EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23307. June 30, 1967.]

DAMASO P. PEREZ and REPUBLIC BANK, ETC., ET AL. , petitioners-

appellants, vs. MONETARY BOARD, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
BANKS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE , respondents-appellees. AURORA R. RECTO, MIGUEL
CANIZARES, LEON ANCHETA, PABLO ROMAN, VICTORIA B. ROMAN
and NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING , intervenors-appellees.

C .D. Baizas & Associates and Halili, Bolinao & Associates for petitioners-
appellants.
Natalio M. Balboa, F .E. Evangelista and Severo Malvar for respondent-appellee
Central Bank.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor C .S. Gaddi for respondent-
appellee Secretary of Justice.
N .J . Quisumbing and E. Quisumbing-Fernando for the intervenors-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CENTRAL BANK; NO POWER TO PROSECUTE VIOLATORS OF BANKING

LAWS. — Although the Central Bank and its respondent o cials may have the duty
under the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act to cause the prosecution of
those alleged violators, yet We nd nothing in said laws that imposes a clear, speci c
duty on the former to do the actual prosecution of the latter. The Central Bank is a
government corporation created principally to administer the monetary and banking
system of the Republic, not a prosecution agency like the scal's o ce. Being an
arti cial person, the Central Bank is limited to its statutory powers and the nearest
power to which prosecution of violators of banking laws may be attributed is its power
to sue and be sued. But this corporate power of litigation evidently refers to civil cases
only.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL A
PROSECUTING OFFICER TO PROSECUTE A CRIMINAL CASE IN COURT. — As for the
Secretary of Justice, while he may have the power to prosecute — through the o ce of
the Solicitor-General — criminal cases, yet it is settled rule that mandamus will not lie to
compel a prosecuting officer to prosecute a criminal case in court.
3. COURTS; POWER OVER INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS. — Purely interlocutory
orders remain constantly subject to alteration, modi cation or reversal by the court
rendering the same before the rendition of final judgment on their merits (Rule 135, Sec.
5 (g), Rev. Rules of Court; Gonzales vs. Gonzales; 81 Phil. 38; 6 Moran. 1963 ed., 180).

DECISION

BENGZON , J.P. , J : p

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 Petitioner-appellant Damaso P. Perez, for himself and in a derivative capacity on
behalf of the Republic Bank, instituted mandamus proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on June 23, 1962, against the Monetary Board, the Superintendent of
Banks, the Central Bank and the Secretary of Justice. His object was to compel these
respondents to prosecute, among others, Pablo Roman and several other Republic
Bank o cial for violations of the General Banking Act (speci cally secs. 7678 and 83
thereof) and the Central Bank Act, and for falsi cation of public or commercial
documents in connection with certain alleged anomalous loans amounting to
P1,303,400.00 authorized by Roman and the other bank officials.
Respondents assailed, in their respective answers, the propriety of mandamus.
The Secretary of Justice claimed that it was not their speci c duty to prosecute the
persons denounced by Perez. The Central Bank and its respondent o cials, on the
other hand, averred that they had already done their duty under the law by referring to
the special prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal investigation and
prosecution those cases involving the alleged anomalous loans. 1
On July 10, 1962, respondents moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of
cause of action. Petitioners opposed. The lower court denied the motion.
Subsequently, herein intervenors-appellees, as the incumbent directors of the
Board of the Republic Bank, led a motion to intervene in the proceedings. Petitioners
opposed the motion but the lower court approved the same.
On January 20, 1964, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution
No. 81 granting the request of Republic Bank for credit accommodations to cover the
unusual withdrawal of deposits by its depositors in view of the fact that said Bank was
under investigation then by the authorities. The grant, however, was conditioned upon
the execution by the management and controlling stockholders of the Republic Bank of
a voting trust agreement in favor of a Board of Trustees to be chosen by the latter with
the approval of the Central Bank.
Pursuant to this resolution, Pablo Roman and his family, as the controlling
stockholders of Republic Bank, executed a voting trust agreement in favor of a board of
trustees composed of former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, Hon. Miguel Cuaderno and
Mr. Felix de la Costa. Subsequently, or on March 13, 1964, this agreement was
superseded by another one with the Philippine National Bank as the trustee. 2
In view of these developments, the intervenors-appellees led a motion to
dismiss before the lower court claiming that the ouster of Pablo Roman and his family
from the management of the Republic Bank effected by the voting trust agreement
rendered the mandamus case moot and academic. Respondents-appellees also led a
like motion to dismiss in which they again raised the impropriety of mandamus. Acting
upon the two motions and the oppositions thereto led by petitioners, the lower court
granted the motions and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
Appellants, contending that the ouster of Pablo Roman from Republic Bank's
management and control has not altered or rendered moot the issues in the case, argue
that the remedy of mandamus lies 3 to compel respondents to prosecute the
aforementioned Pablo Roman and company. Addressing Ourselves directly to this
issue raised on the propriety of the petition for mandamus, We rule that petitioners
cannot seek by mandamus to compel respondents to prosecute criminally those
alleged violators of the banking laws. Although the Central Bank and its respondent
o cials may have the duty under the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act to
cause the prosecution of those alleged violators, yet We nd nothing in said laws that
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 imposes a clear, speci c duty on the former to do the actual prosecution of the latter.
The Central Bank is a government corporation created principally to administer the
monetary and banking system of the Republic, 4 not a prosecution agency 5 like the
scal's o ce. Being an arti cial person, the Central Bank is limited to its statutory
powers and the nearest power to which prosecution of violators of banking laws may
be attributed is its power to sue and be sued. 6 But this corporate power of litigation
evidently refers to civil cases only.
The Central Bank and its respondent o cials have already done all they could,
within the con nes of their powers, to cause the prosecution of those persons
denounced by Perez. Annexes 5 to 7-C CBP of respondents' answer and even
petitioners' opposition to the rst motion to dismiss 7 show that the cases of the
alleged anomalous loans had already been referred by the Central Bank to the special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal investigation and prosecution.
For respondents to do the actual prosecuting themselves, as petitioners would have it,
would be tantamount to an ultra vires act already.
As for the Secretary of Justice, while he may have the power to prosecute —
through the o ce of the Solicitor General — criminal cases, yet it is settled rule that
mandamus will not lie to compel a prosecuting o cer to prosecute a criminal case in
court. 8
Moreover, it does not appear from the law that only the Central Bank or its
respondent o cials can cause the prosecution of alleged violations of banking laws.
Said violations constitute a public offense, the prosecution of which is a matter of
public interest and hence, anyone — even private individuals — can denounce such
violations before the prosecuting authorities. Since Perez himself could cause the ling
of criminal complaints against those allegedly involved in the anomalous loans, if any,
then he has a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, which
makes mandamus against respondents improper.
But petitioners-appellants would insist that the impropriety of mandamus could
no longer be raised before the lower court for the second time since it had already been
invoked in a previous motion to dismiss which was denied. This is untenable. The lower
court was not estopped from changing its opinion while it was under its jurisdiction to
do so and on the same ground of lack of cause of action raised before, because the
former order was purely interlocutory and thus remained constantly subject to
alteration, modi cation or reversal by it before the rendition of nal judgment on its
merits. 9
Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is, as it is hereby, a rmed.
Costs against petitioner-appellant Perez. So ordered.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. See Annexes 5, 7 and 7-A CBP of respondents' answer.

2. See Annex "A" of Petitioners-Appellants' brief.

3. I.e., that in their petition, pars. 6-10 and 12 specially, a cause of action for mandamus is
stated.

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 4. Sec. 2, Republic Act 265.
5. See People vs. Tan, L-9275, June 30, 1960.

6. Sec. 4, Republic 265.

7. See Records, p. 40.

8. Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846; Dimaunahan vs. Hon. Aranas, 74 Phil.
455; People vs. Natoza, L-8917, Dec. 24, 1956.

9. Rule 135, Sec. 5(g), Rev. Rules of Court; Gonzales vs. Gonzales; 81 Phil. 38; 6 Moran,
1963 ed., 180.

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