaratory relief 7
echo the requisites for an actual case or controversy, similarly with certiorari
and prohibition which historically developed as petitions to assail judicial or
quasi-judicial acts and which effectively confine these remedies to errors of
jurisdiction involving adjudicatory functions.
Note, at this point, that the enumeration of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction under Section 5, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution
refers to the exercise of its traditional jurisdiction. The enumeration of what
may be reviewed by the Court all refer to cases, with reference to the
traditional jurisdiction of settling actual cases or controversies under
Section 1, Article VIII, viz.:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(emphases supplied)
The modes by which these cases may reach the Supreme Court for
review are either through an appeal of errors involving questions of law or
questions of law and facts (via a petition for review on certiorari), or
through a petition for certiorari assailing errors of jurisdiction.
Thus, certiorari under Section 5, paragraph 2 refers to a recourse under
the traditional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as provided under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
At the same time, the Court has recognized and acted on the basis of its
expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, albeit not explicitly at first. Thus, we have cases where
the Court, recognizing its duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the
part of governmental agencies or entities, reviewed acts that are neither
judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature. Notably, the procedural media used in
invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction have been petitions for certiorari,
or prohibition. 8 This practice reflects the wording of Section 1, paragraph 2,
which does not limit the determination of grave abuse of discretion to quasi-
judicial or judicial acts, but to any act involving the exercise of discretion on
the part of the government. 9
A distinctive feature in these developments is the strong correlation
between the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction, and its relaxation of
the requirements for actual case or controversies. 10 The Court relaxes the
requirements for judicial review when the petition raises matters of
transcendental importance. That a matter is of transcendental importance
tempers the standing requirement for judicial review, which in turn, indirectly
relaxes the presence of an actual case or controversy itself.
Amidst these jurisprudential developments, the Rules of Court
has remained static; its express terms remained confined to the courts'
exercise of traditional jurisdiction over judicial or quasi-judicial acts. Yet the
Court unhesitatingly used the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to enforce
its power and to undertake its duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the government. Thereby, the Court effectively relaxed the rules
on certiorari, notably by allowing its use in the review of acts of government
that are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. 11
It is in this latter sense that the majority in Jardeleza and in the present
case allowed the use of certiorari to determine whether there had been grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC. As I emphasized in my Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino, 12 a prima facie showing of grave
abuse of discretion is both sufficient and necessary to trigger the Court's
expanded jurisdiction, in the same way that an actual case or controversy is
necessary to invoke the Court's traditional power of judicial review. In cases
that successfully invoked the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the transcendental
importance of the public issue presented by the petition likewise relaxed the
standing requirement (such that a Filipino citizen, by virtue of his citizenship,
possesses the standing to question a governmental act). The prima facie
showing of a grave abuse of discretion, on the other hand, takes
the place of the actual case or controversy requirement in the
traditional concept of judicial review.
The present petition, as earlier mentioned, successfully alleged the
commission of grave abuse of discretion, but the allegation, on deeper
consideration, was not grave nor serious enough to trigger the Court's
expanded jurisdiction. Unlike in Jardeleza where the JBC violated its own rules
thereby gravely abusing its discretion, the JBC's action in the present petition
was actually in accordance with its policy, which policy is within its power to
formulate. That this policy later turns out not to be a "grave" abuse of
discretion translates to the petitioner's failure to prove that he is entitled to
redress under the Court's expanded jurisdiction. This legal conclusion,
however, does not render the JBC fully immune to the Court scrutiny
as the claimed transgression may also open or trigger a parallel and
separate constitutionally granted Court action — the Court's
supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC.
B. Supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
Article VIII, Section 8 (1) and (5) provide that "A Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court. . . It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to
it."
Supervision, as a legal concept, has been defined as the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. 13 The Constitution's use of the concept of "supervision" carries various
significations that should not be missed.
First, the JBC is a body subordinate to the Supreme Court although
the Chief Justice who is primus inter pares within the Court also heads the
JBC as its ex officio Chair.
Second, the Court's power of supervision over the JBC gives the Court
the power to ensure that the law or the rules governing the conduct of the
JBC are followed.
And third, the Court as the supervising entity merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but it does not, by itself, lay down these rules, nor does it
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed,
the Court may only order the work done or redone, but only to conform to
higher applicable rules. 14
In more succinct terms, the Court's supervisory authority over the JBC
involves ensuring that the JBC's actions are in accord with the Constitution, as
well as with its own rules. Thus, when there are allegations regarding the
JBC's non-compliance with the Constitution or its own rules, especially when
it comes from an applicant who is in the position to know of these infirmities,
then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty
to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with the laws
applicable to it.
B.1 The Court's supervisory
jurisdiction over the JBC is
general, and not limited to
administration
That the Court's supervisory authority extends beyond mere
administrative supervision is beyond question.
Administrative supervision involves overseeing the operations of
agencies to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically, but without interference with day-to-day activities. 15 In
contrast, general supervision involves ensuring that the agency supervised
follows their functions, directing them to redo their actions should these be
contrary to law.
Textually, nothing in the 1987 Constitution limits the Court to the
exercise of mere administrative powers over the JBC when called for. Section
8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
the private sector for one year.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for
the Council.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 8, Article VIII clearly grants to the Supreme Court the power and
duty of supervision over the JBC. It does not specify nor limit the Court to
administrative supervision over the JBC, but couches the grant of power to the
Court in general terms, i.e., "supervision."
When the Constitution used the general term "supervision" over the
JBC, it meant to grant the Court general supervision, for had it meant to limit
the Court to administrative supervision, or to the JBC's administration, then it
could have used these words to convey this concept. Even the Administrative
Code, which provides definitions of administrative relationships, recognizes
the need for a law to specify its intent to limit the supervising authority's to
administrative supervision, by making the function of administration a part of
supervision, viz.:
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific
law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word
"supervision" shall encompass administrative supervision as defined in
this paragraph. 16
Otherwise stated, when a law grants a government agency supervision
over another agency, it automatically includes administrative supervision.
Thus, if an agency merely exercises administrative authority over another,
this should be specified in the law granting it.
Additionally, the Court, has, in the past, exercised its general supervision
over the JBC. In In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta (Valenzuela), 17 for instance, the Court
en banc motu proprio decided to resolve the issue of whether the election ban
applies to the Judiciary in lieu of the constitutional questions raised by the
JBC's attempts to continue its deliberations in order to transmit a list of
nominees to the President despite the ban. In a Resolution ordering the
interested parties (none of whom raised a petition before the Court) to submit
a comment regarding the matter, the Court en banc instructed the JBC to
defer any action over the appointments pending the Court's resolution of the
election ban issue.
The Court's acts in Valenzuela can hardly be described as administrative
supervision. In Valenzuela, the Court en banc found that the JBC's actions
could violate the Constitution and thus instructed its members to defer its
deliberations and to desist from transmitting any list of nominees to the
President until the Court en banc had resolved the constitutional question. The
C ou rt en banc initiated the determination of the constitutional question
without any interested party filing a petition for its resolution; from this
unique perspective, the Court's action was an exercise of its power to ensure
that the JBC performed its functions in accordance with the law, i.e., its power
of general supervision over the JBC.
The Court, after considering the pleadings filed by interested parties in
Valenzuela, decided to annul appointments that violated the constitutional
prohibition on the election ban. This Court action no longer involved an
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, but had spilled over into its expanded
jurisdiction to annul acts of grave abuse of discretion, which according to
Valenzuela, violated the Constitution. Interestingly, the Court distinguished
this ruling from de Castro v. JBC 18 with respect to appointments to vacancies
in the Supreme Court. The fine distinctions raised, however, do not negate the
fact that the Court exercised acts of general supervision over the JBC in
Valenzuela.
The distinction between the Court's exercises of its power of supervision
over the JBC and its expanded jurisdiction over all government agencies is
important, lest we be accused of exceeding our own jurisdiction and meddling
with the exclusive affairs of an independent constitutional body.
To reiterate, the Court, as an aspect of its supervisory power, can direct
the JBC to defer or stop its actions and to redo them, should it be necessary to
comply with the Constitution. We have, in the past, exercised our supervisory
jurisdiction when we instructed the JBC in Valenzuela to defer its proceedings
pending the resolution of a constitutional question; directed the JBC to review
its rules in Jardeleza v. Sereno; 19 and now, directed the JBC to publish its own
rules.
In contrast, the Court, as an aspect of its expanded jurisdiction, has
annulled acts that violate the Constitution: the Court did this when it
annulled the appointments made by the President in violation of the election
ban in Valenzuela; and when it annulled the application of the Rule 10,
Section 2 of the JBC Rules to Justice Francis H. Jardeleza in Jardeleza v. Sereno.
Note at this point, that the independent character of a
constitutional body does not remove it from the Court's jurisdiction.
The Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, Commission on Civil
Service and the Office of the Ombudsman are all independent constitutional
bodies — and none of them can invoke their independence as a means to
avoid judicial review, more so when their assailed acts involve grave abuse of
discretion.
Additionally, the Court's general supervision over the JBC is in line with
its constitutionally-bestowed discretion to assign additional functions and
duties to the JBC.
This grant of discretion empowers the Court to direct the JBC to redo its
acts that are contrary to law. To be sure, the Court's power to assign duties to
the JBC as an aspect of general supervision over it does not grant the Court
the power to substitute its discretion over the JBC; the Court, in exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC, can at most direct it to redo their actions
that are contrary to the law or to the Constitution.
Lastly, that the Court has issued A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC or A Resolution
Strengthening The Role and Capacity of the Judicial and Bar Council and
Establishing the Offices Therein, which acknowledges the Chief Justice's
administrative authority of the JBC, does not contradict the Court's power of
general supervision over it. First, the Constitution recognizes the Chief Justice
as the JBC's ex officio chair, implying her administrative authority over the
JBC. A.M. No. 03-11-16-SC merely affirms this provision in the Constitution.
Second, the Court's administrative authority over the JBC does not rule out
its power to supervise it, and may, as illustrated in the Administrative Code,
be construed as an aspect of general supervision.
B.2 The Court's supervisory
jurisdiction as applied in the
present case
The current petition questions the JBC's policies for having violated the
Constitution but not at the level where these policies have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. As the majority eventually held, these policies are
in accord with the JBC's powers to determine whether applicants possess the
requirements for members of the bench. The majority, however, noted that
these policies should be published, and issued a directive to this effect.
To arrive at this conclusion, however, the Court must necessarily wear
its supervisory hat to determine whether the JBC's actions had been in accord
with the Constitution and relevant laws.
In this regard, I ask: is the Court, in exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction over the JBC, limited to the examination of acts alleged
to have been committed with grave abuse of discretion?
The Court is not and cannot be so limited under the terms of
the 1987 Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 8 — the provision for the Court's supervision over
the JBC — is separate and more specific than the general grave abuse of
discretion provision under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, this supervisory authority, as a separate and more specific grant of
power, may be invoked and exercised separately from the Court's traditional
and expanded jurisdictions.
In the present case, I believe that what we ultimately undertook, based
on the conclusion we arrived at, was an exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction
over the JBC, made as a parallel power in the course of acting pursuant to our
expanded jurisdiction. From the prism of a petition for certiorari, we yet again
relaxed our rules when we allowed the use of the petition for another power
of the Court; we allowed the use of certiorari to invoke the Court's
supervisory jurisdiction.
In these lights, the Court should neither be hesitant nor timid in
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC, without encroaching on
their prerogative to determine whether applicants to the judiciary
possess the characteristics that the Constitution requires of each
member of the bench.
I believe, too, that this active Court role is necessary in light of the
recent cases brought before us and the issues that they presented. But the
Court's approach should be made very clear, particularly when a certiorari
would be the medium used, to avoid confusing the traditional, the expanded,
and the supervisory occasions in invoking the Court's jurisdiction.
To reiterate, the Court's power of supervision over the JBC is a power
granted distinctly and separately from the Court's traditional judicial review
and expanded jurisdiction powers. Thus, the exercise of supervision does not
need to be limited to instances where there is a prima facie showing of grave
abuse of discretion (as in petitions invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction).
Neither should it be exercised only in conjunction with the Court's judicial
power to settle actual cases or controversies.
To forestall confusion in the future, the rules in this regard should be
very clear, particularly on when and how the Court's supervisory power over
the JBC may be invoked. Because the Court's power is independently granted,
recourse to the Court based on its duty to supervise should not be confined to
highly exceptional circumstances of grave abuse of discretion or as an adjunct
of adjudication.
Note, too, that we exercised our power of supervision over the JBC when
the Court's majority in Jardeleza recommended that a review of its rules be
made in light of the due process rights violations in that case. This was a
review of the JBC's quasi-legislative power and was a distinct act of
supervision separate from the exercise of our expanded jurisdiction to nullify
the grave abuse of discretion the JBC committed when it applied the
unanimity rule against Jardeleza.
As a final point, the recent cases involving the JBC has shown us that its
exercise of discretion is not infallible, and that it can commit errors that
violate the Constitution, or even its own rules. These abuses, no matter how
well-intentioned, should not be left unchecked, and the Court, as the body
tasked with supervisory authority over the JBC, should open up and clarify the
avenues by which these JBC errors may be remedied. The power to take part
in the President's power to appoint judicial officers is too important to be
hindered by mere technicalities and should be closely safeguarded.
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur in the dismissal of the Petition.

The Petition should be dismissed as it is procedurally infirm and fails to
establish petitioner's right to be nominated to a judicial post.
I
A writ of mandamus, certiorari, or prohibition cannot be issued against
the Judicial and Bar Council or can it be the subject of a petition for declaratory
relief absent a clear and convincing case of grave abuse of discretion.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
mandamus may be availed to compel the performance of a duty, or to compel
the inclusion of a person in the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
the inclusion of a person in the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he or she is entitled. The provision states:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or
at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the respondent.
In particular, the remedy of mandamus requires the performance of a
ministerial duty:
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused,
on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other. 1 (Citations omitted)
Although petitioner filed, among others, a petition for mandamus, his
prayer does not seek the performance by the Judicial and Bar Council of a
specific ministerial act. In particular, he prays that:
[p]ending resolution of this Petition, a temporary Restraining
order, and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued compelling Public
Respondents to refrain from disqualifying the Petitioner and all other
Judges similarly situated with the petitioner in their present or future
application for second level courts (RTC Judges) and to include the
petitioner as applicants in the above mentioned RTCs and go through
the process of selection and evaluation[.] 2
It can be inferred from his prayer that petitioner seeks to compel the
Judicial and Bar Council to include him in the list of applicants for the vacant
positions in the Regional Trial Courts. In my dissenting opinion in Jardeleza v.
Judicial and Bar Council: 3
[t]he determination by the Judicial and Bar Council of the
qualifications and fitness of applicants for positions in the judiciary is not
a ministerial duty. It is constitutionally part of its discretion. Mandamus
cannot compel the amendment of any list already transmitted, and it
cannot be made available to compel the Council to transmit a name not
in the original list.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council clarifies a unique instance
when mandamus lies against the Council. This is with respect only to the
constitutional duty to allow the President the mandatory 90 days to
make an appointment. Thus:
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees
before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the
candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted
to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The
object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only
refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of
nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in
order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus
to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to
the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President. 4
(Emphasis supplied)
A writ of certiorari or prohibition cannot also be issued against the
Judicial and Bar Council as the remedy of certiorari can only be used against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions while
the remedy of prohibition can only be used against any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.
Rule 65, Section 1 and Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure state:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Emphasis supplied)
The ponencia correctly stated that "[i]n the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the [Judicial and Bar Council] neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative." 5
The functions of the Judicial and Bar Council are neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial in nature. It does not perform "adjudicatory functions such that
its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court." 6 The exercise by the Judicial and Bar Council
of its constitutional duty is also not a ministerial act by which it may be
restrained from performing.
The relief sought by petitioner cannot also be the subject of an action for
declaratory relief. Under Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
petition for declaratory relief may be filed before the Regional Trial Court by
one "whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation[.]"
The ponencia correctly stated that "no person possess[es] a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial
positions." 7 The Constitution does not grant to any person the right to be
nominated when he or she qualifies. The Judicial and Bar Council is given by
the Constitution the full discretion on the selection and qualification of the
nominees for judicial office. There are no rights adjudicated in the Judicial and
Bar Council's selection process.
It is also settled that this court does not have original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council , 8 this
court previously encountered a petition for declaratory relief for this court to
interpret Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the Constitution. This court, in ruling
that the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief, stated the following:
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and
construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition
should properly be considered as that which would result in the
adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief
to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document
sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the
petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the
petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the
original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
II
The only exception to the use of Rule 65 is when this court's power of
judicial review due to a constitutional violation is raised. While expansive, the
exercise of this power is subject to limitations: "(1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case." 10
In Prof. David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo: 11
[a]n actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right,

an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interest"; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.
12

Petitioner has no legally vested right to a nomination in an application
before the Judicial and Bar Council. The relief he requests cannot be granted
since there is nothing in the Constitution that gives this court the power to
order the Judicial and Bar Council to nominate him. There is no actual case or
controversy that merits this court's power of review.
III
The zeal that characterizes the vigilance of petitioner to protect his
constitutional right against unequal protection of the laws is commendable
but unfortunately misplaced.
The five-year requirement imposed by the Judicial and Bar Council for
first-level court judges before they can be considered for another tier is
reasonable. This same requirement cannot be imposed on applicants from the
public service, private practice, or the academe simply because they are not
from a judicial service. This does not mean, however, that there is no
requirement or any consideration made by the Judicial and Bar Council that is
equivalent or more stringent. We cannot assume that a constitutional body
tasked to determine the fitness, competence, integrity, and independence of
those that seek to serve in our branch of government will be less dedicated to
its task when screening these applicants.
At the very least, petitioner has not shown clearly and convincingly that
the burden that he imagines he bears has no equivalent to other applicants
who are not similarly situated. Certainly, any petitioner who raises the
constitutionality of an act of a constitutional organ tasked to discharge its
duties bears the burden of showing that his claims are fully grounded.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition.
Footnotes
* No part.
** On Official Leave.
*** On Leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Section 10. As soon as PHILJA shall have been fully organized with the
composition of its Corps of Professorial Lecturers and other personnel, only
participants who have completed the programs prescribed by the Academy
and have satisfactorily complied with all the requirements incident thereto
may be appointed or promoted to any position or vacancy in the Judiciary.
5. AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, DEFINING ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
6. Rollo, p. 28.
7. Id. at 40-60.
8. Id. at 68-95.
9. Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al. ,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
10. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.

11. Id.
12. Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, the Judicial and
Bar Council and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 213181,
August 19, 2014.
13. Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and
Manuel V. Fernandez v. Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and
City Council of Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014.
14. Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013,
688 SCRA 403, 424.
15. Rollo, pp. 57-58.
16. Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al. , 616 Phil. 177, 186 (2009).
17. Hon. Quisumbing, et al. v. Gov. Garcia, et al. , 593 Phil. 655, 674 (2008).
18. See Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206794, November 27, 2013, 710 SCRA 608, 618.
19. Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
xxx xxx xxx
20. AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980". Approved on
March 25, 1994.
21. Supra note 10.
22. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial, 630 Phil. 599, 609 (2010).
23. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 419.
24. CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 7 (3) states:
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

25. Supra note 12.
26. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
27. Administrative Code, Book VII (Administrative Procedure) provides:
Section 1. Scope. — This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the
next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating
exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole,
and state universities and colleges.
28. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Judicial Department states:

Section 8. — A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court . . . .
29. Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535 (1986).
30. Supra note 12.

31. Rollo, pp. 86-87.
BRION, J, concurring:
1. Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209827, July 1, 2014.
2. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.

3. Whereas clause of JBC-009 provides:
WHEREAS, while the Council has been applying similar criteria in its assessment of
candidates to the judicial office or the Ombudsman or deputy Ombudsman,
there is a need to put these criteria in writing to insure transparency in
its proceedings and promote stability and uniformity in its guiding
precepts and principles;
4. See, for instance, the following provisions:
Article III, Section 7

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. — Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
Article VI, Section 16, par. 4
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Article VI, Section 20
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Article VI, Section 21

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure . The rights of persons appearing in,
or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Article XI, Section 17
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath
of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers
of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
5. As the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-157 (1936)
said:
. . . The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine

the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution.
6. Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1,
35; and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003).
7. Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar
Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or

remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of
the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (1a, R64)
8. See, for instance, the recent cases where the Court exercised its expanded
jurisdiction: Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. v. Honorable Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013;
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819,
April 8, 2014; Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III, et
al., GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
9. See the discussion on the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of the Court in
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910 (2003),
viz.:
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari
jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored
in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx xxx xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past,
but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set
up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence,
certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question. 35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
10. See the ponencia's discussion of the transcendental importance doctrine in
Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17,
2010, 615 SCRA 666, 722-728.
11. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198, 230-233.
12. Supra note 1.
13. More often than not, supervision is defined in relation with the concept of
control. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, 568 Phil. 658, 715 we defined
"supervision" as follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned
task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty,
but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties," if the
duties are not being performed because of JBC's fault or inaction, or
because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard
that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and
duties — a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely
supervisory.
14. In Hon. Dadole v. COA, 441 Phil. 532, 543-544, citing Drilon v. Lim, 336 SCRA
201, 214-215, we have further discussed the difference between control and
supervision. "Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their
discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even
decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover
such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they
may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.
They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed."
15. See the definition of Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2,

Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code:
(2) Administrative Supervision. — (a) Administrative supervision which shall govern
the administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and
regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be
limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference
with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause
the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to
determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses
and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them;
16. Section 38, paragraph 2 (c), Chapter 7, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code.
17. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.

18. G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
19. Supra note 2.
LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay, et al., 595 Phil. 305, 326 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
2. Petition, pp. 15-16.
3. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/213181.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc].
4. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
213181, August 19, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/213181_leonen.pdf> 21 [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc], citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al. , 629
Phil. 629, 706 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

5. Ponencia, p. 4.
6. Santos v. Go, 510 Phil. 137, 148 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
7. Ponencia, p. 6.
8. G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
9. Id. at 592.
10. Id. at 593-594, citing Senate of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 522
Phil. 1, 27 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
11. 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Guttierez, En Banc].
12. Id. at 753, citing ISAGANI CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 259 (2002).

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.]

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC,

Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this

LEONEN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dismissal of the Petition.

[a]n actual case or controversy involves a conﬂict of legal right,

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10. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.

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28. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Judicial Department states:

30. Supra note 12.

2. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014.

Article III, Section 7

Article VI, Section 21

The Constitution is a deﬁnition of the powers of government. Who is to determine

7. Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or

I suppose nobody can question it.

xxx xxx xxx

[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an oﬃcer to see that

15. See the deﬁnition of Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2,

17. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.

LEONEN, J., concurring:

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