Bicarme V. Court of Appeals
Bicarme V. Court of Appeals
Bicarme V. Court of Appeals
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Spouses Bicarme were the original co-owners of 2 parcels of land. They died
intestate and were survived by their children. Victorina, one of the children, later died
intestate survived by her only daughter Cristina. Maria, without the consent of Cristina
executed 3 deeds of sale over the corn land. Cristina filed an action for partition
because her aunt Maria refused to share with the yearly fruits of the subject land. She
claims that upon the death of her grandparents, her mother Victorina and her aunt Maria
became co-owners of the land. Upon the death of her mother, she and her aunt Maria
then became co-owners.
The trial court ruled that Maria and Cristina are co-heirs based on the 3 deeds of sale
executed by Maria where it was stated that she is the sole owner of the property having
acquired the same by inheritance from his later father. By admitting that the land is
inherited property, Maria in effect recognized Cristina’s rights as a co-owner. As such,
prescription as a mode of acquiring title cannot apply. A co-owner is a trustee for the
other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may acquire exclusive ownership of the
common property through prescription for possession by one trustee alone is not
deemed adverse to the rest. The CA affirmed.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or
co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and
exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the
co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility of an action for partition cannot thus be
invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner,
and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co-
owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies
the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of
ownership.
PANGAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their names.
Petitioners’ contend that they exclusively owned the property in view of their exclusive
possession and their declaration of the land for taxation purposes. Private respondent
filed a petition to set aside the decision.
The trial court dismissed the petition finding that whatever rights respondent had was
forfeited by extinctive prescription. The CA reversed, saying that respondent is entitled
to ½ of the land; and that petitioner’s possession was not for their benefit alone but also
in favor of Teodora who was a co-heir with them. Hence, possession was not adverse to
uphold acquisitive prescription.
Ruling: It was held that as a general rule, possession by one co-owners will not be
regarded as adverse to the others but in fact beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long his
co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will not prescribe. However, if
the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the
other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to, it after the
lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period.
The question now involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere partition. For
title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that
he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have been
categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question.
Petitioners have not proved that their possession excluded their co-owner and aunt or
that they derived their title from a separate conveyance to them of the property.
6 of the 7 children, excluding petitioner, filed a petition for judicial partition of the 7
parcels of land. Petitioner intervened to oppose the petition, claiming exclusive
ownership over the 2 parcels. Her payment of the repurchase and redemption was on
the understanding with her parents that she would thereafter be the owner thereof, and
that her exercise of ownership over said parcels to the exclusion of her parents and
siblings reveals that she is the exclusive owner of the lots.
The trial court ruled against petitioner, saying that she was merely holding the property
in trust for the other co-heirs. At most, she is only entitled to reimbursement for the
expenses of redemption.
Ruling: Petitioner is not the sole owner of the 2 parcels. The fact that it was her money
that was used for the repurchase does not make her the owner thereof. Neither will her
exercise of acts of ownership bring us to that conclusion. She was allowed to maintain
possession and enjoy the fruits only by mere tolerance of the other co-owners.
Thus, petitioner’s possession of the 2 parcels did not ripen into sole and exclusive
ownership thereof. Prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive
possession. In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the other
co-owners, he must have performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
The trial court rejected all the documents presented and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. The CA affirmed.
Ruling: Here, Virginia et al did not acquire the subject lots through prescription. In order
for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur:
(1) That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners
(2) That such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners
(3) That the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
(4) Possession is open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Although Jose wrested possession of the properties, it does not amount to adverse
possession because as co-owner he had the right of enjoyment and his use cannot
prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact the Virginia sought to extra judicially
divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that Virginia had
made this known to Pedro et al.