Petitioner IMS MOOT #2

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4th NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION|2016
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL

MOOT COURT COMPETITION| 2016
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
WRIT JURISDICTIONW.P.No. ____/2015
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 32 AND 132 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
TOMAR RASHID…………………………………………………………..……….…PETITIONER
NO.1
KAMAL KAPOOR……………………………..……..………………….……….…..PETITIONER NO.2
RAMAIYA KUMAR………………………………………………………,.….………PETITIONER NO.3
V/S
UNION OF INDIANA...…….…..…………………………………………………RESPONDENT NO.1
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Paragraph
¶
AIR All India Reporter
AISU All India Students Union
Anr Another
Art Article
Bom Bombay
Co Company
CriLJ Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
ER England Reporter
GNU Great Northern University
GNUSU Great Northern University Student Union
Govt Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
IPP Indiana Peoples Party
Mad Madras
MP Madhya Pradesh
No. Number
Ors Others
p/pp Page
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Sec Section
UP Uttar Pradesh
US United States
Vol Volume

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
[A] CASES
1. A.K. Roy &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272.

2. AnandPatwardhan v Union of India AIR 1997 Bom 25
3. Arup Bhuyan v State of Assam (2011)3 SCC 377.
4. BabulalParate v State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 884 (888)
5. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab (1955) 3 SCC 214.
6. Bennett Coleman & Co. v Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106
7. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431.
8. BishamberDayal Chandra Mohan v State of U.P., (1982)1 SCC 39
9. BrijBhushan v State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
10. CharanLalSahu v. UOI (1990) 1 SCC 614 (667).
11. DainikSambad and Anr. v. State of Tripura and ors. AIR 1989 Gau 30
12. Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv Anand2004 (11) SCC.
13. Dr. VinayakBinayakSenPijushPiyushBabunGuha v State of Chattisgarh 2011 (266) ELT
193
14. Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 (629)
15. Gambhirsinh R. Dekare v. FalgunbhaiChimanbhai Patel and another AIR 2013 SC 1590
16. Ghulam v Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 71
17. Gurjatinder Pal v State of Punjab 2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 224.
18. HamdardDwakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554
19. HarakchandRatanchandBanthia&Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., 1969 (2) SCC 166
20. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India
and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 515
21. Indra Das v State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 380
22. K.A. Abbas v Union of India [1971] 2 S.C.R. 446.
23. Kartar Singh v State of Punjab 1994 SCC (Cri) 899.
24. KedarNath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955.

25. KunnathtaThatunniMoopil Nair v The State of Kerala AIR 1961 SC 552;

26. LaxmiKhandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873
27. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Professor Manubhai D. Shah, (1992) 3 SCC 637
28. M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha AIR 1959 SC 395
29. M/s. HiralalRatanlal vs. STO AIR 1973 SC 1034.
30. Maybee v White Plains Pub. Co., (1945) 327 US 178 (184)
31. Naraindas v State of MP, (1974) 4 SCC 788 (816)
32. NiharenduDuttMajumdar v Emporer AIR 1942 FC 22.
33. PrakashNath Khanna vs. C.I.T. 2004 (9) SCC 686.
34. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264
35. Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court, (2003) 3 SCC 427
36. Ram Nandan v State , AIR 1959 AII 101.
37. RamlilaMaidan Incident, re, (2012) 5 SCC 1
38. RomeshThapar v State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594
39. S. Bharat Kumar v Chief Election Commissioner 1995 (1) ALT Cri 230
40. S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal&Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 600.
41. S.Rangarajan v P.Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574
42. Sakal Papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305
43. SanskarMarathe v The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2015 CriLJ 3561.
44. Satvant Singh Sawhneyv D. Ramarathanana, AIR 1967 SC 1836
45. Secretary, Ministry of I & B v. Cricket Association, Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 1236
46. ShreyaSinghal v Union of India (2013) 12 SCC 73.
47. Simranjit Singh Mann v State of Punjab 1995 CriLJ 3264.
48. State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1961 SC 293.
49. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664
50. Tiger Muthiah v State of Tamil Nadu 2000(1) CTC 1: 2000(1) MLJ 516(Mad H.C.)
51. Udai Singh Dagar and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and ors. AIR 2007 SC 2599
52. Union of India v Motion Picture Association, AIR 1999 SC 2334: (1990) 6 SCC 150

[B]BOOKS
1. Basu, Durga Das, Law of the Press, (5th ed., 2010)
2. Diana, MadhaviGoradia, Facets of Media Law, (2nd ed., 2013)
3. Roy, G.K, Law relating to Press and Sedition, (2nd ed., 2013)
[C]LEGISLATIONS
[D]ONLINE DATABASES
1. Westlaw(www.westlawindia.com)
2. Manupatra(www.manupatra.com)
3. SCC Online(www.scconline.com)
4. Lexis Nexis(www.lexisnexis.com)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court has been invoked under Article 32 for the enforcement of
fundamental rights and Article 132 of the Constitution of Indiana.
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part.
Article 132 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in constitutional cases.If
the High Court certifies under article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme
Court, then the appeal is competent.
132. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in
certain cases (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment,
decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil,
criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies under Article 134A that
the case involves a substantial question of law as t the interpretation of this
Constitution
The petitioners submit to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Indiana.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana, situated in Southeast Asia, gained independence from a European nation in

1957, which established a common law system. The central government exercises direct
control over Indiana, a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic and republic country
acknowledged worldwide for the fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
2. New Delporto, the capital of the country, has its own government despite being a Union
Territory, although the Home Ministry controls public order within the territory. It is also
an education hub.
3. Great Northern University (GNU) is situated in New Delporto and is well known for its
rich academic culture and contributions in areas of research. Student politics is an active
affair in this university with clashes between ideological enemies turning violent and
aggressive quite often.
4. All Indiana Students Union (AISU) is a left inclined organization having a traditional
history of holding protests and student revolutions. It is also the parent body of the Great
Northern University Students Union, the largest student union in GNU. Ramaiya Kumar,
the president of GNUSU has a substantial influence over other members.
5. The Indiana Peoples Party, nurturing right wing ideologies, was popularly elected to the
lower house in 2015 and embarked on an economic reform mission with intent to
liberalize the economy and bring in foreign investment.
6. In disagreement with the action of the government, the GNUSU held countrywide protest
to express it opposition.
7. On June 8 ,2016, the AISU declared a countrywide strike, in pursuance of which its
supporters staged a protest on a national highway in the union territory of Utkal.
Allegedly the highway was blocked due to such protest and the police retaliated by
resorting to lathi charge, due to which many were seriously injured and admitted to the
hospital. One of the injured, Tomar Rashid, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court
claiming infringement of his fundamental right of assembly and adequate compensation
for his injuries.

8. The claim of the protestors that they were sitting peacefully and were not given adequate
warning before the lathi charge , spread through electronic and social media and gave rise
to violent protests across the country.
9. Gathering momentum and politically swayed, the movement was joined by many
students and on 16 June, 2016, a rally, to show solidarity to the injured in Utkal, was
organized by the GNUSU.
10. Posters put up across the GNU campus, bearing Ramaiya Kumar’s signatures, claimed
that the rally was also in solidarity of the hanging of Chengiz Khan, a separatist leader
and the main accused in a terrorist attack at the Indiana Parliament in 2006, 3 years ago
on the same date.
11. The rally saw the protestors shout slogans against the government’s dictatorship and
pledged to fight against it. The videos of Ramaiya Kumar claiming independence for the
northern most state of Mashkir became viral on social media and the government arrested
him on sedition charges.
12. After being convicted and sentenced to one-year imprisonment by the Sessions Court,
Ramaiya Kumar appealed to the High Court of Delporto, challenging the constitutionality
of provision of sedition. Although the High Court upheld the order of the session’s court,
it issued a certificate under Art 134A.
13. Repeated telecast of Ramaiya Kumar’s speech on new channels led to evocation of
sympathy towards him from the political and intellectual class, opposed to IPP’s
ideologies.
14. Section 14A was inserted into the Press Councils Act, 1978 by way of an amendment,
imposing heavy penalty on news agencies offending the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation or the manipulate public opinion against the elected government, if so found by
the Council.
15. Many news channels and newspapers were censured and fined right after the amendment
and one of them was ‘Indiana 24*7’ whose head, Mr. Kamal Kapoor, filed a petition in
the Supreme Court of Indiana challenging the constitutionality of Sec 14A.
16. The three matters were clubbed by the Supreme Court of Indiana and are now listed for
final hearing.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE, WAS
INFRINGED.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III.
WHETHER SECTION 124A IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS
I.
WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE WAS
INFRINGED.
II.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE WAS
INFRINGED
It is contended that the action of the police infringed the fundamental right to peaceful assembly
under Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution as it is violative of Article 19(1)(a) [1.1], it does not
fall under the restrictions provided under 19(3) [1.2] and the police did not follow the procedure
prescribed under section 129 of Code of Criminal Procedure [1.3].
1.1 FREEDOM TO SPEECH AND EXPRESSION INFRINGED BY WRONGFUL

DISPERSAL.
Art 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”),
which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, has been held to be the
foundation of a democratic country1 and allows the active and intelligent participation of the
citizens in the affairs of the country.2 Every citizen has the right to express his views and by
doing so can also create public opinion with respect to any subject in the public domain.3
In the present case, the protest by the All India Students Unions (hereinafter referred to as the
“AISU”) was a medium to express their views on the decision of the government with respect to
foreign investment. The call for a countrywide strike was to put forward their stand and gather
support for an opinion that, though contrary to government actions, was not unlawful by virtue of
Art 19(1)(a).
1.1.1. PROTEST OR STRIKES ARE AN EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

EXPRESSION
1
Union of India v Motion Picture Association, AIR 1999 SC 2334: (1990) 6 SCC 150
2
S.Rangarajan v P.Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574
3
Tiger Muthiah v State of Tamil Nadu 2000(1) CTC 1: 2000(1) MLJ 516(Mad H.C.)

Everyone has a fundamental right to form his opinion 4 .The State cannot prevent open discussion
or open expression if it is in pursuance of such right 5. Expression of one’s opinion by exercising
the right of assembly can be in the form of either demonstrations or protests as long as the
intention in both situations is to convey the feelings of the group which assembles.6
Protests in order to openly criticise government policies are an exercise of the fundamental
rights under Art 19(1)(a) as well as 19(1)(b) and cannot be a ground for restriction expression ,
by itself..7Freedom of expression means freedom not only for the thought we cherish but also for
the thought we hate.8Drawing an analogy to the present case, the protest organized by the AISU
in pursuance of the countrywide strike was to express their disagreement about the decisions of
the ruling government and in doing so, was an exercise of their fundamental right of free speech
and expression.
1.1.2.Unreasonable restriction on freedom of speech and expression
The freedom granted under 19(1)(a) can only be curtailed based on the grounds mentioned in Art
19(2) which includes restrictions under eight main heads. Since, the intent of the protestors was
only to express their view on the economic reform measures of the government, it does not form
a part of any of the restrictions as stated under Art. 19(2).
It has been held by the Supreme Court that the freedom of expression cannot be infringed unless
the situations created by allowing such freedom are pressing and endanger community
interest.9Such anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or farfetched and should have
proximate and direct nexus with the expression.10 Even then the power to ‘impose restriction’ on
fundamental rights must satisfy the test of reasonableness.11
With respect to incitement to offence , in the present case, the protest was only a medium to
express the disagreement of the AISU with that of the Government and there was neither
intention nor instance during the protest so as to incite to offence any other person or group of
persons .
4
AnandPatwardhan v Union of India AIR 1997 Bom 25
5
Ibid.
6
Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law (Ed. 7 , 2014) pp.1054
7
8
Naraindas v State of MP, (1974) 4 SCC 788 (816)
9
10
Ibid.
11
Bennett Coleman & Co. v Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106

Freedom to speech and expression is the basis of protest and demonstrations and the
infringement of such freedom has a consequent effect on right of assembly. The right under
19(1)(a) of protestors is curtailed by dispersal of such protesting elements, consequently
violating the right under 19(1)(b) as well. Hence, violation of the right to freedom of expression
consequently also violates the right to assemble in pursuance of a protest against certain State
actions and government measures.
1.2 RESTRICTION IMPOSED WAS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH ARTICLE 19(3).

Clause (3) of Art 19 of the Constitution of Indiana empowers the State to impose reasonable
restriction upon the right of assembly in the interest of ‘public order’ and ‘sovereignty and
integrity’ of Indiana.12Reasonable restrictions imposed on a person on enjoyment of a right
cannot be arbitrary or excessive in nature or beyond what is required.13
It has been held by the Supreme Court that the imminent danger to public peace is a facile
ground resorted to by the Police to do things, which it cannot do under the law. 14The Police have
neither power nor duty to suppress the lawful exercise of a legal right simply because obstruction
on the parts of the wrongdoers might lead to a breach of the peace.15
In the present case, the protestors apparently blocked the highway and this has been cited as the
cause of the subsequent act of the Police to disperse the crowd by resorting to lathi charge.
Although the blocking of highway might give rise to chaos and disruption to a certain extent, it
does not constitute an act resulting in such grave breach of peace so much so that the police had
to resort to direct lathi charge without even giving a warning.Public order under Art 19(3) differs
from local breaches of public order, in that the situation in the latter does not affect the public at
large. In a case decided by the apex court it was held that local breaches of public order were no
grounds for restricting the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. 16. The protest does
not have the propensity to disrupt public order since blocking of a highway, as an invariable
consequence of a large gathering, might affect the immediate environment but in no way will
lead to the disruption of public order as under 19(3).
12
BabulalParate v State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 884 (888)
13
BishamberDayal Chandra Mohan v State of U.P., (1982)1 SCC 39
14
Ghulam v Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 71
15
Ibid.
16
RomeshThapar v State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594

1.3 THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY CRPC WAS NOT FOLLOWED BY THE

POLICE
The concept of Rule of Law is invoked often to convey the sense that the Administration cannot
exercise arbitrary powers and that it should function according to law. 17Irrespective of whether
the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi judicial , a duty to
act fairly , that is in consonance with the fundamental principles of substantive justice is
generally implied. The presumption is that in a democratic polity wedded to the rule of law, the
State or the Legislature does not intend that in the exercise of their statutory powers its
functionaries should act unfairly or unjustly.18
One of the aspects of Rule of Law is that every executive action if it operates to the prejudice of
any person, must be supported by some legislative authority. 19In the present case, the action of
the police to disperse the crowd by use of force, although provided under Sec 129, is wrongful
due to the failure to follow procedure prescribed under such section. [1.3.1]
1.3.1. PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 129 NOT FOLLOWED

Section 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the dispersal of an unlawful assembly,
which is likely to cause disturbance of public peace, and also allows the use of minimal force
only when such command to disperse is not complied with. Assuming that the assembly was
unlawful due to the highway block caused due to the enormity of the crowd, there should be a
direct command to those assemble to disperse, thus making it the duty of such people to
necessarily follow such order. 20
In the present case there was no command or order for the protestors to abide by and disperse.
Rather the lathi charge by the police force was a direct use of armed force without adequate prior
warning.
For the dispersal of an assembly it has to be first warned and non-compliance of such warning
will then allow use of force to disperse by either confining or arresting the members of such
17
Jain M.P. and Jain S.N..,Principles of Administrative Law (6th Ed, 2013) pp. 20
18
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664
19
Satvant Singh Sawhneyv D. Ramarathanana, AIR 1967 SC 1836
20
Sec 129(1), Code of Criminal Procedure,1973

assembly. Sub Section 2 of Sec 129 states that one can resort to arrest and confinement measures
if the command to disperse is not complied with but does not provide for employment of armed
force for such purposes. Dispersal of an assembly by use of armed force is provided under
Section 130, but only in cases where the crowd cannot be otherwise dispersed. A coherent
reading of the sections clearly highlights the procedure to be followed in case of an unlawful
assembly.
In the instant case, the police, by resorting to lathi charge, did not follow procedure since Sec
129 does not provide for use of armed force and thus the use of lathis is wrongful due to the
failure of the police authorities to comply with the procedure defined in relation to such
circumstances. Moreover, such action of the police cannot be justified under Sec 130 since
failure to issue a warning order and use of armed force without giving a chance to those
assembled cannot allow one to conclude that such assembly could not have been dispersed
otherwise.
Such action of the police was not in compliance with the procedure that should have been
followed and hence, was arbitrary and in contravention to the principles of rule of law.

ISSUE 2
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is contended that Section 14A of The Press Council Act 1978 is unconstitutional as it is
violative of Article 14 [1.1], it is violative of Article 19(1)(a) [1.2] and it is violative of Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of Indiana 1950 [1.3].
2.1 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 14.
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana forbids class legislation. However, it does not forbid
reasonable classification of persons provided that it should be based on intelligible differentia
[1.1.1] and it must have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question [1.1.2].21
2.1.1 CLASSIFICATION UNDER SECTION 14A IS NOT BASED ON INTELLIGIBLE

DIFFERENTIA
Under Article 14, classification should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based
on an intelligible differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons
or things grouped together in the class from others left out of it. The freedom of speech under
Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to express one’s views and opinions at any issue through any
medium, e.g., by word of mouth, writing, printing, picture, film, movie etc.22 The freedom of
press is included within the ambit of Right to Freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a).23 The freedom of press is regarded as a “species of which freedom of expression is a
genus.”24 Since, the freedom of speech and expression of press flows from the same Article as it
flows for the citizens of Indiana, therefore, the press enjoys no extra privileges as such distinct
21
LaxmiKhandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873
22
Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court, (2003) 3 SCC 427
23
RamlilaMaidan Incident, re, (2012) 5 SCC 1
24
Sakal Papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305

from the freedom of citizens.25 ‘The editor of a press or the manager is merely exercising the
right of expression, and therefore, no special mention is necessary of the freedom of press.’26
It can be inferred from the above paragraph that citizens and the press are kept at an equal
pedestal. The right of freedom of press is not higher than the right of freedom of speech of an
individual and this right is not an absolute right. 27 The citizens and the press are classified under
one category for the purposes of Right to freedom of speech and expression. They are given the
same privileges under Article 19(1)(a) and are subject to the same restrictions under Article
19(2). The state shall not single out newspaper industry for harsh treatment. 28 However, the
enactment of Section 14A subjects the news agencies to scrutiny and puts restrictions on their
publications. It makes press a distinct class, which is arbitrary, artificial and evasive. It is not
based on an intelligible differentia.
2.1.2 SECTION 14A HAS NO NEXUS WITH THE OBJECT OF THE ACT
The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or reasonable nexus
with the object sought to be achieved by the statute under consideration. The object of the Press
Council Act 1978 is to ensure Freedom of press. However, in the present matter, section 14A of
the Press Council Act 1978 gives the power to the Press Council to warn, admonish and censure
the newspaper and to impose a fine on the editor or the journalist, whose conduct the council
may disapprove. Section 14A provides discretionary powers to the Council to take punitive
actions against the news agencies. Both the notions are contrary to each other. The impugned
section imposes additional restrictions and liabilities on the Freedom of Press, thus violating the
Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression on grounds other than Article 19(2).
Also, the phrase ‘Manipulate public opinion against the elected government’ indicates a
favorable approach towards the Indiana Peoples Party (IPP). It implies that the government has
power to censure anything that has been published against its ideologies. Such power defeats the
whole purpose of enactment of the Press Council Act, 1978, which is preserving the freedom of
the Press.
25
M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna SinhaAIR 1959 SC 395
26
Dr. Ambedkar’s speech in Constituent Assembly Debates, VII, 980
27
Gambhirsinh R. Dekare v. FalgunbhaiChimanbhai Patel and another AIR 2013 SC 1590
28
DainikSambad and Anr. v. State of Tripura and ors. AIR 1989 Gau 30

2.2 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(A).
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana states that all citizens shall have the Right to
Freedom of Speech and Expression. Freedom of Speech and of the Press lies at the foundation of
all democratic organizations, since proper functioning of the government is not possible without
free political discussion and public education.29 Freedom to air one’s views is the lifeline of any
democratic institution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-
knell to democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. 30 Section 14A of the Press
Council Act is violative of Article 19(1)(a) as it imposes censorship on grounds other than article
19(2) [1.2.1] and suggests punitive measures for non-compliance [1.2.2].
2.2.1 SECTION 14A IMPOSES CENSORSHIP ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN ARTICLE

19(2)
Article 19(2) of the constitution states certain grounds where the Right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression can be taken away. Article 19(2) empowers the State to put ‘reasonable’
restrictions on the following grounds, e.g., security of the state, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court, defamation, incitement to offence
and integrity and sovereignty of India. No restriction can be placed on the right to freedom and
expression on grounds other than those specified under article 19(2) 31. Section 14A states
‘manipulation of public opinion against the elected government’ as one the grounds for imposing
censorship. Neither the State nor its officers have any authority in law to impose any prior
restraint on publication of any material in the press on the ground that it is defamatory of the
State or its officers.’32
This Section, literally interpreted, imposes restrictions of the publications of the news agencies
on grounds other than Article 19(2), and hence, is violative of Article 19(1)(a).
In the present matter, the government slapped Ramaiya Kumar with sedition charges. However,
through the repeated telecasts of the news channels, sympathies began to pour in from certain
sections of political and intellectual class of the nation. The opinion of the public favored
Ramaiya Kumar and went against the elected government. The impugned amendment was
29
RomeshThapper v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124
30
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Professor Manubhai D. Shah, (1992) 3 SCC 637
31
Secretary, Ministry of I & B v. Cricket Association, Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 1236
32
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264

passed in order to prevent the news channels from publishing/telecasting such matter that goes
against the government. Since, censorship on grounds other than Article 19(2) is not permitted,
hence, the amendment is unconstitutional.
2.2.2 SECTION 14A SUGGESTS PUNITIVE MEASURES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE

One of the basic functions of press is that it serves as a powerful antidote to any abuse of power
by government officials. In the present matter, the series of events taking place in Indiana had
gained much popularity and political importance. The news channels were covering all these
politically significant events and disseminating it to the public. Section 14A of the Press Council
Act 1978 states certain grounds on which the council may censor the newspaper and impose a
fine not exceeding Rs. 10,00,000/- on the editor or the journalist if it disapproves of their
conduct. Imposition of such a huge amount of fine is punitive in nature and is a deterrent to the
fundamental Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Also,
the section is ambiguous about the nature of conduct and restraints put on the conduct of the
editor or the journalist.
2.3 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(G)
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of Indiana states that all citizens shall have the right to
practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The newspaper industry
enjoys the freedom to engage in any profession, occupation, trade, industry or business
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 33The power of the state to impose
restrictions on a business is to be found from clause (6) of Article 19, which authorizes the state
to impose “in the interests of general public”, “reasonable restrictions”, which is subject to
judicial review.34 In the present matter, section 14A of the Press Council Act is violative of
Article 19(1)(g) as the restrictions under it are not in the ‘general interest of public’ [1.3.1] and
are unreasonably vague [1.3.2].
2.3.1 SECTION 14A IS NOT IN THE ‘INTEREST OF GENERAL PUBLIC’
33
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 515
34
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 (629)

The ‘interests of general public’ have to be kept in mind while putting restrictions on Article
19(1)(g). Only if a restriction to be imposed by a statute is a reasonable one and is
in public interest then the same is constitutionally valid.35 “As the press has business aspects it
has no special immunity from laws applicable to business in general.” 36 In the present matter,
section 14A of the Press Council Act, 1978 imposes restriction on the ground that ‘an editor or
working journalist has by their conduct tried to manipulate public opinion against the
sovereignty and integrity of the nation or against the elected government.’ This restriction is in
interest of the elected government and not in the interest of the general public. The government
is preventing the Press from performing its basic function of communication of affairs and
disseminating information about the burning topic of the day, thereby restricting freedom of
business and trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The restriction imposed is arbitrary
and of excessive nature.
2.3.2 SECTION 14A IS UNREASONABLY VAGUE

The law imposing restrictions upon the Press, may be constitutionally valid only if the restriction
falls under the ambit of ‘reasonableness’ as stated under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of
Indiana. Any restricting law is invalid if it is not related to the ‘general interest of public’ or is
unreasonably vague.37 Manipulating public opinion, being subjective in its meaning, is vague and
ambiguous since it cannot be determined whether the opinion of the public was per se the same
or was it actually affected by the press. Therefore, it is contended that Section 14A is
unreasonably vague and hence, violative of Article 19(1)(g).
35
Udai Singh Dagar and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and ors. AIR 2007 SC 2599
36
Maybee v White Plains Pub. Co., (1945) 327 US 178 (184)
37
HamdardDwakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554

ISSUE 3
SECTION 124A IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
It is contended before this Hon’ble court that Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
(hereinafter referred to as Section 124A) is violative of the Constitution of Indiana since it is a
colonial provision which is no longer relevant [3.1], the section is vague [3.2], it is violative of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution[3.3] and is greatly misused and not strictly implemented
[3.4] ArguendoRamaiya Kumar is not liable under Section 124A for sedition[3.5].
3.1 SECTION 124A IS A COLONIAL PROVISION WHICH IS NO LONGER

RELEVANT
The British Colonial Government introduced sec 124A in 1937 38, however its relevance in the
present day scenario is doubtful and questionable.
United Kingdom, among many other countries, which was the most enthusiastic user of sedition
laws during colonial times, has already repealed its sedition law because it became obsolete.
Despite the fact that the law has not undergone any change since its inception, the same text
continues to be used despite the risk of being obsolete with respect to the present times.
Thus, even after Indiana gained independence and became a democratic country, legitimate
criticism and comments were stifled using sedition as a weapon.39 The fact that the framers of the
Constitution did not expressly include ‘sedition’ as an exception to the right to freedom of
speech and expression, clearly shows that they did not intend it to be an exception to the same. If
sedition were to be included as an exception to the right of freedom of speech and expression,
people of Indiana would not be able to enjoy any greater freedom of press than what they
enjoyed under the British Rule. Also they will have no means of getting the law invalidated even
if it violates their civil rights.40
Thus the law of sedition is a colonial provision, which has lost its relevance in the present times,
and hence it should be scrapped.
38
Macaulay’s Draft Penal Code of 1837-1839, section 113.
39
Sanskar Marathe v The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2015 CriLJ 3561.
40
Constituent Assembly of Indiana debates( proceedings), Volume VII, on 1st December, 1948

3.2 SECTION 124A IS VAGUE

‘Sedition is perhaps the very vaguest of all offences known to the Criminal Law.
It is evident that the vagueness of the charge is a danger to the liberty of the
subject, especially if the Courts of Justice can be induced to take a view favorable
to the Government.’41
One of the essentials of section 124A is to bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt or
excite or attempt to excite dissatisfaction. However, the section is worded in an extremely
ambiguous and imprecise manner, it uses a number of terms and phrases the meanings of which
have not been explained exhaustively. The terms ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’, or ‘disaffection’ are not
defined. Also, the section fails to mention among whom such feelings should be produced.
The words “in the interest of public order” are of the widest amplitude. “Reasonable restriction”
and “words of widest amplitude” are mutually contradictory. Restrictive provisions should be
narrow and restricted. They cannot be so wide and open ended. Further where the persons
applying the law are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes away a
guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution. 42 Thus the language, which
has been taken from the English law is very wide. If it is interpreted literally it can lead to unfair
conviction of people exercising their right to fair criticism thus depriving them of their right to
freedom of speech and expression which is unconstitutional.
Now, assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court
cannot correct or make up the deficiency. 43 Thus, considering the literal interpretation of Section
124A, no incitement or tendency to incite violence is actually required for the offence.
Consequently, the section is clearly vague and further the Courts cannot amend the same through
judgements like KedarNath v State of Bihar44 since it would be ultra vires to do so.
Vague laws tend to trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. They delegate matters for
resolution to police and judges on a subjective basis thus leading to arbitrary and discriminatory
application.45 Thus,laws can be invalidated on the ground that they are vague and not adequately
defined as far as their applicability is concerned.46
41
Brian A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8thEdn. , 2004, p.1388.
42
K.A. Abbas v Union of India [1971] 2 S.C.R. 446; State of M.P. v. Baldeo PrasadAIR 1961 SC 293.
43
Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv Anand2004 (11) SCC.
44
KedarNath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955.
45
Kartar Singh v State of Punjab 1994 SCC (Cri) 899.
46
HarakchandRatanchandBanthia&Ors.v. Union of India &Ors., 1969 (2) SCC 166; S. Bharat Kumar v
ChiefElection Commissioner1995 (1) ALT Cri 230; KunnathtaThatunniMoopil Nair v The State of Kerala AIR 1961

3.3 SECTION 124A IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(a) OF THE CONSTITUTION

A fundamental right cannot be trampled upon by any legislation unless that legislation imposes a
reasonable restriction and thus falls within the category of an exception. The rights guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) are to be read along with article 19(2) which carve out areas in respect of
which valid legislation can be made.47
The right to freedom of speech and expression is undoubtedly indispensable for the preservation
of a democratic society. Though not absolute, it is necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular
views.48 It is one of the essentials for the proper functioning of a democratic Government is free
political discussion.49 Expression of different views is allowed not because they are correct or
valid but because the citizens have a freedom of expressing different views on any issue.50
In Ram Nandan v State,51with regard to the constitutionality of Section 124A, the court observed
that section 124A is admittedly a law which restricts the fundamental right of freedom of speech
and expression and is therefore inconsistent with the Constitution. The court remarked that
section 124A of the I.P.C.includes within its ambit not only the speeches that cause or threaten to
cause public disorder but also even those which do not do so, thus danger of causing public
disorder is not an ingredient of sedition. Therefore the section is not consistent with the freedom
of speech and expression as it may put restriction even on those speeches that do not contain any
threat to public order. In the opinion of the court “there is nothing whatsoever in the section to
distinguish between the two classes of speeches”. It is hit by the doctrine of severability as it
includes acts both within and outside the permissible limits of the Constitution and the two are
not severable. Thus in the present case section 124A was held to be ultra vires the Constitution
on the ground that it infringes the right under article 19(1)(a) and is not saved by the provisions
of clause (2) of article 19.
Further, in construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the
literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision
SC 552; A.K. Roy &Ors. v. Unionof India&Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272.

47
Indianan Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited &Ors. v. Unionof India&Ors., (1985) 2 SCR 287.
48
S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal&Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 600.
49
BrijBhushan v State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
50
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India, Vol. 2, 8 th Edition, Wadhva and Comapany, Law
Publishers, Nagpur, 2007, p.2390.
51
Ram Nandan v State , AIR 1959 AII 101.

say.52Thus the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent
and the legislature is presumed to have made no mistake and that it intended to say what it has
said.53And again amending or correcting an originally defective provision through judgments is
beyond the powers of the court and thus, cannot validate an unconstitutional law.54
3.4 SECTION 124A IS GREATLY MISUSED AND NOT STRICTLY IMPLEMENTED

The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the
individual.55
In judging the Constitutional validity of the Act, the subsequent events, namely, how the Act has
worked out, have to be looked into. 56 When the constitutionality of a law is challenged on the
ground that it infringes a fundamental right, what the Court has to consider is the ‘direct and
inevitable effect’ of such law.
Despite the limited construction adopted by the Supreme Court 57, as far as the law of sedition is
concerned, there has been a continued misuse by the successive governments and erroneous
interpretation by the courts to curb legitimate criticism thus encroaching upon the right to
freedom of speech and expression.58
The punishment of those accused of sedition begins with the legal process. Even if they are
ultimately freed, they have to go through a long legal process, which serves as a punishment and
a deterrent for those rightfully exercising their right to speech and expression.
3.5 ARGUENDO: RAMAIYA KUMAR IS NOT LIABLE UNDER SECTION 124A FOR
SEDITION
Assuming but not admitting that Section 124A is constitutional, it is contended that Ramaiya
Kumar is not guilty under Sedition since mere raising of slogans does not amount to sedition
[1.5.1], there was no incitement to violence [1.5.2].
52
M/s. HiralalRatanlal vs. STOAIR 1973 SC 1034.
53
PrakashNathKhanna vs. C.I.T. 2004 (9) SCC 686.
54
Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv Anand2004 (11) SCC.
55
K.A. Abbas v Union of India [1971] 2 S.C.R. 446.
56
CharanLalSahu v. UOI (1990) 1 SCC 614 (667).
57
58
Dr. VinayakBinayakSenPijushPiyushBabunGuha v State of Chattisgarh 2011 (266) ELT 193; SanskarMarathe v
The State of Maharashtra and Ors.2015 CriLJ 3561.

3.5.1 MERE RAISING OF SLOGANS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO SEDITION

As it has been held in Kedarnath’s case59, that the offence of sedition could only be committed if
there is an incitement of violence or public disorder, raising of anti national slogans per se cannot
amount to sedition.
In Balwant Singh v State of Punjab60,the accused were charged under section 124A and 153A for
shouting of slogans ‘KhalistanZindabad’ and ‘Raj karegaKhalsa’ at a crowded place near the
cinema. The Supreme Court held that casual raising of the slogans, once or twice by the two
cannot be said to be aimed at exciting or attempting to excite hatred or disaffection towards the
government. Therefore the court set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused persons
since there was no disturbance caused and people were generally unaffected by their actions.
Similarly, in Simranjit Singh Mann v State of Punjab 61, the court quashed an FIR against
Simranjit Singh Mann on allegations that he had raised “KhalistanZindabad” instigating people
and Dilwan Singh, the human bomb who assassinated the Chief Minister Beant Singh.
Thus the mere shouting of slogans by the students should not amount to sedition. 62 Even if
slogans have been raised and are seditious Ramaiya Kumar cannot be convicted under sedition
for slogans raised by others. Mere presence at a gathering doesn’t mean sedition unless he
actively abetted and encouraged and took part in them.
Therefore, assuming that Ramaiya Kumar shouted anti national slogans mere raising of slogans
cannot amount to Sedition.
3.5.2 THERE WAS NO INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE

The Supreme Court observed that the explanations to the section 124A make it clear that
criticism of public measures or comment on government action, no matter how strongly worded
it is would be within the reasonable limits and consistent with the fundamental right of speech
and expression.63
59
60
Balwant Singh v State of Punjab (1955) 3 SCC 214.
61
Simranjit Singh Mann v State of Punjab1995 CriLJ 3264.
62
Gurjatinder Pal v State of Punjab2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 224.
63

The Supreme Court has unambiguously stated that only speech that amounts to “incitement to
imminent lawless action” can be criminalized. 64 In Shreya Singhal v Union of India 65, the
Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between “advocacy” and “incitement”, stating that only
the latter could be punished. Therefore, advocating revolution, or advocating even violent
overthrow of the State, does not amount to sedition, unless there is incitement to violence, and
more importantly, the incitement is to ‘imminent’ violence
Even if Kanhaiya Kumar had played a larger role in organizing the event or chanted “anti-
national” slogans, however offensive, he would still not be liable under Sedition unless his
alleged words have an active, direct, and imminent incitement to violence, which Indiana’s
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled must be present to be constitute sedition under Section
124A.
In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of Andhra Pradesh,66 Bilal was allegedly an active member of Ál-
Jehad’, a militant organization formed with the aim of liberating Kashmir from Indiana. The
court however held that this would not amount to sedition and the conviction was not
sustainable.
Thus the mere fact that Ramaiya Kumar is supporting a separatist movement or even a convicted
separatist leader for that matter is covered within his right of freedom of speech and expression.
After all, the decisions of the Courts may have been final but are not infallible. Also, considering
that the facts clearly state that the rally ended peacefully 67, the same cannot amount to sedition.
Further, in a university like GNU, which has a special reputation in research and academics and
an active culture of student politics, such ideological clashes are natural. Restricting such right of
the youth to participate in politics is detrimental to their fundamental rights.
Thus, it is submitted that Section 124A is unconstitutional and Ramaiya Kumar should be held
liable under the same.
PRAYER
64
Arup Bhuyan v State of Assam(2011)3 SCC 377.
65
ShreyaSinghal v Union of India(2013) 12 SCC 73.
66
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of Andhra Pradesh(1997) 7 SCC 431.
67
Moot proposition p 17 ¶11.

Wherefore it is prayed, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare/adjudge/hold that :
Pass any other Order, Direction or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of Justice,
Fairness , Equity and Good Conscience
For this Act of Kindness, the Petitioner Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Respondent)

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IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4th NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION|2016

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL

WRIT JURISDICTIONW.P.No. ____/2015

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 32 AND 132 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1. A.K. Roy &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

25. KunnathtaThatunniMoopil Nair v The State of Kerala AIR 1961 SC 552;

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

The petitioners submit to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Indiana.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1. Indiana, situated in Southeast Asia, gained independence from a European nation in

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE, WAS

WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS

WHETHER SECTION 124A IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE WAS

WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS

WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1.1 FREEDOM TO SPEECH AND EXPRESSION INFRINGED BY WRONGFUL

1.1.1. PROTEST OR STRIKES ARE AN EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1.2 RESTRICTION IMPOSED WAS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH ARTICLE 19(3).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

1.3 THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY CRPC WAS NOT FOLLOWED BY THE

1.3.1. PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 129 NOT FOLLOWED

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

2.1 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

2.1.1 CLASSIFICATION UNDER SECTION 14A IS NOT BASED ON INTELLIGIBLE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

2.2 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

2.2.1 SECTION 14A IMPOSES CENSORSHIP ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN ARTICLE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

2.2.2 SECTION 14A SUGGESTS PUNITIVE MEASURES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE

2.3 SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS VIOLATIVE OF

2.3.1 SECTION 14A IS NOT IN THE ‘INTEREST OF GENERAL PUBLIC’

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

2.3.2 SECTION 14A IS UNREASONABLY VAGUE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

3.1 SECTION 124A IS A COLONIAL PROVISION WHICH IS NO LONGER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

3.2 SECTION 124A IS VAGUE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

3.3 SECTION 124A IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(a) OF THE CONSTITUTION

SC 552; A.K. Roy &Ors. v. Unionof India&Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

3.4 SECTION 124A IS GREATLY MISUSED AND NOT STRICTLY IMPLEMENTED

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

3.5.1 MERE RAISING OF SLOGANS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO SEDITION

3.5.2 THERE WAS NO INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE