Case Digests On Co-Ownership

CASE DIGESTS IN CO-OWNERSHIP
1. Cases on Arts. 484-486, NCC:

Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 456 SCRA [2005]
FACTS
Petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of Partial Partition,5 distributing to each of them
their shares consisting of several lots previously held by them in common. Among the properties
adjudicated to defendant Cruz was the parcel of land covered at the time by TCT No. 495225. It
is the subject of this case.
Subsequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing to share equally
in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had been subdivided and individually
titled in the names of the former co-owners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition. This
arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement executed on August 23, 1977 or a
day after the partition. The tenor of the Memorandum of Agreement was annotated at the back
of TCT No. 495225 on September 1, 1977.
Sometime in January 1983, petitioner Thelma Cruz discovered that TCT No. 495225 had already
been cancelled by TCT No. 514477 which was issued on October 18, 1982 in the name of
Summit. Upon further investigation, petitioners learned that Arnel Cruz had executed a Special
Power of Attorney on May 16, 1980 in favor of one Nelson Tamayo, husband of petitioner
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, authorizing him to obtain a loan in the amount of One Hundred Four
Thousand Pesos (P104,000.00) from respondent Summit, to be secured by a real estate mortgage
on the subject parcel of land.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arnel Cruz is allowed to encumber the subject parcel of land in a real estate
mortgage.
HELD
Yes, Arnel can encumber his subject parcel of land because he is already an absolute owner of
said partition.
To be considered a co-owner, one "must have a spiritual part of a thing which is not physically
divided, or each of them is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract." In Dela
Cruz v. Cruz, et al., this Court denied the prayer for legal redemption of plaintiff-appellant
therein because "the portions of appellant-plaintiff and of the defendant spouses are concretely
determined and identifiable, for to the former belongs the northern half, and to the latter
belongs the remaining southern half, of the land."
Petitioners do not question the validity or efficacy of the Deed of Partial Partition. In fact, they
admitted its existence in their pleadings and submitted it as part of their evidence. Thus, the deed
should be accorded its legal dire effect. Since a partition legally made confers upon each heir the
Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him, it follows that Arnel Cruz acquired
absolute ownership over the specific parcels of land assigned to him in the Deed of Partial
Partition, including the property subject of this case. As the absolute owner thereof then, Arnel
Cruz had the right to enjoy and dispose of the property, as well as the right to constitute a real
estate mortgage over the same without securing the consent of petitioners.

Basa v. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128
FACTS
Genaro Puyat, respondent, sold his one-half (1/2) share of the parcel of land in question in favor
of private respondent spouses Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat, daughter of Genaro.
Seven (7) days later, the herein petitioners, the owners co-pro-indiviso of the other undivided
one-half (1/2) share of the parcel of land a civil case praying that they be allowed to exercise the
right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, for which purpose they deposited with
the court the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) as redemption money.
ISSUE
Whether or not co-owners may redeem the subject property.
HELD
Yes, the co-owners can exercise their right to redemption over the subject property.
The trial court judge disregards the express letter of the law invoked by the petitioners and
ignores the philosophy of the same. Article 1620 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares
of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only
do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the of
her owners are sold to "a third person." A third person, within the meaning of this Article, is
anyone who is not a co-owner.

Del Ocampo v. Abesia, 160 SCRA 379
FACTS
This case involves a parcel of land, Lot No. 1161 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, involves two
friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City.
Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45
square meters.
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square
meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan,
both parties discovered that the house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s
adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who
should take possession of the encroached 5 sq.m.
ISSUE
Whether or not the rules coownership applies on property that used to be co-owned but was
subdivided.
HELD
NO. When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new
Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil
Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate
said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay
the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the
latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the
plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial
court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion
of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.

Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 738
FACTS
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis
pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private respondent, Celestino
Afable. The co-owners of the land are Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all
surnamed Bailon, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being
represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in 1931
and had not been heard from since then.
Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land to Delgado. Then Rosalia
Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land to Lanuza. Lanuza acquired from Delgado the
16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio.
On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife,
Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had
acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty
of laches. He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly
suffered as a result of the sale to him of the land.
ISSUE
What is the effect of the sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common
without the consent of all the co-owners?
HELD
The effect would be that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In this case, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with
respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the
disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof. As such, since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other
co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Oliveras v. Lopez, 168 SCRA 431
FACTS
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 in Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 sqms. In 1931, Lorenzo
Lopez died, leaving said property to his widow, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that
time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than 20 years later, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez (herein respondent) ,
executed a deed of absolute sale of the undivided eastern portion of their interest in favor of
spouses Oliveras & Minor; another deed of absolute sale of the undivided eastern part in favor of
spouses Oliveras & Gaspar, both in consideration of the amount of P1,000. The two Oliveras
spouses had since possessed the properties, they planted palay and peanuts and paid real property
taxes, respectively.
Thirteen years after, the counsel of the two Oliveras spouses wrote to the remaining heirs of Lopez
reminding them of the Oliveras spouses’ demand to partition the property so they could acquire
their titles without court action. The heirs did not answer so the Oliveras spouses filed a complaint
for partition and damages. According to the Oliveras spouses, possession of the disputed
properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the heirs.
However, according to the defendants, no sale transpired as the vendors, the widow and
Candido, could not sold specific portions of the property and thus making the Oliverases
possession illegal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the deeds of absolute sale were null and void since the lot had not yet been
partitioned.
HELD
No, the deeds of absolute sale were both valid. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code,
co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the
former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a 10-year
period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the
maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such
maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed 20 years so property should be
divided after 20 years. Each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing insofar as
his share is concerned.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than
twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the
complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over
them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for
partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of
Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, merely served to put a stamp of
formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than
twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period

set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be
rendered meaningless.

Tagarao v. Garcia, 61 Phil 5
FACTS
This action was brought by the brothers and sisters Resurreccion Tagarao, Buenaventura
Tagarao, and Serafin Tagarao, children of the deceased Merced Garcia, daughter of the deceased
Buenaventura Garcia who was a brother of the defendant Marcos Garcia, against the latter and
the other defendants named Paula Tabifranca, Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia, Dolores Rufino
and Eleuterio Rufino, praying that judgment be rendered against the defendants ordering them
to deliver to the plaintiffs, after executing the necessary deeds of transfer, one-fourth of the land
known as lot No. 510 of cadastral case No. 11 of the municipality of Isabela, Occidental Negros.
The complaint was later on amended, plaintiffs prayed that should the defendants fail to deliver
to them the required portion of the land in question, the latter be ordered to pay them the value
thereof based on the assessed value of the whole property, and that they furthermore be
indemnified for the value of 1,407 cavans of palay at the rate of P4 a cavan, alleging that said
1,407 cavans represented their share in the products of said land from the time the defendants
took exclusive possession thereof.
Defendants filed demurrer alleging that the lower court lack jurisdiction to try the case by reason
of the subject matter involved and the lower court overruled said demurrer ordering them to
answer within the reglementary period. Defendants alleged that although they formerly were the
absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question they already ceased to be so at that time,
having sold the half belonging to Paula Tabifranca to the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino, and the other half belonging to Marcos Garcia to Eleuterio Rufino.
They filed a petition stating that they had no more interest in the case, having sold their
respective participations. Eleuterio Rufino was included among the defendants. Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino jointly entered a general denial of all the allegations
contained therein, alleging as a special defense (1) that they are the exclusive owners of one-half
of the land in question; (2) that the plaintiffs have already lost their right of action because such
right, if they ever had any, has already prescribed.
After due trial the lower court rendered judgment ordering the defendants to deliver to the
plaintiffs one fourth of the land in question after executing the necessary deeds of transfer in
favor of said plaintiffs or, in lieu thereof, to indemnify them in the sum of P3,882 plus the value
of 1,000 cavans of palay at P3 a cavan, with costs. In said judgment said court "declared the
deeds of sale executed by Marcos Garcia in favor of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino and by
Paula Tabifranca in favor of the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, null and void." The respondents filed an appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the three plaintiffs are entitled to what they jointly pray for in their complaint.
HELD
NO.
According to American jurisprudence, a co-owner in joint tenancy cannot dispose of his share or
interest in the property which is the subject matter of the joint tenancy, without the consent of
the other co-owner because in so doing he prejudices the other's rights and interests but in this

case the separation of rights and interests among the plaintiffs was practicable. It is logical to
conclude that the right of action of the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao is barred, and the fact that
that of her brothers and co-plaintiffs Serafin and Buenaventura Tagarao still subsists does not
inure to her benefit. This is based on the fact known that the purpose of the statute of
limitations is no other than to protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his
rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of exercising them one way or another to show that
he truly has such rights.
Resurreccion Tagarao could have enforced the right which she exercised in this case, but she did
nothing to protect her rights. On the contrary, she allowed said spouses to perform acts of
ownership on the land covered by said certificate, publicly, peacefully, uninterrupted and
adversely to the whole world including herself, and from that time until the filing of her first
complaint more than ten years had elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot be sustained that
the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, after it has been shown that the transfers
made by them are null and void, being fictitious and false, hold the land in question in trust,
because if they ever held it in said capacity it had been during the lifetime of the plaintiffs'
mother to whom said defendants used to give part of the fruits thereof. But after she had died,
their possession was under the circumstances above stated and the law provides that in whatever
way the occupancy by a person claiming to be the owner of a real property may have
commenced, if said occupancy is under claim of title and is furthermore open, continuous for
ten years and adverse, it constitutes sufficient title for the occupant thereof (sections 40 and 41
of Act No. 190), and there can be no other exception to this rule than the disability of persons
who are entitled to said property, by reason of age, some mental defect, or imprisonment, for
whom the same law provides the exceptions contained in its section 42.

Rivera v. People's Bank, 73 SCRA 546
FACTS
Ana Rivera was employed by Edgar Stephenson as housekeeper from the year 1920 until his
death on June 8, 1939. On December 24, Stephenson opened an account in his name with the
defendant Peoples Bank by depositing therein the sum of P1,000. On October 17, 1931, when
there was a balance of P2,072 in said account, the survivorship agreement in question was
executed and the said account was transferred to the name of "Edgar Stephenson and/or Ana
Rivera."
The survivorship agreement stipulates, thus:
…that said money and all interest thereon, if any there be, shall be the property of both
of us joint tenants, and shall be payable to and collectible by either of us during our joint
lives, and after the death of one of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the
survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible by such survivor.
At the time of Stephenson's death Ana Rivera held the deposit book, and there was a balance in
said account of P701. 43, which Ana Rivera claimed but which the bank refused to pay to her
upon advice of its attorneys who gave the opinion that the survivorship agreement was of
doubtful validity. Thereupon Ana Rivera instituted the present action against the bank, and
Minnie Stephenson, administratix of the estate of the deceased, intervened and claimed the
amount for the estate, alleging that the money deposited in said account was and is the exclusive
property of the deceased.
ISSUE
1. WON the subject survivorship agreement is valid.
2. WON Ana can recover the remaining balance of said savings account pursuant to
survivorship agreement.
HELD
1. Yes, the survivorship agreement is valid as it is akin to an aleatory contract.
Article 1790 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
ART. 1790. By an aleatory contract one of the parties binds himself, or both reciprocally
bind themselves, to give or to do something as an equivalent for that which the other party
is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at
an indeterminate time.
The survivorship agreement in this case is valid such that it is an aleatory contract supported by
law a lawful consideration — the mutual agreement of the joint depositors permitting either of
them to withdraw the whole deposit during their lifetime, and transferring the balance to the
survivor upon the death of one of them.
2. Yes, Ana can recover the remaining balance of the savings account because there is joint
ownership in this case.

"it is well established that a bank account may be so created that two persons shall be joint
owners thereof during their mutual lives, and the survivor take the whole on the death of the
other. The right to make such joint deposits has generally been held not to be done with by
statutes abolishing joint tenancy and survivorship generally as they existed at common law."

Gatchalian v. Collector of Customs, 67 Phil 666
FACTS
Jose Gatchalian along with 14 others bonded together to purchase a sweepstakes ticket in the
amount of P2.00 and registered the same as Jose Gatchalian and Company. This ticket has
eventually won 3rd prize amounting to P50,000.00 which they divided in accordance with their
aliquot share in the cost of the ticket. Gatchalian receiving P4,425 for his P0.18 cost.
A month after winning the ticket they were assessed by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the
payment of Income Tax of their unregistered partnership requesting them to pay P1,499.94.
They replied that that they merely formed a co-ownership not Partnership and requested the
CIR that they be exempted from paying such assessed income tax. They also submitted evidence
of payment of income tax by each of them for their corresponding individual taxable pertaining
to their share in the winnings.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners formed co-ownership or partnership when they purchased the winning
sweepstakes ticket.
HELD
Petitioners formed a partnership in this case.
There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a community of property the latter is
exempt from the payment of income tax under the law. But according to the stipulation facts the
plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up money to buy a
sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win, as they
did in fact in the amount of P50,000.
Article 1665. The partnership was not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the
winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the Philippines Charity
Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collection the prize, the office issued the
check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said partner, in the same
capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs
organized and formed a community of property only.

Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay, 55 Phil 100
FACTS
Plaintiffs are children/heirs of Ramon,who co-owned land with his siblings and his nephew Jose
P. The land was leased to Yap Kui Chin by their Ramon’s siblings, without signature of Ramon
or Jose P. The rights of Yap were assigned to defendant. Plaintiffs prayed that the contract of
lease be declared void because it involved alteration of property but had no signature of all co-
owners.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract of lease is void because it contained alterations to the property and
it was not signed by all co-owners.
HELD
Yes, the contract of lease is void in this case.
Article 397, now Article 491, of the Civil Code which provides that "none of the owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the common property even though
such alterations might be advantageous to all."
The court does not think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease,
especially so since none of the co-owners objected to such alterations until over twenty years
after the execution of the contract of lease.

Tuason v. Tuason, 88 Phil 428
FACTS
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio
Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title
No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves
wanted that the common property be partitioned among them but failing in which she sold her
share later to Gregorio Araneta Inc.
The three co-owners entered into a contract where the parties agreed to introduce improvements
upon the land such as land filling, roads and other buildings and then subdivide such land later
to be sold. They agreed that co-owner Araneta Inc. will undertake such improvement and
assume all expenses relating to such project. Before, during and after the execution of this
contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-
owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time, he was a
member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact
and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of
Agreement" and abuse of powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said
contract and she asked that the property held in common be partitioned. The suit was
administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., joined
Araneta as a co-defendant.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract should be declared null and void as it violates the provisions of Art.
400 of the Civil Code, now Art. 494 of the New Civil Code.
HELD
No. Article 494 of the Civil Code is not applicable. The contract far from violating the legal
provision that forbids a co-owner from being obliged to remain a party to the community
precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the
community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among
the co-owners.
The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have
been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-ownership. By virtue of the
document, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership
as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, and the life of
said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

Mariano v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 736
FACTS
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived by his heirs, namely: Third-
Party Defendants: wife Antonia and Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-
appellants Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by daughter Pinky
Rose), and Jacinto. The lot in dispute was foreclosed due to failure to pay the loans. The lot was
then awarded to mortgagee bank as the highest bidder. Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed
the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89 and the balance of P423.35 was paid on
December 28, 1964 to the mortgagee bank. Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that of her
minor children Emma, Lina, Norma together with Carlos and Severino executed a "Deed of
Assignment of the Right of Redemption" in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial
register of Pedro. Amparo then sold the property to Leonardo Mariano. Grace learned of the
sale and confronted Mariano to present her claim to said property, but no settlement was made.
Leonardo then sold the property to his children.
On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint for "recovery of
possession and legal redemption with damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina
Mariano. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in
question, they have the right to recover their respective shares in the same, and property as they
did not sell the same, and the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners
sold to the defendants.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of legal redemption was not timely exercised by the private
respondents?
HELD
No, the right of legal redemption was not timely exercised by the private respondents
The fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that when the sale consists of an
interest in some particular property or properties of the inheritance, the right redemption that
arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in Article 1620. On the other hand, if the
sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any
particular object, the right recognized in Article 1088 exists. There is also a rule that the giving of
a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.
In this case, the records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale
being given whatsoever to private respondents. Although, petitioners allege that sometime on
October 31, 1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the questioned
deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the Barangay Captain sometime
November 18, 1982, this was not supported by the evidence presented. As such, respondents
have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20
FACTS
Petitioners Arcelona are brothers and sisters (hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et
al.) and co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents.
A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al.
The lease contract was for a period of three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984.
Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the
same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination of
the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the
lessors, Olanday, et al.
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted a civil case
for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the
issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., before Respondent RTC. The case
was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond.
ISSUE
Whether or not a co-owner can initiate an action for ejectment without impleading all the other
co-owners.
HELD
No, a co-owner cannot initiate an action for ejectment without impleading all the other co-
owners. Here, petitioners co-owned the undivided fishpond; being undivided, it is impossible to
pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion
belongs to petitioners. It is not possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of
private respondent has been established and ruled upon. Thus, all co-owners in action for
security of tenure of a tenant must be impleaded as indispensable parties. Failure of such will bar
the court from making adjudication. In other words, a tenant who fails to implead all the co-
owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.
Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment
without joining all the other co-owners. The purpose of this provision was to prevent
multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right against the defendant to include with
him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that
the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the
definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.

Adlawan v. Adlawan, 479 SCRA 275
FACTS
The ejectment suit started from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built registered
in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla,
Cebu. Petitioner is an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is
the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of
generosity allowed the respondents who are siblings of his father to occupy the property
provided that they would vacate when his need for the property arise.Sometime in January 1999,
he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead
an action for quieting of title with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last
demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case.
Respondents denied the allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents’
name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said
house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of
money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of
sale in favor of Dominador.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the ejectment suit.
HELD
No. Under ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment and renowned
civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject
property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings.

Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court 156 SCRA 55
FACTS
On February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel
Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among
others:
• they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of
Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban,
Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;
• the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time
represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for
them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island; and
• whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-
owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4
share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo- 2/4 shares which shall be placed
under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into
by them on February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution
of the lands, comprising the Island of Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom,
as follows:
(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;
(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;
(c) The third one-fourth (1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their
deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola.
(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and nieces
(1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5)
Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under
the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
Two more agreements of the heirs of co-owners had been executed at the turn of the century. In
the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was
to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907
reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had yet been
done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be
conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a
son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the
surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was
entrusted, however, testified that said contracts were never implemented because nobody
defrayed the expenses for surveying the same.
On November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as
parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second
contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants,

petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership,
estoppel and laches.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not there had been a partition on the four agreements thus terminating the
co-ownership.
2. If co-ownership is not yet terminated in this case, whether or not co-owners and their
successors-in-interest can exclude other co-owners and respective successors-in-interest
from the enjoyment of some portions of the whole property.
3. Whether or not the action for partition among the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
original co-owners already prescribed. Assuming arguendo that the action did not
prescribed, whether or not the parties are guilty of laches.
HELD
1. No, there is no partition yet on this case based on the four agreements thus co-
ownership is not yet terminated.
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island
had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The
agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be
derived from the island. The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be
considered as their common property.
In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing
proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island each
of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the children of the deceased
brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr.
Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island.
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island
was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20,
1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as
yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be
conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a
son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the
surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was
entrusted, however, testified that said contracts were never implemented because nobody
defrayed the expenses for surveying the same.
2. No, co-owners and their successors-in-interest cannot exclude other co-owners and
respective successors-in-interest from the enjoyment of some portions of the whole
property.
It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership under the present Civil Code as in the Code of
1889 that no individual co- owner can claim any definite portion thereof (Diversified Credit
Corporation vs. Rosada 26 SCRA 470 [1968]). lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-
owners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island
occupied by them.

It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of
their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court
of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure
laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the
petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the
Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not
been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there
is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the
possession of the other co-owners.
3. No, the action for partition among co-owners or their successors-in-interest cannot be
barred by prescription or laches.
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common
property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc,
79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co- owner.

Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal, G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014
FACTS
The subject property consists of a 3,750 square meter-portion of the 15,000 square meters parcel
of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan under the names of Reynaldo Dela Rosa
(Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa
(Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal and
Mario Batongbacal for ₱50.00 per square meter or for a total of ₱187,500.00. Pursuant to the
agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment of ₱31,500.00 leaving a balance of
₱156,000.00. On 18 February 1987, the parties agreed that the amount of ₱20,000.00 as part of
the advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-Attorney (SPA),
which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject property on behalf of his co-owners and
siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in ₱10,000.00
monthly installments until the purchase price is fully settled.
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement, Mario, and Guillermo, on their own instance,
initiated a survey to segregate the area of 3,750 square meters from the whole area covered,
delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several
demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed upon, but such demands all went
unheeded
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific Performance or Rescission
and Damages before the RTC, seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell. In their complaint,
Mario and Guillermo asserted that they have a better right over the subject property and alleged
that the subsequent sale effected by Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith.
It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its
impossibility, to return the amount of ₱31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in either
case. To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario and Guillermo also filed a Notice of
Lis Pendens registering their claim on the certificate of title covering the entire property.
Reynaldo countered that the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never gave his
consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to understand that the contract between
him and the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the latter
will loan to him the amount of ₱31,500.00 payable once he receives his share in the proceeds of
the sale of the land registered.
ISSUE
Whether or not Reynaldo’s agreement with Guillermo and Mario is enforceable
HELD
Yes. The agreement is enforceable. A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals
nothing therein suggests, even remotely, that the subject property was given to secure a monetary
obligation. The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the instrument was
executed with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property to the buyer in
exchange for the price.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property even without the consent of his co-owners. This right is absolute and in accordance
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and
has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment.

Arambulo v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
FACTS
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita vda. De
Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo,
Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco are co-owners of a
233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila.
When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have
authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or
more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common,
the courts may afford adequate relief.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents, as co–owners, can be compelled by the court to give their consent
to the sale of their shares in the co–owned properties.
HELD
No.
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full ownership of their
parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the
full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners
will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of
the co–ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by
petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co–owned, likewise stays.
Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–
owner without the consent of the other co–owners are not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co–owner–seller is transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the
property. To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every
recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial
conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of
free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring a suit for partition, which
is one of the modes of extinguishing co–ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
no co–owner shall be obliged to remain in the co–ownership, and that each co–owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co–owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to
(a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co–owners but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among them
shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co–owners.

This is the result obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot
be done while the co–ownership exists.

Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014
FACTS
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia
Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late
Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners
of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C,
Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.
The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002,
respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed
as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.
Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the
property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No.
390484 was issued in the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their
7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and
Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and
the title was partially cancelled as a result.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein
they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received
the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse,
open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are
allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds
was denied.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred
by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is
an admission petitioners’ part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly
mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had
to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the
subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of
the property.
RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations that
they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted there was
no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer of the
siblings’ interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.
CA upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the plaintiffs-
appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10
undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey
building at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision
plan.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the
partition of the property.
HELD
The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in
petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by
respondent spouses. Art. 496, NCC provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the
parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of Subdivision
allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for
partition for respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never
took part in preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation
whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore,
lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact
would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among
the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices.

Apique v. Fahnestich, G.R. No. 205705, August 5, 2015
FACTS
Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao, until Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979. On
August 2, 1995, Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney constituting
Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to manage or supervise
her business affairs in the Philippines.
She opened a joint savings account on January 18, 1999 with Dominador at the Claveria Branch
of the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) in Davao City, which later became
Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), and now Banco de Oro.
On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank. It
was only on February 23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of
EPCIB and discovered that Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own
account.
Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no
avail. Hence, she filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees, with prayer
for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO)
against Dominador.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dominador may validly withdraw from the joint account without the prior
consent of Evangeline.
HELD
Yes. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or
more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-
owners of the said account, their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless contrary is
proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal
unless the contrary is proved.
The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each
of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may
deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other,
during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other
may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened
and how it will be operated.
In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador under
Savings Account with EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also admitted that: (a) the account
was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the transfer of needed funds for Evangeline's
business projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if" there is a need to meet

Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said projects. Hence, while Dominador is a co-
owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit
and/or withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him
and Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is
circumscribed by the purpose for which the subject account was opened.

Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao,
Iloilo a Complaint4 for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron alleging that
sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of
Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5
covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various demands for
respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them
but the same was unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate
the subject lot on January 15, 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such
possession.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been impleaded as co-
plaintiffs in the ejectment case against respondents.
HELD
Yes, petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the
ejectment case against respondents.
Art. 487 provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Jurisprudence also provides that a co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession
for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. That a co-owner is not
even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his
absence.
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in the
complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the
subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but
he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the
benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a
co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs.

Caro v. Court of Appeals 113 SCRA 10
FACTS
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito, and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels
of land covered. Mario died sometime in January 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and
his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed as joint administrators of Mario's
estate.
In 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of his 1/3
undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro, for the sum
of P10,000.00. The sale was registered with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito
as shown in their affidavits,thereafter a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over
Lot.
In 1966, the respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learned from an allegation in a pleading
presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508 that Caro acquired by purchase from
Benjamin Benito the aforesaid 1/3 undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. So she
sent her counsel to Caro with a written offer to redeem the said 1/3 undivided share. Petitioner
ignored the offer, so private respondent filed for annulment f sale and mortgage and cancellation
of the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land but did not
succeed as the principal case was dismissed on a technicality.
Private respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one and in the trial sought to
prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the
sale.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of redemption could still be exercised when the property sought to be
redeemed is no longer owned in common.
HELD
No, Court ruled that once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption
(Caram, et al. V. CA).
It is undisputed that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when
Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by
administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito,
agreed to subdivide the property. As a rule, an agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and
consequently binding upon the parties.

Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court 165 SCRA 118
FACTS
A 312 square meter parcel of land was registered originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a
bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
The intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio executed an extrajudicial partition effected among the
intestate heirs ¼ undivided portion of which to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque.
Respondent Ernesto and Victor’s other co-owners, in consideration of the aggregate amount of
P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to
respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete
ownership of the property.
On 27 November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4)
undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the
same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario
Avendaño.
Concepcion Roque and allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on
20 September 1975. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan was drawn up by the Geodetic
Engineer identifying and delineating a one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the
property as belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14
April 1962), upon the one hand, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 square meters) of the
same property as belonging to petitioner Concepion Roque, upon the other hand. Respondents
Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's
claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6
December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" against respondents
Ernesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below)
claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549. Petitioner
alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that
she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not reivindicatory action is the proper remedy in this case and not action for
partition.
2. Assuming that it should be action for partition, whether or not the action already
prescribed.
HELD
1. No, petitioner is correct in instituting the action for partition.
An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a
specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-
owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second,

assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how
the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go
to which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-
owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In
case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff,
the court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary and in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or
not. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action,
separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved. This is the import of our
jurisprudence on the matter and is sustained by the public policy which abhors multiplicity of
actions.
2. No, the action did not prescribe.
In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how long
the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided
the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition.
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or
action familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it
may be repudiated by a co-owner [i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie.
What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner [i.e., the heirs of Catalino and Galo] is an
accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred
by prescription.
Petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co-owner seeking partition — has been and is presently in
open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in
common. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of
the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over
the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-
ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the
action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of
institution by Concepcion of the action.

Delima v. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 641
FACTS
Lino Delima acquired a parcel of land by sale on installments from the government.
After his demise in 1921, he had his three brothers and a sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were
Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima, and Vicente Delima.
A new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima
represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs
adjudicating to himself the subject property excluding the other heirs. He declared the lot to be
of his own and paid for its taxes. On February 29, 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and
Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for reconveyance and
partition of property and for the annulment of the certificate of title issued plus damages against
their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also later included as party defendant for his refusal to
help in the action.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided
by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shared in the disputed property.
HELD
Yes.
Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: “No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized the
co-ownership.” By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse against the others but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was
holding the property in representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an
administrator who took care of the property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the
property to his co-owners.
However, this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute
and exclusive ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptibly of the
action for partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over
the property. In order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and (3) that the evidence thereon
should be clear and conclusive.
Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the
cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, he thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners
over their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run.

Aguilar v. Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 472
FACTS
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that
Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left
in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu. After their father’s
death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the
property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them, but the latter refused. Petitioner
then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was
regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to
accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did
not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent
and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to
the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed.
Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in
declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?
HELD
Yes. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either
one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object
to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their
respective interests.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed

Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 316
SCRA 502
FACTS
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro,
died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that
their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan,
Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty-nine (2,269) square meters more
or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold
by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented
himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale
made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of
the other co-owners’ equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for partition already prescribed in this case.
HELD
No, the action for partition did not prescribed yet.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share
pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition
of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of
possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or
partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging
to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action for partition is
a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. In Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court has
interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.

Robles v. Court of Appeals 328 SCRA 97
FACTS
Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited
the property. They took adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task of
cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops.
He also built a nipa hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to
their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the, name of Silvino
Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles who is the
wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo
Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred
[to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant
Hilario Robles and his wife.
In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax
declaration as security.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural
Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank
sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property but
was unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of the property
in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the mortgage is valid.
2. Whether or not the free patent grant shall be given due course.
HELD
1. No, the mortgage, and subsequent foreclosure, is invalid due to the Cardona
Rural Bank’s bad faith.
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void.
In the present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner of the entire
subject property; and that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title
thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith.
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute
owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of
Cardona, Inc., only his undivided share therein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor
of the Santos spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the

entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what
legally pertains to the latter — Hilario's share in the disputed property.
2. No, the free patent grant is null and void because the subject land is a private
land in the first place.
The same issue was resolved by this Court in Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals. In
that case, the trial court dismissed a Complaint seeking the declaration of nullity of an Original
Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a free patent, reasoning that the action should have been
instituted by the solicitor general. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held:
It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void and produces no
legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit affectum. Moreover, private
respondents' claim of open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250
square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners
and in their original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
The foregoing considered; we sustain the contention of petitioners that the free patent granted
to the Santos spouses is void. It is apparent that they are claiming ownership of the disputed
property on the basis of their possession thereof in the concept of owners — openly, peacefully,
publicly, continuously, and adversely since 1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest
have occupied, possessed and cultivated it as owners for more than thirty years, only one
conclusion can be drawn — it has become private land and is therefore beyond the authority of
the director of lands.

Case Digests On Co-Ownership

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CASE DIGESTS IN CO-OWNERSHIP

1. Cases on Arts. 484-486, NCC:

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

Errol J. Dobrea JD 2L-404

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