Land WK 7 Tute - PE

Land Tute: PE
Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55

An example of courts being strict about PE, leaving it with a narrow application. C has to
believe promise was binding and irrevocable, although this is greatly tempered by Thorner v
Major.
ALSO Lord Walker said unconscionable was not a state of mind but an objective value
judgement on behaviour.
C was a property developer in negotiations for purchase of building owned by D. Parties had
reached oral agreement, in reliance on which C had incurred considerable expense. When D
tried to change terms, C claimed an interest based on PE. HoL said parties were well aware
that there was no binding contract, and refused to find PE. His was mainly on the basis of
unconscionability only. D was bound in honour only, and C new this, so her behaviour was
unattractive but not unconscionable. HoL did allow Cobbe to recover his outlay on the basis
of unjust enrichment.
Lord Scott and Walker and different reasons for refusing PE claim. Scott seems to require an
assurance as to a specific proprietary right. This would mean that most family' or 'wills'
cases would fail as the parties would not generally talk in terms of specific rights, but would
refer to them in much more vague terms. Although Lord Walker distinguishes family and
commercial cases, acknowledging that in the former, the parties would have little
knowledge of proprietary rights, he still requires a belief by the claimant that the assurance
is binding and cannot be revoked.
Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18

An assurance in family situations may be more uncertain than in commercial settings,
reflecting the different circumstances. Assurance need be 'clear enough', but what this is
depends on context. HoL said only thing that mattered was whether a reasonable person
could have relied on the conduct that look like an assurance.
Facts like Gillett and Holt except no explicit assurances, but instead oblique remarks and
statements. On Thorner’s farm, David worked for 30 years unpaid, as well as on his parents’
farm where he got housing and money. He believed he would inherit the farm encouraged
by conduct such as in 1990 giving a bonus relating to two assurance policies saying ‘that’s
for my death duties’, but no explicit promise. Peter left the farm to David, but destroyed the
will when he fell out to others to whom he had left cash, and did not make a new one.
Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159
Expectation is only a starting point for award. If C's expectations are uncertain, extravagant,
or out of all proportion to the detriment, the court should recognise that C's equity should
be satisfied in another and more limited way. CONFIRMED in Davies v Davies.
Jennings cared for an elderly Mrs Royle. She was running out of money and told him that he
need not worry about not being paid since ‘he would be all right’, but Jennings not sure on
exact words. He was awarded £200,000 taking into account th apyments he had foregone,
finding proprietary estoppel.
Actual Tute Question

First thing to say is that S116 LRA makes clear that an equity by estoppel may bind a
purchaser. This is governed by actual occupation Sch3(2) or otherwise by a S32 notice on
the charges register. The former is relevant here. So we need to look at whether an equity
arose out of estoppel initially.
1. Representation or assurance
 Jim saying ‘Ted could look on Greenwood Lodge as his home for as long as he
wanted’ seems to be pretty clear that D will receive a right to reside for life like in
Griffiths v Williams. Even if it is not completely clear it is ‘clear enough’ under
Thorner v Major, and assurances can be more uncertain in family situations.
2. Reliance on assurance
 Ted used his savings to landscape the garden and a summer house under the belief
that he would be able to live there for life.
3. Detriment due to reliance.
 Financial Loss in having the garden landscaped and installing the summer house.
4. Unconscionability
 Would be unconscionable for him to lose his ability to live there. It’s not like in
Yeoman’s Row where he knew that Pippa was only bound by honour. He genuinely
thought he would have the right to live there.
Therefore, the courts are likely to establish an estopped which creates an equity – i.e. the
right to seek a remedy from the court. This does not mean that Ted is entitled to the
remedy, this is still at the court’s discretion.
What if Greenwood lodge were unregistered land?
Then the rules of binding successors are less clear. Since estoppel is an equity, we might
assume it cannot be protected by entry of a Land Charge. So Doctrine of Notice applies – i.e.
purchaser needs actual, constructive, or imputed notice. Since Ted is living there, this is
definitely notice. Everything else is the same.
Pippa had inherited the property from Cara?
A donnee is always bound under S116 LRA.

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Land Tute: PE

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55

Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18

Actual Tute Question

3. Detriment due to reliance.

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