LTD Cases

Lizette Dato

1. Montano vs. Insular Government (G.R. No. 3714, January 26, 1909)
Facts:

A petition lodged by Isabelo Montaño before the Court of Land Registration to register in his
name a piece of land used for fishery, growth of nipa and salt deposits

The petition was opposed by the Director of Public Lands on the ground that the land in
question belonged to the State

The Court of Land Registration dismissed the opposition in favor of Montaño and Director of
Public Lands appealed to the higher court

ISSUE
Whether the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some
distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be overflowed at high tide could be
registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section
54 of Act No. 926 of the Phil. Commission.

RULING

The court upheld the decision of the Court of Land Registration holding that lands under tide
water are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner of lands above high water
mark. Although Art 14 of the Law of Waters declared the right of shore fishery public, Art 23
stipulated that authority might be granted individuals to establish hatcheries for fish and
seashells and by article 15 salt-water ponds on private ground not communicating with the sea by
water navigable by boats were recognized as private property, while chapter 10 permitted and
regulated the draining of swamps and marshes, both of private and of public ownership.

Under this uncertain condition the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into
fisheries which became common feature of settlements along the coast and at the time of the
change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. In our opinion it was
the object of Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the purposes
of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, the judgment of the
Court of Land Registration is affirmed,
 2. Legarda vs. Saleeby (G.R. No. 8936, October 2, 1915)

FACTS

Two parcels of land with a wall between them. One parcel registered to the plaintiff and the
adjacent lot to the defendant.

On May 25, 1912, the Court of Land Registration caused the registration of the land in favor of
the plaintiff under the Torrens System, and the wall was included. Several months later, (13
Dec 1912), it was found that the same wall was included in the land title granted to the
defendant.

ISSUE:

Who is the rightful owner of a property ( the wall ) which was registered twice by two different
owners under the Torrens System

RULING:

When two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold - that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with the requirements of the law first, ( the one who
registered the property first ) should be protected.

3. Palomo vs. CA (G.R. No. 95608, January 21, 1997)

FACTS
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which
form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows

1. Involving some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality
of Tiwi, Province of Albay Which, on June 13, 1913,was declared by then Governor General
of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes reserved for provincial park purposes.
Later, the same Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States
of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40
in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916; December 28, and January 17, 1917.
Palomo then donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were
allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 to his heirs,
herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.

3. Sometime soon, Ignacio Palomo claimed that the aforesaid original certificates of title
were lost during the Japanese occupation and filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court
of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953
 4. On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park,"
The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141)
nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

5. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On
April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a
loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

6. On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the
name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as
defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of
Albay.

7. The court ruled in favor of the Republic finding no sufficient proof that the Palomos have
established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which
ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming
that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no
right at all over the properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force. The RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the lower Court

ISSUE:
whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the
Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to
the petition for reconstitution are valid.

Ruling:
The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with the modification that TCT 3913 be
annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable.

Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels
of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof
of ownership in land registration cases
Petitioners apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they
filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates approved by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-
9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, "in
conflict with provincial reservation." In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and
the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for
the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the
reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, were within the perimeter of
the national park, no pronouncement as to damages is in order.

4. DCD Construction vs. Republic (G.R. No. 179978, March 2, 2007)

FACTS:
DCD Construction, through its President, Danilo Dira, applied for registration of
Cadastral Lot No. 53311 through prescription alleging ownership through open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property for over
thirty (30) years.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to grant ownership of the land
in question to the petitioner

RULING:
The court denied the petition for certiorari on the following grounds:

The certification submitted to prove that the land has been declared alienable and
disposable is not sufficient. It is not enough for CENRO or PENRO to certify that land is
alienable and disposable, The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as
alienable and disposable

Doctrine: Based on the doctrine in Republic v Alconaba, one’s ownership acquired

through occupation has to be proven by actual possession and not merely by fiction.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of ACTS OF DOMINIUM over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
 5. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008) ( duplicate of Palomo v
CA )

6. Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap (G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008)

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases regarding the right of the present occupants of Boracay to
secure titles over the lands they occupy, claiming that Proclamation 1801 raised doubts
on their rights to secure the lands by virtue of open, continuous,exclusive and notorious
occupation and possession of the said land since June 12, 1945 or earlier - since time
immemorial.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that since Boracay was not declared
alienable and disposable, whatever possession the petitioners have can not ripen into
ownership.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private complainants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied land in Boracay

RULING:
Continued possession and investments of private claimants do not automatically give
them the right to apply for title of land they are presently occupying. Phil Bill of 1902,
Act 926 and Proc 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay island into agricultural land.
Applying the Regalian Doctrine, it is still considered state property

Persons applying for registration of land or claiming ownership must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable as established by a positive act of
the government

7. Republic vs. Fabio (G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008)

FACTS:
 On May 26, 1995, heirs of Juan Fabio present evidence to establish ownership over
ancestral land in an application to register the land in their name alleging occupation,
improvements and payment of taxes constituting acts of dominium since time
immemorial

On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents’ application for

registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were
lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent heirs of Juan Fabio have indeed acquired a right to register the
subject land in their name

WON the subject land is subject to appropriation and registration

RULING:
THe petition of the Republic was granted and the respondents’ application for
registration and issuance of land title dismissed due to a lack of sufficient evidence that
the lot was classified as alienable and disposable. Said lot is classified as INALIENABLE
LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN and not subject to appropriation nor registration

8. Republic vs. INC and Manalo (G.R. 180067, June 30, 2009)

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the
Register of Deeds To register a parcel of land in Ilocos Norte under Iglesia Ni Cristo, through its
corporate sole, Erano Manalo. This petition was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General
in the lower court.

In 1952 and in 1959, the lots in question were transferred to Iglesia ni Cristo through a Deed of
Sale, the INC alleging 10 years of open, continuous,peaceful possession and occupation of the
subject lots.

The OSG contended that the said lots were only declared alienable and disposable land of
public domain only on May 16, 1993, just five (5) years before the INC’s filing of application for
registration on November 19, 1998

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the lower court’s decision to order the Register of
Deeds to register the subject lands in the name of corporate sole Iglesia ni Cristo despite OSG’s
contention that said lang was not yet declared alienable and disposable land during the time it
was purchased by INC

RULING:
The Court relied on its ruling in the Naguit case, utilizing Sec 14 (1) of the PLA explaining that
the only requirement for the property sought to be registered is that it should be already
alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of registration.

The court further states that if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable , there is already a clear intention on the part of the state to abdicate its exclusive
prerogativeover the property, hence the petition of the OSG was denied.

9. Sampaco vs. Lantud (G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011)

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the Court of Appeals decision. The respondent, (
petitioner in lower court ) filed an action to quiet title with damages before the RTC against
petitioner Datu Kiram Simpaco ( deceased ) and substituted by his heirs represented by Soraya
Sampaco - Macabando

Lantud alleged that he is the owner of the parcel of land in dispute, and that on Aug 25, 1984,
petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco with several men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property
and destroyed nursery buildings, seedlings and other improvements worth 10,000 pesos.

On August 30, 1984, Brgy Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and council issued a decision in writing
that petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco is the rightful owner of the subject land.

Lantud, fearing that the Barangay decision might cast a cloud or prejudice his title stating that
he and his predecessors in interest have been in open, public and exclusive possession of the
property praying that the decision of the Barangay be invalidated and the respondents be
made to pay 10,000 pesos and attorney’s fees

Defendant Sampaco denied the allegations and asserted that it was he and his predecessors
who hae been in open, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the property in dispute
and that the title OCT no. P-658 was secured through fraud and misrepresentation

The trial court based on evidence presented, held that the title was tainted with fraud and
irregularity and therefore, spurious, in effect, null and void without probative value.

Respondent appealed the decision and the CA reversed the decision confirming Lantud as the
owner of the parcel of land covered by OCt P-658 to quiet his title and ordered defendant-
appellee to pay 50,000 as attorney’s fees. CA held that respondent is the holder of a Torrens
title which is 1) the best evidence of ownership 2) incontrovertible and indefeasible and v 3)
not subject to collateral attack

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the validity of OCT P-658 and confirming that the
respondent is the owner of the property in dispute

RULING:
The court holds that the petitioner’s counterclaim for cancellation of respondent’s title is not a
collateral attack but a direct one on the Torrens title which has already prescribed since the
OCT was issued on May 22, 1981 while the counterclaim filed by petitioner was on Oct 15, 1984
clearly beyond the one year prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals did not err in confirming
that the respondent is the owner of the parcel of land covered by OCT P-658

10. Casimiro Development Corp. vs. Mateo (G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011)

FACTS
The parcel of land in dispute was the ancestral land owned the the Mateo family, registered
under the name of one of the children, Laura. Laura, in turn, mortgaged the land to her
creditors without the knowledge of the other members of the family. Eventually, one of
Laura’s creditors further mortgaged the land to China Bank, and unfortunately, was no longer
able to redeem the title to the subject parcel of land. China Bank eventually sold the property
to CDC ( Casimiro Dev’t Corporation ) as is where is. Since the Mateos were in occupation of the
land at the time of the sale, CDC filed an action of Unlawful Detainer against the Mateos to
recover the property

ISSUES
Did CDC acquire the subject land in bad faith?

Who has the better right of possession? One who has a Torrens Title or one who is occupying
the subject land?

RULING:
The Supreme Court declared that since the TCT was in the name of Casimiro Development
Corporation, the Torrens Title was valid and subsisting, CDC having paid the full and fair price of
the land was an innocent purchaser for value. The Torrens Title being indefeasible,
imprescriptible and incontrovertible, no longer open to review or attack.
 11. Valiao vs. Republic (G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011)

FACTS
On Aug 11, 1987, the RTC granted the petition of Pacifico Valiao and his co-heirs to register a
parcel of land in Ilog, Negros Occidental. However, a few days later, a private oppositor filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the land in dispute has not yet been declared
alienable and disposable.

The Republic, through the OSG opposed the application for Registration for the reason that
Petitioner Pacifico Valiao and heirs were not able to prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the said land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto,
contending that tax receipts were not sufficient evidence of ownership. Furthermore, claiming
that Res Judicata had already set in.

The CA reversed the RTC’s decision thus the petition of review on Certiorari

ISSUES:
Whether or not the alleged possession of the applicants for registration, through their
predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to sustain their claim for prescription

Whether or not the lot in dispute is alienable and disposable land of public domain

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petitioners’ registration of the land in question for the reason
that the heirs were not able to present enough evidence that they have been in open,
continuous exclusive and notorious occupation and possession of said land since June 12, 1945.

The Court indoctrinated that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive of ownership
unles supported by other evidence

Furthermore, petitioners also failed to present proof that the land has been declared alienable
and disposable .

12. Republic vs. Jaralve (G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012)

FACTS
This is a petition for Certiorari assailing the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the RTC to allow the petitioners to register a parcel of land in their name .
Gloria Jaralve et al ( respondents) declared that they were co-owners in fee simple of the
subject property, a parcel of land with an area of 731,380 square meters belonging to Cadastral
Lot 18590 situated in Brgy Quiot, Cebu City. They alleged that they occupied the property and
that to the best of their knowledge, there were no encumbrances to their ownership and that
no other party was in possession thereof. They claim that they acquired ownership by means of
purchase of their predecessors -in - interest who have been in continuous, open, adverse,
public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for mor than 30 years or from
June 12, 1945.

To support their application, the following documents were submitted:

1. Sepia Plan

2. Blue Print copy of survey plan

3. Technical description of SGS-07-000307

4, Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate ( of survey of property )

5. Certificate of Community Environment and National Resources office (CENRO) dated March
20, 1996 signed by CENR and PENR Officers that the subject property is within the alienable
and disposable portion of Lot 18590

6. Deeds of Sale

7. Tax Clearances

8. DENR Certification that subject Property is not covered by any subsisting land application

The decision was opposed by several private parties as well as the Republic through the office
of the Solicitor general alleging that the CA erred in ordering that the OCT be issued in the
name of the applicants,

ISSUE:
Did the lower court and the CA err in their decision to have the OCT issued in the name of the
applicants

Whether or not the land in dispute is indeed alienable despite evidence to the contrary

RULING:
Regarding the nature and character of the subject property, the court indoctrinates that land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed, it must be proved. To prove that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, respondents presented
the CENRO certificate, however, the court has previously ruled in Republic v T. A. N. Properties
that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable or
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR secretary had
approved the classification of land and released the land of public domain as alienable and
disposable. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR secretary . These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.

Moreover, DENR Administrative Order ( DAO ) No. 20 dated May 30, 1988 delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. CENRO issue certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. For those falling above 50 hectares, the
issuance of such certificate is within the function of the PENRO. In the case at bar, the subject
property has an area of 731,380 square meters or 73.138 hectares , clearly beyond the
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public domain, thus,
the respondents’ application for registration and issuance of title to lot SGS-07-000307 filed
with the RTC of Cebu, Branch 20, was dismissed.

13. Malabanan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013)

FACTS:

The court addresses the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, heirs of Mario
Malabanan who died during the pendency of appeal for judicial registration of land. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC and denied the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had
not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

During the trial, Malabanan claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

To prove that the property was alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)

On February 23, 2007, the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be
tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:

WON Malabanan was able to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s decision in granting Malabanan, through his heirs, judicial
title to the subject land

RULING:

The Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners failing to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land
as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

14. Gaerlan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014)
FACTS:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the Decision dated
March 11 , 2010 and the Resolution dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in approving the application for registration of title filed
by petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan

In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the above-mentioned property from Mamerta
Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. She had the
property declared for taxation purposes under her name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos.
99893 and 058351.After finding petitioner's application sufficient in form and substance, the trial
court set the case for initial hearing.

On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an Opposition to petitioner's application for registration on the ground that

(1) neither petitioner nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier;

(2) the muniments of title and tax declarations attached to the petition do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject land;

(3) the claim of ownership based on Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of registration;
and

(4) the subject land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable.
Despite these grounds, the trial court rendered Judgment On November 20, 2001, granting
petitioner's application for registration of title.

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that the court
erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is available for private appropriation.On March 11,
2010, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the ruling of the trial court and
dismissing the application for registration of title filed by petitioner, finding that the same failed to
present any proof to establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable.

The CA stressed that the applicant for land registration must prove that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the
application falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO)

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the decision of the RTC and denying the petitioner’s
application for registration of land title?j

RULING:

The court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals based on the following grounds:

1. Petitioner was not able to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation and
possession of the land in dispute since June 12, 1945. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Here, it is not shown by
clear and satisfactory evidence that petitioner by herself or through her predecessors-in-
interest had possessed and occupied the land in an open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious manner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
2. Petitioner failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable land of the public domain her application for registration of title of the subject
property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.

15. Gabriel vs. Crisologo (G.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2014)

FACTS:

Carmeling Crisologo brought an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with
Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an
(petitioners) before the MTCC alleging that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners
unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and
knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon, and that upon discovery of this stealth, verbally
demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures, however, the
petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00 per square meter; that she
gave petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them;
that petitioners refused to vacate the subject property despite several demands.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Crisologo and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises and pay
damages. However, the petitioners attacked the Torrens Title of Crisologo collaterally ,citing that
were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos, and reiterated in Republic v.
Marcos;that the said case was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1271, entitled
"An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but
Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are Alienable and Disposable Under Certain
Conditions and For Other Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that Crisologo failed
to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles,
hence, the titles were void; and that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was
never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land

The RTC reversed the decision of the MTCC, prompting Crisologo to bring the case before the Court
of Appeals. On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC
decision and reinstating that of the MTCC.

ISSUES:

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the RTC’s decision and in reinstating that of the MTCC?

Was Crisologo’s Torrens title subject to collateral attack ?

Who had the better right to possession of the said properties?

RULING:

The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be resolved in this suit to recover
possession is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
subject parcels of land. Therefore, the foremost relevant issue that needs to be determined here is
simply possession, not ownership.

The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim of
possession over that of petitioners

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the
same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides
that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordancer with law.

After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession
over the subject parcels of land.The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner
of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force
and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession of
the subject parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.The
respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land.
Kristina Alpon

16. Moscoso vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46439, April 24, 1984)

FACTS:
· Petitioner applied for land registration of a parcel of residential land
· Alleged the property is her share in the estate of her late father in the partition she entered
with her five other siblings
· The application was opposed by three alleged children of applicant’s father in a common
law union prior to his marriage with applicant’s mother.
· the trial court rendered a decision finding that applicant is not the exclusive owner of the
property
· trial court directed the registration of the land in co-ownership with applicant and the three
oppositors.
· Applicant filed a motion for reconsideration.
· After hearing, the trial court modified its decision finding that of the three oppositors, only
one was able to prove her being an acknowledged natural child of applicant’s father by competent
proof
· the applicant’s share would be 13/14. CA affirmed the decision.
· Applicant contends that the trial court, acting as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue whether oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of his father.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court, acting in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court, Is competent
to determine the right of the opposition to inherit?

RULING No. Due to the following exceptions:

1. Mutual consent of the parties to submit the issues for the determination of the
court;
2. Full opportunity was given to the parties in the presentation of their respective
sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto;
3. Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and
adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues. In the instant case, the exceptions
exist.

17. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 113549, July 5, 1996) - guys sorry medyo haba gd ni kay
ang dates important since may ara prescription and publication involved gusto ko
xa i-summarize kaso basi may miss out ko.

FACTS:
• A parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the
spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor.
• The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting
Director of Lands on 3 January 1922.
• However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision, these exhibits
do not at all show the surveyor's signature.
• In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot
covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay.
• Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the
parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya.
• Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26
February 1926.
• The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not
published.
• On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued while on 19 August
1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-
13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya.
• On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the
owner's duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-
10848 (3947).
• In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the
land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-
96075, approved on 16 December 1968.
• In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land and claiming
ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-
10848 (3947).
• The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that
the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the
amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No.
• The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the
land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.
• In its decision of 11 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner
as follows: 1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and
effect; 2. Ordering Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT
No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the... same;
• The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for
registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land;
however, the then CFI, as a land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot
due to lack of publication or republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was
the basis of the decree of registration and OCT No. 3947.
• The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the
spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a
bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present
any tax declarations.
• The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351),
which, in its decision of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:
• Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for
annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title
• Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land
subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on
31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of
18 September 1925.

RULING:
• Land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only
on 31 December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which
was not yet alienable and disposable.
 • The State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion
of the land is not barred by prescription. –
• Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does
not run against the state.
• The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
• The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52 never acquired jurisdiction over the land
covered by either the original plan or the amended plan for lack of sufficient publication of the first
and total want of publication of the second
• As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the
notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered
by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette.
• There was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law
then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land
registration court was void for want of the required publications.
• The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through
publication and service of notice.
• The decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey
plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended
(Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all.
• There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the amended
plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the
decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots
were concerned.
• A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of
the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have
amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their
way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No.
3947.
• Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the
decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of
publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over
the land embraced by the amended plan.

18. Delos Angeles vs. Santos (G.R. No. L-19615, December 24, 1964)

FACTS:
· An application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land was filed by Leonor de los Angeles
and 7 co applicants.
· Among other things it alleged that “applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of
the aforesaid land.
· The required notices were given. Dir. of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land “is a
portion of the public
· domain.” The court dismissed the application. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land
for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative
act consisting in the issuance by the Dir. of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same
parcel of land?

RULING:
 Orders appealed from set aside
· Director of lands’ jurisdiction, administrative supervision and executive control extend only to
lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private ownership. Accordingly, a
homestead patent issued over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect
against the owner.
· Proceedings for lands registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead
patent are
not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the private or public character of
the land as far as the courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned

19. Concepcion vs. Concepcion (G.R. No. 147928, January 11, 2005)

FACTS:
· The land under dispute in the case at bar is the Zulueta property.
· The trial court in the partition case filed by Jose Concepcion, father of herein
respondents, declared Jose entitled to a part of the land under dispute and ordered
petitioners to contribute proportionately to satisfy said claim. Petitioners failed to comply
with the said order.
· Jose Concepcion filed a petition for the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title
of the questioned land before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sitting as a Land
Registration Court.
· Said court ordered the delivery of said title to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of Jose's part of the land.
· Petitioners opposed the decision but said opposition was dismissed by the cadastral
court on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court has jurisdiction to resolve the opposition.

RULING:
· It is the decision of the Supreme Court that the trial court sitting as a cadastral court
has jurisdiction to resolve the opposition brought about by herein petitioners. Under
Section 2 of P. D. 1529
· Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interests therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
· The Supreme Court further held that the above provision has eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the Regional Trial Court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court.

20. Latorre vs. Latorre (G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010)

FACTS::
· In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection
and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own
son, herein respondent, and one Ifzal Ali.
· Petitioner alleged that respondent leased a parcel of land that they co-owned to Ifzal in
Dasmarinas Village and that respondent declared that he is the sole owner of the said parcel of
land.
· Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the
case was improperly laid.
 · He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration
of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real
action affecting title to and interest over the subject property.
· Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should
have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.
· The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of the respondent on January 2, 2001.
· However, on April 28, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because the
case should have been filed in RTC Makati.
· Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
· Hence, this petition.

ISSUE::
· Whether or not petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule
41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC is the
proper remedy in the case at bar.

RULING:
· A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
· Petitioner prayed to the Supreme Court to decide the case on the merits. To do so, however,
would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented,
taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits.
· This, unfortunately, the Supreme Court cannot do.
· It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with the Supreme Court
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
· Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
· This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

21. Lozada vs. Bracewell (G.R No. 179155, April 2, 2014)

FACTS:
1. · Petitioner Nicomedes Lozada filed an application for registration and confirmation
of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted by the
RTC-Makati City, acting as a land registration court.
2. · The Land Registration Authority (LRA) consequently issued a Decree in the name
of petitioner, who later obtained Original Certificate of Title covering said parcel of land.
3. · Subsequently, respondent James Bracewell filed a petition for review of the decree
of registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
“Property Registration Decree” before the RTC-Las Pinas City, claiming that a portion of
the aforementioned Plan of which he is the absolute owner and possessor, is fraudulently
included in the earlier mentioned Decree.
4. · The RTC-Las Pinas City rendered a Decision finding that petitioner obtained the
Decree in bad faith.
5. · Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside said Decree and ordered petitioner to
cause the amendment of the said Plan.
6. · Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before the CA arguing mainly that
the RTC-Las Pinas City had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the same branch of the
court that rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the decree.
7. · The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Las Pinas, finding that respondents were
able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of said Decree, which is
 the only ground that may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration
under Section 32 of PD No. 1529.
8. · It likewise held that, since the petition for review was filed within one (1) year from
the issuance of the questioned decree and considering that the subject lot is located in
Las Pinas City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the case. With the motion for
reconsideration denied, petitioner thus sought relief via the instant petition for review
challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the RTC-Las Pinas City.

ISSUE:
· Whether the RTC of Las Pinas City has jurisdiction over the petition for review of the
Decree.

RULING:
· Yes, the RTC of Las Pinas City has jurisdiction over the petition for review of the Decree.
· Under Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended, which was the governing law
at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration proceedings,
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was conferred upon the RTCs of their
respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.
· The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD NO. 1529 and under
Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the RTC
of the province or city where the land is situated. Basically, Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides
that any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud may file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration no later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration.
· As the land subject of this case is clearly situated in Las Pinas City, the application for its
original registration should have been filed before the RTC-Las Pinas City.

22. Noblejas vs. Teehankee (G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968)

FACTS:
· Antonio Noblejas, herein petitioner, was the duly appointed and confirmed Commissioner of
Land Registration. Under the terms provided in Republic Act No. 1151, the said Commissioner is
entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a judge of the Court of
First Instance.
· On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice sent to the petitioner a letter requiring
him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for
"approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision
plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
· Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance,
and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule
140 of the Rules of Court.
· On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case
exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner
was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
· On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in
his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and
praying for restraining writs.
· In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration
Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of
 First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the
function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature;
that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle
of the separation of powers.
ISSUE:
· Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court?
RULING:
· No.
· If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent
to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme
Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative
function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the
control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
· There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with
administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
· The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
· The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions.
· RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was
not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon the Court’s recommendation.
· Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.
· The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

23. Gomez vs. CA (G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988)

Facts:
· Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan
onAugust 30, 1968.The lots were among those involved in the case of Governmentof the
Philippine Islands vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner
of certain lots in SitioPoponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
· Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez(father of Consolacion).
· After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court
issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating
the subject lots in petitioners' favor.
· On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of
August 5, 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office
to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of
August 5,1981.
· On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original
Registration, Land Registration Commission submitted a report to the court aquo stating that
portions of the land sought for registration were covered by homestead patents issued in1928
and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act.
· He recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order of October 6, 1981 be
set aside.
· Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of
Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981 should be
implemented because it had long become final and executory.
 · After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting aside the decision dated
August 5, 1981 and the order dated October 6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees.
· Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
· Hence, this recourse.

Issue:
· Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and executory, that it may no
longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.

Ruling:
· Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property RegistrationDecree)
which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith
issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title.
· Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 ofP.D. 1529 in
that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section30, the decree of registration
must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge
set aside in his decision, dated25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981,he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
· Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in
a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration.
· Petition denied.

24. Angeles vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 142549, March 9, 2010)

FACTS:
The property involved in this case is covered by OCT No. 994, which
encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate.
· On May 3, 1965, petitioner and some individuals, claiming to be the heirs
of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to
inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in
the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal
· Commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the
property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly
registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
· The court granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs.
· Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that
did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the
issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had
already become final and executory.
· Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called
for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its
jurisdiction, as it saw fit. Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City filed their Comment on November 16, 2000.
· Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the
rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition.
· Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-
interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land
described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share,
ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to
XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive.
 · However, the Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City
refused to comply with the RTC Order based on endorsements issued by the
DOJ and the LRA for it was found that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was
issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919)
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429.
· This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding
Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of
the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support
the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance
of new transfer certificates of title in their names.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may refuse to issue the decree of registration, even though
ordered by the court.

RULING:

· Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its

duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative.
· Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy
the integrity of the Torrens system of registration.
· The issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely
ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double
titling of the same parcel of land.
· The Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with
the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the
subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those
requesting for the issuance of the TCTs.
· There was sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with
the RTC Order, given the finding that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights,
did not exist.

Leigh Razonable

25. Balbin vs. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur (G.R. No. L-20611, May 8, 1969

FACTS:

• On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate
copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of
Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title.

• The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise
not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the
certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in
favor of three different buyers

• The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional
memorandum stating that "three co-owners duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the
register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan
upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the
vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur."

• Petitioners referred to the Land Registration Commissioner, which upheld the action taken by the
Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur.

ISSUE: WON the co-owners copies must be presented to the Register of Deeds before their title will be
annotated.

RULING: Yes. It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different
occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to
Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owners duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the
three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the
three co-owners duplicates must likewise be surrendered.

Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel
annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which
provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument
is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of
deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument."

There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be
adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on
the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which
means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting
the land covered by the title.

The decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration
are affirmed.

26. Guzman vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46935, December 21, 1987)

Facts:

· Deogracias Queriza was the original owner of a parcel of unregistered residential land. On July 20,
1957, he executed a Deed of Pacto de Retro sale over said land in favor of his niece, private respondent
Quirimit with the express stipulation that the "vendor a retro may exercise the right of repurchase within 5
years from the execution of these presents and upon failure to take advantage of the right herein granted
him, then this contract shall acquire the character of absolute, irrevocable and consummated sale."
Private respondent did not register the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale but took possession of the land by
building her house on a portion thereof.

· It appears that subsequently, Deogracias Queriza mortgaged the same parcel of land to the
Manaoag Rural Bank, from which it was allegedly redeemed on his behalf by his nephew Miguel Queriza

· Deogracias Queriza, without having exercised his right to repurchase under the Pacto de Retro
Sale, executed over said parcel of land and two others, a Deed of "Rimunitary [sic] Inter-vivos Donation" 2
in favor of Miguel Queriza, who thereafter declared the land in his name for taxation purposes and
registered the Deed of Donation on August 8, 1967 in the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.

· On December 8, 1970, Miguel Queriza sold the land to petitioners spouses Gregorio de Guzman,
Jr. and Corazon Quinto. The Deed of Sale was registered on December 9, 1970 and the tax declaration
placed under their names.
· Petitioners sent private respondent written notice to vacate the land in question, and upon refusal
by the latter to do so a Civil for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession before the CFI

· It ruled that the Pacto de Retro Sale was only a mortgage and that the Deed of Donation in favor of
Miguel Queriza was valid, declaring petitioners owners of the land.

· The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that private
respondent had a preferential right to the land as against petitioners who were purchasers in bad faith. It
also found the transaction between Deogracias Queriza and private respondent to be what it purported to
be — a pacto de retro sale and not an equitable mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether or not that the pacto de retro sale was an equitable mortgage?

Whether or not the donation was valid?

HELD: The transactions between Deogracias Queriza and private respondent was a pacto de retro sale.

The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would have taken under the
circumstances, especially in buying a piece of land in the actual visible and public possession of another
person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to had faith.

Appellant has been and continues to be in actual possession of the property, and her deed of pacto de
retro sale dates back to 1957 while the deed of sale in favor of appellees was executed in 1970; and there
is no showing that appellant’s possession and her pacto de retro sale were done in bad faith."

The transaction between Deogracias Queriza and private respondent was a true pacto de retro sale.
The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately
vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within
the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the
vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold 9 and failure of the vendee
a retro to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership
for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. 10 In
the case at bar, absolute ownership of the land in question was vested on the private respondent in
1962 upon failure of Deogracias Queriza to repurchase said land. Thus, in 1967 when he allegedly
donated the same to Miguel Queriza, he was no longer the owner thereof. Settled is the rule that a donor
cannot lawfully convey what is not his property.

Respondent Raymunda Ringor Quirimit owner of the land in dispute is affirmed.

Abrigo vs. De Vera (G.R No. 154409, June 21, 2004)

*MEDYO LABA N NGA CASE PO MAY PARTS NGA GN BUTANG KO LNG PARA CLEAR
ANG BASIS, PWEDE NYO LANG MA OMIT LATER*
Facts:

· On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go.
The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the
vendees.
· On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, approved the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of
the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the
previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding
and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania
failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.

· Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a
free patent over the parcel of land involved which was later canceled.

· On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to
the Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo.

· On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x.
Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence.

· On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages
against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal Trial Court. On February 25, 1998, the
parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that
neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.’

· on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City] for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order
and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].

· dThe lower court rendered the Decision, awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as
damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent]
damages and attorney’s fees."Not contented with the assailed decision, both parties [appealed to the
CA].

· the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of
7
Private Respondent Romana de Vera. Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.

· On reconsideration, the CA amended its decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a

purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on
the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.

Issue: Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in
question?

Held: Romana de Vera is the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in
question, being an innocent purchaser for value.

{{Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:

"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
 "Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith."

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the
property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go)
knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
respective sales under Act 3344.

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice
to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean
that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded

Good Faith Requirement

Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not
by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such
registration must be coupled with good faith.

Where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by
the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights
under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in
converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is
first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.}}

Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith

Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The
subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing
in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant
[Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no
notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her
vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her
vendor’s title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises.

27. Fudot vs. Cattleya Land, Inc. (G.R. No. 171008, September 13, 2007)

FACTS: Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked
someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it
intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles,
respondent purchased the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992 and
subsequently, on 30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale
were registered with the Register of Deeds on 06 November 1992 and 04 October 1993,
 respectively.The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate the
deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment. The attachment was
eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their
attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent.

On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the
owner’s copy of the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly
executed by the Tecsons in favor of petitioner on 19 December 1986. On the following day,
respondent sent a letter of protest/opposition to petitioner’s application. Respondent learned
that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and
issued a new title in her name.

On 26 June 1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed any
deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She averred that
her signature in petitioner’s deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be declared null and
void.8 She also claimed that she has discovered only recently that there was an amorous
relationship between her husband and petitioner.

Petitioner, for her part, alleged in her answer10 that the spouses Tecson had sold her the subject
property and delivered to her owner's copy of the title on 26 December 1986. She claims that she
subsequently presented the said title to the Register of Deeds but the latter refused to register the
same because the property was still under attachment. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondent and later appealed in CA claiming that the rule on double sale is applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on double sale is applicable to the case? /Who has the better
right between the petitioner and the respondent on the land?

HELD: (Trial Court & CA Favored Respondent, affirmed by SC)

The trial court rendered its decision:

(i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed
of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject
land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing respondent’s claim for damages against the Register
of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncion’s claim for damages against
petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim for lack of the
required preponderance of evidence.

The respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in its favor ahead of petitioner. The
trial court concluded that the purported signature of Asuncion in the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner was forged, thereby rendering the sale void.

The appellate court, however, dismissed her appeal, holding that there was no double sale
because the alleged sale to petitioner was null and void in view of the forgery of Asuncion’s
purported signature in the deed. Moreover, even if there was double sale, according to the
appellate court, respondent’s claim would still prevail since it was able to register the second sale
in its favor in good faith, had made inquiries before it purchased the lots, and was informed that
the titles were free from encumbrance except the attachment on the property.

SC finds the appeal without merit and affirms the decision of CA.

28. Alinas vs. Alinas (G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008)

Facts:
 ● Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated. They left behind two lots:

> Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega standing on it (Lot A)

> Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house (Lot B)

● Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers.
Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent
spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to
the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO),to pay off
petitioners' loans with said institutions.
● Lot A was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot B was mortgaged
to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the
administration of said properties.
● petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of respondent spouses.
● Records show that Lot A was foreclosed & issued in the name of RBO. RBO executed a sale and
conveyed the said lot to the respondents
● Lot was foreclosed by SSS. It was redeemed by Onesiforo and sold the house to the respondent
spouses with his signature in the Absolute Deed of Sale
● Petitioners filed for with RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their
conjugal properties

Issue: Whether or not the acquisition of Lot A & Lot B by the respondents was valid.

Held:

● There is no proof that the petitioners left the care and administration of their properties to
respondent spouses and that there is an agreement between the petitioners and respondent
spouses regarding remittance to the SSS and the RBO of rental income from their properties.
Respondent spouses are not responsible for the non-payment of loans.
● Lot A had been validly purchased by respondent spouses from RBO. the sale was made after the
redemption period had lapsed. Respondent spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO
and definitely not from petitioners.
● Lot B is governed by the Conjugal Property of Gains under the family code since the sale in
question occurred in 1989 although the petitioner were married before it was promulgated.The
sale of property under CPG without the consent of one renders it null and void. The sale of
petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.

29. Montaño vs. Francisco (G.R. No. 160380, July 30, 2009

Montano v Francisco

Facts:

Petitioner spouses Montaño executed a Deed of Conditional Sale with GSIS covering a parcel
of land together with the house and improvements. The Montaños started paying the
amortization in January 1979, and occupied the house and lot in 1980. Atty. Salvador Paja I
went to their house and claimed that the lot was already owned by respondent Rosalina
Francisco in the summer of 1994.

Petitioner made inquiries regarding the sale of the lot. There was an annotation stating that a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property was executed in favor of Rosalina Francisco
covering the disputed parcel of land. There also appears an order directing the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City to issue a new owner's duplicate copy of the said certificate of title in the
name of GSIS and declaring the lost copy as null and void. She requested the Register of
Deeds to annotate a Notice of Adverse Claim on the said certificate by virtue of the Deed of
Conditional Sale executed by GSIS in her favor. She learned that the respondent purchased the
subject land in a public auction sale of delinquent real property.

Petitioners claim that they were not given a notice of the auction sale. They were not furnished
with a sale certificate nor did they receive any notice to the right to redeem the property.

The record folder presented in the trial court showed that the subject property is in the name of
Baldomero Dagdag. It also included other notices and certificates of the tax delinquency
proceeding. The proceeding was addressed to GSIS and not to the spouses Montano.The
Notice of Right to Redeem was addressed to GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag and the Final Deed
of Sale but no redemption was made within 1 year period.

Issue: Whether or not the tax delinquency proceedings made on the subject lot was regular and
legal.

Held: Yes, the tax delinquency proceeding was proper. GSIS, as the registered owner of the
property, is the taxpayer entitled to the notice of tax delinquency and not the spouses Montano.
It was not deprived of its property without due process and that notice was regularly served.
When public respondents caused the service of the notice of sale to Baldomero Dagdag of the
GSIS, the interest of the taxpayer was deemed to have been protected and the notice
requirement was complied with.

Regarding the alleged defect in the publication, the notice was published thrice, as required by
law as noted in the affidavit of the Editor-in-Chief of the Visayan Tribune.

There was no redemption made within one year period. The Final Deed of Sale executed in
favor of the respondent was valid.

30. Bulaong vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 156318, September 5, 2011)

Facts: The case involves conflicting claims of two sets of parties over parcels of lands. The first
parcel of land was originally registered in the name of Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha
Limpo.6 The other parcel of land was originally registered in the names of Pacifica E. Limpo,
married to Nicanor C. Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha Limpo.

These parcels of land were mortgaged by the daughter of Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina
Christi Limpo, upon the authority of her father, to the Bulaongs, to secure a loan. The mortgage
was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage dated January 13, 1993.

The Bulaongs alleged that before they executed the mortgage, Regina gave them the owner’s
duplicates of title of the two properties. Anselmo Bulaong, together with his counsel, Atty. Roberto
Dionisio, allegedly went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to check the titles of the
properties to be mortgaged. According to the Bulaongs, the Register of Deeds, Atty. Elenita Corpus,
assured them that the TCT were completely clear of any liens or encumbrances from any party.
Relying on this assurance, Anselmo Bulaong agreed to the execution of the mortgage over the two
properties.
After the execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs once again went to the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan to register and annotate the mortgage on the titles. They learned then that the
Register of Deed’s copies of the two titles were among the records that were burned in the fire on
March 7, 1987. Atty. Elenita Corpus convinced them to cause the reconstitution of the originals of
the titles, and further assured them that the mortgage over the properties would be protected since a
copy of the Deed of Mortgage had already been given to her office for annotation.

On February 4, 1993, the newly reconstituted titles were issued, still in the names of Fortunato
Limpo, and of Pacifica Limpo and Fortunato Limpo, respectively.

New titles were again issued upon the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Regina’s parents.
Regina replaced her parents as the registered owner; similarly, The other parcel of land was issued
in the names of Pacifica Limpo and Regina Limpo, as her parents’ heir. The new titles are in
Regina’s name.

To the Bulaongs’ astonishment, the new titles in Regina’s name now contained entries pertaining to
a Writ of Execution. It appears that a certain Veronica Gonzales had filed a criminal case for estafa
against Regina with the RTC of Bulacan,The RTC rendered a decision acquitting Regina, but at the
same time ordering her to pay Veronica actual damages.By virtue of a writ of execution issued on
December 29, 1992, the above-quoted notice of levy was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Registry of Bulacan on January 4, 1993. However, this was not annotated on the titles themselves
because at the time of the levy, the properties had not yet been transferred to Regina, but were still
registered in the name of her parents.

The annotation was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by her parents on
November 5, 1991 to transfer their interest in both properties to her. Notably, Regina never
registered the sale with the Register of Deeds.

To satisfy Regina’s judgment debt, the two lots were sold at public auction to Veronica, the only
bidder. The Certificate of Sale was annotated on the titles. Upon the lapse of the one year
redemption period on June 20, 1994, Veronica’s titles over the properties were consolidated. A final
deed of sale was issued in Veronica’s name and annotated.

On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had the mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff
conducting the auction sale on August 22, 1994. The Bulaongs were the highest bidders, buying the
properties, paid the corresponding capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax, which were
required before the titles to the lots could be transferred in their names. The Certificate of Sale in
their favor was inscribed on August 23, 1994.

ISSUE: a.) Whether or not Veronica has a superior right over the properties?

b.) Whether or not there was a valid foreclosure sale?

A. The Higher Court grant the petition and held that redemption is not the proper remedy. The
CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming the properties from Veronica when they had the
option of doing so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA concluded that the consolidation
of the titles to the lots in Veronica’s name thus became a matter of course.Regina’s interest
in the properties is not established.

To begin with, not only were the properties subject of the attachment not registered in
Regina’s name, the Deed of Absolute Sale on which Regina based her interest was not even
annotated on these titles. While Regina purportedly purchased her parents’ rights to the
subject properties in 1991, she never asserted her rights over these properties by presenting
the Deed of Absolute Sale to the Register of Deeds for registration and annotation on the
 titles. As a matter of fact, it was Veronica, and not Regina, who presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale to the Register of Deeds.

From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens system remains,
for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is registered,
notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the corresponding deed is
registered. Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.

One of the principal features of the Torrens system of registration is that all encumbrances
on the land shall be shown, or at least intimated upon the certificate of title and a person
dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and
inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated. Since the Bulaongs
had no knowledge of the unregistered sale between Regina and her parents, the Bulaongs
can neither be bound by it, nor can they be prejudiced by its consequences. This is but the
logical corollary to the rule set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529, in keeping with the basic
legal maxim that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

B. The foreclosure sale was not valid. Where the property to be sold consists of distinct
lots, tracts or parcels, or is susceptible of division without injury, it should be offered
for sale in parcels and not en masse, for the reason that a sale in that manner will
generally realize the best price, and will not result in taking from the debtor any more
property than is necessary to satisfy the judgment. It will also enable the defendant to
redeem any one or more of the parcels without being compelled to redeem all the land
sold.A sale of additional land or personal property after enough has been sold to
satisfy the judgment is unauthorized.

One of the lots would have been sufficient to satisfy the judgement debt. The sale of
both parcels of land resulted in great prejudice to the Bulaongs. The execution sale is
defective. Veronica’s execution sale is invalid and must be set aside.

31. Aboitiz vs. PO (G.R. No. 208450, June 5, 2017)

*six issues sang case, gn butang ko lg tanan po pwede na pili nyo lg ang related sa LTD,
under sa Register of Deeds ni nga topic sa syllabus*

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land initially registered and titled under the name of Roberto
Aboitiz (Roberto). The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. This parcel of land originally belonged
to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of his son, Ciriaco Seno (Ciriaco). This property included 2 lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land
subject of this case, Lot No. 2835. In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had
executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor
of [petitioner] Roberto." In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot
2835 and 2807." The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco
agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as
consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with
after the quitclaim. In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with
portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision
dated November 23, 2009. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision,
declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles
issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected. The Court of Appeals
discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good faith
since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the Spouses Po. However, it ruled in
favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that registered property may be reconveyed to the
"rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name." The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no
longer the owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano, during
his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent buyers in good
faith. The Spouses argue that the decision of Regional Trial Court City granting the complaint of
the Spouses Po is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter. They claim that a branch of the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal
branch; it is the Court of Appeals that has this jurisdiction. The Spouses Po also filed a Petition
for Review. They claim that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers
for value." They allegedly knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax declaration had
the following annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA
LEE PO, married to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that one may be considered a
duplicate to the other.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria
Po's complaint;

2) Whether the action is barred by prescription;

3) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;

4) Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust
for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;

5) Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and
Victoria Po should be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property;
6) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable
parties; and

7) Whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz are
innocent purchasers in good faith.

HELD:

1) Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or possession of,
real property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over the
annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is
provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate
Appellate Court shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts. While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul the
judgments of the Regional Trial Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of
a Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title. Considering the
Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the latter's
assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for
annulment of judgment. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.

2) "An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten [10] years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property." The basis for this is Section 53, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 in relation to Articles 1456 and 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Under Presidential Decree No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner of a property may avail of legal remedies
against a registration procured by fraud: SECTION 53. Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon
Entry of New Certificate. – In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue
all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however,
to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title ... CIVIL CODE, Art. 1456
provides: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1144(2) provides: Article 1144. The following
actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (2) Upon an
obligation created by law. In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the
time the property is registered. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek
to question the contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to t h e property.
What is put on issue in an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is the ownership of
the property and its registration. It does not question any fraudulent contract. Should that be the
case, the applicable provisions are Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. Thus, an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property. Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on
November 19, 1996, less than three (3) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action
for reconveyance.

3) There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable
time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned it. Laches has set in
when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert the right. The elements of
laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio: There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the
defendant or one under whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was
delay in asserting a right after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to
sue; (3) defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4)
there is injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.
"Laches is different from prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an issue of
how much time has passed. The time period when prescription is deemed to have set in is fixed
by law. Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the effect of delay and not the period of
time that has lapsed. When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the
Spouses Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property
sold to them by Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad
faith and fraud. The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of
registration. Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this
case. There was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had
knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right. Thus, it cannot be said that they are
barred by laches.

4) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata
embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment,
respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c):
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary Thereto. An exception to this rule is if the party
claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land
registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an issue of ownership has
been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full
opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a
bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property. However, this is not the
circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their claim in the
registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.

5) The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses
Po is fake and fraudulent. 181 They argue that this is evidenced by certifications of the
document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their
rights over the property until 18 years later. They also claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale is
inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to
prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial Court lent credence to
documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter's testimony about Mariano's sale of the
property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco's sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in the name of Victoria. The Regional Trial Court thus held: In this case, the Court
believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the proprietary rights of the plaintiffs
considering the land was already declared for taxation purposes in plaintiffs' names after the tax
declaration of said land, first in the name of Mariano Seno was cancelled and another one
issued in the name of Ciriaco Seno when the latter bought the said land from his father Mariano
Seno, and after the said tax declaration in the name of Ciriaco Seno was cancelled and another
one issued in the name of plaintiffs herein. So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject
land from the Heirs of Mariano Seno who are no longer the owners thereof and the tax
declaration of subject land was no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs
of Mariano Seno. The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the
effect that Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po
was issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz married to
Maria Cristina Cabarruz. Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their
interest, will first verify from the Assessor's Office that status of said land whether it has clean
title or not. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is,
thus, presumed regular and authentic. Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the
property was sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the
right to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and
the Mariano Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on.

6) The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so
necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her
interest in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties. The
Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at
best necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court: Section 8.
Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. It is clear that the
Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests in the
property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any
ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance.
The ruling of this Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not
affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and
Isabel. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable
parties.

7) An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and
fair price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. He or she buys the
property believing that "the seller is the owner and could transfer the title to the property." If a
property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look beyond the transfer
certificate of title to be considered a purchaser in good faith for value. Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 states in Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing
under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of
record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or
encumbrances of record. Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser
for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone. Third. Any public highway or private way established
or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of
title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have
been determined. Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by
virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian
reform. In Leong v. See: The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as
a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further." One need not inquire beyond the four comers of
the certificate of title when dealing with registered property... The protection of innocent
purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social interest embedded in the legal concept
granting indefeasibility of titles. Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more
familiar with the history and status of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur
less costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property compared to a third party. Such
costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in
transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for the entire society. Thus, respondents
were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the property. They may rely
solely on the face of the title. The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual
knowledge of any defect or other circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to
inquire into the title of the seller. If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is
obliged to investigate beyond the face of the title. Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed a
purchaser in good faith entitled to protection under the law.

Respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel cannot be deemed purchasers in bad faith.

32. HI-LON Manufacturing Inc. vs. COA (G.R. No. 210669, Aug

HI-LON MANUFACTURING, INC vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (now
DPWH),converted to a road right-of-way (RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m. parcel of
land located in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project. The
subject property was registered in the name of Commercial and Industrial Real Estate Corporation
( CIREC) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. T-40999. Later on, Philippine Polyamide Industrial
Corporation (PPIC) acquired the subject property, which led to the cancellation of TCT No. T-40999 and
the issuance of TCT No. T..:120988 under its name. PPIC then mortgaged the subject property with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government financing institution, which later acquired the
property in a foreclosure proceeding on September 6, 1985. TCT No. T-120988, under PPIC's name, was
then cancelled, and TCT No. T-151837 was issued in favor ofDBP. Despite the use of the 29,690 sq.
m.portion of the property as RROW, the government neither annotated its claim or lien on the titles of
CIREC, PPIC andDBP nor initiated expropriation proceedings, much less paid just compensation to the
registered owners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not HI-LON is entitled to just compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject
property?

HELD: NO.

Having determined that HI-LON or its predecessor-in-interest TGPI does not own the RROW in
question,as it has been the property of the Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by the DBP up
to the present, the COA concluded that the proper valuation of the claim for just compensation is
irrelevant as HI-LON is not entitled thereto in the first place.Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the
subject property is not just an ordinary asset, but is being used as a RROW for the Manila South
Expressway Extension Project, a road devoted for public use since it was taken in1978. Under the
Philippine Highway Act of 1953, "right-of-way" is defined as the land secured and reserved to the public
for highway purposes, whereas "highway" includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage structures,
signs,guardrails, and protective structures in connection with highways. Article 420 of the New Civil Code
considers as property of public dominion those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character.Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-of-way (RROW) can be
considered as a property of public dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be
leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or
improvements and other incidental matters. However,this RROW must be differentiated from the concept
of easement of right of way under Article 649 of the same Code,which merely gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title thereto.In as much as the owner of
the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established,and may use
the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.

Nelly

33. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds (G.R. No. L-630, November 15, 1947)

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
register of deeds on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction.
Krivenko appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:

· WoN an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

· WoN the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitution is applicable in the case at bar?

RULING:

· NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that,
under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per
se and ab initio.

· Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed
that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained
in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except
"upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.

34. Grande vs. CA (G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962)

FACTS:

· The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela inherited from their deceased
mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the
Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes.

· The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as
stated in the title.

· By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river,
and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The
Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in
 peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948,
when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however,
stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

· The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and
pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.

ISSUE:

WoN the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners?

HELD:

· Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent
land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have
become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of
which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by
prescription.

· Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934
via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the
Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired
the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession
took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code,
which only took effect in 1950.

35. Director of Lands vs. CA (G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

§ Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
 § possession of the Infiels over the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan
§ land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain
§ Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
§ ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
§ donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

ISSUES:

1. WoN the land is already a private land - YES

2. WoN the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO

HELD:

IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1. YES
§ already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
§ it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption
§ The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
§ The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO
§ If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had
a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
§ The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

36. Republic vs. IAC (G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988)

FACTS:

· On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose
T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said
parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is
located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the
applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far
back as 1928.

· The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was the
service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.

· On behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the
Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that the
applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied
for.

· At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation
of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence, an
Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except for the
Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development.

The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it
has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with
its predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of
survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-
65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-112592 (at
least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, conti nuous, peaceful, adverse
against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

· Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11 of the
1973 Constitution to the case at bar.

· Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is

disqualified to own and register its title to the lots in question. Further, it argues that since the
application for registration was filed only on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution
took effect on January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffec-
tual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said Constitution.

ISSUE:

· WoN the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporate sole should be treated as an
ordinary private corporation for the purpose of application of Art. XIV, sec 11 of 1973
Constitution?

HELD:

· Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as
follows:
"Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. --Any corporation sole may purchase and hold
real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes,
and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real
property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the
province where the property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made to the
satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given
by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said court may have directed,
and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted.
The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief
archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as a corporation sole, and
may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, sect or church represented by the
corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the
religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and
personal property, such rules, regulations and discipline shall control and the intervention of the
courts shall not be necessary."

· There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation is vested with the
right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an
ordinary private corporation because whether or not it will be treated as such, the Consti tutional
provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.

In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of
Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property
at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.

37. Cureg vs. IAC (G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989)

Leonida Cureg, Romeo Carniyan, et al. v. IAC, Domingo Apostol, et al.

GR No. 73465 I September 7, 1989 I Medialdea, J. (Gel)

Facts:

· In 1982 Apostol filed a complaint for quieting of title and damage with preliminary injunction against the
Carniyans with the RTC of Isabela.

· Apostol, et al. alleged that they are the legal heirs of Domingo Geraro who has been in OCEN
possession of parcel of land referred to as “motherland” since time immemorial or before July 26, 1894.

· During the execution of the Extrajudicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance, the motherland
already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about 3 has on the north caused by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River.

· Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under a declaration. Apostol, et al.
were about to cultivate their “motherland” together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by
the Carniyans from continuing to do so.
· Carniyans’ answer: the “motherland is nonexistent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of
Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the “subject land” is an accretion to their registered land
and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the “accretion” for many years now.

RTC: Apostol is the absolute owner

IAC: affirmed RTC

Issue: W/N can be considered riparian owners who are entitled to the “subject land” which is an accretion?

Held:

· Apostol’s claim of ownership is anchored on 4 tax declarations, while Carniyans relied on the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate Title (OTC) No. P19093, dated November 25,
1968. The declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not conclusive
evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an OCT indicates true and legal ownership by
the registered owners over the disputed premises.

· Since OCT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, Apostol’s
claim over their “motherland,” allegedly existing between petitioners’ land and the Cagayan River, is deemed
barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT.

· Thus the alleged “motherland” claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The “subject land” is an
alluvial deposit left by the northland movement of Cagayan River and pursuant to NCC 457:

· “To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.”

· However, it should be noted that the area covered by OTC No. P19093 is only 4,584m 2. The accretion
attached to said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners’ land, being an
accretion left by the change of course or the northland movement of the Cagayan River does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. (Grande v. CA, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens
System.

· Petition granted. IAC reversed.

38. vi. Jomoc vs. CA (G.R. No. 92871, August 2, 1991)

FACTS

· The lot in Cagayan de Oro City of the late Pantaleon Jomoc was fictitiously sold and
transferred to third persons.

· Maria P. Vda. Jomoc, as administrator of the estate filed suit to recover the property.
· The case was decided in favor of Jomoc and was accordingly appealed by Mariano So and
Gaw Sur Cheng. Pending the appeal, Jomoc executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement aid Sale
of Land with private respondent. The document was not yet signed by all the parties nor
authorized but in the meantime, Maura So had made partial payments.

· In 1983, Mariano So, agreed to settle the case by executing a Deed of Reconveyance of the
land in favor of Pantaleon Jomoc.

· On February 28, 1983, the heirs of Jomoc executed another extrajudicial settlement with
absolute sale in favor of Lim Leong Kang and Lim Pue king. Later, Maura So demanded from the
Jomoc family the execution of the final deed of conveyance.

· Demand ignored. Maria So sued the Jomoc heirs for specific performance to execute and
deliver the proper registrable deed of sale over the lot. So then filed a notice of lis pendens.

· Jomoc’s heirs believed that Maura So had backed out from the transaction as evidenced by
an oral testimony that she did where she expressed frustration in evicting squatters who
demanded large sums as a condition for vacating. Hence, they executed the other extrajudicial
settlement with sale of registered land in favor of the spouses Lim.

· The spouses Lim, however, registered their settlement and sale only on April 27, 1983. The
lower court found that (1) the case is one of double sales; and (2) the spouses Lim are registrants
in bad faith. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

ISSUE

WoN contract of sale by Maria P. Jomoc with private respondent is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds.

HELD

· No. The contract is enforceable.

· The meeting of the minds and the delivery of sums as partial payment is clear and this is
admitted by both parties to the agreement.

· The contract of sale of real property even if not complete in form, so long as the essential
requisites of consent of the contracting parties, object, and cause of the obligation concur and
they were clearly established to be present is valid and effective as between the parties.

· Spouses Lim do not have a better right. They purchased the land with full knowledge of a
previous sale to private respondent and without requiring from the vendor-heirs any proof of the
prior vendee’s revocation of her purchase. They did so in bad faith or on the belief that a
registration may improve their position being subsequent buyers of the same lot.
 39. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 108998, August 24, 1994)

Facts:

· On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. in San Pablo City, from Cristeta Dazo Belen At the time
of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.

· The vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land
Act (CA 141)

· On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for the registration of title of the two
(2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, they
were no longer Filipino citizens but are now Canadians.

· An opposition was filed by the Republic, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming
private respondents' title to the lots in question. Petitioner submits that private respondents have
not acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor.

· It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands
under the Regalian doctrine principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State.

· Before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

Issues:

WoN foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired and
purchased while still a citizen of the Philippines?

HELD:

· It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has
been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession.

· Respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937,
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private
property

· The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.

· It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership

· Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue
thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an
imperfect title. They were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest.

· Certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was
also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta
Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia... a... report from
the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest
Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of alienable and disposable zone of the
government and that no forestry interest was affected. P

· Private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.

"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands, subject
to limitations provided by law."

"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."

"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizens of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and
who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of
the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the... maximum herein fixed.

· What governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

· Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private
lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by...
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains.

· The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They
are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive... possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.

· The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence

Principles:

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act

When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued
As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of.

40. Ong Ching Po vs. CA (G.R. No. 113472, December 20, 1994)

FACT

· Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land.

· On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San
Nicolas to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee.
· The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English.
Subsequently, the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private
respondent.

· According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to
petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she
demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners
refused to vacate the said premises.

· On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner
Ong Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court
dismissed her case. The dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory.

· Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po
bought the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photocopy
of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese.
· Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same
vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.

Issue:

WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale

Held:

· No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that
aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public
lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands.
· The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The
Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
· The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the
Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was
owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

· Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring
and owning real property, it being contrary to law.

Gabrielle buena

41. Republic vs. Alconaba (G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004

Republic V. Alconaba

Facts:

On November 1996, respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao Laguna, an

application for registration of title over five parcels of land with an area of 5,220 sq.
meters. The respondents claim that their parents had been in possession of the said
property since 1949, which after their parents’ death in 1967, have been in public and
peaceful possessors in the concept of owners.

The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed the
application of the respondents on the following grounds: a.) neither the respondents nor
their predecessors possession sufficient title or have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of said land, on or before June 12,
1945; b.) the evidences presented by the respondent (tax receipts), are not sufficient
proof of a bonafide right to registration of land under Section 48 (b) of C.A. 141 or the
Public Land Act; c.) the claim of ownership on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed by the respondents; and d.) The land claimed is part of the public
domain, and thus belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the application for registration of the land in question be approved
Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court finds the petition to be meritorious. In Section 14 of PD 1529,
it was emphasized that those who may apply for registration of title land should have
possesses (or their predecessors-in-interest) and occupied the same on or before June
12, 1945, and that the land should be part of the alienable and disposable lands. Since
there is no enough evidence that the respondents or their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession and occupation of the land in question since time immemorial, and
there is no document that shows the exact date of the declaration of such land as
alienable and disposable, the respondent’s application should be denied. Thus, the
petition is granted.

42. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005)

Republic v. CA

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Corazon Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a
petition for registration of title of a parcel of land, with an area of 31,374 sq. meters
(3.1374 ha). The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title
over the land, which was granted by the lower court, RTC, and CA. The OSG assailed the
decision of the Court of Appeals by claiming that the CA has erred in holding that there
is no need for the government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain
before it can be considered alienable and disposable within the meaning of P.D. 1529,
and challenged the claim of Naguit of leaving possessed the property in question in the
concept of an owner of the required period.

Issue:

Whether or not Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

Ruling:

The SC affirmed the decision of the CA, considering that the possession of the subject can
be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest, which commenced since 1945 for almost 30
years. This was proven by the presence of the 50-60 year old trees and the tax declaration dated
1945. Indeed, Naguit has already acquired title thereto, which may be brought under the operation
of the torrens system.

43. Borromeo vs. Descallar (G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009)

Borromeo v. Descallar

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, to the Philippines to fulfill some work-related

duties. When he was in Cebu, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a
separated mother with 2 boys, who was working as a waitress at a hotel. Jambrich
befriended her and later on, asked her to be his English tutor, which the respondent
agreed to. After some time, they fell in love with each other. Later on, they brought a
house in Mandaue, where Jambrich and the respondent were referred to as the buyers. A
deed of absolute sale was also issued in their favor. When the deed was presented for
the purpose of registration before the ROD, the registration was refused on the ground
that Jambrich was an alien, and therefore, could not acquire lands. After five years of
being together, the couple broke up and both had then found new lovers.

Jambrich then met petitioner Borromeo, who was engaged in real estate business
and speedboats. Sometime in 1989, Jambrich bought an engine and some parts for his
boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000. To
pay for his debt, he sold his right and interests to the properties he bought together with
then Filipina partner, Antonietta, only to find out that the three lots have already been
transferred in respondent’s name and that they have already been mortgaged.

As a result, Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of real property before the
RTC of Mandaue, stating that the respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact, a buyer. On the other hand, Respondent claims to
have used her personal funds to pay for such properties. Petitioner argues that this was
impossible for the Respondent did not have the means to pay for such properties.

Issues:

Whether or not Jambrich is not entitled to any rights with regards to the property
in question because of being an alien

Whether or not registration of the properties in the name of the Respondent

makes her the owner thereof

Ruling:

No, Jambrich is entitled to the right of transferring the properties in favor of a

Filipino citizen. While it is true that aliens cannot own land in the Philippines, the act of
transferring his rights and interests to a Filipino citizen cures the defect. Therefore,
Jambrich’s act of using the properties he bought as payment to the Petitioner, a Filipino
citizen, is valid for he is entitled to do so.

No, evidence clearly shows that Jambrich was the one who bought the properties
with his own money, which is proven by the financial incapability of the Respondent.
Registration is merely a confirmation of ownership, but does not confer ownership.
Therefore, a mere act of registration by the Respondent does not automatically make her
the owner of the properties, considering that such ownership was validly challenged by
Jambrich and the Petitioner.
 44. City Mayor of Paranaque vs. Ebio (G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010)

City Mayor of Paranaque v. Ebio

Facts:

Respondent Ebio claims to own a 406 sq. meter-land located in Paranaque. Such
land was a product of an accretion of the Cut-cut creek. Respondent said that his great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez, was the original occupant and possessor of the land in 1930.
Such land was passed on to his son Pedro, who had a daughter named Zenaida, to whom
the respondent was married. Pedro then transferred his rights to the land to Ebio after
his daughter’s marriage to the latter.

12 years after the conferment of the right to the Respondent, the Office of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez asked assistance from the Cityof Paranaque for the
construction of a road along the Cut-cut creek, which the respondents opposed.

Another 4 years later, respondent witnessed the cutting of their coconut trees by
the Barangay Officials. 2 years later, respondent received a letter ordering them to vacate
the premises within 30 days. Consequently, respondent went to the RTC of Paranaque,
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners, to recover
possession thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the Barangay can build such road over the land claimed to be
owned by the respondent

Ruling

No, for the land is a product of the gradual deposit of soil coming from a non-navigable
water, the Cut-cut creek. While it is true that creeks are owned by the State, the accreted portion
attached to one’s property where the alluvial deposit is attached, he is therefore also the owner of
such deposit. Hence, the Barangay cannot proceed with the building of road, for it is not owned
by the State, by Ebio.

45. Malabanan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 & September 3, 2013)

Malabanan v. Republic

Facts:

Malabanan filed an application for lad registration over a parcel of land. Such land
was purchased by him from Eduardo Velasco. He claims to have been in adverse
possession and occupation of such for more than 30 years. The Republic contravened by
stating that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Further, it stated that Malabanan is not eligible
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title for he had not been in possession of the and
for the period required by law.

Issue:

Whether or not Malabanan is eligible in applying for registration of land on the

basis of acquisitive prescription

Ruling:

No, before a person can apply for registration of land by basis of acquisitive
prescription, there must be a proof shown that such land was expressly declared by the
State that it is no longer intended for public use or service for the prescriptive period to
run. In the case at hand, Malabanan had failed to protect evidence that the land has been
declared as part of alienable and disposable land of public domain. Therefore, although
petitioner has possessed such land for more than 30 years, the prescriptive period did
not start running. Thus, he cannot register such land by basis of acquisitive prescription.

46. Uy vs. Fule (G.R. No. 164961, June 30, 2014)

Uy v. Fule

Facts:

After the death of Conrado Garcia, his heirs extrajudicially settled the division of
his lands and registered such afterwards. DAR issued a certification that stated that the
land was an untitled property and then included it in the Operation Land Transfer
Program. Subsequently, the office issued emancipation patents and Original Certificate
of Titles to farmer-beneficiaries, including Mariano Ronda. Ronda sold his share to a
Chisan Uy, whose heirs sold them to a Hector Uy. In 1997, a new TCT was issued under
the names of the heirs of Garcia, cancelling the old TCT in the name of Conrado Garcia.
In 1998, DAR issued emancipation patents in favor of farmer beneficiaries, but Conrado
Garcia’s TCT was already named under Hector Uy. The heirs of Conrado Garcia filed a
complaint, in the RTC, questioning the validity of the TCT named under Hector Uy. The
RTC favored the heirs, who filed an appeal, which the CA denied, affirming RTC’s
decision. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Hector Uy was an innocent purchaser who had better rights than
the heirs of Conrado Garcia over the land in question

Ruling:

No, the SC ruled that Uy was not an innocent purchaser for he had failed to
exercise reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title, and therefore did not have
a better right. Under the law, there is good faith:
1.) The seller is the registered owner of the land;

2.) The owner is in possession thereof;

3.) At the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some
other portion in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in
his capacity to convey title to the property.

Absence of one or two of the aforementioned conditions would oblige the buyer to
exercise a higher degree of diligence, to be considered a buyer in good faith. In this case
the third condition was not met, for the buyer was aware of the heirs of Conrado Garcia’s
claims. In line with this,Uy should have exercised a higher degree of diligence, which in
this case, he didn’t. Therefore, Uy was not a buyer in good faith and thus has lesser
rights than the heirs of Conrado Garcia.

47. Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental vs. Anglo (G.R. No. 171804, August 5,
2015)

Register of Deeds of Negrofarmer-beneficiariess Occidental v. Anglo

Facts:

Anglo Sr., the respondents bought parcels of land from Alfredo V.

Deocampo, which the Republic, the petitioner, claims to be owned by Bureau of
education by way of donation the late Esteban Jalandoni. Despite demand by the
Bureau, respondent still exchanged said parcels to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for
shares of stock. A letter was sent to Oscar Anglo of Anglo Agricutural Corporation to
surrender the title, as per order of the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, Anglo Sr.
and the Corporation filed a complaint for recovery of damages from the Assurance
Fund against the ROD of Negros Occidental and National Treasurer of the Republic of
the Philippines before the RTC of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

Issue:

Whether or not Oscar Anglo Sr. and Anglo Corporation are entitled to an
award of damages from the Assurance Fund

Ruling:

No, Respondents are not entitled to such award of damages from the Assurance
Fund for they do not meet the criteria for eligibility for recovery of damages laid on
Sec. 95 of P.D. 1529. Although, Anglo Sr. is a buyer in good faith, his act of
exchanging the parcels of land for stocks, shows that he is no longer interested in
such properties. On the other hand, Anglo Agricultural Corp. cannot be considered as
a buyer in good faith, for it was aware of the notices, which were addressed to its
representative. Therefore, the two respondents have no right to claim damages from
the Assurance Fund.
 48. Republic vs. Lao (G.R. No. 200726, November 9, 2016)

Republic v. Lao

Facts:

Lao filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, which she acquired from
siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela, who inherited the land from
their father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edliberto period by transfer.
She claimed that she had been in adverse possession occupancy of the land for more
than 30 years and presented witness and that the land was also occupied by her
predecessors. The court approved the application. The Petitioner, represented by the
OSG appealed the decision before the CA, which reaffirmed the RTC’s decision.
Petitioner appealed in the SC, claiming that the evidence was not enough to prove
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the lands for
periods required by law for there to be registered and showed no evidence of the land
being classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent’s application for registration should be approved

Ruling:

No, respondent had in presented insufficient evidence to prove that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have adversely possessed and occupied the land since or
before June 12, 1945, as required by CA 141 to register land. Further, respondent
failed to how evidence of classification of land as alienable and disposable.
Therefore, petition is granted, denying the respondent’s application for registration,
and reversing RTC’s and CA’s decision.

Yvonne Dolorosa

Full cases with highlights here (For you reference): http://bit.ly/ltdcases

50. Republic vs Ocol

FACTS

1. On September 19, 2008,5 respondents, Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and

Eulalio Ocol filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 266 an application for land
registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The application covers three (3) parcels of land described
as follows: a) Lot 2 under approved survey plan Ccs-00-000258 with an area of 3,731
square meters; b) Lot 1672-A under approved subdivision plan Csd-00-001798 consisting
of 1,583 square meters; c) a lot under approved survey plan Cvn-00-000194 consisting of
6,066 square meters.6 The total assessed value of the parcels of land is P288,970.007

2. On October 6, 2008, the RTC issued a Notice of Initial Hearing, copy furnished the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). The notice was sent to the Official Gazette for
publication and was served on all the adjoining owners. It was likewise posted
conspicuously on each parcel of land included in the application.8 During the initial
hearing on January 13, 2010, respondents, by counsel, presented the jurisdictional
requirements (Exhibits "A" to "I" and their sub-markings). There being no private
oppositor, an Order of General Default was issued except against the Republic of the
Philippines.

3. At the ex-parte presentation of evidence on January 22, 2010, respondents Rosa

Ocol, 72 years old, and Felipe Ocol, 70 years old, testified that they are the children of the
late Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol (Exhibits "U" and "V"). They inherited the subject
lots from their father and mother who died on February 1, 1949 and March 22, 1999,
respectively. When Felipe Ocol was only about eight years old and Rosa was still in
grade school, their parents developed and cultivated the subject lots as rice fields. In the
1940's, there were only a few houses around their house. At present, one of the lots is
residential while the two remaining lots have become idle. Their parents and
grandparents had been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the lots without
any interruption for more than sixty five (65) years. Felipe and Rosa have been in
possession of the land for more than fifty (50) years. There is n0 existing mortgage or
encumbrance over the said lots.

4. Respondents presented witness Antonia Marcelo who was 85 years old at the time
she testified. She is the neighbor of Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol in Barangay
Calzada where she has been residing for more than fifty (50) years. She testified that
during her childhood days, she used to play on the subject lots and had seen the
spouses Ocol cultivate the lots by planting vegetables, rice and trees.

5. On February 11, 2010, respondents formally offered their documentary evidence.

The RTC set the case for presentation of evidence of the government on April 16, 2010.
On the date of the hearing, there was no appearance from the government. Hence, the
court, upon motion of applicants, considered the case submitted for resolution.

6. On August 12, 2010, the RTC issued an Order granting the respondents'
application for registration of title to the properties.

7. The RTC found that respondents were able to prove that their predecessors-in-
interest possessed the subject lots from 1966 until 2002 with respect to the first lot; from
1942 to 2002, with respect to the second lot; and from 1949 to 2002 with respect to the
third lot, as shown in the tax declarations. The court posited that even if the subject lots
were declared as alienable and disposable public land only on January 3, 1968,
respondents had already "acquired title to the land according to P.D. 1529" by virtue of
the continued possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest from
January 3, 1968 to the present. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC
on February 15, 2011.

ISSUES

1. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES HAD

BEEN CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE;

2. THE RECORD IS BEREFT OF PROOF THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,

CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION Of THE SUBJECT LOTS
UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945, OR EARLIER;

3. ALTERNATIVELY, RESPONDENTS CANNOT INVOKE PRESCRIPTION UNDER

SECTION 14(2) OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529. THE SUBJECT LOTS HAVE NOT
BEEN CONVERTED INTO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE STATE.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public; domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.30 Under Section 14(1),
respondents need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945
or earlier. These respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.

In the case at bar, the first requirement was not satisfied. To prove that the subject
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondents presented three certifications - two are dated January 29, 2010 (Exhibits "J-
3" and "K-2") and one is dated January 28, 2010 (Exhibits "L-3") - issued by Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno and Chief of the Forest Utilization and Law
Enforcement Division of the DENR-National Capital Region.32 The certification attests
that the lots are verified to be within alienable and disposable land under Project No. 27-
B Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623 approved on January 3, 1968.
However, the certifications presented by the respondents are insufficient to prove that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable. We reiterate the standing doctrine
that land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared
alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.
Applicants must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the
said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
The applicant may also secure certification from the Government that the lands applied:
for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certfication
refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove
that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Clearly, the aforestated doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by
the DENR does not suffice to support the application for registration, because the
applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable
and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.42chanrobleslaw

Hence, in the instant case, the DENR certifications that were presented by the
respondents in support of their application for registration are not sufficient to prove that
the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable. It is still imperative for the respondents to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the
application for registration in spite o£ the failure of the respondents to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Anent the second requirement, the tax declarations do not prove respondents' assertion.
The Court emphasizes that respondents paid the taxes due on the parcels of land subject
of the application only in 2009, a year after the filing of the application.

The Court also doubts the respondents' claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owners from June 12, 1945, or earlier. The evidence presented by the
respondents does not prove title thru possession and occupation of public land under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously
been declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared
patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of
possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive prescription.

In this case, there is no evidence showing that the parcels of land in question were within
an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to
be no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth.

Evidently, there being no compliance, with either the first or second paragraph of Section
14 of PD 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case.

51. Espiritu vs. Republic

FACTS

On March 1, 2010, the petitioners, with their now deceased sibling, Carmen Espiritu, filed
before the RTC an Application for Registration of Title to Land[4] covering a parcel of
land with an area of 6,971 square meters, located at Barangay La Huerta, Parañaque City,
Metro Manila, and identified as Lot 4178, Cad. 299 of the Parañaque Cadastre Case 3
(subject land).

Attached to the petitioners' application were copies of the following documents: (1)
Special Powers of Attorney respectively executed by petitioners Oscar Espiritu (Oscar)
[5] and Alfredo Espiritu (Alfredo)[6] in favor of petitioner Conrado Espiritu, Jr. (Conrado,
Jr.), to represent them in the proceedings relating to the application; (2) Advanced
Survey Plan[7] of Lot No. 4178, Cad. 299 of the Parañaque Cadastre Case 3; (3) Technical
Description[8] of Lot 4178, AP-04-003281, being an advanced survey of Lot 4178, Cad.
299, Parañaque Cadastre Case 3; and (4) Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. E-005-01718-TR.[9]

The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado Espiritu, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.)
and Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu (Felicidad), were the owners of the subject land; that
they inherited the subject land after their parents passed away; and that they, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, public, and
continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner for more than thirty
(30) years.

Subsequently, the RTC determined that it had jurisdiction to act on the application.
Thereafter, trial ensued, during which Oscar, Conrado, Jr., Ludivina Aromin (Aromin),
Ferdinand Encarnacion (Encarnacion), and Marrieta Espiritu-Cruz (Marrieta), were
presented as witnesses.

Encarnacion, a staff in the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority, testified
that the notices relative to the application for registration of the subject land were served
on the owners of the adjoining lots.
Marrieta testified that she is one of the children of Conrado, Sr. and Felicidad; that she
was born on February 23, 1933; that she has known the subject land since she was seven
(7) years old because her parents owned the same; that before her parents, her
grandparents and Felicidad's parents, Dalmacio Rodriguez and Dominga Catindig were
the owners of the subject land; that she, together with her siblings, inherited the subject
land from Conrado, Sr. and Felicidad, who died in March 1984 and on January 10, 1986,
respectively; that they possessed the subject land openly and continuously since the
death of their parents; that the subject land was agricultural in nature because it was
being used as salt land during summer and as fishpond during rainy season; and that
there were no adverse claimants over the subject land.

Oscar corroborated Marietta's testimony. He reiterated that they were in possession and
occupation of the subject land because they could visit the property whenever they
wanted to, introduce improvements thereon, and prevent intruders from entering it.

Conrado, Jr. testified that he commissioned the survey of the subject land; that he
requested and received from Laureano B. Lingan, Jr., Regional Technical Director of the
Forest Management Services (FMS), Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
National Capital Region (DENR-NCR), a Certification,[10] dated October 6, 2010, stating
that the subject land was part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and that they utilized the subject land in their salt-making business, which they inherited
from their parents.

On cross-examination, Conrado, Jr. admitted that their salt-making business ceased

operation in 2004, and that the subject land had become idle.

For her part, Aromin, the Chief of the Technical Services of the DENR-NCR, testified that
their office issued a certified copy of the technical description of Lot No. 4178 (AP 04-
003281) on February 18, 2010; and that the technical description was verified to be
consistent with the approved survey plan of Lot No. 4178.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE.

RULING

For registration under this provision to prosper, the applicant must establish the
following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property
of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least
30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been
converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said
10-year or 30-year period of possession.

As regards the first and most important requisite, the Court has ruled that declaration of
alienability and disposability is not enough for the registration of land under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. There must be an express declaration that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial property.[35] This is only
logical because acquisitive prescription could only run against private properties, which
include patrimonial properties of the State, but never against public properties.

Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which could show that the
subject land had been declared as part of the patrimonial property of the State. The
DENR-NCR certification presented by the petitioners only certified that the subject land
was not needed for forest purposes. This is insufficient because the law mandates that to
be subjected to acquisitive prescription, there must be a declaration by the State that the
land applied for is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the petitioners failed to
prove that they acquired the subject land through acquisitive prescription. Thus, the
same could not be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

In fine, the petitioners failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to land
under either Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

52. Dy vs. Aldea

FACTS

Petitioner Mamerto Dy (Mamerto) is the owner of Lot 5158 located in Vito, Minglanilla,
Cebu, with an area of 6,738 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-24849.

In June 2005, Mamerto agreed to sell the subject land to his brothers Nelson Dy (Nelson)
and Sancho Dy, Jr. (Sancho). He asked them to secure copies of the tax declarations
covering the subject land from the Municipal Assessor's Office. Nelson found out that
the subject land had gone through a series of anomalous transactions. The owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No.T-24849 was declared lost. As a result, a new owner's duplicate
copy of the same TCT was issued and the subject land was subsequently mortgaged.

On August 17, 2005, Mamerto, through his lawyer, sent a letter to the Register of Deeds
of Cebu informing the said office that his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849 was
never lost and that he never mortgaged his property to anyone.

When Mamerto discovered that the subject land was being fenced upon the instruction of
respondent Maria Lourdes Rosell Aldea (Lourdes), he immediately filed a complaint
against the latter before the barangay office of Minglanilla. Lourdes, however, failed to
attend the hearing. A certificate to file action was subsequently issued.

On September 16, 2005, Atty. Manolo D. Rubi, Deputy Register of Deeds, informed Nelson
that TCT No. T-134753 covering the subject land was issued in Lourdes' name.[5]
Mamerto insisted that he never executed any deed of sale in favor of Lourdes and that
the signature appearing on the purported deed of sale was not his authentic signature.

For her part, Lourdes countered that in 2004, a certain Mila Labang (Mila) was introduced
to her by her aunt Luz Aldea (Luz). Mila told her that several parcels of land in
Minglanilla, including the subject land, were purportedly for sale.

After she visited the lots in Minglanilla, Lourdes signified her intention to buy the subject
land. Mila informed Lourdes that the subject land was mortgaged to a certain Atty. Lim
and further told her that she should pay the loan secured by the mortgage. Thereafter,
Mila introduced her to Fatima Nadela (Fatima), who allegedly knew the owner of the
subject land and promised Lourdes that she would prepare the deed of sale.

On June 20, 2004, Lourdes met with the person impersonating Mamerto (the impostor) at
a hotel in Cebu City. She gave the impostor P1,010,700.00 as payment for the 3,369
square meter-portion of the subject land. Thereafter, they signed the Deed of Sale[9] in
the presence of Mila, Fatima and Zenon Aldea (Zenon), Lourdes' uncle. Afterwards,
Lourdes, Fatima and the impostor went to the office of Atty. Lim to pay the mortgage
loan.

A few weeks thereafter, the impostor called Lourdes and insisted that she should buy the
entire land for it would be difficult and expensive to subdivide the same. Lourdes agreed
and paid an additional P673,800.00. Lourdes and the impostor signed a second deed of
sale. For the 6,738 square meter-property, Lourdes paid an aggregate sum of
P1,684,500.00.[11]

After weeks of waiting, Lourdes was informed by Fatima that the impostor was dead and
he had not given any money to process the transfer of the subject land. Lourdes went to
the Office of the Provincial Assessor to process the payment of capital gains tax and the
transfer of title in her name. Eventually, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-134753
under her name.[12] Consequently, Mamerto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
deed of sale and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with injunction and
damages.

In its November 18, 2009 Decision, the RTC ruled that Mamerto had a better right over the
subject land and was the rightful and lawful owner thereof.

In its assailed January 30, 2015 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.
Aggrieved, Mamerto moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its July 1, 2015 Resolution.

ISSUES

(1) WHETHER THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE, FROM WHICH TCT NO. T-134753 IN THE
NAME OF LOURDES WAS DERIVED, IS VALID.

(2) WHETHER LOURDES IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE WHO IS ENTITLED

TO THE APPLICATION OF THE MIRROR DOCTRINE.

(3) WHETHER MAMERTO HAS BETTER RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND.
RULING

The petition is meritorious.

When the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title has not been lost, the reconstituted
certificate is void.

The following requisites must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be
issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property
or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost
and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred.

Mamerto asserted that he never lost his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24829 and
that he had always been in possession thereof. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that another
person impersonated Mamerto and represented before the court that the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24829 was lost in order to secure a new copy which was
consequently used to deceive Lourdes into purchasing the subject land. Hence, the fact
of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title, which is the primordial
element in the validity of reconstitution proceedings, is clearly missing. Accordingly, the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings initiated by the
impostor, and its judgment rendered thereafter is null and void. This alone is sufficient to
declare the reconstituted title null and void.

Only an innocent purchaser for value may invoke the mirror doctrine.

In order to resolve whether Lourdes holds an indefeasible title to the subject land, it
becomes necessary to determine whether she is an innocent purchaser for value.
Lourdes cannot be considered a purchaser in good faith.

In the case at bench, Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land.

Certainly, it was not enough for Lourdes to show that the property was unfenced and
vacant; otherwise, it would be too easy for any registered owner to lose his property,
including its possession, through illegal occupation.[28] It was also imprudent for her to
simply rely on the face of the imposter's TCT considering that she was aware that the
said TCT was derived from a duplicate owner's copy reissued by virtue of the alleged
loss of the original duplicate owner's copy.[29] That circumstance should have already
alerted her to the need to inquire beyond the face of the impostor's TCT.[30]

In sum, the Court rules that Lourdes is not an innocent purchaser for value.

Mamerto may recover the subject land notwithstanding its registration in Lourdes' name.
53. Abellera vs. Farol

FACTS

Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate involved herein, sued
Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either the same parties in this case or the
latter's predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the land. But his complaint was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1) prescription in favor of
defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of these lands to him had not been formally
accepted according to Article 633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground aforementioned (Abellera
vs. Balanag G.R. No. 11970, promulgated March 22, 1918, and reported in 37 Phil. 865).

In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned decision of this Court,
petitioner herein brought another action for recovery of the land against the same
defendants in the previous case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of
First Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which included the hacienda in
question that had in the meantime been subdivided into lots. When the cadastral case
came up before the Hon. Meynardo M. Farol at Aringay, La Union, in July 1941, Fabian
B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso de Guzman and others appeared as
adverse claimant. The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's claim over the lots
concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.

ISSUE

Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res judicata, have any power to entertain the
motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove his
ownership of these lots?

RULING

A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the previous case (37 Phil., 865)
convinces us that there is no res judicata. We merely held that Abellera had not acquired
title to the hacienda until the execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification
thereof, and we clearly refused to prevent Abellera from instituting a new action based
upon his assertion that he had acquired title to the estate since the dismissal of his
original action.

The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription, is not involved in the present
proceedings.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two conditions are present:
(1) analogy or need to supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and
convenience.
While in a cadastral case res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the
alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment cannot set up in a motion
to dismiss.

54. Sideco vs. Aznar

FACTS

This is an action for partition and for the recovery of plaintiff and appellants' share in the
produce of the land sought to be partitioned. The defendant and appellee is the judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased Crispulo Sideco, who died on the 26th of
May, 1942. She is the decedent's widow by his third marriage, which took place on
January 26, 1912. The plaintiffs and appellants are his (Crispulo Sideco's) children and
grandchildren by his wife Matilde Jimenez, who died on March 14, 1906.

The subject of the action is a parcel of riceland 134.6671 hectares in area, situated in the
Sitio of Pulong Pandan, Barrio Sangitan, Municipality of Cabanatuan, surveyed on May
21, 1908, and registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco, widower, on March 12, 1909,
under certificate of title No. 77 (Exhibit 6). The land was declared for the land tax in the
year 1906 in Crispulo Sideco's name (Exhibit 5). The land was mortgaged to the
Philippines National Bank on May 10, 1912, for P8,000, on July 30, 1917, for P6,400, and
on September 28, 1922, for P5,800. In June, 1923, the loan with the Philippine National
Bank was paid, but the land was sold with pacto de retro to Margarita David for P16,000
redeemable in two years, this period extendible for one year. In 1928 Margarita David
resold the property to Crispulo Sideco, but the same was again mortgaged to her for
P6,000 (Exhibit 6). In 1933 certificate of title No. 77 was cancelled, and No. 7631 issued in
lieu thereof in the name of Margarita David (Exhibit D). The land, however, was
reconveyed to the estate of Crispulo Sideco on August 31, 1946 (Ibid). The land is now
covered by transfer certificate of title No. T-303 in the name of his estate (Exhibit 21-A).

In the year 1917 cadastral proceedings were instituted in Cabanatuan, and the land now
in question was included therein. The land (already registered) was named as lot No. 880,
and the chief surveyor asked the court to order the cancellation of the certificate of title
covering it and that another be issued in lieu thereof, and to ascertain at the same time
the names of the persons in whose names the new title will be issued (Exhibit F-1). The
court ordered the interested parties to state to court what they desired in respect thereto
(exhibit F-2). Pursuant to this order, Crispulo Sideco filed a petition signed by himself,
dated December 15, 1917, praying that the land be adjudicated in his name and in those
of his children (Exhibit G-1). On the same day the court ordered a new certificate of title
to be issued, one-half in favor of Crispulo Sideco and the other one-half in the name of
his children Natividad, Milagros, Cesar, Gonzalo, Anastacio, Mariano, and Pablo (Exhibit
G-2). On December 19, 1917, another order was issued in favor of the above-named for
the registration of the land in their names, with a correction of the lot number given to
the land (Exhibit G-3). A decree in pursuance of the order was issued by the General
Land Registration Office on January 19, 1918 (Exhibit H-1), although it does not appear
that this order was ever complied with and the new title issued as ordered.

The land was in the continuous possession and enjoyment of Crispulo Sideco up to the
time of his death in 1942. His children by his second marriage lived with him and were
given education at his expense, one of them studying in the United States. They lived
with him until they were married, evidently at the expense of their father, even after his
third marriage to the present administratrix.
The trial court found that the land is the exclusive property of the deceased Crispulo
Sideco, basing this finding on various considerations, the most important of which are
that the only heir by the first marriage did not show any interest; that it could not have
been conjugal property of theirs (lot 934) was registered as such, and because
notwithstanding the time that had elapsed since the court had ordered the issuance of a
new title in the name of Crispulo Sideco and his children by the second marriage, these
had done nothing to have the new title issued, without an explanation for such lack of
action or interest on their part; that the motion of Crispulo Sideco for the issuance of a
new title in his name and in those of his heirs by the second marriage was merely an act
of generosity, which was, however, never consummated and legalized; that his motion to
have the new title issued and the order of the court to that effect are unauthorized and
illegal, and the court's order beyond its jurisdiction.

This property was previously declared under Tax Declaration No. 213, Barrio of Sangitan,
Municipality of San Isidro. Against the above facts and evidence, nothing to the contrary
was presented.

ISSUE

Did the order of the cadastral court of December 19, 1917, amount to a readjudication of
the title and, therefore, null and void? Was the proceeding which culminated in the
issuance of the order unauthorized?

RULING

Both of these questions must be answered in the negative. When the cadastral
proceedings were instituted, the chief surveyor reported to the court that lot No. 880 was
land covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding, registered in the name of
Crispulo Sideco, and he, therefore, recommended that the title be cancelled and a new
one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine (Exhibits F-1).
Pursuant to this report, the court ordered the parties interested to express what they
desired (Exhibit F-2, and Crispulo Sideco filed his petition (Exhibit G-1) that lot No. 880
be adjudicated to him and his children (by his second marriage), in accordance with
which the court later issued the disputed orders (Exhibits G-2 and G-3). The above
proceedings are expressly authorized by the provisions of Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act, which are also applicable to cadastral proceedings. (Section 11,
Cadastral Act, as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 3080). Said section 112 provides:

Any registered owner . . . may at any time apply by petition to the court . . ., upon any
other reasonable grounds, and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties interested, and may order the entry of a new certificate
or any grant any other relief . . . .

The proceedings did not in any way purport to re-examine the title already issued, or to
re adjudicate the title of the land. They are precisely predicated on the finality of the title
already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his desire
with respect thereto, and the court's order precisely followed the petition of the
registered owner.
Our attention has been called by a member (of the Court) to the fact that the act of the
deceased in admitting the land to belong in part to his children by the second marriage
would prejudice the heirs by the first and third marriages. But the law (Section 112, Land
Registration Act), which requires that notice to interested parties be given, was complied
with or must have been complied with. No claim is made that no notice of the motion was
given, or that the issuance of the order was irregular. The proceedings are presumed to
have been regular, and that notices thereof were given, there being no fact or
circumstance to indicate the contrary. Besides, cadastral proceedings are proceedings in
rem. The proceedings must, therefore, be held to bind all the children of the deceased,
including those of the first and third marriages.

Furthermore, the issuance of the decree of registration and the title in the name of
Crispulo Sideco did not operate ipso facto to make the land his own exclusive property
and to relieve him of the obligation to account for it as conjugal property of himself and
his deceased wife Matilde Jimenez, or destroy the rights of the children of the latter as
co-owners. To this effect is the express provision of section 70 of the Land Registration
Act, thus:

SEC. 70. . . . . Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way be construed to relieve
registered land or the owners thereof from any rights incident to the relation of husband
and wife, . . ., co-partners, joint tenants and the other co-tenants, . . . .

55. Rodil vs. Benedicto

FACTS

1. In Cadastral Case No. 61, LRC Rec. No. 1369, Lot Nos. 2417, 3423, 3424, 3753 and
3754 of the Penaranda (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre were claimed and applied for by the
spouses Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz.

2. Pursuant to the decree of registration, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1719 was
issued to the applicants on December 10, 1958. On February 26, 1959, the heirs of
Alejandro Abes filed a petition with the court for the review of the registration decree
upon the ground "that the petitioners are the true owners and are the ones in actual legal
possession of the aforesaid land and that the award of said lots to claimant-spouses was
secured through fraud."

3. On July 7, 1961, the cadastral court denied the petition for review upon the ground
that the petitioners failed to overcome the evidence of the claimants-adjudicates.

4. An appeal was interposed with this Court, docketed herein as G.R. No. L-20996.
On July 30, 1966, the Court rendered judgment, affirming the orders complained of, with
costs. 2
5. Upon the return of the records to the lower court, Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession asking that they be placed in
possession of the lots and that the heirs of Alejandro Abes be evicted therefrom.

6. On April 11, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order granting the petition only
with respect to Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes, and Cornelio Abes
and denied the same with respect to the other respondents stating that he is completely
at a loss as to who, aside from Alejo Abes, Cornelio Abes, Bienvenido Abes, and Teodora
Abes, among the said respondents. were parties to the original cadastral proceeding or
as to who were at least occupants of the properties in question prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration. 4 Pursuant to said order, a writ of possession was issued on
April 19, 1967.

ISSUE

prescription of the rights of the respondent corporation to ask for a writ of possession.

RULING

The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot be said to be strangers to the

registration proceedings. A cadastral proceeding is a proceeding in rem and against
everybody, including the respondents herein, who are deemed included in the general
order of default entered in the case. Besides, it appears that the said respondent heirs of
Alejandro Abes filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration, thereby
becoming a direct party in the registration proceedings by their voluntary appearance.

The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot also be said to be not occupants of the
land during the registration proceeding prior to the issuance of the final decree of
registration.

The right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of
possession of the land never prescribes.

56. Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo

FACTS:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo. Its
purpose was to recover of the defendant the municipality of Iloilo the sum of P15,780 as
the value of the two lots Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant
municipality had illegally appropriated, together with the sum of P5,000 as damages and
costs. The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that
the plaintiff and appellant was not and never had been the owner of said lots Nos. 537
and 703. The municipality of Iloilo contended that it had purchased said lots from
Concepcion Lopez on the 9th day of March, 1925, for the purpose of widening the
adjoining streets and had paid therefore the sum of P25,000. The other defendants
answered the petition and supported the contention of the municipality. After hearing the
evidence upon the issue presented, the Honorable Leopoldo Rovira reached the
conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence supported the contention of the
defendants, and rendered a judgment absolving them from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed.

The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and 703 had
been included in the registered title (title No. 464) of Concepcion Lopez in November,
1915, and Concepcion included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that
he was the indisputable owner thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had appropriated
said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots together with damages.

ISSUE

purpose to recover of the defendant the municipality of Iloilo the value of the two lots
Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally
appropriated

RULING

With reference to the theory of the appellant, an examination of the records shows that
as early as April, 1915, said lots had been turned over by Concepcion Lopez to the City of
Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots
had been included as a part of the streets in the City of Iloilo. They had been segregated
from the lot formerly owned by Concepcion Lopez. Said lots 537 and 703 had become a
part of a public highway established by law. The same were therefore illegally included,
in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of Act No. 496, in the certificate of title
issued to Concepcion Lopez on the 10th day of November, 1915. That fact was
recognized by Concepcion Lopez as well as by each of the subsequent purchasers of
said lots. The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does
not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If
a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake or oversight
land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said
certificate alone, becomes the owner of the lands illegally included. (Legarda and Prieto
vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590.)

The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give
to the holder of such certificate said public highways. The appellant, therefore, even
though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been included in the original
certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of
said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover their value from the City of Iloilo nor the
damages prayed for.

57. Demasiado vs. Velasco

FACTS

Janiuay cadastre-through pacto de retro sale on May 3, 1955 from his uncle Ambrosio
Demasiado for P1,000.00 which vendor a retro could repurchase within ten years after
the first five years from the date of the document as shown by document of sale with the
right to repurchase Exhibit B. That said vendor a retro subsequently executed a deed of
definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff Melquiades Demasiado and his wife
Jovita Pareja for a total consideration of P2,000.00 per deed of sale executed on May 14,
1966, Exh. C. That the said land in question was bought by said Ambrosio Demasiado
from Pablo Britanico then Justice of the Peace of Janiuay in 1936 as stated in the deed of
definite sale Exh. C and testified to by plaintiff Melquiades Demasiado; that according to
information, this land in question was bought by the late Judge Britanico from Feliciano
Aplasca, father of defendants Aplascas; that plaintiff has been living in Silay City since
1963 and while there the land was possessed by his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado who
died on November 21, 1966. That when the land in question was definitely sold to him by
Ambrosio Demasiado in 1966, he visited the land and found therein defendant Ramon
Velasco working on the southern portion of the land and he then told defendant Velasco
not to work on the land but since he was not answered, he asked the help of a certain
barrio captain Andong Moralidad and as he heard no news from the barrio captain nor
from Ramon Velasco, he went to see his lawyer last July 19, 1966 and this case was filed.
That the land is still declared in the name of Ambrosio Demasiado per tax declaration No.
3670 Exh. D but he (plaintiff) paid taxes for this land from 1963 to 1966 as shown in Exh.
E. That he obtained the sketch of Lot 5169 from the Bureau of Lands Exh. F and on the
said plan, witness drew a straight line from point 3 to point 6 to show the northern
portion that has been worked by their tenant Romeo Oveja since 1964 to 1966 while the
southern portion was worked by defendant Ramon Velasco. This witness further testified
that when he bought the land on pacto de retro in 1955, his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado
possessed the lot as his overseer and that he was then given his yearly share from the
land from 10 to 20 bultos of palay.

It is admitted that both Exh. B (deed of conditional sale dated May 3,1955) and Exh. C
(Deed Absolute Sale executed on May 14, 1966) though contained in a public document
have not been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.

Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff and defendants, the plaintiff has not even
proved his clear right over the whole lot, and much more on the one-half (1/2) southern
portion occupied by defendant Ramon Velasco for his co-defendants as what has been
admitted by defendants is the mortgage of the 1/2 portion on the north of the lot in
question. Exhibits B and C (Deeds of Sale) could not be superior to the existing valid
original certificate of title, Exh. 6.

ISSUE

1. counsel assails the ruling of the trial court sustaining the conclusiveness as proof
of the ownership of the land claimed by him of the transfer certificate of title issued in
1936 in the name of appellee Ramon Velasco's wife Natividad Aplasca showing her to be
the owner of 1/4 share thereof.

2. appellant insist trial court should have recognized the probative value of the two
unregistered deeds of transfer relied upon by him, Exhibits B and C, referred to above,
since they are public documents.

RULING

1. Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the certificate of title
covering registered land "shall be received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines,
and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein (principally, the Identity of the
owner of the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in the Act itself. And there
is no pretense that appellant comes under any of the exceptions mentioned in Section 39
of the Act. What appellant tries to point out, however, is that the trial court admitted the
certificate of title invoked by appellee without the same being properly Identified.
According to appellant, although the trial court did rule that said certificate "should be
admitted", it did not actually rule that "they are hereby admitted." We believe such
argument is unavailing, considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate, "the
owner's copy of Original certificate of Title No. 61801 is admissible", was precisely made
after originally sustaining appellant's counsel's objection to its admission, which must
be deemed to be clearly even if not categorically, a reconsideration and reversal of its
earlier ruling rejecting the Same.

2. With respect to the claim of the defendants to the right of legal redemption, we
find that said right of legal redemption on the part of Asuncion Aplasca and Tarcila
Moralidad and Lolita Moralidad in pursuance to the provisions of Art. 1623 of the New
Civil Code has long expired and they can not now claim that right as it can not be denied
that said defendants Asuncion Aplasca and the two Moralidad sisters have long known
that the other 1/2 portion of the land in question has been possessed and acquired by
plaintiff's predecessor in interest Ambrosio Demasiado and subsequently, by the
plaintiff. (Pp. 47-48, Rec. On Appeal.)

In other words, all that His Honor did was to apply the accepted rule that a certificate of
title covering registered land is not subject to collateral attack. And as to the supposed
evidence presented by appellant of long possession until appellee allegedly entered the
land in question (the southern portion, which according to the title pertains to Natividad
and Enecito Aplasca) in 1963, We are not in a position to reverse the factual findings of
the trial court adverse to such contention, this appeal being purely on question of law. In
any event, it is the law that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." (Section 46,
Land Registration Act.)

In consequence of the above premises, We have no alternative but to affirm the appealed
decision in toto.

As regards the appeal of the intervenors, seeking to enforce their supposed right to
redeem from appellant Melquiades Demasiado the northern portion of the land in
question, from what appears in the appealed decision, there has been no sale of said
portion to appellant but only a mortgage, and since there is no showing as to what is the
status of said mortgage, there is no clear basis for Us to determine at this stage whether
or not the invoked right of redemption may still be exercised. We note, however, that the
lower court has held that the period therefor has expired. Intervenors have not shown,
they have not even alleged in any of their assignments of error, that such is not the case.

58. Oca vs. Matas

FACTS
the OCA filed with this Court an administrative complaint charging the herein
respondents with the violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act
committed as follows:

1. That on or about the month of March, 1987 respondents Judge Jesus V. Matas,
Eduardo Torres, Jr., OIC Clerk of Court and in connivance with private citizen George
Mercado concealed from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his (George
Mercado's) knowledge of the petition for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies
OCT Nos. P-12658, 12659, P-12661 and T-9857, and filed Misc. Case No. 1626 before the
sala of respondent Judge and took cognizance of the same notwithstanding the fact that
his Court has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and Sto. Tomas, Davao where subject
properties covered by the aforesaid titles where located.

2. That notwithstanding the fact that the properties are owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the posting of said
Order and petition for at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1987 at
the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Municipal Hall, Barangay Hall or Barangay School
where the properties are located;

3. That thereafter on April 6, 1987 respondent Judge likewise issued an Order directing
only the Station Commander of Sto. Tomas, Davao to comply with the posting despite
the fact that some of the properties involved in Misc. Case No. 1626 are situated in
Kapalong, Davao; and

4. That a day after the hearing where J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises was
not present, respondent Judge forthwith issued an Order for the issuance by the
Register of Deeds of Davao of new owner's duplicate of aforesaid titles to George
Mercado thus, causing injury to J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises whose
owner's duplicate copies in its possession were cancelled without due process.

After having presented two witnesses, the counsel for the private complainant and the
OCA representative moved for a suspension of the proceedings because they intended
to amend the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Miscellaneous Case No. 1626

RULING

Jurisdiction is the power and authority to hear, try, and decide a case; it does not depend
on the regularity of the exercise of that power.

In the instant case, it cannot be said that Branch I of the RTC of Davao del Norte, then
presided by the respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over Miscellaneous Case No. 1626
which is a "Petition for the Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Certificates in lieu of Lost
O.C.T. Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-12661, and P-9855."
Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 states that Courts of First Instance (CFI) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. Under Chapter X of the decree entitled "Petitions and Actions After Original
Registration" is Section 109 which governs petitions for issuance of lost or stolen
owner's duplicate certificate of title. Clearly, petitions for replacement of lost duplicate
certificates, as in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, are cognizable by the RTCs.

Now, on the venue or the place where such petitions may be instituted. Section 17 of P.D.
No. 1529 provides that the application for land registration shall be filed with the CFI
(now RTC) of the province or city where the land lies. Under Section 108 of the same
decree, all petitions motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.

Notably, the certificates involved in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 were each obtained not
pursuant to a decree issued in a judicial registration proceeding, but pursuant to a patent
issued by the Director of Lands and registered in accordance with Section 122 of Act No.
496 (now Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529). Nevertheless, applying Sections 2, 17, 108, and
109 of P.D. No. 1529, we may say that the petition for replacement of lost duplicate
certificates in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 was properly taken cognizance of by Branch
I of the RTC of Davao del Norte presided by the respondent Judge, since that petition
stated that the lots covered by the lost duplicates are situated in Kapalong and Sto.
Tomas which are both in the province of Davao del Norte.

Hence, no lack of jurisdiction, gross ignorance of law, or gross inexcusable negligence

can be ascribed to the respondent Judge.

Jabez Oberes

49. Odsigue vs. CA (G.R. No. 111179, July 4, 1994)

TOPICS COVERED: CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

G.R. No. 111179 July 4, 1994

DAVID ODSIGUE, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and ARMANDO ANGELES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACts:
 Petitioner has been in possession of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4050 and situated at Lagundi, Morong, Rizal, Since 1972, by tolerance of
the owner, Platon Espiritu Santo. In 1989 Espiritu Santo died and was succeeded
by his heirs, among whom was private respondent Armando Angeles. On January
10, 1991, private respondent Armando Angeles, as co-owner and assignee of the
other heirs, sent a letter of demand to petitioner to vacate the premises and filed a
suit for unlawful detainer a month after. The MTC, in its decision ordered the
petitioner to vacate the premises. On appeal, the RTC and later the CA affirmed
the decision of the MTC. Thus, the petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner was asked to file a comment in which he alleges that the technical
description in the title does not sufficiently identify the property of private
respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his improvements
should be demolished should first have been conducted by the private
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Certificate of Title is sufficient enough to identify the

location of the property being owned.

RULING:

Yes. The court held that the survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is
conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its
location. The subject of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050.
Accordingly, petitioners will be required to demolish only whatever is constructed
within its boundaries.

50. Tan vs. Bantegui (G.R. No. 154027, October 24, 2005)
51. Vicente vs. Avera (G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009)

G.R. no. 169970 January 20, 2009

PROTACIO VICENTE AND DOMINGA VICENTE, represented by Rondolf Vicente, Petitioners,

vs.

DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA and RONBERTO VALINO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch
70, Pasig City, Respondents.

FACTS:

Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property in dispute, then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34351.On October 1, 1987,
Rebuquiao executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners, spouses
Protacio Vicente and Dominga Vicente, over the property in dispute.[5]
Respondent Delia Soledad Avera alleges that on October 9, 1987, Jose Rebuquiao,
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney granted to him by Jovencio Rebuquiao,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption... of Mortgage in favor of Roberto
Domingo, Avera's spouse at the time, and herself.
Avera filed for declaration of Nullity of her marriage against Domingo in 1991(JRDC
Case). The court inscribed a notice of Lis Pendens on the TCT.

Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute. On July 22, 1998, TCT No. 34351
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the Registry of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for
the property in dispute, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987. The
notice of lis pendens was carried over to TCT No. 14216.

When Avera’s and Domingo’s marriage was declared void, the former filed for the writ of
Execution. Movant declared in her motion that the said property is now registered in the
name of another person, namely, Protacio Vicente, under TCT No. 14216 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Consequently, the Sheriff, Ronberto Valino, served a Notice to
Vacate.

Petitioners filed for a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) before the RTC. It was granted by the RTC. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and held that petitioners are bound by the outcome of the JDRC case, because
the annotation of the notice of lis pendens (January 23, 1992) was ahead of petitioners’
registration of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 (July 22, 1998). Thus, this
petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether a Notice of Lis Pendens affect the title of a property.

RULING:

No. A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where
the transferee who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case
the transferee’s title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis
pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the
property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to the JDRC
case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao’s
title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners’ title
to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.

52. Del Prado vs. Caballero (G.R. No. 148225, March 3, 2010)

G.R. No. 148225 March 3, 2010

CARMEN DEL PRADO, Petitioner,

vs.
 SPOUSES ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA CABALLERO, Respondents

FACTS:

On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen del Prado, Lot No. 11909, for Php
40,000.00, on the basis of the tax declaration covering the property. In the Deed of sale, it
was declared that the property contains an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less, with
boundaries specified . the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No. 11909,
was issued only on November 15, 1990. Therein, the technical description of Lot No. 11909
states that said lot measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less.

On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for
7
Registration of Document Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529" in order that a certificate of
title be issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909. In the petition, petitioner
alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the sale was for a lump sum, in
which case, the vendor was bound to deliver all that was included within said boundaries
even when it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Respondents opposed, on the main
ground that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner. The court favored the
petition. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court because it found that
petitioner availed herself of an improper remedy. The "petition for registration of document"
is not one of the remedies provided under P.D. No. 1529, after the original registration has
been effected. Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court committed an error when it assumed
jurisdiction over the petition, which prayed for a remedy not sanctioned under the Property
Registration Decree

Issue:

Whether or not the sale was for a lump sum or not.

RULING:

No. In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties
agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m,
more or less, with specific lots as boundaries in the North, South, East and West. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any other statement, with respect to the area contained within its
boundaries.

53. Fernando vs. Acuna (G.R. No. 161030, September 14, 2011)\

FACTS:
A parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-487 (997) was
registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A.
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When
they died intestate, the property remained undivided. When they died intestate, the
property remained undivided. The petitioners in this case, their heirs and successors in
interest did not agree on the division of the property even after conciliation in the
Barangay Lupon.

The petitioners, except the heirs of GErmogena Fernando, filed a complaint for partition
against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. They alleged that they are common
descendants of Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe
Galvez. There being no settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share
because they wish to build up their homes or set up their business in the respective
portions that will be allotted to them.

Respondent Leon Acuna file for Intervention. He averred that a Cadastral Court decision
identifying Lot 1303 was already divided and adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando,
married to Felisa Camacho; (b) spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses
Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco; and (d) Jose Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest

The trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court,
adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando’s share to Lot 1303-
C, was never implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years.
Thus, the said decision has already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial
court ordered the reversion of Lot 1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando
and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. RO-
487 (997) and allowed the partition

Upon Appeal, the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 covered by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) should
revert to the descendants and heirs of the late spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio
and Antonia Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez.

RULING:

No. The petition is without merit.

As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of
Baliuag, Bulacan (in Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was
written in Spanish, Lot 1303 had already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose
A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses
Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison;
and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent Acuna derived
his title. The court ordered fro its subdivision and the order be forwarded to the Register
of Deeds.

54. Wee vs. Mardo (G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014)

FACTS:

Felicidad Mardo, respondent, was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284,
dated April 26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through
a Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a
consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate
and turnover the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.

Petitioner, filed an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that
she is the owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. She filed a
Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the application was
different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was denied. A motion for
reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by
respondent, but both were denied by the RTC.

RTC granted the petition of Wee. Respondent filed an appeal and RTC’s decision was
reversed. The CA held that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of
possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the subject property.

RULING: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

The Property Registration Decree governs the original registration proceedings of

unregistered land. The subject application for original registration was filed pursuant to
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, which provides the conditions necessary for registration, one of
which is who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier..
The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have
complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered
under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite,
under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.

The Petition is DENIED.

55. L.P. Leviste & Co. vs. Noblejas (G.R. No. L-28529, April 30, 1979)

56. Martinez vs. Garcia (G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010)

57. Chua vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc. (G.R. No. 165863, April 10, 2013)

RICKY

58. VIRTUCIO VS ALEGARBES

GR NO187451

AUGUST 29, 2012

Ko land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio,
claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, The Director of Lands denied
Alegarbes' protest. An order of execution ordering Alegarbes to vacate the subject lot was
issued, but he refused. In 1997, Virtucio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership. The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that
Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of the lot by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Aggrieved,
Virtucio filed this petition. Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is tenable.

HELD: The petition must fail. Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of
prescription of actions. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive
prescription are natural and civil interruption. . Civil interruption takes place with the service of
judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a
judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to
run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead
application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as
jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said
period. Only in cases filed before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus,
interrupt possession. Records show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before
the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot
140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive
possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land.

59. Selph vs. Aguilar (G.R. No. L-13465, March 29, 1960)

Selph vs Aguilar

G.R. No. L-13465 March 29, 1960

Facts:

A case concerning a ten-hectare land in Atimonan. The property was originally owned by
Capule however by virtue of writ of execution against the Capule, the property was then
transferred to Devilles by public auction.

In turn, Capule filed a complaint against Devilles. Capule won and was able to reacquire the
land. Capule mortgaged the land to Manila Trading Co to secure payment over 16 promissory
notes.

After one month, Devilles filed a complaint praying to annul the judgment that was in favor of
Capule, Devilles also caused the notice of Lis Pendens to be inscribed in Capule’s title.

Meanwhile, Capules failed to pay their obligation to Manila Trading, thus Manila Trading
foreclosed the mortgaged land. A new certificate of title was issued to Manila Trading and
notice of Lis Pendes as likewise annotated.
Subsequently, Devilles won the case against Capule. SC declared the title of Capule null and
void ad that a new certificate be issued in favor of Devilles.

By virtue of the SC decision, Devilles sold the land to Aguilar(respondent).

Register of Deed sent a letter to Manila Trading requiring it to surrender owner’s duplicate of
Transfer Certificate and for cancellation in accordance wih SC decision above.

However, Manila Trading sold the property to Julius Reese, its President, which was subject to
Lis Pendens and was issued under his name.

When Reese died, the administrator of the estate of Reese filed cancellation of the Lis
Pendens but Aguilar filed opposition.

AGUILAR argued that they purchased the property to Devilles, and Devilles had a right over
the land by virtue of the SC decision which declared the title of Capule as cancelled.

It is undisputed that this land has always been in the possession of Devilles first, and of the
spouses Vicente Aguilar later. Now Reese wishes to recover ownership possession thereof on
the strength of the title he obtained from Manila Trading & Supply Co. But Manila Trading &
Supply Co. derives ownership from the Capules whose title in turn has been voided by the
decision of Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Aguilars are transferees of Devilles whose
title to the land (in a suit against the Capules) was expressly upheld by this Supreme Court.
Both Reese and the Manila Trading were aware if that suit by virtue of the lis pendens notice,
and are bound by the judgment against the Capules, their predecessor in interest.

As to the order for surrender of the title and the issuance of a new certificate, Reese object on
the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the SC decision. Reese argued that the
appealed order would enforce the judgment of 1934, which has prescribed, more than ten years
having elapsed since that year.

I: WON Reese can object the order to surrender the title on ground of non-enforcement and
prescription of a previous SC decision
R: No, As to the order for surrender of the title and the issuance of a new certificate, Reese
cannot object on the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the previous SC decision,
because if any one could object thereto, it was the Register of Deeds who was called upon to
implement the order of cancellation and issuance; and yet he has shown willingness to comply.
It is true that in complying, the Register is now requiring Reese in turn to surrender his title. But
the latter may not properly refuse, because he received such title from the Register upon his
undertaking to respect the outcome of the litigation, the title being expressly subject thereto, by
the annotation of lis pendens.

Indeed, even admitting for the sake of argument that the annotation in the Register's Office
concerning the lis pendens had become ineffective by reason of non-presentation (to the
Register) of this Court's 1934 decision there is still ample ground to hold that as Reese
purchased the property with actual notice of the controversy over the title thereto, he was
particularly subject to its outcome.

Remember, however, that although action on a judgment prescribes after ten years, the period
begins from the time such judgment becomes final and no proof exists as to date when the
judgment of 1934 became final. And then, in so far as Reese's attempt to get possession the
decision may be invoked in defense as res judicata which does not prescribe.

At any rate, according to sec. 81 of the Land Registration Act, the judgment in 1934 was
"entitled to registration" upon presentation of appropriate papers to the Register of Deeds; and
the section fixes no time for such presentation. And when such office was requested, in
accordance with the 1934 judgment, to cancel the outstanding title and to issue another in the
name of Devilles' successors, he was authorized to take adequate measures by sec. 111, Act
496 of the law applicable which reads as follows:

SEC. 111. In every case where the clerk or any register of deeds is requested to enter a new
certificate in pursuance of an instrument purporting to be executed by the registered owner, or
by reason of any instrument or proceedings which divest the title of the registered owner
against his consent, if the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate is not presented for
cancellation when such request is made, the clerk or register of deeds shall not enter a new
certificate, but the person claiming to be entitled thereto may apply by petition to the court. The
court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate to
surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate of title upon such surrender.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds required Manila Trading to surrender the title, and its refusal
or failure gave Devilles' successors the right to petition the court for appropriate orders, in other
words, a right of action which obviously had not yet prescribed when it was asserted in the
Tayabas court as a counterclaim in this case.

60. Filinvest Land, Inc. vs. Adia (G.R. No. 192629, November 25, 2015)
FILINVEST vs. ADIA

G.R. No. 192629. November 25, 2015

FACTS:

Respondents were the registered owners of various parcels of land located in Barangay Hugo
Perez, Trece Martires, Cavite. These properties were awarded to them pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) under seventy-five (75) TCTs. In 1995, Filinvest
Land, Inc. (Filinvest) acquired possession of these properties. Each of the respondents
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay entitled Pagbibitaw ng Karapatan (affidavits). The
respondents alleged that they surrendered possession of their properties with the
understanding that Filinvest would develop these into a residential subdivision, pursuant to a
joint venture agreement (JVA). Filinvest however began to fence the area and prohibited entry.
Filinvest argued that (a) the respondents had relinquished their rights over the property, (b) no
JVA was signed, and (c) all of the respondents signed the affidavits under which possession
was validly transferred to Filinvest. At trial, the respondents’ witnesses initially denied that they
executed the affidavits, however, later admitted that they executed them. RTC found the
respondents to be the lawful possessors. CA affirmed the RTC decision ruling that respondents
owned the properties and that the affidavits could not be a valid source of Filinvest’s right since
they were contrary to law. CA also ruled that both parties knew that the transfers were
prohibited

ISSUES: (1) Whether the affidavits which assigned possessory rights are valid.

(2) Whether the fact that parties are in pari delicto avoids the contract

RULING: (1) No. WAIVER OR SURRENDER OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTIES AWARDED

UNDER CARL IS A PROHIBITED TRANSFER. It violates Sec. 27 Transferability of Awarded
Lands which states that lands acquired by beneficiaries under the Act “may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government or the LBP
or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years.” The pronouncements in Torres
v. Ventura, 187 SCRA 96 (1990), were ruled to be applicable to land awards under RA 6657 in
Maylem v. Ellano, 592 SCRA 440 (2009), in Lebrudo v. Loyola, 645 SCRA 156 (2011), and in
Gua-an v. Quirino, 685 SCRA 236 (2012). In these cases, the Court emphasized that any
waiver and transfer of rights and interests within the 10-year prohibitory period under RA 6657
is void for violating agrarian reform law whose main purpose is to ensure that the farmer-
beneficiary shall continuously possess, cultivate, and enjoy the land he tills. The affidavits and
quitclaims signed by the farmers to surrender possession were accordingly declared void.

(2) NO.In Torres, we ruled that the pari delicto doctrine does not apply in an agrarian reform
case. To hold otherwise would defeat the spirit and intent of the agrarian reform to free the
tillers from the bondage of the soil. The policy of the law must be upheld. To elaborate, Article
1416 of the Civil Code provides an exception to the pari delicto doctrine. Under this article, the
plaintiff may recover what he paid or delivered pursuant to a void contract if the following
requisites are met: (a) the contract is not illegal per se but merely prohibited; (b) the prohibition
is for the plaintiff’s protection; and (c) public policy will be enhanced by his recovery. These
requisites are present in this case.

61. La Urbana vs. Bernardo (G.R. No. 41915, January 8, 1936)

62. DBP vs. Bautista (G.R. No. L-21362, November 29, 1968)
63. Treasurer of the Philippines vs. CA (G.R. No. L-42805, August 31, 1987)

THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

CA

G.R.No. L-42805 August 31, 1987

Nature: The petitioner asks us to reverse a decision of the respondent court affirming that of the
trial court holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable for damages sustained by the private
respondents under the following established facts. Petition granted.

Facts:

Lawaan Lopez was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a certificate of title. In
1965, an impostor, identifying himself as Lawaan Lopez, and claiming that his certificate e of
title had been burned in his house, filed a petition in court for the issuance of a dubplicate
certificate of title.The petition was granted.

After the issuance of the new duplicate certificate of title, the impostor executed a deed of sale
in favour of the respondents Ocsons, who paid him the purchase price in full. The
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently issued to them after cancellation of
the duplicate certificate in the name of Lawaan Lopez. 2 years later, the real Lawaan Lopez
filed a petition in court to declare as null in void the transfer of her land by the impostor to the
private respondents. After trial, the questioned deed of sale was annulled, together with the
duplicate certificate of title issued in the name of Lawaan Lopez, and the Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of the private respondents; then, the owner’s duplicate of certificate of the real
Lawaan Lopez was revalidated. Neither the Solicitor General nor the private respondents
appealed the decision, but Lawaan Lopez did so, claiming that the defendants should have
been required to pay damages to her and the costs. The appeal was dismissed, with the finding
of the Court of Appeals that there was no collusion between the private respondents and the
impostor. Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan
Lopez and the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages
sustained by the plaintiffs as above narrated. Both the trial court * ruled the respondent court **
ruled in their favor, holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable for the sum of P138,264.00
with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint, in case the judgment could not be
enforced against the other defendant who had been defaulted and could not be located. The
petitioner, disclaiming liability, is now before us and prays for relief against the decision of the
respondent court which he says is not in accord with law and jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not the Ocsons being neither the registered owners nor innocent purchasers,
are entitled to recover from the Assurance Fund?

Held: No.

As this Court held in La Urbana v. Bernardo "it is a condition sine qua non that the person who
brings an action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and as the
holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value." Being neither the registered owners nor innocent purchasers, the private respondents
are not entitled to recover from the Assurance Fund.

And, for failure to exercise the necessary diligence in ascertaining the credentials and bona
fides of the false Lawaan Lopez, and as a result of his deception, respondents never acquired
any title to the said land or any interest therein covered by Section 101 of Act No. 496.

The applicable law is Section 101 of Act No. 496 (before its revision by P.D. No. 1529)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January
26, 1976 is set aside, and Civil Case No. 12426 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal is
dismissed. No costs.

64. De Guzman vs. The National Treasurer (G.R. No. 143281, August 3, 2000)
65. Guaranteed Homes, Inc. vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009)

GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. v. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 171531| 30 JANUARY 2009

FACTS:
CA reversed the order of RTC-Olongapo, which
granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
Guaranteed Homes. Respondents, descendants of
Pablo Pascua, filed a complaint seeking
 reconveyance of a parcel of land in Cabitaugan,
Subic Zambales and covered by OCT No. 404 in the
name of Pablo.They are praying for damages. The
trial court held that petitioner was already the owner
of the subject property, noting that the failure to
annotate the subsequent property to it at the back of
said OCT did not affect its title to the property..CA
reversed and held that the respondents’ complaint
for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value, i.e. there is no need to go beyond the
registered title of spouses Rodolfo.
HELD: Yes (there is no need for petitioner to go beyond the clean title presented to them).
Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.

The Court held that it is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go
beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since “the act of
registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned,” it follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud
or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

In the present case, it is enough that petitioner examined the latest certificate of title issued in
the name of spouses Rodolfo. The petitioner as purchaser is not bound by the original
certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the
property.

66. Po Sun Tun vs. Price (G.R. No. 31346, December 28, 1929)

PO SUN TUN vs. PRICE

G.R. No. L-31346 December 28, 1929

FACTS:

On November 29, 1921, Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap, the owner of land, sold the land to Po
Tecsi. Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price. Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price.
Price in turn, sold the land on February 16, 1927, to the Province of Leyte. Returning again to
the original date of November 29, 1921, on that date Po Tecsi gave a general power of attorney
including the right to sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap. Gabino sold the land on November 22,
1923,to Jose H. Katigbak. In turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun on
October 12, 1927.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property first sold to a person who only secures a receipt would prevail over
where that same property sold to another person who records his documents in the registry of
deeds.

RULING:

Registration in general, as the law uses the word, means any entry made in the books of the
Registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation,
and even the marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the Registry which
records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. It results as a
matter of course since the deed made by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap in favor of Jose H.
Katigbak was not only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded,
and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a Torrens title and
transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defensible title,
has no legal rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible titles.
Also, if necessary, it could be ruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the Land
Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the
disputed property.Where a piece of property is first sold to a person who only secures a receipt
for the document evidencing the sale from the office of the Register of Deeds and where the
piece of property is later sold to another person who records his document in the Registry of
Deeds as provided by law and secures a Torrens title the property relays to the later person.

Janine Espina

67. Serra Serra vs. CA (G.R. No. 34080, March 22, 1991)

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on august 3 1971, setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued on june 7 1971.

Primitivo Hernaez , Rogaciana Hernaez and Luisa Hernaez filed with then CFI(now RTC) a petition
for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title in the name of their predecessor-in-
interest, Eleuterio Hernaez, covering Lot No. 1316, Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 all in the Province of
Negros Occidental.The petition was supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds, Bacolod,
Negros Occidental, that no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties.The petition
was granted and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental reconstituted original certificates of title.

Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, upon learning of the existence of the above
transfer certificates of title filed with the Registry of Deeds an adverse claim against the reconstituted
certificates of title in the name of the Hernaezes. They also filed a motion for cancellation of said
certificates of title claiming that they are holders of valid existing certificates of titles and that they
are in actual possession of the properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles since
before the war. The motion was forwarded to the CFI where the lots are situated.

The presiding judge denied the motion for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing. The
Serras challenged the legality of the issuance of the writ of possession before the Court of Appeals in
a petition of certiorari. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued and granted. The petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order dissolving the writ but was later denied. The petitioner
alleged that the lifting of the writ was allegedly premature and claimed that the order of the trial
court for the issuance of a writ of possession over the disputed lots in favor of private respondents is
void because a writ of possession in a cadastral proceeding can only be issued pursuant to a final
decree of registration and not on the basis of an order denying a motion to cancel certificates of title.

ISSUE:

1.whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction it previously issued.

2. Whether or not the main petition in the Court of Appeals questioning the propriety of the issuance
of a writ of possession by the trial court cannot be resolved without resolving the issue in the Court of
Appeals.

RULING:

The supreme court holds that the issuance of the writ of possession by Judge Abiera(presiding judge)
after the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title filed by petitioners was
dismissed and under the circumstances in this case, was not proper.

The law specifies when a writ of possession may be issued.

(1) in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Act No. 496)

(2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage (Sec. 7, Act No. 3135)

(3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened (Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v.
Mañalac and Lopez, 89 , Phil. 270, 275)

(4) in execution sales (last par. of Sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

Since the instant case does not fall among the cases mentioned the issuance of the writ of possession
was not proper. The lifting of the previously issued writ of preliminary injunction by the respondent
appellate court, resulting in the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by the trial court and
the dispossession of the petitioners of the subject properties was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent Court of
Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in
Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of this case
and of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the motion for cancellation
of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the possession of
the properties in question. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on February 15,
1972, enjoining private respondents from interfering in any manner, with petitioners' right of
possession of the properties in question, shall remain effective until the issue of ownership and/or
possession of the properties is finally settled by a competent court.

68. Ragua vs. CA (G.R. No. 88521, January 31, 2000)

FACTS:

These cases are now before the Court for review via certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
that reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of ordering the Register of
Deeds, Quezon City to reconstitute Original Certificate of Title No. 632 in the name of Eulalio Ragua.
Eulalio Ragua, claiming to be the registered owner, together with co-owners Anatalio B. Acuña,
Catalina Dalawantan, and other co-owners, filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, covering a parcel of land, known as the Diliman Estate,
attached to the petition was a photostatic copy
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (Tuason) filed with the Court of First Instance petition alleging that OCT No.
632 was fictitious and the land was covered by TCT No. 1356 in the name of People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC). TCT No. 1356 originated from OCT No. 735 registered in the name of
Tuason's predecessor-in-interest..

On September 10, 1964, the People Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), later succeeded by
the National Housing Authority (NHA), filed with the same trial court its opposition to Ragua's
petition for reconstitution of OCT No. 632.

In sum, the petition for reconstitution filed by Eulalio Ragua was opposed by several parties.
On April 18, 1968, Eulalio Ragua died, and on April 29, 1968, was substituted by his heirs

In due time, oppositors, including the Republic, filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. On August 29, 1980, the trial court denied the motion.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution for failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and
posting of notices.

ISSUE:

(1) whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings for reconstitution of title
due to non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements prescribed for reconstitution of
titles

(2) whether the evidence of the sources of the title to be reconstituted was sufficient basis.

RULING:

The supreme court held that the petitioners admittedly did not comply with the requirements
of Section 12 (d), (e) and (g) :

(1) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong
to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements.

(2) the names and addresses of the occupants of the adjoining property and of all persons
who may have any interest in the property.

(3) no deeds or other instrument affecting the property have been presented for registration.

The Supreme Court ruled that the failure to comply with the requirements of publication and
posting of notices prescribed in Republic Act No. 26, Sections 12 and 13 is fatal to the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements renders
its decision approving the reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and all proceedings therein null and
void.

The 2nd question the supreme court is convinced that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are supported by sufficient evidence and, thus, binding on this Court. They will not
disturb these factual findings.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petitions in G.R. Nos. 88521-22 and G.R. Nos.
89366-67, for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV Nos. 00705-00706, promulgated on May 30, 1989. No costs.
 69. Manotok vs. Barque (G.R. 162335, December 18, 2008)

FACTS:

On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita Barque-
Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City which was allegedly destroyed when a fire
gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr.
submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax
Declaration.

Atty. Bustos (Reconstituting Officer) requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a
certified copy of Subdivision Plan (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated
letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-
NCR). In his reply dated 7 November 1996, Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the
Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. Chief of the Surveys Division of the
LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file. Due to
the conflict of records Atty Bustos sent another letter to Engineer Dalire requesting for
clarification. It was later raised that the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR,
was certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in
the file. The LMS-DENR-NCR is sure that the copy did not come from their Office and the
copy bears forged initials of the action officer. In a letter dated 19 February 1997, Engineer
Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious and denied having
sent the letters.

In an Order dated 30 June 1997, Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 because the lots were covered by TCT which registered in
the name of the Manotoks and submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document.

The Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA.

RULING OF THE LRA

The LRA gave a resolution dated 24 June 1998, the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The
LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13, only the owner or co-owner's duplicate of an
original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative
reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other
than the owner's duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engineer Dalire failed to deny or
question the genuineness of his signature in the letter. The LRA held that the January 2
1997 letter is an official communication from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator
personally opined that the Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is a sham and spurious.
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a court of
competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks.
The Manotoks trace their Torrens title to the purchase by their predecessors-in-interest of
the property from the Government in 1919.

The Barques filed a Petition for Review praying for the modification of 24 June 1998
Resolution and Order of the LRA. The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of
TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

In its Decision of 29 October 2003 the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks' petition and
affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration of
the Barques, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration. The court's
decision is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT
No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-
210177.

The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision and the Court of
Appeals denied the motion. The Manotoks filed a Petition for Review with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 162605. The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2
August 2004.

In a Decision dated 12 December 2005, the First Division of this Court denied the petitions
and affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals. In its 19 April 2006
Resolution, the Special First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks' motion for
reconsideration. No proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court assailing the
validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques'
simple petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court cancelled
the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not only
reconstituted, but also valid.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-
22481 without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a proceeding directly assailing
the validity of petitioners' title?

2. Whether or not the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly
lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT
No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?

3. Whether or not the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners' TCT
No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?

4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership
of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this
Court.

First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns well-
entrenched doctrines of this Court such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva
Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon.

Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because of the pre-
existing Torrens title of the Manotoks.

Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct proceeding assailing its validity is filed
before the proper Regional Trial Court.

Fourth, the Barques submitted patently forged documents in the administrative

reconstitution of their title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August
2007.

Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT petitioners' letter motion for reconsideration dated 19 July
2006, (2) REVERSE the Court's First Division Decision dated 12 December 2005 and
Resolution dated 19 April 2006, (3) RECALL the Entry of Judgment dated 2 May 2006, and
(4) DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 filed by
respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.

NO NEED TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE RULING JUST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts."

First, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative

reconstitution of title resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person
without a direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court.

Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to

reconstitute administratively a Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued
Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person.

Third, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the issue of ownership of
land is decided with finality in a petition for administrative constitution of title.

fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the petitioner in an

administrative petition praying for a simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected
and undeserved windfall – the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the
cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the
same property.

DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE

The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division has
already become final and executory. The dissenting opinion states that there is no
compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of immutability and inalterability of
decisions. However the Supreme court held that the decision never became final and
executory under 2 compelling reasons.

First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en
banc or in division.

Second, the doctrine of immutability and inalterability of decisions applies only if the trial
court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

THE MANOTOKS' PRIOR TITLE NULLIFIES RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS OF BARQUES

The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto
nullified the reconstitution proceedings.

A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN A DIRECT ACTION ASSAILING ITS

VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in

accordance with law.

LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY

At any time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or destroyed
title is subsequently found. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative,
executive or ministerial determination.

A SURFEIT OF FORGERIES AND BADGES OF FRAUD

Equally disturbing, there are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and other dubious
circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed aside in its Decision.

WHETHER ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR NOT, A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE

CANCELLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE
and a GUARANTY OF STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM.

70. Vilbar vs. Opinion (G.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014)

FACTS:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the May 26, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in which affirmed the January 31, 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 98-0302, an accion reinvindicatoria case filed by respondent Angelito L Opinion against
petitioner-spouses Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar and others. Also assailed is the CA' s December 22,
2006 Resolution which denied spouses Vilbar's Motion for Reconsideration.

Spouses Vilbar claimed that they and Dulos Realty and Development Corporation (Dulos Realty), entered
into a Contract to Sell involving a Lot 20-B located in Airmen’s Village, Las Piñas City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title. Sometime in August 1979, spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot 20-B in the
concept of owners and exercised acts of ownership thereon with the permission of Dulos Realty after
making some advance payment.

Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20, Dulos Realty executed a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Vilbar and their co-purchaser Elena. However, spouses Vilbar and
Elena were not able to register and transfer the title in their names because Dulos Realty allegedly failed
to have the lot formally subdivided despite its commitment to do so.

Spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty also executed a Contract to Sell covering Lot 21, Block 4 of Airmen’s
Village covered by TCT. To pay for the balance of the purchase price the spouses Vilbar obtained a
housing loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) secured by a real estate mortgage
over the said lot 21. Dulos Realty facilitated the approval of the loan, the proceeds of which were
immediately paid to it as full payment of the purchase price. In 1991, the spouses Vilbar were able to pay
the loan in full and DBP issued the requisite Cancellation of Mortgage. The spouses Vilbar have been in
actual, open and peaceful possession of Lot 21 and occupy the same as absolute owners since 1981.

In contrast, Opinion claimed that he legally acquired Lots 20 and 21 through extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage constituted over the said properties by Otilio Gorospe, Sr. and Otilio Gorospe, Jr. in his favor.
Opinion alleged that on January 12, 1995, the Gorospes borrowed ₱440,000.00 and, to secure the loan,
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject Lot 21 and Lot 20. The subject properties
were sold at a public auction where Opinion emerged as the highest bidder.

On February 13, 1997, Opinion filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession against the spouses
Vilbar and Elena and served with a notice to vacate the premises.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of Opinion declaring that he lawfully
acquired the disputed properties and that his titles are valid, the sources of which having been duly
established.
The trial court, in ruling for Opinion, ratiocinated that there was no doubt that Opinion’s predecessors-in-
interest likewise acquired title to the properties through lawful means.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On May 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners contend that they are the rightful owners and possessors of the contested properties through a
valid sale perfected in 1981. They maintain that Gorospe, Sr., the predecessor-in-interest of Opinion, did
not acquire ownership over Lots 20 and 21 because at the time of the levy and execution, said properties
were no longer owned by Dulos Realty. Gorospe, Sr. could not, therefore, validly pass any rights to
Opinion which the former did not have in the first place.

ISSUE:

1. who between the parties has a better right over Lots 20 and 21?

RULING:

The Court finds no merit in the Petition. Respondent Opinion’s predecessor-in-interest is an innocent third
party purchaser in the public auction sale, absent proof to the contrary. It is worth stressing at this point
that bad faith cannot be presumed. "It is a question of fact that must be proven” by clear and convincing
evidence. Respondent Opinion was proven to be in good faith when he dealt with the Gorospes and relied
on the titles presented to him. Spouses Vilbar, on the other hand, failed to present substantial evidence to
prove otherwise..

The real estate mortgage entered into by the spouses Vilbar with the DBP does not, by itself, result in a
conclusive presumption that they have a valid title to Lot 21. The basic fact remains that there is no proof
of conveyance showing how they acquired ownership over Lot 21 justifying the issuance of the certificate
of title in their name.

The Supreme Court in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
May 26 2006 of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

71. vs. HEIRS OF FLORENTINO

Republic AND PACENCIA
MOLINYAWE (G.R. No. 217120, April 18, 2016)
Facts

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines praying that the February
20, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 133803 be reversed and set aside and that
Civil Case No. 10-658 pending before the Regional Trial Court,(RTC-Branch 57), be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

In the CA, the appellate court denied the Republic's petition for certiorari which sought to annul the
orders, of the RTC-Branch 57 admitting the Amended and Supplemental Petition of the respondents,
seeking the cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of title of said TCTs on the ground of prescription because the
Republic failed to execute the final and executory decision of a co-equal court.

On May 16, 1960, criminal cases for malversation were filed with the then Court of First Instance ( CFI-La
Union) against several accused including Florentino Molinyawe.
In that same year, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a forfeiture case pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 before the then CFI-Pasig against Florentino, his relatives, and the
respondents in this case. The forfeiture case involved several parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
75239, 76129 and 77577, and registered in the names of the spouses Miranda, Spouses Padilla and
Vivencio Leus. The Republic claimed that Florentino had illegally acquired the said properties as their
values were said to be grossly disproportionate to his declared income.

On September 22, 1972 the CFI-Pasig declared the sale of the subject properties to the Spouses
Miranda, Spouses Padilla and Leus null and void, and ordered that the said properties be forfeited in
favor of the Republic.

The CFI-Pasig then issued a writ of execution, the writ was duly served on the respondents more than
thirty (30) years had passed , but still the Republic failed to cancel TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577
and transfer them to its name. It appeared that Florentino did not turn over to the Republic the owner's
duplicate copies of the subject TCTs.

The Republic filed a separate action with the RTC (Branch 138) specifically a petition for
annulment of owner's duplicate copy of said TCTs and the issuance of new ones pursuant to
Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 allegedly due to the respondents' refusal to surrender the owner's
duplicate copies.

On September 12, 2011, the RTC-Branch 138 decided in favor of the Republic declaring the
owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 in possession of the respondents
as null and void. Thus, cancelled the same and directed the Register of Deeds (RD-Makati) to
issue new owner's duplicate copies of said TCTs in the name of the Republic. No appropriate
remedy was pursued within the reglementary period, the September 12, 2011 decision in the LRC
case became final and executory. In January 2012, the Republic filed a motion for execution which
was granted by the RTC-Branch 138.

The decision of CFI on September 22, 1972 was appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied by the
CA. No further action was taken to set aside the judgment thus the CA issued an Entry of Judgment.

Many years later the respondents, as heirs of Florentino, filed with the RTC-Branch 57, a Civil Case ,
praying for the cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and
77577 and for quieting of title on the ground of prescription for the non-execution of the September 22,
1972 CA decision

Consequently, the Republic filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the annulment of
the orders issued by the RTC-Branch 57. It argued that the trial court had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that a] it had no jurisdiction over the
original complaint/petition; b] the amendment sought a review of a final and executory decision of a co-
equal court; and c] the amendment is a collateral attack on TCT.

In its February 20, 2015 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition.

Not in conformity with the CA decision, the Republic filed the subject petition based on the GROUNDS
THE DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the RTC-BRANCH 57 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ADMITTING RESPONDENTS' AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AS IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 10-658
 2.) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND ITS
JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 65 WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIVIL
FORFEITURE CASE IS CONTINGENT OR DEPENDENT ON THE
CRIMINAL CASE.

RULING

The supreme held that the petition is meritorious since grant of extraordinary
remedy of certiorari justified when grave abuse of discretion present. In the case
at bar, a cursory review of the records would reveal that the RTC-Branch 57
violated several rules of procedure and well-settled rulings. Thus, its decision was
arrived at arbitrarily and whimsically clearly constituting grave abuse of discretion.

It cannot be denied that the forfeiture case involving the subject TCTs was filed
before the CFI-Pasig while the complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens
and quieting of title was filed before the RTC-Branch 57. It was the CFI-Pasig that
had jurisdiction over the main action or proceeding involving the subject TCTs, not
the RTC-Branch 57. Hence, the RTC-Branch 57 had no jurisdiction over the
respondents' complaint/petition. The Court agrees with the Republic's contention
that only the court having jurisdiction over the main action or proceeding involving
the property may order the cancellation thereof. In this case, only the CFI-Pasig
can order the cancellation of lis pendens, not the RTC-Branch 57.

The supreme court GRANTED THE PETITION. Accordingly, the February 20,
2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Civil Case
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City is ordered
DISMISSED.

72. Cabañez vs. Solano (G.R. No. 200180, June 6, 2016)

FACTS

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Amended Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 29, 2011 and
January 10, 2012, respectively.

Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in Alabang Hills,
Muntinlupa, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627, respectively.
Appearing on the face of these titles as the registered owner is herein respondent, "Maria
Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age, married to [herein petitioner] Benjamin H. Cabañez

On February 12, 2007, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a
"Petition for Correction of the Name and Marital Status of the Registered Owner of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the Registry of Deeds. Respondent
alleged that without knowing the legal implication, Petitioner erroneously made it appear that
she is married to Mr. Benjamin when in truth and in fact they are not married but merely living in
a common-law relationship. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez is actually married to a certain Leandra D.
Cabañez who had previously filed a case against Petitioner, questioning the ownership of the
said properties which case however was terminated by virtue of a compromise approved by the
court. The respondent prayed of this Honorable Court that Petitioner's name and marital status
appearing in Transfer Certificates of Title No. 154626 and 154627 be corrected from "MA.
JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ to "MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO,
single" as it is the true and actual status of petitioner.

RTC found the petition to be well-founded and meritorious, thus GRANTED. However upon appeal
the Court of appeals in the instant Petition granted the Annulment of Judgment and SET ASIDE
the decision of the RTC.

Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the provisions of PD 1529,
and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, should be applied in the present case; posting of the
notice of hearing of respondent's petition is deemed constructive notice to the whole world,
including petitioner; the petition filed by respondent is an action in rem where jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

This time, the CA agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the governing law and that
there is nothing under the pertinent provisions of the said law which states that publication is a
requirement for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over respondent's petition. The CA also ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the existence of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of the
assailed judgment of the RTC.

The Motion for Reconsideration was GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment is DENIED.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AMENDING ITS
ORIGINAL DECISION CONSIDERING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION AND SUMMONS
WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT SUPPLETORILY
APPLY TO THE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 WHEREIN THE
REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY.

RULING

The Court finds merit in the petition, but for reasons which are not identical as those espoused
by petitioner.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that the CA ruled on the basis of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Specifically,
the CA cited Sections 2 and 108 of the said law, which provide the Section 2. Nature of
registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts and Section 108. Amendment, and alteration of
certificates.

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FOR READING PURPOSES ONLY NO NEED TO WRITE :)

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and
decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Section 108. Amendment, and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment

shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of
the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the
same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has
married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new
certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider
proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the
court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value
and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the
preceding section. (emphasis supplied)

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this
Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the
decree or registration was entered.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RESUME WRITING

The Court notes that the petition was clearly one which was filed after the original registration of
title, as provided under Section 2 of PD 1529. Moreover, respondent's petition was filed with the
RTC for the purpose of correcting supposed errors which were committed when entries were
made in the subject TCTs, as contemplated under Section 108 of the same law.

However, under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of
a certificate of title under Section 108 of PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature.They are
limited to issues so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The proceedings
thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical,
but certainly not controversial issues.

In the present case, it is now apparent that before the trial court can alter the description of the
civil status of respondent in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have to receive
evidence of and determine respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial rendering the
summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529 inadequate.

It is settled that a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot
be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of
notice. However, as found by the CA, respondent failed to comply with the said requirements. In
all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the
proceedings will be utterly void. It is wrong for the CA to rule in its Amended Decision that
publication is not a jurisdictional requirement for the RTC to take cognizance of respondent's
petition. on the bases of petitioner's serious objection and adverse claim, it is apparent that he
has an interest to protect.

The instant petition was GRANTED. The Amended Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The original Decision of the Court of Appeals, which
annulled the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, is REINSTATED.

73. Rivera vs. Moran (G.R. No. 24568, March 2, 1926)

FACTS

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari. The record shows that in cadastral case
No. 9 of the Province of Tarlac, the Court of First Instance in a decision dated
September 16, 1922, ordered lots Nos. 1199, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1222, 1223, 1224,
1225 and 1230 registered in the names of Estanislao Garcia and Rafael Llorente.
Both the provincial fiscal of Tarlac and the Attorney-General, representing the
Director of Lands, filed motions for a new trial which are denied. A bill of
exceptions was also presented but was disapproved by the court on the ground
that it had not been filed in time.ch

Subsequently, Rafael Llorente transferred his interest in the lots to Estanislao

Garcia who mortgaged the land to the petitioners herein. The mortgage was
inscribed in the unregistered land register on April 10, 1923. The meantime on
February 15 1923 the Attorney-General presented a petition for review under
section 38 of the Land of Transportation Act, alleging that the adjudication by
fraud consisting in fraudulent alterations of the stenographic notes taken in the
cadastral case. chanrobles virtual law library

On April 25, 1923, the Court of First Instance granted the petition for review, set
aside the decision of September 16, 1922, and ordered that the case be reopened
and reset for a new trial. The case was assigned for trial on June 15, 1923, but on
motion of the respondents Garcia and Llorente without objection to the
jurisdiction of the court the trial was postponed until further notice.c The
petitioner filed a motion in the cadastral case alleging that they had accepted the
mortgage hereinbefore mentioned on the strength of the decision of September
16, 1922. That they were the holders of the mortgage as innocent third parties
and in good faith. Thus the court had no jurisdiction to grant the petition for
review under section 38 and they asked the court to declare itself without
jurisdiction and desist from proceeding with the retrial of the case. This motion
was denied.

ISSUrarISSUE

Whether or not the decision of September 16, 1922, is to be regarded as a decree

the petitioner having acquired their interest in the land subsequent to said
decision are innocent parties and that therefore the remedy provided by section
38 is not available.

RULING

The contention that the petitioners must be regarded as innocent

purchasers for value within the meaning of the section 38 cannot be
sustained. They acquired their interest in the land before any final
decree had been entered. The litigation was therefore in effect still
pending and to appear that they were aware of the fact. In these
circumstances they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in
good faith. It is further observed at that time, the petitioner could have
acquired no interest valid as against third parties until their title thereto
had been duly entered in the Torrens register in the office of the
register of deeds. Section 59 of the Land of Registration Act provides
that "the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and
affect the land." The inscription in the unregistered land register did not
materially improve the petitioner's situation such inscriptions are
without prejudice to third parties with a better right..

From what has been said, it follows that the court below did not exceed its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for review and in reopening the
case. iThe petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.

74. Pua Hermanos vs. Register of Deeds (G.R. No. 274349, September 10, 1927)

FACTS

This is an appeal from a ruling of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in the exercise of the
supervisory power conferred in section 200 of the Administrative Code, sustaining the register of
deeds of Batangas in refusing to record a sheriff’s certificate showing that certain property
located in Lipa, Batangas, had been sold to the appellant at a sheriff’s sale under execution.

The appellant, Chua Pua Hermanos, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas for the purpose of recovering a sum of money from the defendant Jose H. Katigbak.
Shortly thereafter the plaintiff in said action caused a writ of attachment against the defendant
to be placed in the hands of Carlos Ilustre, as provincial sheriff. This attachment was levied upon
a house and lot located in the poblacion of Lipa, Batangas, and more particularly described in the
sheriff’s return to the writ, the same being the house in which Katigbak was then living.

On June 11, 1926, a judgment was rendered in said civil case in favor of the present appellant,
Chua Pua Hermanos, to recover of the defendant Katigbak the sum of P13,912.37, with interest
as prayed in the complaint. Upon said judgment execution was issued and levied upon the same
property was sold at public auction by the sheriff to the appellant, as the only bidder at such
sale, for the sum of P15,000. The sheriff issued his certificate of sale in due form to Chua Pua
Hermanos, who on September 11, 1926, presented said certificate to the register of deeds of the
province for registration.

The register of deeds has raised an objection to the placing of this certificate of sale on record on
the basis that after the attachment had been levied, in the action instituted by Chua Pua
Hermanos, another creditor of Katigbak, namely, Samuel Murray, Admr., also commenced a civil
action against Katigbak in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover a large sum of money
and in due time judgment was entered in favor of Murray to recover the amount sued for.
Execution for the enforcement of this judgment was issued on July 15, 1926, the same was
levied on all the right, title, and interest which the judgment debtor Katigbak had or might have
in the same property which had already been attached by Chua Pua Hermanos. Thereafter said
property was sold at public auction, on August 21, 1926, to the plaintiff Samuel Murray, in his
capacity as administrator. The sheriff, on September 1, 1926, issued his certificate of sale to
Murray, which certificate was duly presented to the register of deeds and by him recorded.

Murray succeeded in obtaining final judgment before final judgment had been entered in favor of
Chua Pua Hermanos.

ISSUE

Whether or not the register of deeds in this case can exercise a quasi-judicial power

RULING

The Court opined that the register of deeds in this case was in error in supposing that he
exercises a quasi-judicial power in determining the rights of persons under sheriff’s deeds. His
duty with respect to the notation or recording of these instruments, so far at least as relates to
unregistered property, is ministerial only. The noting of these instruments of record adds nothing
to their intrinsic effect, such step being devised only as a means of notification of the claimant’s
right to the public, in accordance with the American system of registration. If, for instance, it
should transpire that there was some fatal defect in the execution of Murray’s judgment which
would have rendered the sale to Murray invalid without the registration of the certificate of sale,
such defect has not been cured by the recording of the certificate.

The right of a junior judgment creditor to levy upon property that has already been levied upon,
subject of course to the efficacy of the prior execution and the duty of passing upon the
competitive rights of two judgment creditors pertains to the courts when such rights are drawn
in question in proper proceedings.

For the reasons stated the order appealed from must be reversed, and the respondent register of
deeds is directed to receive and record the appellant’s certificate of sale, upon tender by the
appellant of the proper fee incident to the service to be rendered.

75. Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009

FACTS

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Amended Decision dated 26 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals which recalled and set
aside its earlier Decision dated 2 June 2008. The prior Decision of the appellate court
reversed the Decision dated 15 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City,
which pronounced that herein respondents Flora Mendoza and Ponciano Hernandez
(respondents) were the lawful owners of the property subject of this case.

Ignacio Mendoza is the common ascendant of the parties herein. Ignacio was first married to
Juana Jaurigue, to whom Dominador and Victoria were born. Petitioner Herminio M. Gutierrez
is the son of Victoria, and petitioner Elisa A. Gutierrez-Mayuga is the daughter of Herminio.

After the death of Juana Ignacio married Ignacia Jaurigue, the younger sister of Juana. Out of
this second marriage, five children were born.

The parcel of land subject of this case is an unregistered land located in Barangay Sta. Clara,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

On 25 March 1916, Ignacio acquired the subject property by way of purchase from Luis
Custodio which sale was contained in a notarized document entitled Escritura Publica.
Thereafter, on 8 March 1940, Ignacio executed a deed of donation inter vivos. The subject
property was donated to the children whom he begot with Ignacia, his second wife. The deed
was likewise duly notarized, but the same was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

Subsequently, on 27 April 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria,

Publiciana and Quieting of Title against petitioners in the RTC of Tanauan City. Respondents
alleged that after the execution of the deed of donation inter vivos, the subject property was
assigned to Flora and her sister Felisa, who then possessed and occupied the same as
owners. Ponciano took over and exercised the rights of his mother Felisa after the latter died
in 1988. On or about late January or early February of 2006, petitioners took possession of
the southern portion of the subject property and constructed a house of strong materials
despite the vigorous objection and opposition of the respondents. As the parties were close
relatives, respondents exerted efforts to compromise and amicably settle the case, but
petitioners refused. Respondents prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of
the subject land and that petitioners be directed to demolish and remove the house of strong
materials, which they built in bad faith.

Petitioners denied the averments in their Answer, asserting that Ignacio and his first wife,
Juana, had been in possession of the subject property as early as 1900. After the death of
Juana, Dominador, Victoria and Ignacio took over possession of the subject property. When
Dominador and Victoria died in 1940 and 1943, respectively, their heirs, including petitioners,
occupied and possessed the subject property openly, peacefully and publicly. Petitioners
likewise disputed the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of donation inter vivos,
considering that for more than 65 years the said document was not registered with the office
of the Register of Deeds to cause its transfer to respondents. Respondents’ presence on and
occupancy of a portion of the subject property were allegedly a mere tolerance on the part of
petitioners. Thus, the title and rights of petitioners over the subject property were absolute
and legal by virtue of succession..

On 15 June 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. Principally, the RTC
relied on the deed of donation inter vivos in awarding the subject property to respondents.
However upon appeal on 2 June 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision,
reversing the ruling of the RTC. The CA held that it is undisputed that the subject property is
an unregistered land over which both parties, who are descendants of Ignacio Mendoza,
claim ownership. A careful review of the records shows that the deed of donation, was not
registered at all. The petitioners, being third parties are not bound by the transmittal of rights
from Ignacio Mendoza to the respondents.

On 26 September 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision setting

aside its earlier Decision. Holding that as pointed out by the respondents, the law has
exceptions. "The conveyance shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except
(1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice of
knowledge thereof"

ISSUE

Whether or not the deed belatedly introduced by Ponciano is also fatally invalid in view of its
non-registration as prescribed by law

Whether or not the petitioners can validly claim that they have occupied and possessed a
portion of the subject property in their own right and in the concept of owners, thus acquiring
the same by prescription.

RULING
The supreme court denied the petition and affirmed the amended decision of the CA.
Petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos is a
notarized document. According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented
in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved." A notarial document is
evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be
presented to overcome such legal presumption.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the above
presumption.

The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity thereof.
Registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the
effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.

The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into. The conveyance of
unregistered land shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the
grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge
thereof. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners are the heirs of Ignacio, the grantor of
the subject property. Thus, they are bound by the provisions of the deed of donation inter
vivos.

Petitioner’s claim of prescription is not meritorious since the petitioners cannot adequately
explain how they entered and possessed the subject property to become owners thereof.
Thus, the possession of the property by Victoria was only by virtue of the mere tolerance by
Ignacio and the children of his second marriage. The alleged possession by petitioners,
which they claim to trace to Victoria, was also by mere tolerance on the part of respondents.

Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of
the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession.1avvphi1

Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner
are clearly not en concepto de dueño, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.