EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992.]

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Romulo R. Macalintal for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; PROHIBITION ON POSTING OF DECALS AND STICKERS ON

MOBILE PLACES (SECTION 15 (a) AND SECTION 21 (f) OF COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
2347); NULL AND VOID. — The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. — COMELEC

Resolution No. 2347 unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. There are various concepts
surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our
own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom. all of the protections expressed in the Bill
of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred
freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1980]). This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises
from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.
(Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]). It is
difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections
may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken
away. We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the
utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST AND PUBLIC INTEREST, NOT
THREATENED; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE, NOT PRESENT. — The regulation in the
present case is of a different category. The promotion of a substantial Government interest is
not clearly shown. "A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S. Ct
1673." (City council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S. Ct 2118
[1984]) The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public
interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen’s
right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must
the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be
so substantive as to justify a clamp over one’s mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:
"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual’s freedom ends and the State’s power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced
by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the first Amendment ... That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and
a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the
limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice .... For these reasons any
attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion,
at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending.
Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]." Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political
party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If,
in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by
newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these
are not covertly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we
sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of
belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

4. ID.; ID.; DEBATE ON PUBLIC ISSUES SHOULD BE OPEN. — We have adopted the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may
well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 [1964]; cited
in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v. National
Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]. Too many restrictions will deny to people the
robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections
will truly be free, clean, and honest.

5. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INFORMATION PREVAILS. — When faced with border
line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the
part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the
ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate are not
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.

6. ID.; ID.; REGULATION OF ELECTION ACTIVITY, LIMITED; TEST OF VALIDITY. — The

regulation of election activity has its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the
limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano,
shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too
general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one’s
expression of belief in a candidate or one’s opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the
flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus
with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 (a) AND SECTION 21 (f) COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2347 VOID
FOR OVERBREADTH. — Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. A statute is considered void for overbreadth
when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
(Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]). "In a series of decisions this Court has held that,
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTRICTION PROVIDED THEREIN VIOLATES DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. — The
resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-½)
inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places
whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction
as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even
the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence
of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides "that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law." Property is more than the mere thing which a person
owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th
Amendment, protects these essential attributes. Property is more than the mere thing which
a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.
The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holde v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780. 790, 18 Sup. CXt. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save by the
law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127." (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION DEPRIVES CITIZEN OF RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND
INFORMATION. — "We have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on
cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such
posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process,
it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information. Freedom to
distribution information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to
the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations
of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger of distribution can
so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each householder the full right
to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of
ideas." (Martin v. City of strutters, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943]) The
preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to dole-
out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number
of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his
choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or
stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is
impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

10. ID.; ID.; RA 6646, SECTION 11; RIGHT TO PROPERTY JOINED BY LIBERTY INTEREST;
REGULATION, NOT JUSTIFIED. — The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on
the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is
not met in this case. Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it
prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private
except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private
person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a
post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, the are no limits
to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or
regulation, may do. The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they inclose
the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom. This is
delegation running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 46 [1935], "The delegated power is unconfined and
vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No such plenitude of power is susceptible of
transfer."cralaw virtua1aw library

11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 11 SECTION 26 AND ARTICLE XII SECTION 1 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE IX (c) SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION; NOT IMPAIRED BY POSTING OF DECALS
AND STICKERS ON PRIVATE VEHICLES. — The constitutional objective to give a rich
candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
candidacies, mandated by Article II Section 26 and Article XIII Section 1 in relation to Article
IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and
other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing
freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance. Under Section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service, . . . while under Section 1, Article XIII thereof "The
Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
nor the common good."cralaw virtua1aw library

12. ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 (a) AND SECTION 21 (f) OF COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2347;
PROHIBITION BECOMES CENSORSHIP, NOT JUSTIFIED BY CONSTITUTION. — In sum, the
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot
be justified by the Constitution: ". . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the
highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is
to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost
rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must
ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be
transcended. the Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of
the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this
basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure
that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme
law." (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

13. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INFORMATION, CALLS FOR MORE LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION. — The unusual circumstances of this year’s national and local elections call
for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone
the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern
us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring
about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates
and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters
cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does
not know who are aspiring to be elected to public office. There are many candidates whose
names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may
accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such candidate’s name on his car
bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.chanrobles law library

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers
granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166
and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election
propaganda:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written
or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen
(14) inches in length Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 21(f) Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x           x          x

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate’s own residential house or one of his
residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election
propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size." (Emphasis supplied)

x           x          x

The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code on lawful election propaganda which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:chanrob1es virtual

1aw library

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size
not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;

(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
candidate;

(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding
two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or
rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three
feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be
displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be
removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or

(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission
may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested
parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission’s
authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the
nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section
37, 1978 EC).

and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda

prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw,
paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in
the immediately preceding section, at the candidate’s own residence, or at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election
propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided Further,
That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than
two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5)
days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24)
hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails
the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile"
places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In
addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22,
1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election
Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster
Areas."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for
by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III) There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.

There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted
as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.

All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to
free speech the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430
[1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970]).

This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the
freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 11
L. Ed. 2d 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando
in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]). Too many restrictions will
deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest
essential if our elections will truly be free, clean, and honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The determination of the limits of the Government’s power to regulate the exercise by a
citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy
objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests —
individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even
more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority
to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly
elections.

We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the election period is
granted regulatory powers vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants special privileges, or
concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns
and forms among candidates in connection with the object of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections" (Article IX (c) section 4)

The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National
Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion
cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of
election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and
honest elections. In the National Press Club case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the
preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of
campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go
on a case to case basis.chanrobles law library : red

There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign
activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly
restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.

For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they
deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial
process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act
instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or
ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable
opportunities may have been lost.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in
favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s
power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the
efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.chanrobles law library

There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections (supra) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its
limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully
worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election
campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not
limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one’s expression of belief in a
candidate or one’s opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting,
and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally
sanctioned objective.

Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather
strong dissents, in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a
different category. The promotion of a substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.

"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673." (City Council v.
Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does
not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen’s right of
free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the
danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one’s mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual’s freedom ends and the State’s power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced
by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the
limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .

For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights
rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion
and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger,
actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]." (Emphasis
supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the question prohibition is not so much
that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was
careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and
commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or
purchased opinions with less reason can sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a
sticker or decal on his private property.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).

"In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.

In Lovell v. Griffin , 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct. 666, the Court invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia,
without a license, pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish
legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct.. 146,
the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or
imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid,
the court noted that where legislative abridgment of ‘fundamental personal rights and
liberties’ is asserted, ‘ the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.’ 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct.
900, 128 ALR 1352, the Court said that ‘[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society,’ but pointed out that in each case ‘the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."
(310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 [1960])

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half
(8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile
places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.
In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would
be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.

"Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire,
use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential
attributes.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes
the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential
attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s
acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com.
127." (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])
As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on
cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such
posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process,
it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so

clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and
health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger
of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the naked
restriction of the dissemination of ideas." (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87
L. ed. 1313 [1943])

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is
joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must
be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.cralawnad

Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or
display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common
poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own
crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the
COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and
partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do.cralawnad

The provisions allowing regulations are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom. This is delegation running
riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293
U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935]), "The delegated power is unconfined and vagrant. . . This is
delegation running riot. No such plentitude of power is susceptible of transfer."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II,
Section 26 and Article XIII, Section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution,
is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared
to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial
considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.chanrobles law library : red

Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, . . . while under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress
shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to
doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the number of
decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice
and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers
for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible
encroachment of his liberties.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in
the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of
its being the supreme law." (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year’s national and local elections call for a more liberal
interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest
possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are
we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political
change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective
positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name
half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who
are aspiring to be elected to public office.

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualification, platforms, programs and
ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a
candidate’s name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing
ideas. Our view of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today’s
particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is
DECLARED NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,

Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., is on leave.