Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, GR Nos.

95770
and 95887 March 1, 1993
 Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court
in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded
their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches
of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of
other persons. 

Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006

a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.
a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind.
Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state. 
Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in
the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An
accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for
the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. 

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left
to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official
functions.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32
. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular
purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or
dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. 
The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals,
rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Imbong vs. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819, April 08, 2014

Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
1.  The petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to
the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them.” To
him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary
in that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears
emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority
to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the
Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
 been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US)
constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also
all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as
they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this
jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.
has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
 substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Considering that
it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken
away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does
not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by
Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him,
“fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is
the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of
implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or
scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but
to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object – it is a living human being complete with DNA
and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only
 for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To
adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law
but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life
begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained
but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning
of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right
to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are
self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was
stated:
1.   x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that –… in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . .

2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the

provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
 could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine

whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church … are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are
misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because
the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things
that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to
refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information
on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the
 basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should
be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the
RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right
to free exercise of religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering
that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer
under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it
must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law
is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
 reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality
or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts
of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s reproductive health care program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing
that they be given priority in addressing the health development of
the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall
be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
 couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the
RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render
pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat
is made upon them to render pro bono service against their
will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite
to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the
same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent with what the
Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the
only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health
products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that
 ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From
the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the
task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence, let alone
the interest and the time, to provide the required direct
and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it

pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of
skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute.
The national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
In re: Letter of Tony Q. ValencianoA.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 07,
2017

the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the
government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of
the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs.
 
the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for
public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of
its primary purpose.

Union International School vs. Dagdag G.R. No. 234186, November 21,
2018

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be
gauged — it is public and secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered
disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to
qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and
secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral.[2

Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil 778

Genuino vs. De Lima G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018

. If a law or administrative rule violates any norm of the constitution, that issuance is null and void and has
no effect. In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are
allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as may be provided by law. The ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ
circular 41 is for the petitioners to be present during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is
outside the allowable restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is ultra vires and has no effect.

Stone vs. Mississippi 101 US 814

The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The
Court viewed the lottery as a vice that threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in
the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary
suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be
revoked by the will of the people.
Rutter vs. Esteban 93 Phil 68
The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by
the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence
is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State
may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts.

PNB vs. CA G.R. No. 165571, January 20, 2009

Considering that the provisions of the loan agreements are merely
suspended, there is no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in
the mortgaged properties.

This arrangement provided by law is intended to give the receiver a

chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a
possibility for doing so, without being unnecessarily disturbed by the
creditors' actions against the distressed corporation.
SWS vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015
It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare."[135] "It is a basic
rule in contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between the parties."[136] The
incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a postulate of the police power of the State."[137]
(Weather vs. Comelec G.R. No. 208062 April 07, 2015)

This decision, and more, can be found at https://www.digest.ph/decisions/weather-vs-comelec-1