Updates on the Law on Property : JUSTICE HECTOR L.

HOFILEÑA
Updates on the Law on Property
Immovable Property
By contracts, all uncontested in this case, machineries and equipments are included in the
mortgage in favor of RCBC, in the foreclosure of the mortgage and in the consequent sale on
foreclosure also in favor of petitioner.
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments is even in full accord with the
classification of such properties by the Civil Code of the Philippines as immovable property.
Thus:
Article 15. The following are immovable property:
(1) and, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(5)     Machinery, etc.
x x x x [Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation of the Philippines, 692 SCRA
438(2013)]
Movable Property
Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the  object of
appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not
enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it
may be appropriated.Following the ruling in Stochecker v. Ramirez, Business should also be
classified as personal property.Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real
properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No.
155076, January 13,2009, 576 SCRA 41)
Property of the public domain
The Regalian Doctrine  dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony, a doctrine consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and  1987 Constitutions.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required for the registration   of
lands under the Torrens system. Section 8 of CA 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been “officially delimited and classified.”
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. Yap 568 SCRA 164.
Disposition of lands of the public domain
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands
of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are
also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) he following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any
of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable
as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land
dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant
has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction,
the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary,
proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA
561(2013)]
Classification of public lands
It cannot be overemphasized that the prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to
administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to do so, namely DANR
now DENR and its two bureaus, the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry. (Republic vs.
Mendoza, Sr., 519 SCRA 203)
Alienable and Disposable Land
The certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr. , as annotated on
the subdivision plan, constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement.  It clearly
indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable  and disposable area as
early as July 18, 1925. (Republic vs. Serrano, 612 SCRA 537)
Property held by public corporations
PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily
responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation
of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with the public interest.
x         x        x 
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing
governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic stability.  These
instrumentalities perform essential public services for the common good, services that every
modern state must provide its citizens.  These instrumentalities need not be economically viable 
since the government may even subsidize their entire operation. These instrumentalities are 
not the “government-owned or controlled corporations” referred to in Section 16,  Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.”  (Republic vs. City of Parañaque, 677 SCRA 246 [2012])
Ancestral Lands
Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to
occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1,26 Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same
DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the
domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right
to build permanent structures on ancestral lands—an act of ownership that pertains to one (1)
who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title.  [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority vs. Carantes, 621 SCRA 569(2010)]
 Ownership of Expropriated property
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either  by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of
the estate or title acquired, or  any reversion to the former owner. [Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA ) vs. Heirs of  Marcelina L. Sero, 551 SCRA 633]
Accion Publiciana
Accion publiciana,  also known as accion plenaria de posesion, is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title – it refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of  one year from the accrual of  the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of thy property. (Madrid vs. Mapoy, 596
SCRA 14)
Acquisition of ownership through delivery
Actual delivery of a thing sold occurs when it is placed under the control and possession of the
vendee.  Pante claimed that he had been using the lot as a passageway, with the Church’s
permission, since 1963. After purchasing the lot in 1992, he continued using it as a passageway
until he was prevented by the spouses Rubi’s concrete fence over the lot in 1994. Pante’s use of
the lot as a passageway after the 1992 sale in his favor was a clear assertion of his right of
ownership that preceded the spouses Rubi’s claim of ownership.
Delivery of a thing sold may also be made constructively. Article 1498 of the Civil Code
states that:
“Article 498. hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.”
Under this provision, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be upheld since the contract
executed between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting the deed into a public
instrument. [The Roman Catholic Chruch vs. Pante, 669 SCRA 234(2012)]
Ownership and Certificate of Title
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title,
the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership [Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA
677(2011)]
Accession (Alluvium) 
But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.Thus, it
is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.One who claims
the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions
provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to
prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.  (New Regent Sources, Inc.  v. Tanjuatco,
Jr., G.R.No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCA 1329)
Builder in good faith
Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not  give the lessee the right
of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith – the doctrine
is that a lessee a neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the
application of Articles 448  and 546 of the Civil Code since his rights are governed by
Article 1678. (Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. vs. Nayong Filipino Foundation, 576 SCRA 655)
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession,
i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.  However, even
as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.  He must
choose one. (Briones vs. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010)
Respondent’s argument does not hold water. Since respondent’s occupation of the subject
property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the
Civil Code.  She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she
cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article
546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At the
time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession
was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person
who builds on land with the belief that she is the owner thereof. [Esmaquel vs. Coprada, 638
SCRA 428(2010)]
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the improvements on the
leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in
good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property.  Indeed, full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only
to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one’s only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to “improve” his landlord out of his
property.   [Mores vs. Yu-Go, 625 SCRA 291(2010)]
In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond its limited definition.  We
find no reason not to apply the Court’s ruling in Spouses Macasaet vs. Spouses Macasaet  In the
instant case. First, good faith is presumed  on the part of the respondent-spouses.  Second,
petitioner failed rebut this presumption.   Third, no evidence was presented to show that
petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. 
Consequently, we can validly presume that petitioner consented to the improvements being
constructed.  (Communities Cagayan, Inc. vs. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 [2012])
With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles
had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and
obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.
Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to
Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of
Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the
grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code. [Angeles vs. Pascual, 658 SCRA
23(2011)]
Accretion
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs
ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
“ART. 4. ccretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and
lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.”
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
“Art. 57. o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how
long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State
regarding property of public domain.  Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State.  [Offices of the City Mayor of Parañaque City vs. Ebio, 621
SCRA 555(2010)]
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof.  They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had
formed Lot 3998-B.  Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up riverbed
of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B
was “the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard
after it dried up”.  (Republic vs. Santos III, 685 SCRA 41 [2012]).
Dried-up Creek
Assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek, under Art. 420 and Art. 502 of the Civil
Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion  (Fernando vs. Acuna,
657 SCRZ 499)
Co-ownership
We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive
of the civil status of the registered owner.  Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership
under Article 148 of the Family Code. [Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA
702(2013)]
Co-ownership: rights of a co-owner
A co-owner cannot give valid  consent to another to build  a house on the  co-owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.  Cruz
vs. Catapang, 544 SCRA 512.
Co-ownership; Partition
The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches;   The only exception
to  the imprescriptibility  of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership.  Monteroso vs. Court of Appeals, 553 SCRA 66.
In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-ownership amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. [Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. vs.
Reyes, 626 SCRA 758(2010)]
Co-ownership and Partnership
There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.It is a
partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or
industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co-ownership share or do
not share any profits made by the use of the property held in common does not convert their
venture into a partnership. Or the sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership whether or not the persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in
the property.
Co-ownership and Partnership
This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the presence of other elements
constituting partnership is necessary, such as the clear intent to form a partnership, the existence
of a juridical personality different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom to
transfer or assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others. [Jarantilla,
Jr. vs. Jarantilla, 636 SCRA 299(2010 )]
Co-ownership; Partition
“The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the
[c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to  be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. x x x” (Emphasis supplied.) [Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677(2011)]
Fraudulent Partition
A  deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.  Such action for the
annulment of such partition,  however, must be brought within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud. (Feliciano vs. Canoza, 629 SCRA 550)
Oral partition
The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. It is not required, contrary to the
MTC’s stated reason for denying some documentary exhibits to prove partition, such as the
individual TCTs obtained by Manuel Urbano II and Cornelio Gamboa over portions they have
acquired, that the partition agreement be registered or annotated in OCT No. 48098 to be valid.
In another case, we have held that after exercising acts of ownership over their respective
portions of the contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying the existence of an oral
partition.   [Notarte vs. Notarte, 679 SCRA 378(2012)]
Condominium
In order to have a notice of assessment to be considered a lien on a condominium unit, the same
must be registered in the Registry of Deeds.  Cardinal Building Owners Association, Inc, vs.
Asset recovery and Management Corporation, 495 SCRA 103.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal
in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction
over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957. [Dazon vs. Yap, 610 SCRA 79(2010)]
As earlier stated, both the law and the Master Deed refer to utility installations as forming part of
the common areas, which reference is justified by practical considerations. Repairs to correct any
defects in the electrical wiring should be under the control and supervision of respondent to
ensure safety and compliance with the Philippine Electrical Code, not to mention security and
peace of mind of the unit owners.  (Limson vs. Wack-Wack Condominium Corp., G.R. No.
188802, February 14, 2011)
The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate dispute—the Moreno spouses were asking
for an accounting of the association dues and were questioning the manner the petitioner
calculated the dues assessed against them. These issues are alien to the first case that was
initiated by Salvacion—a third party to the petitioner-Moreno relationship—to stop the
extrajudicial sale on the basis of the lack of the requirements for a valid foreclosure sale. 
[Chateau de Banie Condominium Corporation vs. Moreno, 644 SCRA 288(2011)]
Among the obligations of FDC and FSCC to the unit owners or purchasers of FSB’s units was
the duty to provide a centralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity, and water; and to
maintain adequate fire exit, elevators, and cleanliness in each floor of the common areas of FSB.
But FDC and FSCC failed to repair the centralized air-conditioning unit of the fourth floor of
FSB despite repeated demands from Agcaoili. To alleviate the physical discomfort and adverse
effects on his work as a practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the air-
conditioning unit, he installed two window-type air-conditioners at his own expense.Also, FDC
and FSCC failed to provide water supply to the comfort room and to clean the corridors.  The
fire exit and elevator were also defective.
These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend the payment of
his monthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of addressing his valid complaints,
FDC   disconnected the electric supply of his Unit 411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate
without justification.
Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code   provides that those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.   [Fedman Development
Corporation vs. Agcaoili, (2011)]
Action to Quiet Title
If the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right
to seek  reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the  property, does not prescribe,
the reason being that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.  Aliño vs. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, 556 SCRA 139.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.   [Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation vs. Bonifacio,
651 SCRA 327(2011)]
Possession
Two elements are paramount in possession – there must be occupancy or taking and there
must be intent to possess. (So vs. Food Fest Land, Inc., 617 SCRA 5410)
Acquisition of Possession
Execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery.  It is
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. (Beatingco vs.
Gasis, 642 SCRA 539)
Actual and constructive possession
A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive
possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. [Villamar vs. Mangaoil, 669
SCRA 426(2012)]
Possession and Occupation
Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because
the law requires possession and occupation.Ong vs. Republic,  548 SCRA 160.
The law speaks of “possession and occupation”.  Possession is broader than occupation because
it includes constructive possession.  Unless, therefore, the law adds the word “occupation”,  it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Republic  vs. Enriquez,
501 SCRA 436.            
Possession  alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of  the  public domain
because the law requires possession and occupation-since these words are separated by the
conjunction ”and”, the  clear intention of the  law is not  to make one synonymous with the
other;  Possession is broader  than occupation because it includes constructive possession-when
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Mistica vs. Republic, 599 SCRA 401.
 Possession by Tolerance
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses  to comply with
such demand;  The absence of demand to vacate  precludes the Court from treating this
case, originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of the unlawful detainer, since
demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action  for unlawful detainer.  Acaylar, Jr. vs.
Harayo,  560 SCRA 624.
Right of Possessor
The purchaser’s right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and
his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right  of  possession is adverse to the
latter
Where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession
from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into
possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by
enforcing the decree. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood
Association, 587 SCRA 582. 
Usufruct
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is
only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the club’s facilities and privileges while
employed with the company. In Thomson v. Court of Appeals,20 we held that a trust arises in
favor of one who pays the purchase price of a property in the name of another, because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself.   [Sime Darby
Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Mendoza, 699 SCRA 290(2013)]
The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredo’s possession; he was
holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed
before his death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case.
Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now
rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1)
of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or
to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution.
[Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera, 696 SCRA 613(2013)]
Easement on riparian bank
Thus, the above proves that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by
law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this,
the Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that
respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are
occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents
have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land.
Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded
upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are
deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is
presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and
the local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be
achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while
the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279
(otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of
squatting in the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and
demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds.  [Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag, 693 SCRA 96(2013)]

Easement of right of way, (NPC cases)

If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary 
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and
disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent  with the
exercise of the attributes of ownership or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by
their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and
property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the
monetary equivalent of the land. National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco, 514 SCRA 674.
Because of the nature of the easement of right-of-way of National Power Corporation’s
(NAPOCOR’s) transmission lines, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite
period, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected
properties. National Power Corporation vs. Purefoods Corporation, 565 SCRA 17.
Considering the nature and the effect of the installations power lines, the limitations on the use of
the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property.  For
this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more
nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.  National Power Corporation vs.  Bongbong,
520 SCRA 290.
As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that
properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements
and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market
value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private
property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon
proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.)  (National Power Corporation  vs,
Tuazon, G.R. No. 193023, June 22, 2011)
We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation.  Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.] Compensable taking
includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands. (National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R  No.
165828, August 24, 2011)
It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land
if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his
proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are
inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of
structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death
upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.  Measured not by the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.   [Cabahug vs. National Power
Corporation, 689 SCRA 666(2013)]
    Continuous and apparent easement
A water facility constructed on a lot in a subdivision, through which the residents of the
subdivision obtain water for 30 years, constitutes a continuous and apparent easement, and a
compliance with the requisite for an open space in the subdivision.  Hence, the said lot cannot be
sold. (Liwag vs. Happy Glen Hope Homeowners Association, Inc., 675 SCRA 744 [2012])
Easement of lateral and subjacent support
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from
making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent.
However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer
necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A
judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same,
including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to
court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be
recognized and respected. (Castro vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011)
Voluntary Easement
As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement
by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.Unicourse Development
and Marketing Corp. Vs. Joseph Chung, et al.,  G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA
382.
Easement;  restrictions on rights of owner of dominant estate.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on
its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of
the easement; (2)  it cannot use the easement except for the benefit  of the immovable
originally  contemplated; (3)  it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the
use and preservation of the easement; (5)  it cannot alter or make the easement more
burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary
works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner
to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.Goldcrest Realty Corporation vs.Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation, 584
SCRA 435.
 Easement of right of way
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through
other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’
concept of what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in
order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious
or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can
be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.20   [Dichoso, Jr.
vs. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495(2011)]
Nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A
nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or
the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the
safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have
the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.   [Gancayo vs. City Government of
Quezon City, et al., (2011)]
Donation
It must be stressed that the donation  is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with
the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes.  Under Article 733 of the New
Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed
by the rules on contract. 
It has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation.  Petitioner DECS failed to use
the property for the purpose specified in the deed of donation.  In fine, petitioner DECS has no
use for the property, hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents. Secretary of
Education, The vs. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., 480 SCRA 452.
Post-mortem dispositions typically:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive.
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,  ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed.
(3)  That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Further –
(4) [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa.
(5) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect
that the donation is  “to take effect at the death of the donor” are not controlling criteria; such
statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor, (and)
(6) That  in case of doubt, the  conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather that
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x
Rodriguez,” signalling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving
Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned
of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on
the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily
stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that “the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to
any person or entity” x x x or words to that effect.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve
his cause (e.g. “the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise” and “devise”).
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted holistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as “mortis causa”
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos, consistent with the principle that “the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are
not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in
order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor.” Indeed, doubts on the nature of
dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers “to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership
of the property subject of the deed.” (Villanueva vs. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24,
2011, 640 SCRA 308)