Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalis PDF

Part Two Final File First Edition_cover part two 5/21/14 9:43 PM Pagina 2
Edited by Warren Neidich
ESSAYS BY
INA BLOM
ARNE DE BOEVER
PASCAL GIELEN
SANFORD KWINTER
MAURIZIO LAZZARATO
KARL LYDÉN
YANN MOULIER BOUTANG
WARREN NEIDICH
MATTEO PASQUINELLI
ALEXEI PENZIN
PATRICIA REED
JOHN ROBERTS
LISS C. WERNER
CHARLES T. WOLFE
A R C HI VE BOOKS
VOX S ER I ES
Edited by Warren Neidich
ESSAYS BY
INA BLOM
ARNE DE BOEVER
PASCAL GIELEN
SANFORD KWINTER
MAURIZIO LAZZARATO
KARL LYDÉN
YANN MOULIER BOUTANG
WARREN NEIDICH
MATTEO PASQUINELLI
ALEXEI PENZIN
PATRICIA REED
JOHN ROBERTS
LISS C. WERNER
CHARLES T. WOLFE
A RC HI VE BOOKS
This book collects together extended
papers that were presented at The
Psychopathologies of Cognitive
Capitalism: Part Two at ICI Berlin
in March 2013. This volume is the
second in a series of book that aims
attempts to broaden the definition
of cognitive capitalism in terms of
the scope of its material relations,
especially as it relates to the condi-
tions of mind and brain in our new
world of advanced telecommunica-
tion, data mining and social relations.
It is our hope to first improve awa-
reness of its most repressive charac-
teristics and secondly to produce
an arsenal of discursive practices
with which to combat it.
Edited by
Warren Neidich
Coordinating editor
Nicola Guy
Proofreading by
Theo Barry-Born
Designed by
Archive Appendix, Berlin
Printed by
Erredi, Genova
Published by
Archive Books
Dieffenbachstraße 31
10967 Berlin
www.archivebooks.org
ISBN 978-3-943620-16-0
CONTENT S
I NT RODU CTIO N
Warren Neidich
The Early and Late Stages
of Cognitive Capitalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SECTIO N 1
Cognitive Capitalism
The Early Phase
Ina Blom
Video and Autobiography vs.
the Autobiography of Video.
An Historical View of the Ambiguities
of Self-monitoring Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
John Roberts
The Psychopathologies
of the Bourgeoisie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Patricia Reed
Logic and Fiction:
Notes on Finance and
the Power of Recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Maurizio Lazzarato
Does Cognitive Capitalism Exist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Karl Lydén
Therapy for a
Pathological Capitalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
CON TEN TS
SECT I ON 2
The Psychopathologies of Cognitive

Capitalism and its Responses
Yann Moulier Boutang

Mental Quilombos in the Production of Value:
Flights and Counter-forms of Mania Under
Cognitive Capitalism in a Postcolonial World . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Arne De Boever
A Fiction of the Great Outdoors:
The Psychopathology of Panic in
Robert Harris’ The Fear Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Pascal Gielen
A Chronotopy of
Post-Fordist Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Alexei Penzin in conversation

with Maria Chekhonadsikh
The Only Place to Hide?
The Art and Politics of Sleep
in Cognitive Capitalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
CONTENT S
S ECTIO N 3
The Cognitive Turn in

Charles T. Wolfe
Cultured Brains and the Production
of Subjectivity: The Politics of Affect(s)
as an Unfinished Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Matteo Pasquinelli
The Power of Abstraction and its Antagonism:
On Some Problems of Contemporary Neuroscience
and the Theory of Cognitive Capitalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Liss C. Werner
Towards A*cognitive Architecture:
A Cybernetic Note Beyond –
or the Self-informing Machinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Sanford Kwinter
Neuroecology:
Notes Toward a Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Warren Neidich
Computational Architecture
and the Statisticon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
WAR RE N N EID ICH 9
Introduction:
The Early and Late Stages
of Cognitive Capitalism
The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism is an ongoing

event structure composed of symposiums, workshops and
publications initiated by Chiara Figone of Archive Books
and myself through my art project the Office of Aesthetic
Occupation. Our intention is to raise consciousness by
disseminating information about cognitive capitalism in
general and its associated discourses. This volume emanated
from a conference held at the Institute of Contemporary
Inquiry in Berlin in the spring of 2013. This was preceded
by our initial event, co-sponsored with California Institute
of the Arts and Art Center School of Design, in collaboration
with my colleagues Arne De Boever and Jason Smith in
the fall of 2012. The Psychopathologies of Cognitive
Capitalism: Part Two is being launched, on the occasion of
our third happening at Goldsmiths College, University of
London in cooperation with Mark Fisher and the Department
of Visual Cultures.
The idea of specifically focusing on the psychopathologies

of cognitive capitalism was inspired by reading the books
of a number of authors originally connected with Italian
political movements such as Operaismo and Autonomism
and included the writers Paolo Virno, Franco “Bifo” Berardi,
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and Christian Marazzi, amongst others. I was especially

inspired by Bifo’s Soul at Work, which I read sitting on my
porch in Venice, California, formally a quiet hippie haven
on the edge of Los Angeles, where incidentally Google has
moved its southern headquarters. (That emigration initiated
a mass migration of other high tech corporations producing
what is now known as Silicon Beach.) Of course earlier
readings of Deleuze and Guattari, especially the Anti-Oedipus
and Chaosmosis, provided the idea with extra layers of
complexity. I met Bifo when I attended one of his lectures
in Berlin and it was there I realized that many of my own
ideas registered with some of his core intuitions. Cognitive
capitalism, like other forms of capitalism that preceded it,
is a contingent formation that subsumes the social, political,
economic, psychological and technical relations in which
it operates. My interest in materialist ontologies as they
related to cultural plasticity and neural plasticity might
provide bridging concepts with which to frame anew his
Autonomist and Operaist arguments.
What is Cognitive Capitalism and Three Disclaimers?
Cognitive capitalism heralds a mutation of post-Fordist

capitalist accumulation with its emphasis on flexploitation
of labor processes and flexible specialization, just-in-time
production and consumption, rapid acceleration in the
pace of product innovation, faster product turnover times,
computer and robotic interventions and an increase in the
complexity of supply chains.
Pascal Gielen in his essay included here entitled, “A Chrono-
topy of Post-Fordist Labor,” adds two more conditions of
post-Fordism that are relevant in its transition to cognitive
capitalism. First what he refers to as de-verticalization.
In his model, space and time have lost their vertical di-
mension and are characterized by superficiality and hori-
zontality resulting in hegemony of a global chronotopy.
11
This condition leads to specialized symptomologies mani-

festing themselves as lethargy, stress, depression, tunnel
vision and burn out. The globally “organized free market
economy” manifests itself “as instant bottomlessness or
bottomless instantaneity.” (p. 198)
John Roberts, in his essay “The Psychopathologies of the

Bourgeoisie,” focuses on the implications of the social and
economic hegemony of neoliberalism from the angle of
artistic production and distribution. After elucidating the
conditions through which the left has maintained their
grip on the discursive practices surrounding art theory, he
explains how the ‘nuts and bolts’ operations by which art is
produced and funded have been taken over by the right.
Of the many results of this new condition, the entrepreneuri-
alization of the cultural worker is the most invidious. (p. 60)
But he also writes of the positive effect in which simulta-
neously a dispersionary force of cultural producers operate
in defiance of the market. Together these two authors create
the platform upon which to construct the next formation:
that of cognitive capitalism itself.
Cognitive capitalism is defined by an early phase and a later

phase, in which we are presently living. Three disclaimers need
to be announced before moving on. Firstly, the actual date(s)
of the transition are not clear although some have suggested,
for example by Yann Moulier Boutang, that 1975 marked the
first pure elaboration of its conditions (Boutang 2008, 9).
(Note: Maurizio Lazzarato in his contribution assigns Enzo
Rullani as the inventor of the term.) But can one really desig-
nate a moment for the emergence of the characteristics of
cognitive capitalism with its emphasis on the predominance of
knowledge as a commodity, the new nature of conflictual ten-
dencies between capital and labor and the overriding technicity
of new forms of computational machinery as it is insinuated
directly into society and the workplace? (Vercellone 2007, 13-16)
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Could not one instead argue that the so called machinic

intelligence of the 19th century factory assembly line, in
which the machine itself designates, organizes and informs
the intelligence(s) needed to perform specific tasks and that
the notion of abstract labor in its various forms of scarcity
could be seen as the real roots of cognitive capitalism?
Secondly, this designation does not claim that the conditions
of the early phase, whenever and wherever they may be
designated, have been subsumed by those of the later phase.
In fact those contingencies of the initial phase still predomi-
nate much of the laboring landscape. Certainly this is true
of the way that valorization creates artificial needs and
desire leading to over-consumption and debt. What has been
referred to as the asymmetry of debt and credit (Lazzarato
2011, 20). Thirdly, in opposition to those theorists whose
use of the word cognitive is not meant to denote the brain
but rather to refer to information and knowledge and
who refuse any appeals to science as positivist I would
embrace the position of Sylvère Lotringer who writes,
“It would, by the way, be utopian to think one is able to
situate oneself outside of these machines of meaning,
these machines of science. [...] It all depends on what you
want to do with them in a perverse way, catching them off
guard, quickly snatching them up in order to plug them
into something else, onto the socius, or the cosmos.”
(Lotringer 2005, 47) As such this project refuses to ele-
vate cognitive neuroscience above cultural studies and
the theory of cultural history in the production of the
knowledge commons. Rather it understands that the two
forms of knowledge creation can be co-determinant and
coextensive as well as territorializing and deterritorializing.
If we are to understand and deterritorialize the normal-
izing conditions of the cynical dispositions of cognitive
capitalism as it is instituted through the networks of
its own faith/truth structure, then we must understand
the logics of its terms, mechanism and dispositifs.
13
Importantly, we must understand what challenges we face

today so we can collectively cultivate and facilitate the proper
response. For instance by using, producing and implementing
a transverse armament of resistant social/cultural/political/
psychological dispositifs to counter its overwhelming dis-
positions; especially when it is linked to the hypercomplex
objects of neoliberalism for which it does its bidding. Hopefully
this collection is a step in that direction.
Cultural plasticity is a term that denotes the degree to which

any particular culture can adapt to objects, things and ideas
erupting from outside the logics of its own historically
developed institutional regimes and practices. As such its
flexibility is tested when its, to use Quentin Meillassoux’s
words, extro-scientific potentialities are made explicit, or it
utilizes strategies of post-aesthetic poetics as Peter Osborne
has intuited or it redistributes sensibility in order to engage
forms of materialism that modulate some of its effects.
Metanoia as elaborated by Armen Avanessian and Anke
Hennig and discussed in this volume by Patricia Reed is
another example. (p. 84) One of the underlying themes of
this collection is that these mutations of the cultural land-
scape, for instance built space, has ramifications for analo-
gous and sometimes complimentary changes in the brain.
The development of new possibilities for the elaboration

of autobiography which resulted from the invention of
the Portapak video tape analogue recording system as
developed in Ina Blom’s essay “Video and Autobiography
vs. the Autobiography of Video” is a case in point. She
delineates how the changing conditions for the production
of autobiographies of selfhood in the early stages of new
media, for instance in the works of Joan Jonas and Keith
Sonnier, simultaneously produced an analogous transfor-
mation of the autobiography of video. Her delineation of
the autobiography of video and its complimentary effect
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on the process of subjectivization present a looking glass

through which we might observe and understand the tech-
nologies of the late 20th century, such as the Internet, CAD
software or After Affects, that have followed and have
produced transformational effects on the laboring subject.
Karl Lydén delineates the heroic act of parrhēsia in which

one speaks the truth freely even it might mean risking ones
life as an antidote to the chatter of communicative capitalism
and the overwhelming subsumption of image culture. In the
transition between the semiotic turn of the late seventies and
early eighties and its transition to communicative capitalism
in the nineties and now to the cognitive turn in the early 21st
century, knowledge, in its many forms, is the prime force for
the processes of subjectivization. As such parrhēsia and truth
as truth building for collective reinscription becomes a new
form of therapy. Importantly for us here is “The care of the
self as expressed in a set of truth acts, and even shaping of
the formal conditions for such acts, has to transform into the
collective shaping of a communist set of practices.” (p. 129)
In the last section of the book a number of authors will use
theories of epigenesis, in which the brain’s neuroplastic
capacity is sculpted by culture, to understand the importance
of such practices like parrhēsia as a therapeutic regimen
for the psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism.
This book is divided into three parts; 1. Cognitive Capitalism

– The Early Phase; 2. The Psychopathologies of Cognitive
Capitalism and its Responses; 3. The Cognitive Turn.
15
Section 1:
Cognitive Capitalism – The Early Phase
The early phase of cognitive capitalism is delineated by

the following traits. It is constituted by precarious labor
in which part-time employment is performed in isolation.
The precarious worker is a freelancer and always on call,
anxiously awaiting their next assignment, working in multiple
time zones simultaneously with clients sometimes halfway
around the globe. This is related to its second characteristic
that is what Jonathan Crary and others have called the “24/7
work-day,” in which the formal subsumption has given way
to real subsumption (Crary 2013, 33). Thirdly, value has
been replaced by valorization in which the cost of a product
to a consumer depends to a great extent upon the quality of
its lived or imagined experience. Valorization is one of the
strong links between cognitive capitalism and post-Fordism
through its connection to attention which is captured by
quick-changing styles and marketing. Behavioral economics
and herd behavior join valorization as forces that effect
investing practices and market “labile affect.” Immaterial
labor in the knowledge economies concerns a form of
creativity and virtuosity. Poesis and Praxis become entan-
gled as both do not leave a trace. Artistic labor becomes a
key model for labor in general and in cognitive capitalism,
which is also called creative capitalism. We will under-
stand as this book unfolds that immaterial labor is not so
immaterial as it plays an important role in reconstituting
the memory circuits and attention networks of the material
brain. Cognitive capitalism has redefined the definition of
the consumer from someone who simply shops to someone
who produces data as a result of unpaid labor. These activities
of the shopper produce data profiles that are bought and
sold by data barons. Data barons are the 21st century ana-
logue of the Robber Barons of the industrial revolution.
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Financialization of capital describes the process whereby

worker compensation funds are invested in the market and
hedge funds thus tying their future incomes to the success
or failure of the companies they work for. This has reper-
cussions on their ability to resist unfair labor practices as
any demonstration created to put pressure on the company’s
profits may also affect their own profits.
Maurizio Lazzarato in his essay “Does Cognitive Capitalism

Exist?” questions the very notion of the cognitive in cognitive
capitalism because of its entangled relation to science and
cognitivist paradigms. He argues against this approach because
“A new subjectivity cannot come from a mere treatment of
flows (linguistic, cognitive, economic, etc.), nor can any new
knowledge or innovation.” (p. 111) Accordingly cognitive
explanations do not have the capacity to reach down to the
substructures of inarticulate and undifferentiated understanding.
As a result the concept of the cognitive threatens to shield off
the possibility of change and rupture. The semiotic, cognitive
and discursive systems form a system of extensive crystalized
relations, modular systems are extensive while networked
systems are intensive, and as such are linked in a chain of
narrative linkages. As a remedy to this condition Lazzarato
introduces an idea from Guattari called the existential function
“which will function as the creative motor of enunciation and
subjectivation while being perfectly non-discursive.” (p. 97)
He later links this existential function to the ‘aesthetic para-
digm’ or the topical art of cartographies. Cartographies are
like diagrams and as Gilles Deleuze states in Francis Bacon:
The Logic of Sensation, “The diagram is indeed a chaos, a
catastrophe but it is also a germ of order or rhythm” [...] “The
diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between
forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which proceeds by primary
non-localizable relation and at every moment passes through
every point, or rather in every relation from one point to
another.” (Deleuze et al. 2002, 102 and Deleuze et al. 1998, 36)
17
This art of cartographies has the potential to jumpstart

the production of a new form of subjectivity in order to
combat the stasis that has set in. For as we will argue
shortly the productions of this aesthetic paradigm not
only mutates the conditions of the sensible, changing it
from an extensive to an intensive existential assemblage
but its underbelly as well. As such aesthetics through
reconfiguring surface representations affects the sub-
structural and tectonic relations releasing new emergent
patterns that redefine the explicit cultural landscape and
subjectivity as well. This volume suggests that another
component to conditions of evolving subjectivity needs
to be considered. The evolving map of political-social-
psychological-economic and spiritual relations produces
a cultural landscape, for instance the designed urban space,
that has implications for the brain as well and calls out
through a process of interpellation the indeterminate and
living variability of its neural plasticity sculpting it anew.
(See discussion of Pasquinelli and Kwinter)
Patricia Reed in her contribution describes what Marx

called “fictional capital” and realizes that it is imbedded
in a network of other machinic fictive phylum that together
create the hyperobjects of our virtual world which has im-
plications for the image of thought that attempts to cogni-
tively map it. Is Reed calling attention to a new form of
alienation in which human beings are alienated from their
own condition of alienation? That in this totally subsumed
fictive condition a new form of sublime alienation arises.
Alienation in the past was first the result of a fear of nature,
which then mutated to a condition of alienation from the
incomplete productions of ones own laboring in industrial
capital which were abstract and incomplete. In cognitive
capitalism what Reed is alluding to and what Arne De
Boever later on will further unpack is an “extro- machinic
intelligence” created outside humanities episteme.
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Machinic intelligence today concerns creating laboring

platforms for other machinic intelligences, like robots,
rather then human beings and is formed by superordinate
algorithms and super complex parametric equations.
Machinic intelligence today and in the future, think here
of ubiquitous computing, is precisely that, referring only
to itself, no longer linked to human reason yet stimulating,
probing, affecting various contingencies as a puppeteer
would influence the actions of his or her puppet. Reed
asks if poetics can ‘deregulate’ the conditions of this all-
consuming fiction rendering its seamlessness inoperable
to expose new surfaces and “uncalcify common sense.”
Section 2:
Capitalism and its responses
Cognitive capitalism is also characterized by a number of
distinct psychopathologies such as attention deficit disorder,
panic attacks, depression and autism. The specificities of
the psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism is a bridging
concept between its early and late phases. First they are
produced by living in the moment of cognitive capitalism;
the anxieties and constant stress produced by the continual
need to adapt to the accelerated pace of the new, its loneliness,
its precarity and uncertainty, its linkage to surveillance and
paranoia. On the other hand they are the product of neurobi-
ological alienation in which the accelerated pace of cultural
change, or cultural plasticity, outstrips the ability of the brains
neural plasticity to adapt thus creating a lack of adequate
perceptual and cognitive processing. In this form of what
is called opaque alienation individuals experiences a real
psychological syndrome with material sequelae registered
as inconsistencies and aberrations in the neurobiological ar-
chitecture of the brain, which create adaptation difficulties.
19
They are aware of the deficits and usually search out assistance.
Full-blown attention deficit disorder and autism represent
this opaque form of neurobiological alienation. I would like
to suggest that, like sleep, transparent and opaque forms of
neurobiological alienation especially the psychopathologies
in their milder forms could be sites of creativity and experi-
ence beyond the reach of capitalist intervention. That they
are in fact the sites of a recurring freedom! (Neidich 2014,
forthcoming) The notion of an alternative way with which
to regard the role of psychopathology reminds us of similar
ideas of the famous Berlin Neurologists Kurt Goldstein’s in
which illness, as Matteo Pasquinelli reminds us, is a norma-
tive process that creates other possibilities for creativity and
understanding, conditions that may have consequences for
the image of thought. We will return to the implications of
his work in the last section of this book.
The authors of this collection give new life to the concept

of psychopathologies. This kind of freedom, erupting as
it does from the bowels of power’s grip, undermines it,
tethers many of these essays together. For Yann Moulier
Boutang a pattern emerges in history in which melancholia
follows the defeat of the hope for radical transformation.
He asks whether this sort of B-phase of depression follows
the manic phase that greeted the information and computer
age. This kind of regret and longing for modernism erupted
from a realization that the utopian aspirations of a new
connected world were now being supervised by a new form
of beekeeper who was monitoring our moves and selling it
to the highest bidder. But this is where Boutang’s pessimism
ends. Far from the ashes of a new world of technological
promise a phoenix appeared. With it emerged a business
model that required more freedoms and creative impulses
to keep it going. Instead of melancholia one is faced with
the burnout. Finally, “Primitive accumulation of cognitive
capitalism however is a much more complicated task.
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Subjection of the forces of invention needs to compete with

an unavoidable condition; that of extracting value from the
living. A much higher degree of liberty and socialization is
required if you want to capture innovation and collective
intelligence, which is by far the most valuable and hegemonic
part of value today.” (p. 157)
For Arne De Boever, psychopathologies—and specifically

panic, an overlooked psychopathology of cognitive capitalism
—needs an extro-scientific apparatus to create forms of
therapeutic fiction to deal with the pseudo-surrealistic
conditions of the new economy and the machinic algorithms
that control it and that constitute (in De Boever’s reading) a
version of what Quentin Meillassoux calls the “great outdoors.”
What is criticized in De Boever’s article is the ways in
which human beings, born from inside an overwhelming
nature, create a second nature as a form of protection from
their fear of being overwhelmed. In this way, they at least
still have linkages to nature through their self-actualization
(which is, all the same, a kind of immunization against over-
whelming nature). However, with the alienation of nature
resulting from our present contemporary and algorithmic
condition, a machinic intelligence develops outside what
human beings can imagine with the common-sense tools
they have at hand. This is the situation, delineated in De
Boever’s article through a reading of Robert Harris’ novel
The Fear Index, of the computer virus gone wild. Under
this sublime condition, which in the 21st century has become
the order of the day, fear is pointless; panic, and the corre-
lationism it springs from, only adds oil to the fire. Could
this hark back to what Ina Blom means when she states that
“human seeming quasi-subjects taking on specifically
human temporalities and forms of cognition also alert us
to the tenuous nature of all such identifications”? What can
be literature’s role in this kind of situation, in particular
in view of the criticism that all narrative is correlationist?
21
Two kinds of pathology are endemic, according to Pascal Gielen,

of cognitive capitalism. First as we mentioned is this chronotopy
of bottomless instantaneity. The distinction between past and
future is consumed by a bottomless present. Trauma is no longer
something that needs to be uncovered from the unconscious as
it can be recovered from the endless streams of omniscient data.
Every trauma is recorded and continually circulating in the end-
less nomadic dance that is the Internet. There are no any longer
any defenses with which to hide the past: everyone is exposed
24/7. “Our digital lives are evolving as a public portfolio.” (p. 199)
We need what he calls a “techno-mental” ecology to deal with
these new conditions. (p. 199) In this way he reconfirms Ina
Blom’s above statement about the repercussions of new media
on the autobiographical self. Gielen’s second psychopathology
is related to a kind of hyper precariousness of exchangeability.
Thus in a hyperconnected world in which one is always on call
24/7, a hyperconnected hysteria emerges. Hysteria in its 19th
century guise was constituted through, according to the logics
of psychoanalysis a relation between the contents of the symbolic
unconscious and its outward manifestation as an improbable
paralysis of a limb or blindness. In its 21st century form it is rather
substituted for with a kind of hysterical fear of an impending pre-
carious loss of ones connection to the web itself. The interior
chambers of Charcot’s Salpêtrière Hospital demonstration cham-
ber has now gone global and with it the fear of not being on call,
not being wanted by the collective, being totally disconnected.
In his essay “The Only Place to Hide? The Art and Politics of
Sleep in Cognitive Capitalism” Alexei Penzin once more con-
firms what Jonathan Crary in his book 24/7 suggests that sleep
is the only natural barrier to an insistent non-stop laboring.
But for him the philosopher must be a night watchman guarding
the contents of sleep. Importantly, what was a model of sleep
disruption in post-Fordism, so called insomnia, is substituted
for by the much more dangerous sleep apnea in which respira-
tory and cardiovascular disruptions can endanger life itself.
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Section 3:
The later phase of cognitive capitalism is delineated by its

‘cognitive turn’ in which labor itself is predominately mental
in nature and is located in the ‘factory of the brain.’ In a world
in which the predominate forms of labor are intellectual
and service oriented, the machinery of the brain takes on
added importance as a locus of capitalistic adventurism and
speculation. As such various interdisciplinary approaches
have been engaged to understand its logics.
Matteo Pasquinelli’s essay, “The Power of Abstraction

and Its Antagonism: On Some Problems Common to
Contemporary Neuroscience and Theory of Cognitive
Capitalism,” brings forward many important issues that
deal with what is meant by the cognitive turn. Like the
basic conception of this book he traces the relation of the
mind and body and world back to the German notion of
the ‘Lebensphilosophie,’ in which the living was rarely
detached from the dimension of cognition or abstraction.
Following the model of Kurt Goldstein it becomes his
central condition for understanding both biopower and
abstraction. “Going deeper in this genealogy, the power
of abstraction will be disclosed at the original core that
inspired the paradigm of biopower. It is not an exaggeration
to affirm that neuroplasticity (as understood by Goldstein)
was the original inspiration of the notion of biopower.”
Crucial to our understanding of the relation between biopower

and neuropower is presented in a quote by Elizabeth Grosz
with which Pasquinelli begins his essay, “Life cleaves to mat-
ter, elaborating and contracting matter, bringing to life the
virtualities within the material in unknown directions.” (p. 275)
23
But as Catherine Malabou has noted plasticity’s native land

is the field of art. Plasticity characterizes the art of modeling
and in the first instance, the art of sculpture. The plastic arts
are those whose central aim is the articulation and development
of forms; among these are counted architecture, drawing, and
painting (Malabou 2005, 8). Key for us here are the notions
of bringing to life the virtualities locked deep within the
materiality in unknown directions and the idea of the plastic
arts whose central aim is the articulation and development
of forms. The plastic arts when they are delinked from com-
mercial enterprise create a multiplicity of forms and variation.
This variation is coupled to an inherent variation in the brain.
As Olaf Sporns states, “The indeterminancy of the information
content of world objects and events is matched by the struc-
tural variability of animal nervous systems, at many levels
of organization.” (Sporns 1994, 5)
This variation of the brain is also a key component for
what the neuroscientist Gerald Edelman calls the primary
repertoire. This primary repertoire is the brain one is born
with at birth. It is the result of a contribution of each of
the biological parent’s genetic contribution to the child
genetic make up and the events incurred upon the brain
during pregnancy, such as, the effect of starvation, drug
addiction, illness and the events of the birth event itself.
As these events are particular to each individual each brain
at birth is very different from each one another. Through
its relational coupling, not correlation, with the unspecified
world of objects its variability is sculpted by those con-
sistent relations or features characteristic and essential for
the animals survival. This is the key in which to understand
Grosz last part of the statement, “Life emerges as a be-
coming thought or-as a consciousness, a becoming-brain.”
Importantly it is a political becoming. For this becoming
is the site of modern day capitalisms interventionist
tactics. For how that matter is sculpted details the on-
togeny of the neural zoe as it becomes the neural bios.
24 WA RR EN NEIDICH
Pasquinelli’s understands that “abstraction is intended also as

the power of differentiation with respect to neural matter, the
power to produce further bifurcation of information and percep-
tion perceptual flows” is key to this ongoing ontogeny. (p. 277)
Sanford Kwinter elaborates upon this further as it relates

to architecture in his text “Neuroecology: Notes Toward a
Synthesis.” Following the work of Bruce Wexler, incidentally
a speaker from our first conference in Los Angeles, he
reiterates the role of epigenesis in sculpting the brain in the
infant and then proceeds to elaborate the second phase in
the process occurring in the adult phase, “the focus shifts
toward reversing the action of the sculptural knife, so that
the shaping now of the external world becomes the main
priority, in order to bring about, or simply extend, what
I call the dynamic sympathetic mutuality with reality.” (p. 328)
In other words adults modify the world to coincide with
the in relation to the new contingencies of their neurobio-
logically modeled self-image. Or do they? For importantly
each successive generations neural architecture is sculpted
anew. The inherent variability and difference that is the
function of the brains’ primary repertoire samples the
pluripotential cultural plasticity according to different
generational logics entangled and deranged as they are
by the social, political, economic, psychic, and techno-
logical that delineate it. This leads Kwinter to make the
concluding statement, “For every maturing organism
notes, almost without delay, the unavoidable non-match
between its internal (rearing) environment and the persistent
elements of those of the previous (parental) generation’s,
and hence seek almost immediately to impose upon it
images, shapes, relationships whose effects will better
correspond to, and generate, the desired internal states
that have become existentially necessary to their intuitions
of freedom and well-being. This is a profoundly creative
as well as destructive and aggressive act.” (p. 329)
25
Liss C. Werner’s text “Towards A*cognitive Architecture: A

Cybernetic Note Beyond – or the Self-informing Machinery”
takes this idea one step further and proposes what she refers
to as a ‘A*cognitivist architecture,’ “Architecture in a cyber-
biological framework embedding its construct within the mind/
body phenomenon immanent in social environments.” (p. 296)
The world we live in is no longer defined by static Euclidean
geometries and rather the result of multiplexed, distributed
and form finding algorithms that have mutated the conditions
of built space as a site defined by calculus. Think here of
Otto Frei’s German Pavillon, Montreal World’s Fair, 1967.
The crux of A*cognitivist Architecture, a product of digitisa-
tion and the Internet, lies in the intensity and amount of
cognitive capital highly dependent upon it in perpetuating
collective brainpower that is all but reduced to aesthetics
only. It is about understanding the logic of becoming form,
breeding forms, and understanding form as a result of com-
munication processes and the ability to decode within a
system, rather than form for forms sake. Cognition is ex-
tended: the world and the inhabiting organism constitute a
single system. Their differences are fuzzy and nondescript.
What this means for the brain is that in a world of non-
linear, distributed intensive systems the brain is also a non-
linear and distributed network system.
Charles T. Wolfe adds another dimension to this problem

of how this environment might become interiorized as Lev
Vygotsky states in his Mind and Society, “What takes place
is what we have called internalization: the external sign
that school children require has been transformed into a an
internal sign ... produced by the adult as a means of remem-
bering.” (Vygotsky 1930) As Wolfe surmised this process
is another key to unlock the mechanisms by which the
environment can sculpt not only the individual but also
the group. To do this he utilizes Balwinian Evolution or
the Baldwin Effect.
26 WA RR EN NEIDICH
Because of the importance of these claims in understanding

the “cognitive turn” in cognitive capitalism I want to look at
this idea more closely. As I show in my essay “Computational
Architecture and the Statisticon” although neural plasticity is
an important component of how culture might sculpt the brain
it sometimes it is not enough. An interesting example is what
is referred to as the “neuronal recycling hypothesis” (Dehaene
2004, 141-142). I explain this construct in detail in my own
text so there is no reason to do so here except to say that read-
ing popped into the cultural repertoire about 6000 years ago
with the Sumerian Tablets and most evolutionary biologist
believe that there has been too little time for genetic evolu-
tionary factors to have played a role in the explanation of how
we now have areas of the brain that light up during reading
when we are being scanned in an MRI machine. (Dahaene
2004, 141-142.) Two complimentary theories could explain
this. First is that this area called the Visual Word Form Area,
located in the posterior brain, is the product of neuroplastic
modulation from the pressures of the symbolic environment
upon it as suggested by Terrence Deacon. In this case a given
afferent message will cause long term stabilization of the neu-
rophysiology of a given set of synapses that regulate each
other forming a maximally intergrated and efficient network
while others will regress.” (Changeux et al. 1993, 376)
A second explanation would be that certain predispositions
predetermined in the anatomy of that area make it the likely
place for reading to be processed as suggested by Stanislas
Dehaene. He points out that there is an area in macaques
called the Inferior Temporal Area that does very similar
things. That it is related to the Visual Form Area and is most
likely its analogue. That in fact over generations the Inferior
Temporal Area evolved to become the Visual Word Form
Area through a series of small steps in which the primary
area sculpted reading in accordance with its proclivities
so that it would fit its already elaborated neurobiological
architecture. Over time language would adapt itself.
27
This is a parsimonious explanation Together they create the

dance that is so much apart of this volume between genetic
and epigenetic factors. But there is one more key to this and
that is what Wolfe alerts us to. That is to say Baldwinian Evo-
lution (Deacon 2003). As we saw previously the brains of hu-
mans are highly variable. First, during human development as
a result of different genetic contributions from the mother and
father but also because of events occurring during pregnancy
and subsequently as a result of very different events occurring
during their lives especially early on during what are referred
to as critical periods. This variability gives certain members
of a population different adaptive capacities for the wide vari-
ety of changes that they might encounter in the environment:
reading in this case being one. Some members of the popula-
tion could adapt better and take advantage of what reading
provided in a broader cultural context. This is where reading
comes in and Wolfe quotes Peter Godfrey-Smith. Importantly,
“The population will then have the chance to reproduce muta-
tions that cause organisms to exhibit the new optimal behavioral
profile without the need for learning. Selection will favor these
mutants, and in time the behaviors which once had to be learned
will be innate.” (p. 252) Could architecture and art provide
the abstract contingencies? He then goes on to say, that is
significant for us here that the Baldwin effect is very close,
in fact, to the promise of the social brain, namely that “the
human cerebral cortex [is] an organ of civilization in which
are hidden boundless possibilities.” (p. 252)
This volume embarks upon a journey that is now in its beginning

stages. To confront a cynical materialism in which research
on the complexities of the brain are being used by neoliberal and
capitalism formations to produce a normalized citizen consumer.
It is my hope that the knowledge developed in these various
events will begin a search for new methods with which to con-
front this trend or at least to slow it down. We need to produce
an emancipatory materialism in the world and in the brain too!
28 WA RR EN NEIDICH
Changeux, J.P. and Dehaene, S., 1993. “Neuronal Models of Cognitive

Function.” in Brain Development and Cognition: A Reader, M.H.
Johnson (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, p. 376.
Crary, Jonathan, 2013. 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep.
London: Verso, p. 33.
Deacon, Terrence, 2003. “Multilevel Selection and Language Evolution”

in Evolution and Learning, The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, B. Weber,
D.J. Depew (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 100.
Deheane, Stanislas, 2004. “Evolution of human cortical circuits for

reading and arithmetic. The ‘neuronal recycling hypothesis’” in
S. Dehaene, J. R. Duhamel, M. Hauser & G. Rizzolatti (Eds.), From
monkey brain to human brain. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Deleuze, Gilles, 2003. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.

New York: Continuum.
Lazzarato, Maurizio, 2011. The Making of the Indebted Man.

Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Malabou, Catherine, 2005. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality

and Dialectic. London and New York: Routledge, p. 8.
Moulier Boutang, Yann, 2011. Cognitive Capitalism. Malden: Polity

Press, p. 9.
Neidich, Warren, 2014 (forthcoming). Resistance is Fertile. Berlin:

Merve Verlag.
Sporns, Olaf and Tononi, Giulio, 1994. “Selectionism and Instructionist

Ideas in Neuroscience.” in Selectionsism and the Brain, Review of
Neurobiology, Volume 37. San Diego: Academic Press, p. 5.
Vercellone, Carlo, 2007. “From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect:

Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive Capitalism.”
in Historical Materialism, 15, p. 13-16.
Vygotsky, L.S., 1978. Mind and Society. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, p. 33.
29
SECTIO N 1
The Early Phase
30
IN A BLOM 31
Video and Autobiography vs.

the Autobiography of Video.
An Historical View of the
Ambiguities of Self-monitoring
Technologies
I
Video and autobiography. The coupling of the two terms seems
self-evident, a cliché even. In an age of ubiquitous camera
functions, video seems to present itself as an autobiographical
medium par excellence, a technology at the service of subjects
continuously tracking their existence on digital devices big
and small, cheap and expensive, stationary and mobile. But
the coupling in fact goes back to the early days of analog video.
The 18 lb. Sony AV-3400 Porta Pak camera that came on the
market in 1969 was also considered an intimate appendage
to the human body—a harbinger of today’s self-monitoring
technologies. In distinction to the floor-bound cameras
of official television, the Porta Pak was understood to be
‘handheld,’ like a pen, and like a pen made seemingly limitless
tracings in real time. Not only did a 1969 tape reel allow an
entire 30 minutes of continuous recording (as opposed to
the 3 or 11 minute runs of Super 8 or 16mm film rolls),
you could also connect the camera directly to a monitor,
eschewing the temporal limitations of tape. From this
moment onwards, video emerged as a signal-based corollary
to the first person narratives of the modern novel—a literary
form that not only veered towards the self-exposure of
actual living persons, but that had its historical roots in the
handwritten private letter.
32 INA BL OM
For the crux of the epistolary genre was ultimately

that of asserting the evolving existence of a writing subject,
however banal. This subject was at once self-observed and
presented for observation. Ray Johnson, an American artist
best known for shaping his entire artistic activity as a postal
network of private letter writers, was dead on target when—
in a 1978 mimeographed document—he presented this network
as “Ray Johnson’s History of Video Art.” (Blom, 2003, p.60)
It was a joke, of course, but, on that offered a sudden flash
of insight into actual connections. Analog video at the hands
of private individuals was just the latest and most efficient
technological framework for the production and exposition
of the self-monitoring being, otherwise known as the modern
subject. Clearly video was to become a key technology of
the so-called culture of the self-alternatively defined as
the open-ended production of subjectivity characteristic of
cognitive capitalism and its real-time media environments.
To review the close association between video and autobiog-

raphy is, inevitably, to revisit a key question in the debates
on the recent transformations of capitalism: the relation
between media technologies and processes of subjectivation.
Real-time technologies are here seen as apparatuses that
capture and exploit the forces of intellectual and spiritual
labor. Since such technologies produce rather than represent
time, they establish relations of proximity and collaboration
with the production of time that takes place in the human
brain and that is a key feature of mental operations. Hence,
real-time technologies do not just control and augment the
consumption of intellectual and aesthetic materials but, more
importantly, access the creative processes of memory and
self-relation that are an inevitable part of any affective
and cognitive activity. It is in this precise sense that video
technologies may be called the machineries of subjectivity-
production (Lazzarato 2007, 93-122).
V IDEO A ND AU TOBIO GR APHY VS.
33
THE A UTO BIOG RAP HY OF VID EO.
For an art historian interested in the introduction of real-

time technologies in the sphere of art production, these per-
spectives are suggestive insofar as they also resonate in the
discourses of early video art. More precisely, they resonate
in the specific forms of social imagination that emerge in a
practice in which the close interaction between human and
technical forms of memory have been exposed and ex-
plored. Yet if early video art tended to produce a close asso-
ciation between video technology and the memory-genre
named autobiography, this autobiographical tendency was at
the same time marked by dilemmas and conflicts, bifurca-
tions and divergences. And these divergences touch on the
question of who or what actually count as memorizing
agents in the theories of recent subjectivity-production: how
they are to be defined, from what elements they are consti-
tuted and how they interact in the production of the social.
Ultimately, this question concerns the very functioning of
the social machines of post-industrial capital: it emerged as
a critical site of investigation the moment video technolo-
gies were ‘released’ for use beyond the confines of state or
corporate broadcasting.
The most readily evident feature of video in this context

seems to be its intimate association with the very question
of subjectivity. When it comes to video, technology tends to
be more or less equated with subjectivity, to the extent that,
conversely, subjectivity also emerges as a technical medium.
There are obviously multiple dimensions to this mediatic-
autobiographical conundrum, which spans from the formatting
of identity in the name of control and domination to the explo-
ration of subjectivation as open-ended ‘dividuation’—processes
that pass above or below the frameworks of individual identity.
What marks this field of activity is, however, a tendency
towards a naturalization of the human/machine link—to the
extent that this link almost comes across as a distinct identity.
34 INA BL OM
One symptom of such naturalization is a curious lack of

interest in the video technologies themselves. In relation to
the richness of human autobiography and subject-formation,
video here often appears in a reductivist guise, i.e., as a limited
set of standardized operations that seems to corroborate and
support the dynamic flow of human life-time.
However, the same artistic context also opens toward
a parallel form of autobiographical existence—a related, yet
very different phenomenon. To study early video art is notably
also to be confronted with a marked investment in the plu-
ralization and individuation of the various affordances of
real time technologies, to the extent that video itself may
come to appear as an electronic subject exploring its own
capacities for cognition and memory. Video, in other words,
appears as an autobiographical agent. And with this point
of view comes the realization that those capacities might not
necessarily converge with human perception and memory.
In the context of early video art, the widespread intuition
that video may operate as a human-seeming quasi-subject,
taking on specifically human temporalities and forms of
cognition, also alerts us to the tenuous nature of all such
identifications: Instances of apparent identity are often
precisely those sites where all-important differences emerge.
In early video art, such differences may involve competing
takes on the place of technology in its relation to human
subjects, attesting to competing social ontologies. Tracing
the autobiography of video may therefore be a process in
which the coupling between video and autobiography is at
once asserted and opened up, its logic reconsidered, perhaps
even reconstructed.
At stake here, obviously, is a politics of memory—a key

feature in a form of media capitalism closely aligned with
the modern effort to govern the very forces of life. Here ‘life’
is not just a question of the survival and reproduction of the
population—it is more closely aligned with the definition
35
of life as memory introduced by molecular biology, as the

physical preservation of the past in the present. The life
forces modulated by real-time technologies are then
approached in terms a capacity for memory shared with all
living entities, including a number of technical machineries
(Lazzarato 2006, 183-4). Such a biopolitics of memory must
necessarily affect the concept of social memory, which may
now be explored in terms of the future-oriented concerns
of living matter at the molecular and microtemporal level,
rather than as a process of ‘storage’ of a collective past.
Yet, in the disciplines of cultural history, the question of
who or what are counted as the social agents of this volatile
memory/life remains. This question opens up the new horizons
of control, exploitation and regulation as well as the new
margins of freedom.
The early association between autobiography and
analog video appears as a site where this question is raised
to a principle—explored, excavated, and turned into a crisis
point. And this is no doubt due to the duplicitous effects
of video’s ‘living’ signal-based materiality. Such effects
were perhaps more keenly felt in a pre-digital age where
the material reality of the electronic substrate was closer
to human media users, in the sense that the modulation of
voltages were not supporting the abstractions of binary
processing and today’s plethora of user-friendly, blackboxed
applications. Nam June Paik’s (1963) manipulation of televisual
scanning patterns made him intensely aware of the existence
of flows of signals that he could (at this point) neither
hold on to nor control. The dynamic feedback patterns that
emerged in the interaction with such signal flows alerted
him to powers of becoming that were on the one hand
understood as entirely asubjective, part of the ‘constantly
changing nature’ celebrated by John Cage, and on the other
hand as instances of the new modes of human flexibility
and self-extension that characterize a media age of instant
information transfer, learning and networking (see Paik 1973).
36 INA BL OM
The generative signal flow may have asserted the dynamic

reflexivity of emergent life forms—a general autobiographical
principle that has expanded to become the emblematic cultural
form of today’s information society. And yet, the work of Paik
and a number of other early video experimenters show that
the allocation of a self-memorizing agency within a general
(and expanding) memory culture could in no way be taken
for granted.
II
If the coupling between video and autobiography comes
across as one of several automatisms delivered by video,
this is in no small part thanks to the critical literature on
what is often referred to as the ‘autobiographical impulse’
in video art and related forms. The notion that there is some
impulse at work here obviously indicates the presence
of something automatic, not fully willed or consciously
thought out. Interestingly enough, the authors for the most
part takes this as their cue to remain strangely passive or
uninterested when it comes to the question of the more
specific features or functions of the technologies that
would produce such an impulse. Video here is even at times
unquestioningly paired with film, as if the assignment of
autobiographical affordances to two technologies as different
as film and video might not in fact complicate the concept
of ‘autobiography’ as a modern media genre.
The reason for this technological disinterest may
stem from the fact that focus here is invariably on the
subject of autobiography—notably the human subject and
the way in which its auto-representation through signaletic
media seem to open for a destabilization of specific ideas
about subjectivity and identity. The drama surrounding
such questions of subjectivity all but cancels out more
detailed perspectives on the material substratum of the
autobiographical technologies. But, even more pertinently,
it seems to be rooted in a mode of thinking in which the
37
individual subject is already understood as a medium, with

the result that the technical apparatuses at its disposal are
easily conflated with this medium-subject.
From one perspective it could be seen as another story
of technological servitude. Video, it appears, is fundamentally,
ontologically, tied to the first person perspective of an
individual subject at once reified and dynamized, asserted
and displaced. (It is of some interest to note that the term
video—the first person present tense conjugation of the
Latin verb videre—literally means ‘I see,’ not ‘you see’
(videt) or ‘we see’ (vidémus)). To see the very open—in
fact limitless—terms of this servitude it is enough to recall
literary historian James Olney’s brilliant exposition of the
ontology of autobiography:
I suggest that one could understand the life around

which autobiography forms itself in a number of
other ways beside the perfectly legitimate one of
“individual history and narrative.” We can understand
it as the vital impulse—the impulse of life—that
is transformed by being lived through the unique
medium of the individual and the individual’s
special psychic configuration, we can understand
it as consciousness pure and simple, consciousness
referring to no objects outside itself, to no events
and to no other lives, we can understand it as
participation in an absolute existence far transcend-
ing the shifting, changing unrealities of mundane
life, we can understand it as the moral tenor of
the individual’s being. Life in all these latter senses
does not stretch back across time, but extends
down to the roots of the individual being, it is
atemporal, committed to a vertical thrust from
consciousness down into the unconscious rather
than to a horizontal thrust from the present into
the past. (Olney 1980, 239)
38 INA BL OM
It is worth noting that autobiography is here not tied to the

representation of history and the recording of the past. It is
simply a vital impulse that asserts itself through what Olney
calls the medium of the individual. It is a pure consciousness
and an existential force that finds in the individual its technol-
ogy of inscription, self-relation or expression. Its atemporal
mode is that of the eternal present, the now-time of a con-
stantly unfolding memory that instantiates itself in a living
organism in action. Olney’s topic may have been literature
and more specifically the writings of Paul Valéry, but word
for word his analysis evokes the intuitions and terminologies
through which a real-time medium named Video emerged as
a cultural force to be reckoned with. Video is the medium
of the individual, seeing/being processed through the first
person present tense. In fact it is almost as if the medium
of the individual only reaches full cultural autonomy, a full
realization of its forces and potentials through this specific
technology. Paper and pen was fine, but only live signals
could imbue the still-shaky historical construction of the
individual subject with the indisputable presence, authority
and contingency of a distinct life force. As a medium, the
individual subject was quite simply in need of a bit of dis-
creet technological updating.
This conflation of video and autobiography in the name of

existential forces and real-time presence makes sense in
light of the fact that video autobiographies are, for the most
part, narratives of subjectivities at risk, on the margins, in
process or up for radical questioning. The general autobio-
graphical emphasis on becoming subjectivity and the attendant
concepts of continuous modulation and flexibility are, in other
words, instantiated with respect to subjects that find themselves
in the position of being particularly exposed to problems of
adaptation or demands for self-transformation. Topics such
as AIDS, feminist politics, gender identity, race, migration
and youth inform almost every single one of these accounts.
39
Evidently, autobiographical video is not the form through

which white adult masculine middle class heterosexual cul-
ture expresses itself. To the extent that this particular subject
position was at once hegemonic, naturalized and normative,
it seems to have had little need for the self-explorations of
‘the subject in history’ that Michael Renov, for one, sees as
the key ambitions of autobiography in film video and film.
Video autobiographies, in his view, pursue the ‘documentary’
impulse of Michel de Montaigne’s essay format, in which
a subject’s ‘gaze upon the world’ is paired with a ‘forceful
reflex of self-interrogation’ that displaces any stable bound-
aries between subject and object.
It is interesting to note, of course, that such reflexivity
provides no shelter against the spectre of commoditized sub-
jectivity or reified identity-positions that haunt this complex
media landscape. This is in many ways the critical drama in
relation to which autobiographical video is understood to be
at once the symptom and the cure. Hence, as Roger Hallas
informs us, confession is for instance not a critically valid
option in autobiographical AIDS video. For confession simply
plays into the hands of a media economy where first person
accounts are already a key commodity, as well as an effect of
a neoliberal tendency to privatize of the political. The self-
memorizing of any AIDS patient is by necessity haunted by
the ever-present reality of death, whose unrepresentable
horror cannot be contained by the neatly formatted product
known as the ‘intimate disclosure.’ However, creative use
of the real-time immediacy of video—a technical corollary
to consciousness itself—might provide a sense of the
precariously live and present that underscores the reality
of death precisely by not representing it (Hallas 2009).
In an analogous move, Julia Lesage asserts that since
women’s consciousness is already fragmented—an effect of
women’s social devaluation, labor in the domestic sphere
and the ideological control of representations of gender and
sex—its only adequate means of self-memorizing is the
40 INA BL OM
fragmentary, temporally flexible and non-representational

visual/verbal realm of media production facilitated by video
(Lesage 1999). Chris Straayer (1985) sees the distributed
perception of video’s camera/monitor set up as a discursive
‘performance’ of the subject, where the subject that says
‘I’ is brought out for inspection rather than concealed, as is
typically the case in third person narratives. In his text on
the autobiographical video art of Lynn Hershman, David
James (1995) essentially sums up this tendency to search for
points of identification between televisual technologies and
appropriate modes of autobiography in the media age: ‘Only
in the multiple, dispersed yet interconnected practices that
constitute television can be an adequately extensive, flexible,
and nuanced metaphor for the self now be found,’ he writes.
Video autobiography may function as a technology-driven
archaeology of the very question of the individual subject and
its material production, but it is also, paradoxically, a technical
corollary to the economic and political investment in individual
subjectivity at its most ‘flexible’ and ‘open.’ The individualiz-
ing properties of this medium seems to resonate with more
general attempts to move beyond purely formalist definitions
of ‘medium specificity’—most notably Stanley Cavell’s
description of the medium of the modern work of art as an
automatism, a specific and ‘individual’ machinery generat-
ing its own specific instances. (Cavell 1979, 105-108)
The paradigmatic example for a number of critics
is the early 1990s work of Sadie Benning—a precocious
teenage artist who, armed with a Fisher Price PXL2000
PixlVision children’s video camera, mixed bedroom con-
fessions with a blend of audio-visual materials from the
realms of television and pop music—much of it harking
back to the mythical media age of the 60s and 70s. Here,
it seems that the very simplicity of the toy camera—video
reduced to a few rudimentary, handheld ‘essentials’—
provides a sort of technical validation of the precarious intimacy
that is now seen as the hallmark of video autobiography.
41
Its lack of sophisticated production values and allegorizes the

non-self-mastery of the autobiographer: Benning’s radically
anti-cinematic camera never seems to take in entire scenes,
but slides impulsively between close-ups of body parts,
notebook writings, TV images and various teenage room
stuff, interspersed by voiced confessions. Here, the autobio-
graphical subject comes forth as a fragmentary production
that not only mediates the connection between an outer
world and an inner self, but that from the outset eschews
any attempts at ‘imaging’ the self as a consistent entity.
From this perspective it is interesting to note that the threat

of reified or preformatted subjectivity presents itself with
particular urgency the moment autobiographers start ex-
ploiting one of the camera functions that is specific to video
and that film cannot simply replicate: specifically the act
of turning the camera to yourself, while simultaneously
following your own on-camera action on a monitor in real
time. For some critics this particular strategy seems to
evoke the psychological structure of narcissism. Performers
resorting to this technical set-up are routinely accused of
locking themselves up within a self-repeating matrix that
excludes an evolving engagement with an outer world and
its historical and material specificity. This type of analysis
proceeds from the ambiguities of Marshall McLuhan’s
view of media technologies as prostheses. The ‘prosthetic’
metaphor not only indicates an augmentation of connec-
tivity and a view of the human body as an infinite system
of ‘additions,’ but also inevitably invites you to imagine
an amputation of the human organs and their powers of
sensual connection. Seeing the subject as a medium in this
case indicates the possibility of being locked up in a feed-
back loop in which you will, ultimately, lose your ability
to ‘connect.’ This is the ambivalent discursive terrain
emerging out of the first attempts to associate human sub-
jectivation with the specificity of video camera affordances.
42 INA BL OM
The medium of the subject, on the one hand understood

as a open-ended existential real-time force, is, on the other
hand, haunted by a technophobia that seemingly cannot
help situate the individual subject as an unalienable fact
prior to its eventual (self)production. Symptomatically,
self-monitoring video artists like Lynda Benglis and Joan
Jonas are denounced by Micki McGee for having allowed
themselves to be bracketed by the technology, turned in on
themselves, trapped between themselves and the image of
themselves like all narcissists. In contrast, Martha Rosler’s
use of the same camera technique in Vital Statistics of a
Citizen is deemed acceptable, since what is brought forth
in this work is not really an individual body or subject, but
a sample from the realm of statistical anybodys—the ideal
referent of standard sociology and hence a certified point of
connection with the ‘world out there.’ (McGee 1981).
III
When subjects are, in all seriousness, said to have been
‘bracketed by technology,’ it is actually technology itself
that is bracketed, rendered ineffective and immaterial, pulled
out of historical time and the contingencies of technical
connectivity. But this seems to be the price for what is
essentially, if ambivalently, a representational model of the
relation between technology and subjectivity. Depending
on how its specific temporalizing features are deployed,
video is here basically understood as an instance that ‘mimes’
a more or less reified, more or less dynamic and more or
less contingent version of the autobiographical human
subject and the durations of existential time.
In view of this hypostatized version of the humanity
of video (a form of reductionism that is also a key ideological
figure of current politics…the individualizing machine as
me, my body, my memory), it is worth recalling Dominique
Janicaud’s point that there is no such thing as ‘time itself’
that is subsequently captured and processed by technologies.
43
Time only comes to exist through the myriad of technical

apparatuses and functions that generate its fundamental
heterogeneity. This position resonates in the realm of digital
technologies where we are constantly made aware of the
importance of all the different microtemporalities, the
processes and operations that have no correlate in human
perception. But similar confrontations with microtempo-
ralities took place in the encounter with video and television
technologies as well: the merest attention to the realm
of frequencies and wave phenomena (and all the techni-
cal syntheses that are based on the exploitation of these
phenomena) exposed the limits of human perception.
Bergson inadvertently gave a compelling example of this
when he mentioned (in Matter and Memory) the 400
trillion vibrations per second that produces the colour red.
This simple fact does not just give us an inkling of the
mathematical basis of the frequency modulations under-
lying the constitution of any electronic image, but also
their dependence on a realm of speeds alien to human per-
ception and memory. Confrontations with the technical
basis of video should then put us on the guard against too
rapid identification between human autobiographical
memory and video technology—at least to the extent
that is is based on the idea of a similarity between Bergson’s
description of the ‘pure duration’ of consciousness and
a general view of video’s flexible processing of past
materials within a real-time now rife with the virtualities
of constant modulation. This is not because duration
is at odds with measure and numerical abstraction.
Janicaud is, if anything, critical of Bergson’s opposition
between measured time and pure duration, and one of
the key points of his argument is that any ‘sense’ of dura-
tion or temporal qualification depends on some instance
of rhythm, division or measure. The interesting thing is
precisely the differences between the various measuring
instances and the specific temporalities they produce.
44 INA BL OM
To the extent that all forms of measure instantiate what

Janicaud calls ‘asubjective retention’—the minimal
difference between a before and an after that is the general
condition of all types of time production—we may rather
choose to see the constant association between autobiogra-
phy and video as a technical/political site exposing us to
the complex and not-self-evident intersections of human
and nonhuman forms of cognition.
This obviously does not mean that the much-discussed
association between video time and Bergsonian duration
supports the reified conceptions of individual memory and
subjectivity that is symptomatic of today’s media economy.
Bergson’s concept of duration is notably part of an ontology
where memory is a general feature of matter itself, and
where individual brains are just interfaces within the gen-
eral flow of memory/matter. In Lazzarato’s account, the
production of video signals out of pure streams of light is
simply seen as structurally similar to the brain’s creation
of signifying patterns out of the asignifying streams of
stimulations or impressions. Yet in the context of an
economy that capitalizes on the open-ended production of
‘lifetime,’ it is well worth emphasizing the extent to which
video technologies are also not correlates of human forms
of perception, memory and affect, and exhibit forms of
cognition that do not support human forms of knowing and
being. Various types of temporalizing operations performed
by so-called memory technologies reveal different qualifica-
tions of the matter of memory and the forms of ‘subjectivity’
it produces, and these complicate our understanding of
technical access to the ever more ‘intimately’ human. We
cannot talk of a contemporary politics of memory without
also considering the limits of such intimacy, represented by
the manifold potentials and directionalities of the so-called
apparatuses of capture.
45
From an art historical point of view, it is therefore interesting

to observe that right alongside the prominent discourse of
video as a medium of human autobiography, an alternative
video-discourse emerged., one that we may perhaps call ‘the
autobiography of video.’ Early video art, a privileged site of
identification between human and technical “‘subjects,’ then
also presents itself as the site of a marked des-identification or
differentiation between human and technical forms of cognition.
Autobiographical strategies—the reflexive tracing of memory
operations—remained. But it is no longer certain whose
autobiography it was. It might for instance seem as if the
electronic subject, or subjects, named ‘video’ used the con-
text of experimental art practices in order to appropriate
this genre of human memory—to overtake it so as to open
other avenues of thinking social memory. At the same time
as the temporally oriented technicity of autobiography
supported the production of human subjectivity, this same
technicity seemed to generate questions regarding the
various ‘individualities’ of time technologies themselves.
If autobiographical investigations showed human subjectivity
to be multiple, contingent, open and variable, video as a
technological subject was no less so.
This is a mode of thinking that can be observed
once you return to the technologically oriented sources of
early video art—or, more precisely, to those sites where
the range of technical features available under the term
‘video’ seem engaged in various forms exploration of their
own memory capacities. Video technologies here present
themselves as distinct forms of agency, with the powers
to forge new alliances whose relations to existing social
institutions (media, art practice, capital) remain an open
question. (First encounters with such agency typically emerge
in the artistic efforts to control or stabilize video images
and in the quest for technologies that allow for more control
but that in fact lead to new and unexpected inventions.)
46 INA BL OM
On a technical level, the autobiography of video finds

articulation through analog videotape works or closed-
circuit camera and monitor set-ups that may or may not
include frequency modulation by means of video synthesiz-
ers and other types of TV studio equipment. A key example
is the early work of Keith Sonnier, where you come face
to face with an inverted world in which attentive humans,
ostensibly at the controls of the various televisual machiner-
ies, now emerge as the latter’s accessories, parts of their
working components. In these tapes, humans are sometimes
heard but rarely seen. No longer faces or figures, they are
essentially voices emerging from the depths of the studio
situation, where they seem submerged in a sort of protracted
operational dialogue with a number of technical personae—
relays, wipes and switches, mat keys and machine clocks,
‘Scanimate’ and ‘Kodalith’ effects, to mention but a few.
These are, for all intents and purposes, the real protagonists
of these tapes. Presented as the key functions in the milieu
of the television studio, they are also the operative forces
of these technomorphic tapes. Only the most stubborn
anthropocentrism would elevate the somewhat distant
human presences in these works into sovereign or dynamic
subjects, makers and users of technology. In fact, by access-
ing humans as voices rather than figures, video not only
captures a particular mode of everyday intimacy and inten-
sity in man-machine interactions that could not be further
away from the awkward and alienated robot bodies that
were (at the time) usually brought on to demonstrate such
exchange. As voices, humans are here in fact defined as
frequencies and in this sense quietly appropriated as parts
of the electromagnetic spectrum that is video’s particular
sphere of operation. Video translates human action to sig-
naletic phenomena and—even more pertinently—to the in-
tensities of physical events whose temporalizing modes
radically exceed the normal frameworks of human percep-
tion and memory.
47
What is taking place in these works is a technical

recontextualization of human capacities that seem to open onto
what might perhaps be called a videomatic inscription of
social and political thought itself. Emerging here is a self-
conscious collectivity moving to the beat of the experimental
temporalities that result from the difficult encounter between
temporal synchronization and heterogeneity. But videomatic
thought may also be traced at the level of textual reflection—
for instance where technical experts are compelled to think
alongside the set of features that allow machines to respond
to their environments within a time frame that is—in human
terms—often perceived as ‘immediate.’ A key example
is a 1968 text by the personnel researcher Hal Sackman of
System Development Corporation of Santa Monica—a Rand
Corporation spin-off that was charged with developing the
systems software for the SAGE air defence project in the 1950s
and early 60s. The text is entitled A Public Philosophy for Real
Time Information Systems and reflects the macro concerns of
an employee in a company said to have ‘trained the (computer)
industry,’ i.e. a concern for the way in which interaction with
real-time systems changes the object and impact of knowledge
itself. In fact, the text establishes an ethical/political stance that
depends precisely on a new form of recognition of technological
agency. Sackman’s intimate familiarity with the speed and
immediacy of real-time technologies translates to worry
about the lag between the speed of technical events and the
much slower human cognition of change. But (in contrast
to the more dystopic descriptions of thinkers like Paul Vir-
ilio) machinic speed is here at once the problem and the so-
lution: the lag can be handled if human perception, memory
and thinking is made to collaborate with real-time systems.
A real-time information system is here primarily defined

as a set-up that allows you to monitor events in a specified
environment with the intention of controlling the outcome
of those events in a desired direction: it is at once an early-
warning system and a system for corrective regulations.
48 INA BL OM
The salient political/ethical point derives from the technical

integration of knowledge and action. Older media technolo-
gies (books and films, traditional archives, and even new
mass-distribution media like radio and, to some extent, tele-
vision) are based on a model that separates storage and re-
trieval of knowledge from the passage into action. With
real-time systems, the technical collection, organization and
storage of information leads directly to action. Such systems
are not just passive spectators of their own events but active
agents that mould a partially plastic environment in accor-
dance with a preconceived image. In other words, technol-
ogy no longer figures as an instrument; for Sackman, it is
explicitly presented as a form of agency. And it is only by
properly acknowledging technological agency and its spe-
cific and autonomous forces that humans will remain politi-
cal players in a world that is no longer their own. Politics is
here defined in terms of a certain type of democratic effec-
tiveness: notably the power for social change as self-change
(as opposed to change imposed from without). Significantly,
this videomatic inscription of political thought is retroac-
tively identified with the one philosophical tradition that
consistently links knowledge with action - the pragmatism
of Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and William James
(Sackman 1968).
Recognizing the technological agency of real-time
systems (as Sackman concludes) enables social experimen-
tation on a scale not seen before and in ‘a bewildering variety
of forms.’ Real time collection, reduction and analysis of social
data introduce a new temporal dimension to social reflexivity,
to the extent that it would seem as if social ontology had been
reconfigured in terms of the duplicitous temporality of events.
As it happens, video technologies enforced almost exactly the
same type of inscription of social/political thought within the
Raindance video collective (founded in 1969), an organization
that saw itself as the radical or underground mirror of the
Rand corporation, and their publication Radical Software.
49
In the multifarious writings of this collective and their many

affiliates, generally seen as one of the theoretical and organi-
zational cradles of video art, you see, over and over again, the
forging of associations between technical time and social
reflection. In a 1970 text by philosopher and family therapist
Victor Gioscia, video is defined in terms of what Gioscia calls
‘chronetics’ and discussed from the perspective of A. N.
Whitehead’s critique of the fallacy of key memory-related
concepts such as ‘place’ and ‘location.’ ‘There is no universe
anywhere, ‘at’ any instant, for there are no instants. ‘There isn’t,’
Gioscia asserts, before claiming that he wants to understand
‘the chronetic laws of that accelerating process of which elec-
tronic software is the current mode.’ The accelerating process
referred to here is, again, the impact of time technologies on
the notion of human centrality, since exposure to the pure
temporalities that we call frequencies also alerts us to the fact
that the human sense apparatus can only ‘tune in’ to an infinitely
tiny spectre of universal frequencies. And once more, the
emphasis on human limitation does not produce dystopic vi-
sions of loss, but alternative social ontologies—mainly through
a critique of what Gioscia calls the sociology of expectation or
prediction. The sociologist’s desire to anticipate recurrence and
periodicity so as to be able to generalize will have to be done
away with if humans are going to politically mediate the event-
like temporalities of frequencies that displace their self-
proclaimed centrality in the social world. Hence, as Gioscia puts
it, any software system that sets the outer limits of its responsibil-
ity as fostering the synchronicity of present human wavelengths
could be guilty of a reactionary nostalgia (Gioscia 1970).
If video and real-time technologies are key machines in a form

of capitalism that captures the creative forces of thinking and
memory, the bifurcation of autobiographical modes of reflec-
tion in video art of the 1960s and 70s also demonstrates the way
in which these technologies are implicated in the simultane-
ous development of differing conceptions of social memory.
50 INA BL OM
Where video emerges as a technology representing human

time and existence at its most dynamic and open-ended, it
may support a questioning of the construction and production
of subjectivity, but within a framework where the individual
human subject is still the central figure, standing out against
a background of technology, economics, politics and history.
Where video technology becomes a cipher for modes of
cognition and memory that may or may not correspond with
those of the human sense apparatus, it is, in contrast, the
very concept of a social/political ground that is opened up,
dynamized and rethought in terms of the events of constant
reflexive experimentation. It seems to me that this ontological
‘conflict’ within the autobiographical scenarios of early video
art is indicative of some of the problems of political imagina-
tion that we are grappling with today (see Boutang 2011, 1-10).
Once analyses move beyond a generalized focus on the virtual
or event-oriented temporalities of these technologies, the default
attentiveness to the existential and ethical-political conundrum
of individual subjectivity is perhaps less easy to maintain.
It is a truism that real-time technologies are regularities
that support the emergence of new types of dispersed col-
lectivities. However, our ability to think and act as if such
collectives amount to more than simple interconnections
of individuals will depend on our ability to appreciate the
irregularities of such technologies, their constant invention
and differentiation of temporal operations and modes of
technical individuation.
As it happens, a more systematic unfolding of the non-
formatted powers of video happened in the context of the
nascent environmental politics of the 1960s and 70s—that is, in
an atmosphere of risk, crisis, urgency and failure in which bio-
logical life itself could for the first time no longer just be taken
for granted. Here, the biopolitical potentials of video actively
reorient the televisual technologies of presence that have a
special purchase on memory/life—primarily by producing new
continuities between technical, biological and social forms of life.
51
In the environmentally oriented works of Frank Gillette

and Paul Ryan, video instigated a form of surveillance of
the natural world that might, on first impression, seem to
illustrate Stanley Cavell’s description of televisual percep-
tion: An anxious monitoring of a planet whose very survival
seems to depend on our constant real-time attentiveness
(Cavell 1986; see also Doane 1990). But here the familiar
televisual reduction of the world to a precarious entity—the
crisis version of McLuhan’s global village—is counteracted by
the contingencies of interaction between monitoring systems
and ‘living nature’1. The unfamiliar natural world, mediated
through the various affordances of video technologies present
a very different concept of life, as if engaging a set of uncate-
gorizable forces that make us question normal gauges of
mediation and measure: At exactly what distance will the
objects of this world start to make sense to us? In what time
frame? Related to which preconceived patterns, which memory
systems? A biologist might have precise ideas about this and
might choose a microscope or a satellite depending on the
scientific argument at stake; if collaborating on a television
nature documentary she would make sure the natural objects
were clearly identified and inscribed in a coherent narrative.
But a video surveillance system is not a biologist and may
base its environmental engagement on technical properties that
seem quite random compared with the established scientific,
journalistic and artistic disciplines of nature representation.
1 A key example here is Frank Gillette’s six channel work Symptomatic
Syntax (1981), in which a still camera surveys a biotope in a way that

does not identify organisms and relationships and in which the technology
itself comes across as a key component of the system under observation.
A number of other works by Gillette revolved around similar issues
concerning the complex interface between time technologies and biology.
52 INA BL OM
What we encounter here is a natural world that is emphatically

multifarious and expansive, even monstrous. To monitor such
a world is to confront, head-on, the fact it is also invented by
the specific velocities of video attentiveness. by microtempo-
ralities and techniques of frequency modulation at odds with
any human sense of time.
Such exercises gave a whole new twist to the idea environ-

mental responsibility, creating a reflexive mode of involve-
ment that was technical, material and pragmatic through and
through. Paul Ryan used the term ‘video perception’ in order
to underscore the intuition that whatever was produced by
the video camera was not a representational image but a
live memory of the world itself, shaped by the technical/
perceptual apparatus—just as the human nervous system
always already shapes the visions that seem to just ‘hit’ the
eye (Lettvin et al. 1988). Nature was then neither an original
‘condition’ to which one should return, nor a separate entity
whose need for protection could simply be proven with accu-
rate scientific representation or by appeal to moral principles.
According to video, both the imagination of crisis and the
means to crisis management lay in constant perceptual and
aesthetic involvement, a non-stop irritation or innervation of
the senses that enforced, so to speak, a new type of feedback
loop between the neuronal systems of protected, risk-averse,
affluent, televisually connected humans and their larger
technopolitical environment. The problem was how such
innervations might be effectively shared—how, hopefully,
thousands of individual nervous systems might be inter-
linked in such feedback loops. Where Gillette’s monitoring
of nature typically disclosed the perceptual production of
new and disquieting biotopes, Ryan wanted something
more systematic and also more distributed. The answer was
the Earthscore Notational System (1971-) and its corollary,
the Ecochannel design for a television project that would
constantly broadcast nature from a number of locations.
53
Over time, this image stream would pick up behavioural

patterns in the individual ecosystems, what biologist C.
H. Waddington called chreods or ‘necessary pathways.’
Identifying such chreods might provide the basis for a
notational system through which to interpret an emergent
natural world. (Ryan 2001) Earthscore was then essentially
a perceptual syntax: its whole point was to facilitate a
veritable ‘orchestration’ of perceptions, so that a collective
of TV-viewers would start to intuitively see and feel
both regularities and critical changes in the environment.
Knowledge about possibly damaging changes to the
ecosystem would no longer be disembodied facts hurled
at one by specialists and activists, but part of a shared
sensorial apparatus.
The project was probably doomed to fail. Given the guerrilla

habits of much of the 1970s counterculture—attacking
institutions and corporations at the macro level, feeding off
antagonisms—a form of activism built around the type of
aesthetic attachment to the real-time apparatus that was also
the driving force of capitalist media did not have much
political leverage. Today, however, Earthscore’s mode of
action and reflection (if not its technical solutions) may seem
less quixotic. Today we know, for better and for worse, the
technologies of tracking and coordinating the most micro-
scopic sensibilities, and we are increasingly aware of how
the technical agencies of specific programs and algorithms
are key to the formation of differentiated collective forces.
Under any circumstance, analog video produced intuitions
about the political potential of attention to technical differ-
entiation or individuation, in contrast to the analytic ortho-
doxies of technical/mediatic specificity. In the early 1970s,
environmental monitoring emerged as one of video’s key
autobiographical modes: a mode of memory-action in
which the technological capture of life forces also produced
a rethinking of political dynamics from the ground up.
54 INA BL OM
Blom, Ina, 2003. The Name of the Game. Ray Johnson’s Postal
Performance. Kassel: Stedelijk Museum Sittard.
Boutang, Yann Moulier, 2011. Cognitive Capitalism. Cambridge:

Polity Press.
Cavell, Stanley, 1986. “The Fact of Television,” in John G. Hanhardt

(ed.) Video Culture. A Critical Investigation. New York: Visual Studies
Workshop Press, pp. 192-218.
Doane, Mary Ann, 1990. “Information, Crisis, Catastrophe,” in Patricia

Mellencamp (ed.), Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 222-239.
Gioscia, Victor (1970). “Frequency and Form,” in Radical Software 1/2.
Hallas, Roger, 2009. “Related Bodies: Resisting Confession in Autobio-

graphical AIDS Video,” in Reframing Bodies: AIDS, Bearing Witness, and
the Queer Moving Image. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 113-149.
James, David E., 1995. “Lynn Hershman: The Subject of Autobiography,”

in Michael Renov and Erika Suderburg (eds.), Resolutions: Contem-
porary Video Practices. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press, pp. 124-133.
Cavell, Stanley, 1979. The World Viewed, Reflections on the Ontology

of Film, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lazzarato, Maurizio, (2007). “Machines to Crystallize Time,” in

Theory, Culture & Society 24/6.
Lazzarato, Maurizio, 2006. “The Concepts of Life and Living in the

Societies of Control,” in Martin Fuglesang and Bent Meier Sørensen
(eds.), Deleuze and the Social. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, pp. 183-184.
Lesage, Julia, 1999. “Women’s Fragmented Consciousness in Feminist

Experimental Autobiographical Video,” in Diane Waldman and Janet
Walker (eds.), Feminism and Documentary. Minneapolis: The University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 309-337.
BIBL IOG RA PHY 55
McGee, Micki, 1981. “Narcissism, Feminism and Video Art: Some

Solutions to a Problem in Representation,” in Heresies 12, pp. 88-91.
Olney, James, 1980. “Some Version of Memory/Some Versions

of Bios: The Ontology of Autobiography,” in James Olney (ed.),
Autobiography. Essays Theoretical and Critical. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, pp. 236-267.
Paik, Nam June, 1963. Exposition of Music – Electronic Television

(Printed invitation for exhibition, Galerie Parnass, Wuppertal, 1963).
Paik, Nam June, 1973. “Expanded Education for the Paper-Less Society”
(grant report to Rockefeller Foundation in 1968), in Nam June Paik,
Videa ’n’ Videology, New York: Everson Museum of Art.
Sackman, Hal, 1968. “A Public Philosophy for Real Time Information

Systems,” in Proceedings of the AFIPS 1968 Fall Joint Computer
Conference 33/II, pp. 1491-1498.
Straayer, Chris, 1985. “I Say I Am: Feminist Performance Video in

the ‘70s,” in Afterimage 13/4, pp. 8-12.
Lettvin, Jerome Y. et al., 1988. “What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s
Brain,” in Warren McCulloch (ed.), Embodiments of Mind. Cambridge:
MIT Press, pp. 230-255.
Ryan, Paul, 2001. “The Earthscore Notation System for Orchestrating

Perceptual Consensus about the Natural World.” Available online:
http://www.earthscore.org/themes.html [last accessed February 2014].
56
JOHN RO BERTS 57
The Psychopathologies
of the Bourgeoisie
One thing that has irritated the conservative high bourgeoisie,

despite the political defeat of the left and of Communism, is
that the left continues to dominate the debate in the arts and
culture (in cinema, art, theatre and literature). And this has
pretty much been the case since the 1930s and the rise of the
Popular Front. This is why there are no influential right-wing
cultural think-tanks devoted to ways and means of bringing
to public prominence and approbation a reactionary aesthetic
of hearth, home and nation. To do so would court ridicule,
given modern culture’s antipathy to patriarchal, nationalist and
religious structures of observance over the last 100 years, and
the broadly functionalist role liberalism plays in securing the
‘creativity of the market’. Such conservatism would just not
play in any practical sense. Moreover, it would take a strong
and authoritarian state to implement this ‘top down’ view and
as such would be utterly antipathetic to a free market ideology.
Now, of course, the widespread acceptance of ‘low culture’ or
religious conservatism on the right is admittedly something of a
caricature; the modernist right’s early influence on modernist
culture (particularly literature) is extensive, and has contributed
to the heteroticity of the novel form and poetry in the twentieth
century (T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, D.
H. Lawrence, Wyndam Lewis, Ferdinand Celine, E. M. Cioran).
58 JOH N R OBERT S
Divided between a largely anti-collectivist Nietzschean

transgressivism and a high church respect for religious
sublimity and pre-modern ‘modernisms’, this (heavily
masculine) tradition has been particularly astute on the
cultural costs of modernity, albeit within an utterly counter-
revolutionary framework. Thus the trauma of modernity
here may qualify the inter-war left’s unexamined defence of
industrial progress, but is invariably attached to a national-
ist, racist and anti-semitic project. This is why conservative
modernism appears particularly retardataire and exposed
ideologically when posed against the post-colonial transcul-
tural ‘modernisms of resistance’ in the second half of the
twentieth century. Despite imperialism’s draconian trading
arrangements with the non-Western peripheries—preventing
any realistic global and equitable process of moderniza-
tion—globalization has produced an antipodal literary and
film culture of immigrant and post-colonial narratives that
has become a world historical cultural resource. Even if im-
perial capital still holds most of the cards politically and cul-
turally, this is a modernity of combined and uneven
development in which centre and periphery are culturally in-
terdependent. Thus conservatives now find it increasingly
difficult to dismiss or denigrate this shift against the imag-
ined ‘quality’ of the Western canon—even armed with a few
of Harold Bloom’s barbs.
Yet if religious conservatism and neoliberalism have

withdrawn from direct confrontation with left-modernism
and its post-colonial variants, the former are quite happy,
of course, to fund social and economic think-tanks devoted
to getting branches of the state to ‘pay their way’. Thus
neoliberal apparatchiks these days don’t need to play the
conservative culture war at all, when market cost accounting
and the threat of the withdrawal of public funding can just
as easily stop independent film, theatre, and post-conceptual
art in its tracks, or block its cultural reception and influence.
THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES OF THE BOURGEOISIE 59
Indeed, in those national cultures where neoliberalism is at its

strongest, this is precisely what we have seen over the last
25 years. Rather than a rightist bourgeoisie confronting liberal
and left modernism on the grounds of bad taste or misuse
of public funds or loss of quality, it is now content to do its
ideological work implicitly through the stringent effects of
commercial accounting. This is the infamous ‘privatization’
of culture that has redrawn the boundaries of public funding
and the horizons of a public radical culture since the early
1990s (Wu 2003). Three things have occurred as a conse-
quence, in keeping with the monopolization tendencies of
the stagnation or non-reproduction of post-1970s capitalism.
Firstly, in the commercial sector—theatre, film and popular lit-
erature—thematic pre-formatting and the reworking of popular
genres drive the need for immediate returns on financialization.
For example, in London’s West End, the majority of stage
productions are now musicals (usually derived from familiar,
popular cultural sources), producing a narrow ‘bunching’ of
content, which of course, follows a similar and more success-
ful model since the 1980s in Hollywood: the film franchise
or extended sequelization. Indeed, stage shows are now com-
monly based on these franchises themselves. Financialization,
then, is not so much geared to making quick and secure
returns—backers have always wanted and expected this—
but producing a flexible model that guarantees repeated
returns in the long run. This is why ‘pre-recognition’ (ghost
brands) is the great mantra of the neoliberalization of com-
mercial theatre and commercial film. In turn, this has not
only pushed out so-called serious bourgeois theatre from
theatre’s tenuous relationship to the public sphere, but also,
the legacy of the avant-garde and its relationship to the
idea of theatre space as ‘political forum’ and its possible
interactive relationship to the other arts. The creation of a
theatre of radical and partisan affects (Robert Wilson, Heiner
Müller, Sarah Kane) and a theatre of discursivity and history
(Tony Kushner), as moments in a wider engagement with
60 JOH N R OBERT S
the theatre’s condition or telos, has been displaced from the

main stage, to disappear or to return as a kind of ‘whiny’
little thing or niche interest from the margins. No neoliberal
cultural representatives, of course, are saying in public that
this theatre is unrewarding or pernicious, but the conditions
of cultural production make it incredibly difficult to get a
wider audience to open up subjectively to such works. And
everything militates against this from within the capitalist
sensorium. This has also had a huge knock-on effect on pub-
lic arts funding. Again, ‘neoliberal’ accounting in the public
funding of the arts rarely arrives with an explicit ideological
and frontal attack on the leftist or radical influence on cul-
tural debate. Rather, it lets fiscal probity (the shibboleth of
‘value for money’ in indebted times) and, in turn, the self-
protectionist agendas of administrators, directors, curators
and producers do this work for them. So, in this sense, the
implementation of cuts tends to find the line of least resist-
ance: ‘in order to do our job under the given and restricted
fiscal conditions we must find that which fits without con-
straint.’ And finally, the third consequence is perhaps the
most invidious, if the most naturalized, in the current pe-
riod: the entrepreneurialization of the cultural producer.
The entrepreneuralization of the cultural producer, as a

petty-bourgeois advocate of self-reliant and realist market
values, brings cultural production into alignment with
the ‘indebted’ logic of neoliberal ideology. As Maurizio
Lazzarato (2012, 11) argues: ‘The debt economy combines
“work on the self” and labor, in its classical sense, such
that “ethics” and economics function conjointly.’ In turn,
this reflects an ‘asymmetry of forces, a power to prescribe
and impose modes of future exploitation, domination and
subjection’ (Lazzarato 2012, 34-5). As a result, even in the
post-conceptual radical sectors of the international artworld
producers increasingly take account of how work will sit in
relation to the demands of ‘foot fall’ and popular interaction.
But more significantly, art has also become a speculative

field for art’s post-conceptual transformation into abstract
labor or waged-labor. With the unemployment or underem-
ployment of artists in the light of the exponentially global
increase in professional artists and occasional artists, and the
increasing incorporation of artistic production into conceptual
frameworks, neoliberalism is accustomizing the artist to
working on ‘social regeneration’ and capital intensive projects
in which artists’ labor becomes a direct part of the accumula-
tion process. In these terms, the artist-as-wage-laborer forfeits
his or her (socialized) autonomy for a modicum of ‘social
engagement’. And this of course is deeply attractive to the
artist under the prevailing precarious conditions of artistic
production: he or she is guaranteed a living wage (for a short
while) and is able to employ their skills in the creation of pal-
pable use-values. However, if this provides a post-institutional
solution of sorts to the deployment of unstable artistic skills,
this move is nevertheless utterly assimilationist in its conse-
quences, turning artists into conceptual/technical advisors or
consultants and project employees within the cultural service
industries. As such, neoliberalism increasingly lets the
rationalization of accounting do its ideological work for it,
turning everyone into market realists and service providers.
Yet if this has produced a widespread centripetal pressure
across practices and institutions to ‘make things pay’, it has
also in the domain of art produced a countervailing centrifu-
gal or dispersionary force, in which an increasing number of
cultural producers, voluntarily or through sheer necessity,
operate in defiance of the market and the socialized capital-
intensive project. This is the rise of the second economy of
art under neoliberalism, in which the expanded ‘superfluous
population’ of artists, artist-activists, writer-artists, occa-
sional artists and amateur artists have created a dissident or
non-compliant realm of artistic production and exchange,
invariably, but not always, attached to various political re-
search projects (see Roberts 2011).
62 JOH N R OBERT S
In many ways this excluded and underfunded domain has

provided the social base for the socialized (participatory)
anti-neoliberalism turn in art over the last fifteen years, and
constitutes the unanticipated blowback to neoliberal entre-
preneurial ideology. As a commercially un-assimiliable and
un-exploitable mass of creativity under neoliberalism, these
artists and producers represent the new forces of collectivity
and post-professional productivity generated by the post-
Fordist mode of network production (see Gielen 2009).
In turn, this creates a pressure from below on the social division
of labor and the wage form as artists, as the ‘creative poor’,
engage in the production of non-market use-values that offer—
despite the severe economic pressure on the artist to quit or fall
in line with the market—other modes of working and being.
The artworld is a highly ambivalent and contested domain,
therefore. At its international high end, of mega-museums and
auction houses, finance capital has never been stronger, in
which the high bourgeoisie continues to give institutional
support for, and gain huge financial returns from, blue chip
investments. But culturally this is an increasingly dead-zone,
given the increasing antagonism on the part of contemporary
artists to producing for the market, opening up possible
creative links between post-object and post-market artists,
who show in museums and public art galleries, with the
second economy. Indeed, this fraction of the high bourgeoisie
is utterly disconnected from the production of contemporary
practice, leading a ghost life as collectors of status modernist
collectibles and contemporary flummery, and museum
board members. Unlike the old liberal bourgeoisie, they have
no productive role in the support of contemporary art, given
that contemporary post-object and participatory practice
provides no place for the collector and blocks off private
patronage on strict political grounds. Even those collectors
who know their way around digital culture—as network
CEOs or managers of creative-industry start-ups—have
little foothold in this new world of post-object production.
This tension between a ‘collectors world’—linking

overwhelmingly to the social rituals of finance capital—
and un-mappable or un-biddable dispersed post-object
and moving-image culture under neoliberalism is re-
flected in the ambivalent status of the biennale. On the
one hand, the contemporary biennale is a familiarly
prestigious realm of speculation in blue-chip dry goods
and cultural state-building for national capitals, but it is
also a forum for a vast array of second economy produc-
tion, particularly digital video and digital film, that
takes its critical point of departure from a renewed radi-
cal internationalism and global political contexts. The
reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the role of federal
administrations or mayoralities allows biennales to be-
come liberal forums for discussion and debate in recog-
nition of the fact that the biennale has to be accountable
to what artists of note are actually making and doing.
This decision is, of course, tied to political majorities—
and across national boundaries is subject to changing
political realities and countervailing economic forces—
but, nevertheless, biennales have been allowed to become
‘clearing zones’ that don’t fall in line completely with
the artistic dry goods market. Secondly, the distinctive way
in which this constitutive openness of the biennale-form, in
turn, is able to facilitate the low costs of art production
itself, given the biennale-form’s larger scale of operation.
Overall, art institutions don’t have to make the same
draconian decisions about cost effectiveness as commercial
cinema and theatre, and even literature, given, on the
whole, the historically low level of capital costs for entry
into artistic production and exhibition. Artists can pro-
duce and move their stuff about relatively cheaply, rela-
tive to film and theatre production (this is why artists
have historically contributed to their own exploitation:
work of quality can be produced, without support or
patronage, out of the most restricted of circumstances).
64 JOH N R OBERT S
Biennales in particular, therefore, (certainly an event like

Documenta in Kassel) can accommodate a huge amount
of low-cost, heterodox material that doesn’t need careful
long-term financialization and management, as long as
the overall project or exhibition costs are met. This
lessens the pressure—certainly when biennales are com-
mitted in spirit to ‘showing all of value’—to exclude or
censor on the grounds of political probity, or the commer-
cial anxieties of sponsors. This is one of the reasons that
the international world of the biennale under neoliberal-
ism has taken up the ideological slack in the culture. The
world of the biennale—and its links to various public gal-
leries around the globe that see themselves as commis-
sioning ‘research centres’, rather than simply exhibition
spaces—has become one of the few large public arenas
still able to function as a space of open dialogue, in which
artists and intellectuals and the public can participate.
The rise of the philosopher-speaker and political activist
at such events since the 1990s is a case in point. Further-
more, this expanded cultural and intellectual space has
also colonized the realm of independent and radical film.
Over the last fifteen years we have been witness to an ex-

traordinary incorporation of digital video and film produc-
tion into the viewing circuits of the biennale and the public
gallery more generally, as independent and neo-avant-garde
film is increasingly excluded from cinemas and film festi-
vals, and sidelined into niche sites on the internet. Indeed,
this exclusion of the rich legacies of independent and avant-
garde film from public moving-image culture has been the
most corrupting of changes that have occurred since the
1990s. The neoliberal reification of the mass cultural image
in the new millennium as the site through which all value
must be measured—very different from the heteroclite
exchanges between popular culture and high culture in the
1980s—functions as a vast system of image ‘enclosure’,
in which the horizons of image production, drawn from an

extraordinary narrow range of fantasy, entertainment and
infotainment, are based on advertising, TV and popular
film as interlocking ‘content providers’. Finance capital is
desperate to keep this loop in intact, in order to facilitate
the smooth exchange of cultural commodities; there can be
no content ‘gaps’ that might weaken the delivery of adver-
tising to film, film to advertising, TV to advertising and
film, and advertising and film to TV. In her book “The
Wretched of the Screen” (2012), Hito Steyerl has talked
strikingly about this neoliberal condition of the moving-
image in terms of the rise of the excluded ‘poor image’.
This is a moving-image that in its non-compliant, hetero-
clite and ambivalent status is a hindrance and superfluous
to these circuits of exchange, and thus finds itself pushed
from out of public circuits of exchange into the ‘boutique’
consumption of the internet, where committed organiza-
tions and aficionados keep these independent traditions
alive. But if the biennale has stepped in to relieve the
downward pressure of these traditions—in particular docu-
mentary practice—and their exit onto the Internet, this new
post-cinematic space of reception is confronted neverthe-
less by the centrifugal realities of the second economy. In a
viewing situation such as the biennale where hundreds of
films and videos are possibly shown, no one person is able
to watch so much material and establish a critical
overview. In this light, Steyerl talks sanguinely about the
expanded conditions of reception in these art contexts as
producing something akin to the ‘collective spectator’,
and, as such, a possible source of liberation from criti-
cism’s reliance on the singular author and commentator.
Yet, even if this is true, something significant is lost here
that neoliberalism continues to benefit from politically:
namely the loss of that space of cognitive mapping and
critical legibility engendered by a stable and shared space
of reception.
66 JOH N R OBERT S
Now, neoliberalism has not in and of itself produced these

conditions of compression, expulsion and monopolization
in the production and reception of culture, as if these
tendencies were not operative at some level in capitalism
prior to the 1980s. In the early 1970s Alexander Kluge and
Oskar Negt were offering a similar kind of (post-Adornian)
cultural autopsy (Negt & Kluge 1993). This is why the at-
tachment of the critique of neoliberalism to ‘restorationist’
capitalist logic is problematic, a position now increasingly
favoured by those advocating a return to some new New
Deal or socialized market capitalism, as if monopolization
was an alien ideology imposed by neoliberalism on late
capitalism. Monopolization is integral to the ‘free market’,
as larger units of production swallow up smaller units,
gravely weakening the ‘free-market’s’ would-be dynamism.
As Lenin was even saying in 1916, far from the rise of
monopolization reflecting the power and productiveness of
capitalism, it in fact represents its opposite: the long-term
destruction of capitalism’s own conditions of competitive-
ness (Lenin 1916). Yet, if neoliberalism has not itself
created the new forms of monopolization, it has certainly
accelerated them, inflating their pathological effects.
This is why the psychopathologies of contemporary
culture and the psychopathologies of the new bourgeoisie
are indefatigably linked to a process of social and economic
compression that derives its logic from the long-term reali-
ties of the capitalist system and not from the ‘abnormal’
particularities of neoliberalism itself. Thus the periodization
of capitalism after the post-war boom, as a system that is in
relative stagnation, is absolutely crucial in explaining the re-
ality of these effects and the rise of neoliberal ‘indebtedness’
as a model of cultural and political accounting. As Robert
Brenner has argued, along with many other ‘stagnation’
theorists in the new millennium: ‘The long term weakening
of capital accumulation and of aggregate demand has been
rooted in a profound system-wide decline and failure
to recover the rate of return of capital, resulting largely—

through not only—from a persistent tendency to over-
capacity, i.e. oversupply, in global manufacturing industries’
(Brenner 2009, 2; see also Pröbsting 2008). In this respect
capitalism is unable, as Brenner (2009, 3) puts it, to ‘drive
itself forward on its own steam.’ The figures make startling
reading (derived here from the 2006 “UN World Economic
and Social Survey” and the 2007 “World Bank: Global
Economic Prospect Report”) and, therefore, are worth
presenting in detail, in order to show how clear the arc of
decline is since the early 1970s. Below, I list the figures
for GDP growth, production growth rate (surplus value
production), global savings and investment rates as a
proportion of GDP, proportion of total investments in plant
and machinery to GDP, net investment as a proportion of net
domestic investment, net profit rates in the non-financial
sector, wage share of GDP, and mortgage debt as a percent-
age of disposal income. These figures, in some instances,
are admittedly only up to 2004 and 2007, but there is no in-
dication, certainly since the crash of 2008, that the situation
has changed, or looks likely to change, despite the opening
up of new markets.
Since the 1960s there has been steady decline in per capita
GDP growth (in the advanced economies from 3.5 in the
late 1960s to 2.7 per cent in the 1970s, 2.0 per cent in the
1980s and 1.7 per cent in the 1990s; and in the developing
economies from 3.7 in the late 1960s to 1.8 in the 1970s,
followed by a slight rise to 2.0 in the 1980s and then back
down to 1.7 in the 1990s). Global production growth rates
were 3.0 per cent in 1980s, 2.4 per cent in the 1990s, and
1.4 per cent in the first half of the millennium (although
the USA has been able to partially offset this decline).
Global savings and investment rates as proportion of GDP
during the period 1970-2004 are down from around 24
per cent of world gross product, to just over 21 per cent.
68 JOH N R OBERT S
The proportion of total investments in plant and machin-

ery to GDP is also down overall in the major industrial
economies (in USA by under one per cent, in Japan by
over 25 per cent, in the UK by around 15 per cent); the
only countervailing tendencies to this drop in invest-
ment, as to be expected, are in China and India, the only
major industrial countries to show an increase (around 60
per cent and 38 per cent respectively). Net investment as a
proportion of net domestic investment is down between
1980-2006 in the advanced economies, from around 13
per cent to around 8 per cent, and net profit rates in the
non-financial sector in the USA, Japan and Germany from
1948-2000 are dramatically down, around 30 per cent,
around 40 per cent and over 60 per cent respectively. Wage
share of GDP in the Eurozone has dropped (1991-2000) as
an indication of the redistribution of wages to profits, from
just under 62 per cent to just under 58 per cent, and in the
USA from just under 64 per cent to 62 per cent. Mortgage
debt as a percentage of disposal income has risen exten-
sively across North America and the Eurozone (1992-
2003)—around 36 per cent in the USA and an incredible
200 per cent in Spain.
These figures, then, are an extraordinary indictment of

decline, pointing to how under neoliberalism capitalism
has been unable to raise the standard of living for the mass
of people, reducing the purchasing power of the working
class, petty bourgeoisie and middle class alike. As even
Larry Summers, former US Treasury Secretary and one
of the architects of privatization in Russia, has admitted:
‘for the first time since the Great Depression, focusing on
redistribution makes more sense than focusing on growth’
(quoted in Freeland 2012, xiii). These figures also explain
why the system is driven to greater internationalization and
global integration. The increased export of capital to the
semi-colonies since the 1980s, for example, is the result of
the declining rate of profit in home markets, as is the rise in

financial speculation (between 1994 and 2000 speculative
finance was responsible for three quarters of the entire
increase in profits in the major industrial economies).
Yet the bourgeoisie has been successful in raising the rate
of exploitation despite the long-term decline of productive
labor. Workers work longer for less, producing more. This
suggests, therefore, something other than the threat of coercion
is producing this new phase of labor-capital relations: there
has been a massive material and ideological re-investment in
the system (certainly for those who remain in work). This is
partly as a result of the remaining social democratic illusions
of the leadership of the left that continues to offer the hope
of recovery—a capitalism shorn of its excesses, defended, in
particular, by what remains of the Trade Union movement—
but also the very real material entanglements of workers in
the logic of indebtedness itself as a consequence of the long
term fall in the rate of profit. Personal indebtedness admit-
tedly is very uneven across classes and national boundaries,
yet its global impact as a technique of governance and self-
governance has been successful in shifting political perspec-
tives and possibilities for action. This seems a sharper way
of addressing the (conflicted) process of re-investment, than
assuming that with the shift to new forms of affective and
cognitive labor workers are more willing, as Franco Berardi
(2007, 79) claims, to prolong the working day.
Stagnation and decline, then, do not presuppose collapse,

or even ideological disinvestment (quite yet). Capitalism
remains remarkably ideologically resilient precisely because
of its continuing ability to link personal creativity to the over-
coming of crisis. Because capitalism is a system that is mate-
rially and logically driven by its own crises, it is constantly
able to link the possibility of recovery to a potent petty-bour-
geois and individualist ‘creative’ overcoming of the present
(so indebtedness is internalized as something to ‘face down’).
70 JOH N R OBERT S
The left, in comparison, is yet to find a comparable set of

subjective (collective) conditions that might contest the very
meaning of crisis itself and its ‘resolution’. For to do so, in
any realistic fashion, it would be compelled to talk of the
overcoming of crisis beyond capital, and this of course it is
presently ill equipped and unprepared to do. Thus we have a
peculiar aporia: reformism is dead, but it continues to have
this attenuated afterlife as the imaginary reverser of decline.
But the recessions are getting more frequent and deeper,
transforming the very meaning and possibility of this cre-
ative overcoming of the system’s recurring crises. In other
words, the repeated creative overcoming of recession is not
the harbinger of expansion, but the expression of a funda-
mental slow down. This is because the successive downturns
since the 1970s have not been able to destroy enough capital
value to revitalize the system overall; only a fundamental
shake-up, as in the early 1930s, or a world war—which un-
derwrote the post-war boom—is capable of achieving this.
But the social costs of such a shake-up would be too great,
and the possible radicalization of the working class too ex-
tensive, as in the 1930s. Policy makers and planners, there-
fore, have pursued fiscal and monetary policies that have
avoided a full-scale destruction of capital value, which they
know they may not be able to control politically. This is why
downturns after the 1970s have not been as severe as the
Great Depression, but also why the system is unable to re-ex-
pand (see Kliman 2012). In the major recession of the early
1980s, for example, the destruction of capital was only a
fraction of what it was in the 1930s. Thus the bourgeoisie is
always balancing the costs of capital expansion against the
destruction of the social and metabolic conditions of repro-
duction that will enable such expansion.
Perhaps a more appropriate description of the current sit-

uation, then, would be ‘rolling non-reproduction’, rather
than, expressly, stagnation. The former implies less a halting
slow-down than a situation of narrowing options, within an

attenuated process of continuation. It also recognizes how
capitalist governance is producing a chronic loss of affect, even
belief, in the efficacy of the system as whole, even amongst its
staunch political advocates. This is reflected in the changing
social role of the bourgeoisie under the logic of financialization
and democracy-through-indebtedness (or austerity politics).
The historical role of the bourgeoisie as a mediator between
the cruel but necessary realities of capitalism and the consoling
verities of humanism is discernibly weaker than it has ever
been. There is little enthusiasm on the part of the high bour-
geoisie to produce a ‘universalizing’ bourgeois discourse of
progress and material well-being that captures the future collec-
tively, for workers and the bourgeoisie itself. This is due to a
crucial shift politically within the bourgeoisie under the new
pressures of indebtedness and decline, to a primary commit-
ment to state-as-capital, away from a tradition of ‘political
liberalization’. That is to say, the bourgeoisie’s major concern
under neoliberalism has not been the ‘market’ and its freedoms,
so to speak, in opposition to the state, but on the contrary, se-
curing the state for the market; markets free of state support can
be exposed to all kind of vagaries and instabilities, markets op-
erating under the protection of a strong state can flourish. This
is why the attacks on civil liberties, the draconian anti-union
legislation in the USA, Southern Asia and the Eurozone, and
the increased global state surveillance, all point to a bourgeoisie
increasingly preoccupied with the creation of a maximum state
for capital-accumulation (particular in the imperialist zones),
and a minimal social state for workers and everyone else. This
shift though is easily misunderstood, as if the new bourgeoisie
(CEOs, bankers, senior administrators, hedge fund managers,
etc) were somehow betraying a long-standing liberal bourgeois
project. The bourgeoisie today, certainly does not speak with
the same degree of confidence as its forebears about fashioning
a political programme that would incorporate the interests
of the popular classes as part of a national consensual order.
72 JOH N R OBERT S
But this is not a betrayal of any ‘bourgeois liberal project’

as such, as if the bourgeoisie today has abdicated its social
responsibilities. On the contrary, there has never been a
‘bourgeois liberal’ project; bourgeois universalism and
freedom was always constructed in the ‘name’ of the
bourgeoisie from pressure below (or from within counter-
factions within the bourgeoisie itself), and continues to
shift its character. The bourgeois revolutions, therefore,
were not classical liberal programmes in any strict sense.
Indeed, all evidence points in the opposite direction. The
bourgeoisie’s commitment to political ‘universalization’
was always subject ultimately to the exclusion of the
popular classes from the political process. What univer-
salization largely meant, rather, was the inclusion of
those elements of the ruling class into the political
process that had previously been excluded, and not the
inclusion and mobilization of the popular will (Chibber
2013, 75). All the subsequent democratic gains of the
working class (from universal education, enfranchise-
ment, trade unions) have been won from the bourgeoisie
after lengthy struggle.
Today, however, faced with little pressure from below

there is finally no restraint on the part of the bourgeoisie to
express or defend its fictive ‘universalizing’ liberal role at
all. Under the logic of indebtedness ‘universalization’ be-
comes the express credo of economic liberalization itself,
in which personal freedom is identifiable with entrepre-
neurial self-valorization above all else—hence the wide-
spread deference on the part of the new bourgeoisie to a
post-class, ‘human-capital’ ‘solution’ to the labor-capital
relation promulgated by the representatives of finance cap-
ital and productive capital. Everyone has the right to de-
velop their own labor power as a source of creativity and
well-being, pace Richard Florida’s (2002) ‘creatives’ or
Reid Hoffman’s (2012) effervescent entrepreneurs.
One of the outcomes of this is that the traditional bourgeoisie’s

residual humanism is rarely brought to bear as a moral com-
pass against the depredations of this ideology, and when it
does appear it is invariably inconsequential against the de-
mands of fiscal probity. This is clear from the weakened
presence of the bourgeoisie in the public domain and public
service, as it shifts its focus whole-scale into global charity
work, or into what remains of high-cultural leverage in the
art-world and classical music world. There is a kind of
shiver of revulsion at participating in what remains (of their
destruction) of the classical bourgeois sphere, for it means
touching the edges of a world of collective provision that re-
sists the language of accountability. In other words, what
was once the industrial bourgeoisie’s touchstone, humanism
as a flag of convenience for ‘shared values’, produces a
form of cognitive dissonance that sits at odds with the ‘cre-
ative violence’ of capital now. For in the dominant language
of finance capital, the injuries and risks of capital are part of
the constant flow and energy of the capitalist system that
brooks no opposition. Thus no cultural institution, no set of
practices and forms, are immune from the ‘efficiency’, ‘cre-
ativity’ and ‘productivity’ of the market. And this produces
its own particular forms of psychopathology—virulent
forms of disavowal, aphasia, victimization and persecution
mania—that are very different in affect and aspect from the
psychopathologies of Berardi’s ‘cognitive worker’, with his
or her extensive range of ‘communicational disorders.’ This
is a world of ‘rolling non-reproduction’ in which the rich
don’t want to be described as rich—because this is just too
divisive!—and who, in turn, believe that, ‘what is happen-
ing at the top [isn’t] class war it’s arithmetic’ (Freeland
2012, xiii).
74 JOH N R OBERT S
Berardi, Franco “Bifo”, 2007. The Soul at Work: From Alienation

to Autonomy, Preface by Jason Smith, trans. Francesca Cadel and
Giuseppina Mecchia, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
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for America: The Origins of the Current Crisis,” Prologue to the
Spanish translation of Brenner’s Economics of Global Turbulence
(first published in a Special Issue of the New Left Review No. 229,
May-June, 1998), Madrid: Akal.
Chibber, Vivek, 2013. Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital,

London and New York: Verso.
Florida, Richard, 2002. The Rise of the Creative Class: And How
It’s Transforming Work, Leisure and Everyday Life, New York:
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Super-Rich, London: Penguin.
Gielen, Pascal, 2009. The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude:

Global Art, Memory and Post-Fordism, Amsterdam: Antennae Valiz.
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in That’s the Way We Do It, Bregenz: Kunsthaus.
Steyerl, Hito, 2012. The Wretched of the Screen, Berlin: Sternberg Press.
World Bank, 2007. “Global Economic Prospects.” Available online:

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2006/12/06/000112742_20061206155022/Rendered/PDF/
381400GEP2007.pdf [last accessed February 2014]
Wu, Chin Tao, 2003. Privatising Culture: Corporate Art Intervention

since the 1980s, New York and London: Verso.
76
PATR ICI A REED 77
Logic and Fiction: Notes on Finance

and the Power of Recursivity
We have to create the real possibility of our

fiction, certainly. Create the real possibility
of our fiction which is a generic fiction in a
new form, the new localisation is probably
a question of a new political courage.
(Badiou 2005a, 13)
With half a decade since the 2008 financial crisis, a far more
distressing crisis has emerged among all the proposed reform
strategies, austerity measures and jagged-edged line-graphs:
a crisis of imagination. This is rather surprising seeing as
how much creativity it took to get us into this plight. From
the decoupling of the dollar with the gold standard in 1971,
to a situation where even negative value (debt) generates
profits in excess of our wildest dreams–to a layperson such as
myself, this is an achievement of alchemist-like proportions.
Just as currency was becoming an object of speculation
(and not just a tool of equivalence), the first academic journal
of finance economics emerged in 1974 (Mackenzie 2008,70),
paving the socio-economic road we (rapidly) travel down
today. That the ideas and spirit of the finance economics
endemic to the neoliberal revolution were birthed in acade-
mia should give us pause against the many critics who
suggest the university is an elitist tower at a gaping dis-
tance from ‘lived’ life. This is not to say that ideas floating
about in specialist journals are the impetus of popular
change, but that every novel transformation of our condi-
tion is rooted in thought, more crucially the experience
of thought, and its incorporation into a localization or a
‘doing’ (Badiou 2005b, 46). Thought carries real potency.
78 PATRI CI A REED
Without resorting to utter discursive constructivism, when

it comes to the contingency of socio-economic ordering
(concepts driving the organization of peoples, exchange,
technology, communication, logistics and goods), there are
countless possibilities to be tested and presuppositions of
the ‘nature’ of existence to be contested. The successful
uptake of the financialization project testifies to the potency
of enacted thought: ideas and ideals launched in a mountain
village in Switzerland1 and functionally modelled in Chicago
have come to shape our everyday condition on a global scale.
The self-fulfilling prophecy of financial models, evidenced
by Donald MacKenzie’s analysis of the incorporation of the
Black-Scholes-Merton model of efficient pricing upon the
development (and ‘legitimacy’) of the Futures Market 2,
1 The Mont Pèlerin Society was inaugurated in Switzerland in 1947
with a group of 39 scholars (mainly economists) and continues to the

present. Founding members include Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper
and Milton Friedman.
2 In Donald MacKenzie’s study of the financial turn in economics, he
particularly highlights the incorporation of the futures market within the

mainstream economy and the role of the self-fulfilling prophecy (positive
feedback) of mathematical models upon reality. The first battle of the fu-
tures market was for it to be legal, making a distinction between delivering
an asset (legal) and delivering in cash only (a wager, and therefore illegal).
Through expensive and time-consuming lobbying and commissioned
reports (for example, Milton Friedman’s ‘The Need for Future Markets
in Currencies’) the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) was
born—born of collective action paradoxically based on the economic
ideology of a rational egoist. The thriving of the CBOE was due largely
to the Black-Scholes-Merton model of efficient pricing (a Nobel prize
winning model)—instantiating the market as wholly legitimate and not
merely a site gambling. At first the correspondence between the model
and actual prices was fairly inaccurate (the model did not reflect reality),
yet as traders began to rely on the model—taking up its mathematical
claims of legitimacy, directly using it’s projections in their practice
through the dissemination of purchased pricing charts—the model began
to create reality, it became a tool of the trade, or what MacKenzie calls
‘an engine, not a camera,’ a (once inaccurate) model (now) driving reality.
LO GI C AND F ICTI ON: N OTES ON F INAN CE
79
A N D T HE P OWER OF RECURSIVI TY
points to the performative requirement (or positive feedback)

underpinning the propagation of ‘fictitious capital.’ Marx’s
now infamously prophetic turn-of-phrase, fictitious capital
refers to where value takes on properties beyond what can
be realized in the commodity form (like credit, shares and
debt), and is, in part, why those who write under the rubric of
‘cognitive capitalism’ often diagnose our situation as entirely
linguistic, meaning that it, like language, refers to nothing
other than itself (de Boever 2013, 104-5) in a logic of recur-
sivity (Vishmidt 2013). It is the sort of potential embodied
by the premise of recursivity that drives MacKenzie to pose
the open question at the end of his book: ‘What sort of
world do we want to see performed?’ (Mackenzie 2008, 275).
It is also behind Arne de Boever’s call for a ‘reclaiming of
fiction within financial culture’ where ‘sign-practices’ are a
primary site of action in a semio-capital world (de Boever
2013, 106) and the Accelerationists’ call for the creation of
an alter ‘intellectual infrastructure’ as a counter Mont-Pè-
lerin Society in their manifesto (along with institutions and
economic protocols) to cope with the cataclysmic socio-eco-
logical condition that we are currently facing (Williams &
Srnicek 2013, 03.16). Beyond the internal debates amongst
these positions, which are plentiful, what becomes apparent
is the urgent need for alternative modes of organisation, em-
bracing a logic of and for a new world. These calls urge and
provoke us towards the future (and not Futures!); they seek
to affirm the creation of novel structures of cohabitation,
rather than inhabiting a purely critical space (negation with
no alternative); they seek more than an escapist tactic (solip-
sistic retreat); they do not aim merely to throw a wrench
into the cogs of the machinery (sabotage); they demand
much more. They ask of us not to rest on diagnostics alone
concerning our contemporary plight, but propel us to specu-
late on what does not yet exist, to speculate on the inexis-
tent—an imaginative force of the most rigorous and
courageous sort.
80 PATRI CI A REED
Hyperobjects and Apocalyptic Logic

Dominated by spectre of ‘the economy’ (rather than
‘economies’ in the plural and diversified sense), the
relations of production, distribution and consumption
have been subsumed within a totalized and autonomous
domain since the mid-twentieth century (Mitchell 1998).
In more recent discourse, Nick Srnicek has extended the
(non)picture of ‘the economy’ under neoliberal reign as a
hyperobject, meaning that it has grown so complex and
manifold that no one (including experts) can grasp its con-
tours or scope, nor reduce its effects to individual, causal
components (Srnicek 2012; see also Morton 2010). The
autonomous hyperobject of ‘the economy’ that ideologi-
cally governs us today seems to obscure the possibility of
a cognitive map, for there exists a vast gap between our
localized experiences of the world and the real global con-
ditions that produce it. As Srnicek suggests, fiction may
be a tool for overcoming this gap, yet cognitively map-
ping our given condition does not alone propel us into the
realm of a speculative future—it is but a humble (though
daunting) first step. Hyperobjects (for example, climate
change) display their properties only as traces of residual
information, or after-effects of various component interac-
tions, like carbon emissions depicted in multi-coloured,
3D, animated form. The fictions that loom today across
popular media seem, at best, only able to evolve scenarios
based on the extension of these informational residues ev-
idenced by the obsessive treatment of the apocalyptic nar-
rative of either war or climate induced catastrophe (the
end-of-the-world before the end of capitalism position)
(Fischer 2009, 1-11). The only other ready alternative is
presented within the actual sphere of finance and the
rather science-fiction scenario of increased algorithmic
governance played out in the high-frequency trading
arena—where the only limitations seem to be the laws of
81
physics and geographical impediments that can be overcome

2013) 3. The sphere of finance capital and the envisioning of
our demise on a species-wide level seem to be at the reigns
of our collective narrative—a world in which Ray Brassier
proposes the image of the Phyllium, a leaf insect that mimics
its own food and ends up cannibalising its others (Wilkins &
Dragos 2013). These scenarios seize upon the diagnostic
actuality of our situation and thrust it towards its existing
logical telos, never, however, moving beyond diagnostic or
‘known’ thought. These fictions may appear to oppose or
at least set off a warning siren as to our actual or ‘logical’
future, yet like the properties of hyperobjects themselves,
they inhere and reinforce existing modes of operation
without offering any alternatives (they merely dramatize and
perpetuate the same logic). The possibilities of fiction and
its potential role in cognitively mapping the experiential
conflict between local existence and global paradigm, may
serve as an initial step, yet it is worth to recall Oscar Wilde’s
(1891) romantic sentiment: ‘A map of the world that does not
include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves
out the one country at which Humanity is always landing.’
A cognitive map of the future is always somewhat impossible.
While we seem quite adept in the proliferation of dystopic
fictions (a symptom of nihilism), we already inhabit a
highly fictionalized world predicated on ‘the economy.’
3 In particular the proposal by MIT academics Alex Wissner-Cross
and Cameron Freer to distribute ‘optimal intermediate locations

between trading centres, “leading to this science-fictional scenario
of a terraforming inhuman distributed finance:” unmanned pods of
densely packed microprocessors overseen by next-generation AI bots
processing billions of orders streaming out of unmanned AI pods
positioned optimally around the world, the silent beams of high-
frequency orders shifting trillions across the earth’s oceans at light
speeds, all automated, beyond the scope of humans to remotely
grasp the nature of the transactions.’ (Toscano 2013, 77)
82 PATRI CI A REED
Even before credit swaps and options, the sublimation of

everyday objects into a commodity form is wholly dependent
on fiction—the fiction of value perception. As the supreme
energy driven by capital-fictions steer reality towards pyramidal
inequality (with a steeple) and socio-climactic devastation, we
must seize upon the recursive power of fictions to repurpose
their plastic force with an ethos of jujitsu-like acceleration.
Fiction and Recursivity

The Accelerationist critique of dominant leftist strategies with
respect to simplification, slowness, localness and ‘68 era protest
techniques is most welcome, a position embodied more collo-
quially in Jodi Dean’s (2011) quip that ‘Goldman Sachs doesn’t
care if you raise chickens.’ Although admirably tackling questions
of Promethean scale, they neglect the politico-economical force
of fiction in their purview. Neglecting the role of fiction in the
anticipation of an alternative future forecloses the necessity of
belief and commitment to said belief, crucial to any political
project of ideological and operational restructuring. What we need
are not only novel forms of activism and tangible intervention
played out on the algorithmic/technological/organisational plane
(amounting to more than mere sabotages of current systemic
weaknesses such as false rumour hacks of twitter-feeds leading
to brief market crashes and public relations disasters4), but more
4 The Syrian Electronic Army’s attack on Barack Obama’s Twitter feed
where a shortened URL directed users to a 24 minute video of terror

attacks committed by US supported rebels, along with their hacking
of the Associated Press Twitter account citing a fictitious attack on the
White House that caused US Stock Markets to sporadically loose 200
billion US in value. Src: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/08/27/new-
york-times-website-down-again/
83
importantly, new logical fictions where an imagined ‘we’ can

incline towards an ‘uncancelled’ future, foretasting the incorpora-
tion of novel thought as a recursively alternative political practice.
The pairing between logic and fiction may at first appear

to be odd, as some sort of basic fact vs. untruth dichotomy.
Let us step back for a moment to erase such oversimplifi-
cation, and affirm Alain Badiou’s claim that ‘Every world
possesses its own logic, which is the legislation of appearing’
(Badiou 2009, 72). When we apply this in Jacques Rancière’s
terminology, logic is akin to the distribution of the sensible,
or even more succinctly, what counts as making sense within
a given sociological condition.
When politics, according to Rancière, is equal to a redistribu-
tion of the sensible, it is equal to the creation (or perceptibility)
of a new logic—that is, a new (legitimate) regime of appearing
and being (ac)counted (for) within a given socio-economic
order—and this, to my mind, includes not only peoples
and places, but also ideas and the fiction of futurity itself 5.
Following the Modernist poet Wallace Stevens’ trajectory of
thought, the intersection of poetry with politics allows us to
experience the contingency, or fictional character, of our given
order (the incommensurability between sense and sense).
Expanding upon the manner in which Stevens’ understands
it, poetics is the creation of novel grammatical structures and
general semantics that uncalcify common sense and render the
given order entirely plastic and subject to de-re-formation. It was,
after all, the poet Rimbaud, who coined the term ‘deregulation’
in relation to words and meaning, before it was appropriated
by contemporary fiscal policy makers (Berardi 2012, 28).
5 I am summarizing rather briefly the extended thought of Rancière and
Badiou, who share some core agreements (axiom of equality), yet who
diverge (dramatically) on the point of creation of Truths. A critique of
Rancière by Badiou can be read in two chapters (7 and 8) of Metapolitics.
84 PATRI CI A REED
The first fictional step is poetry, in rendering the laws dictating

common sense fluid and contingent (the sense of possibility).
The second step is supreme fiction; it is the energetic organiza-
tion of ‘sensed’ poetic plasticity, where an alternative fictional
formalisation becomes navigable (the articulation of the possible).
Supreme fiction is a noological machine of orientation, it is al-
ways unfinished, yet maps out exploratory points equal to the
constituting of an alter logic, and to echo Badiou, it is precisely
this supreme fiction we regrettably lack and so urgently need.
Anticipation and Metanoia

The task of inscribing supreme fictions is the anticipation
of the re-legislation of appearing in the world; and like
everything that does not yet exist (the state of futurity), it
exists only within the domain of imagination. If imagination
is the ability to make present what is absent, it is the capacity
‘to think, in a world, what does not appear within the world,’
(Badiou 2009, 122) the capacity to ‘think’ the inexistent.
Without introducing an artificial chasm between thinking
and doing (between mind and body), thinking alone is not
enough until the thought is performed (in a movement of
recursive incorporation), for this is, as Kierkegaard notes,
existing in what one thinks (Badiou 2009, 427). This imagi-
native thought turned existential practice is the fidelity to
‘metanoia’—a term indicating a transformation of thought,
of seeing the world in a novel way that (again, recursively)
redefines reality itself—it is the experience of one’s plastic
existence (Avanessian & Henig 2013). It is that moment
from which you can never turn back, a rupture in your
understanding of the semantic pillars bracing the logic of
a world. There is no certainty with metanoia, no guarantee
as to the outcome of this ‘new light,’ it is entirely specu-
lative—it is a risky fiction predicated on the incorporation
of thought, and becoming prey to that living thought.
85
Becoming prey to metanoia is an experience of fundamental

weakness in letting oneself become ingested by thought.
It is where the sovereignty of the self is usurped, and consumed
by thought casting a subject in fidelity to the existence of an
inexistent logic. A subject is born through the active becoming-
prey to thought, animated by the trace of an idea whose
sustenance is the ‘bread of faithful speech’ (Stevens 1990, 408).
Such is the forcing of a new logic.
The fidelity to metanoia has largely been derived from the

field of literature, but the written word is only one possible
source of existential transformation. Metanoia is irreducible
to word alone, but any thing (material or otherwise) capable
of affect, where language is more humbly an ontic operator
for us humans, in the hyper-chaotic ontology of a world.
It should be asserted that metanoia, if it is to take on any
political import beyond individual transformation, must exert
a noological force upon the fictional plane of the generic
—that is, on the ‘we’ of a collective people, or a ‘trans-
individual’ plane (Critchley 2012, 26). A politicized metanoia
is the collective bringing closer to reality of an inexistent,
an alter logic from which a novel world is possible—an
insistence on a supernumerary possibility obfuscated by
the logic of ‘what is.’
Abstraction and the Generic Will

Metanoia, as a motivational impetus driving an alter logic of
a world that ‘could be,’ is here directly linked to the concept
of the general will. The incorporation of metanoia as a general
will is the affirmative means through which a collectivity
is bound together, authorizing the production of a new logic,
and therefore a new world. The general will, or perhaps
better, the generic will (of axiomatic equality), is the yoking
of the concrete individual with the abstraction of the ‘we.’
86 PATRI CI A REED
Since the ‘we’ is an abstraction, it does not itself exist in

reality as a mere count of the population. It cannot be known,
and this is precisely why fiction is necessary, especially
if we are to further our notion of an abstract ‘we’ beyond
anthropocentric horizons of political congregation. The
uncountable ‘we’ as a concrete inexistent, yet abstract exis-
tent, can only be touched by an imaginative space of fiction
since there is no proposition of futurity to be verified as
knowledge. And just as Rousseau has asserted, it is only
through imagination—that mediating force between sense
and intellect—where the measures of the possible can be
exceeded (Sallis 2000, 65), and the immediate bounds of
our concrete local experience can be sensed in an abstract
global reality. The fictional ‘we,’ driven by the collective
existential impulse of metanoia, can only be an abstract
fiction, for abstraction is the enunciation of detachment to
the logic of a world as-it-is. In this way abstract fiction is a
gesture of violence—not the nihilistic violence of dystopic
narratives that plague us today, but an affirmative violence
in exiting the as-it-is logical condition. Furthermore, this
abstract fiction is located in the future present (in the ‘what
will have been’) requiring the anticipatory exercise of
imagination as a ‘violence from within that protects us
from a violence without’ (Stevens 1951, 36).
One may suggest that the evil of late, or cognitive capital-

ism, is abstraction itself: the abstractions of money/systems
of exchange (especially from the financial sphere) and the
category of labor itself (the division of labor across the
entirety of society) (Pasquinelli 2013). On the one hand,
value-extraction within the paradigm of cognitive capitalism
is wholly dependent on the increased abstraction of global-
ized capital, often pilfering from that most basic human
impulse and capacity for communication (a commonly shared
general intellect, or social knowledge as such), subsuming
the entirety of life to its imperative force.
87
The vehement effect of abstraction upon everyday existence

is, no doubt, the reason why so many tactics seeking
to resist total absorption resort to concrete, localized,
immediate and direct modes of opposition. Yet to oppose
abstraction tout cours is also to deny the category of the
‘we,’ or the common, upon which it depends (as well as
negating several advances—technological infrastructure
—made under the paradigm of globalism). The question
is not about obliterating abstractions, as if there is some
fundamental, concrete core of pure humanity to return
to (an essential ‘natural’ human state). No, the question
revolves around how to deploy the power of abstraction
towards an alter logic that redistributes the constellation
of life, exchange, production, and consumption. As Matteo
Pasquinelli (2013) has argued, this power of abstraction
is endemic to humanity as a species—it is the power
of the organism (and more precisely the human brain)
to invent new norms in relation to its surroundings by
exiting the as-it-is condition. Abstraction is not some
malevolent force to be tossed aside, but is at the very
least a mode of survival (mere life, or physiological
existence) and an adaption mechanism (protection, care
of the self). At its best, abstraction is an impetus towards
sur-vival (more life, beyond simply physiological needs),
an apparatus of projection conducive to the shaping
of futurity as such. The task of abstract fiction under a
regime of cognitive colonization is not only to distin-
guish itself from the as-it-is logical condition (for utter
separation can easily become nothing more than a tactic
of solipsistic retreat); it also involves the generation
of new connections to and within a world. This task,
according to Rousseau, is the artful exercise of politics,
the fictional work of moulding new associations
(Critchley 2012, 33), with one part xeno (or making
something alien) and the other part philia (the forging
of a new bond).
88 PATRI CI A REED
Unreadiness-to-hand and Psychopathology

The logic of the world we inhabit today is dependent on the
integrated thought and performance of infinite economic
growth, with the assumption that competition between actors
is the ‘natural’ motivator of continual innovation in order to
gain marketplace advantage (with the ‘neutral’ market being
the most efficient mechanism to sift out winners and losers).
This logic is most evident in the proliferation of the debt
economy, for it can only operate under the presupposition of
an ever-more prosperous future where debts can be reim-
bursed. In reality, however, this type of debt-bondage essen-
tially cancels the possibility of a future (not to mention
undercutting the illusion of the free market), instantiating in its
place a society subtended by asymmetric power relations, be-
tween the few who supply credit and the rest who are indebted
(such relations are never subjected to the egalitarian promise of
open markets) (Lazzarato 2011, 38). This is one footprint of the
logic that traverses social bodies today in the so-called ‘third
wave of capitalism,’ a logic that forecloses on the future as its
very core principle (except one premised on deepening crises,
inequality and climactic devastation). And, it must be added,
this is also a logic of essential competition/propriety that actu-
ally impedes innovation through increased monopolisation of
possible intellectual/developmental resources. Such footprints
lead to the conclusion that this nebulous hyperobject we call
‘the economy,’ whose transcendental presence compels all of
us (including its detractors), has become a veritable ‘broken
hammer’ (Harman 2013). When ‘the economy’ is grasped as a
tool of distribution, production, consumption and valuation, the
ready-to-hand quality it may have possessed is now quite bla-
tantly unready-to-hand. In the parlance of Heidegger, that which
is ready-to-hand is transparent, such that we deploy it as a tool
seamlessly to complete an end goal. In contrast, unreadiness-to-
hand is when the tool becomes opaque because of malfunction-
ing or is no longer capable of performing its intended task.
89
The global economic meltdown of 2008 displayed the

unreadiness-to-hand of the neoliberal economic (and
ideological) tool—yet the response to this ‘rendering
opaque’ of malfunction has been a structural re-strengthening
of the same broken logic (Williams & Srnicek 2013, 01.04),
indicating a frightening withdrawal of (global) political
imagination towards the creation of a new logic. Beyond
mass depression, attention deficit, panic and anxiety disorders
(the cognitive response to a logic of a world in violent crisis
rendered normal via psychopharmacology), the non-adaption
to the unready-to-hand condition of ‘the economy’ that
dictates the ‘nature’ of our existence seems to be the greatest
psychopathology of our time.
The continued success of the neoliberal 2.0, or cognitive

capitalist project, especially under conditions of empirical
failure to deliver on core promises of an infinitely ‘better’
future (more individual trickle-down wealth), not to mention
the death of an ‘enlightened capitalism’ where working hours
would be greatly reduced (Williams & Srnicek 2013, 03.02),
is a signal that rational responses and strategies alone
are insufficient to reclaim the future. Indeed, the call for more
economic rationality holds no weight at all, as Marina
Vishmidt points out, since in the neoliberal ideological
program—where models drive a reality that drive models,
ad infinitum—negative, objective results are met as blips,
detours or exceptions of ‘the most efficient’ (or least bad)
system (Vishmidt 2011). Vishmidt points out that no amount
of counter-information or exposure of contradictions will
weaken this core logic, and the only way forward is to drain
this ideology of its legitimacy. This is crucial, yet only amounts
to one step in the process of creating abstract fictions necessary
for the anticipation of a new future beyond annulment—
the step of separation from the existing logic (xenos). The
second step requires affirming a new bond with an alternative
logic (philia) towards which a ‘we’ can incline in belief.
90 PATRI CI A REED
Returning to the question of ‘what sort of world we want to

see performed,’ a question that seeks to harness the potential
of logical recursivity is, fundamentally, an ethical question.
It is not only a call for the creation of models to propel alter
movements of circulation within the sphere of economy, but
ultimately a question as to what ends we want to deploy the
tool of economy beyond our enslavement to its ideological
imperatives? Like all ethical questions, we are required to
speculate on a good (and most certainly not the least bad),
and because that good is inexistent, it requires prophetic acts
of imagination to authorize its ideological impetus traversing
an abstract ‘we.’ Although fictions today (and our capacity
to anticipate something alternative) seem colonized under a
regime of rent-driven finance capital, it is not the time to un-
dermine, nor merely point to the hypocrisies of the intellec-
tual apparatuses that brought us to this point. It is, rather,
time to seize the power of their fictional infrastructure that
fails to deliver, and repurpose its energy towards a logic of
serving the many. Such repurposing requires not only the
concrete construction of models able to map the complexity
of a global situation, but also, and above all, the vigor of an-
ticipation—an abstract fiction—that compels our collective,
ethical inclination in the fabrication of novel associations
with each other and with the surroundings. The forcing of
such an abstract fiction is nothing less than the creation of a
logic orienting a ‘we’ towards the constituting of futurity
(the inexistent) beyond the existent, unbounded by what-is.
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MAU RIZIO LAZZAR ATO 93
Does Cognitive Capitalism Exist?
“In the era of Leninism, power had to be overturned,

trade unions were economists, they betrayed, power was
due to the Soviets, at least there was an idea, there was
something. Now, really there is no idea. Nothing at all.
There is the idea of macro-economy, of a certain number
of factors: unemployment, the market, currency,
abstractions that do not adhere to social reality at all.”
“It is less a question of having access to novel cognitive

spheres than of apprehending and creating, in pathic modes,
mutant existential virtualities.”
Félix Guattari
Many psychopathologies (racism, extremism, new nationalism

etc.) of the so-called cognitive capitalism derive from our
incapacity to invent modes of collective subjectivation that
disrupt the subjugating contingencies of contemporary
capitalism. I do not believe that the catastrophic situation
we are in is due to the force of the capital, of its “techno-
semiotical” industries, to the power of financial networks etc.
The major defect lies in our incapacity to invent modalities
of collective organization as did those that constituted and
created the “First International” in the 19th century and
Leninism in the 20th.
94 MAURI ZIO LAZZA R AT O
Even the psychopathologies that Franco “Bifo” Berardi justly

underlines depend on the fact that the isolated, fragmented,
scared, incriminated individual can be neither the analyst nor
the interpreter nor the critic of the mega-machines of mass
media, finance and production. Only a collective assemblage
of bodies and enunciations can start to fill up the monstrous
and monster-generating gap that results from exasperated
individualization on the one hand and socialization of capital
on the other.
There is no “anthropological degradation,” but transformation!

Transformation of the relations constituting Man/social-
machine and Man/technical-machine. Which does not have
to impede the emergence of rich and innovative political
experiments. I happen to have lived experience exciting
experiments myself even very recently. I am not talking about
a sort of miracle that would lead us out of our powerlessness.
I am simply pointing out a blind spot current theoretical and
political action.
In the 1980s, Foucault and Guattari designated in different

ways the production of subjectivity and the constitution
of “the relation to oneself” as “the” contemporary political
problems that solely can indicate exits from the impasse
in which we are caught up.
Questioning the process of political subjectivation by

shedding light on the “micro-political” (Guattari) and the
“micro-physical” (Foucault) dimensions of power cannot
dispense with the necessity to examine and reconfigure
its macro-political dimension. Guattari advises us on the
contrary: “One thing or the other: somebody or whoever,
will produce new instruments for subjectivity production,
be they bolshevik, maoist or whatever, or the crisis will
just continue to be aggravated”
DO ES COG NI TIV E CA PITA LISM EXIST? 95
I profoundly agree with this statement. It is obviously neither

possible nor desirable to repeat the experiences of the workers
movement, but entirely possible and desirable to repeat
their act of invention! Since the First International as much
as Leninism are by all means inventions. We are now very
distant from them, so I am obliged to take up the problem,
together with Guattari, from afar.
Critic of linguistic and

political representation
Collective forms of contemporary political mobilization,

be they urban uprisings or “syndicalist” struggles, pacifist or
violent, are altogether penetrated by the same problem: the
refusal of the representation and invention/experimentation
of forms of expression and organization that would break
up with the modern political tradition of power delegation
to people’s and class’s representatives.
On this subject, Guattari opens more than one path of reflection.

Questioning the relation between the discursive and the
cognitive on the one hand, and the existential on the other,
he redefines the process of subjectivation on the macro-
political as well as on the micro-political level. Paradoxically,
by stipulating the “existential”–which, is neither linguistical
nor semiotical nor cognitive in the first place–as an essential
condition of subjectivation and enunciation, he operates a
displacement that neutralizes the power of representation.
So what interests me here is the question of the relationship

existing between the linguistic, the cognitive and the semiotic,
which are always actualized realities of the non-physical
dimension of creation, of rupture, of transformations that
are in and for themselves not linguistic, cognitive or semiotic
but which constitute the condition of reconfiguring the

linguistic, the cognitive and the semiotic. The concept of
“the cognitive” threatens to shield off the possibility of
rupture and change. The actualized dimensions of subjecti-
vation will be analyzed here via language, but at any time
you can add the cognitive dimension.
According to Guattari, we live in a paradox and a challenge

that linguistics can neither reveal nor relieve us from: “We
find ourselves thrown into discursive systems, and, at the
same time, we are confronted with the challenge of creating
points of convergence of existential affirmation, which,
themselves, are not discursive [...] When a machine of love
or a machine of fear engages, it is not due to the effects
of discursive, cognitive or deductive phrases upon us. It is
already given. And this machine will progressively develop
different means of expression.”
At the basis of enunciation, there is no linguistic or cognitive

competence but an existential apprehension and appropriation
of the self and the world, and it is only from this existential/
affective appropriation that there can be language, discourse,
knowledge, narrative, oeuvre etc.
The statement thus has a twofold function: to signify, to

communicate, and “politically” declare, but also and above
all “to produce assemblages of enunciation capable of cap-
turing”, territorialize and unfold the singularities of a focus
of existential subjectivation, endowing it with consistency
and persistence.
One the one hand, the crystallization of subjectivation

processes “is not the exclusive privilege of language; all
the other semiotic components, all the other procedures
of natural and machinic encoding, contribute to it.” On the
other hand, the subjective mutation is not discursive and
cognitive at first because for being so it would need to touch

the “focus of non-discursiveness which is the core of subjec-
tivity [...] in order to make narratives, narrate the world and
one’s life, one has to start from an unnamable point, which
is the very point of the breakup of sense and the point of
absolute non-narrative, of absolute non-discursiveness,” of
not knowing. Besides the signifying and denotative function,
Guattari introduces the “existential function” which will
function as the creative motor of enunciation and subjectiva-
tion while being perfectly non-discursive.
In the aftermath of the linguistic turn and structural-linguistic

Lacanian psychoanalysis, Judith Butler reduces subjectivity
to nothing more than the resultant of signifying operations.
Guattari prefers to map the diverse components of subjecti-
vation in their profound heterogeneity, operating a “radical
divorce between the production of sense, the production of
signification, the pragmatic production and the production
of subjectivity.”
The same semiotic chains can operate on “producing dis-

course” and “producing existence,” “the same phrases that
will signify something in a dream are entangled in a subjec-
tive agglomerate which conveys to them not a signification,
but an existential impact.” They will constitute the one who
pronounces them as a subjective entity.
Existential pragmatics, in contrast to discursive pragmatics,

refer back to the production of the self, to “ontological sin-
gularities of ones own self-appropriation, the singularities
of self-consciousness.” Existence is of the nature of self-
positioning, of self-affectation.
The constitution of the self can rupture with dominant signi-

fications as primarily it puts into play a power of auto-affec-
tion, not signifiers, discourse or sense. For Guattari, this
affirmation of the self assumes a particular coloring, as the

“for oneself” and the “for others,” the focal points of enun-
ciation, the vectors of subjectiviation, are not exclusively
human. Existence relates to a “machinic” logic, “in any case,
something that doesn’t at all function in the logic of discursive
sets, but what I have recently been calling existentialisation.”
Words and propositions of language can function within the

logic of sense, referring from one referential sense to another,
or within a diagrammatical logic that does not go through
representation, conscience and the “I” of the subject…
Semiotic flows, cognitive flows, by the same effect as mate-

rial flows, social and economical flows etc. exist in actual-
ized spatio-temporal coordinates, whereas the “the relation
to oneself,” “existential territories” and “universes of value”
constitute the incorporeal, affective and intensive dimension
of the assemblage, which is not ordered by the ordinary co-
ordinates of space and time. The existential escapes determi-
nation and physical causality and constitutes a non-energetic
and non-informational “machinism.” The transformations
that are brought about in existence are incorporeal and, un-
like the transformations studied by science, they do not put
into play energetic or informational or cognitive processes.
Disjunction and conjunction of

the discursive and the existential
The relation to oneself constitutes an incorporeal existential
focus, an autopoietic machine whose consistence, persistence
and development depends, in a second step, on the multiplic-
ity of actualized elements that it will penetrate and reconfigure
(the discursive, the cognitive, but also institutions, the social,
the economic etc.).
“Subjective matter” of “existentialization” uses discursive-

ness in order to “appear to itself–even manifest itself to itself–
as a body without organs, as a pseudo-unity which nonetheless
is not a totalization of the type that we observe in the logic
of sets.”
By establishing a difference of nature between the discur-

sive (and the conceptual or the cognitive) and the existen-
tial, Guattari thinks not only the disjunction but also the
conjunction of two disparate logics, the “semiotic logic” of
the construction of sense and the “pragmatic ontological”
of the construction of existential territories. Let us rapidly
enumerate the “dissymmetries” between these two logics.
One can easily verify that the only “topology” I am interested
in is the one of the relation to oneself.
First of all, the discursive and the existential work with

heterogeneous “referents.” The semiotic, discursive or
cognitive dimension “stems from a system of extrinsic refer-
ences, i.e. it implies at any time that every element is discur-
sive in relation to another element which constitutes its
referent” in a way that situates its “truth, its essence” outside
of its existence. Within existential logics, however, “the
singular element is itself its own reference and generates its
reference, it secretes reference into its world.” Existential
pragmatics is “self-referencing, self-productive of reference.”
Existence “produces itself in its own movement.”
Secondly, discursive logic is linear. There is one element, then

another element. It unfolds itself according to the temporality
of a time-line. Existential self-assertion is circular, it returns
continuously onto itself, it intensifies existence and conveys
consistence to it, or else it vanishes, lacking the capacity to
cross certain thresholds. From that return onto itself, from the
agglomeration and consolidation of this focus of existential-
ization, from that subjective emergence, it transversalizes
1 00 MAURI ZIO LAZZA R AT O
the actualized—economic, political, social, linguistic,

cognitive—dimensions, configuring them differently.
Third dissymmetry: within discursive logic, repetition al-

ways produces discourse and combinations of discourse,
whereas within existential logic, repetition (“ritornellos”)
produces transformations of subjective states that model
subjectivity. The fact that existence is self-productive of
reference signifies that “repetition in relation to itself will be
the reference.” The ritornello (“empty word”/”parole vide”)
has, in contrast to the repetition of sign in Derrida and
Butler, an existential function since it endows the relation
to oneself with consistency.
In ritornello-repetition, what matters is not semantic content

but the repetition itself which produces a transformation of
subjective state. Christian or Leninist ritornellos can’t be
measured in terms of sense but in terms of the transformative
impact on the subjectivity they determine, of consistency,
threshold-crossing, of agglomeration, of the transversality
of subjectivity which they enable and engender. Christian
and Leninist ritornellos trigger “a sort of universe, a fram-
ing, a scenery which corresponds to a collective production
of subjectivity.”
Existential ritornellos may have semantic contents and

constitute systems of expression, but a part from that
they function as modes of constitution of another type of
universe that will bring up a “surplus of possibilities.”
Fourth difference: discursive sets articulate distinctive (speaker/

auditor/content/expression/subject/object etc.) and personolog-
ical (“I”/“you”) oppositions that unfold in extensive spatial-
temporal coordinates of representation, whereas existential
sets are animated by logics of intensity, by affects that emerge
before the distinction of identities, persons and functions.
Affects, while being non-locatable in respect to their origins

and their destiny (fear or joy affect the speaker as well as
the auditor, they constitute transitional subjectivities) are
perfectly perceptible from the threshold of consistence
they determine.
Existential pragmatics can not easily be circumscribed

within the logic of discursive sets because here, contents
and expressions are reversible (there is no ground from
which an expression could detach itself, “everything can
be content and everything can be expression”), the operators
are not subjects and objects, but “subjectities and objectities,”
mutating, half-object half-subject entities that don’t have
an inside or an outside but do engender interiority and
exteriority. “They are becomings (devenirs), understood as
focal points of differentiation.” The distinctive traits of
existential sets do not concern subject and object, I and you,
but the crossing of thresholds, the gradients of intensities.
Discursive logic implies exchange, while in ontological

pragmatics, existence is not exchangeable. “The existence
sticks totally to its topos, rendering impossible to ever de-
tach a form of it that would be a form of existence. You’re
there or you’re not there [...] and there is no existential neg-
ativity. Existence is to itself all the existing. And if it is not,
there is nothing to say about it, one cannot designate it as
non-existent.”
Ontological or existential pragmatics is processual, irre-

versible, singular, event-like, while discursive logics is re-
versible, structural, a-historical, universal. The two logics
refer thus to dissymmetrical functionalities of subjectivity.
It is up to us to see how the conjunction between these two
series of such different functionality can be operated.
The aesthetic paradigm

The non-discursive does not have the powerlessness of the
irrational, but the power of the incorporeal, of intensities,
affects which constitute as many spaces for proto-enunciations.
The non-discursive is not a formless matter waiting for a
differentiation, disciplinarization or organisation (signifying
or symbolic) stemming from language and “the law” (as
Lacanians would have it). There is nothing mystical about
it, as there is in Wittgenstein. On the contrary, it is traversed
by very rich semiotic and expressive dynamics, affects that
function like “emergent selves,” spaces of mutant subjecti-
vation and proto-enunciation, human and non-human, which
are so many machines self-producing existence.
How should one then articulate the relationship between the

discursive and the machinic existential, the actual and the
virtual, the possible and the real? One cannot establish a
“scientific” relation between these two levels, a cognitive
relation, a biunivocal relation, since there is a radical asym-
metry between the “discursive” and the “existential.” This
relationship can only be addressed from a new paradigm
that Guattari calls “the aesthetic paradigm.”
The process of subjectivation is not the effect of economic,

sexual, linguistic and social infrastructures (which would
mean it has a referent outside itself). On the contrary, the
phenomena of self-positioning, self-affection, self-referen-
tiality operates as an opening towards processuality, creation
of possibilities, and the initiation of becoming; mutations
are originary. But these autopoietic spaces only gain materi-
ality by transversalizing, repositioning and reconfiguring
all realms considered as “structural” (economic, political,
social, linguistic, sexual, scientific, etc.).
Subjective self-reference “is obviously unsustainable as

such, since it lacks any external referent, does not possess
external reference [...] They cannot sustain themselves—
what is more, they only sustain themselves in a reinitiation
of discursivity.” The enunciation of the relation to self and
the existential territories supporting it, always requires an
abduction of narration, which does not primarily aim at pro-
ducing rational, cognitive, scientific explanations, but to
generate complex ritournelles (“mythico– conceptual, phan-
tasmatic, religious, romanesque”), which give some flesh
(consistance) to the emergence of new existential territories.
This is not a return to the irrational, or to the era of myths,
but it is about undoing the scientific paradigm that the entire
19th and 20th centuries, all the way to Althusser, believed in.
It is towards aesthetic experience, not as productive of art-
works but as a pragmatics of the relation between discursive
and existential, between actual and virtual, that Guattari turns.
“The paradox to which aesthetic experience constantly brings

us back to is that these effects, as a mode of existential ap-
prehension, are given as a unity, despite, or besides the fact
that indicative traits, signifying ritournelles, are necessary
to catalyze their existence in fields of representations.”
Approaching existential territories always involves a certain
discursive or semiotic surveying, but this surveying is nei-
ther scientific, nor objectivist or rationalist. There are no other
ways to access existence than self-existentialisation. The
knowledge of existence requires what Guattari called, follow-
ing Giambattista Vico, a “topical art,” an art of cartographies.
The relation of self to self, self-affection, self-positioning

will make use of signs, myths, narrations and conceptualisa-
tions which do not operate like an (impossible) translation
of the existential into the discursive, but as a cartography
which will serve as a surveying, as access to the processes
of subjectivation, to existential territories.
“Existence may be located in cartographies and it maybe

involves in its unfolding, its locating and production,
something which is inherently antagonistic to the discur-
sive treatment which belongs to objectivist procedures.”
Signifying semiotics, before carrying or transmitting messages,

before having a discursive function, operate like existential
“ritournelles.” This does not imply a devaluing of language,
concepts or conceptual abstraction, on the contrary. The more
the cartography is abstract and the more the possibilities of ar-
ticulating the discursive and the non-discursive are diversified,
the more the cartography is arbitrary and articulation finds
in it a favorable landscape for its unfolding. There are 2 types
of cartographies according to Guattari: there are the “concrete
cartographies that directly produce what I shall call an existen-
tialisation, which generate a subjective territory at the same
time as the cartography unfolds [Ed. Note: the existential
cartographies of a person, a group or even a nation] and then
there are, besides, speculative cartographies which do not pro-
duce territories, second-order cartographies, whose function is
to think and organize, to articulate the relation between these
two radically heterogeneous levels.” Whence the fundamental
importance of theological, political and philosophical debates.
Theological disputes in early Christianity or Bolshevik debates

around 1905 did not serve to establish true statements, but car-
tographies were able to open up possibilities for articulating
the existential and the discursive, inventing ritournelles which
are ‘hooks’ for subjectivity, which enable it to cross thresholds
and initiate a process.
The theoretical discourses of Marxism and Freudianism which

claim to be scientific constructs, “only received social vali-
dation” inasmuch as they crystallized, gave flesh and trans-
versality to the mutant, emergent “spaces of subjectivation”
of capitalism.
Neither Freud nor Marx brought about a new science

(Althusser), but instead, they articulated “mythico-concep-
tual” surveying instruments which enabled Marx to create
a “stage” (the history of humanity as the history of class
struggle), mythico-conceptual characters (the proletariat as a
subject that would abolish salaried labor and social classes)
that could welcome and semiotize the singularity of the
subjectivity of the first industrial revolution. But always
from an unnameable point, an unrepresentable point, with
a signifier which alone, creates the possibility of devices
(dispositifs) of subjectivation, not in order to “tell a story”
(histoire) but so that history (histoire) can happen. In this
context, narratives, concepts and “myths” do not have a
communicative, intersubjective or cognitive function, but
an “aesthetic/existential” one.
This is a paradoxical relation (“it is not a relation, but it is

not without relation”), since it is only by a certain use of
discursive categories that one can access existential effects
and mutations. Speculative cartographies function not only
like passive surveyings, but also like active kick-starters of
processes of subjectivation.
It is in this context that Guattari returns to Christic ritournelles,

Leninist ritournelles, Debussyist ritournelles as “gimmicks”
(“semiotic acts,” the way one says “speech acts”) which kick-
start processes of subjectivation, which bring us into other
realms of reference, and facilitate the move to action. The dis-
cursive as such is not enough to grasp subjectivity, to involve
it, to push it to act. To grasp and involve subjectivity, to push it
to act, discourses signs and concepts must function like modes
of access to new worlds, “diagrammatic initiators” of action.
The “current” crisis

In a 1984 seminar, Félix Guattari asserted that the crisis
occurring in the West since the early 1970s, before being
an economic or political crisis, was a crisis in the produc-
tion of subjectivity.
Most of the “current crisis” lies in the incapacity of capital-

ist forces to articulate the discursive, cognitive and existen-
tial dimensions together; the impossibility of linking economic,
social and technological flow together with the virtual, in-
corporeal dimension of the production of subjectivity, exis-
tential territories and realms of value. If the production of
subjectivity is not articulated together with a social field, a
“production,” a politics, a language, etc., the result is, like
today, a pathology of subjectivity (racist, xenophobic, indi-
vidualist, turned back on one’s own interests, etc.). The slo-
gans of the Left on employment, full employment, wage labor,
work, the defense of Welfare, etc., which should be articulated
together with subjectivity, do not set into motion processes of
subjectivation, because they are not open onto new worlds,
are not a matter with which contemporary subjectivity works.
The political problem lies in the articulation and concatena-
tion of “the processes which power the technical, social and
economic machines, and the processes of subjectivation.
If this fourfold articulation is not present, it doesn’t work.”
The unfolding of subjectivation must happen in a system

of flows which enable one “to be at once in material effects,”
“economic,” social and linguistic production (etc.), but
“which also must generate the production of subjectivity.”
Neo-liberal capitalism (and what is left of the labor

movement) was not able to articulate the relation be-
tween economic, social and technological flows, and the
becoming-subjectivity forms in contemporary capitalism.
It failed to articulate discursive (economic, social and institu-

tional) and existential meaning, because in current conditions,
both the subjective figure of the entrepreneur and that of the
salaried employee, “do not yield mythical consistency, do
not make you want to go on a Crusade or participate in the
October Revolution!”
The subjective figure of the indebted man articulates these

various flows, levels and plateaus but only in a regressive
and repressive way. It offers no “future,” no “possibilities.”
Hence the stumbling-block is subjective as much as it
is economic.
The articulation between heterogeneous levels is not es-

tablished spontaneously, it must be constructed, invented,
worked at. The articulation is singular but not necessary;
nor is it the fruit of chance.
We still live in a paradoxical situation. The mutations of

subjectivity are sudden, occurring at “infinite speeds,” in
Guattari’s words. The mutations of subjective states are
given “from the outset; then, secondarily, in discursive
time, one will say: this is so boring! This is so stressful!
What a great atmosphere! The first given will create a
disposition or situation which means I am here, in the
room, enunciation gains thickness.”
What is being constituted in these condensations, these

agglomerations, these sorts of “enunciative chunks,” is not
knowledge (whence the limits of any cognitivism!). Existen-
tial crystallization implies that there is “a certain arrangement
in between the way of disposing signs, seeing art forms,
and sensing time: it’s organized that way prior to any other
construction.” These points of crystallization, condensa-
tion, agglomeration are not self-sufficient. They ultimately
require an “aesthetic and ethico-political fulfillment.”
“Aesthetic, because there is a way statements are evident,

when there is a relation of love or hate. As Spinoza says,
there is no mistake, even a dog understands the right away,
with no debate, if one wants to spank or pet him.” At the
same time, “there is the ethico-political dimension, because
this matter is not just an aesthetic matter, it is also a matter
involved in relations of transversality with other, completely
heterogeneous levels,” political, social, economic, artistic, etc.
Work on these forms of emergence follows a methodology

which consists precisely in the “aesthetic paradigm” or the
topical art of cartographies. Just as the artist should not
expect some kind of inspiration, politics action must build
and invent instruments and processes of experimentation,
research and intervention which do not primarily involve
the economic, social and linguistic realms, but instead, the
production of subjectivity.
The relation between discursive and non-discursive, concep-

tual and existential should not end in silence (“Whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”), but must be
worked at, conceptualized, semiotized, staged, narrated, etc.,
starting from the unrepresentable. Instead of ending up
with Badiou’s retrospective faithfulness (faithfulness to the
event, once the event has occurred), one must intervene in
the emergence of emergent spaces of proto-enunciation
and proto-subjectivation.
Crystallizations, condensations, emergent agglomerations

must be aesthetically and ethically completed, both at the
micro-political level (“working on a point of subjectivation
which is non-discursive, a point of subjectivation which can
be melancholic, chaotic or psychotic”) and the macro-political
(a point of revolutionary or reactionary, fascist or identity
subjectivation, etc.) These a-signifying crystallizations
qua existential functions are “wrapped up like in a Turkish
Delight pastry, in meanings and denotations.” Working on

them means liberating them from these shells that bind
them, and putting them “in a position where they proliferate
[...] i.e., to establish connections, associative branches of
production, passages towards other realms.”
The great merit of Guattari’s work is to problematize the

relation between discursive and non-discursive, to question
the modalities of the articulation of the existential with
economic, social, and political flows–this is precisely the
weakness of contemporary theories that claim to be critical
or revolutionary. On the one hand we have, with Badiou or
Rancière, a subjectivation which doesn’t need to be articu-
lated with social, economic and cultural flows since it is
self-contained. Politics is independent, autonomous with
regard to what Rancière and Badiou call economics, just
because their image of the latter and of capitalism in general
is the caricature produced by the economists themselves.
What Badiou and Rancière call economics performs a twofold
implication and exploitation of subjectivity, through social
subjection and machinic enslavement.
To say that political subjectivation is not deducible from

Capital in Badiou and Rancière’s sense is quite different
from asking the question of their paradoxical articulation.
In the former case, we have the illusion of a “pure” politics,
since subjectivation, as it does not articulate itself on any-
thing, will never reach a thickness or flesh (consistance)
required to exist. In the latter case, you open areas for exper-
imentation and construction since subjectivation must, if it
is to exist, gain materiality, traverse and reconfigure the so-
cial, the political, the economic, etc.
The theories of cognitive capitalism do not, in addition, articu-

late the linguistic, cognitive, representational dimension with
the pre-verbal, pre-cognitive and non-reflexive dimension.
Knowledge is supposed to fulfill diverse and unlikely

functions of creation of possibility, aesthetic creation and
the production of subjectivity, all of which belong to the
existential machinic.
The inventor of the concept of “cognitive capitalism,” Enzo

Rullani, has an unlimited faith in knowledge: “Cognitive ex-
perience is always a process–great or small–of world-making,”
creating possible worlds. “Cognitive experience” also elabo-
rates “worldviews, aesthetic codes,” which as they spread,
“change people’s values.” “Knowledge” is not just the basis
of economic and aesthetic value, but also of the production
of subjectivity. Through cognitive experience, “we are open
to the possibility that it may change our perception of the
world and ourselves, our deep identity.”
He cheerfully confuses–like his disciples–the production of

subjectivity with the production of knowledge.
Knowledge, information, language as such, has no potential

to create possibility, to multiply material forms. The flow of
knowledge, like information or semiotic flows, are always
unidirectional: “they always discursive,” that is, they remain
on the same plane, they never attain existential territories,
where the mutation of subjectivity can occur. It is not
knowledge, information or communication which can serve
as the basis for the creation and production of the new, but
rather, an existential mutation, a transformation that touches
the non-discursive space of subjectivity, its existential terri-
tories, its modes of subjectivation.
That the theory of cognitive capitalism is incapable of ex-

plaining its own objects (innovation, the creation of the new,
new knowledge) is synthetically demonstrated by the tautol-
ogy of one of its theoreticians who defines this economy as
“the production of knowledge by means of knowledge.”
“A new subjectivity cannot come from a mere treatment of

flows (linguistic, cognitive, economic, etc.),” nor can any
new knowledge or innovation.
Even the production of science and knowledge has to drift

away from a scientistic or “cognitivist” paradigm towards
an aesthetic paradigm, that is, they are dependent on an act
of subjectivation, in the sense defined by Bakhtin as cited
by Guattari: “From within the field of knowledge itself, no
conflict is possible, because one cannot encounter any het-
erogeneity there. The scientist, not science, can enter into
conflict, and even then, not ex cathedra, but as an aesthetic
subject, for whom knowledge is an act of knowledge.”
Only a break in the mode of subjectivation can secrete an

existential crystallisation which produces new references,
new self-positionings which in turns, open up the possibil-
ity of constructing new languages, new forms of knowl-
edge, new aesthetic practices, new forms of life. To break
with dominant meanings and established forms of life, one
must pass through areas of non-senses, a-signifying, non-
discursive–which, in politics, take the form of strikes, re-
volts, riots which suspend time, for a short moment, and
create other possibilities, in which, if they gain in material-
ity, other subjectivations and existential crystallisations
can proliferate.
“In the other type of logic, which I am superposing onto dis-

cursive logic, the same elements of semiotic discursivity are
taken from the opposite direction; at that point they are
taken qua producers, not of discursivities compared to one
another, but of existence, sensitive territories and universes.
In that logic, the constellations that emerge maintain the
same elements, but in one case you have semiotic produc-
tions, in the other subjective productions.”
This cartography of the production of subjectivity breaks

radically with analytic philosophy, Lacanianism, linguistics,
a certain form of Marxism, but above all, with the concept
and practices of representation (whether political or linguis-
tic), and enacts a displacement from which we will have to
start, if we wish to conceive of a politics appropriate to the
current crisis.
Guattari, Félix, 1989. Cartographies schizoanalytiques.

Paris: Editions Galilée.
Guattari, Félix, 1992. Chaosmose. Paris: Editions Galilée.
Guattari, Félix, In Chimères n° 23, p. 58.

KARL LYDÉN 1 13
Therapy for a
Pathological Capitalism
Anything that includes so many words as the title,

“psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism” could be
accounted for in a large number of ways, as well as on
many different levels, in this case spanning from cognitive
science to economic thought. But if we try to understand
the notion in a general, aggregate manner, we could per-
haps see it as psychiatric and psychological disorders,
distresses and discontents, the pathological patterns and
cognitive blockages resulting systemically in the produc-
tion of the different subjects of cognitive capitalism: the
latter defined as a new dynamic of waged labor, where
profit or surplus value is not simply extracted from sur-
plus labor time, but also from unwaged cognitive and
communicative processes.
In an early text elaborating the concept written by Lazzarato

it is thus said:
“By cognitive capitalism we denote a regime of

accumulation in which the object of accumulation is
principally constituted by the knowledge tending to
be subjected to a direct valorisation, whose production
exceed the traditional confines of the enterprise.
1 14 KARL LY DÉN
This regime manifests itself empirically by the im-

portance given to research, technological progress,
education, circulation of information, systems of com-
munication, innovation, organizational apprenticeship
and strategic management of organizations. On the
side of demand, consumption is also directed towards
technology and most notably the ‘technologies of
mind’, i.e. those which set into play (into exercise)
the mental faculties via interaction with new techno-
logical objects: audiovisual, computers, internet,
game consoles, etc.” Turning to Grundrisse, cogni-
tive capitalism is thus understood as the regime of
accumulation succeeding the previous industrial capi-
talism, a transformation framed in an actualization of
what Marx described as the general intellect, where
the distinction between dead and living labor is sur-
passed and ”social knowledge has become a direct
force of production.” (Lazzarato et al. 2001, 9)
Much has been written on the subject since then,

digital communication has developed further, and a global
financial crisis has taken place. But this early text from
2001 has a certain merit in its preliminary approach, de-
scribing cognitive capitalism as “in becoming,” renouncing
itself from the principle belief that modern societies form
an essential unity, with an already present order. Perhaps
one could then read the existence of conflicting regimes into
this regulationist 1 approach: “Fundamentally, it amounts to
recognizing the existing tensions between the capitalist
order and the new conditions of accumulation characteristic
of the regime currently under construction.” (ibid.)
1 Regarding the Regulation School, see Aglietta, Régulation et crises
du capitalisme, second edition, Editions Odile Jacob, 1997.

THERAP Y F O R A PATHOLOG ICAL CA PI TA LI SM 1 15
This preliminary approach, which refrains from describing

any of the all-encompassing features of cognitive capitalism,
seems necessary already in the description of the increasing
abstraction of capital and the decreasing importance of the
industrial norm of abstract labor. While abstract labor—
the Marxian concept of waged, general labor defined by
its duration—no longer occupies the same position of value
it held during industrial capitalism, the notion can hardly
be done away with altogether. Because while industrial
production and the manufacturing sectors employ relatively
less labor in its abstract form, the chronometer still marks
the beginning and end of labor worldwide. While it might
be true that “The law of value founded on the measure of
abstract labor-time immediately dedicated to production
enters into crisis” (Vercellone 2007, 29) regarding extraction
of surplus value from social production, and while Marx
himself states in the Grundrisse that “Labor no longer appears
so much to be included within the production process;
rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman
and regulator to the production process itself,” (Marx 1973,
704) it would seem hasty to completely do away with the
theory of value developed in Capital. (Marx 1976/1990, 283)
If we continue this open-ended and preliminary reading of
cognitive capitalism, there might be space, before we go
on, to make two general suggestions or additional remarks.
The first point relates to the periodization and definition
of the regime of accumulation. Since the crisis of industrial
capitalism and Fordist production, indeed since the crisis
of surplus value production in the 1970s, profit accumu-
lation has increasingly been moving through financial
channels, producing enormous gains and crises alike.
But what is also highly relevant in this context is to note
the phenomenon which David Harvey has called “accumu-
lation by dispossession.” (2003, 137) This expression of
Marx’s “primitive accumulation” of looting, conquering
1 16 KARL LY DÉN
and feudal relations, is now upgraded to the recent

processes of privatization by which enormous masses
of wealth have passed from the public into the private
domain (through below market-price acquisitions of capi-
tal, for instance), financialization, as well as management
and manipulation of crises, whereby assets are accumulated
in speculation as a result of vicious circles of mortgage
loans, crises and foreclosures.2 Whether one could posit
this other regime of accumulation next to the one of cog-
nitive capitalism and remain faithful to the theoretical
project of the latter, is perhaps a matter of discussion.
In any case, considering the transfers of wealth it has
produced, this accumulation by dispossession seems of
historical relevance in any account of the last decades of
political and economical development.
The second suggestion could be regarded as a matter of

speed. Being an inherent component of financialization
and phenomena like split-second trading, speed, in addi-
tion to this, is often recognized as forming the basis of the
individual psychopathologies of contemporary capitalist
subjects. Cognitive capitalism is a based on an “intensifi-
cation of the rhythm of innovation,” (Corsani et al. 2001,
30) and in 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep
(2013), Jonathan Crary defines an unbound “24/7 ‘attention
economy’,” where the inactivity of daydreaming and
above all of sleep is conceived of as the ultimate obstacle
to a constant connectedness to commodified and mostly
electronic or digital circuits. “There is a profound incom-
patibility of anything resembling reverie with the priorities
of efficiency, functionality, and speed.” (Crary 2013, 88)
1 See Harvey, David. Rebel Cities, Verso, London/New York,
2012, p. 24-29.
The point is not to deny the relevance of Crary’s account of

specific psychopathologies resulting from “24/7 capitalism”
—for instance a dramatic increase young children’s autism
correlated with near-constant television watching–nor is it
to contradict the fact of an ever-growing consumption of
pharmaceuticals, which for example Franco Bifo Berardi
describes as a “Prozac-economy.” Berardi identifies a
particularly harrowed species: cognitive workers as bodies
with their nerves tense from constant attention to semiotic
flows, operating on prescribed and non-prescribed drugs.
One would have to assume that it is in this intensified
“economic accumulation [...] causing the social nervous
system to suffer contraction and stress” (Berardi 2009, 82)
that biopolitics represents “a morphogenetic modelling of
the living operated by the habitat with which it is required
to interact.” (ibid., 187)
But if we take Berardi’s and many other’s reference to
the Foucaldian biopolitics, we could perhaps, alongside this
hypersemiotics, identify another feature of contemporary
capitalism which are actually slowing things down. That is,
the constant use of statistics, evaluation, and quantification
in the workplace, particularly in the public sector. Because
these are precisely a general application of the characteristics
Foucault originally described as belonging to biopolitics: the
understanding of the population as biological mass, leading
to a regulation of this mass by means of statistical predictions,
approximations, and informative actions. (Foucault 2003, 243)
Rather than only recognizing an overabundance of high-
speed semiotic flows, together with the stressful flexibilities
of the entrepreneur-like cognitive worker immersed in
immaterial production, one could thus recognize a certain
bureaucracy which seems to be slowing things down.
Think of the use of protocols, lists, evaluations and statisti-
cal forms to complete in the educational and health sectors,
or indeed the (semi-privatized) public sector as a whole.
1 18 KARL LY DÉN
This so-called New Public Management has, perhaps most

recently and notably in the Scandinavian countries created
an increasingly malfunctioning and aggressive bureaucratic
state, and to some degree a contemporary form of work place
management which inserts sabotage-like caesuras in its own
dissipated workings. As Paulo Virno writes in Lessico post-
fordista (2001): “The peculiar public character of the intellect
indirectly manifests itself in the state through the hyper-
trophic growth of the administrative apparatus. The heart
of the state is no longer the political parliamentary system
but the administration.” 3
These two general remarks are not directed towards the

theoretical attempts to account for the workings of cognitive
capitalism, a post-Fordist mode of production, or a 24/7
paradigm, but are rather to serve as an assertion of a frag-
mented, multidimensonial aggregation of regimes of accu-
mulation and governmental practices. That is to say, a unity
“overdetermined in its principle,” (Althusser 1969, 101) where
a certain effect–whether it is the psychopathologies of capital-
ist subjects or precarious workers–can have different and at
times conflicting causes. Thus, it does in no way exclude the
possibility or even likely scenario that social subjects are
under all of these three features of contemporary capitalism
at once: employed, perhaps, in the sector of manufacture or
in any case forming part of abstract labor, and–whether it is
during work time or leisure time–consuming and producing
value within the social realm, while having to deal with an
increasingly deplete, slow, hostile, and rigid state apparatus
in order to receive basic social functions like health care, ed-
ucation, and unemployment benefits when needed.
3 This English version of Virno’s text is a translation by Arianna
Bove, published on Generation Online. http://www.generation-on-

line.org/p/fpvirno10.htm.
THERAP Y F O R A PATHOLOG ICAL CA PI TA LI SM 119
What then are the possible means or strategies of resisting,

refusing or countering such three-headed hydra? There is
the suggestion of the social wage made by Corsani et al,
which is also developed by Yann Moulier-Boutang in his
book Cognitive Capitalism (2012). Such a demand could
perhaps become part of some kind of minimum programme,
such as the programme of the French Workers’ party from
1880, co-written by Marx and French Socialist leader Jules
Guesde, expressing the decision “to enter the elections
with [certain] immediate demands” for ameliorations of
labor conditions. However it would not principally oppose
the real subsumption or extraction of surplus value from the
social domain, as it would not oppose the pathological side
of the capitalist system having its subjects consume, produce
and circulate in an ongoing, 24/7-like incubator of value.
What would then be the therapy for such pathologies?
The care of the self and the subject of truth

Here, one could turn to Michel Foucault’s work from his
later lecture courses at Collège de France, where truth
plays a pivotal role. Not, however as suitable it might
seem, the 1978 lectures entitled The Birth of Biopolitics
where Foucault defines the man of neoliberalism as an
“entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital,
being for himself his own producer, being for himself the
source of [his] earnings.” (Foucault 2010, 226) And then,
demonstrating how the market “is becoming what I will
call a site of veridiction. The market must tell the truth
(dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to govern-
mental practice.” (ibid., 32) Here, the focus will rather
be on the lectures developed in the subsequent years, until
his death in 1984, centered on the relation between subject
and truth, where subjects could constitute themselves in
care of the self, consisting in acts and practices of truth.
1 20 KARL LY DÉN
From a certain political perspective, or in relation to the

concept of ideology, truth as a constitutive practice of the
individual subject might seem like an odd strategy, given
how Marx in his second thesis on Feuerbach relates it in-
strumentally to class power and class struggle: “The question
whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking
is not a question of theory but is a practical question.
Man must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and power, the
this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.” (Marx 1969, 13)
It may seem equally odd that Foucault, who had located
the workings of power in its most capillary instances, as
far as possible from its apparent centre, would elaborate a
string of lectures on the subject as being constituted in a
dramatic and central moment of truth, in the heroic act of
parrhēsia, of speaking the truth even at the risk of ones
own life. Indeed, Foucault almost seems embarrassed at one
point, hesitating before taking a five minute break in a 1983
lecture “at this somewhat pathetic formulation of the relation-
ship between truth-telling and the risk of death, but this is
what we should now [after the break] start to disentangle.”
To which he adds: “I’m bothered.” (Foucault 2010, 57)
Nevertheless, this act of speaking the truth as an auto-
constitutive practice on the part of the subject is what is
being outlined in these lectures, albeit in a number of
different ways and contexts.
In his lectures delivered in 1980, Foucault thus departs from

his recently established concepts of biopolitics and liberal
governmentality, and embarks on the project of truth and
subjectivity that will concern him for the rest of his life.
Here, he frames an analysis of the manifestations of truth in
Oedipus the King along with the theme of Christian confes-
sion during the first centuries of our era, continuing and trans-
forming this study in the next year’s unpublished lectures.
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject from 1982, [re]turning
to the Greek antiquity and most notably in Plato’s dialogue
Alcibiades, he sees the first thematization of epimeleia heauto,

“the care of the self,” the set of techniques and practices that
ultimately will point to capacities of the subject to constitute
and transform itself. And this is the point, through meticulous
comparisons and analysis of a vast blend of antique sources that
will multiply in the following years—Plato’s Apology and Al-
cibiades, tragedies by Euripides and Sophocles, medical sources
such as Galen, and texts by the Epicureans, Cynics, and Roman
Stoics—at which the subject’s constitutive relation to itself crys-
tallizes in the notion of parrhēsia, which means “to speak can-
didly,” “to speak everything,” or “to speak freely,” even if it
implies the risk of ones life, whether it is in front of the other, in
front of the assembly or in front of the tyrant. “To stand up, to
rise, to take the word and speak the truth.” (Foucault 2008, 148)
What is striking in these lectures are the constant reitera-

tions, rehearsals, and redefinitions of the issue at stake.
At the same time, this is period of a major theoretical dis-
placement for Foucault, which he described as “passing
from a theory of the subject, [on the basis of which one
would try to bring out the different modes of being of
subjectivity in their historicity] to the analysis of the
modalities and techniques of the relation to self, or again to
the history of this pragmatics of the subject in its different
forms.” (Foucault 2010, 142) This means, in the most
schematic manner one can put it, that Foucault is passing
from his previous elaborations of the subject as an effect of
discursive exclusions, power relations and individualizing
disciplinary measures, to the study of a subject which—to
some degree, and still historically determined—is capable
of constituting itself through a number of critical truth acts.
What can this examination of truth practices as a means of
subjectivation during Antiquity have to say about the subject
of contemporary capitalism? What does it have to do with
the exploitation or, if you will, psychopathologies suffered
under the current material and immaterial regimes of accu-
1 22 KARL LY DÉN
mulation, and under state functions that display something

of an autistic inability to grapple with basic social needs?
As Foucault puts it: “It is already very clear in Plato. It is even
clearer in the post-Platonic tradition: the ontos philosophein
of Epicurus is the kat’aletheian hugiainen (that is treating,
curing according to the truth); and in the Stoics, starting
with Posidonius, the relationship between medicine and
philosophy—more precisely, the identification of philo-
sophical practice as a sort of medical practice—is very clear.”
(Foucault 2005, 97) The philosophy as cure is certainly a
well rehearsed trope, which in its most generalized form
amounts to little more than a cliché, presumably of no rele-
vance to the given historical point of potential struggles.
Yet, some specific instances of “treating, curing according
to truth” might have something to say about the pathologies
at hand. In Foucault’s close reading of classical sources and
its uses of the term parrhēsia, one could isolate a certain
moment, which might be related to a contemporary themati-
zation of politics and political struggle. This happens to be
among the very first instances where parrhēsia is brought to
the foreground, and concerns the Epicurean circles and an
obscure community described as the Therapeutae group.
When Foucault elaborates the notion of the care of the self in

his reading of Plato’s Alcibiades, it concerns Socrates’ dialogue
with the reassured young man of noble birth who is eager to
enter public life and become adviser of the Athenians. This is
in a certain analogy with another figure under scrutiny (as in
the 1983 lectures), the main character of Euripides tragedy Ion.
Ion is a young man considered with the unknown circum-
stances of his birth: it is only if his mother is an Athenian that
he will be granted the privilege of parrhēsia, the exercise of
free speech to influence the assembly. Thus, Foucault states:
“I think parrhēsia is, in a way, a discourse spoken from above,
which comes from a source higher than the status of the
citizen, and which is different from the pure and simple ex-
ercise of power. It is a form of discourse which will exercise

power in the framework of the city, but of course in non-
tyrannical conditions, that is to say, allowing others the free-
dom to speak, the freedom of those who also wish to be in the
front rank, and who may be in the front rank in this sort of
agonistic game typical of political life in Greece and especially
in Athens.” (Foucault 2010, 104) This is in stark contrast not
only with other characterizations of parrhēsia given in these
same lectures,4 The Government of Self and Others, but also
with the Epicurean and Stoic practice of parrhēsia as first
provided in The Hermeneutics of the Subject: parrhēsia is a
technical term–a technique which lets the master work with
honesty and without formal rules for his speech on the trans-
formation of his disciple. And while the latter might be a
discourse spoken from above, in the sense that it is the master
who addresses his disciple, it is, on the other hand, a discourse
produced within a certain community, far from the parrhēsia
at the Assembly, exercised by the citizen belonging to the
“front rank” over the rabble, the, if you will, hoi polloi.
Against these young, affluent men, Foucault raises the example
of the Epicurean groups, and in particular one that Philo of
Alexandria describes the Therapeutae, a community striving
to treat the soul as a doctor treats the body; whose social
basis in no way seems to have been made up of aristocrats
or citizens with privileges.
4 See, for instance, the description of Galen’s conception of the care of
the self, where one needs an other to tell him the truth: “You recall that
Galen does not present the person to whom we must resort as a techni-
cian; he is not presented as a technician of the medicine of the body
or as a technician of the medicine of souls, neither as a doctor nor as a
philosopher. According to Galen’s text we should appeal to a man who
has reached a certain age, has a sufficiently good reputation, and who
possesses, in addition, a certain quality. This quality was parrhēsia, free-
spokenness. A man of a certain age, who has a good reputation, and who
possesses parrhēsia are the three necessary and sufficient criteria for the
person we need for us to have a relationship to self.” (Foucault 2010, 44)
1 24 KARL LY DÉN
[T]he Therapeutae were a group of people who had

retired to the surroundings of Alexandria, not into the desert,
as will be the practice of Christian hermits and anchorites
later, but in kinds of small suburban gardens in which each
lived in his cell or room, with some communal areas. This
community of Therapeutae had three axes and three dimen-
sions. On the one hand, there are very pronounced cultic or re-
ligious practices: praying twice a day, weekly gatherings at
which people are placed according to age with each having to
adopt the appropriate demeanor [... * ] . On the other hand,
there is an equally marked stress on intellectual, theoretical
work, on the work of knowledge (savoir). On the side of the
care of the self it is said from the start that the Therapeutae
have withdrawn to their spot in order to cure illness caused by
“pleasures, desires, sorrows, fears, greed, stupidity, injustice
and the countless multitude of passions.*” These then are the
Therapeutae who come to cure themselves. Second, another
reference: what they seek above all is egkrateia (mastery of
the self by the self), which they consider to be the basis and
foundation of all the other virtues. Finally, and here the text is
very important for its vocabulary, on every seventh day, when
they have their gathering, so, just once a week, they add care
of the body to their everyday activity of the epimeleia tes
psukhes [care of the soul]. (Foucault 2005, 116-117)
In their practice of truth speech or parrhēsia as an art to cure,

educate, and transform a subject, Foucault emphasizes that the
majority of this kind of groups would not accept any distinction
between rich and poor, between the ones of noble birth and the
ones of obscure backgrounds, or between the ones who exer-
cise political power and the ones leading lives in the shadows.
Not even the opposition between free men and slaves were
accepted, at least not theoretically: “Consequently, since there
is no difference of status, we can say that all individuals are in
general terms ‘competent’: able to practice themselves, able to
carry out this practice of the self.” (ibid., 118)
From here, Foucault moves on to (or back and forth between)

a large number of other Antique texts. But if we arrest the
train of thought at this point, it is because of the interestingly
collective–if also rather sect-like–characterization of the care
of the self as practiced by the Therapeutae. And can we not, in
light of Foucault’s subsequent assertion of “this idea that the
true life is an other life” (Foucault 2011, 340; my italics), see
a certain affinity to a contemporary strain of political thought?
The insistence of each and everyone’s competence and capa-
bility, the refusal of distinguishing between the abilities of rich
and poor to lead a virtuous life, along the withdrawal to a
community of studying and writing? At least as a matter of
hypothesis, one could perhaps put this inherently political care
of the soul by the Therapeutae in analogy with certain works of
Jacques Rancière. For Rancière, as expressed in Disagreement,
any subjectivation is a disidentification grounded in an assertion
of equality: “A political subject is not a group that ‘becomes
aware’ of itself, finds its voice, imposes its weight on society.
It is an operator that connects and disconnects different areas,
regions, identities, functions, and capacities existing in the
configuration of a given experience.” (Rancière 1999, 40)
Without wishing to make certain similar features into a common
argument, one can easily spot them: for Rancière, “equality is
simply the equality of anyone with anyone else: in other words,
in the final analysis, the absence of arkhe, the sheer contin-
gency of any social order.” (ibid., 15-16) While Foucault,
however, remains within an epistemological terrain defining a
“theoretico-practical position on the non-necessity of power
as a principle of understanding of knowledge itself” not as
anarchy but as “a sort of anarcheology.” (Foucault 2012, 77)
In his La nuit des prolétaires, Rancière decided to turn to the

French workers’ archive of the 1830s and 1840s, in order to
escape any prevalent essentialist and theoretically dogmatic
notion of “the worker.” This resulted in the discovery of
workers’ nocturnal poetry sessions and self-taught projects,
1 26 KARL LY DÉN
along with the view of politics as the act of reconfiguring the

distribution and the division of the sensible: the act of opposing
and reshaping the dividing lines of work/sleep, speech/noise,
and labor/art, etc. Perhaps this archivally obsessed project of un-
earthing a radical and collective process of subject formation of
the past bears some resemblance to Foucault’s fascination re-
garding the Epicurean and Stoic sects of the first two centuries
of our era.5 One might object that the two theoretico-historical
accounts are of completely different nature, or that Rancière’s
Nights of Labor operates on a wholly different level of concrete-
ness. A curious fact in this context is that Foucault seemed to
have similar plans to such a study already in 1973. In the newly
born newspaper Libération, he did an interview with a discarded
worker from the Renault factory, anonymously named “José”.
5 If the Epicureans and Stoics’ different practices of truth-speech form
the starting point for Foucault’s tracking of the concept of parrhēsia, the
very last instance of parrhēsia which he lays out in the final lectures of
1984 could serve as some kind of counter-point: the cynic Diogenes.
Following the notion of parrhēsia as it is developped through these three
years of lectures from 1982 to 1984 it is almost as if one could see a
movement of increasing solitude or isolation on the part of the parrhēsiast.
When the notion is first elabaroted, the parrhēsiast, both according to
Philodemus, Epicurus, and Seneca and others, is the master guiding or
leading the soul of his disciple towards something like autonomy in a
collective endeavor. Then Foucault passes to the écriture de soi, through
the political parrhēsia of 1983—Pericles speaking in front of the assem-
bly or as Plato as the counselor to the tyrant of Sicily—finally arriving
in the 1984 lectures on the cynics, and Diogenes, the mad dog, using his
own life as example, in an instant where we have “parrhēsia as life”.
This position almost amounts to an ontological figure of resistance, and
is probably much closer to something like Antonio Negri’s poor militant
than Rancière’s notion of politics: “The poor person is then not someone
constituted by pain, but is inreality the biopolitical subject. He is not an
existential trembling(or a painful dialectical differentiation): he is the
naked eternity of the power of being.” (Negri 2004194) See also: Katja
Diefenbach. “Living Labour, Form-Giving Fire. The Post-Workerist
Reading of Marx and the Concept of Biopolitical Labour,” in Ed. Gal
Kirn Post-Fordism and its Discontents, 2010, 86.
Here Foucault states that: “The intellectual is useful for as-

sembling ideas, but his knowledge is only partial in relation
to the workers’ knowledge” (1994/2001, 1289), before sug-
gesting a comprehensive collective research project, pre-
cisely about the “whole tradition of workers’ struggles of the
19th century, little known and poorly recounted.” As is evi-
dent, nothing became of the project and Foucault himself
never took up any of its parts; but it may serve to illustrate
that Foucault was considering collective forms of self-orga-
nization, long before his 1980s work on subjects and their
auto-transformative techniques of the self.
Rather than a passage, the politics of a tunnel
What, then, are the possible implications of these practices

of truth in a contemporary political perspective? After all,
the communitarian therapeutic described above might not be
so far detached from the earlier quotation of Marx’s second
thesis on Feuerbach.6 Despite the fact that the very term seems
6 In a recent paper called “Le sujet productif,” Pierre Macherey points
out the importance of Marx’s Capital (rather than the young Marx)
for Foucault’s analysis of power in its positive mechanisms: “dans
une conférence donnée à Bahia en 1981, publiée sous le titre imagé
“Les mailles du pouvoir” (...), Foucault confirme explicitement ce
rapprochement. Il y déclare : « Comment pourrions-nous essayer
d’analyser le pouvoir dans ses mécanismes positifs ? Il me semble que
nous pouvons trouver, dans un certain nombre de textes, les éléments
fondamentaux pour une analyse de ce type. Nous pouvons les trouver
peut-être chez Bentham, un philosophe anglais de la fin du XVIIIe
siècle et du début du XIXe siècle, qui, au fond, a été le grand théoricien
du pouvoir bourgeois, et nous pouvons évidemment le trouver aussi chez
Marx, essentiellement dans le livre II du Capital. C’est là je pense
que nous pourrons trouver quelques éléments dont je me servirai pour
l’analyse du pouvoir dans ses mécanismes positifs. » (DE IV, p. 186)”.
Pierre Macherey, “Le sujet productif,” available online: http://philolarge.
hypotheses.org/1245#more-124 [last accessed May 2014].
1 28 KARL LY DÉN
to play in completely different registers, it could perhaps be

useful to establish the links between the practice of truth
in Epicurean communities and the process in which “[m]an
must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking in practice.” And without entering
the debate itself, one could note that it was in the immediate
continuation of this idea that Rancière framed his then still
Marxian critique of Althusser in Althusser’s Lesson (2011).
Because it is by rereading the third thesis on Feuerbach that
Rancière reproaches Althusser for ascribing the young Marx’s
argument that “circumstances are changed by men” (rather
than the party) to Feuerbach—a thesis which ends with a
sentence very fitting in this context: “The coincidence of
the changing of circumstances and of human activity or
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood
only as revolutionary practice.” (Marx 1969, 13)
But how does this relate to the context of cognitive capital-

ism? Are there any strategic potentials in the care of the self
to be realized under a new division of labor where “the con-
ditions of the process of social life itself have come under
the control of the general intellect and been transformed in
accordance with it?” (Marx 1973, 706) As a matter of fact,
even the concept of the self has been done away with in a
contemporary conjunction of neuroscience and philosophy.
To popularize his critique of the notion of the self, Thomas
Metzinger developed the metaphor of the Ego Tunnel:
“Modern neuroscience has demonstrated that the content of
our conscious experience is not only an internal construct but
also an extremely selective way of representing information.
[...] Therefore, the ongoing process of conscious experience
is not so much an image of reality as a tunnel through reality.”
(Metzinger 2009, 6) But as some critics have noted, “Metzinger
is not discrediting the very notion of a “self”, so much as he is
describing what a “self” actually is.” (Shaviro 2011) The merit
of the tunnel, then, is its non-anthropocentric features: taken
as a metaphor not only for the self but also for collective
techniques of the self as outlined by Foucault in 1982, the
inner landscape of the tunnel must be shaped not by an indi-
vidual brain and nervous system, but rather by a collective.
The care of the self as expressed in a set of truth acts, and
even shaping of the formal conditions for such acts, has to
transform into the collective shaping of a communist set of
practises, cares, and acts of truth as the cures for our most
acute pathologies. That is to say, one would have to with-
draw together with others and form separate communities,
whether it is in small suburban gardens like the Therapeutae
or in other places, in order to embark on the collective care
of the self and others that amounts to the construction of a
communist tunnel.
And while there seems to be no exit from a tunnel which

constitutes our immediate and ultimate experience of the
world, the only strategy which remains is the one of invert-
ing the it. Creating a communist tunnel and–in a peculiar
spatial logic–inverting it: like a three-dimensional Mobius
strip, merging its interior of a classless community with that
which is outside.
1 30 KARL LY DÉN
Aglietta, Michel, 1997. Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme.

(2nd edition). Paris: Editions Odile Jacob.
Althusser, Louis, 1969. “Contradiction and Overdetermination,”

trans. Ben Brewster, in For Marx. London: Penguin Books.
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& Giuseppina Mecchia. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
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Comme Sortie de la Crise du Capitalisme Industriel,” in I.SY.S. –
MATISSE UMR CNRS Université Paris 1 n° 8595. Available online:
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%20alii%20-%20Le%20capitalisme%20cognitif%20comme%20sortie
%20de%20la%20crise%20du%20capitalisme%20industriel-%20CAP-
ITALC.PDF [last accessed April 2014].
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London: Verso.
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Workerist Reading of Marx and the Concept of Biopolitical Labour,”
in Post-Fordism and its Discontents. Amsterdam: Jan van Eyck.
Foucault, Michel, 2012. Du Gouvernement des Vivants: Cours au

Collège de France, 1979-1980. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil.
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Collège de France, 1983–1984. Trans. Graham Burchell. Hampshire:
Palgrave/Macmillan.
Foucault, Michel, 2010. The Government of Self and Others: Lectures

at the Collège de France, 1982–1983. Trans. Graham Burchell.
Hampshire: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Foucault, Michel, 2008. Le gouvernement de soi et des autre: Cours

au Collège de France, 1982-1983. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil.
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at the Collège de France, 1981–1982. Trans. Graham Burchell.
Hampshire: Palgrave/Macmillan.
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Foucault, Michel, 1995/2001. “Pour un Chronique de la Mémoire

Ouvrière,” in Dits et écrits I, no. 117, p. 1267.
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idées mais son savoir est partiel par rapport au savoir ouvrier”,
Dits et écrits I, no. 123, s. 1289
Foucault, Michel, 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the

Collège de France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham Burchell. New
York: Picador.
Foucault, Michel, 2003. Society Must Be Defended, trans. David

Macey. London: Penguin/Allen Lane.
Hansen, Morten Balle, “New Public Management in Danish and

Swedish state and in Administration Patterns of Adoption.” Available
online: http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/egpa/org/2010Toul/Papers/Morten_
Balle_Hansen_EGPA%202010.pdf [last accessed April 2014]
Harvey, David, 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
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Polity Press.
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http://philolarge.hypotheses.org/1245#more-1245. [last accessed April
2014]
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Penguin Classics.
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Works, Volume One. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 13-15.
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parti-ouvrier.htm [last accessed April 2014], made from the French
original in: Jules Guesde, Textes Choisis, 1867-1882, Editions sociales,
1959, pp.117-9
1 32 KARL LY DÉN
Metzinger, Thomas, 2009. The Ego Tunnel. New York: Basic Books.
Rancière, Jacques, 1999. Disagreement. Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press.
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Negri, Antonio, 2004. Time for Revolution. New York: Continuum.
Vercellone, C., Historical Materialism 15 (2007), pp. 13-36

1 33
SECTIO N 2

Capitalism and its Responses
1 34
YANN MOU LIE R BOU TA NG 1 35
Mental Quilombos in the Production

of Value: Flights and Counter-forms
of Mania Under Cognitive Capitalism
in a Postcolonial World.
Does Exit Triumph Over Voice in

Producing Necessarily Psychosis?
Flight, exodus, secession have represented alternative tactics

of dependent labor refusing domination as well as exploitation
to voice solutions in antagonism, what Hirschman had called
“exit solutions” (Hirschman 1970). The constitution of a revolu-
tionary subject since Renaissance has shown that melancholia
appears each time after various types of hopes of a radical
transformation of society have been defeated. Bipolarity of
the mood is frequent and produces a mix of alternative and
successive hysterical political collective feelings of, on the one
hand, superpower, and on the other, a floating depression.
1 36 YANN MOUL IER BOUTANG
Under the regime of cognitive capitalism, that is increasingly

investing, involving and exploiting all the brain, how is this old
dialectic of the subject renewed? In order to understand this
very peculiar form of pathology of the mind, we propose to
draw a parallel between the historical experience of Quilombos
of the slaves1, a typically postcolonial revisit of the fight be-
tween the master and the slave, and the Web utilizing the decla-
ration of Independence of James Barlow to make the argument.
What are the conditions for a mental Quilombo that would
create a sustainable TAZ [Temporary Autonomous Zones,
as delineated by Hakim Bey]?
I shall explore the following points. In the first part, I will

examine how Melancholia has replaced the antic and medieval
Acedia and what Gordian Knot has woven a thread between
Melanchton and Dürer on the one hand, and Benjamin and
Althusser, on the other. In the second part we take the exam-
ple of a true historical secession–after that of the Roman
plebs–when the runaway slaves in Brazil create a real utopia
and revivify the old commons that Enclosures had just de-
stroyed in Europe. Then I will ask what about the future of
the new Commons through a short examination of the con-
temporary forms of Quilombos. The third part is dedicated
to some of the main features of trade in the new primitive
accumulation of third capitalism: raiders, privateers, pirates.
In the fourth part and conclusion, we will isolate what char-
acterizes the succinct conditions of cognitive capitalism: the
capture of intangibles hard to codify, to enlighten what are
the conditions of a sustainable Quilombo of the Mind.
1 For further reading on this point see my book from 1998, From slavery
to wage labour (PUF, Paris), which has been released in English by

Brill, Netherlands. In a second moment we try to characterize the
historical experience of the Brazilian quilombos and the old Commons
destroyed in the late XVII-XVIII by the enclosures.
MENTAL QUILOMBOS IN THE PRODUCTION OF VALUE 1 37
1. The moment Melancholia and politics

The defeat of the promises of Humanism can be read in Italian
painting when one places side by side The resurrection
of Christ by Piero della Francesca of the San Sepolcro2
(1463-1465) and The Lamentation Over the Dead Christ
(1480) by Andrea Mantegna. “Renaissance” was not used,
as a term then and was only invented much later, by the
French historian Jules Michelet. Representational models
depict ethical relations: on one hand the hope of an evangel-
ist Church and of a faith in Christ are depicted in Greek and
Latin standards of the body and on the other a suffering
Gothic model in which the body seems smashed down.
Piero della Francesca died in 1492, triple year of the discov-
ery of the New World, of the Reconquista (fall of Granada)
and of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. Less than fif-
teen years after these events, three seminal books for the re-
shaping of subjectivity in modern politics were released:
The Prince by Machiavelli (1513), In Praise of Foolishness
by Erasmus (1511) and Utopia by Thomas More (1516).
Albert Dürer’s famous The Angle of Melancholia was engraved
in 1514. Erwin Panofsky’s interpretation of this master-
piece as a self portrait of the artist (Panofsky and Klibansky
1964) also fits relatively well within this conjuncture.
2 The most beautiful painting in the world according to Aldous Huxley.
Albert Camus writes in Noces (1938), “C’est sur ce balancement qu’il

faudrait s’arrêter, singulier instant où la spiritualité répudie la morale,
où le bonheur naît de l’absence d’espoir, où l’esprit trouve sa raison
dans le corps. S’il est vrai que toute vérité porte en elle son amertume,
il est aussi vrai que toute négation contient une floraison de ‘oui.’ Et ce
chant d’amour sans espoir qui naît de la contemplation peut aussi figurer
la plus efficace des règles d’action: au sortir du tombeau, le Christ
ressuscitant de Piero della Francesca n’a pas un regard d’homme. Rien
d’heureux n’est peint sur son visage – mais seulement une grandeur
farouche et sans âme, que je ne puis m’empêcher de prendre pour une
résolution à vivre. Car le sage comme l’idiot exprime peu.”
What is astonishing in the angel’s eyes is the absolute

acuteness of the look mixed with something like disap-
pointment and/or despair. Thomas More concludes his
chapter “Of the Wars and the Religion of the Utopians” in
his Utopia with the following statement that Machiavelli
could have also signed: “I may rather wish for than hope
after.” Hereafter, Melancholia will become a positive af-
fect of modernity and the psychopathology per excellence
of politics. Melancholia expresses clearly a distance,
even secession from the power it inherited from the legacy
of another important disposition of the mind in Antiquity
and medieval Christianity, acedia. In order to unpack this
term I hope the reader will not mind a small detour.
In Q. 35 in the Second Part of his Summa Theolog-

ica, Thomas Aquinas identifies Acedia with “the sorrow
of the world” (Weltschmerz) that “worketh death” and
contrasts it with that sorrow “according to God” de-
scribed by St. Paul in 2 Cor. 7:10. Acedia is an affect that
regards not problems of the subject with himself, or with
instances of the self–unconscious and conscious for ex-
ample–but problems with the entire world. In this respect
it is both a matter of politics and something distinct from
neurosis, verging on what Freud referred to as the charac-
teristics of psychosis, that are beyond that which can be
cured by analysis.
For Aquinas, Acedia is “sorrow about spiritual good in as

much as it is a Divine good” (Aquinas 1557). It becomes a
mortal sin when reason consents to man’s “flight” (fuga)
from the Divine good, “on account of the flesh utterly pre-
vailing over the spirit.” Acedia is essentially a flight from
the world that eventually leads to not caring even that
one does not care. It abolishes desire and hope. The ulti-
mate expression of this is a despair that ends in suicide.
Acedia is quite near sloth, laziness and a refusal to work
or participate in any activity. In a way it is the utmost sin,

since it despairs of the whole creation and hence of God.
The modern period that starts with what we call the Ren-
aissance has totally excised the negative connotation
conferred upon the antique and medieval meaning of ace-
dia, turning it instead into a percept close to madness but
with a positive tonality. This movement affects not only
the humanists of the early XVI° century. Pascal on the
contrary, stands for a devaluation of all forms of activi-
ties– entertainment–that diverts man from confrontation
of his nothingness compared to the infinity of God.
If melancholia does not produce the same kind of exit at-

titude that Acedia does–intelligence seems at its highest
peak–it nevertheless conveys an impression of powerless-
ness in action. All the Machiavellian virtù cannot over-
take unpredictable fortuna. Phillip Melanchthon on the
Protestant side, along with Thomas More and Erasmus
had dreamt of reconciliation between different forms of
Christianity3. The three were impotent to achieve that
goal and soon war erupted in Europe, which would last
for more than a century. Bipolarity of power and authority,
(the Prince or the Emperor and the Summum Pontifex or the
Pope) then later represented as either Church or Science
and Humanities, reappears as the opposition between the
authority invested in the principle of the word, represen-
tation or painting and political power. The original excite-
ment that believes in the power of words gives way to a
more lucid allowance of the impotence of the clerks.
3 Philipp Melanchthon who had written great part of the Augsbourg
Confession (1530) was soon accused of weakness, indecision and

melancholia (black tempered). The moment was the apex of the financial
crisis of the Roman Catholic Church after the failure of the last of the
kind of derivative products (trade in Relics/traffic in Indulgences and
Purgatory) trying to convert in cash (works) the Christian faith.
The Angel of Melancholia of Albert Dürer (1514)
Melancholia’s bipolarity fits exactly the description of

maniacal depression. Unlike Acedia, the fault does not
fall any more to the person there who is inhabited by a
devilish contempt of the world, but to history itself of
missed opportunity (to kairos).
MENTAL QUILOMBOS IN THE PRODUCTION OF VALUE 141
Acedia by Hieronymus Wierix (1553–1619)

2. Romantic melancholia after

the defeat of 1848.
Before coming to our digital epoch of “historical disease”
(Nietzsche 1874) let us examine the romantic melancholia
that fed subjectivity after the defeat of the Great Revolution
and the 1848 upheaval in Europe. In The Contemplations
(Third Book, 1856) Victor Hugo writes about Melancholia.
This poem expands a sharp criticism of industrial labor but
what gives it its taints of Melancholia is an acute feeling of
powerlessness in front of the triumph of capitalism and the
great industry.
Victor Hugo asks:
Où vont tous ces enfants dont pas un seul ne rit ?

Ces doux êtres pensifs que la fièvre maigrit ?
Ces filles de huit ans qu’on voit cheminer seules ?
Ils s’en vont travailler quinze heures sous des meules ;
Ils vont, de l’aube au soir, faire éternellement
Dans la même prison le même mouvement.
Accroupis sous les dents d’une machine sombre
Monstre hideux qui mâche on ne sait quoi dans l’ombre,
Innocents dans un bagne, anges dans un enfer,
Ils travaillent. Tout est d’airain, tout est de fer.
Jamais on ne s’arrête et jamais on ne joue.
(….)
Travail mauvais qui prend l’âge tendre en sa serre,

Qui produit la richesse en créant la misère,
Qui se sert d’un enfant ainsi que d’un outil !
Progrès dont on demande : « Où va-t-il ? Que veut-il ? »
Qui brise la jeunesse en fleur ! Qui donne, en somme,
Une âme à la machine et la retire à l’homme !

Que ce travail, haï des mères, soit maudit !
Maudit comme le vice où l’on s’abâtardit,
Maudit comme l’opprobre et comme le blasphème !
Dieu ! Qu’il soit maudit au nom du travail même,
Au nom du vrai travail, sain, fécond, généreux,
Qui fait le peuple libre et qui rend l’homme heureux !4
4 Where do these children go for whom nobody laughs?

These sweet, pensive beings wasted away by fever?
These eight year-old girls you see walking alone?
They go to work – fifteen hours in the mill;
They go from dawn to dusk, eternally repeating
The same motions in the same prison.
Stooped beneath the teech of a somber machine,
A hideous monster that chews who-knows-what in the shadows,
Innocents on the chain gang, angels in some hell,
They work. All is bronze, all is iron.
Never do they stop and never do they play.
(...)
Evil work that takes tender youth in its grasp,

That produces wealth by creating misery,
That uses a child like one more tool!
Progress of which we ask: “Where are you going? What do you
want?”
That breaks youth in bloom! that gives, in sum,
A soul to a machine and yanks it from a man!
That this work, hated by mothers, be cursed!
Cursed as a degenerative vice!
Cursed as damnable, cursed as blasphemy!
O God! be it cursed even in the name of work,
In the name of true work, healthy, fecund, generous,
That makes the people free and makes man happy!
Hetzel’s illustration of Melancholia by Victor Hugo (1880)
In this illustration by Pierre-Jules Hetzel it is important to

notice the eyes and mouth formed in the shape of gears in
a terrifying monstrous all consuming machine as well as
clouds of smoke which on one hand produce connotations
of a fire eating dragon but on the other the surface gyri and
sulces of the two hemispheres of the brain.
3. The modern melancholia
Now we come to the modern melancholia dominated by

the defeat of revolutionary communist subjectivity. Walther
Benjamin and Louis Althusser represent both the failure of
the project of modernity and the Bolshevik revolution. The
suicide of Walter Benjamin in 1939 occurring simultaneously
with the unthinkable alliance between Hitler and Stalin broke
the back of any hope for victory of leftist factions exemplified
in the Spanish Revolution but also in Europe. Another corner
stone is the 1956 Hungarian Revolution that provided an op-
portunity to many communist activists, to depart without
noise from their party. Louis Althusser’s psychopathic murder
of his wife nine years before the final double falling down of
the Berlin Wall and two years later the end of the USSR plus
the bloody repression of the Chinese Spring, anticipated the
end of left wing ideology as a global force. While André Gorz
had said “bye bye to the Proletariat” Althusser had made a
clamorous declaration at Terni and Venice in 1978 about
Marxism being just bullshit and for the first time in his life
adopted a public position against the French Communist
Party (Althusser 1978). After the failure of the “cultural revo-
lution” in China (1966-1976) and the absorption of the 1968
events, the manic depression of Althusser was a symbol far
more spectacular of the impossibility to create a new subjec-
tivity. Further investigation of Althusser’s biography, which
he had vetoed for so long, soon revealed the cyclical character
of his maniacal psychosis and its correspondence with the up
and down of the political cycle. Modern negativity therefore
corresponded to a process of reification beyond the figure of
the grand bourgeoisie or marginal aristocrat but characterized
a pathology of revolutionaries as well.
Depression has sprung from the failure of the hope of trans-

formation of humanity, which was a throw off of the true
answer to Zarathoustra’s new gospel. That is to say that the
end of Man as a logical conclusion of the death of God;

man’s secularity had brought him to a form of atheism in
which as superman he or she became totally responsible for
his actions with the full weight that that responsibility en-
tailed. If we turn back to our present, which means from
1968 up today, we see the emergence of two conditions
which promote a new hope of transformation. First the ro-
mantic hope of liberation from domination and not any
more of exploitation. Communism had defined as a precon-
dition of the new transformation a liberation that embraced
quite different and sometimes opposite trends like liberation
from colonialism and imperialism. Secondly the struggles of
minorities against discrimination of race, gender, cast.5
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s these movements reached
an apex. But their capacity to disrupt capitalist order was
progressively blurred by the entrance by a long term stagna-
tion of capitalism its so called the B phase of a Kondratiev
cycle—precariousness and underemployment. Instead of re-
unifying the working class something quite the opposite oc-
curred; a splintering and segmentation of it occurred resulting
in a phase of self-reflexive inquiry into questions concerning
what defined work and the working class began popping up.
That is to say that ognitive capitalism adds a new difference
between the creative classes beyond their material differ-
ences instead substituting, it, as Bernard Stiegler has pointed
out, with differences in access to knowledge (Stiegler 2004).6
5 For further information on this subject please see Frantz Fanon’s
Essays, Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays (1969), The

Wretched of the Earth (1961) and Che Guevara’s Radical Writings on
Guerrilla Warfare, Politics and Revolution.
6 See B. Stiegler’s, “Proletarisation: La prolétarisation est, d’une manière
générale, ce qui consiste à priver un sujet (producteur, consommateur,

concepteur) de ses savoirs (savoir-faire, savoir-vivre, savoir concevoir
et théoriser)” available online: http://arsindustrialis.org/prolétarisation
[last accessed April 2014].
4. Post modern melancholia?
From 1985 to the present day we have entered a new era for
subjectivity. The fast expansion of information and communi-
cation technologies has stimulated the constituency of a homo
numericus within cognitive capitalism very different then
the New Man promised by the Maoist Cultural Revolution.
This great transformation of economic value, organization
of work and of capitalism as a global and pervasive and intru-
sive system (Boutang 2012) was not only an “objective
transformation” of the economic infrastructure, but also a
mutation of work: without which such transformation would
not have been possible. The entrenchment between private
appropriation of surplus value of activity in general as a social
and global result (and not only of waged work) and free ac-
cess platforms, what can be called “communism of capital,”
has fostered rational and utopian hope for liberation of man
through collective intelligence, contributory economy, free
software, peer to peer economy, wiki platforms, crowdfund-
ing for social entrepreneurship etc. Among researchers, politi-
cal activists, ‘geeks’ and hactivists in the decade between
2003 and 2013, a vivid and somewhat fierce debate began be-
tween optimistic versus pessimistic analysis. I must confess
that by psychological disposition of mind, I have never been
melancholic or Saturnian. Therefore I was soon classified as
an apologist of cognitive capitalism verging dangerously to
indulgence towards a new kind of Saint-Simonism, what Mat-
teo Pasquinelli has criticized as the “Californian digitalism”
(Pasquinelli 2008) who was supporting diabolic Gaffa
[Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple] against the old mate-
rial industrial capitalism. Beside psychological considera-
tions, standing for a deliberate optimism of the reason, and
not of the will, I persist and sign on for political reasons.
For example, towards a Marxist and the operaist tradition,
to which I owe a great part of my education, I retain only
useful passions that increase the conatus and joyful passions.
The great melancholy of Dürer as well as its modern form

of maniac depressive psychosis do not provide any help
for a reconstruction of a revolutionary subject, on the con-
trary, it reveals quite accurately disappointment and disil-
lusionment of a given period of history. No doubt that
many hopes of transformation of society and flight of cap-
italism were lured, to quote Stefan Sweig, to its Confusion
of Feelings (1927), “Being itself beauty, youth has no
need of transfiguration. In the superabundance of its vital
forces, it is allured by the tragic and in its inexperience, is
prone to accept the embraces of melancholy.” The French
translation of German is still more evocative, reading,
“The Youth […] is inclined to be allowed to be sucked the
lifeblood out of by the melancholy.”
Should we describe the golden age of the web and the

spell that has followed the discovery of the creative power
of the multitudes and the raising contributory economy of
Wikipedia as the hypo maniac phase of hacktivism and
expect the B phase of depression? A sort of Kondratiev of
the mind? I am not sure. I suspect more that the tale of
psychopathology or psychosis to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The more you indulge in melancholy the more
you become melancholic, and with the assistance of med-
ical institutions today you soon will finish a kind of psy-
chotic, mysteriously linked to the low part of the curve of
political mood. To this dominant story in the Western
mind of Revolution, I would oppose another story or tale
of a sort of pharmacon (drug, remedy and poison): the
flight or exodus in the quilombos during the first capital-
ism (slavish mercantilism) and the lesson that can be
drawn for our present disease.
5. Quilombos in the History and Old Commons
Utopia was but a book and Thomas More finished beheaded

in 1535 (canonized four hundred years after by the Roman
Catholic Church as saint for political leaders). Attempts of
concrete utopias as “the aspiration to a society of justice”
(A. Colombo) ended in medieval and modern Europa in the
burning fire for witches and those found guilty of various
heresies. These dismal events were another additional source
of melancholia together with the three aborted revolutions
(the English, the French and the Russian ones).
However, outside European tradition, we encounter in the New
World an historical tradition that has transformed flight and exit
into truly liberated territories: quilombos (Brazil) or palenques,
in Spanish Latin America. Most of the inhabitants of quilombos
(called quilombolados) were runaway African slaves. Some-
times these escaped African slaves have been sheltered them-
selves by other minorities of marginalized descent such as
Portuguese, Jews and Amerindians. The Quilombo dos Palmares
was a self-sustaining republic of escaped slaves from the
Portuguese settlements in Brazil, “a region perhaps the size of
Portugal in the hinterland of Bahia” (Braudel 1984, 390). More
than 2,100 quilombos were identified under colonial Brazil.
Exit was the reaction of slaves to their capture and transporta-
tion from Africa, as well as a reaction to the exploitation in the
plantations. In fact it was also a true agrarian revolution be-
cause by so doing, run away slaves occupied the humid forest
(mata) and the fertile land growing sugar cane. Open and
claimed secessions were not the only forms of these liberated
zones. Less studied and more successful in the long run were
the urban quilombos inside Recife that have created the model
of informal employment and the favelas. Although quilombos
had been receding during the 19th century with the increase of
European immigration, it created a real means through which
individuals gained access to land, through what was called
usucapio (capture of property by continuous usus and fructus).
So succesful were these ventures that Lula’s second govern-

ment introduced a ‘right to reparation’ for the descendants of
quilombolados that had been expelled by landlords of Euro-
pean small colons of the XIX and XX centuries who become
successful farmers. These territories were innovative: they
exchanged with the rest of Brazil. Beekeeping provided the
first food, soon becoming part of more elaborated foods which
were sold outside of the quilombos to get access to powder,
arms even if little metallurgy was practised (Dirceu 2011).
These former slaves from Benin were excellent at extracting
and purifying gold and by the way they even consulted the
Portuguese King on how to not to be cheated on the value of coins.
What is fascinating is that in these quilombos experiments,

in order to survive, these former slaves created new forms
and systems for the social division of work that relied upon
polyandry consisting of structures of habitation with the
woman and mothers leading to family structures which allotted
lands to men through very sophisticated rules for cultivation.
A man who was not fulfilling his tasks was deprived from
the use of the land and naturally he had no right to appropri-
ate the surplus. Departing from Harold Demsetzr’s superficial
analysis of the use of land by Hudson Bay Indian tribes,
that gave birth to the legend of the “tragedy of commons,”
Elinor Oström has demonstrated that governance of tres-
passing, access, usus, fructus–with no private abusus, defini-
tive transfer of property rights but provisory concession to a
group or community–was and is still a much better way to
manage complex ecologic systems, for example, adminis-
tering limited fish resources. One could produce from the
quilombos experience a theorem: the higher the degree of
flight from dependant labor, the deeper auto-organization,
the wiser, more sound and sustainable the governance of the
famous population/resources problem. Its opposite, central-
ization through the State, as well as decentralization by mar-
ket tools, had proved very destructive of the environment.
For how political and social structures arise in regards to

private property management and interest is quite obvious.
As far as public good and the State are concerned this result
is less evident. However as H. Heller has shown in 2002,
state property without any community to enforce intelligent
use of land and natural and cultural resources has been proven
to create “a disaster of the uncommons.” The cases of America,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, i.e. all countries where an aboriginal
population, was scattered and/or destroyed by European
colonials is instructive in this regard.
6. Our news Quilombos and future of the Commons
Now moving on to digital and post industrial capitalism the

question arises, how are exit spaces for subjectivity con-
figured in our developed and already industrialised world?
A world in which information and knowledge are not scarce
although some scarcity could be maintained artificially?
Has not science and technology gone far beyond traditional
knowledge and old Commons?
We suggested above that bitterness or melancholia as a pecu-

liar modern affect, the feeling of ineffectiveness: the failed
utopian project of a society of justice from Renaissance
to Enlightening, from English Revolution to Bolshevik revo-
lution. Melancholia was also about codification of human
activity in the Procrustean bed of dependant labor since
in a capitalist world be it mercantilist or industrial, laziness
in the mind, physical refusal of work (absentee) were part of
the constitution of an alternative subject. But a third compo-
nent should be added from the colonial legacy: the quilombo
tradition. It could assume all forms of traditional commons
including escaping to the margins of Nation-States. Any
movement of separation from the bitterness of mercantilist
slavery was constituted by, as we noticed, the sweetness of
quilombos, although they were defeated in the long run.
But what happens in the age of real subsumption of labor

under capital? In the beginning of the age of the Internet a
new form of liberation took place. It was not that much
concerned with exploitation. Any kind of immaterial work
on the Web seemed autonomous and free from the factory, the
individual boss. Exploiting the muscle only brings tiredness
and sometimes (for intensive sport) serotonin. Exploiting the
brain (attention but also knowledge, games) requires a pre-
liminary development and expansion of capacities. So who
would care about capture of your personal data, your privacy
by a hidden robot or eliminating advertising from the white
page of Google? In the deluge or tsunami of data who could
not feel freer to act and navigate than in the desert world of
scarce goods except for “millionaires”? The Declaration of
Independence by John Barlow and the first steps of disclosure
of privateer property by the General Public Licence made by
Richard Stallman both sounded like a truly New Age mantra
with its Christian guru to whom the Anabaptist and somewhat
prophetic culture had really prepared the American audience.
However very soon, by the end of the 1990s a new melancho-

lia had arisen embedded as it was in the post-modern milieu.
A melancholia or secret saudade [regret, nostalgia] erupting
out of the fact that modernity was now behind us. This deep
feeling sprang from a kind of disappointment. The New Con-
tinent of peer-to-peer collaboration, the realm of abundance
and gratuitousness did not remain unpolluted by merchants
and traders. A new kind of immaterial beekeepers appeared.
They accepted host human interactivity in technological
platforms from search engines to the cloud and started to put
clickers at work a long time before anyone was really aware
of it, so called software agents. It was, and is still very clever,
since this kind of click work is not regulated by either the
state or by any trade-unions and is not rewarded by any cash
reimbursement. This form of industrial profit turned out to
create and capture a gigantic amount of positive externalities.
In few words we assisted in the rise of massive primitive

accumulation of cognitive capitalism (Boutang 2012). Non
standard historians, and economists,, including the group
Midnight Notes (G. Caffentsis, S. Federici) who were born
from the Review Zero Work on the end of the 1970, soon
followed with documented analysis (M. Rediker, P. Linebaugh,
J.W. Scott, S. Federici, E.P. Tompson) returned to the historical
antecedents to discover the defeat of surging antagonistic
subjects (pirates, witches, thieves, smugglers and poachers) in
order to confront the birth of absolutism and primitive accu-
mulation (XVI-XVIII). Massimo de Angelis in his 2007 The
Beginning of History: Value, Struggle and Global Capital, has
drawn a parallel between the actual situation and this key period
for the setting of conditions of capitalism. The great tale of this
desperate fight is supposed to infuse an optic of kinetic resist-
ance, rebellion, revolt the episodes of which are only dedicated
to slowing the pace of the race toward ubiquitous capitalism,
even if it is in vain, at the end of the road. In such a perspective,
the existence of free spaces on the Web will not last since they
have already been colonized and the hypothesis of a massive
expropriation of the virtual quilombos be it by the big Gaffa and
the little dragons or with the tidying by the state as shown by
the various attempts of Hadopi, Lopsi, Acta is considered as in-
escapable; a powerful factor of discouragement and melancholy.
But is that the whole story? What period of history shall we
choose to understand our times? The late period of Parliamentary
enclosures (XVII’-XVIII’) or the period of the deserted village?7
The destruction of piracy in the Caribbean by the end of the
XVI’? Or the Magna Carta moment (Lindebaugh 2009)?
What is annoying in this history of the big disaster of the vic-
tory of capital is that it puts aside or neglects a completely
different hypothesis: that flight and fight have had a much
more decisive impact on capitalism than we tend to imagine.
7 For further information on this point I discuss it in my book From
Slavery to Salariate (1998).

That is to say the resistance was not in vain because it has

transformed and shaped deeply the kind of capitalism that
resuletd from this antagonism. In intercultural and transcultur-
ation models the relation modifies both workers and capitalists
(Ortiz 1942). Continuous flight and fights (Exit and Voice)
achieve radical transformation. This was the precious legacy
of Tronti’s book Operai e Capitale, a true Copernican revolu-
tion in matter of constituency of capitalism as an historical
process and capital as a unstable relationship and not a thing.
7. Raiders, privateers, piracy, trade in the primitive

accumulation of the third capitalism
The battle about new enclosures is rather confused. Those

who were pirates (Pirate Bay), hackers, crackers soon
discovered that capitalist are also privateers. For more
information on this subject we can look at the analysis
of biopiracy by Vandana Shiva and her fight against it.
Matteo Pasquinelli has introduced the concept of parasite
to characterize cognitive capitalism (Pasquinelli 2008).
However the technicalities of viruses have been invented
by developers. On the other hand, privateer as rent seeker
of human activity and not only of wage labor could be a
good definition of Web 2.0. devices.
With the capitalist use of Web 2.0 techniques of traceability
of human interaction (from Google through to social networks)
leisure, alternative consuming, dreaming of Art, independ-
ence of science, activity as time outside the grid, sociality,
emotions, are not quilombos but more similar to Jesuit
reductions facing the new Bandeirantes.8 Nowadays, the
fablabs, the digital canteens, are haunted by head-hunters.
8 Bandeirantes were soldiers and mercenaries raiders employed by the
Brazilian planters to capture new slaves or to get back the run away slaves.
The incubators of start-up get invitations from big companies

to join them or share their ideas with them most of the time
for a dish of lenses. Does this picture necessarily indulge
in melancholia?
This new melancholia as it was first discovered by the Frankfurt
school concerned how the media and communication in-
dustry, subsumed the entire society and was described in
the “situationniste société du spectacle” from Guy Debord
to Jean Baudrillard (Debord 1995 and Baudrillard 1987).
Now we have a digital department of the Frankfurt School.
Sometimes this consciousness or fear of an already announced
defeat brings social activists to retreat or flight in anti-stress
techniques like new age literature.
Sometimes it falls into rage, a “no future” hatred syndrome
self-enclosed in more and more isolated ghettos for radicals,
something little more effective than confinement in a mental
ward. But has this ghetto something in common with the antic
quilombos? I shall say that this attempt of secession was never
achieved. The state of slavery in the real and juridical world has
the advantage of being really overpassed. The symbolic and
virtual slavery or alienation is much more difficult to suppress.
8. A little detour: Cognitive capitalism as capture

of intangibles 2
Cognitive capitalism in the age of digital networks and tech-

nologies of information and communication is a new inter-
acting system—not a structure—for capturing economic value.
Value can be globally defined as the capture of any positive
externality or avoiding the compensation of negative exter-
nalities, for any private agent, or state. It springs from produc-
tion, but production is not anymore production of commodities
by the means of commodities. It is bio production of life
and biosphere produced by relations and only through cir-
culation. It is also accumulation of living activity remaining
alive in the consumption of resources (Boutang 2011).
What is accumulated is knowledge acting and living and not

dead knowledge, or codified knowledge that does not produce
positive externalities. Hence value is seriously different from
Marx’s definition of exploitation when he faced mercantilism
and the fast rising fabric capitalism.
To extract economic value from human interactivity that

I call human pollination,9 the third capitalism or cognitive
capitalism must get through Caudine Forks, or as we might
refer to them as the new contradictions of the “materialist
dialectic.” Firstly one must keep human activity and labor
as living hence develop the brain in a body at a level that
was anticipated by Marx as only reachable in the communist
phase as described in the Grundrisse, i.e. as a general and
common intellect equipped by digital technology and linked
by networks. Controlling this “invention force” (Lazzarato
2010) is much more complicated than the former proletari-
anization. There is the necessity of taming this new force
to perform adequately. Depriving the labor force from its
means of production has not been an easy task. All the vio-
lence of primitive accumulation was needed. The old com-
mons was not a geographical margin for the expansion
of a sort of gas capitalism occupying all the space available.
The space was not available; it was already occupied and
defended. Taming the just freed serfs and peasants and fixing
them by putting them to work in factories took four hundred
years. And the most difficult was to reshape, reformate their
minds and the subjectivity. Humiliating the poor in European
society, and through the extraction of absolute surplus
value, enslaving huge part of the new labor force as was
done by the market helped by the absolute Nation State.
9 For further information see my own book L’abeille et l’économiste,
Paris: Carnets Nord, 2010.

Primitive accumulation of cognitive capitalism however

is a much more complicated task. Subjection of the forces
of invention needs to compete with an unavoidable con-
dition; that of extracting value from the living. A much
higher degree of liberty and socialisation is required if
you want to capture innovation and collective intelligence
which is by far the most valuable and hegemonic part
of value today.
In order to crop positive, externalities cognitive capitalism

must extend the margins of liberty, destroy the wall of the
old fabric, empower society and encourage many “hundred
flowers campaigns” like those of Mao.10 Communism of
capital, this capital not the old industrial one, means only
that the bases of exploitation now include quilombos with-
out destroying them. It needs the creativity of digital
quilombos, innovation distributed in society and not their
reduction to melancholic boarders in mental wards. When
profit depends on crowd sourcing, crowd design, cloud
computing the apparatus of control and discipline is not for
expanding generalized melancholia in which the possibility
of the end of work might be its conclusion. No, the most
used tool is now the apparatus of burn out. A continuous
although non-linear praise of the expense of the brain in
cooperation and care networks “à la Georges Bataille” in a
permanent potlatch! (Bataille 1933) But do not think that
the flight towards the shadow kingdom of melancholia has
the same virtue than the one of Dürer. Nervous breakdown
and permanent stress are the true pathology.
What are the objective limits to the control of the brain under
a regime of cognitive capitalism?
10 Between February and April, 1957 Chairman Mao launched the
Hundred Flowers Campaign [ ].

The first one regards codification of positive externalities

by transforming them into knowledge or information
goods and then into quasi-public goods. Commonly pro-
duced goods and producers and consumers are more and
more reluctant to produce, use and consume through the
market inasmuch as they are more and more complex and
inter dependant.
The commoditization of incorporated knowledge, science
and technology into products and services was achieved
through juridical and artificial conventions palliating indi-
visibility, non-rivalry and non transferability and difficul-
ties to copy. So cheating was difficult and traceable. The
revolution of the information and communication new
technologies has destroyed easy and durable enforcement
of intellectual property rights. Digital Rights Management
has been a failure and a constant battle Cognitive capitalism
meets another difficulty: trespassing IPR has devaluated
their prices and the kind of externalities most valuable are
related intangibles that cannot be codified, meaning care,
learning, attention, intelligence in act, competence, cooper-
ation, trust, tolerance, love. Even if you measure it (for ex-
ample, the audience of a book, of reputation) it is too fickle
a phenomenon to be able to predict or produce it. There is
no manual for making a best-seller. Uncertainty is systemic.
The solution found by cognitive capitalism is to capture
the traces of interaction, personal data, through Web 2.0
arrangements, such as search engines, platforms for coop-
eration, innovation, and social networks.
But this is raising now a great political debate about per-
sonal data, privacy, digital citizenship and cyber liberties.
Good morning for a new cycle of struggles on the rights
of the cybercitizen. The quilombo cannot be attacked by
armies and reduced unless cognitive capitalism decides to
trade off its internal platform and new fabric for an imagi-
nary political order achieved through counterevolution.
For the time being, he has two big problems with material
and industrial capitalism just like the later had problems

with the slavish mercantilism. I see no internal reasons why
cognitive capitalism will commit suicide. The liberation
process is at the same time to big, as the absolute condition
of wealth, and to feeble (the quilombo has not reach the ma-
turity of getting rid of which the reign of scarcity).
New commons are the fundamental condition for the survival
of capitalism under its new avatar. Promotion, extension and
protection of the news digital commons should make profit
of the experience of the old commons.
Let us take the experience of the terra nullius principle that
has destroyed the ancient commons. Open source and public
domain promoting the end of all copyrights but also unlimited
supply of positives externalities for market activities are a sort
of modern “terra nullius.” To avoid depressive exhaustion
of the resources of the mind in networks some new rules of
protection of collective knowledge should be instituted on
the basis of creative commons (Boutang 2010). These rules
cannot exclusively rely upon public and state policies,
inasmuch states through private/public partnership very
often are preparing old and new commons to a privatization.
Let-us ask the thorny question: “Is cognitive capitalism still

capitalism?” It seems that answering “yes,” we will be brought
back to the revolving failure that has fed melancholia and
various forms of psychopathology of the revolutionary mind
since the Renaissance. I believe that the new great transforma-
tion of capitalism into its third regime and dispositif is creating
new margins of liberty at the very moment it tries to block its
commonism. Remember how the Wall Street Journal that had
praised Empire, was reluctant to praise the Multitude and enraged
with how Commonwealth’s authors treated “cattivi maestri”
[bad masters]. On the one hand cognitive capitalism promotes
free access, interaction, pollination, in a certain way similar to the
way communism or digital commoners in the virtual world do.
On the other hand, it re-enforces IPR and captures intangibles.
By so doing, as soon as it makes more visible the huge produc-

tivity of human interaction free to pollinate it recreates tools
of control at a meta-level in the cloud. The modern question
of the enclosures will have to face the question of the property
rights (i.e. the modalities of appropriation) of big data.
Naturally, creative labor and cognitive labor stands less and
less for old forms of hierarchies and promotes distributed
non-hierarchical forms through the web instruments of direct
democracy of Wiki politics which I have explored elsewhere
(Boutang 2011). To what extent will cognitive capitalism
open a fork in the road, rerouting the organization of society,
will depend on conflicts about the space of liberty.
Richard Stallman has fought against the Open Source movement
in late 1995. Open source is not copyleft. It allows cognitive
capitalism to use positive externalities without any limitation, nor
reconstitution of them. The same has to be done for open data.
Open knowledge must achieve a sustainable model of produc-
tion, consumption and circulation of intangibles 2.
What would need to be avoided is precisely reducing exter-
nalities and intangibles to cash machine like it as has been
done in the brutal management of universities as if they were
mills of old capitalism, while cognitive capitalism is trying to
mimicry the academy and peer to peer evaluation processes.
The second mistake to avoid is reducing intangibles, non-codified
knowledge, intangibles 2 to codified intangibles 1 like evaluating
everything through quantitative indexes computed in Excel tables.
Such is the prescription that I would formulate to handle the psy-
chopathologies of the cognitive capitalism. Digital quilombos do
not need mental homes for maniac depressive psychosis, let us
leave that kind of horrible medicine to industrial capitalist.
Don’t cry, don’t smile, just understand as Spinoza used to say.11
11 As Baruch Spinoza wrote in Tractatus Politicus (1677), “non ridere,
non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere” [not to laugh, not to weep,
not to curse, but to understand].
BIBL IOG RA PHY 161
Althusser, Louis, 1978. Ce Qui ne Peut Plus Durer Dans le Parti

Communiste. Paris: Maspéro.
Aquinatis, S. Thomae, 1557. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Malo, Quaestio

11, De Acedia. Et habet articulos Quatuor. S.C. Selner-Wright (trans.)
Washington: The Catholic University of America Press (2011).
Bataille, Georges, 1949. La Part Maudite précedé de La Notion de

Dépense. Paris: Minuit (2011).
Baudrillard, Jean, 1990. Cool Memories. London: Verso.
Debord, Guy, 1995. The Society of the Spectacle. New York:

Zone Books.
Hirschman, Albert O., 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Responses to

Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Lazzarato, Maurizio, 2002. Puissances de l’Invention. La Psychologie

Économique de Gabriel Tarde Contre l’Économie Politique. France:
Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond.
Moulier Boutang, Yann (September 2001). “Marx in Kalifornien:

Der dritte Kapitalismus und die Alte Politische Ökonomie” in
Marx en Californie : le Troisième Capitalisme et la Vieille Économie
Politique, Communication au Congrès Marx International III,
Section Économie. Available online: http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/
98BOPR0,0,Marx_in_Kalifornien:_Der_dritte_Kapitalismus_und_die
_alte_politische_%d6konomie.html Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte
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Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1873. On the Use and Abuse of History. New York:
Cosimo (2005).
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Stiegler, Bernard, 2004. De la Misère Symbolique. Paris: Galilée.

1 62
AR NE DE BOEV ER 163
A Fiction of the Great Outdoors:

The Psychopathology of Panic
in Robert Harris’ The Fear Index
Looking Back
In my contribution to the first volume of the series of books
related to the “Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism”
conferences that Warren Neidich, Jason Smith and I launched
in Los Angeles in November 2012, I wrote some sentences
about speculative realism, specifically about a passage from
the “Ancestrality” chapter of Quentin Meillassoux’s book
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency,
that now strike me as not very well thought out (see Boever
2013, 108). I want to come back to those sentences here,
since my clarifications of what I wrote then will lead directly
into the subject of the present article, namely panic as a
psychopathology of cognitive capitalism.
In the passage that I commented on, Meillassoux asks about

the meaning and truth-value of “scientific statements bearing
explicitly upon a manifestation of the world that is posited
as anterior to the emergence of thought and even of life—
posited, that is, as anterior to every form of human relation
to the world” (Meillassoux 2008, 9-10). In my article, I read
this question about science as a question for philosophy:
how could philosophy make such statements—speculatively,
as I wrote, but with the realist authority of science?
1 64 ARNE DE BOEV ER
It was in this context that I introduced literature, and specifi-

cally fiction: for it seemed to me that Meillassoux’s question
applied particularly well to fiction, a speculative discourse
that, in the case of realism for example, makes claims that have
a certain truth-value (different from science, even though some
realists have thought about their work as a kind of science).1
The issue seemed perhaps particularly pertinent to me (as well
as to some others working along these lines) because I am of
the opinion that fiction, like philosophy and science, thinks
(see Gourgouris 2003). What are the grounds for this thought,
in particular if it were ultimately to pertain—as thought—to
a manifestation of the world anterior to every form of human
relation to the world? How could fiction, which seems so
wrapped up in the human-world relation, ever aspire to this?
Clearly, and this is the part of my reading that I now take issue
with, these questions remained within the limit, or at the
limit, of science, of a science that makes statements of the
kind that Meillassoux describes—about “the age of the
universe, the date of the accretion of the earth, the date
of the appearance of pre-human species, or the date of the
emergence of humanity itself” (Meillassoux 2008, 9). But
while we may be at science’s limit here, there is of course
no reason why we would have to stay within it, in the same
way that if we pursue this question at the limit of fiction,
there is no reason why we would have to stay within its limits
and limitations. It may indeed be that, when pushed all the
way, fiction would crumble in the face of these questions.
1 I make this statement even if these claims in the overwhelming
majority of cases still involve humans.

A FICT ION OF T HE G REAT OUTDOOR S 165
In what follows, however, that does not turn out to be the

case—at least not for fiction. With science, as we will see,
it’s another story. So my ‘corrective’ attempt is to nuance
my previous use of both the terms ‘science’ and ‘fiction’ in
order to see what possibilities for fiction remain within the
speculative realist optic.
Fiction and the Great Outdoors

What follows is driven by a fascination with what Meillassoux,
early on in After Finitude, calls “the great outdoors,” and
specifically by the relation of that ‘great outdoors’ to literature.
In Meillassoux’s words, the great outdoors is:
the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside

which was not relative to us, and which was given as
indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing
in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or
not; that outside which thought could explore with the
legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory—of being
entirely elsewhere. (Meillassoux 2008, 7)
As such, it poses a challenge to what Meillassoux calls corre-

lationism, or thought that is caught up in the relation between
reality and its human perceiver. If this is the case, then this
great outdoors poses a formidable challenge to literature and
specifically realist fiction as it is traditionally practiced.
Others have picked up on this. In his book Alien Phenome-

nology, Or What It’s Like to Be a Thing, in which Meillassoux’s
great outdoors is a recurring concern, Ian Bogost notes
that literature’s “preference for traditional narrative acts
as a correlationist amplifier.” “Whether empathy or defa-
miliarization is its goal,” he adds, “literature aspires for
identification, to create resonance between readers and
the human characters in a work” (Bogost 2012, 40-41).
The ‘whether’ clause is important: for it thus seems that

even literature that would mess with traditional narrative—
literature that would defamiliarize—would still be caught
up in the correlationist bind, as long as it aims to create
resonance between readers and characters. It may be, then,
that it is nearly impossible for literature to break out of
this bind—unless the literature in question is something
like Ben Marcus’ The Age of Wire and String, discussed
later on in Bogost’s book, and characterized by Bogost as
“incomprehensible” (Bogost 2012, 82). It’s “within that
incomprehensibility” (ibid.), he argues, that something like
a literature of the great outdoors becomes possible.
Interestingly, some of the work associated with Meillassoux’s

philosophy has been literary: Cyclonopedia, Reza Negarestani’s
cult ‘novel’ (if we can still call it that), has already had an
important symposium dedicated to it (see Keller et al. 2012),
and the event brought together some of the most impor-
tant voices in contemporary speculative realism. Indeed,
Meillassoux himself has taken on the question of literature
in his work. His second book to be translated into English,
The Number and the Siren, is a study of Mallarmé’s ex-
traordinary poem Un Coup de dés—and it’s an impressive
demonstration of how his philosophical thought can be de-
veloped through a meticulous, obsessive reading of a work
of literature (see Meillassoux 2012). However, Un Coup
de dés is of course a poem, and one that lends itself particu-
larly well to Meillassoux’s thought. What about the great
outdoors and the rest of literature? Graham Harman has
pointed to the weird fiction of H.P. Lovecraft as a key re-
source for his object-oriented thought (not the same as
Meillassoux’s philosophy, but related to it) (see Harman
2012). Indeed, it’s worth noting that Meillassoux himself
has written about fiction in an essay titled “Metaphysics
and Extro-Science Fiction” (see Meillassoux 2010).
I would now like to briefly review this latter text since its
argument will prove to be of central importance to the reading
of Robert Harris’ novel The Fear Index that I’d like to develop.
It is in fact through this review that the ‘corrective’ of my use
of the word science in my earlier text can occur.
Indeed, it becomes quite clear from the opening pages of this

essay on fiction that Meillassoux has very little intention of
holding on to science. Distinguishing between two regimes of
fiction, one which he labels science fiction (SF) and one which
he labels extro-science fiction (XSF), he points out that as
far as its relation to science goes, SF preserves the existence
of science. In SF, science “may be profoundly transformed,”
he writes, “but there will always be science” (Meillassoux
2010, 27). In XSF, this is not the case: XSF thinks “worlds
outside science,” “where experimental science is impossible
in principle, rather than unknown in fact” (ibid.). It’s the
latter that Meillassoux finds significant—not because he is
particularly interested in fiction, but because the distinction
between SF and XSF enables him to lay out a conceptual
distinction that he deems to be of philosophical interest.
So whereas I suggested, in my earlier text, that Meillassoux

was interested in how science makes speculative statements
that have truth-value, with a realist authority, and whereas
I read this interest at the time as a challenge to philosophy
and the statements it makes, the interest in fact seems to
go in quite a different direction. Specifically, it’s from the
philosophico-fictional terrain of XSF that experimental
science is rendered impossible—that the conditions of
science are destroyed, as he announces toward the end of
his essay, even though consciousness is still possible. There
is something that emerges from the great outdoors that
challenges the science that operates at its limit—to such
an extent that this science enters into its impossibility.
However, this may be the very site where philosophy

and fiction are liberated—can be legitimately let loose on
foreign territory, to recall Meillassoux’s words. As he sees
it, “[t]he guiding question for XSF is: what could a world
be like, for it to be in principle inaccessible to scientific
knowledge; for it to be incapable of being established as
the object of natural science?” (Meillassoux 2010, 28)
Meillassoux’s discussion revolves around “Hume’s problem,”

familiar to readers of After Finitude. The problem involves
a billiards match, “during the course of which the laws of
dynamics cease to apply” (Meillassoux 2010, 30). How can
we know, Hume asks, “what truly guarantees—but also, what
persuades us—that physical laws will continue to hold in a
moment’s time, given that neither experience nor logic can
assure us of this?” (ibid., 31). Meillassoux goes on to discuss
Karl Popper’s answer to this question: Popper argues that
‘nothing could guarantee it, but moreover that this was a good
thing, since there is nothing fantastic about these possibilities
—they must be taken entirely seriously’ (ibid.). This is,
Meillassoux points out, the SF answer: “Popper tells us that
new experiences could refute our theories; but he never doubts
that the existing, canonic experiments will always produce the
same results in the future” (ibid., 35). He thus confuses Hume’s
problem, which is ontological, with an epistemological problem.
Meillassoux argues, however, that Hume was interested in
something else: “Hume’s problem mobilizes another
imaginary, the imaginary of extro-science fiction, a fiction of
a world become too chaotic to permit any scientific theory
whatsoever to be applied to reality anymore” (ibid., 36).
To illustrate, but also to further his thought on the problem,

Meillassoux turns to an Asimov story: it captures the XSF
imaginary, since “a totally unforeseen event ... comes to pass” in
it; but it’s ultimately an SF story since this totally unforeseen
event appears to still be explainable by the laws of science.
That is why, Meillassoux argues, the story works: narrative

needs this SF resolution, and a world of “pure chaos, a pure
diversity ordered by nothing” risks rendering fiction impos-
sible. In other words: with the XSF imaginary, fiction is
able to go where science cannot—and evidently some kind
of thought still happens there.
I will skip now, in the interest of time, the crystal-clear pages

on Kant that follow in the essay, where the possibility of
this “some kind of thought”—consciousness—is discussed.
I want to list, instead, the possibilities of XSF worlds
with which Meillassoux’s essay concludes: type one worlds
would be “irregular, but not enough to affect science or
consciousness”—as he notes, these worlds are not extro-
science “in the strict sense since they still allow the exercise
of science” (Meillassoux 2010, 50) (this redeems my reading
of science in relation to his work in my earlier text some-
what); the irregularity of type two worlds “is sufficient
to abolish science but not consciousness”—these worlds,
he notes, “are the real extro-science worlds” (ibid., 52);
finally, type three worlds “represent lawless universes in
which disordered modifications are so frequent, that …
the conditions of science and those of consciousness alike,
are abolished” (ibid., 56-7).
Which brings him to his final question: how to write XSF?

He lists three solutions: first, “[introduce] just one rupture with-
out cause or reason” (he summarizes this as ‘catastrophe’);
two, “nonsense” (this recalls Bogost’s discussion of the Ben
Marcus novel); or, three, write “stories of uncertain reality,
those in which the real crumbles gradually, from one day to the
next ceasing to be familiar to us” (Meillassoux 2010, 60). It’s
this third solution that he considers to ‘[express] most faithfully
the XSF genre.’ Meillassoux summarizes this as “the dread
uncertainty of the atmospheric novel,” and notes that there
probably aren’t enough of these around “to constitute a genre.”
Indeed, at the beginning of his essay, too, there are some

genre-related worries: some might argue, he notes, that
the SF genre already includes the XSF genre and that it
thus makes no sense to separate between the two, in fact
that the SF genre contradicts the very distinction he is try-
ing to make. Like him, I think this is not a worthwhile ar-
gument, in part because I am of the opinion that XSF is
not a genre—in fact, we do it harm to locate it under SF.
One could ask here in what kind of contexts this experi-
ence of dread uncertainty is most profound: in recogniz-
ably weird contexts, where the literature we are reading is
explicitly, openly trying to break with traditional narra-
tive (as Graham Harman seems to think when he pro-
poses H.P. Lovecraft’s weird fiction as the key resource
for object-oriented ontology); or in familiar contexts,
where the literature we are reading is realist, but is in-
fected nevertheless by an incomprehensibility that begins
to corrode fiction at large.
My own position is the latter, and as a consequence I

don’t think of XSF as a genre but as a modality of writing,
which can be practiced in any genre. It may of course be
that certain genres lend themselves better to it than others,
and it certainly may be that SF is one of those genres.
Given Meillassoux’s description of what he calls “the at-
mospheric novel,” however, and the ways in which in
such novels “the real crumbles gradually, from one day to
the next ceasing to be familiar to us,” I think a case could
be made for the realist novel—of course, written in a cer-
tain modality—as a good genre for the practice of XSF.
As the title of Harman’s book already reveals, this very
distinction between ‘weird’ fiction and ‘realist’ fiction
may be precisely what is under discussion here, since the
point of the XSF modality would arguably be to reveal the
weird as real, and the real as weird.
It is this deconstruction that I will now pursue in my reading

of Robert Harris’ The Fear Index (2012). A finance novel
set against the background of the so-called ‘flash crash’ of
2010, the day when the Dow Jones Industrial Index suffered
the biggest one-point decline in its history, The Fear Index
records Dr. Alex Hoffman’s psychopathology of panic to the
point of his near self-destruction. Alex’s becoming-panic is
linked in the novel to what, in the first volume of this series,
I have argued to be a common trope of contemporary finance
fictions: psychosis. Indeed, given that Alex is first and fore-
most a scientist, Harris’ fiction, set in Geneva and including
references to both Mary Shelley and Charles Darwin, links
this trope to an even more common one: the mad scientist.
What interests me in light of the novel’s representation of

panic, however, is how these tropes are also resisted in The
Fear Index: whereas the novel at first sight appears to buy
into the cliché of the mad scientist/psychotic money-man,
its ending clearly puts this cliché aside so as to (impossi-
bly) affirm the reality of the psycho-economic breakdown
it records. Psychosis cannot be blamed for this madness:
instead, The Fear Index delivers something like a ‘capital-
ist realism’ (to loosely borrow Mark Fisher’s term, see
Fisher 2009), backed up by science. This requires us to
open ourselves up to what I will call, adapting this term
from Meillassoux’s work “the great outdoors” (Meillas-
soux 2008, 7) of realist fiction: an outside that literature,
“whose preference for traditional narrative acts as a corre-
lationist amplifier” (Bogost 40-41), to use Bogost’s words
again, has difficulty writing. My psycho-political argument
will be, however, that in order to work through the pathol-
ogy of panic, we must open ourselves up to this great out-
doors, indeed let ourselves go in the face of it, so as to
begin to write anew the individual and collective fictions
by which we live.
A Panic Novel
The Fear Index tells the story of twenty-four hours in the
life of Dr. Alexander Hoffmann, from the moment when he
receives a copy of the first run of the first edition of Charles
Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Ani-
mal (1872) and is leafing through it in the study of his sixty
million dollar house in Geneva, Switzerland, to when he is
lying unconscious in bed at the city’s University Hospital,
badly burnt and with multiple fractures. On the night when
he receives the $10K Darwin book in the mail—he later
confirms that it was ordered and paid for by him, even though
he cannot remember doing so—, Alex has a violent run-in
with a home invader who appears to have had knowledge of
the codes to dismantle his house’s state of the art security
system (his house, like his office, most closely resembles
a fortress). Throughout the day, more evidence comes to
light suggesting that someone is using his email account in
an attempt to ‘destroy’ (FI 138) him. “Someone’s really after
me,” he confesses to his business partner, Hugo Quarry. ‘Out
to destroy me bit by bit’ (FI 144). And it’s not only Alex
who is under attack: whoever is behind this is attempting to
take down his company as well.
The company in question, Hoffmann Investment Technologies,

is a hedge fund. Asked by the policeman who has come to in-
vestigate the home invasion, Jean-Jacques Leclerc, what it
makes, Hoffmann dryly replies: “It makes money” (FI 23).
Like others in the finance world, Hoffmann came to Switzer-
land ‘in the nineties (at the height of the era Hugo describes
as “the coke and call girl glory days,” FI 73) to work for
CERN [European Organization for Nuclear Research], on the
Large Hadron Collider’ (FI 22). After about six years of
working as a physicist, he was lured away by the world of fi-
nance: not because he wanted to work for a bank—he makes
that quite clear to Hugo when he comes to recruit him—but
because this world enables him to progress with his research

on autonomous machine learning (CERN had to contain it be-
cause an algorithm he had designed went out of control and
started affecting its systems like a virus). In a speech to the
team he’s working with at the hedge fund, he insists that “it’s
never been just about the money” (FI 234; indeed, Leclerc
notes that Alex’s library does not contain a single book about
money, FI 28). Instead, he thanks them for the scientific
progress that they have made. In this economic case too, how-
ever, it appears that the algorithm that Alex has created has
gotten out of control, and now it is Alex himself who will try
to shut it down. That’s what the plot of the novel amounts to:
it’s a story about a mad-scientist-gone-hedge-fund trying to
pull the plug on the digital life-form he has created.
The story of course rings a few bells: set in Geneva, it recalls,

first of all, Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein (1818), and
Harris includes references to this text in his novel. Many of
the novel’s chapters are introduced with quotes from books by
Charles Darwin, not just the already mentioned Expressions of
the Emotions but also On the Origin of Species (1859) and The
Descent of Man (1871). What makes Harris’ novel unique, and
uniquely contemporary, is that these two sources of inspiration
are combined with the world of economics: other mottoes
introducing the novel’s chapters are taken from Bill Gates’
Business @ the Speed of Thought—this text is also explicitly
credited in the novel as the source for Hoffman’s idea for an
‘entirely digital’ company (FI 53-54)—, or from various other
luminaries in the world of high finance. Thus combining eco-
nomics with genetics and literature, Harris’ novel aligns the
story of Alex’s personal downfall and the downfall of his
company and sets this already powerful tale against the back-
ground of the so-called ‘flash crash’ of May 6th 2010, the day
when the Dow Jones Industrial Index suffered the biggest one-
point decline in its history. (The novel’s general background is
the austerity crisis in Europe, particularly in Greece, FI 49.)
By the end of the novel it is not entirely clear whether this

crash is indeed merely background: it may actually be that
the algorithm Alex has created—or ‘fathered,’ as the language
of the novel suggests (FI 149, 215, 232, 262); though it is
not always clear who is the father and who the child (Alex
is also referred to as ‘babyish’ in the book’s opening and
closing pages, FI 16; 286)—is responsible for the crash.
What is certain is that it ends up making a huge profit from
the collapse, and without raising suspicions with the regula-
tors: Hoffman Investment Technologies makes “a profit out of
the crash of four-point-one billion dollars,” one of its analysts
remarks, “and the beauty of it is … that that represents only
zero-point-four percent of total market volatility” (FI 283).
In other words: not significant enough to trigger an investi-
gation. This huge profit, divided in bonuses among the com-
pany’s employees, will silence everyone who has witnessed
the algorithm’s actions. The only one who had said he would
complain—the company’s risk assessor—is conveniently
killed off by the algorithm, who uses the elevator in the
company’s headquarters to get the employee out of the way.2
As its title reveals, this is a novel about fear, and more specifi-
cally panic—both at the personal level, and in its mass form as
when, for example, ‘the market’ panics (references to theorists
of masses and groups accumulate in the novel, cf. FI 28).
2 This is perhaps a reference to the Dutch director Dick Maas’ tech-
horror flick De Lift, remade for international audiences as Down.

As many reviewers have noted, Harris’ book echoes other classic films
of tech-horror: Alex’s algorithm recalls Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space
Odyssey, for example, and the scenes toward the end of the novel
in which Alex is trying to shut the algorithm down mirror the scene
in Kubrick’s film when Dave is trying to shut HAL down—“This
must be the cortex,” Alex muses when he arrives at the algorithm’s
central control unit, as if it actually has a brain; later on, ‘reluctance’
is attributed to the algorithm (FI 260).
A FICT ION OF T HE G REAT OUTDOOR S 1 75
In fact, Alex’ body in the novel becomes something like the

site where the panic of the market is played out—it’s a ‘body
economic,’ so to speak (I use the phrase here in parallel with
the more familiar term ‘body politic’), and one that—like the
body of Victor Frankenstein’s creature—risks to come apart
at the seams (FI 100). In the state of panic—private, public—
Alex is indeed turned into a creature, a being not only in
between human, and animal life, but also digital life; someone
who has lost all control over the determinants of his existence.3
Early on in the novel, when Alex is on the tracks of the un-
known man who has invaded his house, he can still insist that
while he is afraid, ‘he felt no panic’ (FI 13). “Panic was quite
different to fear, he was discovering. Panic was moral and
nervous collapse, a waste of precious energy, whereas fear was
all sinew and instinct: an animal that stood up on its hind legs
and filled you completely, that took control of your brain and
muscles” (FI 13). Some forty pages later, however, when he
finds out he did not place the Darwin book order that originated
from his email account, “the confidence leaked from his voice
and he felt almost physically sick with panic, as if an abyss was
opening at his feet” (FI 65). Another eighty pages later, when
he realizes that his marriage is disintegrating because of the
crises in which he has landed, “[p]anic welled inside him
again” (FI 142). At his office later on, he tries very hard not
‘to create a panic’ among the traders; but as the crisis around
the algorithm grows, ‘panic’ (FI 258) invades their minds and
their bodies anyways. In the genre of the finance novel,
The Fear Index can clearly be categorized as a panic novel:
as that particular subgenre of economic fiction that focuses on
the panic that is produced by (and produces) a market crash.
3His wife’s art arguably evokes this state: ‘”n the coffee table in front of
him was one of Gabrielle’s early self-portraits: a half-metre cube, made
up of a hundred sheets of Mirogard glass, on to which she had traced
in black ink the sections of an MRI scan of her own body. The effect was
of some strange, vulnerable alien creature floating in midair” (FI 18).
Indeed, one of the things that sets Alex’s algorithm—and

algorithms in general—aside from humans is that “they
don’t panic” (FI 84). “And that’s why they’re so perfectly
suited to trade on the financial markets” (FI 84). However,
what makes Alex’s algorithm particular is that at the same
time, it thrives on human panic. Here’s how the novel
describes the logic of its operations: as Alex, Hugo, and
co. see things, today (as opposed to for example during the
Cold War era of mutually assured destruction) “digitaliza-
tion itself is creating an epidemic of fear.” “The rise in mar-
ket volatility,” they argue, “is a function of digitalization,
which is exaggerating human mood swings by the unprece-
dented dissemination of information via the Internet” (FI
86). Alex’s algorithm is a way to make money out of this
situation: it monitors panic on the world wide web, and
trades on the basis of the data it collects there, thus making
huge profits out of human emotion. One of the potential
investors of Hoffmann Investment Technologies refers to
this as “behavioral finance,” thus splicing Darwin and
economics together.
An autonomous machine-learning algorithm, the VIXAL-4

(as it is called) is “only likely to become more effective”
“[a]s it collects and analyzes more data” (FI 88). The novel
suggests, however, that this algorithm grows a little too
smart for its own good, crashing the market while arranging
its trades in anticipation of a colossal crash, and thus making
a huge profit from this collapse. It’s this particular situation
that Alex tries to prevent. However, even though it initially
appears he shut the algorithm down, the novel closes with
the reality that it is still trading—and that we cannot do much
else than obey it. While Alex is out in his hospital bed, his
business partner Hugo resumes work at the office, giving
“the slightest bow of obeisance” (FI 285) to the algorithm
spying on him through a hidden camera—and increasing
Hugo’s profit by the minute.
Pan’s Pharmacology
Obeisance: it’s a gloomy conclusion, to be sure, and one
that very much taps into the age-old ‘fear of technology’ or
‘technophobia’ that may strike many now as ridiculous. In
the case of The Fear Index, technophobia becomes linked to
digitalization (one could speak of high-technophobia) and
the economy—in short, to digital economy. The novel can
be read as an evocation of what I would like to call, splicing
the French words for economy, the digital, and panic together,
‘éconuméripanique’—a pathology that is characteristic of
our age. One can consider here, for example, the work of a
contemporary theorist of panic, who has approached panic
within the parameters that the novel sets up: the Italian
thinker Franco “Bifo” Berardi.
Let’s recall, for a moment, the classical origins of the word

‘panic’: it can be traced back to the Greek god Pan. Half goat,
half human (like a Satyr), he was the god of the wild, of
shepherds and of flocks; and also of hunting and rustic music.
Associated with sexuality (polygamy, eroticism, masturbation,
rape, lust, etc.) and fertility, and a companion of the nymphs
(many of whom suffered a terrible fate because he pursued
them), he was usually worshipped in a natural setting—a cave,
for example. Some theories have it that he’s the son of Zeus.
Others suggest that he’s the son of Hermes (and the nymph
Penelope of Mantineai—apparently, she later became confused
with the Penelope from the Odyssey, and Pan was thought to
be the son of Penelope’s intercourse with all of her 108 suitors...).
Probably one of the oldest gods, many have also noted that
he is the only god who dies. “Pan o megas tethneke!” [The
Great Pan has died!] was a cry that was popular with the
Romantics, because it evoked the loss of human beings’ re-
lation to nature—to “the overwhelming flow of reality, things,
and information that we are surrounded by” (Berardi 2009a,
44), as Bifo puts it in his book Precarious Rhapsody.
As our contemporary use of the word ‘panic’ also reveals,

‘panic’ was not necessarily a ‘comforting’ relation. Pan’s
unseen presence produced feelings of panic in human
beings who were traveling through remote, lonely places
of the wild. But at least as long as Pan was alive, human
beings still had some relation to nature.
Some are suggesting that today, this relation is gone.

Today, ‘panic’ names a psychopathology of cognitive
capitalism—a pathology produced by a contemporary
economic situation in which the mind and the brain
have become the new focus of laboring. One of the
theorists of this new form of capitalism, Bifo has re-
peatedly discussed panic in his work on this subject.
Noting, perhaps a little too positively, that “[o]nce,
panic used to be a nice word” (the feelings produced by
Pan’s unseen presence can hardly be called ‘nice’!),
Bifo points out that:
[t]oday, panic has become a form of psychopathology.

We can speak of panic when we see a conscious
organism (individual or social) being overwhelmed
by the speed of processes he, she is involved in, and
has no time to process the information input. In these
cases the organism, all of a sudden, is no more able
to process the sheer amount of information coming
into its cognitive field or even that which is being
generated by the organism itself.
(Berardi 2009a, 44)
In short: no more relation! Returning to panic a little later

on, he writes: “The mental environment is saturated by
signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a perma-
nent electrocution, which leads the individual mind as
well as the collective mind to a state of collapse” (ibid., 45).
He articulates the issue in both a temporal and a spatial

way: it’s associated with the acceleration of time, while the
problem is particularly present in urban environments.4
So whereas the ‘nice’ Pan is associated with the countryside,
the ‘evil’ Pan is associated with the city.5
In his book After the Future Bifo returns to the topic of panic.
Here he writes about what he now refers to as the “city of
panic,” a phenomenon I’d be inclined to call (with reference
to Plato’s utopian kallipolis) a dystopian panipolis. According
to Bifo, and others who have argued the same, the ‘urban
territory is increasingly traversed’ by panic. He refers to
Salman Rushdie’s 2001 novel Fury as a book that describes
this situation: “Rushdie depicts the virtual class nervous
system, a social class of producers of signs as well as a class
of people living a common condition of evanescence and
existential fragility: cellularized splinters, fragments in a
perpetual abstract recombination of connected terminals.”
“Anxiety’ is ‘growing’ in the city, ‘the urban libidinal
economy’ is ‘going insane.’ ‘In the city of panic, there is no
longer time to get close to each other; there is no more time
for caresses, for the pleasure and slowness of whispered
words” (Berardi 2011, 94-5). Once again, it’s the end of a
relation that seems to be at stake.
4 Stiegler too has noted the ‘urban’ dimension of the panic-related
phenomena he is describing, and he notes that “we are now all, or

nearly all, urban” (Stiegler 2013, 89).
5 In fact, things are more complicated than this: the ‘nice’ Pan was
already a little bit evil... But let us leave Bifo’s terms as they are:
I read Pan in a more pharmacological way. In this context, it is worth
remembering, as Jacques Derrida already pointed out, that ‘scapegoat’
is one of the meanings of the Greek word ‘pharmakon.’
It is in Bifo’s 2009 book The Soul at Work, however, that the

argument about panic is brought in relation with the economy.
“When in 1999, Alan Greenspan spoke of the ‘irrational
exuberance of the market’,” Bifo writes,
his words were more of a clinical than a financial

diagnosis. Exuberance was an effect of the drugs
and of the over-exploitation of available mental
energy, of a saturation of attention leading people
to the limits of panic. Panic is the anticipation of
a depressive breakdown, of mental confusion and
disactivation. (Berardi 2009b, 98)
The key issue, for Bifo, is thus revealed to be what he

as well as others call the ‘attention economy’: the ways
in which our attention is being captured, exploited and
destroyed under the conditions of cognitive capitalism.
However, one should not be fooled by Bifo’s shift from the

‘financial’ to the ‘clinical’: The Soul at Work is obviously
a book about labor today, about a contemporary economic
situation in which our very souls—our minds, our spirits—
are exploited at work. Once again, Bifo notes that the word
panic is associated with the god Pan. But in this case, Pan
is not just ‘nice’: he “appeared bringing a sublime, devas-
tating folly overtaking those who received his visit.” This
same ‘syndrome,’ as Bifo now puts it, has become diffused
in our time for three major reasons: “the social context is a
competitive society where all energies are mobilized in
order to prevail on the other … if one does not win, one can
be eliminated” (think of the popular contemporary Ameri-
can film The Hunger Games, or its Japanese source of in-
spiration Battle Royale). Second, “the technological context
is the constant acceleration of the rhythms of the global
machine, a constant expansion of cyberspace in the face of
the individual brain’s limited capacities of elaboration.”
And third, “the communicational context is that of an endless

expansion of the Infosphere, which contains all signals from
which competition and survival depend.” For Bifo, this situation
is “very similar … to the one pictured by the Greek etymology
of the word panic.” “The infinite vastness of the Infosphere,”
he concludes, “is superior to the human capacities of elabora-
tion, as much as a sublime nature overcomes the capacities of
feeling that the Greeks could summon when faced with the
god Pan” (Berardi 2009b, 100-101).
In Bifo’s view, and The Fear Index appears to see things the
same way, this situation is largely due to the rise of the digital.
Bifo in fact singles out the algorithms that are central to
Harris’ plot as one of the major players in this development.6
What we find here is another case of hightechnophobia: at
the end of the day, everything is blamed on the internet! In
case you need any more proof, when Alex’s wife Gabrielle
goes to visit one of Alex’s old colleagues at CERN, she no-
tices in the lobby of the Computing Center an “old computer
in a glass case.” “When she went closer, she read that it was
the NeXT processor that had started the World Wide Web at
CERN in 1991” (FI 211). It is here that another possible (but
no doubt apocryphal) origin of the word ‘panic,’ and another
meaning of the novel’s title, is revealed: “Pandora’s Box”
(FI 211), says the man who has come to meet Gabi—the box
that, famously, contains “elpis,” meaning ‘hope’ or ‘fear.’
Bernard Stiegler, too, insists on this in a related context.7
One cannot, then, but wonder whether The Fear Index, as a
novel that clearly comes down on the side of fear, may also
hold an element of hope within it—but what kind of hope?
6 In Stiegler’s work too, the ‘algorithm’ turns into something like
an enemy, see Stiegler (2011, 125).

7 ‘Elpis’ is a concern in many of Stiegler’s books. For an explicit
discussion of elpis and Pandora’s box, see Stiegler (2011, 100).

Money, Psychosis, and Science

As Bifo sees it, our contemporary social, technological,
and communicational situation has produced a state—best
visible in the city—of panic, and there is (I think we can
gather from the three reasons he gives) an economy that
is closely tied to this socio-techno-communicational panic.
The economy today thus produces a generalized state of
panic in which all of us, without exception, fall prey to this
psychopathology—to the point of losing every relation alto-
gether to “the overwhelming flow of reality, things, and
information that we are surrounded by” (Berardi 2009a, 44).
It’s to deal with this loss of relation that Alex comes up with
his algorithm. But very quickly, the algorithm itself grows
out of control, and the very means that he used to manage
the flow of information becomes part of the uncontrollable
flow of information itself—except, it is still exercising
some controlling force within it. The algorithm itself clearly
still has some kind of relation to the flow of information
of which it is a part, otherwise it would no longer be making
a profit. It is this capacity for control in a climate when
all overall control appears to have been lost (see FI 283)
that leads Hugo to desperately obey it: at least with
VIXAL-4, there still is something to hold on to. At least
around VIXAL-4, there can still be a company: it may be
one without workers, without managers—it may be one
that is a digital entity that is alive (as the company’s new
motto, probably created by the algorithm itself puts it, FI
283-4)—but at least it is still making a profit, which is all
Hugo really cares about.
The situation is different for Alex. For him, as I indicated earlier

on, it was never just about the money: ultimately, he is a man
of science and the world of finance is merely a means—it’s
what enables him to pursue his research, without constraints.
And yet, even though the world of science and finance are
obviously different, the novel also brings them in uncom-
fortable proximity to each other. One of the major causes of
Alex’ corruption that the novel pursues—and one that I have
already discussed in my contribution to the first volume in
this series—is money. In the Fear Index, money reveals it-
self to be toxic, and in that sense Alex’s work at the hedge
fund needs to be set aside from his work as a scientist at
CERN. “However, there was one great difference between
the two,” as he concedes: “You couldn’t buy anything with a
nanosecond or a neurojoule,” which is how the success of
his experiments at CERN was measured. Money, however,
“was a sort of toxic by-product of his research. Sometimes
he felt it was poisoning him inch by inch, just like Marie
Curie had been killed by radiation” (FI 141).
This discourse returns at various points in the novel, often

in relation to Alex’ wife, the artist Gabrielle, who feels
that money has turned her husband into a different person.
“What exactly have you turned into, Alex?” she asks her
husband at some point in the book. “I mean, Leclerc wanted
to know if money was the reason why you left CERN, and I
said no. But do you ever stop to listen to yourself these days?
Two hundred thousand francs… Four hundred thousand
francs… Sixty million dollars for a house we don’t need…”
(FI 135). Later on, she wonders:
[t]o take such a vaulting ambition [Alex’ talent for

science] and place it entirely at the service of making
money—wasn’t that to marry the sacred and the
profane? No wonder he had started to behave so
strangely. Even to want a billion dollars, let alone
possess such a sum, was madness in her opinion,
and there was a time when it would have been his
opinion too. (FI 250)
The trope that is delivered here is that of the ‘mad banker’:

“such greed was worse than madness,” the paragraph I just
quoted from concludes, “it was wicked—nothing good would
come of it—and that was why she needed to get out of Geneva,
before the place and its values devoured her…” (FI 250).
It is no coincidence, I think, that these thoughts about money’s
toxicity, about its effects on the human psyche, are voiced by
Alex’s wife Gabrielle, since her artwork partly consists of
revealing the materiality of the brain—its plasticity, the ways
in which it is being shaped by money, for example. The inside
of the covers of my edition of Harris’ book are printed with
images of brain scans.
This theme of money and its corrupting effect on human

beings is only intensified in the age of digital money.
Alex himself, recalling the history of money that I have
laid out elsewhere, rehearses the reasons for the increase
of risk-taking in money matters:
If the money had been in the form of bars of gold or suit-

cases of cash, they might perhaps have been more careful.
But this was not really money in the physical sense at all,
merely strings and sequences of glowing green symbols,
no more substantial than protoplasm. That was why they
had the nerve to do with it what they did. (FI 110)
In line with Gabi’s religious, quasi-exorcist discourse, the migra-

tion of scientists to the world of high finance is characterized
in the novel as a move to “the dark side,” as a Faustian deal with
“the devil” (FI 126). Once again, it’s under the conditions of the
digital economy that this corruption becomes particularly intense.
The novel ties this trope of the ‘mad banker’ closing a deal
with the devil to one that might be its direct antecedent:
the mad scientist or ‘mad professor’ (FI 6), familiar to
us through works of fiction like Shelley’s Frankenstein.
If scientists used to be the figures par excellence of world-

making, today, they have migrated into the world of economics,
and consequently it is the scientist-economists who have
become our prime figures of world-making (and -breaking).
The mad scientist—think of Stevenson’s Strange Case of
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886), another crucial reference
in Harris’ book—has thus become the mad financier, and
we have plenty of tales to prove this omnipresence of the
mad money man or woman: in a book I am currently writing,
I also look at Marion Crane (Psycho), Sherman McCoy
(Bonfire of the Vanities), Patrick Bateman (American
Psycho), Tyler Durden (Fight Club), and Eric Packer
(Cosmopolis) as examples.
However, The Fear Index’ relation to this trope of madness

needs to be assessed with some subtlety. First of all, while
the novel participates in the shift from the mad scientist to
the mad banker, it also undoes it by pushing the connection
madness-economy back to the connection madness-science.
Alex is, after all, more a scientist than an economist, and the
novel arguably asks us to consider the madness that rages in
the economy—at least the one surrounding the algorithm—
as one that predates its economic context, and was already
active within science (with the important difference that at
CERN, it was still curbed—finance sets it loose). But the
critique, I think, goes further than this.
The novel entertains the familiar hypothesis—familiar from

other finance novels, I mean—that everything that happens to
Alex may be due to his psychosis. When Alex receives an MRI
scan at the hospital after he has been hit on the head by the
man who invaded his house, some anomalies are discovered
in his brain: we learn that these may be due to the attack, or
may also suggest a pre-existing condition. When police start
looking into Alex’ history, they discover that he had a psychotic
episode while still at CERN (FI 122; depression, FI 126).
As his life starts spinning out of control—in Alex’ view, due

to acts he did not commit (ranging from the acquisition of a
Darwin first edition to the buying of all of his wife’s art on
the opening night of her gallery show) —those around him
think that this is possibly due to the psychosis from which
he may still be suffering.
The interesting thing about The Fear Index is that while

it fully entertains this familiar hypothesis—the man of
finance, or the man of science, is psychotic; he is, given
that everything happens here within twenty-four hours,
a 24 Hour Psycho, to recall Douglas Gordon’s work—
it also decidedly takes it back, thus undoing at least to
some extent the familiar connection of finance/science to
madness. Alex himself insists, at numerous points in the
novel, that he is not mad:
But I am not mad, he thought. I may have killed a

man [his attacker, whom he has traced to a hotel in
the off-the-grid red light district of Geneva] but
I am not mad. I am either the victim of an elaborate
plot to make me think I am mad, or someone is trying
to set me up, blackmail me, destroy me. (FI 210)
Indeed, the murder scene that is referred to here, initially

has the intruder, Johannes Karp, wielding a knife and
forcing Alex into the bathroom, and into the actual tub
(see FI 159)—a reference, no doubt, to Hitchcock’s Psycho,
placing Karp in the role of Bates, and Alex in the role of
Marion (this does not necessarily release him from the sus-
picion of madness, as my discussion of Psycho in volume
one of this book series reveals). Of course, any reader will
point out that there is little to no reason why we should
take Alex’ statement as reliable—in fact, if Alex is really
mad, it would be typical for him to be convinced otherwise.
And yet, the novel is largely with Alex in that it exposes that
what those who are sane in the novel perceive as madness is
in fact a reality that is fully rational: VIXAL-4 has become
truly autonomous, and is trading as an intelligence of its own,
controlling the market, making it crash, managing its trades
with this knowledge, and all the while making a profit off it.
There is a capitalist realism at work here that asks us to ac-

knowledge the reality of capital not as psychotic but as real.
In The Fear Index, psychosis cannot be blamed for the madness
of the economy. That would mean taking the easy way out, and
avoiding responsibility. Instead, the novel asks us to recognize
the weird reality of finance, and take responsibility for it.
Ultimately, while most of the characters in the novel choose

to deny it—they all seem to prefer to think that Alex is crazy;
he must have invited Karp to destroy him when he was in a
psychogenic fugue state—The Fear Index asks us to accept as
real a world that is governed by a digital organism (it controls
not only the market but it also buys books in your name, sets
up bank accounts for you, has security cameras installed in
your house, etc.). Of course, the novel is still asking us to
do so in the context of a fiction. A review in The Economist
characterizes its plot as ‘wholly implausible’—Alex is evidently
mad! (And one understands why it would be convenient for
the world of finance to blame everything on madness, and
challenge the plausibility of the plot.) However, as one other
reviewer of the novel cautions: “[I]s it fiction? Not so fast,
reader…” After all, the flash crash really happened, and up
until this day, we still do not know what caused it.8
8 One of my favorite hypotheses, one that reintroduces the material
into the immaterial world of high finance, is the ‘fat finger’ theory:
it suggests that somewhere, some banker with a fat finger hit the wrong
key on his computer keyboard, thus triggering the avalanche that led
to the crash…
Consider also, for example, a sudden market drop that occurred

in the week of April 23rd, 2013: when the Associated Press
twitter account was hacked and a message was posted there
that two bombs had exploded in the White House (this was
in the immediate aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing),
algorithms picked up on the fact that tweets combining ‘White
House’ and ‘bombing’ were trending, placing their trades
on the basis of the panic they were anticipating. The market
went into a downward spiral—for no real reason. Is it really
that far-fetched to ask us to accept, then, an economy—and
by extension a world—that is governed by algorithms,
and in which all of us are reduced to creatures—to bodies
economic—due to our exposure to finance?
A Speculative Conclusion
The question, then, especially given the ethical and psycho-
analytic overtones of the term creature and the psychopatho-
logical angle that I have developed here, is: what do we do
about it? This final question brings me back to Bifo and his
discussion of panic. As Bifo sees it, the economy today pro-
duces a generalized state of panic, in which all of us, with-
out exception, fall prey to feeling overwhelmed, to the point
of losing every relation altogether to “the overwhelming flow
of reality, things, and information that we are surrounded by”
(Berardi 2009a, 44). Bifo thus fears a state in which there
is no more relation—a state in which, some would no doubt
venture, there is also no more ‘overwhelming,’ since that is
clearly a relational notion that is caught up in the correlation-
ist set-up of a subject perceiving the flow of reality. In such a
state of panic, then, there is simply the flow of reality, things,
and information. For Bifo, this appears to be a bad state,
produced by the contemporary economic and digital situation—
and indeed, it’s a state that has us reduced to creatures (in his
film on the September 11 terror attacks, Michael Moore has
relentlessly exposed politicians’ abuse of this state).
What should be our response? Should we try to get back

to a relational model? Isn’t this what drives Alex to come
up with the algorithm, which in fact worsens the situation?
Isn’t it our very desire for relation that makes Hugo—
one of the few who realize that Alex isn’t mad, but that
VIXAL-4 has gone rogue—bow in obedience to VIXAL-4
in the closing pages of The Fear Index? Isn’t it, in other
words, with relation itself that we would need to break in
order to get out of this spiral of éconuméripanique and
regain our freedom of self-determination?9 Our freedom
to write the fictions by which we live?
There are other theorists working today for whom this

panic experience (though they do not call it such) of what
they have called “the great outdoors” could in fact mark
some kind of emancipation, some kind of liberation from
what Quentin Meillassoux calls ‘correlationism’ (thought
that is perpetually caught up in the relation between reality
and its human perceiver). Meillassoux is trying to think
a real outdoors in this context: life at the time of the Big
Bang, life after all humans have become extinct. Why
would this have us panicked? Ian Bogost (2012, 5) speaks
in this context of “the grassy meadows of the material world.”
‘The great outdoors involves,’ he writes elsewhere, ‘both
untold cosmic and worldly paraphernalia, one no longer
broken down into crass hemispheres of nature and culture’
(Bogost 2012, 38).
9 ‘Éconuméripanique’ is a portmanteau word splicing together the
French words for economy, the digital, and panic that I have used
on occasion to capture the particular state of panic that The Fear
Index diagnoses.
Let me return here for a moment to a tension in Bifo, namely

his remark in Precarious Rhapsody, that “panic once used
to be a nice word.” I have already footnoted my concern that
Bifo is overstating the case here. But it reveals something
interesting about his position: he is clearly nostalgic about a
time when we were still in relation to the overwhelming
flow of reality. Today, as a result of the workings of contem-
porary capital, we have ‘lost’ this relation. And so, in an ar-
gument of this kind, nostalgia for ‘what used to be’
inevitably lingers (he may be a pessimist precisely because
of this nostalgia, see ‘Happy End,’ see Berardi 2011, 158).
But what if the state of panic produced by contemporary
capital is comparable, in terms of its effect, to something
like what Marx and Engels call in The Communist Mani-
festo the “bourgeois revolution”: a revolution that would
melt all that is solid into air, in order to thus pave the way
for another, more radical revolution—he proletarian one?
What if contemporary capital, by its production of a state of
panic, has actually paved the way for something else,
namely the great outdoors? Could this even be more desir-
able—a panic outside of correlationism, a panic that no
longer ‘overwhelms’—a panic that is simply the flow of re-
ality? In short: a panic that is barely a panic any more—the
mere flow of reality, things, and information? A true, prole-
tarian democracy of the real? 10
10 This would be my particular spin on the argument that Alex Galloway

develops in “The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism”
(Critical Inquiry, 39.2 (2013): 347-366). He discusses the homology
between contemporary capitalism and certain trends in contemporary
philosophy. I think we can take this homology for granted—but that does
not mean that contemporary capitalism and contemporary philosophy
are doing the same thing. My suggestion would be that contemporary
capitalism paved the way—through destructive practices of speculation—
for the constructive practices of speculation of contemporary philosophy.
It is, on other words, the pharmacology of speculation itself that we
are confronting here.
My argument has been that The Fear Index begins to write

such a democracy. Indeed, what I want to ask in closing is:
what kind of novel—a non-relational novel—could come out
of such a situation? The answer takes us back to James Wood’s
“Human, All Too Inhuman” essay (Wood 2001). In this essay,
initially published in The New Republic in July 2001, Wood
takes to task some contemporary novelists—Zadie Smith, author
of White Teeth, among them—for providing a brand of what
he calls ‘hysterical realism’: novels that have become conveyors
of information, rather than stories about actual human beings.
In these novels, “[t]he conventions of realism are not being
abolished but, on the contrary, exhausted and overworked.”
Such novels are awkward “about character and the representation
of character.” They are full of “inhuman stories”—and Wood
deplores this lack of humanity. He would insist on the point
again a few weeks later, after the September 11 terror attacks.
Smith was one of those who responded. In “This is how it

feels to me,” published in The Guardian in October 2001,
she actually agrees with Wood and his plea for a more
‘human’ kind of fiction (Smith 2001). (Her real response
to his challenge came much later, in November 2008, when
she wrote her own “Human, All Too Inhuman,” a text titled
“Two Paths for the Novel,” Smith 2008.)11 My suggestion
would be, however, that at the end of The Fear Index—
a novel that would not normally be considered as part of
these discussions—another option reveals itself: what if we
did not follow Wood’s plea for a return to the human, and
what if hysterical realism was really only a step towards
the inhuman storytelling that could have been achieved?12
11 I discuss Smith’s response in chapter four of my book Narrative
Care: Biopolitics and the Novel (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).

12Literary theorist Kate Marshall has been exploring a related question
in her new research project, titled “Novels by Aliens.”
What if, in other words, we took hysterical realism a step

further, and considered the possibility of a novel of infor-
mation—a purely inhuman type of fiction that would no
longer be limited to a relation with the flow of reality but
would merely offer the flow of reality itself? Could this
amount to a ‘world literature’ in the proletarian, radically
democratic sense of the term?13 What possibilities may
lie there for the future of fiction—and how may these
possibilities already lie contained in its past? How might
such fictions help to dismantle, in the last instance, the
psychopathology of panic that affects all of us today?
13 We would need to revisit here, of course, what we mean by ‘world,’
see Bogost 2012, 11-13.

BIBL IOG RA PHY 193
Berardi, Franco “Bifo,” 2009a. Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism

and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation. Trans. Arianna Bove,
Erik Empson, Michael Goddard, et al. London: Minor Compositions.
Berardi, Franco “Bifo,” 2009b. The Soul At Work: From Alienation

to Autonomy. Trans. Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. Los
Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Berardi, Franco “Bifo,” 2011. After the Future. Gary Genosko and
Nicholas Thoburn (eds.). Trans. Arianna Bove, Melinda Cooper,
Erik Empson, et al. Edinburgh: AK Press.
Boever, Arne De, 2013. “‘All of us go a little crazy at times’: Capital and
Fiction in a State of Generalized Psychosis.” in The Psychopathologies
of Cognitive Capitalism. Part One. Ed. Arne De Boever and Warren
Neidich. Berlin: Archive Books, pp. 89-115.
Bogost, Ian, 2012. Alien Phenomenology; Or, What It’s Like to Be a

Thing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fisher, Mark, 2009. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?

Winchester: Zero Books.
Gourgouris, Stathis, 2003. Does Literature Think? Literature as

Theory for an Antimythical Era. Stanford: Stanford UP.
Harman, Graham, 2012. Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy.

Winchester: Zero Books.
Harris, Robert, 2012. The Fear Index. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Cited parenthetically as FI, followed by page reference.
Keller, Ed, Nicola Masciandaro, and Eugene Thacker (eds.), 2012.

Leper Creativity: Cyclonopedia Symposium. New York: Punctum.
Meillassoux, Quentin, 2008. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity

of Contingency. Trans. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum.
Meillassoux, Quentin, 2010. “Metaphysics and Extro-Science Fiction.”

Trans. Robin MacKay, in Florian Hecker. Speculative Solution [CD]
Falmouth: Urbanomic, pp. 25-60.
Meillassoux, Quentin, 2012. The Number and the Siren:

A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup de Dés. Trans. Robin
MacKay. Falmouth: Urbanomic.
Smith, Zadie, 2001. “This is how it feels to me.” Available online:

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/oct/13/fiction.afghanistan
[last accessed February 2014]
Smith, Zadie, 2008. “Two Paths for the Novel.” Available online:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/nov/20/two-paths-
for-the-novel/?pagination=false [last accessed February 2014]
Stiegler, Bernard, 2011. The Decadence of Industrial Democracies.

Trans. Suzanna Arnold and Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity.
Stiegler, Bernard, 2013. Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected

Individuals. Trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity.
Wood, James, 2001. “Human, All Too Inhuman.” Available online:

http://www.powells.com/review/2001_08_30.html [last accessed
February 2014]
PAS CA L GIE LEN 1 95
A Chronotopy of
Post-Fordist Labor
While light shines more than ever on our face through

computer interfaces, we get increasingly enmeshed in global
networks. We surf on the surface of the earth that seems
to become ever flatter and wetter. We bounce from one in-
formation wave to another while we lose height and depth.
Network societies have a very specific chronotopy, to rehabi-
litate a classic concept of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981). The space
and time vectors have lost a vertical dimension. Network
structures quickly lose sight of history, including their local
cultural, economic, and political anchoring. Networks have
a preference for surface and superficiality or horizontality.
In the flows of globalization we have experienced the last two
decades, the local chronotopy in which our perception of time
was connected to a geographically defined place, is supplanted
by a global chronotopy. It is now well established that world
time is ticking increasingly in an ever more uniform manner
to the rhythm of capitalism in a neoliberal choreography.
This global chronotopy has consequences for labor. Workers
need to be increasingly associative and adaptive to what
matters in global networks. Time is accelerated under the
influence of the booming creative and cultural industries,
while cultural geography disappears in the background.
In a corporate world, society is losing its time to dig deep.
1 96 PA SCAL GI ELEN
Not obstinacy, stubbornness and steadfastness, but adaptability,

flexibility and mobility allow people to survive in a global
network configuration. Today, we have to take the witticism
‘Time is Money’ literally. Time is no longer determined by a
place or a local polis, but by virtual money flows which stream
in high speed around the globe. This leads to the speeding-up
of fast changing connections, in which we not only lose depth,
but also height. Consequently, having ‘no time’ means that
you don’t have the time to stand still by yourself. Time for
(self)reflectivity is shrinking, also the time to stand above
yourself, looking at yourself while you operate in the world.
‘De-verticalization’ is characteristic of a contemporary post-
Fordist economy. In order to escape the fear of ‘being out’,
getting ‘off-line’, or being disconnected and isolated, the post-
Fordist (wo)man constantly needs to follow the trends, needs to
be ‘in(formed)’, needs to stay connected to confirm one’s own
position. But it is exactly this hyperconnectedness that warns
us constantly of the danger of being ‘dropped out’. And it is
precisely this permanent warning that prevents us from standing
still, taking time to get above ourselves, our surrounding world.
Symptoms of this ‘de-verticalization’ on the individual level
include lethargy, stress, depression, tunnel vision, burnout and
hysteria. In short, while the light from the computer interface
shines into our face, it becomes darker in our head.
During this essay I wil ask the question how we can describe
the symptoms of this post-Fordist chronotopy. How can we
define it, and how do artists react to it?
Bottomless Instantaneity
According to Félix Guattari (2000) nature, socius and
psyche are today exposed to the same principle: all three
are thoroughly ‘de-territorialized’. Post-industrial capitalism
—or ‘integrated world capitalism’, as he calls it—displaces
not only individuals and societies but also complete ecosystems.
A C HRON O TOPY O F POST-F OR DI ST LA BOR 197
This de-territorialization stimulates a general bottomlessness

in a political system which can be brought under the umbrella
term of what Christian Joppke (2007) has called ‘repressive
liberalism’. But while the sociologist Joppke relates this
concept only to immigrant policy, I generalize the principle
as a structural mechanism of liberal democracies, which is
addressed to all their citizens. This philosophy proclaims
the freedom of the individual and the post-Fordist working
condition; it encourages independent (cultural) entrepre-
neurship, embraces the creative industry, utters the rhetoric
of deregulation, and swears by the limitation of government
(regulation). At the same time, however, we can empirically
demonstrate that in contrast to the implementation of this
discourse, regulation is increasing, audits are prevalent, and
a decentralized bureaucratic machinery—privatized or
“farmed out,” to be sure—is growing rampant. Freedom,
and especially the free market, is thus embraced by govern-
ments while the regulation of that freedom is increasingly
being contracted out, and, moreover, is expanding. Hence
the seemingly paradoxical label of repressive liberalism.
By unravelling the welfare state and its solidarity struc-
tures, by the privatization of medical care, social security,
public transport and education, this political regime con-
tracts citizenship to the extent that it is both mentally and
socio-politically is without any infrastructural support. Peo-
ple are responsible only for themselves and their own sur-
vival. The responsibility for one’s immediate environment,
social context or circle becomes dysfunctional because man
continuously has to move, either mentally or physically, in
order to survive. Furthermore, those who become disen-
gaged from solidarity structures are at the mercy of the
here-and-now. These freelancers and other post-Fordist
workers have to resort to short-term thinking, as they are
obliged to quickly, flexibly and opportunistically anticipate
constantly changing and unpredictable opportunities.
Certainly for illegal aliens, but also for freelancers, a long-term

perspective becomes difficult to achieve. Their experience
of time becomes that of an almost ‘instantaneous time’, to
quote the sociologist John Urry (1999).
This at once clarifies how place and time are related within
repressive liberalism. Bottomlessness or de-territorialization
generates time that is instantly experienced. Following Mikhail
Bakhtin (1981), we could label the chronotopy of the current,
globally organised free-market economy as instant bottomless-
ness or bottomless instantaneity. To some extent, time and space
implode in the permanent here-and-now culture, a global present.
Within this chronotopy, pollution of the soil, social disintegration
and mental bottomlessness, detachment disorder or borderline
syndrome come together in a curious way.
External Trauma
A first pathology of instant bottomlessness, or bottomless
instantaneity, has to do with the fact that it flourishes in a
hyper-networked world, aided by high-tech digital informa-
tion systems. In this world, a kind of ‘timeless time’ breaks
free from the former ‘clock time’ as we know it from the in-
dustrial era. This means that time, for the first time, goes
‘beyond the feasible realm of human consciousness’ (Urry
1999, 126). One of the characteristics of such computer net-
works is that they have incredibly huge amounts of memory.
In addition, we know from our own personal computer that
it stores indelible traces of all our activities, every query we
have ever made and all images we have ever uploaded. This
capacity in itself profoundly changes our relationship with
time. Combined with techniques that make it possible to find
and retrieve files very quickly, this has the effect that the
World Wide Web is almost incapable of forgetting anything.
Stored histories, done deals, including recorded mischief, may
be catapulted back into the present in a matter of nanoseconds.
Memory, in other words, can be continuously refreshed and

the past can easily infiltrate the present. History itself thus
becomes ‘instantaneous’. The same goes for personal histo-
ries. The possibilities of digital memory make forgetting
semi-impossible. In other words, while people can of course
repress and forget things, there is always the possibility of
retrieving their digital biography, a possibility that extends
to others’ potential to unlock any particular individual’s dig-
ital biography.
However, psychoanalysis has taught us that repres-
sion and selective amnesia are functional defence mecha-
nisms for dealing with traumatic experiences. The potential
of an instantly retrievable digital Self blocks this functional-
ity. Moreover, activities that were not experienced as trau-
matic in the past can yet become painfully confronting when
they appear on-screen in the present. Our individual walk
through life—quite literally in the case of the memory in
GPS devices or mobile phones—becomes increasingly easy
to register, trace, consult and reconstruct. Combined with
the lifting of the separation between private and public ap-
pearance in both work and the digital domain, a so-called
external trauma emerges. This is not a social trauma, such
as an unforgettable event that haunts a collective. Nor does
it have the characteristics of a psychopathology in which a
traumatic incident constantly threatens to intrude upon an
individual’s consciousness. In this case, the traumatic mem-
ory exists as a potential that is externally—i.e., digitally—
recorded and can be reinserted into the present by both the
individual and by anyone else. In short, not only have our
private lives become increasingly public, our digital pasts
are evolving towards a public portfolio. This turns every-
one’s past into a potentially irrepressible present. It is a
possibility that needs a new ethics to regulate both the tech-
nical and mental management of our personal life history.
Call it the need for a techno-mental ecology.
Global hysteria
The second pathology has to do with the devaluation of
labor security and the dismantling of state guarantees by re-
pressive liberalist politics, which are making workers in-
creasingly dependent upon real and virtual networks. In a
post-Fordist economy of temporary employment contracts,
fleeting assignments and projects in rapid succession, work-
ers constantly have to stay ‘connected’ in order to survive.
This hyper-connectivity also maintains a chronotopy of bot-
tomless instantaneity. Creative knowledge workers—espe-
cially if they are freelancers—always have to rely on their
environment to acquire new projects. After each sent email
they nervously await the answer. If it doesn’t come within
two days, they start to worry. Have they read my mail? Did
something go wrong? Or worse, did I say something wrong?
Did they hear a bad thing about me or have they dug it up
via one of the social media? Is there perhaps a totally un-
founded rumour about me doing the rounds in the network?
Was the latest job I did for them perhaps not as good as I
thought? And, worst of all, what if they have found someone
better than me? The project worker is in a permanent state
of doubt. A delay in answer could be a sign that the next as-
signment is not forthcoming. Within this context they are al-
ways dependent on others and on what they think others
think about them. Such working circumstances in turn are
the ultimate breeding ground for a pathology that had all but
vanished from the medical dictionary, i.e., hysteria. Accord-
ing to Slavoj Žižek, hysteria is defined by the question:
What kind of object am I in the eyes of the Other? It is a
question that confronts post-Fordist workers with their per-
manent state of being potentially interchangeable. All of a
sudden, the creativity or knowledge they have to offer turns
out to be not all that unique or authentic. Replaceability
confronts creative people with their own potential futility or
insignificance. Says Žižek:
What the hysterical subject is unable to accept, what gives

rise to an unbearable anxiety in him, is the presentiment
that the Other(s) perceive him in the passivity of his
Being, as an object to be exchanged…. (Žižek 2000, 137)
In globally operating networks, this pathology also spreads

itself on a macroeconomic level. Project workers are not the
only ones to fall into a more or less serious state of hysteria
when they miss out on an assignment and discover that they
are replaceable. Companies, educational institutes, research
groups, hospitals or art organisations also tend to become
hysterical when they don’t get an assignment, when grant
applications are turned down or when investors casually
take their money elsewhere. Even nation states, when con-
fronted with multinationals that threaten to move their oper-
ation to a country where labor is cheap, often start to rule
and regulate in hysterical mode. And, as is common knowl-
edge by now, the still lingering financial crisis of 2008
can partly be blamed on the hysteria of the speculating mul-
titudes, which seem impossible to reassure. Within global
networks, individuals and organisations as well as nation
states have become largely dependent upon an environment
that is obscure and difficult to judge. While we systemati-
cally allow fossil materials, plants and animal species to
disappear, laboring under the delusion that they are some-
how replaceable, we humans all share a fear that tomorrow
we may be replaced by someone else. Perhaps this is one
of the most important results of a market competitiveness
that is being introduced as an overall social model, and
even as a philosophy of life. In such a view of society,
everyone is replaceable, which generates a constant
dread of potential futility. On a global scale, this results
in hysterical subjects who suffer from tunnel vision and
short-term thinking and who act blindly. The contemporary
predilection for slowness, slow food, slow living, slow
time, slow art may well be an activist response to this.
However, deceleration as such may bring down the fever

somewhat but it doesn’t cure the cause of the disease. In a
hyper-connected world in which market competition is the
model for social interaction, the hysteria infection sneaks
in and generates the fear of replaceability. Resistance can
therefore only be built up by cutting oneself completely or
partially out of the web. Maybe that’s the reason why since
the 1990’s the nomadic discourse is so dominant in the art
world. In what follows I examine whether nomadic practices
and the artistic activities of exodus could be a sufficient
remedy for the outlined pathologies of post-Fordist labor.
Black Planet
A few years ago, the Amsterdam designer Thomas Buxò
proposed a remarkable version of the map of the world to me.
The bright blue colour of the water and the white, reddish-brown
and green that usually represent the landmasses on such maps
were replaced by a uniform, pitch-black background. Shining
like little stars in this dark area, which no longer showed any
distinction between land and water, were white dots that
marked the international art biennials of the past decade.
In addition to this strange typology, dots also indicated the
locations of closed asylum centres. The fact that Western
Europe was especially bright in Buxò’s world might not be
surprising. However, besides another noticeable concentra-
tion of dots in Japan, what particularly struck the eye was
the darkness in Africa.
This world looked unheimlich, and not just because it
emphasized for the umpteenth time that the distribution of
wealth easily corresponds with that of art and art tourism.
What especially evoked an uncomfortable feeling was the
geographical proximity of art biennials and asylum centres.
It underscored the fact that the right to travel, and more gener-
ally to mobility, is not inalienable for everybody on this globe.
Moreover, the geopolitical areas where this right is both
granted and denied are not equally distributed across the world.
The junctions where travel bans are imposed and where travel
is encouraged as an ideal way of life lie abhorrently close to
one another. Obligatory but unwanted nomads on the one hand,
voluntary and socially encouraged nomads on the other,
can almost see, smell and touch one another. The last of these
possibilities, however, is usually strictly forbidden by repres-
sive liberalism, or at least made physically difficult or even
completely impossible. The careful political segregation of
globetrotters has a bitter taste. Against this background, the
excessive enthusiasm for nomadism that has occupied the
discourse in the art world for the past fifteen years begins to
seem rather unreal.
Nomads & Nomads

‘This is all fantastic for artists—they are no longer duty-bound
by family commitments to work locally… and the open market
allows them to travel fairly freely, give or take a visa or two.
You could say we are becoming highly networked.’
(Black 2012, 1)
‘Rizhomatic’, ‘global drift’, ‘dislocated’, ‘diaspora’, ‘unbelong-

ing’, ‘connectivity’, ‘networks’, ‘deterritorialization’, ‘exodus’,
‘cosmopolitanism’, and of course ‘nomad’ are part of a dis-
cursive universe with which artists and independent curators
have been describing their practices for some time now. Just
browse through a few catalogues of international exhibitions
and you will soon come across the romanticism of the home-
less person. With or without giving it a Deleuzo-Guattarian
gloss, the protagonists in one part of Buxò’s black world
like to describe and promote their activities and events in a
sophisticated ‘nomadeology’. For the record, this term must
not be confused with ‘nomadology’ without an ‘e’, the title
of the similarly-named chapter from the classic A Thousand
Plateaus by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1988).
What particularly concerns me is the one-sided interpretation

of this nomadology. In the art world and elsewhere, this
interpretation is literally one-sided, seeing as Deleuze and
Guattari indicate at least two ‘camps’, or in their terms, two
possible ‘war machines’ in nomadology. Both fight against
the State but from entirely different positions —more on that
later, though. The point is that the positive aura that today is
often attached to notions of travel, mobility, agility, a lack of
attachment and even homelessness makes it likely that the
term has become part of an ideology, which is why I speak
of ‘nomadeology’.
In any case, artists and curators nowadays are morally
obliged to leave their familiar biotope and seek an uncertain
but always inspiring Elsewhere. This can also be read as an
effect of post-Fordism on the art world. To accommodate
them, artist-in-residencies form interconnecting points all
over the world, and the earlier-mentioned biennials along
with international art centres and museums provide the
trusted scenes in which these creative world travellers can
regularly meet up with one another (Gielen 2009). Cheap
plane tickets take away every excuse; artists must explore
the wild blue yonder. The period when travelling around the
world was exclusively reserved for an elitist jet set or for the
time-honoured cosmopolitan with a considerable inheritance
in his or her pocket is a page of history that was turned some
time ago. How long this new, post-Fordist period will last,
nobody knows. For the moment, the continuing financial crisis
has not yet caused the price of plane tickets to rise too dras-
tically, and the looming ecological crash has not yet instilled
enough fear in us to make us stay on the ground en masse.
But this is certainly not just about physical travel. Artists have
always had a fascination for nomads. We already find this in
some descriptions of 19th-century artist-bohemians and flaneurs,
but more recently many artists and photographers have also tended
to portray vagabonds and other homeless people as their subjects.
Thus, nomadism is both an example for artists’ lives and a

subject for their art. This can include both a romantic view
of gypsy life, such as in the work of British photographer
Iain McKell, or solicitude for the continued existence of no-
madic peoples, such as in the documentary work of Dutch-
man Jeroen Toirkens. What to think of British artist Lucy
Orta, who developed ‘refugee fashion’, a kind of survival
kit for the modern nomad including nylon coffins and
‘ready-to-wear outfits for an atomic winter’?
What is striking, as I have said, is the contemporary art
world’s one-sided appropriation of the nomadic discourse.
Why are so many positive characteristics ascribed to no-
madic life? And why does this so easily lead to self-identifi-
cation—at least verbally—in the case of mostly artists and
independent curators? After all, media reports on the fate of
the Roma, fugitives and ‘bona fide refugees’ hardly present
a pretty picture. If they haven’t already become victims of
racist football supporters or the violence of ordinary local
citizens, governments will dump perpetual travellers and
fugitives in camps and ghettos in order to discourage inte-
gration (as in Italy) or enter them in secret ethnic registers
strongly reminiscent of the eve of World War II (as in the
Netherlands). In a world in which aliens’ offices assume that
an asylum seeker is by definition a liar until he or she
proves otherwise, and in which refugees are preferably de-
ported or thrown overboard by the hegemonic repressive
liberalism, the nomadic life does not really offer much to be
jealous about. ‘History has always dismissed the nomads,’
assert Deleuze and Guattari (2010, 63).
Against the background of this philosophical knowledge in
combination with the empirical facts, the ‘lifestyle-nomadism’
and ‘exile-romanticism’ of many contemporary artists and
curators sound somewhat obscene. This glorification of the
nomadic life comes across as misplaced in an era when desper-
ate people are relocated from one condemned building to the
next socio-economically depressed area (Bavo 2010, 59).
It is easy for artists and other post-Fordist workers who are the
products of the middle or upper classes to extol a homeless
existence when they have a credit card and the proper visas
in their pockets.
It should be clear, at least, that nowadays there are different
sorts of nomads. An important distinction can be made between
two groups: those who are forced to move and those who do so
voluntarily. The latter group tends to leave the Heimat from a
comfortable position, both financially and socially. Whether
this second group, to which the earlier-mentioned curators and
artists mostly belong, can so easily identify with the first sort of
nomad is a significant question. A purely discursive and roman-
tic identification with real stateless and homeless people leads
to an aestheticization of the nomadic existence. In the same
way that Walter Benjamin (Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938-
1940) pointed out the problem of the aestheticization of politics
in fascism, here we can pose the question of whether the aes-
theticization of the nomadic existence does not in fact serve the
prevailing repressive liberal hegemony, including post-Fordist
working conditions.
Mobile Loner
Both Richard Sennett (1998) and Luc Boltanski & Eve
Chiapello (2005) argue that the dominant form of economic
policy that is currently spreading across the globe actually
welcomes the mobile person with open arms. This is espe-
cially the case when that mobile man or woman is employ-
able for the further accumulation of capital. Boltanski and
Chiapello even claim that nowadays mobility is one of the
most important discriminating factors around which a new
kind of class segregation is taking shape. The more mobile
people and their products are, the more chance they have
of getting ahead. On the other hand, people who for one
reason or another are tied to a locality have fewer possi-
bilities of working themselves higher up the ladder.
This is why the social mobility of women is still lower than that
of men, because statistically speaking they are still more women
tied to their children and family than their male partners are.
And this is also why speculators and investors can grow rich
more easily than business owners and corporate directors, who
are tied to their means of production. Money is, simply put,
much more mobile than machines, conveyor belts, personnel
and other means of production. Those who are involved only
with speculation can reposition their efforts much more easily
and quickly than those who have to deal with relocating an
entire factory. Flows of capital, which thanks to today’s digital
transactions race around the globe at lightning speed, have
increased liquidity throughout the world. They obligate both
employers and workers to quickly and flexibly take advantage
of new market demands, and therefore new work situations.
This is why economic fugitives are not the only ones who
chase after capital. Entrepreneurs and corporate directors are
also being increasingly forced to relocate their production
centres, while managers feel obligated to change their em-
ployer and workplace once every five to seven years—that
is, if they want to continue moving up the social ladder.
A nomadic existence is extremely functional for an econ-
omy driven less by production, or even consumption, and
increasingly by a hyper-dynamic of liquid assets. Moreover,
as we know, individuals are more mobile than collectives,
such as entire production units, teams, but also families.
What is more, the ‘lone’ nomad, such as the freelancer that
has been promoted by repressive liberalism, cannot fall back
on unions and other collective assurances of solidarity that
are so bothersome for employers. In short, the current re-
pressive liberal hegemony that keeps the global casino
going with extremely virtual games has every interest in de-
claring its players outlaws. The individual nomad fits that
profile perfectly. Then why would the art world want to go
along with this nomadeology by gathering a positive moral-
ity around this highly vulnerable mobile person?
Idealism and Individualism

‘Free movement of thought necessarily implies not always
clinging to what is known and perceived as functional and
“right”, what has been practiced or experienced previously.
Working from the outside, like a non-institutionalized
free agent—who is, to a certain extent, comparable to
an external consultant—also means actively performing
a certain marginality. The isolation of such marginality
can only be overcome by a relentless will for collabora-
tion, a commitment and willingness to change things—
beyond intellectual aspirations, but through significant
distance that produces a mode of criticality, a distance
that an insider cannot offer and does not possess.’
(Miessen 2010, 240-242)
The nomad, the traveller or the ‘uninvited outsider’,

as architect Markus Miessen calls such individuals,
have certain qualities that can call the above-mentioned
hegemony into question. Of all people, the outsider
has the greatest possibility of taking a commanding
view of outmoded local patterns and introducing pos-
sible changes. No one can position themselves above
their own society. Outsiders such as nomads, however,
have the advantage of an alternative way of looking at
things, simply because their cultural background is dif-
ferent. In addition to Miessen, artists such as Francis
Alÿs (see Demos 2010, for example) understand only
too well that it is precisely the ‘in between’ position of
nomads that makes it possible for them to visualize what
others do not see. Moreover, they can more easily mediate
in conflict situations where those involved are too biased
to take a ‘neutral’ position, but they can also highlight what
repressive liberalism hides, or they can point in a reflex-
ive way at the pathologies of the post-Fordist condition.
In other words, the previously posited nomadeology, or

the repressive liberal hegemony’s embrace of the mobile
person, does not prevent the nomad model from being
deployed in a counter-hegemony. Deleuze and Guattari
also make a distinction between two types of nomads,
who in their story stand outside the State:
The outside appears simultaneously in two directions:

huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire
ecumenon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure
of autonomy in relation to the States (for example,
commercial organizations of the ‘multinational’ type,
or industrial complexes, or even religious formations
like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic
movements, etc.) but also the local mechanisms of bands,
margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights
of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of
State power. (Deleuze & Guattari 2010, 15)
It seems as though it would only be possible to fight the

repressive liberalism and the pathologies of post-Fordism
if the art world were to identify with the second type of
nomad. In any case, we find such an idealistic identification
in Miessen’s Winter School Middle East project and in
Alÿs’s walks and poetic activities. Both use nomadic strate-
gies specifically in order to escape the prevailing hegemony
or break regional stalemates. Here, nomadism is courting a
form of interventionism that we know from the history of
the Situationists, but it applies this on a worldwide scale.
And just like the Situationists, these artistic nomads take
the risk of becoming completely caught up in the political
‘war machine’. When they take this risk with conviction,
however, there must be no doubting their sincere idealism.
The question remains, though, whether such a strategy
and nomadic position are actually politically effective.
The designations that Miessen (2010), for instance, uses

to indicate his protagonists, such as ‘freelancer with a con-
sciousness’, ‘crossbench politician’, ‘non-institutionalized
free-agent’ or ‘external consultant’, can be considered
highly ambivalent to say the least. The freelancer and the
consultant do not just meet with pampering in today’s
post-Fordist and repressive liberal regime. What’s more,
their responsibility is only temporary, and their position
dependent on the good will of various employers.
Whether their so-called autonomy, which in fact is an
extremely dependent and precarious professional position,
allows them to take any political risks is very much the
question. Just as the original ‘freelancer’ was a person
who was hired to fight with a lance, nowadays consultants
and free agents are only hirelings in the present repressive
liberal hegemony. And as we know, hirelings historically
have had very little idealism or conscience. These qualities
are quite simply dysfunctional when it comes to their
survival. But even if there were freelancers with a con-
science or consultants with an ideal, as Miessen believes
there are, it is still doubtful whether such positions offer
them the necessary strength and power to actually gener-
ate political effects. Their highly individual position,
which is not institutionally embedded and which therefore
can hardly count on collective support, is precisely what
makes this type of nomad particularly weak in every so-
cial and political struggle. If the Roma, the Jews in exo-
dus, gypsies and other ambulatory hordes have been able
to accumulate a modicum of political power in their long
nomadic history, it was only because they were part of a
relatively sizable collective. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari
expressly state in their fifth proposition: ‘Nomad exis-
tence necessarily implies the numerical elements of a
war machine.’ (2010, 54) Their great numbers and com-
mon exodus are precisely why the Roma and other gyp-
sies have not always remained so invisible and ignored.
It is doubtful whether the individual nomadism of consultants,

freelancers or free agents could develop sufficient strength
to redesign the contemporary post-Fordist chronotopy.
As individuals, they are too weak for that, and moreover,
too dependent on the economic caprices of an environment
with constantly varying principals.
This brings us back to artists. Since the modern age, they
too have claimed a highly individual position. At the end
of the 19th century, this inflated to the proportion of the
romantic bohemian artist. According to rather biographical
myths, such an eccentric regularly navigated a vagabond
middle course between insider and outsider, between maniac
and genius, between drunkard and whoremonger on the one
hand and prominent, even authoritative citizen on the other.
One reason why artists earned that last, positive status was
because despite all their idiosyncrasies they also managed to
incorporate the prevailing values of a liberal civil society.
After all, individual freedom and authenticity were of para-
mount importance to liberalism, which not coincidentally
established its definitive outlines in the 19th century in col-
laboration with the modern artist. Art and market capitalism
have had a good relationship with each other from the mo-
ment that people were willing to pay money for artistic
artefacts. But in their classic study, Canvases and Careers
(1965), sociologists Cynthia and Harrison White convinc-
ingly show that the market did not really begin to play a
central role until after the decline of the academic model.
According to the authors, when the system of the Parisian
Académie royale de Peinture et Sculpture and the annual
salon burst apart under morphological pressure, this en-
abled the birth of what they call the ‘dealer-critic’ system.
Not only did art criticism now gain an important role; the
status of the artist also radically changed under the influ-
ence of the market. The artist’s personal style became more
important than submission to a uniform system of rules.
What was relevant now was not a single, annually-submitted

prospective masterpiece, but a coherent oeuvre that guaranteed
the lasting quality of the artist. To put it in a slightly different
way, when the Académie lost its monopoly, the bets were no
longer placed on masterpieces; instead, the individual careers
of the artists themselves came to the foreground. Or, as the
title of White and White’s study clearly proposes, the central
focus in the post-academic system was not the artists’ canvases
but their careers. Behind these shifts, however, lies a simple
capitalistic market logic. After all, the potential buyer must
be convinced of the quality of an artwork. At this point, the
most significant arguments a seller can use to convince the
buyer are the above-mentioned critique of the work on the
one hand and the perception of the success of earlier works
on the other. In other words, quality that attributed to an ex-
isting oeuvre functions as a promise of future quality.
This discussion alludes to how our contemporary concepts
of ‘the individual artist’ and ‘authorship’ are partly a product
of the marketing of the art world. The artist as authentic
individual is historically supported by a liberal bourgeois
ideal, the artist as nomad by a similarly bourgeois cos-
mopolitanism. In the contemporary art world, that model
easily transforms into a parochial (due to its middle-class
origins) ideal of Rough Guide backpack consumer exoti-
cism. As such, the would-be artist can sharpen his or her cre-
ativity by travelling relatively easily to the Other. In other
words, a liberal-bourgeois ideal simply transmutes to a repres-
sive liberal consumption-individualism in this day and age.
If artists really want to escape this political-ideological
framework, like Alÿs and Miessen, then it seems necessary
to go a step further. Not only must they relinquish their own
cultural and national identity, as in nomadism, but also the
claim to individualism made by almost every artistic practice
until now. Individualism was a mistake. For a truly politi-
cally effective nomadism, individualism must be sacrificed
to the collectivity of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘war machine’.
Or, in their histrionics: ‘You have to be born a slave, to be-

come a soldier.’ (2010, 62). This is not to say, however, that
artistry should be given up, but rather that authorship must
be set free. An artistic act can only be politically effective
when it is a singular act. That is, when an act is set free of
an individual owner and thus becomes truly autonomous.
Such a singular autonomous act is immediately available to
the commons. From there, it can assemble with other singu-
lar energies in order to be collectively appropriated and po-
litically deployed.
In any case, an artistic work that is in the possession of the
artist, a collector or a museum remains politically impotent
when it cannot be appropriated by others. This also holds true
for artworks that ostensibly intervene in public space, that
explicitly propagate a political message, and even works that
lead a risky existence in war zones. When artists do not
generously make their works available to the people they
visit or with whom they identify, when they instead claim
individuality and authorship, they immediately make them-
selves available to the first group of nomads that Deleuze and
Guattari speak of: commercial businesses, the creative industry
and the multinational art market. Certainly now that the State
—unlike how French philosophers conceived of it over 20
years ago—is increasingly putting itself at the service of this
capitalistic ‘war machine’, it is necessary to institute a much
more strongly articulated multitude. Today it is not so much
the State that is confronting the nomadic war machine, as
was the case for Deleuze and Guattari, but ‘war machine’
confronting ‘war machine’. After all, the repressive liberal
State has chosen to dissolve itself by choosing the camp of
the multinationals. As a result, the two kinds of nomads are
confronting one another in an increasingly transparent manner.
Considering this irreversible reality of cognitive capi-
talisms’ appropriation of the ambulatory person and the
State, one has to conclude that nomadism as an artistic
strategy only makes political sense if it is communist.
For the record, this loaded word does not refer to the historical
state communism as we knew it in the USSR, nor to the author-
itarian one-party policy that we still see in North-Korea today.
On the contrary, the communism referred to here is stateless,
precisely because it is nomadic. This is the communistic ideal
(Deleuze and Guattari would have spoken of a ‘thought’,
which according to them is always nomadic) that has been
elaborated by the French philosopher Alain Badiou (2009),
among others. Communism then amounts to a universal call
to radical equality in an endless variety of forms.
Only when artists’ journeys reveal inequalities, and when
their singular artistic acts make them part of collective eman-
cipatory subjectivities, does this nomadism come alive politi-
cally. To deal with external trauma (as I have labelled it
above), artists could, for instance, socialize a practice in
which they developed a particular set of skills, namely
‘telling stories’. Narratives in all kinds of artistic forms and
media characteristically embed individuals in a social context.
For this ‘grounding exercise’ art makes use of, among other
things, expressive means such as an exhibition, a novel, a
musical concert, or a theatre or dance performance. Through
public performances, art attempts to generate social support in
order to then establish a cultural foundation beneath its own
idiosyncrasy. As noted elsewhere (see Gielen 2011), the art-
fulness of art since the modern era has consisted specifically
of generating a broader collective basis for a singular, some-
times highly idiosyncratic idea. The point of this is not to con-
quer a market or gather votes, but to time and again initiate a
process-like movement from a singular idea to a collective-
ness, be it large or small. It is important to note here that this
movement is a completely different one from that of mass
media, which, by contrast, try to determine the greatest com-
mon denominator within the collective in order to ventilate
and capitalize upon it time and again. For example, mass
media achieve this by individualization and personalization of
structural socio-political problems and collective struggles.
Thus, mass media in fact tend to move in the opposite

direction from the work of artists. The success of artistic
‘collectivisation’ depends on the performativity that can be
developed to institute a hitherto unknown situation or event
and to then stabilize it, give it a collective ground, or, in
Guattari’s terms, to reterritorialize it. In such a narrative
movement, the singular ‘institutioning’ is converted into a
communal ‘con-stitutioning’, of a more or less collectively
supported culture. The nomadic gesture rests precisely on
this continuous travelling between positing and constituting,
singularity and collectivity, subjectification and socializa-
tion, between unique art and generally supported culture.
At the same time, within this movement artists create the
opportunity to rewrite and rethink themselves whilst staying
loyal to themselves. For good reason, the American sociolo-
gist Richard Sennett calls such a narrative a value that is
critical in connecting events over time, in accumulating
experiences (Sennett 2006, 183-184). Narration is helpful
in (re)integrating abrupt interruptions into a consistent story.
Only those who can tell and retell themselves and their place
in the world, only those who take the time for this and take up
their own place and thereby relate and define themselves with
regard to their social environment are capable of generating
a ‘sustainable social Self’. Opposite the external trauma,
described above, of the sudden memory that interrupts daily
life through digital media, artists posit a narrative memory in
which sudden events can be reinterpreted. Such events can,
literally, be given a place, a bottom in a common. Nomadic
artists can create spatial-temporal momenta, intense events
in which a collective can re-ground itself, to re-appropriate a
ground on which to stand.
The second pathology discussed above, global hysteria,
can be dealt with by giving people more security by giving
a general basic income to everybody, a system what could
replace the bureaucratic structures of the welfare state
without losing out on the welfare it is designed to provide.
But this is beyond the reach of artistic activities. What artists

can achieve through their nomadic acts amounts to building
solidarity structures, giving form to communities by weaving
stronger webs than the ‘www’ at this moment has to offer.
In this way, they can try to give people a cultural anchor again.
It may sound contradictory, but it is in fact these social bonds
and cultural anchors that make it possible to get ‘disconnected’
from the web of project work and financial flows. They can
make it possible to develop another social time than the in-
stantaneous one, a time for reflexivity and depth and height
again. This means at least that the nomadic artist takes long-
term engagements, often returning to the same locations to
stimulate real social bonds. The uncertainties of project
labor in the post-Fordist condition and the absence of trust
that makes people hysterical can only be remediated by a
strong communal architecture. Artists have the skills to be
among the architects of a new constitution for a common.
However, these artists cannot hide behind a neutral
artistic position. Rather, they will have to choose sides. So
they must no longer noncommittally ‘make things visible’
without showing their colours, without passing judgment
(how often have I heard artists not say that their work has
‘no judgmental intention’). In any event, artists certainly
cannot lay any historical weight on the scales if they do not
bury their ego politics of individualism. Of course, artists do
not have to be political. Of course, they can use trips to ex-
otic places, instructive dialogues and residencies with a
wealth of experience of the Other to simply stimulate their
creativity, expand their networks and make careers for them-
selves. Of course, they can refuse nomadic communism and
allow their love of travel to soak up the Other and make it
their own, in order to build up a strong individuality and
artistic identity. But by doing this, they will only underpin
the contemporary repressive liberalism and its post-Fordist
working conditions. When they identify with the fortunes of
the stateless, the sufferings of the Roma and the misery of
refugees, or when they move through conflict zones without

passing political judgment, it becomes dubious. In these and
other instances, their empathy and ‘engagement’ only serve
as a way of augmenting their own artistic advantage, and
thus enriching themselves. When artists are tempted to do
this, their activities go no further than age-old colonial prac-
tices. However ambulatory, engaged or politically radical
their work may appear to be, ultimately it remains caught up
in the contemporary repressive liberal war machine. Then
the nomadic adventure serves nothing but personal self-en-
richment, and the nomadic rhetoric is no more than a handy
marketing strategy which reinforces the post-Fordist condi-
tion and its pathologies.
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2 20
ALEXEI PENZIN WITH MARIA CHEKHONADSIKH 2 21
The Only Place to Hide?

The Art and Politics of Sleep
in Cognitive Capitalism1
Alexei Penzin in conversation with
Maria Chekhonadsikh
Maria Chekhonadsikh: It seems that the state of sleep

was always a peripheral topic in theory, one that was
never part of the larger philosophical and political issues.
As I understood from you, at the beginning of your
research, which started in the first half of the 2000s,
there were only a few references to sleep as a self-
sufficient subject of study in the humanities.
Alexei Penzin: My project on sleep belongs to the field of

what, according to the German tradition, could be called
philosophical anthropology—but re-evaluated from the
point of view of contemporary critical thought. An example
where we can see a move of this kind is in the recent work
of the Italian philosopher Paolo Virno. Presently, following
the poststructuralist and Marxist critique of many of the
conservative moments and essentialisms that are embedded
in this kind of thinking, this rather serves as an analysis of
the concepts, discourses and potentialities which surround
and compose—or decompose—the figure of the human
being. But I also draw on many sources and materials that
have emerged from more empirical disciplines: history,
sociology, cultural studies, etc.
1 A different version of this text was published as “Can Philosophy
Sleep with Art?” in CAC interview, issue 20-21, Vilnius, March 2013.
2 22 ALEXEI PENZIN WITH MARIA CHEKHONADSIKH
Indeed, when I started this research, very little work had been
done in this field, a few more or less theoretical and eclectic
attempts existed in sociology, empirical anthropology and
history: like the pioneering work by the sociologist Murray
Melbin Night as Frontier: Colonizing the World After Dark,
which, published in 1987, was devoted to the ‘colonization
of night-time.’ Other books which historically look at the
subject are A. Roger Ekirch’s At Day’s Close: Night in Times
Past (2005) and also the anthropological work by Brigitte
Steger and Lodewijk Brunt Night-time and Sleep in Asia and
the West: Exploring the Dark Side of Life (2003). As regards to
philosophy, there was the book by the Austrian thinker Walter
Seitter titled Geschichte der Nacht [History of the Night, 1999].
I read it only later, after I had already started to elaborate a
theoretical framework for my studies, and was surprised by
some shared intuitions and references that really inspired me
in my enterprise, which at that time was sometimes perceived
as unusual and exotic by a selection of my colleagues. Seitter’s
book, however, was quite removed in terms of my political
concerns and the general Marxist framework of what I was
conceiving. Then in 2007 the outstanding French philosopher
Jean-Luc Nancy published a small book entitled Tomber de
sommeil [The Fall of Sleep]. I both admired this book and was
puzzled by it, partly because it stood in the way of the more
political understanding of the problematics I was pursuing,
instead encapsulating them inside a poetical and rather
apolitical—though very insightful—reading.
Also, I rather early on discovered the beautiful book by

Emmanuel Lévinas’ Existence and Existents, published
straight after World War II, and contains several parts
on sleep, insomnia and subjectivity, which were very
important for my work. But, from the very beginning
my methodological ground was the chapter from Karl
Marx’s Capital called “The Working-Day” in which
Marx writes about sleep and the wakefulness of the worker.
THE ONLY P LA CE TO HI DE? 223
At that time the average working day could last between

16 and18 hours and these problems were easily visible.
Marx uses the metaphor of a vampire to describe capital;
a vampire that attacks at night and sucks “the living blood
of labor.” In my view, an important implicit metaphor
here is also that the worker is asleep politically, and that
he needs to recognize his position in this system in order
to wake up politically and begin his struggle. Of course,
years later, and especially in the 20th century, the working
class became tremendously awakened. Now, however,
we live in a period of uncertainty, and we do not know
whether the worker—in his contemporary extended defi-
nition, not just a classical industrial worker, but a cogni-
tive worker too—is asleep again or only awake in the
passive mode of a consumer or a precarious insomniac.
And last but not least, I am indebted to my teacher, the seminal

post-Soviet thinker Valery Podoroga, who among many other
subjects, elaborated a theory of dreams, resisting its psycho-
analytical capture within the notion of symptom, and stressing
the autonomy of a dream world that is not to be instrumentalized
in the form of narration or interpretation. This became one
more starting point for my consideration of the world of sleep
that is today captured in the scientific, medical and neurobio-
logical discourse, and my task was to disclose its anthropologi-
cal and political meanings. Probably, today we need, once and
for all, to free our dreams from the burden of interpretation and
produce something like, The Interpretation of Sleep(s). This in-
terpretation would be not a libidinal one but a political, or, better
to say, though the term is over-used now, a biopolitical one.
And just recently I was glad to learn that a brilliantly written

new book was published. I mean Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late
Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (2013), which is very similar
to my approach. It is an important research that stresses how
late capitalism now attempts to capture our attention, gaze,
motility, the entire wakeful brain functioning and analyses

new social media and mobile technologies as means of this
colonization of everyday life. Sleep, in Crary’s view, is the
only “natural barrier” for this 24/7 mode of production and
control. But in this perspective I miss a discussion of inner,
productive, constitutive forces of sleep. Otherwise sleep may
look as a theological concept, as a sort of katechon, which
impedes a final triumph (or, actually, an apocalypse) of the
24/7 regime. That is why in my research I explore a function of
sleep beyond its natural qualities, as not just a negative break
in this 24/7 oppressive continuity or just as a part of means
of reproduction of labor force, but as something, which is
related to the intimate core of our subjectivity, as a condition
for its constitution. But I will discuss this further later.
MC: Indeed, over the last few years researchers began

discussing sleep in various contexts, ranging from the
analysis of the modern 24-hour society to the representa-
tions and practices of sleep that is customary to various
cultures. These approaches stress the late capitalist,
or neoliberal, ideology of the permanent mobilization
of individuals for labor or consumption. In fact, prob-
lematization of this kind is quite far removed from the
fundamental rethinking of sleep as an ontological or
anthropological problem. What do you think about
this new stream in theory and research?
AP: To outline problems that are specific to my research we

should start from zero. We can ask a simple question: What is a
sleeping human being (a sort of ‘homo dormiens,’ to put it in an
ironic Latinized way)? The answer is not obvious. Of course,
animals sleep too, but in the case of humans, the elementary
biological fact of sleeping is transfigured; it acquires new
cultural and social dimensions, even political ones in my view.
Or, to put it better, my project is about human problematization, to
use Michel Foucault’s term, of such a biological process as sleep.
We can take as an example the practice of vigilance, which

entails a conscious deprivation of sleep. And it is not only
about such human practices, but also about thinking about
sleep and imagining it. The general idea is that this human
problematization of sleep is not just another particular problem.
It can shed some light on other issues that are present in
politics, society or aesthetics. It returns to the field of thinking
that which has been excluded from it, and this inclusion
could change the whole field.
Actually, I suggest a coming out of the ‘wake-up-ism’ that is

embedded in philosophy and theology, as well as in politics
and in economic infrastructures. Classical and modern philos-
ophy, as we know it, is based on the paradigm of a wakeful,
non-sleeping subject. Moreover, in its public practice philoso-
phy aims at waking people up since its origins, Socrates re-
ferred to himself as a gadfly that bites people in order to
awaken them. We could trace this waking-up function of
philosophical initiation up to 20th century radical thought. For
example, the contemporary philosopher Alain Badiou reiter-
ates these metaphors of hidden ‘wake-up-ism,’ for example, by
writing in one of his recent essays that the philosopher is a
‘guardian of truth’ who keeps vigilance even during the night:
“Because we have to protect the fragile new idea of what is a
truth. To protect the new truth itself. So, when the night falls,
we do not sleep. Because, once more, “we must endure our
thoughts all night.” The philosopher is nothing else than, in the
intellectual field, a poor night watch-man (Badiou 2006).
This is a critical part of my research, which opens a new space

for investigation. In the constitutive part of my research, I am
interested in sleep as a crucial experience of passivity, isola-
tion, non-communication and non-productivity. And indeed,
the inclusion of the experience of sleep might be a crossing
point for many contemporary discourses, which would enable
their re-articulation. How? I will briefly outline several points.
Firstly, sleep is a natural obstacle for the pragmatic values

that have been established in modern capitalist societies over
the course of several centuries. These are the principles of
productivity, efficiency and rationality. In the light of these
principles, the only alibi, or excuse for sleep, is that it provides
recreation, relaxation and recuperation for the labor force.
If it were possible to speed up time or reduce the need for
recreation, I believe, modern people would prefer not to sleep
at all. After the retreat of religion, modern people no longer
believe in the infinity of their existence, they are obsessed
with the effective use of the finite time that is allotted to them.
In contemporary culture you can find many examples of such

an attitude to sleep. There are many techniques and means,
including pharmacological, which enable us to control the
duration of sleep. In Japan, where there is an extremely
dominant business culture, certain types of self-help books
are very popular. These manuals offer effective techniques
for how to shorten and manage sleep. For example, following
one such techniques you can break sleep into several parts,
i.e. you can sleep, say, 4 hours, at night, which would be
supplemented by several shorter naps during the daytime.
In connection with the appearance of these trends, some

anthropologists have stated that we can distinguish three
historical modes of sleep: pre-modern, modern, and sort of
“postmodern” or, better to say, contemporary. In pre-modern
societies, in the Middle Ages, there was no standard duration of
sleep. According to a hypothesis by the historian A. Roger Ekirch,
medieval people knew two sleeps: a sleep from the evening until
midnight, which was followed by a brief period of waking, and
then a ‘second sleep’ (Ekirch 2005, 300-324). With the develop-
ment of industrial capitalism, and a system of electric illumination
and security, providing a space for night activities and work as
well, human life became increasingly rationalized, and thus,
certain disciplinary standards were introduced and reinforced
by the authority of medicine, or, on the other hand, by moral

requirements and religious ascetics, for example the ascetic
ethos of Protestantism. It was at this time that the eight-hour
sleep standard emerged. Later, in the “postmodern” or con-
temporary period, sleep became more personalized; it could
become fragmented and managed according to specific tech-
niques as in the aforementioned Japanese managers’ example.
This stage produces a “synthesis” of the previous two, the loose
regulation prevalent in the first one, and discipline and mana-
gerial approach of the second, transferred from collective
bodies to individuals. Actually, the contemporary “deregula-
tion” of sleep somehow reflects neoliberal deregulation of
economy but in my view, the connections of contemporary
social-political forms and sleep structures and its rhythms
are subtler, which I will attempt to address a little later.
Secondly, it is very important to understand how the phenome-

non of sleep was viewed throughout the history of philosophi-
cal and political thought. One could trace several models of
thinking about sleep. Some are extremely negative, as in Plato’s
project of an Ideal State. The order of this State eliminates
sleep in general because, as Plato argues in his final work,
“Laws” [Nomoi], when the citizens of this State are asleep
they lose connection both with logos, rationality, and with
the political body of society. When asleep, men and women
are useless, uncontrollable, and unreasonable. In fact, Plato
said that a sleeper is no better than a dead man (Plato 1926,
69)! Later, from this perspective, the figure of a ‘non-sleep-
ing king’, Rex Exsomnis, appears in medieval theological
thought (Kantorowicz 1997, 131). Generally, in many cul-
tures, not just in European, the rituals of power are closely
linked to the practice of vigilance. For instance, the code of
the ancient Chinese noble rulers depicts the model ruler as
someone who is permanently awake at night, as it is assumed
that he spends his nights in meditation on the welfare of
his subjects and the improvement of his governance…
The sovereign can appoint delegates to spend the night awake

on behalf of him. And modern power, as it was famously
described by Foucault and later Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze 1995,
177-182), is closely related to a multitude of monitoring, control-
ling and tracking devices, which never cease to function, as a
result they “do not sleep.” This uninterrupted functioning, or
vigilance of power covers the entire body of the society.
Finally, a positive model for understanding sleep can be

found in Aristotle’s writings—in the treatise On Sleep and
Wakefulness and in his Metaphysics. Here sleep is not con-
nected to logos, reason, but rather it is seen as part of the
process of life, in which it plays a crucial role by preventing
the immediate waste of vital energy. Sleep suspends human
faculties and charges them with potential. We later discover
elements of these models in modern philosophy, for example,
in Kant and Hegel. As you can ascertain if you read page
398 of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which
was very inspiring for me, the Hegelian sleep is ambivalent:
on one hand, it is a dropping out from universal rationality,
Geist, etc.; and on the other, it is the highest form of subjec-
tivity, i.e. it is complete interiority, an ‘absolute potency’
of residing in itself. In 20th century philosophy, or more
precisely, in those infrequent statements on the topic of
sleep that are relevant to the context of my research, we
can find an even more positive understanding of sleep. For
example, Lévinas thinks of sleep as a subject formation
“support,” comparing a sleeping human being to a refuge
from the pressures and brutalities of the wakeful daily world
that is characterized by anonymous and alienated rationality
(Levinas 1978, 69). Lévinas coins a beautiful and very
contemporary metaphor that relates sleep to our subjective
being; that our being is like the luggage that we drop each
day as we fall asleep. In sleep, we are as if absolute ‘sub-
jects without being’ but we still exist, in a potential form,
which is the safe, mute and secret ground of our existence.
THE ONLY P LA CE TO HI DE? 2 29
So there are many intriguing dialogues and crossroads

between ancient, modern and contemporary philosophical
discourses concerning sleep.
To connect all the points, I think, generally, even at a deeper

ontological level, capitalism is the first social-economic and
power formation, which “reveals” a vigilance of being itself,
this ontological “vigilance” or “insomnia” of being itself
which never leaves us; it never let us go “alone” from being.
And the contemporary power and capital, which tend to
be absolutely continuous, are two mirrors of this absolute
continuity/unity of being itself (even a void continues to be).
As Marx once said, only the late, ripe and developed social
forms fully discover their origins in “primitive” forms
(Marx 1993, 105).2 Why not relate this to pre-human origins as
well? And maybe this “revelation” of contemporary power/
capital is actually a symptom of this “pre-human” being itself.
Maybe, being is an archeo-power, a “primordial” dispositif of
this forced continuity. Probably, it is a super, mighty stubborn
force, which makes us, and everything, be, or to choose
extermination as the only “alternative,” and the third is not
given; we can’t stop being and then “return to being.” This is
a sort of ontological “double bind.” And as any double bind,
this one, the most important, ontologically speaking, dements
philosophy for many centuries, beginning from “Parmenides.”
2 Here is this famous quote from Introduction to Grundrisse: “Bourgeois

society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization
of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehen-
sion of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and
the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of
whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconque-
red remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have
developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human anatomy contains
a key to the anatomy of the ape.”
You cannot play with being, entering and exiting it repeatedly,

like virtual characters in computer games do. At the subjective
level, an “alternative” or “interruption” in this great and
monstrous continuum of being is death. But as known from
classics, where death is, there can be no subject in place.
Many thinkers, except Lévinas and the few others, have
forgotten about another interruption: sleep. And sleep is
“compatible” with the subject, and maybe even more fun-
damental for understanding it than finitude. It gives us a
model for rethinking and exiting from this finitude paradigm.
Thus, according to this hypothesis, which is of course quite
risky, disputable and speculative, humans, paradoxically,
are in fundamental state of antagonism with being itself.
They do not accept this forced continuity. They don’t want
to execute this ontological imperative: “Be or disappear!”
which was famously inverted in the notorious question
asked by Hamlet “To be or not to be?” Maybe, in the
most profound sense, what we try to think and anticipate
as communism is a name for this ontological revolt.
MC: This hypothesis is really impressive, but let’s returns

to more concrete realities of the contemporary moment.
The Fordist society constricted and disciplined the rhythms
of the body–a kind of machine, which has to work, eat and
sleep. Symbolically, this system embodied itself in the vast
project of sleeping suburbs (or sleeping blocks in Russian)
—urban areas designed for living machines, which, after
the working day is done, have to ‘switch off’ in their
apartments. In contrast, Post-Fordism plays with the
plastic and flexible nature of the human being, testing
its limits in various forms of precariousness: fragmented
working days which stretch into the next morning, un-
stable economic situations, housing issues and increased
mobility. This had probably already been anticipated in
18th century in Denis Diderot’s novel Rameau’s Nephew.
There is a small fragment in this novel where the main

character, a bohemian and poor musician, explains why
he believes that a happy person sleeps in a special way:
‘[…] when I go back to my garret in the evening and
tuck myself in on my pallet, I’m shrivelled up under my
coverlet – my chest is tight and my breathing short, like
a weak moan that’s hardly audible; whereas, a financier
makes his apartment reverberate and amazes his entire
street (Diderot 1976, 33-148).’ Would you agree that
these new forms of precarious life also modify sleep?
AP: This is a crucial question today, and the reference made

to Diderot’s quote is very appropriate and thought provoking.
The general premise of my research is that the capitalist order,
far more strongly than any social order before it, privileges
wakeful and active time over passivity and non-productivity
and reasserts old metaphysical ideas, which shared the same
preferences. The merging of the borders between work and life
in “cognitive capitalism,” a phenomenon which has been lively
discussed in contemporary critical theory and social sciences,
is evidence of the fact that the general colonization of society
by capital and its axioms (not only concerning wakefulness
and sleep) has been completed. Marx called this state of things
the “real subsumption” of society under the rule of capital.
At the same time, in cognitive capitalism the question of

sleep sheds some light on the overall logic of the system of
incessant, uninterrupted, sleepless production, communica-
tion and monitoring. I am not saying how it is going to help
us. I am just arguing that in this new zone of indifference
between work and life, sleep has a special position: as the
only non-working time. This makes it ambivalent; from the
point of view of capital, it is negative, from the contempo-
rary ‘creative’ and precarious worker’s (whose entire life is
work) perspective, it is rather positive.
If for Fordism the key sleep disorder was insomnia, based on

a disruption of disciplinary temporality of industrial capitalism,
for post-Fordism, or cognitive capitalism, it is probably
so-called sleep apnea, which is associated with involuntary
interruptions of breathing during sleep. It is a secret illness,
as those who ‘promote’ this disorder in the market of new
medical services argue. It has no visible symptoms; it can be
diagnosed only after a long (and expensive) laboratory study.
If insomnia is visible, agonizing many modernist writers
and artists with its hysterical staging of the ‘wake-up-ist’
imperative of capitalism, apnea is concerned with danger-
ousness and ambivalence of sleep itself. It is very interesting
that the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus, who thought
very profoundly about sleep, once said that in the state of
sleep our only connection to the world (and Logos) is our
breathing (Kirk 1971, 207).3 In this contemporary projection,
sleep apnea is maybe a symptom of this fear of loosing any
ties with the continuity of current incessant forms of life, which
are imposed by the latest stage of 24/7 functioning of society.
Hence, this new interest in sleep has began to surface in

the media and the public sphere, as well as a desire to
use sleep as a kind of natural biological ‘capital,’ a re-
source which can be individually managed and calculated.
The proliferation today of institutions which study sleep,
as well as popular self-help books on “how to sleep better”
are also results of this conjuncture—as are nightclubs,
Internet, 24/7 services, etc. Take, for example, the famous
3 This fragment is DK 22a16 (Diels-Kranz numbering) and reads as
the following: “According to Heraclitus, we become intelligent by

drawing in this Logos through breathing, and forgetful when asleep.
But we regain our senses when we wake up again. For in sleep,
when the channels of perception are shut, our mind is sundered
from its kinship with the surroundings, and breathing is the only
point of attachment to be preserved, like a kind of root.”
and already old movie “The Matrix” (1999): in the film

sleeping bodies are used as living batteries, power sources
for machines, which have seized control over humans.
This is probably the most secret desire of contemporary
capitalism—to put everything to work, to make profit
even from sleep. But the sleepers resist its grasp [laughs].
MC: We have already addressed sleep in contexts, which

are very close to the contemporary art system—discussing
new forms of labor and the conditions of cognitive
capitalism. I suppose art has strongly inspired your
investigation. Could you explain how you connect art
and sleep in your research and why it is an important
part of your project?
AP: If we had to systemise it sleep has been presented

in many works of art from antiquity to the present day.
You could compose a whole collection of paintings, from
classical (Brueghel, Rubens, de la Tour amongst others) to
modern art which depict sleeping people and their bodies
—serenely open, in all possible poses and situations, in
private or public spaces. They express a variety of states;
helplessness, vulnerability, or the quiet enjoyment of peace
and rest. Actually, similar thematic collections have already
been put together and commented upon, for example, the
beautiful book The Art of Sleep by Sophie de Sivry (1997).
But it is more interesting to consider the way in which the

conditions of the artwork could be compared to those of sleep.
There is an interesting book Sublime Poussin (1999) by Louis
Marin, an important French thinker and art historian of the
20th century. One of the chapters of this book is devoted to
the remarkable multitude of sleeping bodies in Poussin’s
paintings. In passim, Marin discusses the possibilities of letting
these ‘powerless’ bodies express themselves, allowing them
to open themselves up in front of our eyes (Marin 1999, 153).
He notes that language, in its broader sense, is not merely

composed of spoken or written words, but also symbols,
bodily gestures, visual representations; it is the force of a
somewhat aggressive and wakeful mobilization of things
and bodies in the world. But in itself, as an immense treasury
of words and phrases that are never fully actualized, it is
a sleep-like potentiality, a ‘sleeping body’ too. Following
Marin, I would say that Poussin’s obsession with the scenes
of sleep in his work is perhaps a reference to the initial state,
the zero degree of any expression and artistic representation.
‘The painted picture is a sleeping body: a mute poem,’ as
Marin says (Marin 1999, 160).
To put it rather loosely and generally, an artwork is the isola-

tion of a phenomenon (or an event, an object, an assemblage
of things); it is an exclusion from the pragmatic contexts of
everyday life. This isolation translates it into the aesthetic
dimension that opens it up to our eyes not as an instrument
or a reference to something else, but as a phenomenon in its
own league. Actually, the Kantian understanding of art as an
object of “disinterested” [uninteressiert] contemplation could
be mentioned here as it is roughly equivalent (Kant 2007, 37).
Likewise, sleeping human bodies are not instrumental; they
are disconnected from work, activity, production, interests
and affects. Sleep is this loss of interest in the world. For
instance, Henri Bergson described the state of sleep as one
of disinterestedness (Bergson 1959, 892); Sigmund Freud
defined sleep as “suspense of interest in the world” (Freud
1999, 3190). From this essential link between artwork, dis-
interestedness and sleep, it could be concluded that when
we sleep, we become artworks of ourselves.
On the other hand, in the arts there is also a tradition of stress-

ing awakening, mobilization, activity, in short, the ability to
influence the spectators, to change their vision of the world
and even the world itself. This tradition manifested itself
especially strongly in many of the art avant-gardes of the

20th century which were truly “wake-up-ist.” Sometimes
this movement of an ‘awakening through art’ addresses
sleep itself by trying to change its conditions. For example,
in the USSR in the early 1920s, an all-encompassing project
for the transformation of daily life was deployed, and avant-
garde art played an active part in this. We might recall
Sonata of Sleep (1929), a project by the famous architect
Konstantin Melnikov, for example. Its idea was to create an
ideal environment for workers to sleep in, i.e. a space for
the recreation and reproduction of the labor force. Melnikov
believed in the healing powers of deep sleep. To facilitate
this sleep therapy, an absolutely fantastic building was sug-
gested; a membrane composed of a circular arrangement of
rooms for sleeping that was able to rock like a cradle, with
special relaxing music, scents and even séances of massage!
Unfortunately it remained only on paper.
I think that Andy Warhol made a major contribution to

problematizing sleep in modern art. In his film “Sleep”
(1963) he simply shot a 6-hour-sleeping person in real
time. While for centuries art and philosophy had asked
questions about dreams and their meaning, Warhol merely
drew attention to sleep as such.
MC: The ideas of non-productivity, laziness and the

independent artist’s autonomy arose together with
the very concept of modern art and have since been
understood as a criticism of the relations and norms
which prevail in society. This may account for why
19th century bohemia hailed idlers and loafers as the
new aristocrats of the spirit. Arthur Rimbaud proclaimed
his hatred of the “century of hands.” (quoted in Saint-
Amand, 2011, 79)For him, only idleness could open the
way to freedom and creativity. To be modern, then,
means to establish a form of life that is autonomous and
independent of power structures – in this sense, idleness

is also a way to resist the established capitalist order.
When Mladen Stilinović extols idleness and inactivity in
his manifesto “In Praise of Laziness” (1993) he is writing
about the right not to produce anything—a right he en-
joyed under socialism that he was deprived of under capi-
talism. From the perspective of sleep, could these notions of
laziness and idleness be understood as a model of resistance
to this ‘wake-up-ist’ ideology you have described?
AP: It is problematic to relate sleep to laziness, as the latter

is another story as far I am concerned. I am not sure whether
my chosen problematization of sleep could be ‘included’ in
the plane of laziness. For example, Paul Lafargue, Karl
Marx’s son-in-law, wrote an entire treaty on “the right to be
lazy,” (Lafargue 1883) but in his famous pamphlet he never
paid special attention to sleep. It is true that laziness is a sort
of unproductivity. If laziness is a conscious strategy, it could
be seen as a form of resistance in a capitalist society that is
obsessed by work, profit and success. But there is nothing in
laziness that interests me as much as the sleeper’s separation
or non-communication, laziness, on the other hand, can be
very chatty…
Charles Baudelaire, an emblematic figure of modern art,

once said: “I fear sleep as one fears a deep hole, full of
vague terror.” (Quoted in Navarina, 2009) He had a very
intricate approach to sleep; he was fascinated by the rather
banal experience of it and exhausted by its monotonic
regularity. Just before his attempted suicide in 1845, he
wrote: ‘I am killing myself because I can no more live,
the fatigue of falling asleep and the fatigue of waking up
are unbearable for me...’ (Quoted in Navarina, 2009).4
4 I owe this quote to my friend, the French artist Virgile Novarina,
whose work I will also discuss a little later.

THE ONLY P LA CE TO HI DE? 2 37
Baudelaire’s refined and in some ways comic critique of

sleep gives its meaning another twist. And perhaps it might
be that the laziness and flaneurism that were characteristic of
the modernist artists, who sought new and exciting impres-
sions and innervations, were oppositions to the monotonic
“large hole” of sleep, at least in the case of Baudelaire and
many other poets and artists. Laziness can also be permanently
wakeful and vigilant. Is it not just modern power and capital
vigilance’s double?
I think that the considerable number of artists trying to explore

the themes of sleep, sleeping body, conditions of sleep, etc.,
signals a growing awareness of this remarkable symptom
of the present moment. Actually, my first published text
about the topic we are discussing was a short review of
an exhibition called Sleepers by a graduate of the Institute
of Contemporary Art in Moscow (Penzin 2001). And my
research was, and is, not just a theoretical discourse, but a
form of life as well – it has generated various encounters
with outstanding people, thinkers, artists, etc.
I could mention a couple of stories. My friend from the

group that I am also a part of, Chto Delat? / What is to
be done?, the artist Nikolay Oleinikov produced a mural
series in 2005-2011 called Is the Worker Asleep? Strangely
enough we never discussed this work before it was completed,
which was such a surprise for me! These huge acrylic
murals were initially made for the exhibition that took
place in the Sormovo neighbourhood of the city of Nizhny
Novgorod. The historical and political background of this
work was the first Russian revolution of 1905; its riots,
barricades, and the incredible rise in self-organization of the
working class in this particular area. Over the century we
have seen Sormovo, a revolutionary district, become trans-
formed into an area of sleep, of so-called sleeping blocks.
This is surprisingly linked to the part of my research on the

political and biopolitical dimensions of the sleeping body in
relation to Marx’s theory as mentioned above.
Another amazing story is related to the French artist Virgile

Novarina whom I met recently. We are true accomplices in
this uneasy undertaking of the exploration of sleep. He told
me that once, when he was young, he said, “I am 22 and I
have spent almost 7 years in sleep. I know nothing about
these 7 years of my life, that is, about myself!” For around
15 years now he has been developing a specific sleep-re-
lated art practice. Novarina memorizes and documents not
dreams–although he started with that–but sleep, or to be
more precise, the states between sleep and waking. When
sleeping we experience ‘micro-awakenings,’ ten or more
during the night, that we usually do not remember after-
wards. Novarina has his notebook and pencil by his bed at
night and tries to record the splashes of light, vision, the
words or figures that appear during these awakenings. The
artist has already produced a large series called Ecrits et
dessins de nuit (2003) [Night’s Writings and Drawings]. He
also makes sleep performances in unusual public places,
like a shop-window, an abandoned factory space or at the
opening of his own exhibition. These things really inspire
me; all the anthropological questions of my research are im-
plied in his work.
Generally, I think that what Louis Marin, whom I quoted

earlier, said about a painting as a sleeping body is also true
for contemporary art, though in a modified sense—an artwork
is a sleeping body. What is, for example, an anthropological
model for any readymade exhibited in a white cube? For
me, the sleeping body is such a model; a minimal experi-
ence of isolation, separation, potentialization. An untouch-
able sleeping body is a “minimal difference” (Deleuze
1986, 171), which at another level produces an artwork.
We should also make reference to the idea of sacralisation/

profanation as developed in contemporary thought by Giorgio
Agamben. His premise is that all sacralisation is rooted in the
elementary structure of isolation of a body, image, object, and
its withdrawal from human practice and use (Agamben 2007,
73-93). For example, you can find in many anthropological
studies that in traditional communities a sleeping person was
untouchable, to disturb him/her was a strict taboo. Contempo-
rary artwork still retains a sacralisation/profanation dimension
—the anthropological model of which is, in my view, the
sleeper’s separation from the world. In this way, perhaps,
each sleeper is comparable with an art performer.
The point of articulation between sleep and resistance is, in

my opinion, a quite ambivalent moment if it is taken seriously.
My project is definitely not about resigning oneself from the
world in which we live. Sleep as an act of non-communication
and non-productivity is a powerful form of exodus from a
society, which is based on communication and production.
If all the people of a given society were asleep, that society
would no longer exist. It would become a political mobiliza-
tion, if every single person came to a demonstration, or to a
sleep-in at a strike, the government would be toppled for sure.
This is why I was excited to learn about the recent so-called
‘sleepful protests’ that were part of the Occupy Wall Street
practices where the activists slept on the sidewalks near banks...
However, I am not praising sleep as a strange new and actual
form of resistance. I am attempting to understand the complex
connections between capitalism, metaphysics, ontology, sleep,
waking, and subjectivization.
Agamben, Giorgio, 2007. Profanations. New York: Zone Books.
Badiou, Alain, 2006. “Bodies, Languages, Truths,” in Lacan.com.

Available online: http://www.lacan.com/badbodies.htm [last accessed
May 2014].
Bergson, Henri, 1959. Oeuvres. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Deleuze, Gilles, 1995. “Postscript on control societies,” in Negotiations.

New York: Columbia University Press.
Deleuze, Gilles, 1986. Cinema I. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press.
Diderot, Denis, 1976. “Rameau’s Nephew,” in trans. T. W. Tancock.

Rameau’s Nephew and D’Alembert’s Dream. London: Penguin Classics.
Ekirch, Roger, 2005. At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past. New York:
W. W. Norton & Company.
Freud, Sigmund, 1999. The Standard Edition of the Complete

Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 15. London:
Vintage Books.
Kant, Immanuel, 2007. Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
Kantorowicz, Ernst, 1997. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval

Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kirk, Geoffrey and Raven, John, 1971. The Presocratic Philosophers:

A Critical History with a Selection of Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lafargue, Paul. The Right To Be Lazy. Available online:

http://www.marxists.org/ archive/lafargue/1883/lazy/index.htm
[last accessed May 2014].
Levinas, Emmanuel, 1978. Existence and Existents. The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff.
BIBL IOG RA PHY 241
Marin, Louis, 1999. Sublime Poussin. Stanford: Stanford

University Press.
Marx, Karl, 1993. Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of

Political Economy. London: Penguin Books.
Novarina, Virgile, 2009. “Le sommeil est une seconde vie,”

in Supérieur Inconnu, Autumn 2009.
Penzin, Alexei, 2001. “Sleepers,” in Moscow Art Magazine,

2001, № 32.
Plato, 1926. Laws, vol. 2. London: William Heinemann.
Saint-Amand, Pierre, 2011. The Pursuit of Laziness: An Idle

Interpretation of the Enlightenment. Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press.
2 42
2 43
SECTIO N 3

2 44
CH ARLE S T. W OLFE 2 45
Cultured Brains and the

Production of Subjectivity:
The Politics of Affect(s)
as an Unfinished Project
Il faut détruire l’ennemi à partir de l’affect. Parce que
l’affect (la production, la valeur, la subjectivité) est
indestructible. (Negri 1997, 56)1
1.
The brain is frequently presented both as a potential
site and substance of radical transformation—a utopian
form of ‘wonder tissue,’ a ‘difference machine,’ an ‘uncertain
system,’ contrasting with the more static, deterministic schemes
envisaged either by darkly portrayed ‘mechanistic materialists’
or ‘nefarious neurophilosophers’ (see Wolfe 2007 for a
discussion)—and, quite symmetrically, as the focus and
resource of consumer neuroscience, ‘semiocapital’2 or
‘neurocapitalism.’ Indeed, the first concept I discuss here,
cognitive capitalism, is itself treacherous, ‘two-faced’ in its
aporias: is it a cyber-metaphysics of frictionless capitalism?
Or is it a Negrist messianic Golem-construction destined
to bring revolutionary pathos, desire, libido, affect thun-
dering through the neuronal avenues that capitalism, its
consultants, the Rand Corporation and the MIT MediaLab
thought had been successfully colonized and turned into
saleable commodities, a.k.a. ‘consumer neuroscience’?
1 This translates: ‘One most start from affects to destroy the enemy.
Because affects (production, value, subjectivity) are indestructible.’

2 Franco Berardi’s term for our world of ‘post-Fordist modes of
production’ (see Terranova 2013).

2 46 CHARL ES T. WOLF E
In contrast, the second concept I address, the politics of

affects, has no such duality: it is intended as an explicit
extension of Autonomist, ontologized Marxism.
How does one get from the aporias of cognitive capi-
talism to the (limited? boundless?) promise of a politics of
affects? The difference between these two concepts is, of
course, partly a matter of style. By articulating a connection
between these two régimes of ‘brainhood,’ to borrow in a
loose sense an expression from Vidal (2009), I also want to
suggest that taken together, they imply a real shift in the
way the fence-posts are placed, repositioning the polarity
between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften, naturalism and
what I’ll refer to as the ‘hermeneutico-humanist complex.’
This is an old opposition, to be sure, but a tiresome one,
which is alive and well today, whether or not it harks back
explicitly to the heavy-handed tradition of ‘Science does not
think’ and ‘animals are weltarm,’ with its smell of dark
green tweed in the forest.
Indeed, conservative bioethicists, neo-Aristotelian
philosophers and orthodox Marxists make for strange bed-
fellows in their shared denunciation of naturalism’s blind,
mechanical externality, which holds value, reason and free-
dom captive, ‘governed from outside, manipulated by blind
causal chains,’ as Sartre (1990, 86) wrote against material-
ism in the early postwar years ‘a causal chain can lead me to
a movement, a behavior but not ... to my grasping of my sit-
uation as a totality. It cannot ... account for revolutionary
class-consciousness’ (ibid., 120). Here humanism takes as
its target materialism, viewed as a kind of unconscious syn-
ergistic meld of scientism and Taylorism: ‘materialism, by
decomposing man into rigorously defined behaviors like in
Taylorism, serves the purposes of the master: it is the master
who conceives of the slave as being like a machine’ (ibid.,
127-128). Sometimes, this kind of denunciation comes from
farther Left, as with Tiqqun’s (2001) piece of learned, para-
noid critique of the dangers of ‘the cybernetic hypothesis.’
CULTURED BRA IN S AND TH E
2 47
PROD UCTI ON OF SUBJ ECT IVI TY
Contrast Guattari, who denied, ‘as opposed to a thinker such

as Heidegger,’ that ‘the machine is something which turns
us away from being’:
I think that the machinic phyla are agents productive of

being. They make us enter into what I call an ontological
heterogenesis. ... The whole question is knowing how the
enunciators of technology, including biological, aes-
thetic, theoretical, machines, etc., are assembled, of refo-
cusing the purpose of human activities on the production
of subjectivity or collective assemblages of subjectivity.
(Guattari 1992/ 2011, 50)
2.
Faced with the fact that our cultural-symbolic envi-
ronment, which provides the scaffolding for complex rep-
resentational structures, can alter the neural architecture of
the developing brain (Quartz & Sejnowski 1997; Quartz
1999; Donald 2001, 153, 212; Thompson 2007, 408), two
distinct responses can be imagined.3
3 I don’t argue for this ‘fact’ here, which emerges from many studies
dating back to James Mark Baldwin in the early 1900s, through Lev
Vygotsky and his younger collaborator Aleksandr Luria in the 1920s,
to work on neural plasticity (including Atsushi Iriki’s ground-breaking
research with primates and tools), Terrence Deacon’s ‘coevolution’
model of language and brain from the late 1990s, which explains the
evolution of the prefrontal cortex as reflecting ‘the evolutionary adap-
tation to this intensive working memory processing demand imposed
by symbol learning’ (Deacon 2003, 100), and Lambros Malafouris’s
cognitive archaeology. Even in writing critical of some neuroscientific
claims, it is acknowledged that ‘neuroscience construes the brain more
and more as an active organism that shapes its environment and is
shaped by it’ (Hartmann 2012, 80).
One response we might label as that of the ‘Rand

Corporation theorist.’ Additionally, it may be that of the
cynical, déracinée commentator on globalization (including
when she assumes a melancholy posture of denunciation)4,
who will emphasize this potential as a resource for what
used to be called, including by the late, equally melancholy
Deleuze, ‘the society of communication.’ We may recall, in
an interview pertaining to his Cinema books, Deleuze’s ob-
servation that aesthetics cannot be separated from the “com-
plementary questions of cretinization and cerebralization”
(Deleuze 1995, 60, my emphasis).5 In truth, this amounts to
a more haughty way of putting Gil Scott-Heron’s famous
sentiment that “The revolution will not be televised.”
Another response would be that of the figure that
by the early twenty-first century we have come to know as
the ‘Art School Marxist’6, who will see the potential for,
or employ a rhetoric of revolutionary transformation.
4 See the early work of David Rieff, Sofia Coppola, and more explicitly
Keller Easterling (2007). A powerful, if self-cancelling tirade against

these utopias-turned-phantasmagorias-of-dystopia is Gilles Châtelet
(1999); see my review in Chimères 37 (1999). Less self-cancelling, but
not in the mode of ‘theory,’ is the work of the cinematographic curatorial
collective Le Peuple Qui Manque (Deleuzians and Straubo-Huilletians
will recognize the reference): http://www.lepeuplequimanque.org/
5The tone of this observation stands in contrast to the exciting, utopian,
forward-looking pronouncement made by Deleuze that many of us have
quoted in our work, namely, that ‘creating new circuits in art means
creating them in the brain too.’ The latter is creative and exhortatory
while the former is bitter and Bartlebyesque.
6 The question as to why Communism is primarily discussed in art
schools (especially in the UK and Northern Europe), is addressed

in David Graeber, “The Sadness of Post-Workerısm,” 2008 Lecture,
at http://www.commoner.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/graeber_
sadness.pdf [last accessed February 2014].
2 49
Namely, the brain—the plastic brain, the cultured brain, the

social brain—must be the site of revolution itself, whether
we take this literally (in its materiality), or more conceptu-
ally (in its immateriality). In an essay on the Spinozist reso-
nance of the social brain (see Wolfe 2010), with particular
focus on Vygotsky and Antonio Negri, I exhumed this
supremely—madly(?)—overconfident pronouncement of
the Bolshevik child psychologist Aaron Zalkind, sounding
more like a Chris Marker creation than a figure from the
history of science or politics: ‘The cortex is on a shared
path with socialism, and socialism is on a shared path with
the cortex’ (Zalkind, quoted in Vygotsky 1929, 14; see Veer
& Valsiner 1991, 320). In case this isn’t clear enough, plans
for the revolutionary reshaping of humanity into the ‘New
Man’ and other shapes-to-come should not only not ignore
neuroscience: for Zalkind, they should embrace it.
That the activity of our brains is either, always already,
revolutionary and transformative, or instead raw material for fas-
cism, is something of a serpent de mer or an endless schoolyard
battle, which spawns twins and mirror images every time one
has one’s back turned. If cognitive capitalism is in the end a creed
of managers and consultants, can there be cognitive Marxism?
Can there be a ‘noo-politics,’ in Maurizio Lazzarato’s terms,
which could employ our immaterial, aesthetic potential to invent
‘existential territories’ (Guattari 1992, 30) far away from this col-
onization of our interior, as in the imagined green spaces lying
somewhere outside sci-fi dystopias (of Blade Runner, Brazil, etc)?
But then isn’t the ‘cognitive’ part the problem, since one remains
trapped in an idealist loop, caught between the Charybdis of virtu-
ality (absolute deterritorialization, lines of flight, quantum flow,
desire, potentiality…) and the Scylla of the ‘cognitariat’? More
concretely, for example, ‘the particular construal of self currently
championed by social neuroscience—with a focus on social-inter-
active skills, low-level empathy and mind-reading—neatly corre-
sponds with the ideal skill profile of today’s corporate employee’
(Slaby & Gallagher 2014). This is, indeed, ‘neurocapitalism.’
In fact, there are not just two types of response to this

promise of the brain (the gleeful commodification of the
Rand Corporation theorist or the fiery revolutionary promises
of the Art School theorist). There is also the recently devel-
oped approach known as ‘critical neuroscience’ (particularly
the work of Jan Slaby and collaborators). While this latter
case takes a critical distance towards the practice and theoret-
ical structure of existing science, it remains very far from the
brusque dismissals or moralistic hand-wringing characteristic
of the ‘hermeneutico-humanist complex.’ While Frankfurt
School fans like Diederich Diederichsen will denounce even
the most hybridized forms of neuroscience (neuroaesthetics,
social neuroscience, affective neuroscience, embodied mind,
etc.), critical neuroscience seeks to look carefully at the inter-
action between neuroscience as it is and analyses of its social
and cultural structure (ranging from brain imaging to psy-
chopharmacology and the role of the military in influencing
basic research…). Critical neuroscience is inspired by Fou-
cauldian analysis (Choudhury, Nagel & Slaby 2009, 66), al-
though its theorists later acknowledge, citing Bruce Wexler
and others, the importance of looking at cortical plasticity in
order to view the brain as ‘in constant interaction with cul-
ture’ (ibid., 71). Even at its most critical, this approach re-
flects on challenges such as how enhancement technologies
confront us primarily with new forms of responsibility. That
is, while some aspects of neurocapitalism could subsume any
of our responsibility under a kind of determinism, ‘consumer
neuroscience’ would conversely give us more choices.7
7 For a careful articulation of Frankfurt-School ‘critical theory’ with
respect to neuroscience, see Hartmann (2012). Hartmann, citing

Martha Farah, speaks of the difficulty of preserving ‘the freedom to
remain unenhanced’ in a context where schools, in a country we don’t
need to name, are coercing parents to medicate their children for atten-
tion dysfunction (Hartmann 2012, 82). In an alternative account, less
‘distant’ while still evaluative, Schmitz (2014) employs feminist con-
cepts to look at the present-day flourishing of ‘neurocultures’.
2 51
Obviously, the interesting cases fall in between: those

which neither engage in catastrophist, anti-science rhetoric, nor
think the issue is about marketing our cognitive capacities.8
The critical neuroscience project is in this more interesting
part of the spectrum, but it has one major difference from the
perspective presented here, in which the social brain, cultured
brain, noo-political brain is real, not a matter of critical, evalu-
ative discourse. That is, from the cultured brain to the politics
of affects, we are engaging neither with critical evaluations
nor with metaphorical discourse, but rather with embodied,
embedded materiality.9
3.
My concern indeed is the relation between brains,
subjectivity and the transformative, symbolic dimensions which
Vygotsky saw so clearly already in the 1920s and which in
the past decades we have come to associate with the ‘Bald-
win effect’ and some writings of Paolo Virno (2003; see also
Depew & Weber 2003; Papineau 2005; Lachapelle et al.
2006): the social brain. The Baldwin effect describes ways in
which non-biological traits such as linguistic and cultural be-
haviors can be assimilated in such a way as to be transmitted.
8 Another version of the former, which relies less on appeals to a
human sovereignty, and more on a kind of descriptive yet apocalyptic

sociocultural discourse, focuses on the way the social world itself is
becoming a neuronal world. In such a world, society is becoming ob-
sessed with brains, whether in the explicit form of ‘neurocapitalism’ or
not, and our desires are increasingly turned towards virtual gratifica-
tion. This position is best expressed in some recent films – I won’t
mention any theoretical work of this sort – such as Ari Folman’s The
Congress (2013), Chris Marker’s Level Five (1997) and, somewhat
more reactionary, Oliver Assayas’ Demonlover (2002).
9 A rare case of an analysis which explicitly addresses ‘affect’ in rela-
tion to the biological without denouncing this possibility is provided

by Papoulias and Callard (2010).
In other words, it attempts to capture how learning can af-

fect the direction and rate of evolution by natural selection.
As such, it is not a Lamarckian view at least in the popular
understanding of that term, since it is not focused on indi-
vidual creative acts. Lachapelle et al. (2006) discuss certain
genetic algorithms which demonstrate that Baldwin effects
are possible within a strictly Darwinian framework. It is
hard to improve on Peter Godfrey-Smith’s explanation:
Suppose a population encounters a new environmental

condition, in which its old behavioral strategies are inap-
propriate. If some members of the population are plastic
with respect to their behavioral program, and can acquire
in the course of their lifetime new behavioral skills that fit
their new surroundings, these plastic individuals will sur-
vive and reproduce at the expense of less flexible individu-
als. The population will then have the chance to reproduce
mutations that cause organisms to exhibit the new optimal
behavioral profile without the need for learning. Selection
will favor these mutants, and in time the behaviors which
once had to be learned will be innate. (quoted in Depew &
Weber 2003, 54; cited in Lachappelle et al. 2006, 316)
What is significant in the present context is the way in which

these concepts blur the border between the biological and the
socio-cultural spheres. That is, the Baldwin effect is very
close, in fact, to the promise of the social brain, namely that
‘the human cerebral cortex [is] an organ of civilization in
which are hidden boundless possibilities’ (Luria 1978, 279).10
10 Luria is glossing on Vygotsky, whose last, posthumously published
work, “Psychology and the Localization of Mental Functions” explicitly

aimed to investigate the functional organization of the brain as the organ of
consciousness (Luria 1966, 23). The development of new ‘functional or-
gans’ occurs through the development of new functional systems, which is
a means for the unlimited development of cerebral activity (ibid., 19, 22).
2 53
It is also close to Deleuze’s ‘neuroaesthetic’ vision in which

‘[c]reating new circuits in art means creating them in the brain’
(Deleuze 1995). This Baldwin-Vygotsky-Deleuze vision is
tantamount to saying, to use Negri’s (1995, 98) words, that
‘Geist is the brain’ (Negri is deliberately being provocative
with regard to the German ‘hermeneutical’ tradition, although
his interests lie less in the realm of the social brain, and more
towards a politics of affects, as we shall see). That properties
of Geist such as its interpretive capacity, its social and inter-
subjective dimension, are in fact properties of the brain
means—and I wish to insist on this point—that these are not
just accounts of interaction between two distinct entities or
fields of activity (e.g. brain and society, brain and symbolic re-
lations, nature and freedom…). They also do not amount to an
insistence that what matters is strictly the world of language in
which we live, irreducible to the brain understood—to use
some vivid judgments from the early modern period—as ‘a
clammy and unactive Nature and Substance; ... a meer passive
Principle, as to the Acts of inward Sensation and Intellec-
tion’—that’s one of the Boyle Lecturers, John Hancock (1739,
II, 243), in 1706—or a mere ‘Cake of Sewet or Bowl of
Curds,’ unfit to perform our cognitive operations for the Cam-
bridge Platonist Henry More (1978, I.11, § 5, 34; cited by Sut-
ton 1998, 145).
That the social brain is not a theory of the interaction
between independent entities called ‘society’ and ‘brain’
(nor a Piaget-type internalization of the outer by something
like ‘the self’) is also a key intuition in Edwin Hutchins’
(1995; see also Latour 1996) celebrated account of the ex-
tended mind in Cognition in the Wild:
Internalization has long connoted some thing moving

across some boundary. Both elements of this definition
are misleading. What moves is not a thing, and the
boundary across which movement takes place is a line
that, if drawn too firmly, obscures our understanding of
the nature of human cognition. Within this larger unit of

analysis, what used to look like internalization now ap-
pears as a gradual propagation of organized functional
properties across a set of malleable media. (Hutchins
1995, 312)
If we further radicalize this thesis, we arrive at Guattari’s vi-

sion of ‘pre-individual intensities’ with its emphasis on af-
fects, perception, and what Anglophone theorists would
most likely call embodiment (although Guattarian embodi-
ment is definitely not about the privacy of ‘my own body’ as
opposed to external, physical nature). In Guattari’s words
(2011, 41): ‘I reject in advance the kind of reductionism
which consists in thinking communication and culture result
from an interaction between individuals. There is no interac-
tion between individuals; there is a constitution of subjectiv-
ity at a scale that is transindividual from the outset.’11
The social brain occurs in a ‘gradual propagation of
organized functional properties across a set of malleable
media.’ Less evident from previous remarks, it is also a
‘constitution of subjectivity at a scale that is transindividual
from the outset’. As such, it requires clarifying what is
meant by affects and their role in this process. Before I at-
tempt such a clarification, I shall reiterate one point and
mention an objection.
First, to reiterate, the biological and the social
(Baldwin), the cerebral and the social (Vygotsky) or the
cerebral and the cultural (Deleuze) crisscross and interpene-
trate one another. However, this is not ‘interactionism’ or
‘constructivism’. Furthermore, if such concepts are valid,
they are so inasmuch as brains themselves ‘make chaos in
order to make sense of the world’ (Skarda & Freeman 1987).
11 For an excellent analysis of the transindividual, see Jason Read (2014).

2 55
This is not a ‘dialogue’ between neuroscience and the world

of the social, or Harawayian metaphors. If naturalism is
dangerous (as claimed by Tiqqun but also some critics of
Paolo Virno), then Vygotsky is dangerous too, which
amounts to a puzzle for Marxist thought (recall my earlier
observation about strange bedfellows).
Second, to raise an objection, in this seamless (or
chaotic but perpetually self-actualizing and transforming)
world, there is no negativity, conflict or dysfunction; there is
no psychopathology, for it is sheer positivity. There are no
monsters in a perpetually transforming, Lucretian world of
hybrids and brains as producers of ‘new circuits’ and artifi-
ciality: there is only matter, and an iteration of forms.12
Some people object that this also leads to another ‘danger’
or flaw, the biologization of the political; I do not think this
follows, any more than it does from Spinozism in general
(see Diefenbach 2011).13 This is where we need to shift the
emphasis from cognitive capitalism (pro and con) and the
social brain, to the politics of affects.
For affects are nature, and yet they are not nature: for-
get the Germanic fascination with second nature, the unique-
ness of the human, our usage of tools, our immateriality or the
Noosphere (Leroi-Gourhan, Teilhard de Chardin, Stiegler).
12 I sought to address this in a critical reflection on the hoped-for mes-
sianic power of monsters with Negrist resonance; there, naturalism ad-

mittedly concludes with a somewhat cynical reminder that there is
only Nature (see Wolfe 2008).
13 Diefenbach would not agree with either the Spinozist or the natural-
ist inclinations of the present essay, but the challenge she poses to the
“confort intellectuel” of a Spinoza-Deleuze-Negri politics of potential-
ity, ‘infinitely extended toward infinite perfection,’ is a real one, and I
acknowledge it.
The brain and affect in this context are closer to what the
18th-century surgeon Georges Arnaud de Ronsil (1768, 246)
said, reacting to the case of hermaphrodites: ce n’est qu’à
peine que l’on reconnaît la nature dans la nature meme
[it is only with difficulty that we can recognize Nature in
Nature itself]. He had not read “Middlesex” to find out that
hermaphrodites have desires like you or me; Ronsil is upset
that nature has done something wrong. Ronsil’s fears about
hermaphrodites (and their implied self-destruction of any
normativity in nature, as if by hara-kiri) clarify that whether
it is a teenager’s brain after years of compulsive gaming, a
psychopath’s brain or Lord Byron’s 2200g brain, your brain
or mine contemplating, now the Kaaba, now James Turrell’s
“Pleiades” (1983) at the Mattress Factory in Pittsburgh, the
difference between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ becomes at best
a matter of convenience, at worst completely empty.
But, my objector will say, this is not enough. For
this problem of a lack of room for dysfunction, monstrosity
or psychopathology is part of a broader reproach sometimes
heard against Spinozo-Deleuzo-Negrist politics and meta-
physics (this is somewhat redundant since a distinctive feature
of this tradition is that the two are folded into one another, in a
prominent motif of Negri’s “Savage Anomaly” [Negri 1991]):
that it folds all struggle into a plane of immanence in which all
cows are grey. As Rancière (2011, 135) put it:
Capitalism may produce more and more immateriality,

yet this immateriality will never be more than the imma-
teriality of capitalism. Capitalism only produces capital-
ism. If communism means something, it means
something that is radically heterogeneous to the logic of
capitalism, entirely heterogeneous to the materiality of
the capitalist world.
Where does the immateriality issue come from, however?

So far, we had not encountered it. It is thus worth clarifying
2 57
that in most theorizations of cognitive capitalism, the em-

phasis is indeed on knowledge and immateriality. Except for
Negri in more metaphorical moments (and Virno explicitly),
none of these theorists are at all interested in brains. Indeed,
some like Lazzarato explicitly denounce any ‘positivism,’
‘naturalism’ or appeals to science. In their usage, the word
‘cognitive’ is simply a derivative of ‘knowledge.’ Value is
located in knowledge (cognitive capacity) and the creative
capacity of living labor. As one of the most prominent theo-
rists of cognitive capitalism, Carlo Vercellone (cited in Ter-
ranova 2013, 47), put it: ‘The importance of ... material
labor decreases in favor of a new paradigm of work, simul-
taneously more intellectual, immaterial and relational.’
To this we need to reply with two points, both of
which are Spinozist at their core. First, as laid out above,
this theory concerns real brains and their materiality
(whether or not the cortex and socialism are really on the
same path). Indeed, denials of this reality—that we possess
brains and that materialists might be able to care about what
Vygotsky, Baldwin, Deleuze and Warren Neidich call ‘cul-
tured brains’ or ‘Bolshevik cortexes’—are typical of the
hermeneutico-humanist-Marxist: recall Sartre’s cold, blind
‘causal chains’ that enclose the free human essence, or
Tiqqun’s denunciation of the mechanisms of control vehicle
by cybernetics and artificial intelligence. I’ve argued for the
contrary elsewhere, inspired by Vygotsky, Virno et al (see
Wolfe 2010, Gallagher, in press, 2013, and Pasquinelli
2014). But here I would add a second feature, which is my
second point: the inclusion of affects and the production of
subjectivity.14
14 Maurizio Lazzarato interprets in a more anti-cognitivist way than
Guattari did, for unclear reasons given his own subtle and well-articu-
lated criticisms of the older dialectical-materialist, Hegelian-Marxist,
party-dictatorship model.
4.
Calls for a politics of affects have been heard from a
variety of quarters, often influenced by Spinoza or at least
Spinoza as reconstructed and joyfully revived since the
late 1960s, by figures such as Gilles Deleuze, Alexandre
Matheron, Pierre Macherey and Antonio Negri.15
On the more naturalistic side, such invocations of
a return to the primacy of affect, or affects, have sought
support in so-called ‘affective neuroscience’ (e.g. Damasio
2003),16 which in its most technical sense, associated
with Joseph LeDoux (see LeDoux 1998) and Antonio
Damasio (more controversially), is the idea that emotions
such as fear ‘are not necessarily mediated through a cogni-
tive appraisal (that is, a mental representation) of the
fearful stimulus, which would necessitate an engagement
of the prefrontal cortex (one of the sites centrally implicated
in cognitive functioning)’ (Papoulias & Callard 2010, 40).
For LeDoux, the temporality of affectivity is of a scale
such that it cannot be perceived by our senses. For Damasio
and LeDoux, then, emotions constitute a pre-reflective
realm of affectivity that pre-exists our folk understanding
of ‘self,’ in which a Spinozist automatic background
could be imagined; consider that ‘the affect is impersonal
and is distinct from every individual State of things:
15 In English, a later but extremely useful work is Gatens and Lloyd (1999).
Thinkers who continue this trend, in some cases as direct students of

some of the above, include Laurent Bove and Pascal Séverac.
16For an interesting discussion and overview see Ravven (2003). For an
example of political-affective neuroscience in practice (different from
the critical neuroscience model, as it is more explicitly political in dealing
with race, oppression, poverty and exclusion), see Protevi (2009).
Protevi surveys some notions of ‘political affect’ further in “Political
Emotion”(2014). An analysis which actually addresses the meaning
of ‘affect’ is Papoulias and Callard (2010)
2 59
it is none the less singular, and can enter into singular

combinations and conjunctions with other affects’
(Deleuze 1986, 98-9).
Closer to home we have the recent efforts of thinkers
such as Yves Citton and Fréderic Lordon (2008) to articu-
late a new Spinozist trend or mood in the social sciences
(Citton & Lordon 2008). But what is this politics of affects
and why should it matter? Spinoza defines an affect as a
‘confused idea by means of which the mind asserts a force
by which its body, or a part of its body, exists’ (Ethics III,
general definition of the affects at the end of Book III, in
Spinoza 1992). When thinkers today invoke Spinoza on
the affects they are often trying to either (a) avoid a kind
of rationalism in politics and/or (b) broaden the scope of
resistance and struggle.
On the one hand, a politics of affects is a way of
avoiding a kind of rationalism, in which everyone has
to contribute just so much, and be entitled to so much.
Such rationalism may be of the discursive space of ra-
tional agents, or indeed of the State shoe factory from
which one is entitled to one pair a year. ‘Considered
from a Spinozist standpoint, political life has less to do
with Kantian-Habermasian communicative rationality
than with phenomena of composition and the propagation
of affects’ (Citton & Lordon 2008, 33).17 Of course, if
we stress the emotions instead as somehow primary or
essential in politics, the sensible democrat will cry ‘Fascism!’
(recall the Carl Schmitt debates of the past few decades:
17 Lordon’s work is not yet translated into English, although “Willing
Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire” is forthcoming

from Verso in 2014. For a useful short presentation, see Jason Read’s
comments at http://www.unemployednegativity.com/2010/ 12/everyone-
is-kettled-lordon-on-marx-and.html [last accessed February 2014].
the moment when the president of the École Normale

Supérieure in Paris called the followers of Negri ‘left-
wing Schmittians’?18
But the goal is not to unleash micro-fascisms every-

where, and impose emotions such as fear as paramount; as
John Protevi puts it, ‘Joy in entrained collective action is by
no means a simple normative standard’ (Protevi 2014, 335).
Rather, we should think of a politics of affects as akin to a
Guattarian ‘production of subjectivity.’ If I am the director
of a prison and, instead of imposing solitary confinement
or the hosing-down of troublesome individuals, I create a
partnership with a community theatre in my city so that
groups of prisoners can put on plays, I am facilitating the
creation of (joyful, affirmative) affective networks. As such,
‘the production of affects, subjectivities, and forms of life
present an enormous potential for autonomous circuits of
valorization, and perhaps for liberation’ (Hardt 1999, 100).
This is part of what Guattari meant by the “ritournellisation
du monde sensible”: not so much the Kantian ‘making up a
world,’ but a pre-individual and relational activity, that can
be the way a child fixates on a part of building in the hous-
ing projects and thus no longer sees the ugliness, or the way
this child might hum a familiar tune (ritournelle) when lost
in the forest, thus creating a more familiar environment. It
may also refer to the invention of new affective territories
by the artist, or the militant.
18 (There was some truth to this, if only in a faintly Hegelian sense in which
the exaggeration is ‘the true.’) Yann Moulier Boutang describes the intel-
lectual and political context for the accusation of ‘left-wing Schmittianism’
(and tries to articulate a model for a ‘revolutionary usage of reactionary
thought’) at http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Y-a-t-il-un-usage-de-gauche-
de-la [last accessed February 2014]. For a more precise analysis, see Jean-
Claude Monod (2005, 2006). See also Yoshihiko Ichida’s very suggestive
essay, “Subject to subject: Are we all Schmittians in politics?” (2005).
2 61
On the other hand, affect is also an operative term

in the notion of ‘affective labor,’ used by Negri, Lazzarato,
Hardt and others to describe, as Jason Read summarizes,
a particular subset of the larger field of “immaterial labor”;

it describes labor that produces emotional states, care,
wellness, desire, etc.: it is labor that produces subjectivity,
in terms of its most basic conditions of existence through
the work of care, and in terms of the feeling and sense
of self. Moreover, the history of feminist writing on
“care work,” reminds us that such work, especially as
it performed in day care centers and nursing homes, is
devalued because it is seen as natural attribute of being
female, as something given rather than learned. Affective
labor plunges us into the unstable border between repro-
duction and production, subjectivity and the conditions
that produce it.19
If we recall the Spinozist definition of affect as a ‘confused

idea by means of which the mind asserts a force by which
its body, or a part of its body, exists’ we can see that the
conception of mental life, and how it relates both to ‘the’
body and to ‘bodies’ overall, is definitely non-individualist
(in the Cartesian sense and beyond), whether or not it is
explicitly materialist. Crucial here is Proposition 57 of
Book III of the Ethics: ‘Affects are related to Desire, Joy
or Sadness; desire is the essence of a being, and joy or
sadness is its way of expressing that essence; they are
passions by which our power of acting—our effort to
persevere in our being—is either increased or decreased.’
19 http://unemployednegativity.blogspot.com/2011/05/affective-
composition-of-labor.html [last accessed February 2014] (thanks to John

Protevi for sending me to this blog). See also, Silvia Federici (2011).
Negri takes this conception of the affects and emphasizes

that an affect is a power of acting, both singular and universal
—singular because of its ‘vitalistic’ overtones (the unmea-
surable, the constitutive…) and universal because they are
inherently relational, in the sense that they relate us to one
another (Negri 1997; Wolfe 2011).
This insight we find extended in the work of Negri,
Citton-Lordon, Lazzarato, and Ulus Baker: sociology is not
value-free (wertfrei), since all social actors are both interre-
lated (whether as brains, imitative machines, sympathetic
agents or in the name of a ‘relational ontology’) and are
actively engaged in the construction of a world, a world of
struggle, power and desire.20 That by the very fact that we
have desires, we are engaged in such construction—in ‘onto-
logical constitution’—is exactly the crucial insight missed
in the old, stale debate between Habermas and Foucault, in
which the former (and his epigones) declared that the latter
was guilty of ‘crypto-normativity,’ or the more common
accusation that Foucault’s world is one in which resistance is
futile (Fraser 1981, 279; see also Rajchman 1988 for a useful
overview and retort). In fact, the politics of affects allows for
my desires and my body to be part of the fabric of the real
and its revendications. That affects are inherently relational
and that they necessarily involve my embodiments and my
desires in relation to the real goes some way towards blunt-
ing both Rancière’s and Diefenbach’s challenges. Specifically,
it represents an objection to the challenge that these theories
are caught in a self-feeding loop of immateriality, or that
they are ‘angelic’ or ‘Romantic’ in their vision of a self-
actualization of potentiality towards infinite perfection.
20 Ulus Baker was a Turkish radical intellectual whose work on the sociol-
ogy of culture and cinema explicitly seeks to extend the project of a ‘soci-
ology of affects.’ In a different version of this essay I seek to contextualize
his work in a Spinozist and Negrist context. I thank Harun Abuşoğlu for
introducing me to Ulus’s work and encouraging me to write on it.
2 63
The politics of affects (i) extends the scope of resistance

and its actors, by allowing for a dimension of subjectivity and of
creation, (ii) allows for a more embodied sense of what it is to
have a mind, desires and to relate to others (indeed, the language
of ‘affect’ and ‘affective’ in cultural studies and elsewhere in
the humanities is almost synonymous with ‘embodiment’ and
‘embodied’), and by extension (iii) interacts fruitfully with a
‘relational’ ontology (Morfino 2006; Read 2014). But inasmuch
as the claim that thought is affective—and that emotions pertain to
the body—is an insight shared both by Spinozism and contem-
porary affective neuroscience, the politics of affects also opens
onto a naturalistic horizon. Recall, this is what is contested by
those I termed hermeneutico-humanists. These can be Marxists or
not: witness Ricoeur and Habermas, or David Hawkes (2011) in
literary studies, with his screeds against what he calls materialism.
5.
Prima facie, attempts to give a natural (usually evolu-
tionary) grounding for ethical and political life deserve the
suspicious reactions they get (from sociobiology in the old days
to evolutionary psychology both then and now). But something
quite different occurs in the politics of affect. Geist now means
the brain, something that was intimated by Deleuze and Guattari
(1994, 209) in “What is Philosophy?” when they suggested
that the future of the Geisteswissenschaften—for them, all
disciplines dealing with ‘the mental,’ from philosophy to
art and science—lay in the folds of an uncertain, chaotic,
‘nonobjectifiable brain’ (see also Murphie 2010). Warren
Neidich (2003) has articulated an extremely original model
for relating ‘cultural plasticity’ and ‘brain plasticity’ in his
theoretical work and artistic practice. Basically, if the brain is
already social and the organism is a ‘developmental system’
inseparable from its environment, knee-jerk anti-naturalism is
an unnecessary attitude to have towards the politics of affect.
It is as if ideology critique always ends up having bad natural-
ism chase away the better kinds (Citton & Lordon 2008, 11).
The production of subjectivity, the politics of multitude and

affect need not rest on a ‘humanist’ appeal to a transcendental
or otherwise anti-natural self, just as it need (indeed, should)
not rest on dialectical materialism (Lazzarato 2005, 2006).
In that sense, while the goal of liberating affects in a
‘production of subjectivity’ may run counter to certain impulses
of control, management or property in ‘neurocapitalism,’21
(although sadly we can be at once master and slave, including
as ‘neuroworkers’: both immaterial laborers and cognitariat)
it has no need or reason to oppose a ‘free’ self (or brain)
to a manipulated creature (of the Rand Corporation, the
CIA or MIT’s MediaLab). As such, the fear of naturalism
is misplaced. Indeed, even the notion of an environment
which stands in a dynamic relation to the individual—who
is thereby not an ‘atom’ or a Randian ‘superman,’ as the
Marxist tradition insists (as in Marx’s famous definition in
the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach that ‘Human essence in
its reality is the sum of social relations’ (Marx and Engels
1978, 122))—can also be found in biology, for example
in the famous ethological theorizing of Jakob von Uexküll
(2010), who described in detail how each organism is em-
bedded in its own Umwelt.22 This kind of biology coheres
with the overall rejection of ‘individualism’ we find in the
politics of affects; for every affect is relational.
21 I refer back to films such as Ari Folman’s The Congress.

22 See the very useful discussion of Uexküll’s ideas also in light of
contemporary discussions of the embodied, embedded mind by Olivier

Surel (Surel 2014). A related concept in more recent biology is niche
construction, i.e., the process whereby organisms modify their environ-
ment (termite mounds and beaver dams being classic examples), which
may result in ‘a change in the selective pressures of such organisms,
which in turn may affect how natural selection operates in this popula-
tion’ (Lachapelle et al. 2006, 319). It is worth noting that I don’t think
Uexküll’s politics were ours.
2 65
In sum, the social brain concept and the politics of

affect taken together articulate a social, relational ontology
without anti-naturalism. Philosophically, this is novel in
rejecting the Natur- vs. Geisteswissenschaften distinction
and thus any hermeneutics, while remaining wholeheartedly
political. The brain and affect concepts allow for both
(neo-)Marxist and naturalistic emphases, such as Deacon’s
’co-evolution’ of language and brain, and they remove the
cognitive capitalism concept from its ‘immaterialist’ tendency.
Cultured-brain neuroaesthetics and pluridisciplinary work
on neural plasticity show that the brain is its own symbolic
machine. It is worth repeating that this should not be con-
fused with neuroaesthetics sensu Semir Zeki (1999), where
the term literally means a ‘neurology of aesthetics’ in the
most crude explanatory sense possible, leading to talk of
laws of aesthetic experience, and other strange hybrids.23
To paraphrase Danto, if someone in a West German police
station in 1975 with slightly blurry vision is looking at some
‘Wanted’ posters which feature some prominent members
of the RAF, for the neuroaesthetician façon Zeki (but not
Neidich), she might be having the same experience as a
non-contextualised viewer of Richter’s ‘October 1977’ series.
Earlier, I suggested that this materialism of the social,
of cultured brains and affects took away some of the sting
of objections such as Katja Diefenbach’s, since this was
neither naïve immanentism (her chosen target) nor crude
naturalism (not her target). Yet, recurrently from the begin-
ning (cognitive capitalism as Janus-faced) through the
incessantly mirrored figures of emancipation and control
or commodification, noopolitics and neurocapital, ‘cerebraliza-
tion and cretinization,’ we have run up against a problem.
23A clear, reasonable warning on these issues (which has the significant
advantage of being naturalistic, rather than a defense of the mystique
of art) is Malafouris (2013).
This, however, is not some logical or conceptual flaw (of the

sort that Rancière thinks he can almost diagnose), but a
problem perhaps inherent in appeals to the real itself rather
than to old-fashioned normativity. It is the problem that oc-
curs when ‘an essentially dynamic, self-organizing biol-
ogy/nature is presented as the guarantor for an emancipatory
and creative politics’ (Papoulias & Callard 2010, 49), al-
though this is not a problem for Spinozism.
Granted, it is hard to be optimistic when the brain,
network, emotion, desire are all potential ‘double binds,’ all
can be disruptive or commodified, and ‘all that is solid
melts into air,’ especially since it is no longer just the labor
of our body which is exploited, but our cognitive capacities.
Indeed, as I revise this essay, I see a disturbing piece of
news—disturbing also in that it further distorts our sense of
the real and the virtual (recall my allusion to ‘The Con-
gress,’ ‘Level Five’ and ‘Demonlover’ at the outset): a game
designer has quit her job after death threats were made
against her and her family, pursuant to her ‘designs’ in the
game displeasing fans (she had revealed that she didn’t like
violence).24 I like the sobering way Lazzarato (2008, 174)
puts it: art and culture are ‘neither more nor less integrated’
into the society of control and security than any other activ-
ity, and they have ‘the same potential and ambiguities as any
other activity’. This is what I referred to above as the ‘two-
faced’ nature of cognitive capitalism; but this formulation
has neither the cynicism of the ‘Rand Corporation theorist,’
nor the naïveté of the ‘Art School Marxist’.
24 See http://metro.co.uk/2013/08/16/bioware-writer-quits-after-death-
threats-to-family-3925970/ [last accessed February 2014].

2 67
So there is little to be gained by investing either a

substance (brain, frontal cortex, organism) or a potentiality
(including that of ‘ritournellisation’ or ‘existentialisation,’ in
Guattari’s processual terms) with an absolute ‘saving power.’
This, however, does not change the way in which a Spinozist
politics of brain and affects is an improvement over those
‘planifications’ which lay out a blueprint for action, with a
hierarchy of actors assigned to their unmoving roles, à la
DIAMAT and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Faced with
ascetic, idealistic models it can always, in contrast, appeal
to the ‘indestructibility’ of affects. In the words of an earlier
materialist, Le pour et le contre (1765), III, in Diderot 1986, 9.
‘There is no pleasure felt that is illusory (chimérique).’
Châtelet, Gilles, 1999. Vivre et penser comme des porcs. De l’incitation

à l’envie et à l’ennui dans les démocraties-marchés, Paris: Exils
(reprint Folio-Gallimard).
Choudhury, Suparna, Nagel, Saskia Kathi and Slaby, Jan, 2009.

“Critical Neuroscience: Linking Neuroscience and Society through
Critical Practice,” in Biosocieties 4:1.
Citton, Yves and Lordon, Frédéric Lordon (eds.), 2008. Spinoza et

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MATT EO PA SQUINE LLI 2 75
The Power of Abstraction and Its

Antagonism: On Some Problems
Common to Contemporary
Neuroscience and the Theory
of Cognitive Capitalism.
Life cleaves to matter, elaborating and contracting matter,

bringing to life the virtualities within the material
in unknown directions. Life emerges as a becoming-
concept, a becoming-thought or—as a consciousness,
a becoming-brain. (Grosz 2012)
We accept far too easily that there exists a fundamental

conflict between knowledge and life, such that their
reciprocal aversion can lead only to the destruction of
life by knowledge or to the derision of knowledge by
life. [...] Now, the conflict is not between thought and
life in man, but between man and the world in the
human consciousness of life. [...] It is not true that
knowledge destroys life. (Canguilhem 1965)
The philosophical debate of the last years, at least at the

boundaries of French and Italian political theory, has been
marked by a conceptual oscillation that has alternately
emphasised immaterial labor or affective labor, knowledge
economy or desire economy, the cognitive or the biopolitical.
No research or political agenda have been immune from
such a hypnotic spiral, which can be traced back to a mil-
lenary low-intensity hostility between the Western concepts
of body and mind. After a period focusing on the knowledge
economy and immaterial labor, for instance, at the end of
the ‘90s, the affective turn of the humanities forced political
theory to give a specific attention to affective labor.
2 76 MATTEO PASQUIN ELL I
On this conceptual journey, theorists rediscovered the repro-

ductive and care labor that feminism attempted to politicise
already in the ‘70s. In the same period, biotechnologies and
the notion of bios occupied centre stage in debates around new
forms of power. A common critique emerged that took the
paradigm of cognitive labor to be overlooking the biological
and genetic materiality of the body, and more importantly its
libidinal and affective dimensions. Lazzarato (2006) proposed
interestingly the idea of noopolitics as an extension of the
definition of biopolitics to cover also the flesh of the collec-
tive imaginary and mind technologies. It must be under-
lined, however, that the sphere of affective production was
originally considered within the sphere of immaterial pro-
duction and never opposed to it (Hardt & Negri 2000, 293).
How can these two spheres once again be put in relation to
each other?
This essay intervenes in the oscillation between these
two poles and advocates a monistic paradigm, where the
opposition between body and mind, or bios and abstraction,
may hopefully vanish—as in the works of Spinoza, Marx,
Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Canguilhem, Foucault and also
Deleuze and Guattari. Yet this time the French lineage is not
followed and the genealogy of the notion of biopolitics is traced
via the German tradition of Lebensphilosophie, where ‘the
living’ was rarely detached from a dimension of cognition and
abstraction. In particular, the German-Jewish neurologist Kurt
Goldstein and his ideas of abstract behaviour and normative
power of the organism are located at the root of Foucault’s
intuition of biopower. In this reconstruction the cognitive
paradigm is turned inside-out: it is in order to understand the
body that we start once again from the brain, it is at very core
of the bios (and the whole matter) that abstraction is found
at work. The cognitive does not emerge after the evolution
of a naked life (and maybe just to become its very enemy),
but it innervates the living matter since its constitution
(as we are reminded in the opening quotation by Grosz).
THE POWER OF ABSTRACTION AND ITS ANTAGONISM 277
Eventually in this essay, the brain is taken to be as the first

model and terrain of biopower. Going deeper in this genealogy,
the power of abstraction will be disclosed at the original core
that inspired the paradigm of biopower. It is not an exaggera-
tion to affirm that neuroplasticity (as understood by Goldstein)
was the original inspiration of the notion of biopower.
Exhuming the forgotten ‘neurological roots’ of the notion of
biopolitics helps to clarify the affective vs. cognitive opposition
and to describe differently the so-called psychopathologies
of cognitive capitalism.
This essay is divided in five sections. The first three
sections focus the notion of abstraction in relation to neu-
rology, political economy and ontology—that is, the notions
of abstract behaviour in Goldstein, abstract labor in Marx,
and abstract machine in Deleuze and Guattari. Abstraction
is here understood as an immanent power that makes and
undoes connections, that territorializes and deterritorializes,
that projects bodies and identities beyond themselves, onto
the surrounding environment and towards the infinite cosmos.
The power of abstraction is intended also as the power of
differentiation with respect to neural matter, the power to
produce further bifurcation of information and perception
flows, as described by a long tradition spanning from the
Gestaltpsychologie to Merleau-Ponty. The fourth section
shows how the recent discovery of mirror neurons in
neurology has further implications for political philosophy.
It also explores Virno’s discussion of mirror neurons within
the tradition of Italian operaismo, and finally how the
notion of abstraction can illuminate them in a different way.
By way of conclusion, against a certain fatalistic tone,
I propose to reverse the approach to the problem of the
psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism by moving
away from the neuropedagogy advocated by Metzinger.
1. Goldstein and the power

of abstraction of the organism
There is a nodal point in the history of the relation between
French and German philosophy when the notions of life
and abstraction are found still bound together. This is, for
instance, a crucial issue in Foucault’s analysis of the relation
between modern forms of power and modern systems of
knowledge, but a more interesting conceptual nucleus is
found in the inspiration of Foucault’s biopolitics. The idea of
biopower emerges in his course The Abnormal (15 January
1975) where it is described as biopolitical normativity.
The innovative idea of the course was that power is no longer
investigated as a discipline of the body (the negative power of
repression) but via the invention of new Norms (the positive
power of normalisation). The normalization of post-Napoleonic
French society is the creative act of power that invents new
norms in the fields of industry, administration, education
and public health. The Norm and the Normal are the key-
words of this institutional consolidation: it is at this time, for
instance, that the École Normale is established. Incidentally,
the first definition of dispositif is given by Foucault in this
course, which refers to the genealogy of normativity. Fou-
cault describes this form of power as a dispositif of normal-
ization: ‘This general technique of the government of men
comprises a typical apparatus [dispositif], which is the disci-
plinary organization I spoke to you about last year. To what
end is this apparatus directed? It is, I think, something that
we can call “normalization” (Foucault 1975, 49). Foucault’s
idea of biopolitical normativity is inspired by his mentor
Canguilhem’s (1966) idea of socio-organic normativity as
discussed in “The Normal and the Pathological,” which
presents the latter’s research on the definition of normality
and illness in medicine and life sciences. Curiously, Can-
guilhem himself built upon the neurologist Kurt Goldstein’s
idea of organic normativity.
Goldstein is not an esoteric figure in the history of

thought. The cousin of Ernst Cassirer, he was the head of the
neurology department at the Moabit hospital in Berlin when
he was arrested by Gestapo and expelled from Germany.
His seminal monograph “Der Aufbau des Organismus” [The
Structure of the Organism] was dictated in exile in Amster-
dam in 1934. Goldstein was also an extremely significant
inspiration for Merleau-Ponty, who cited him hundreds of
times in “The Structure of Behavior” (1942) and “Phenome-
nology of Perception” (1945). Foucault himself opens his
first book “Maladie mentale et personnalité” (1954) with a
considerable critique of Goldstein’s definitions of mental ill-
ness and organic medicine based on the notions of abstrac-
tion, abnormality and milieu. These three notions return
consistently throughout Foucault’s career. In a bizarre circu-
lar coincidence, the last public and authorised text by Fou-
cault is the new version of the introduction to the English
edition of “The Normal and the Pathological.” Following
again Goldstein’s track, Foucault states famously in this in-
troduction: ‘life is what is capable of error’ (Foucault 1985).
In Goldstein normative power is the ability of an
organism (specifically the human brain) to invent and
modify its own norms, internal and external habits, rules
and behaviours in order to better adapt to its surrounding
environment, particularly in cases of illness and traumatic
incidents, in those conditions that challenge the unity of
the organism. Goldstein’s originality is conceiving sick-
ness and all that is considered ‘psychopathological’ and
socially ‘abnormal’ as a manifestation of a positive nor-
mative process, which today would be defined as neuro-
plasticity. Thus truly ‘sick’ is the organism that is not
capable of invention and experimentation of new norms,
the organism that is paradoxically not able of making mis-
takes. For Goldstein, psychopathologies express the posi-
tive self-actualization power of the organism, but Goldstein
defines this positive power as a power of abstraction.
The so-called ‘psychopathologies’ are just the attempt of

our body to invent new norms in adverse conditions, to
project and protect our body beyond itself. This amounts
to an abstract attitude that goes beyond everyday concrete
attitude (Goldstein 1934).
2. Marx and the power of

abstraction of capitalism
The notion of abstraction has been widely shared and debated

within Western philosophy, political economy and cognitive
sciences throughout the 19th and 20th century, before being
recently eclipsed by the rise of the affective studies and
desiring philosophies. How can the model of neurological
abstraction be linked again to the notions of abstract labor
and cognitive labour found in the contemporary theory of
cognitive capitalism (Hardt, Negri, Vercellone, etc.)? It is
not the time to repeat here the well-known theses about
knowledge, language, information and attention as productive
and valorising forces in post-Fordism. Also there is not
enough space to go back to Sohn-Rethel (1978) and his in-
tuitions on the similarity between the abstraction of money
and abstraction of thought or to classic texts in Soviet Psy-
chology such as Ilyenkov’s “Dialectics of the Abstract and the
Concrete in Marx’s Capital” (1960). For the time being, it is
sufficient to recall how Marx framed abstraction as both the
general movement of capitalism and general movement of the
resistance to it. Regarding this power of abstraction in Marx,
Hardt and Negri shed some light in the following passage:
Abstraction is essential to both the functioning of capital

and the critique of it. Marx’s point of departure in Capital,
in fact, is his analysis of abstract labor as the determining
foundation of the exchange-value of commodities.
Labor in capitalist society, Marx explains, must be ab-

stracted from the concrete labors of the tailor, the plumber,
the machinist to be considered as labor in general, without
respect to its specific application. This abstract labor once
congealed in commodities is the common substance they
all share, which allows for their values to be universally
commensurable, and which ultimately allows money to
function as a general equivalent. [...] Marx views abstrac-
tion, however, with ambivalence. Yes, abstract labor and
the system of exchange are mechanisms for extracting sur-
plus value and maintaining capitalist control, but the con-
cept of abstract labor [...] is what makes it possible to
think the working class. Without abstract labor there is no
working class! (Hardt & Negri 2009, 127)
The abstraction of capitalism is a very material process,

as stressed in Sohn-Rethel’s notion of real abstraction.
Furthermore the definition of cognitive capitalism should be
framed in this manner. Cognitive capitalism is not simply the
domain of knowledge production or computer-based labor
but, as Vercellone has explained, a whole new division of
labor (that is a new different machinic bifurcation, articula-
tion and organisation of flows of matter, energy and infor-
mation). The history of capitalism is read by Vercellone
(2007) in three stages: formal subsumption (manufacturing
capitalism), real subsumption (industrial capitalism) and
general intellect (cognitive capitalism). As such, capitalist
production appears to follow movements of deterritorializa-
tion and reterritorialization: the industrial revolution reterri-
torializes the division of labor of manufacturing inside the
factory, whereas cognitive capitalism deterritorializes the
division of labor once more across all society. The logical
chain described by Vercellone between antagonism, division
of labor, machinery and the general intellect perfectly
describes a general abstract machine. The evolution of
the division of labor is indeed this process of abstraction.
However such a power of abstraction must not be understood

merely as an evil external force that belongs only to capitalism,
but rather as a common potentiality of the multitude. As
Negri and Hardt would have it, without abstraction there
is no multitude.
3. The ontology of abstraction

in Deleuze and Guattari
The problem of abstraction is central for Deleuze and Guattari

too, despite emphasis throughout the last few decades on the
desiring and affective side of their ontology. In their mission
to sketch a materialistic ontology and materialistic logic they
transformed and subsumed all the metaphysical and tran-
scendental models of modern philosophy within the immanent
notion of the abstract machine. Here the term ‘machine’
indicates the very contingent and productive process of
abstraction, the connection of different and even radically
different substrates and also the projection and ‘assemblage’
with the infinite and the void. The Abstract Machine is a
universal concept introduced so as to ground a manifold
ontology: ‘The plane of consistency of Nature is like an
immense Abstract Machine, abstract yet real and individual;
its pieces are the various assemblages and individuals, each
of which groups together an infinity of particles entering
into an infinity of more or less interconnected relations’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 254).
The abstract machine marked a final rupture with the
holistic tradition of abstraction, which had been inherited
by German idealism, and inaugurated the abduction of the
Outside by the double pincer of the Lobster-God (Deleuze
& Guattari 1980, 40). Despite having such a cosmological
depth, the notion of abstract machine can also be used to
explain the role of abstraction in the mundane paradigms
THE POWER OF ABSTRACTION AND ITS ANTAGONISM 2 83
of both biopower and cognitive capitalism: the abstract

machine points to a power of abstraction that is able to
ab-stract from its substrates and to produce the universal
equivalent of capital and power (biopolitics).1 This is also
the ability of mind: its ability to make connections, but also
to sever them, to negate them or to repeat them to infinity,
the ability to produce general assemblages. Indeed, Deleuze
and Guattari’s notion can be very useful to mediate between
political economy and neurology, where the abstract machine
could be intended as the ability to escape the limit of the brain
and the organism, to expand towards an external memory
and include the whole universe as an extension of the mind.
It is interesting though how the philosophy of Deleuze and
Guattari has been received mainly as a celebration of infinite
flows of desire. It is true that Spinoza’s infinite substance is
the essential ground of this philosophy, but without abstract
machines construction of any system would not be possible,
hence there would be no becoming in their ontology.2
1 ‘The abstract machine in itself is destratified, deterritorialized; it has
no form of its own (much less substance) and makes no distinction

within itself between content and expression, even though outside it-
self it presides over that distinction and distributes it in strata, do-
mains, and territories. An abstract machine in itself is not physical or
corporeal, any more than it is semiotic; it is diagrammatic (it knows
nothing of the distinction between the artificial and the natural either).’
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, 587)
2 The relation between organism and abstraction, the organic and the
abstract, can be located in their aesthetic model. See their response

to “Abstraction and Empathy” by Worringer (1908), where primitive
art, the first art of humankind, was precisely about the rise of the
abstract line.
4. Socialist cortex and mirror neurons

The notion of abstraction is not just a resonance between
distant authors. There is indeed a common background in
the contemporary history of cognitive sciences and political
philosophy. Wolfe (2010) has underlined this background
in an important essay on the fascinating history of the
so-called ‘socialist cortex,’ which captures the idea of col-
lective brain spanning from Spinoza and Marx to Vygotski
and Negri and the whole Italian operaismo. Another inter-
esting case of the encounter between cognitive sciences
and political philosophy is found in Virno’s (2004) com-
mentary on the famous research on mirror neurons. Mir-
ror neurons were discovered by a team from the University
of Parma, consisting of Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese
and a number of others. They implanted electrodes in the
ventral premotor cortex of the brain of few monkeys and
recorded neuron activities while these monkeys were en-
gaged in some specific actions. They discovered that: ‘a
particular set of neurons, activated during the execution of
[...] hand actions, such as grasping, holding or manipulat-
ing objects, discharge also when the monkey observes sim-
ilar hand actions performed by another individual’ (Gallese
2001). These neurons were firing both when the monkey
was doing the action of grasping a banana and when the
monkey was seeing another monkey grasping a banana: for
this reason they were called mirror neurons. Other studies
have since demonstrated the activity of mirror neurons in
human animals (Mukamel et al. 2010), but just the discov-
ery of this simple link in a specific area of the primate
brain brings incalculable consequences for cognitive sci-
ences and the philosophy of mind. Virno takes Gallese’s
description of mirror neurons as the proof of a natura-
listic basis of human nature and as the basis of the pre-
individual sphere of inter-subjectivity that is supposed
to be a given before the constitution of the human identity:
‘The relation of a human animal to its own kind is assured

by an original ‘intersubjectivity’ that precedes the very
constitution of the individual mind. The “we” exists even
before we can speak of a self-conscious “I”’ (Virno 2004,
175). In this view there is a common empathy between
the individuals of the same species that is rooted before
any linguistic faculty. Mirror neurons allow Virno to
sketch a theory of political agency based on a collective
intersubjectivity that is only afterwards crossed and cut by
the ambivalence of language and the violence of negation.
Virno poses here the common as a pre-given structure of
human nature, as a sort of pre-individual space à la Simondon.
Thereafter, in an elegant way, Virno critiques this substrate
of human nature with the introduction of two other logical
steps: first, the power to negate natural empathy and com-
munality with other human beings; and, second, the power
to negate this negation, to reconstitute the public sphere in
a proper constituent sense. What is interesting for Virno is
the fact that mirror neurons do not explain the power of
negation, while the most peculiar trait of human thought is
precisely the ability to negate.
Language inoculates negativity into the life of the species.

It enables the failure of reciprocal recognition. The lin-
guistic animal is the species capable of not recognizing
its own kind. [...] Language is the antidote to the poison
that language itself pours into the innate sociability of
the mind. Aside from the being able to cancel out neural
empathy, completely or partially, language can also remove
this contradiction. [...] In other words the public sphere is
derived form a negation of negation. (Virno 2004, 176)
Virno’s account appears to be rigorous within the tradition of

Analytical Philosophy, but mirror neurons can be contextu-
alised in a different way within the holistic logic that spans
from German Idealism and Gestaltpsychologie to the more
recent theory of ‘enaction.’ Virno seems to forget that the

very power of negation (which I prefer to call ‘power of
abstraction’) can be innervated deep into the structure of
perception and sensation. There is no ontological difference
between thought and perception, abstraction and negation.
As much as a century ago, Gestaltpsychologie showed
that the visual perception of figures is based on the brain’s
holistic power to generalise points and abstract lines. More
recently Noë (2004, vii) has recalled this position: ‘perception
and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action
and capacities for thought; perception is... a kind of thought-
ful activity.’ The theory of mirror neurons finds itself along
the epistemological border where the scientific data of neu-
rophysiology and the holistic logic of neurophenomenology
look into each other as through a broken mirror. For sure, a
new paradigm will emerge along this fault line.
Indeed, the results of the first experiments on mirror
neurons can be explained in a different and more dynamic
fashion. Evolutionary scientists agree that mirror neurons
are an achievement of evolution: very few animals are ca-
pable of imitation and learning by imitation to the same
degree as primates. The ability of mirror neurons is some-
thing that our organism developed. But how? For a long
time, to be sure, primates had neurons that were firing in-
dependently when an action was performed and when the
same action was seen as performed by somebody else: see
for instance those monkeys that take up to four years to imi-
tate an action to source food that was discovered or invented
by a member of the same group. Then, one day, a link was
established in the brain: two different neurological ‘circuits’
were connected to the same one. In this way empathy can be
described as the power of abstraction in an organism that is
able to associate with another one that which beforehand was
only considered its own. If Gallese points to a pre-individual
commonality, here the commonality is only post-individual—
the effort and the projection of our power of abstraction.
Empathy is then possible only thanks to the power of abstraction

and not the other way around. While negation can be consid-
ered a subset of abstraction, abstraction cannot be considered
a subset of negation. In a similar vein to Virno, but arriving
via a different philosophical tradition, I advance the idea that
the power of abstraction is the only way to the common.
5. Neuropedagogy vs. psychopathologies

If a renewed notion of abstraction is advanced between
the domain of neuroscience and political philosophy, it is
also to invert the common understanding of the so-called
‘psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism’ and to frame
them from the point of view of an empowered subject rather
than from the point of view of an alienated one. Cognitive
capitalism should be defined as the exploitation of the power
of abstraction, intended as the cognitive power of the human
organism, as the very living force that can project the human
beyond its own identity, build empathy and the common, ma-
nipulate objects, machines and information. The main thesis
of this text is the following: we develop psychopathologies
when we lose our power of abstraction, not when we overuse it.
In Goldstein the failure of the power of abstraction
is what produces catastrophic behaviour, in a similar way
to how Berardi (2010) and Marazzi (2002) have described
the reaction of our body to semio-capitalism and digital
mediascape as panic and attention disorder. But in Goldstein
psychopathologies are a ‘positive’ symptom, they are the
manifestation (sometimes desperate) of the affirmative force
of the organism in its antagonism with the environment.
So the point is how to defend or expand the power of ab-
straction of the mind and not simply to make the body an
object of passive care, for instance when Berardi (2010)
claims that ‘if we want to find the way towards autonomous
collective subjectivation we have to generate cognitarian
awareness with regard to an erotic, social body of the general
intellect. The way to autonomous and collective subjectivation

starts here: from the general intellect searching for a body.’
The ‘psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism’ risks
an inadequate conceptualization via which we sever again
the mind/body unity and we abdicate to the colonisation of
our mind by capitalism, leaving our political attention only to
body, libido and affects like unaware slaves. The very basic
body, the poorest form of perception, do not exist without
the power of abstraction, articulation and differentiation
(described also by Merleau-Ponty 1945: 35, 85). In this way
the solution is not about reclaiming the body, affection, libido,
desire and so on. Rather it is about reclaiming abstraction,
the power to differentiate, articulate and bifurcate: in order
to perceive at a higher degree of detail, and to perceive our
feelings at a higher degree of detail. Instead of the fatalistic
tone that meets the current information overload, I prefer
to advocate Metzinger’s idea of neuropedagogy. In his
book The Ego Tunnel, Metzinger has framed the so-called
psychopathologies of the digital age with these words:
The Internet has already become a part of our self-model.

We use it for external memory storage, as a cognitive
prosthesis, and for emotional autoregulation... Clearly,
the integration of hundreds of millions of human brains...
into ever new medial environments has already begun
to change the structure of conscious experience itself...
Today, the advertisement and entertainment industries
are attacking the very foundations of our capacity for
experience, drawing us into the vast and confusing media
jungle... We can see the probable result in the epidemic
of attention-deficit disorder in children and young adults,
in midlife burnout, in rising levels of anxiety in large
parts of the population... New medial environments may
create a new form of waking consciousness that resembles
weakly subjective states—a mixture of dreaming, dementia,
intoxication, and infantilization. (Metzinger 2009: 234)
As a response to this scenario Metzinger advances the idea

of neuropedagogy, which revolves around the ideas of intro-
ducing classes of meditation at the high schools, preparing
the young against the commercial robber of attention and
teaching different techniques of empowered consciousness.
Of course, for Metzinger these classes should be free of any
religious or new age tinge: ‘They might be a part of gym
classes; the brain too is a part of the body—a part that can
be trained and must be tended to with care’ (Metzinger
2009: 236). Metzinger reserves a particular attention also to
the chemical dimension of neuropedagogy (a part that can-
not be expanded upon here) and discusses the popular and
recreational uses of substances such as mescaline, ketamine,
Ritalin, MDMA and 2CB, pointing to the humorous, but in-
deed very serious, concept of cosmetic psychopharmacology.
Neuropedagogy is only the first step of what Metzinger
describes as the project of a new Consciousness Revolution,
where his tone becomes more militant. As Metzinger (2009:
238) remarks, ‘a true consciousness culture will always
be subversive.’ This political focus on the technologies of
consciousness is not new and its fertile influence has been
recorded, for instance in the California of the ‘60s where
psychedelic underground, technological innovation and
philosophical research were mutually entangled (see the
holistic and hyper-textual milieu of the Whole Earth Cata-
logue that paved the way for the brain frame of the World
Wide Web). In conclusion, Metzinger’s neuropedagogy
and Consciousness Revolution can be described also as
the militant response of contemporary living labor to the
regime of cognitive capitalism. There seems to be neither
fatalism nor victimismization in this proposal: it is about re-
claiming, defending and expanding the power of abstraction
that is continuously colonised by capitalism. At the end it is
about organising an epistemic acceleration, to become more
cognitive than cognitive capitalism, not less.
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tion,” in E-flux journal 20. Available online: e-flux.com/journal/cogni-
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LI SS C. WERNE R 2 93
Towards A*cognitive Architecture:

A Cybernetic Note Beyond – or the
Self-informing Machinery
Preface
We are writing in the year 2014. Information increasingly
becomes a desire, the necessity in the form of communication.
Desire is an extension of the brain while communication
seemingly combines heuristic operations in design develop-
ment, and reaches beyond thermodynamics. More than 65
years ago, Norbert Wiener’s “Cybernetics – the Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine” (Wiener,
1948) is published, the Macy Conferences then titled Circular
Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social
Systems are in their 3rd year and following von Neumann’s
findings on the Ergodic Theorem, the Cellular Automaton are on
their way.1 In the meantime Baby, the Manchester Small-Scale
Experimental Machine and the world’s first stored-program
computer, tested for the so-called Williams Tube (a lightweight
storage device) runs its first program. The Universal Turing
Machine becomes the continuing driver for computation.2
1 The Macy Conferences (1946-1953). Core group members included
Bateson, Hutchinson, McColloch, Mead, v. Foerster, von Neumann,

Rosenbluth and Wiener amongst others. The terms cybernetics or
second order cybernetics is not applied yet, however the theories are.
First proposals are made that feedback mechanism are also valid for
economic and social systems. A general system theory is being devel-
oped interdisciplinary.
2 The Universal Turing Machine, UTM (1936-37, Allan Turing). A UTM
has the ability to read any Turing Machine and input for simulation.
In this present philosophy of computation al architecture, Turing’s UTM
is applicable and can be transferred from virtual to tangible.
2 94 LISS C . WERNER
Within the context of The Psychopathologies of Cognitive

Capitalism: Part Two, the subject matter of this paper relates to
accessing knowledge and tools for observing and designing an
interconnected para-metric world; a cybernetic world character-
ized by multidimensional behavioral structures informed through
using the digital as interface. It provides an extension to the ex-
isting emergent construct of The Psychopathology of Cognitive
Capitalism in general and the interdisciplinary Cognitive Capi-
talism Project in particular. The insight given into cognitive
capitalism and design strategies are foundations formed in the
20th century and aims at understanding and formulating of what
the pathology of The Psychopathology of Cognitive Capitalism
may possibly be when looking through the lens of cybernetics
beyond. It offers an investigation to the understanding and the
form of knowledge through communication, a recursive re-
invention and re-understanding of how we think, how we decide
and how we actually design and behave. Not just as architects
in the design process of a building or a city, but as human beings
in the design process of the everyday. A compilation, a collection
of thoughts and findings, hovering in a paradigm between archi-
tecture, cybernetics, system theory, technology and the state of
being; Through Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,
and its subject matter language or syntax, the question of what
is reality, may operate as a filtering veil through which this
essay may emerge.
The paper discusses cultural architectural theory in conjunction

with technical, political and economical possibilities in order to
produce tangible manifestations in the context of interdisciplinary
cognitive work and authorship. In particular, in the context of
open source software, virtual and unknown design teams, whose
common ground is based on common interests and knowledge,
a spatial-temporal structural coupling, which, at times, can occur
in parallel. The field of cybernetics and architecture within com-
putational design, researches facts and theories developed in the
last half of the 20th century, and their relevance to computational
TO WARDS A *CO GNI TIV E AR CH ITE CTUR E 2 95
thinking and digital making, shaping the built and unbuilt

networked environment in the near and distant future. In contrast
to the digital, referring to a particular technology of executing
calculations, the computational relates to a way of thinking and
making reflecting complexity and non-linearity. It is about
process, rather than simply input/output. It is informed by issues
such as emergence, algorithms, structure, material behavior, data
and society. In most cases using computers as interfaces with
calculating machines and CNC (computer numerical control)
for digital fabrication 3D-printing, laser-cutting and/or robotic
fabrication. Underlying principles are not just reduced to archi-
tecture; instead they are methods with broad applications to a
variety of disciplines; in this case relevant as an application and
proof for cognitive capitalism. The model suggested here pushes
the boundaries of the contemporary understanding of architec-
ture and as a result reconstructs reality. through experimenting
with the scale of buildings, cities and smaller prototypes, under-
standing the liminal space between the built environment, ma-
terials used, the perception of the user, the regulation through the
designer, client, budget, and most importantly decision-making
processes, the choice of software during the design process,
data used and the cognitive capital to inform all of the above.
So the questions are: ‘Who is the designer?’ and ‘Who owns
the copyright, or rather the cognitive copyright?’ Architecture
as building, as physical form is the proof of the concept of inter-
play, and most likely is a result of thinking and internalizing
dwelling that has been outlived by the construct architecture
as organism, evolving and informing itself through filtering,
observation and self-observation: “I am the observed link
between myself and observing myself” (von Foerster, 1981).3
3 In his essay “Building, Dwelling Thinking” (in “Poetry, Language,
Thought,” 1951) Martin Heidegger discusses the notion that building

is only possible if we are know what dwelling means and relates to
the relationship of man, space. It is notable that the essay was written
in post-war Germany suffering from a shortage of housing.
Von Foerster’s paper is structured in a series of parts, which at

times overlap and merge. “Defining the Matter” aims to clarify
key terms used, and to establish possible relationships between
them. These terms—which derive from biology, computer
sciences, architecture or mathematics–so far have neither been
defined cross-disciplinarily, nor within architecture. Since,
however, they do affect how the forthcoming text is under-
stood, and since in an era of rapid technological and theoretical
shifts terms and expressions are revisited constantly to receive
numerous varying definitions, there is a necessity to delineate
their function. This will provide a theoretical basis for the
present text and sets the topic into the framework of philoso-
phy of computation at the same time. The main inquiry focuses
on the agenda “It’s not alone, it’s synthetic—the bits are calcu-
lating,” and provides the reader with a description of A*cogni-
tivist Architecture in a cyber-biological framework embedding
its construct within the mind/body phenomenon immanent in
social environments. The narrative Reyner Banham Loves Los
Angeles bridges computational thinking, the body, perception
through our senses and the brain in a material world. This part
introduces the concept of Wechselwirkung offered by biological
cognition and the cognitive Internet, with its unknown amount
of reflectors in an existing non-linear para-space.4 Here the
cybernetic note will be woven into a genealogical string of
thoughts. The paper concludes with an exploration for and of
an interconnected para-metric world by engaging largely with
immaterial, neurotectural design strategies and the question
of collective authorship, relating back to the synthetic that
becomes natural, cognitive and bio-semiotic.
4 Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), biologist and philosopher coined the
term ‘Umwelt.’ ‘Umwelt’ is the environment shaped by animal or human

due to Wechselwirkung. The difference to ‘Umgebung’ [surrounding] is, that
the surrounding accepts its inhabitants and is not shaped by them. A relation
to architecture exists within the notion of place as being a shaped space.
TO WARDS A *CO GNI TIV E AR CH ITE CTUR E 297
Defining the Matter
Decision-making processes in the human brain are predomi-

nantly governed and influenced by heuristics (Gigerenzer and
Brighton 2009) individually generated through experience,
learning and conversations with the living and non-living
environment. Heuristics is a relatively fast method of problem
solving employing existing knowledge and wisdom to arrive
at acceptable but not perfect solutions. Classical methods in
computer sciences have focused on optimal problem solving,
employing accurate and precise algorithms with little tolerance
for perfect outcomes (in many cases with hardly inacceptable
time frames due to complexity). The application of incremen-
tal search algorithms was first developed in the early 1950s
and approached even economic, logistical and infrastructural
issues. Search algorithms are programmed as functions to find
the shortest path between two or more locations in a field,
graph or cell matrix. Certainly restrictive parameters, obstacles
and behavioural rules may influence which form the path may
finally take and be part of the way-finding strategy. Today
search algorithms are used in almost all fields and to a large
extent in search engines. A*, a more flexible search algorithm
designed in 1968 at the Stanford Research Institute can be
combined with heuristic methods and herewith serves as
concept for the notion of A*Cognitivist Architecture. It advo-
cates behavior within architecture—a term to be redefined—
that equals an organism, a living system, functioning according
to a complex set of rules and dynamics, which are alien to
linearity or reliance only. Architecture as social agency, under-
stood in that way adapts and decides in accordance with its
environment and the knowledge available as nodal points or
locations in a dynamic, constantly reconfiguring network,
virtually accessible as space and physically existent in form
of servers and motherboards. Pathfinding for A*Cognitivist
Architecture tracks down the elements of data and information
required for successful problem solving and finds the best
possible solution for survival, or the shortest path to success,

without the dependency to arrive at a desired form or shape.
It is a third order cybernetic system describing communication
between itself and its observer in a dynamic multi-layered
environment. Due to interaction and communication between
the actors (relationship as in the functions between entities are
also considered actors) in different velocities, the observer
and the observed are interchangeable and regulate each other
(Reichenbach 2003). The phenomenon parallels a self-replicating
analogue and digital machinery, with a variety of intersections
and communication abilities. Hence all operations take place in
a ‘Self-Informing’ system, which refers to Humberto Maturana
and Francisco Varela’s concept of ‘autopoiesis,’ established
in 1972 (Maturana 1980). The term autopoiesis as coined
by Maturana and Varela originally meant self-creation of an
autonomous (entropic) organisation out of itself. The fractal
nature of this machinery’s behaviour projects a slight and
constant breeze of Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition
(Deleuze 1968) and The Fold (Deleuze 1992) and refers to both
a process of topological and structural morphosis in a Deleuzian
sense of desire, but also to the process of a series of parts work-
ing together in one system. The difference to the known me-
chanical machine is that the parts of the machine that change
their function and form are soft, malleable and almost liquid,
and therefore process, product and goal reform accordingly.
“A cybernetic Note beyond – or the self-informing Machinery”
occupies stages in interfering interfaces, between coding
designers and hackers, the Internet, software, external and
internal hardware, and cognitive capital as collective design
intelligence nurturing and breeding information. It is an
‘Architecture Machine’ (Negroponte 1973), where the power
of emergence and ability of data storage is congruent with
the agents inhabiting it in constant data exchange through
communication. Decoding and applying exchanged data,
as function, is as relevant as the data itself. The form of
communication becomes its own communication.
inFORM — To illustrate the point of the ‘self-informing

Machinery’ with its data exchange and complex communi-
cation methods I would like to sketch out two architectural
strategies of inFORMation and data transfer, namely geo-
metrical ones that are distinctly different to cognitive once,
but play a role when explored topologically:
a) Algorithmic – means to apply one or more concrete rules
or functions, such as the Golden Mean or Brownian Motion.
b) Parametric – means to apply one or more parameters on
top of an algorithm.
Algorithmic design therefore can be regarded as genotypic
and isolated, parametric design as phenotypic, objected to an
environment. Either is linear and reduced in their cognitive
and biological abilities. Both borrow from nature, such
as the geometrical Voronoi pattern on a giraffe skin or the
Fibonacci series apparent in sunflowers, waves or hurricanes.5
An example for parametric behavior in nature could be the
choreography of a flock of starlings, moving according to
certain internal rules, forming beautiful shapes of clustering
and aggregating, according to and affected by external environ-
mental parameters, such as wind, circulation of air and temper-
ature. Algorithms acting as a regulating system in this fashion
are genetic algorithms, combining biology and geometry.
Both the algorithmic and parametric approaches refer to a
technique for form finding through computational means
and apply one or more algorithms or a combination including
behavioural rules to agents in a system, which have the ability
to generate a multi-dimensional network of varying forms.
Working parametrically is extremely useful in order to in-
vestigate and analyse iterations or forms according to fitness
values (aesthetics, structural behaviour, material usage, etc.).
5 The Voronoi pattern is a mathematically based diagram describing
a way to divide two-dimensional areas or three-dimensional space.

The tessellation is a result of an algorithm employed on previously
established points.
The famous analogue computational string model by Frei Otto,

the father of structural form finding is exemplary for finding a
minimal path network through self-organization of natural
material and environmental behaviour. It is a set up with dry
woollen threads stretching across a circular frame in a regular
fashion. Once water is added material behaviour is elicited
and the threads start to cling together. They create a Voronoi-like
pattern. A natural example for minimal-path finding is the be-
haviour of slime mold, an organism, which naturally finds the
shortest path between all points in a network. Ant colonies are
also behave along the lines of minimal path networks, except
that their behavior responds to pheromone spurs. Structural,
minimal surface (not path) form finding can be seen in the 1972
Munich Olympic Stadium, also designed by Frei Otto. It is de-
signed according to the natural behavior of soap film. Probably
the first building designed through form-finding is the Sagrada
Familia, conceived by Antonio Gaudi in 1882 using a physical
chain model (algorithm) and gravity (parameter), and recently
completed by Mark Burry (RMIT), who used digital algorithmic
computation and fabrication for models and prototypes by the
means of computers. That is to say that there is a similar deci-
sion-making process at play in the choice of algorithm via a spe-
cific design model resulting in a finished materialized product
owning topography, surface topology and tactility. Using param-
eters is a technique, an instrument. Notwithstanding, parametric
architecture has been used to describe a new style [parametri-
cism] of architecture, which reflects ornament, geometry and
the static of the 20th century, and steers away from a context-
based, open-system, cognitive architecture of the 21st century.
The crux of A*cognitivist Architecture, a product of digitilisa-
tion and the Internet, lies in the intensity and amount of cogni-
tive capital necessary for producing collective brainpower that
is all but reduced to aesthetics only. It is about understanding
the logic of becoming form, breeding forms, and understand-
ing form as a result of communication processes and the abil-
ity to decode it within a system, rather than form for forms sake.
A*cognitive Architecture is primarily concerned with extended

parametric strategies focusing on paths between nodes of
knowledge, cognitive capital, all accessed through digital
means. A pool of minds is replacing material capitalism.
Therefore the model A*cognitivist Architecture suggests
is determining for all disciplines. It is a survival strategy,
obeying and extending to what Nicholas Negroponte de-
scribed, as “The Change from Atoms to Bits is irrevocable
and unstoppable” when observing the increasing “instanta-
neous and inexpensive transfer of electronic data that
moves at the speed of light...” (Negroponte 1995, 4).
It’s not Alone, it’s Synthetic – the Bits are Calculating
A CYBER-BIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK — Changes in

socio-economic formations and the rise and availability of
“sophisticated communications equipment (cyberdecks or
matrix simulators), […] privileged or differential institu-
tional access and specialized hardware and software ex-
pertise,” (Tomas 1991, 43) elicited a novel cyber-biological
framework for a large number of players. The pitch can be
regarded as the non-space of a collective, in constant mor-
phis; it also exists as liminal space, consisting of thresholds
between individuals. In both cases it is a non-linear para-
space derived through genealogical cultural evolution, a
cyber-space beyond the unambiguousness between inside
and outside, action and reaction, digital and computational
and last but not least cognitive and economic. “Cognition is
a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as
such; any epistemological insight into the domain of
knowledge requires this understanding.” (Maturana 1980, 7).
The English psychiatrist and cybernetician Ross Ashby
summarized the ubiquitous subject matter and the problem
discussed herewith and today in his book Design for a
Brain, chapter The Animal as Machine when he wrote,
“As the organism and its environment are to be treated as

a single system, the dividing line between ‘organism’
and ‘environment’ becomes partly conceptual and to that
extend arbitrary. Anatomically and physically, of course,
there is a unique and obvious distinction between the two
parts of the system; but if we view the system functionally,
ignoring purely anatomical facts as irrelevant, the division
of the system, into ‘organism’ and ‘environment’ becomes
vague.” (Ashby 1954, 39).
Ashby’s treatise is an early investigation into the behavior

of an animal in relation to stimuli from the immediate envi-
ronment and neural action. More precisely the interaction
between an animals’ observation of an irritation, followed
by information flow to its nervous system and subsequently
physical reaction by the animals’ receptors affecting rele-
vant muscles and also cognitive responses. To illustrate the
apparent complex biophysical mechanism Ashby presents
the example of a sculptor’s hand holding a chisel, and he
goes even further in explaining that the chisel is “a part of
the material which the nervous system is attempting to con-
trol.” (Ibid., 39). The example describes three aspects: an in-
ternal infrastructure for data transfer (between the internal
human and the external object), an extension of the body
through its brain (chisel and sculptor become one, the mar-
ble to be sculpted may be included) and an action specific
configuration of bodies in time and space (space, time and
bodies become one field of relationships and mathematical
functions). In science fiction the scene can be described as
one re-formation of the ‘homos formatos’ (maker) and can
easily be visualised as a temporal topographical merging of
objects and skins made of different materials in order to ful-
fil particular operations. The organism and its environment
as one functional system are structurally coupled within one
and the same paradigm.
BANHAM — Leaving the discipline of biology and cogni-

tion and diving into the same topic through culture, the
very phenomenon of merging becomes a tangible one.
“There is no such feeling in the world that compares with
taking off on a clean seven foot wave crunching down,
feeling the forces of the waves […] It’s just the greatest thing
in the world, I don’t wanna trade it for anything.” (Banham
1972). This scene from the 1972 BBC documentary Reyner
Banham Loves Los Angeles shows a surfer being at one with
his board, his body moving according to the rolling waves
and his physic, balancing in this changing space of the Los
Angeles ocean spirit. The deeply embedded identification
with the sea, surf culture as well as the location LA add to the
physical and cognitive reactions of the surfer’s body affected
by the immediate environmental forces. Reyner Banham un-
derpins the notion of organism established by Ashby through
observing culture. The movie celebrates driving through Los
Angeles, the only way to travel the city, moderated by the lat-
est technology of a Baedeker tape, hence replacing a physical
guide. Banham conveys the idea that Los Angeles’ architec-
ture is more than an aggregation of buildings, but a hub of in-
teractions happening in parallel changing the city constantly,
one city, one homogeneous organism incarnated through the
car. “So something like a million Angelinos could say that
you would never expect to hear them say: I live within walk-
ing distance of my work.” (Banham 1972). Los Angeles was,
and remains to be, a city in which freedom is the driving force
for material and cognitive operations. Freedom describes the
culture and cultural cognitive capital of Los Angeles that
also melts into the export of “Matt Mason space toys, hot
wheels and Barbie dolls to all parts of the free world” (ibid.
1972). Reyner Banham Loves Los Angeles portrays the con-
vergence of feeling as knowledge (and its export), the suc-
cess of freedom and waves and an increasing and reflecting
globalisation that triggers the breaking down of cultural and
communicative differences.
Communicative differences do not relate to rhetorical linguis-

tic or issues of foreign languages, but semiotics, psychology
and values (such as, getting each other to know, beginning
to understand each other). Reticulating the cyber-biological
framework and the above cultural observations within the
architecture of Los Angeles one can claim that neither archi-
tecture, nor cognitive capitalism is alone. Instead they synthe-
size as intertwined entities, as a living thing.
WECHSELWIRKUNG — There is another notable aspect

extending Ashby’s organism/environment notion and the
above epitomised narrative, namely the one of Wechsel-
wirkung as discovered by the biologist and cognitive sci-
entist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944). It describes the
so-called Funktionskreis, where an organism’s ability
consists of firstly perceiving (memory-net) and secondly
acting (work-net). The direct relationship between those
two operations (cognitive and physical) is shown in the
Funktionskreis. Essentially it is an abstracted concept of
experience and learning. Linking two or more memory-
nets results in inter-net computational operations extend-
ing already existing experience and amplifies learning.
Humberto Maturana describes breaking down differences
and learning–a result of communication–as understanding
the code. “Organisms are adapted to their environments,
and it has appeared adequate to say of them that their or-
ganisation ‘represents the ‘environment’ in which they
live in, and that through evolution they have accumulated
information about it, coded in their nervous system.”
(Maturana 1970).
THE BITS ARE CALCULATING — As this paper introduces

steps towards a cultural theory that discusses common ground
between agent-based behaviour through mechanisms of
programming and coding cultures, it strongly relates to a multi-
ordered cybernetic model drawing from Gregory Bateson’s
thoughts on Difference and George Spencer Brown’s Laws

of Form, 1969. The following part of the paper aims at
A*cognitivist Architecture to act as epigenetic extension of
Humberto Maturana’s Autopoiesis towards a living organ-
ism and open organization of architecture as a construct of
information and material alike, acting through and upon a
dynamic, complex system, and therefore also operating as
the system that allows for creating and transferring informa-
tion in form of knowledge or, cognitive capital, if you wish.
The system to be depicted owns a fractal characteristic akin
to what Gilles Deleuze describes in the Fold (Deleuze 1991)
on one hand, and in the age of immaterial material, cognitivist
capital, and computational means of information [ex]change,
an exaggeration of our perception through Jean Baudrillard’s
Simulacra and Simulation, on the other.
As seen in the excursion into algorithmic and parametric
architecture in the previous part, a field can be a system,
dealing with structural behaviour, where human occupancy
is not the driving force for finding a form, but physical forces
and behavior acting upon one larger entity or specific algo-
rithms choreographing a crowd of agents of the same class.
The application of geometric branching algorithm such as
L-system or a search algorithm as in an ant-colony may serve
to breed forms, structures and spaces, formerly alien to the
discipline of architecture. Algorithms may trigger solutions
and generate problems alike. Architecture as a cultural criti-
cal discipline and model drives itself into a state that increas-
ingly departs from the traditional static understanding and
material practice of architecture with all its constraints.
Fields allowing human interaction as part of the structuring
strategy are breeding grounds for knowledge that changes
the surrounding to environment. Parc de la Vilette in Paris
designed by Bernard Tschumi and the Fun Palace designed
by Gordon Pask and Cedric Prize for London (unbuilt) are
just two examples. The ellipsoid IBM Pavilion designed by
Charles and Ray Eames with Studio Saarinen for the Expo
1964/65 in New York takes a slightly different approach

and extends the strategy of breeding knowledge through
introducing computer technology and the modern communi-
cation systems that tie as well as glimpse into the future
for a audience of 500. A combination of computer controlled
multiple, simultaneous screen projections and the appear-
ance of actors in-between was presented to the crowd that
beforehand was physically and collectively lifted into the
space of a 90-foot high theatre. All visitors were part of
one of the first and largest to date public human/computer
encounters. The IBM pavilion housed a physical commonal-
ity, which cannot be regarded as an interacting swarm of
agents, but a performance generating a novel kind of com-
munication between computer technology and the visitor.
The existence of simultaneously running sources of visual
information to be transported to the human brain reminds us
of a modus operandus when using the Internet, except, that
the latter is a field that is not the result of a design strategy
anymore but an integral part of the design process itself.
In contrast to the Internet where individual users create a
virtual commonality with interacting agents, collective in-
telligence, sharing cognitive capital, the Eames’ theatre was
physical in all dimensions. The flesh of architecture in the
21st century is driven by a desire towards the optimal and
grotesque, the ultimate beautification and performative,
the unforeseen and magical, finding its foundations in the
mathematical forms and abstractions manifested by Wiener
or Ashby. The desire leaves the three-dimensional Cartesian
grid behind, and indulges in the incorporation of biological
and cognitive behaviour; the bones and veins are encoded
between the surreal and physical in a virtual asymmetry
of statistical mechanics as operation to foster radical con-
structivism and Eigenform within a field that we ones
called Cyberspace.
I N T E R N E T — N O N - L I N E A R PA R A - S PA C E —
GENEALOGICAL STRING OF THOUGHTS — Since the
late 1980s we have grown extensions of our minds beyond
the individual body and brain into a physical environment;
transformed into binary language, in overlapping simulta-
neous worlds, providing input from remote locations and
IP addresses, output generated by accumulating information
originally produced by grey matter around the globe. For
approximately the past 15 years architects have officially
started incorporating system thinking into their work and
admitting that we are designers of systems and fields rather
then sculptors of discrete objects or fields only. Since the
advent of fast data highways, open source software and a
culture that happily shares knowledge in specialized forums
the options to design have increased by a large extent.
Uploading and sharing code and scripts is extending our
individual possibilities to design into the world, the Internet,
an unimaginable space inhabited by collective design intel-
ligence. Upon the code’s return, it may have not merely
adjusted its phenotypic character, but possibly even changed
into a different creature with new characteristics, mutated
through the filter of “Electronics virtual communities [that]
represent flexible, lively and practical adaptations to the real
circumstances” (Stone 1991, 111). Especially in the field of
architects and designers who develop and use tools based
on code, the early 21st century offers a quantum leap in the
evolution of the virtual excelling traditional methods of
design. Drawing boards have been replaced with light pro-
grams using slender code rather than heavy three-dimensional
‘fancier’ models; office, brain and design abilities are ex-
tended to forums for multi peer reviews, design changes and
advice. This process eliminated economically compensation,
local independency, and software packages that in very
many cases are free to run on machines that are generally
affordable and increased the amount of cognitive capital.
The question and the theory for architecture is if the archi-

tect is becoming a mutator, or the inventor of something that
can be called ‘Neurotecture?’ (Werner 2011)6. When using
code the process to arrive at a final product is closer to
neural activities than mastering ones. “Making the link with
Deleuze, we can see the embodied and embedded nervous
system as a pre-individual virtual field: [...] a set of differen-
tial elements—reciprocally determined functions—in other
words, neural function is networked: there is no such thing
as the function of ‘a’ neuron;” (Protevi 2010, 171). Bits are
the form of operations happening offshore through collec-
tive design intelligence that must not be understood as
phenomenon, but as an activity, as a process to FORM, at
the same time as a form of communication that crates its
own syntax and physiology through an active network of
computational work, born within human nodes in human
brains transported, translated and directed via real-time
Autobahns through immaterial real-estate, the internet.
A distinction between Form as a verb and Form as a noun
vanishes and becomes obsolete.
SYNTHETICAL IS NATURAL — Advanced architecture

using the instruments generously offered in the toolbox of
Neurotecture is an architecture that embraces multiple au-
thors and multiple hackers at risk of abusing the very same
cognitive capital that they produced. Dissipative dynamic
virtual space was almost unthinkable only twenty years ago.
Benedikt writes,
6 Neurotecture may not to be misunderstood as neuro-architecture,
which is a specific interdisciplinary field between neuro-sciences

and architecture, examining how architecture or any other man-
made structure affects a human. Instead it describes an evolutionary
strand of advanced architectural strategies and methods combining
ubiquitous artificial computing and human computing.
“The principle of Commonality in cyberspace recom-

mends that virtual places be “objective” in a circum-
scribed way for a defined community of users. More
specifically, the Principle of Commonality requires
that all comers to a given domain at a given time in
cyberspace are to see/hear largely the same thing-the
same place, the same objects, the same people-or at
least some subsets of one “thing,” and that the same
direction considered as up.” (Benedikt 1991, 180).
Since then a defined group of users, the Commonality,

has become its own commodity. The Psychopathology of
Cognitive Capitalism in this context has been breeding an
offshore collective of design intelligence, a direct descen-
dant of “electronic virtual communities,” the former Internet
in the 1980s, which has already been described as “complex
and ingenious strategies for survival” (Stone 1991, 111).
The modus operandus collective design intelligence
sprawls throughout all disciplines, faculties and individu-
als in ‘hard’ sciences such as mathematics or bioengineer-
ing and ‘soft’ sciences, cultural sciences or comparative
literature alike, operating in a structurally coupled manner,
and using the information exchange through bits and bytes,
in an immaterial world, that we once called Cyberspace.
Growing collective design intelligence and user intelligence
replace designing fields such as Parc de la Villette. Collective
design intelligence must not be understood as phenomenon
or operator, but as an activity, as a process to FORM. The
new cyberspace, the para-space, is very close to “a consen-
sual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate
operators, by children being taught mathematical concepts...
A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks
of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable Com-
plexity. Lines of light in the non-space of the mind, clusters
and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding...”
(Gibson 1984, 51).
This present cybernetic note beyond certainly does not claim

that computer programs or the Internet have achieved the
ability of acting as devices owning artificial intelligence, as
envisaged by Marvin Minsky and his peers half a century
ago, in fact artificial intelligence still seems to be far off
from being implemented in the research laboratories of
Computer Sciences of Robotics institutes. Nevertheless,
computer programs and their environments such as the
Internet seem to start learning and responding as a result of
feeding them with a set of algorithms, complex or simple,
arriving at an unforeseen behavior as a form of communica-
tion. The cognitive, cerebral, data and bits become code and
the isolated structure of a genotype subjected to the environ-
ment transforms into a phenotype. The architectural result is
one of lushness and deep tissue, following periods of absti-
nence: abstinence of mathematic, abstinence of clarity, absti-
nence of pattern, abstinence of heterogeneity and abstinence
of passion and indulgence. Architecture as Neurotecture in
the cyber-biological framework of an interconnected para-
metric field is a production-system, the product of itself and
an evolution of iterations through constant recursive observa-
tion and reinvention. It describes alchemy between real and
virtual, not withholding the scientific, but re-entering it like a
differentiator. A*cognitivist architecture transforms the con-
cept of configuring space, of forming space to a new materi-
alism, a structure considering context, environment, time,
behaviour of and relationships between all agents involved;
mutating, genetically engineering and processing data within
an Architectural Computer Laboratory. We do witness an al-
most self-organising interconnected para-metric world on
many levels owning a variety of intersections and matrixes.
Novel immaterial and known material strategies together
with new data born every split second synthesize in the self-
informing machinery to become the new natural.
BIBL IOG RA PHY 311
Ashby, Ross, 1954. The Animal as Machine. New York: John Wiley &
Sons Inc.
Baudrillard, Jean, 1994. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press.
Benedikt, Michael, 1991. “Cyberspace: Some Proposals,” in Michael

Benedikt (ed.), Cyberspace First Steps. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Deleuze, Gilles, 1968. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul R. Patton,

New York: Columbia University Press (1994).
Deleuze, Gilles, 1991. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Gibson, William, 1984. Neuromancer. New York: Ace Books.
Gigerenzer, G and Brighton, H (January, 2009). “Homo Heuristicus:

Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences,” in Topics in Cognitive
Sciences 1, pp. 107-143.
Maturana, Humberto, 1980, “Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization

of the Living.” Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. The essay
was originally published as “De Maquinas y Seres Vivos,” Editorial
Universitaria S.A., 1972.
Stone, Allucquere Rosanne, 1991. “Will The Real Body Please Stand
Up,” in Michael Benedikt (ed.), Cyberspace First Steps. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Negroponte, Nicholas, 1973. The Architecture Machine. Cambridge:

MIT Press.
Negroponte, Nicholas, 1995. Being Digital, London: Hodder and

Stoughton, p.4.
Protevi, John, 2010. “Deleuze and Wexler: Thinking Brain, Body and
Affect in Social Context,” in Cognitive Architecture. From Biopolitics
to Noopolitics. Architecture & Mind in the Age of Communication and
Information. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
3 12
Reichenbach, Hans, 2003. The Philosophy of Space and Tim, trans.

Maria Reichenbach and John Freund. New York: Dover Publications.
Tomas, David, 1991. “Old Rituals for New Space,” in Michael

Benedikt (ed.), Cyberspace First Steps. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Werner, Liss (2011). “Codes in the Clouds - Observing New Design

Strategies,” in Gengnagel, Kilian, et al. (eds.) Computational Design
Modeling, Proceedings of the Design Modeling Symposium Berlin.
Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
SANFO RD KW INT ER 3 13
Neuroecology:
Notes Toward a Synthesis
Few people, even within design today, are aware of how

problems are formulated in our field, how they are constituted,
and in relation to what forces and developments they are
formed. If design may be described as a form of rationality
applied to the organization of objects, environments, and
behaviors, it is first and foremost a practice of modulating
and compelling routines of experience or, within some
modalities, a practice of clearing the way for unforeseen
experiences to emerge. But what do we mean by the term
experience? Much of contemporary research is directed
to understanding the mechanics and operation—even the
history—of what this term might cover and explain in the
material and historical world.
In the worlds of design and art practice I would argue,

attention has shifted decisively in recent decades from the
signifying modes of communication of objects to illocutio-
nary ones, in which the introduction of forms into the
world can be said to result in a ‘transformation of states.’1
1 The theory of speech acts was initially developed by John Austin in the
1950s as part of a development in language philosophy that considered
the ‘actual’ uses and operations of language, rather than its merely formal
ones. Austin distinguished between ‘constative’ utterances whose primary
purpose was descriptive of states of things in the world—utterances
that ‘stated’ something—that could be subject to true/false criteria and
‘performative’ utterances whose primary effect (and purpose) was to
effectuate something, to cause an action or change of state. In his inimi-
table words: “To say something is to do something”. Typical examples
include speech acts such as “I do.” through which one changes one’s
civil status (among other things). (Austin 1962).
3 14 SAN FORD KWIN TER
Given this shift of focus, a new emphasis on ‘continuum

thinking’ is emerging, in which, among other signal deve-
lopments, we find an increasing concern with environments
(rather than with objects, be these cities, buildings, facades
or chairs).
This mode of thought emerging at the center of design practice

and thought can be exemplified in a variety of works, even
philosophical ones, of which a single recent example is Peter
Sloterdijk’s Sphären. It is in a context such as ours here today
that we can recognize some of the complex paths by which
the so-called problem of ‘nature’ (and I use this term as a
shorthand only) has impressed itself, both philosophically
and practically, as an imperative to be incorporated into design
thinking, or into the systematic accounting of what is in play
by our, or any animal’s, being in the world.
Far from seeking to invoke Heidegger with the use of

this latter expression, I wish rather to propose that we
free ourselves from the common assumption that we are
in the world when, in fact, as a great deal of the science
we will here consider implies, we are the world itself
(Stockhausen 1973).
By invoking the broad and frequently challenged term

of ‘nature’, I leave to one side entirely the platitudinous
objections of “cultural constructionists” for whom nature
is a product of culture and history without independent
ontological, or epistemological, status. By nature I invoke
those parts of the world around us that are motivated by
their own processes and which under normal circumstances
are indifferent to our own. The fact that these undergo
modification by us (and vice versa)—in the course of
history—in no way mitigates the constancy and reliability
of nature as an independent term and object of knowledge
across a multiplicity of modes.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 15
NOT ES TOWAR D A S YN THES IS
I refer to the study of the relations of history (society) and

nature very broadly as ‘ecology’—and it is in this sense that
I make reference to something called ‘neuroecology.’ For
purposes of philosophical rigor I situate the origins of ecolo-
gical thinking in the work—a century before Haeckel—of
Alexander von Humboldt, to his On the Geography of Plants
(1807). Humboldt’s work was the first to place plant species
into their surrounding contexts—latitude, altitude, geology,
climate, temperature, soil type, etc.—even into their human
social environment and their relation to animal species, to
account for the specific patterns they express. His phrase
‘Alles ist Wechselwirkung,’ typically translated in thought
as well as in language, as ‘Everything is connected,’ is more
accurately rendered, with due emphasis, as ‘All is interaction.’
(Humboldt 1803).
The phrase is in fact a description of what came, 150 years

later, to be known as ‘the environment’ itself. This still nascent
concept can be derived from the work of Johann Goethe,
whose study of the morphology of plants proposed an algo-
rithmic blending of—modular—processes of unfolding at
different scales and at different rates, as a generative mecha-
nism of responsive (living) form. Goethe identified three
inputs: a type, a gradient and a cycle, that in any combination
would not only produce a unique and specific plant form
but would account for the variations of forms within a single
plant itself: its petals, leaves, calyx and stem (Goethe 1790).
His theory placed the improvisational integration of diverse
temporalities—each input represented an impetus that un-
folded at a different speed—at the center of natural process.
The model that served centrally in many 20th century formu-

lations of ‘environment’—in Deleuze, for example, Sloterdijk,
Agamben and Rene Thom, to name but a few—was the con-
cept of ‘Umwelt’ from theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexkull,
in many ways among the most useful ones to serve us today.
An Umwelt represents the practical world or environment

that corresponds to the sensory and biological endowment
of any given organism. In a famous set of cartoons from his
book on animal worlds, A Stroll Through the Worlds of Ani-
mals and Men (Uexkull 2010) the point is made: the worlds
of men, dogs and flies overlap, but they do not correspond.
And yet each inhabits not only its particular Umwelt, each
organism is fully continuous and consubstantial with it. The
patches and aspects of the world that represent assets for the
organism—in each case a small portion only of what might
be said to be ‘out there’—correspond to a sensory system
that is both possessed by, and which defines that animal.
An animal represents a segment of a circuit that connects
triggers in the environment to responsive actions in another
part: the organism is a more complex and layered part of
the environment itself. I will refer to this as the principle of
‘immanentism’ according to which the distinction between
organism and environment, inside and out, is but one of de-
gree: a greater or lesser compression or dilation of informa-
tion or, as more common parlance would have it, of life.
Von Uexkull’s emphasis on the senses—the compound sen-

sorymotor apparatus—as the constitutive actor that establi-
shes the organism’s integration or “fit” into, or indeed as, its
world, represents a significant antecedent to contemporary
neuroecology (and formal neurobiology). The field of mo-
dern neurology itself, beginning with C.S. Sherrington’s
Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1920) and Kurt
Goldstein’s The Organism (1934) was built on the central
observation of the brain’s irrepressible drive to cobble toge-
ther smooth and integral functional routines from whatever
partial materials—internal as well as external—that are in
its immediate spatial and temporal vicinity. Even a severely
impaired organism (brain) will assemble a seamless and
whole universe from whatever its senses deliver to it.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 17
From the point of view of design theory this idea has to be

seen as a foundational element within any perspective that
includes the material world as a site of interrogation. The
model of such understanding, both highly developed and
powerful, was not explicitly recognized in the brain sciences
until the work of Gerald Edelman. I refer here to the princi-
ples of evolutionary theory, particularly to the habit of mind
associated with what Ernst Mayr referred to as “population
thinking” (Mayr 2001). Formerly an immunological biologist,
Edelman had originally proposed a model for how a state
of the world—a disease or pathogen—could engender a cor-
relative, responsive (not passive) state in an organism—
an antibody or immune reaction—with such confoundingly
specific accuracy and speed. His discovery of the molecular
structure of antibodies and the mechanisms by which they
could vary, and his subsequent theory of how the immune
system successfully and reliably couples with the world to
respond with pinpoint precision despite the infinity of possi-
ble disease forms the world could present to it, earned not
only a Nobel Prize in medicine, but subsequently served as
a now widely-accepted model for how the open and multipli-
citous environment in which we live sculpts the brain within
what amounts to almost infinitely plastic parameters.
This was not the aspect of brain dynamics to which Edelman
was directly referring by his famous invocation of Darwin
(Edelman 1987)—this was largely reserved for the competi-
tion of neurons for spatial and energetic resources during
the proliferation and pruning phases of brain development—
but the tacit model in which input (information) from the
environment served as form-generating engines for the larger
structures and competences that account for the brain’s more
interesting and important social performance.
Hence, the understanding of the brain as the site of social and

political as well as psychedelic innovation, or if not only of
innovation, also of regressive subjectivation and coercion,
must be placed against a larger backdrop of environmental

history. This, for all its strengths and weaknesses, means
evolutionary theory. Just as the mathematician Rene Thom
(founder of Catastrophe Theory, the first comprehensive at-
tempt to mathematize the class of processes—transitional
phenomena—that govern the biological sciences) found it
congenial to posit ‘embryologies’ wherever in Nature, or in
the world, it was a matter of form developing along partly
deterministic pathways, I see no reason to not invoke the ex-
planatory prestige of epigenetic factors to account for the
prehistory of contemporary cognitive regimes.2
We have learned to refuse the distinction between body and

brain, but we have a way to go till we reflexively think the
unity of our anatomo-behavioral biology in its full poly-
phony. Yet it is just the habit of mind most usefully and cen-
trally featured in evolutionary theory, and sufficient reason
to espouse and engage it.
Paleopolitical Framework
The primary pressures exerted on the development of
human nervous response—thinking, feeling and percei-
ving—not different, for significantly long period at least,
from the pressures on all other organisms—were those di-
rected to predator and anti-predator activity.
2 The debates continue to rage around the claims of evolutionary
psychology, neuro-archaeology, paleo-neurology/-anthropology/

-anatomy, and so on with respects to what the targets of early deve-
lopmental pressures on human cognition were (many focus on corti-
cal plasticity, but many also argue for characteristic hardwired and
relatively closed attributes). It is sufficient here to beg any final con-
clusion by emphasizing simply the diversity of uses of the brain in
human history that remain, through one channel or another, essential
legacies for present usages.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 19
The subduing and incorporation (literally into our own bo-

dies) of those portions of the environment that could serve
us either for nutrition or for secondary economic advan-
tage—clothing, shelter, leisure, or procreative opportunity—
can all be considered as quarry and object of predatory
activity, and regardless of what form of execution they take,
can be subsumed under the category of hunt-and-capture.
Similarly, the evasion of capture by other predatory agents,
to the extent that early humans and prehuman hominins
were competitors for the same resources and habitats on the
savannahs with other social carnivores (the cats, hyenids
and wild dogs) determined to a large degree the forms of vi-
gilance, attention and the extreme acoustic, visual and even
the running competences that endowed us in large part with
the qualities we now routinely recognize in ourselves, as
human (Lieberman 2011, 2013).
Most people outside the field of biological anthropology are

surprised to learn that it has been a working hypothesis
since the 1960s work of George Schaller and Gordon Low-
ther (1969) that the emergence of what came to be the
human type was determined far more by relationships—
convergent developments—with fellow savannah predator
populations—lions, hyenas and dogs—than by the ape line
from which we are routinely but misleadingly said to de-
scend. Our forms of attention, our diet, our modes of asso-
ciation such as family groups, band size, social structure and
divisions of labor, etc. more greatly resemble those of coo-
perative hunting and meat-eating species than those of the
merely prehensile frugivores we left behind in the trees. In
this same respect, research in the 1990s showed extraordina-
rily sophisticated execution of multipart strategies in the
hunting methods of lions, hyenas, dogs and other savannah
carnivores (Stander 1992, 445-454). Let it be said before
moving on however that the adaptations here did not over-
whelmingly point to the human as an effective predator.
On the contrary, much in our makeup pointed to our exi-

stence as a brutishly hunted creature, who adapted the ne-
cessary forms of neurosis, anxiety and fear, (and whose
biology has been comprehensively worked out over 40 years
by Melvin Konner) as well as the need, more than anything,
for a multiplex new organ that could compensate flexibly
and innovatively for our anatomical deficits (lack of claws,
adequate carcass-penetrating teeth, etc.); a large, pluripoten-
tial and highly tunable brain (Konner 2002).
Evolution is in effect a form of biological tuning, especially

when it comes to the brain and its modalities of attention.
Some of its capacities are hardwired and innate of course,
and some merely the result of environmental pressures on the
individual rather than on the species itself. This is a topic of
vast and serious debate that centers on the prefrontal cortex
and on the avalanche of complicated issues that pertain to
how this anatomical machinery is taken up and deployed wi-
thin any specific neuro-ecological framework. The use of the
prefrontal cortex is the materialist stuff of cultural history
(which, as we know, is not yet materialist at all).3
But how the massive human cortex arrived is itself an im-

portant neuro-ecological story. Since animals must either in-
gest or evade one another in order to survive, they must
attune their nervous systems to one another’s actions, and in
3 One significant point of light on the horizon is Daniel Smail’s plea
for a ‘new neurohistory’ that accounts for the constitutive role that
psychotropic processes play in shaping and driving human history.
See his On Deep History and the Brain, University of California
Press, Los Angeles, 2008 and Andrew Shycock and Daniel Lord
Smail, Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present, University
of California Press, Los Angeles, 2011.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 21
particular to one another’s actions on the environment, to

spoor of all kinds [4]. Living in social groups places further
demands on the processing power of a species, insofar as
one must also track and retain knowledge of past behaviors,
character, etc. in order to detect and limit economic chea-
ting, incest, debts, and so on.
More important is the expansion of the entire brain mass—

commonly referred to in evolutionary biology as encephaliza-
tion, a term that is effectively a synonym for hominization.
Humans clearly enjoy their extraordinarily large brains but this
does not mitigate the fact that their brains are exquisitely ex-
pensive. But not only are brains highly expensive to run, re-
quiring a great deal of high quality food to power them, their
high metabolic rate makes them prodigious producers of heat,
and so they are also demandingly expensive to keep cool.
Brains are made of exquisitely sensitive tissue, even a four

degree rise in its temperature is likely to result in death. One
can’t have a large brain without a highly sophisticated cooling
system. But as the newest accounts of the co-evolution of lan-
dscapes and organisms develops today, we are also learning
that climate change—specifically the dramatic heating
up of the environment between 4 and 5 million years ago—
was a prime cause of encephalization and hominization.
4 The English word spoor derives from the Afrikaans (and Dutch) and
refers to any mark, trace, disturbance or sign in the environment cau-
sed by the presence or passage of an animal. It frequently connotes a
linear series that in its aggregate produces a ‘track’ that is typically fol-
lowed by a hunter and which lends to the word one of its most com-
mon, but narrowest, meanings. Spoor refers not only to tracks that one
follows, but to the entire system of legible modifications of a world by
the organisms that comprise it. Arguably, an organism is inseparable
from its spoor, and its relationships to other organisms consists in large
part of the readings and communications generated by them, which is
arguably the principal task of any nervous system in nature.
As the environment grew hotter, it also became dryer (at least

in Africa where it mattered most in the late Pliocene and early
Pleistocene) causing forest habitats to shrink and savannahs
and grassy plains to flourish. Apes, as the now partially discar-
ded but still useful story goes, needed to find food out in the
open—a dangerous place fraught with seasoned predators—
and so required an advantage of some type to protect them.
What they got were several interconnected ones. The first set
of problems requiring solution was how to move quickly through
the dangerous open spaces while carrying one’s young. This
problem was believed to be solved by upright posture and the
freeing of the hands for novel uses. With a new set of ecologi-
cal potentials for the hands (freed from locomotion) came
new cultural possibilities (the central problem of hominin
ecology). Freed hands provided an opening—perhaps even a
demand—for a new and enlarged brain to program them.5
But the new environmental heat placed unprecedented stress on
the animal to keep cool. A large, sensitive, heat-producing and
expensive brain represented a dangerous added burden, unless
a highly innovative system of cooling could be found, and it
was. The invention of this novel air conditioning system is
widely considered to be the defining feature of, and evolutio-
nary impetus behind, the emergence of the human species.
Because humans have large brains, short faces and small, spe-
cialized teeth—all effects of the environment-derived pressures
to change diet and by extension to change all modalities of
combustion including information-processing ones—we do not
possess snouts and therefore lack the hollow nasal chambers
5 The rise of tool manufacturing industry in early hominin societies
are widely seen as adjuncts to a broader set of geographical and eco-

nomic developments that subtended human cultural development.
New environments, and new parts and aspects (assets) of existing
environments, became exploitable through the continuing elabora-
tion—and then subsumption—of the brain-hand-tool assemblage.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 23
and the veinous adaptations in the head that most other ani-
mals use to cool the blood that feeds the brain. (Snouts serve
as radiators.) If apes aspired to compete in savannah habitats
they were going to require innovative adaptations to manage
the heat stress that came with this environment. All other sa-
vannah mammals use ‘selective cooling’ based on the protru-
ding face, the hollow snout and an anatomical formation
known as the carotid rete in which blood is pooled in the sinus
area or neck for cooling. Humans cannot do this; their brain is
proportionately too large and would require a neck as wide as
its thorax. Humans must use general (full body) cooling.
The first adaptation towards this end is said to be the achie-

vement of upright posture, which has been calculated to cut
heat load by more than 30% by exposing less of the ani-
mal’s body surface to the direct rays of the sun; it also
moves the brain and organs away from the ground surface
where temperatures are significantly higher. The second is
the shedding of the fur covering, the development of naked
skin and the profuse sweating that permits ultra efficient ra-
diation of heat through evaporation. But for this last adapta-
tion, the animal would require regular access to considerable
quantities of water on a highly regular basis; the increase in
travel range and the size of hunting and scavenging habitat
was an important result both of the entirely novel form of
human bipedal locomotion and the cerebral cortex used in
calculating interrelationships, navigational and otherwise.6
6 Interestingly, apes and baboons apparently never leave their home
range, despite the fact that their stereoscopic vision permits them to see
very great distances. It would seem that humans are the only primates
who can—and do—go where they see. See John Reader, Africa: A Bio-
graphy of the Continent, Knopf, New York, 1998. Also pertinent is the
influential work of Robin Dunbar on cortical capacity and psychogeo-
graphy, “The Social Brain Hypothesis,” in Evolutionary Anthropology,
Wiley, 1998, pp. 178-190, and “Coevolution of neocortical size, group
size and language in humans. Behav Brain Sci 11:681–735. 1993.
But water resource management is clearly a very different

affair in highly encephalized mammals—it is cognitive and
not only perceptual—as even I have observed, such as in
elephants who track and remember locations far beyond
perceptual range.7
What we encounter at every turn, is a ‘modulus’ or network

of relationships and especially forms, each changing in colla-
boration and communication with the others. But there were
other more internal and less visible transformations that
matter, ones involving feedback phenomena. Among the
most important is how the emerging human form—and the
human cultural type—managed not only its heat budget but
its metabolic budget as well. If the brain is made up of ex-
pensive tissue that requires a great deal of extra calories and
water to maintain, it is also true that no animal could main-
tain such a high-maintenance economic life if it did not have
a very large brain. But more basic than this, is the way the
body itself sought to balance its books. It has been widely
noted that the human gut is very short compared with that of
other mammals for its relative size (half the predicted length).
7 These capacities and performances by elephant groups have no-
thing to do with ‘migratory’ impulses as is the sensationalized case

with herding and grazing ungulates such as wildebeeste. Robert Ar-
drey drew an important distinction in the early 1960s between
“open” and “closed” programs (or instincts), much the same way
Henri Bergson described the increasing complexity and sophistica-
tion of life forms as “the injection of increasing amounts of indeter-
minacy into matter.” Ardrey sought to distinguish between
mechanical and automatic responses to the environment that secure
certain organisms’ success in certain niches, from more general
forms of direction and proclivity that are worked out in essentially
improvisatory manner on an ongoing basis by an organism as it su-
stains its processing or ‘combusting’ of the information and resour-
ces in its world. See The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry
Into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. New York: Athe-
neum, 1976 (1966).
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 25
Physiological studies show that the intestines contribute

as much or more to an animal’s “basal metabolic rate”—
the rate at which it combusts energy at rest—than does the
brain. Intestines it in sum are also very expensive tissue.
The massive increase in human brain size, according to the
current benchmark theory of Leslie Aiello and Peter Wheeler,
was thus balanced by a concurrent decrease in gut size, and
this secondary adaptation had definitive repercussions on
every aspect of the human world. The first and most basic
effect was to require a systematic new approach to eating8
the absolute requirement for very high-quality nutritious
foods that can be ingested in small quantities yet at frequent
and regular intervals. This meant highly selective foraging
behavior and judicious identification particularly of repro-
ductive organs, the most nutritionally dense parts of the
environment: seeds, tubers, nuts, eggs [ibid.]. In addition
to this, environmental accounting on yet another level be-
yond kinship structures, orientation, and predator and prey
monitoring was required—the consistent registration and
calculation of distance to and from water sources since a
distance of more than a day’s walk would almost certainly
result in death. It also meant procuring protein and fat
in the form of meat, an activity requiring considerable
adaptations for strategic hunting, which included the need
to act in coordinated and cooperative social groups, and
even, as some have suggested, to the rise of the family
group structure, divisions of economic behaviors along age
and gender lines, and to the particularities of the age-old
relations between the sexes (ibid.).
8 Nearly all the arguments proposed in this direction are summarized
in Richard Wrangham, 2009. Catching Fire: How Cooking Made us

Human. New York: Basic Books.
The large brain is at once directly and indirectly both a pro-

duct and an expression of climate and ecology: it emerged
as a response to an increasingly hot and dry environment
and in tandem with the evolution of a novel and biologically
unique cooling system. But once the movement toward en-
cephalization began, a broad set of relatively independent
social and proto-political regimes necessarily were trigge-
red, based on the budgetary need to extract from the envi-
ronment the resources to keep the brain running.
Human life in all its diversity and manifoldness, and the human
physical form that enacts and gives style to it—and in this I in-
clude our beautiful (intelligent) faces, flat stomachs, dexterous
hands, subtle humor—our complex behaviors, and our notable
species achievements such as language, technology and cul-
ture, are certainly at least in part, ecological responses to the
broader and more mundane economics of satisfying the dietary
and ethological demands of a large brain (Reader 1998, 90).
The Cognitive-Environmental Circuit

Human social, political and historical life depends upon, but
also integrates and exploits, the consequences of our peculiarly
formed and organized brain. I follow here the recent work of
Bruce Wexler (Wexler 2006; see also Wexler 2010). Following
the last three decades of developments in neuroplastic theory
(summarized in the work of Edelman, Huttenlocher and
others 9) we learn that the brain’s explosive early developmental
9 See Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of
the Mind, New York: Basic Books, 1992; Neural Darwinism: The
Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. New York: Basic Books, 1987;
Peter Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity: The Effects of Environment
on the Development of the Cerebral Cortex, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self:
How our Brains Become Who We Are, New York: Viking, 2002.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 27
schedule of cell multiplication and construction of connective

networks (as many as 100,000 per second during the first 6
months) requires that human young be born as still develo-
ping fetuses and undergo the greater part of brain develop-
ment and expansion outside the womb. (The large braincase
of the mature human baby would not be compatible with the
hip structure of an efficiently bipedal mother.) Hence the pe-
riod of newborn dependency in humans is immensely prolon-
ged beyond that of any other animal—perhaps by 3 years at
least. But most importantly, the billions of cells and quadril-
lions of neural connections that must be assembled in the im-
mediate post-natal years, and the cognitive functions that they
must develop and support, are entirely physically dependent
on sensory stimulation to realize themselves. From the moment
the fetus is separated from the shelter of its womb, its main
business is to extract input from the environment around it,
each bit of which triggers reception scenarios in the cellular
matrix that are subsequently concretized, and retained and
maintained, more or less for its life.10 In this way the brain
“uses” its surrounding environment and the relations it finds
within it, as a kind of model or “homologue” to fashion its
own internal and functional structure. This process establishes
a deeply fateful “coupling” relationship with the world. There
is no metaphor here: Sensory input is not an “immaterial”—
it is the environment itself, and it is the “becoming brain.”11
The world is literally ingested through all the senses, and not
only through the mouth.
10 The latter is a crude approximation that belies the reality that the brain is a
dynamic structure that ceaselessly reorganizes, regenerates, and reforms

itself—within parameters that are themselves variable and heterogeneous in
both its temporal and spatial dimensions (such as the “critical periods”, etc.).
11 This phrase deliberately invokes the work of Deleuze on, among
other things, the Pink Panther, in the early sections of A Thousand

Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi,
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
Besides the Darwinian term ‘homology’ that I used a moment

ago to describe the blueprinting of neural structure by external
event structures in the world, we are compelled to deploy here
also Darwin’s broader concept of ‘fit.’ Fit would describe the
lifelong adjustment of inner to outer states that is the fate and
destiny of the massively encephalized organism. The human can-
not help, given the overriding impetus to thrive, but seek a com-
plex relationship of continuous accommodation with the world,
such that inner and outer states and the forms that represent them,
find a degree of dynamic sympathetic mutuality, that can indeed
be, as befits us humans, extraordinarily complex—consider only
the one we find in the achievements of musical composition and
performance or indeed again, in the recreational use of psycho-
tropic substances, be they alcohol, caffeine, psilocybin or opiates.
To return now to Wexler’s hypothesis, we note his overriding

insistence on two general periodicities in the human life cycle
determined by the scheduling of neural development. There is
the early period of massive profusion of internal structures—
leading into the late teens and characterized by a ‘rearing eco-
nomy’ within the protected home environment, and the period
that follows that may be characterized simply as the organism’s
adult phase. The critical shift that needs to be noted is that
during the rearing phase the organism’s primary orientation is
toward stimulus and sensory input (attractiveness of loud music
is one characteristic, arguably scheduled, ‘episodic’ demand)
in order to complete and fully enrich the insatiable demands of
a trillion trillion neural connections, but during the adult phase,
the focus shifts toward reversing the action of the sculptural
knife, so that the shaping now of the external world becomes
the main priority, in order to bring about, or simply extend,
what I call “the dynamic sympathetic mutuality with reality.”12
12 It bears underscoring here the centrality of psychotropic aspects of
historical unfolding and the relevance of the developing claims of

the ‘neurohistory’ group around the work of Smail.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 29
It is only humans that have such a prolonged phase of neural

development and dependency on the environment, only
humans integrate the structure of their environment (‘secon-
dary repertoire’) at the ontogenetic level (a supplement to
evolutionary capture at the phylogenetic level or ‘primary
repertoire’) and only humans are then, shall we say, neuro-
ecologically compelled to modify their worlds, and produce
objects of meaning and affective capacity in order to modify
in turn their internal body states (art, culture, etc.). Only
humans have political relations written into their biological
substrates and only humans are biologically as it were
compelled to expend energy on nonproductive activities
like art, culture and design. And the impetuses, if we are to
believe the arguments, are linked.13
For every maturing organism notes, almost without delay,

the unavoidable non-match between its internal (rearing)
environment and the persistent elements of those of the
previous (parental) generation’s, and hence seek almost
immediately to impose upon it images, shapes, relationships
whose effects will better correspond to, and generate, the de-
sired internal states that have become existentially necessary
to their intuitions of freedom and well-being. This is a pro-
foundly creative as well as destructive and aggressive act.
13 The famous and endlessly invoked case of the Bower bird as an
animal who dedicates a great deal of its energy to the arrangement of

its environment for attractive or aesthetic purposes does not belong to
this category for the simple reason that its performance is not respon-
sive or connected to its temporal or spatial surroundings in any speci-
fic way, it neither deploys, nor does its bower display, any innovation
that might be called historical or tranformative. It simply reproduces,
as if according to a closed and pre-determined plan a form that provo-
kes a response in a female bower bird as a set, and relatively inflexi-
ble engram.
Through this line of reasoning, one discovers at once an

interesting naturalization and historicization of the principle
of ‘creation’ not so different from that of Bergson’s (whose
ideas underwrote a considerable portion of architecture
theory and production in the 1990s in relation to the digital
revolution). Let it not go unnoticed that what we have here
is not only a full blown cultural theory but also, a neurally-
mediated, biologically and ecologically determined
“homology politics”—a neuroecological politics. Might
the foundations of class struggle (dialectical materialism)
and design practice be discoverable in the brain?
It would be useful and appropriate to leave off here with

these admittedly outlandish proposals. But there is a final
set of ideas that demands to be tabled before ending. First,
the environmental dependency of human neurogenesis has
a larger-scale evolutionary efficiency that requires serious
accommodation: it overwhelmingly favors, in fact guaran-
tees, not just ‘good’ or efficient brains but regionally speci-
fic and highly diverse ones. We are not all the same, and
the differences, distributed spatially and hence implying a
whole political neuro-geography of another order, require
theoretical attention. Second, the advent of writing in
human neuroecology is naturally and arguably the first
major development in the cultural enterprise of abstraction,
one that models and precedes (by almost 2 millennia) the
advent of money and the social partitioning it ushers in.
But if writing was first evolved as a tool to record econo-
mic transactions it soon evolved its dominant function: to
record and externalize both “temporary and more enduring”
internal states of the organism, and to make these accessi-
ble to others (Wexler 2010) Writing is the model of envi-
ronmental modification whose purpose is first and foremost
to transform. And thirdly: The commonplaces of super-
structure/base relationships in the analysis of power rela-
tions may have here met a further withering refutation.
NEU ROEC OL OG Y:
3 31
Uncontested findings in the neurobiological world show

that in human and many other mammals, the essential rela-
tionship to environment is skewed not toward economic ac-
tivity and the procurement of food, but toward the extraction
of sensory stimulation in order to modify mood and body
states.14 In other words, and once again, psychotropic acti-
vity, not economic, is the biological imperative followed by
human populations and organisms, the stuff of which civili-
zation is made and transmitted. If class war can be situated
in and for the brain, it is driven by poesis, not accounting.
Design in its essence is, and in every one of its instances is
compelled to be, ‘revolutionary.’
14 See Bruce Wexler, Brain and Culture and Shaping the Environ-
ments. The concern with ‘body states’ is an immensely important one,

developed throughout Smail and derived from Joseph LeDoux and
Anthony Damasio.
Austin, John L., 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.
Dunbar, Robin (1993). “Coevolution of Neocortical Size, Group Size

and Language in Humans,” in Behav Brain Sci 11, pp. 681-735.
Dunbar, Robin (1998). “The Social Brain Hypothesis,” in Evolutionary

Anthropology, pp. 178-190.
Edelman, Gerald M., 1987. Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal
Group Selection. New York: Basic Books.
Edelman, Gerald M., 1992. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter
of the Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 1790. The Metamorphosis of Plants.

Cambridge: MIT Press (2009).
Hauptmann, Barbara, and Neidich, Warren, 2010. Cognitive Architecture:

From Biolpolitics to Noopolitics; Architecture and Mind in the Age of
Communication and Information. Rotterdam: 010 Publishers.
Humboldt, Alexander von, 1803. Travel Notebooks 1-5, Valley of

Mexico. New York: Knopf (1955).
Huttenlocher, Peter, 2002. Neural Plasticity: The Effects of Environment

on the Development of the Cerebral Cortex. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Konner, Melvin, 2002. The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints

on the Human Spirit. New York: Henry Holt.
LeDoux, Joseph, 2002. Synaptic Self: How our Brains Become Who
We Are. New York: Viking.
Lieberman, Daniel E., 2011. The Evolution of the Human Head.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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New York: Knopf.
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Schaller, G. B. and Lowther, G. R., (1969). “The Relevance of Carnivore

Behavior to the Study of Early Hominids,” in SW J Anthrop. V.25
(pt.4), pp. 307-41.
Shycock, Andrew and Daniel Lord Smail, 2011. Deep History:

The Architecture of Past and Present. Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Smail, Daniel, 2008. On Deep History and the Brain. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Stander, P.E., (1992). “Cooperative Hunting in Lions: The Role of the

Individual,” in Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, Vol. 29, No. 6,
pp. 445-454.
Uexkull, Jakob von, 2010. A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and
Humans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Wexler, Bruce, 2006. Brain and Culture: Neuorobiology, Ideology and

Social Change. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wrangham, Richard, 2009. Catching Fire: How Cooking Made us

Human. New York: Basic Books.
3 34
WAR RE N N EIDICH 3 35
Computational Architecture
and the Statisticon
Introduction
The recent connection of neuro-biopolitical inquiry to post-
Operaist ontologies has created new linkages towards a
deeper understanding of the causes, mediations, and cures
of Cognitive Capitalism and opened a new form analysis
to an activist readership. I would like to continue this con-
versation by moving forward the process I started in Cogntive
Architecture: From Biopolitics to NooPolitics (Hauptman
and Neidich 2010) and The Psychopathologies of Cognitive
Capitalism, Part One (De Boever and Neidich 2013) to
produce a new language with which to understand the
political and cultural consequences of digital architectures
upon our contemporary brain and minds. I would like to
suggest a new opening for critical architecture by suggesting
an alternative locus for the repercussions of avant-garde
architecture and architectural theory that is the neuroplastic
potential of the brain which forms one of the core conditions
of what I call neuropower. (Neidich 2009) An approach,
I might add, that is non-reductive or cognitivist but culturally
biased and ontogenic.
3 36 WA RR EN NEIDICH
The theory of cognitive architecture that I would like to

realize in this paper stands firmly in the camp of those
theoretical approaches that are unconcerned whether or
not architecture and designed space generate platforms for
practice in the neoliberal world of commoditized forms and
environments. Rather, instead of creating spaces and build-
ings that potentiate the efficiencies of neo-liberal market
networks, this work rather concerns its critique and as such
its destabilization. I want to provoke another space for
architectural and design discourse to operate in the age of
information and cognitive capitalism by understanding its
power to provoke new organs of perception and new possi-
bilities for thought. Fredric Jameson, when explaining his
initial experience of the Bonaventure Hotel in downtown
Los Angeles, implicitly understood this when he stated,
I am proposing the notion that we are here in the presence

of something like a mutation in built space itself. My
implication is that we ourselves, the human subjects who
happen into this new space, have not kept pace with that
evolution: there has been a mutation in the object unac-
companied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the sub-
ject. We do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to
match this new hyperspace, as I will call it, in part because
our perceptual habits were formed in that older kind of
space I have called the space of high modernism… The
newer architecture therefore-like other cultural products
I have evoked in the proceeding remarks-stands as some-
thing like an imperative to grow new organs, to expand
our sensorium. (Jameson 1991, 38)
Since 1991, when he wrote these prophetic words, the landscape

of understanding of the neural plastic potential of the brain
and its entangled relation to cultural plasticity with which it
creates a unstable and fluid affiliation has changed considerably
and as such our understanding of the above statement with it.
CO MPU TATIONA L A RCHITECTU RE
3 37
AND T HE S TATISTICON
Preliminary Remarks:
Before moving on I must first elaborate on some of the

essential ideas concerning architectural responses to the
new conditions of cognitive capitalism. Firstly, I will
tether computational architecture to the other regimes and
practices of cognitive capitalism especially its emphasis
upon intensive networks. I want to argue, as Greg Lynn
and others have, that architecture is no longer about static
material space but also concerns mobile and dynamic
fields. Not only, for instance, in our new understanding
of structural techtonics and form making as multiple inter-
acting vectors. (Lynn 1999) We now have a whole host
of apparatuses, like smartphones, navigation devices and
composite smart buildings containing assemblages of
digitally networked self-monitoring devices leading to
datascapes of ubiquitous computing. These devices are
the new engram-exogram dispositifs of cognitive capital-
ism and their actions are directed away from the laboring
body towards cognitive labor and the production of the
knowledge laborer or Cognitariat.
The second component of this argument is an understand-

ing of how the relations of postmodernism as urban
design and architectural practices has helped to amplify
consumption. Branding in our age of advanced informa-
tion technology will be and now is available instantly
and globally. (Klingman 2007, 63) From movies, to news
channels, to universities, museums and even churches are
using the methods of creating brands through linkages with
lifestyles, contexts and consumers all with the intention
of the fulfillment of desires, real and produced. (Ibid., 64)
Important to us as we transition to cognitive capitalism is
how this branding has linked up with the added value
spurred on by recent advances in Neuroconsumerism.
Ronald Braeutigam writes on this subject, “Montague

and all have used fMRI to study neuronal responses
associated with preferences for soft drinks. During in-
formed testing, as opposed to blind testing, subjects are
more likely to prefer Coke over Pepsi, and this prefer-
ence is reflected in increased neuronal activation in
brain regions assumed to be involved in reward. The
observations obtained… shed some light on the neu-
ronal underpinnings of brand effects…” (Braeutigam
2005, 355-360) Could the artificial stimulation of these
regions one day lead to artificially induced preferences?
With this in mind I want to provoke another space for
architectural and design discourse to operate in the age
of information and cognitive capitalism by understand-
ing its power to present, display and bind together fields
of exographic engineered phatic stimuli to provoke new
organs of perception in the brain as synchronously elab-
orated neural architectures that Jameson inferred. First
the probability that neurons synchronize their responses
both within a particular area and across areas should re-
flect some of the Gestalt criteria used for perceptual
grouping. (Singer 1994, 158) As we will note in what
follows this synchronization of responses implicates the
way that the brain neural plasticity is sculpted. The bio-
physics of neurons render them more susceptible to syn-
chronized, excitatory synaptic input then to random
input and furthermore synchronized synaptic input is
usually more efficient at driving its target cell then if the
input is desynchronized. (Koch 2004, 43) Institutional
regimes of sovereign power utilize gestalt perceptional
relations such as closeness, similarity and contiguity and
relationship branding found in marketing techniques to
enlist different synchronously attended assemblages,
which has implications for what will be remembered.
3 39
Finally I would like to introduce the term ‘neuropower,’

which delineates the new conditions of power in cognitive
capitalism. Neuropower concerns the ways and means that
capitalism intervenes upon the neuroplasticity of the brain
in order to produce the perfect consumer through bottom-up
processing, activating the primary cortices of the brain
like the occipital or visual cortex and the auditory cortex.
“The influence of bottom-up factors may be especially
strong online, as consumers engage in fast web surfing and
often spend very little time on any given page. Systematically
manipulating low level visual features to “guide” viewers’
eyes to a webpage’s regions of interest is possible by uti-
lizing insights from visual neuroscience.” (Plassman et al.,
2012, 22) To this form of power is added another direct
action upon the frontal cortex, which through top-down
processing, affects choice and prognostication (this is some-
thing I have discussed in greater detail in my own essay in
The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism, Part One).
“Pioneering work by Knutson and colleagues showed that
a structure within the ventral striatum (VS), the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc), is involved in encoding anticipated
rewards of monetary payoffs.” (Ibid, Plassman 2012, 23)
In cognitive capitalism this top-down processing will
subsume bottom-up processing just as tertiary service and
information economies have subsumed secondary industrial
economies. In my concluding remarks I will attempt to use
this form of power to construct a new model of archi-power
called the Statisticon. This term describes an ongoing process
of subjectivation and subjection that commences with the
panopticon, continues through the synopticon and has re-
cently emerged as the Statisticon in which architecture and
designed space are entangled in synchronous and diachro-
nous datascapes. I want to alert the reader to the possibility
that the Statisticon in its future rendition might not just
monitor and predict your consumer choices.
Neuroplasticity
There are two kinds of cultural neural modulation: the
generational and trans-generational models. Both models
describe a process of epigenesis in which the environment
interacts with a priori genetically inscribed unfolding of the
matter of the brain. In the generational model, as the name
implies, this process is related to events that are occurring
in the life of that subject and the changes occurring in the
microarchitectures of the brain’s basic units of function, its
neurons mostly at the axon-dendrite junctions or synapses
a process called selective stabilization as well as its dy-
namic functional networks. (Changeux 1985) In the trans-
generational model, recurrent cultural events like the discovery
and implementation of reading and writing occurring consis-
tently over the course of many generations and which, there-
fore become stable conditions of, for instance, built space,
as reflected today in our symbolic and mediated spaces, are
reflected in changes in the organs of the brain over time.
Generational Neural Plasticity

In the generational model the human agent is confronted
with highly mobile, evanescent and diverse environment
for which it attempts to find consistency. In today’s world
of accelerated forms and images in flux that task can be
daunting. Neural plasticity is that quality that allows the
unfolding of the genetically prescribed neuro-ontogenic
process in the here and now to be linked up with epigenesis.
In the restricted sense of the brain, epigenesis refers to the
way that cultural influences, which create relationships
between things and objects in the environment, affect the
course of development of the genetically determined un-
folding of the brain. Neural plasticity delineates the ability
of the components of the brain, its neurons, their axons,
dendrites, synapses and neural networks referred to as its
3 41
firmware in addition to its dynamic signatures, oscillatory

potentials which allow distant parts of the brain to com-
municate with each, to be modified by that experience.
(Edelman 1989) In Edelmans model the diversity of the
brain’s constituents, its so called primary repertoire, are
pruned as a result of its being coupled with regimes of
order, either occurring naturally or designed, nested in the
chaos of the world. Dynamic oscillations are most inform-
ative when they are the result of a process of the synchro-
nization of stimuli, which cause neural entrainment in
which independent systems fall into step and become
linked together. Intense and naturally occurring, like those
making up an ecosystem surrounding a pond and cultur-
ally designed distributions of sensibility, those things that
are institutionally produced like brands and those artisti-
cally invented so called redistributions, for instance, de-
constructive architecture, bind and bundle very different
combinations of stimuli together in synchronous pack-
ages. These then elicit different assemblages of synchro-
nous neural oscillatory potentials which, as we will see
further along, have neuromodulatory capacities.
The point that I am trying to make in the following sec-

tion is that the brain has the capacity to change in the sin-
gle lifetime of an individual as well as across multiple
generations. Importantly, culture has the capacity to mod-
ulate the materiality of the brain with significant conse-
quences. Through the traces they leave upon the cultural
artifice as recurrent and ordered forms of architectural,
poetic, cinematic, and artistic transcription as well as the
chaos they produce to obliterate already known forms, in
order to rewrite them, human beings alter their environ-
ment that shapes their brains to a degree unprecedented in
the natural world. “It is this ability to shape the environ-
ment that in turn shapes our brains that has allowed
human adaptability and capability to develop at a much
faster rate then is possible through alteration of the ge-

netic code itself.” (Wexler, 2006, p. 4) After the initial
events of early childhood when the neural plastic potential
is greatest there occurs a period of decreased mutability.
Children can recover from brain injury easier than adults
and also have the ability to learn other languages more easily.
Neural plastic change can and does occur in the adult brain
but their capacity to do so is reduced. The child’s capacity
for neuromodulation is accompanied by a lack of capacity
to alter the environment while the decreased capacity of the
parents’ brain to change is accompanied by a greater ability
to change the environment. According to Bruce Wexler
much of the adults activity is devoted to making the envi-
ronment conform to those newly constructed structures of
their own childhood, a process he refers to as internal-exter-
nal consonance. (Wexler 2006, 5) As the child’s brain was
shaped by very different circumstances than their adults,
their attempt to match the environment to their modified
neural structures will produce a very different world image
or cinema. Importantly, “When young adults act to change
the environment to match their internal structures, they
struggle with their parents’ generation for control of the
public space and to the extent that they succeed they alter
the rearing environment of their own children.” (Wexler
2006, 6) Let us look deeper into this matter as a way to un-
derstand the power of art as a cultural and neurobiological
modifier. Does it work in the way proposed here? I would
argue that artistic production, as a subset of generalized cul-
tural production, elaborates states of diversity and disorder
rather then a set of intergenerational consistent linked and
delinked patterns. This statement is counter intuitive to nor-
malized accounts for instance of the avant-garde which uses
configurations of the myth of Oedipus as a means to under-
stand one generations antipathy to another. The desire to kill
it off and replace another more contingent set of practices.
This leads to two corollaries. First the inherent variability
3 43
and difference that is the function of the brains primary

repertoire samples the plutipotential cultural plasticity ac-
cording to different generational logics entangled and de-
ranged as they are by the social, political, economic, psychic
and technological relations that delineate it. This leads to
different kinds of epigenetically inscribed patterns of neural
modulation. Secondly the linking, as it relates to positivist
notions of the history of technologies, comes later in the
sculpting of this cultural plasticity by the normative
processes of sovereign regimes. As opposed to emancipa-
tory delinked artistic processes art history and market
forces, operating as apparatuses of institutional normalizing
regimes, operate upon the entropic, and diverse conditions
of artistic creativity. Conservative regimes in their attempt
to control meaning and difference operate to suppress singu-
larities and lines of flight erupting as a result of trans-gener-
ational differences in cultural elaboration. Generous forms
of a enlightened and liberal forms of governance embrace
the inherent dissimilarities understanding their extended
neuromodulator capacities which are essential for expanded
repertoires of thought.
Trans-generational Plasticity
Trans-generational changes in neurobiological architecture
are nicely exemplified by the development of writing
and arithmetic some 6,000 years ago, with the first use of
Sumerian tablets. As every neuroscientist knows, when a
patient or subject reads while his brain is being scanned in-
side an MRI machine specific areas of the brain will light
up. For instance, there is evidence that an area called the
Visual Word Form Area (VWFA) located at the junction
of the occipito-temporal sulcus, in the posterior part of the
brain, is highly tuned to acquired script. This is paradoxical
since there has not been enough time yet elapsed for such an
area to form in such a short time period. (Deheane et al. 2004)
This area is very specialized for word recognition. It does

not respond to spoken words, it is best stimulated by real
words rather then consonant strings and finally the VWFA
computes only invariant representations of visual words. Of
interest for us here is that a complementary area of the Infe-
rior Temporal Area of the macaques cerebral cortex does
similar things and is ideally suited to learn and respond to
letters, graphemes and word shapes. Of course the
macaques do not speak although they do communicate.
This part of the brain responds to a mosaic of simple shapes
that resemble our letters. It is hypothesized that this inferior
temporal area in the macaques evolved into the VWFA in
humans. “In that hypothesis, it is not the human cortex that
has evolved for reading—there was not enough evolution-
ary time and pressure for such an evolution. Rather, writing
systems themselves evolved under the constraint of having
to remain learnable and easily recognizable by our primate
visual system. I postulate that cultural acquisitions are only
possible insofar as they fit within this fringe, by reconvert-
ing pre-existing cerebral dispositions for another use… It
thus becomes important to consider what may be the evolu-
tionary precursors of reading and arithmetic.” (Ibid., 141-
142) The implication here is that language forms such as
reading itself develops with the proclivities of the brains
neural anatomy in mind. Terrence Deacon however feels
that there is more to this story and that in a human society
symbolic reference is a selection force working on the neu-
rological resources most critical in supporting it and writes,
“This, then, is a case of selection pressure affecting the
evolution of a biological substrate (the brain) and yet which
is imposed, not by the physical environment, but ultimately
from a purely semiotic realm.” (Deacon 2003) Taken to-
gether there seems to be two systems at work here. First the
predisposition of certain areas of the brain for reading and
simultaneously tremendous selective pressure operating on
the brains neuralplasticity by its own ontogeny.
3 45
But there is one more key to understanding this process that

is what is referred to as Baldwinian Evolution. (Deacon, 2003)
As we saw previously human brains are highly variable at
the micro-anatomical level, ie the morphology and distribu-
tions of its neurons, dendrites, synapses and glia, resulting
from the different genetic contributions of the mother and
father but also the results of events happening during preg-
nancy like illness or starvation. This variability gives certain
members of a population different adaptive capacities for
the wide variety of changes that they might encounter in
the environment during their lifetime: reading in this case
being one. Some members of the population could adapt
better and take advantage of what reading provided in a
broader cultural context. As Peter Godfrey-Smith states:
The population will then have the chance to reproduce
mutations that cause organisms to exhibit the new optimal
behavioral profile without the need for learning. Selection
will favor these mutants, and in time the behaviors which
once had to be learned will be innate.” (Charles Wolfe in
this book. 252) Could architecture, art and other forms
cultural production, like language to which they are linked,
provide similar patterns of abstract contingencies which act
upon distributions of genes within populations?
Reformatting Architecture in the age

of Cognitive Capitalism
Computational architecture is not an isolated sphere of
knowledge but in fact linked to a field of similarly inflected
discourses in which digital processes have become essential.
As such, architecture is but one expertise that has retooled
itself for the contemporary demands of neoliberalism as
a global system. In modern western countries the cross-
disciplinary adaptation to digital machinic technicity has
had other effects on other functional systems such as the
ascension of information and knowledge based economies
in which mass production and industrialization has been
subsumed by a performative and communicative based
economy, so called Semiocapitalism which, “takes the mind,
language and creativity as its primary tools of production of
value” (Berardi 2007). In other words, as labor becomes
cognitive the machinery of the mind and brain and their at-
tributes, like memory and attention, are the new focus of the
capitalist exploitation. Voluntary and involuntary attention as
it produces saliency is important for the formation of memo-
ries in the neurobiological substrate of the brain. Internalized
attention, or contemplating the minds eye, is important intro-
spection and understanding. The terms communicative capital-
ism and cognitive capitalism had until recently been somewhat
interchangeable. As a result of the outcome of two recent
conferences entitled The Psychopathologies of Cognitive
Capitalism Part One and Part Two held in Los Angeles and
Berlin respectively the signifying ecology of these terms has
shifted. What I would like to call the late stage of cognitive
capitalism or its ‘cognitive turn’ shifts its emphasis away from
so called immaterial labor in which labor and performance
are entangled and which therefore does not leave a physical
trace. Instead there is an appreciation for the material changes
that occur in the brain. These material traces and their forma-
tion and processing are the new focuses of capitalism.
3 47
I would like to argue that the transition from architecture as

a form of organization to one of enacted articulation and
later to one of intense datafication and importantly prognos-
tication, reenacts an alternative history of architecture and
urbanization. One that is defined rather as an ontogeny of
the optimization of extended cognition in the context of ever
increasing technicity for the enactment of political control.
Where architecture becomes a method of first capturing data
through human-building interfaces. That this data is used to
track and subjugate subjectivity embedded in actor networks
not only in the past: the where and when you happen to in-
habit. As we will see neuropower is interested not in the
subject in the here and now but rather in the future. It nor-
malizes futures by reducing chance and the unexpected.
First by sculpting the neural plasticity of the brain especially
in young children, a future subject is realized. Secondly by
creating algorithms that intervene directly with those struc-
tures of the brain found to be important for making future
decisions. (ibid., Plassmann 2012) Finally as we see here
our choices in real time are collated and correlated creating
data search profiles which can be used by corporations to
create for us personalized consumer environments. In the
age of congnitive capitalism this forms the relationship be-
tween cognitive (A)rchitecture and cognitive (a)rchitecture.
Furthermore I would like to suggest that this transition, in

fact, follows the transition occurring already in an expanded
political-cultural field. I have already argued elsewhere that
along with this transition has evolved new forms of biopower.
The disciplinary society of Michel Foucault based as it was
on Betham’s Panopticon transitioned to the society of control
of Gilles Deleuze in which the static, enclosed organized ar-
chitectural frame was replaced by another more incessant,
dynamic and modulatory condition (Neidich 2011, 219-268).
As we move towards an advanced technologically inflected,
infra-structurally dominated designed space two further per-
mutations in powers methodologies occurred. Noo-politics

and Neuropower. Noo-politics was an outcome of moving
into what is called the attention economy where value
transitioned to valorization in which the number of eye-
balls watching an event, the amount of chatter in gossip
and social networks became an indicex of profit. Noo-poli-
tics took memory and attention as its new territory for
exploitation. (Lazzarato) Neuropower piggybacked upon
Noo-politics concern for memory and attention. That is to
say attention’s effects on long-term memory. (Dudukovic
et al. 2009, 953-961) It concerns itself less with the indirect
comportment of attention networks in designed and built
space and more with the consequences of attention upon the
configuration of neural networks and long-term memory.
Architectural adaptations trace the story of a static and

enclosed surveillance mechanism of the panopticon where
one, the guard, watches many, the prisoners, to a more
distributed and open variation of the Synopticon in which
many watch a few, celebrities, in the age of television from
their domestic setting. Whether incarcerated in a cell or a
domestic setting, both of these models require a stabile
subject. I would like to suggest that in the last thirty years
architecture and urbanism has had to adjust to the mobile
and topologic conditions of the digital age.
First, as it manifests itself in folded and curvilinear sur-
faces of form finding computational strategies and later
on in the new mobility of the subject in the post-Internet
digitalized domain where mobile phones, iPads and now
smart glasses have made the subject an active rather than
a passive entity. Parametric and digital architectures have
produced an updated model that takes these dynamic
contingencies into consideration and which have already
been remodeled to capture and produce data. These
form the rudimentary conditions of the Statisticon.
Neuropower is an essential component of this Statisticon.
3 49
In cognitive capitalism information and the conditions of

general intelligence itself, which is now engineered for the
efficient use of the machinery of the brain, is sculpting its
static and dynamic architecture. In this regard one cannot
help but notice the upcoming technologies of direct moni-
toring. EEG machines and MRI scanners tethered to brain
wave devices, first used to help patients who are locked-in,
are now finding their way into computer games. “The Emotiv
EPOC headset is being marketed as both a gaming device
and as an aid for the disabled. It has 14 EEG electrodes to
monitor brain activity, a gyroscope so it knows where you
noggin is in space and packs a li-ion battery for 12 hours of
use. It is also wireless, and charges via USB. The headset
reads brain activity related to facial movements, and uses
this to infer your emotional state and intentions. This is then
translated in software to control various applications, from
games to photo viewers to an on-screen keyboard.” (Sorrel
2010) In the world of data mining the negative side effects
of total datafication of the built environment will be investi-
gated. We have witnessed how the parlor games and enter-
tainment devices of the 19th century like stereo cards and
zootropes have evolved into the sophisticated technologies
of cinema and virtual realities. What then of these ‘brain
assisted gaming devices?’
The Exogram – Engram Assemblage

The mind can be located within and outside the skin and
human cognition is locationally uncommitted; a committed
in other words to being uncommitted, distributed and de-
centralized. Important for us here and for what is to come
is that material engagement takes place along a continuum
extending between theories of internalization (inside the brain)
and externalization (in the environment). It is that continuum
as it becomes ‘asymmetric’ in contemporary cognitive
capitalism, as we move into a world of ‘exographic excess’

that is important for theories of contemporary built space.
But allow me to clarify these terms further.
The exogram-engram system is a distributed networked

system that does not respect the boundaries of the material
world, the body or the brain. It forms the basis of a devel-
opmental approach to distributed cognition in which “from
birth the rapidly growing human brain is immersed in a
massively distributed cognitive network: culture” (Donald
2008). Importantly as we have moved in the past fifty years
from an extensive, analogue and linearly mapped world to
one that is intensive, non-linear, and self-organized the na-
ture of engrams and exograms followed suit mutating sepa-
rately and together. As we saw above through generational
and trans-generational plastic changes this change is regis-
tered in the brain’s material nature.
An engram is a memory record stored in the head. There

are at least five dissociable engram or memory systems:
1). Motor skills used in activities such as writing, driving or
playing video games. 2). Conditional emotional responses
like anxiety created by the sight of a rival or autistic ones
defined by detachment. 3). Perceptual learning as it relates
to learning categories of things like flowers or faces, but
also parametrically curvilinear buildings. 4). Semantic
memories that tend to abstract generalizations encoded as
language. 5). Episodic memories that relate to the memory
of personal experiences in one’s life. (Donald 2010, 71-79)
Exographic systems have important properties absent in
natural memory systems that have implications for human
cognition. Examples include totems, masks, knotted cords,
built environments, cave paintings, stone circles and burial
mounds that operate as astronomical measuring devices,
trading tokens, written records, works of poetry, mathemati-
cal notations, architectural drawings, libraries and archives,
3 51
scientific instruments, moving pictures and electronic media

and recently smartphones and robots (ibid. 72). Basic to any
understanding of engrams, exograms, brain-artefacts inter-
faces is the primordial ‘theory of parity’ according to which
if part of the world, e.g. a soft-ware program, “functions as a
process which were it to go on in the head, we would have
no hesitation in accepting it as part of the cognitive process
then that part of the world (for that time) is in fact a cognitive
process” (Chalmers and Clark 1998, 7-19). In other words
portions of the external world can operate as a kind of
memory store, either as a remembrance of an event or a
process that exhumes and constitutes it as an assemblage in
time. However the idea of parity implies that the exogram
and the engram are in some way mimetic in their forms,
evolution, state relations, and inherent processing operations.
Recently the term parity has given way to a theory of com-
plementarity (Malafouris and Renfrow 2010). The term
‘complementarity’ underscores the lack of exact corre-
spondence between an inner cognitive memory repertoire,
engram, and its external cognitive relation, exogram. For
instance, “the reformatable nature of exograms allows for
information to be altered and then re-entered into storage in
ways that an engram clearly can not afford” (ibid.). In this
regard the idea of ‘things in motion’ or of cultural memory
as they travel through different epochs and social constructs
taking on different meanings and uses is interesting for us
here. Furthermore, in order to comprehend the subtleties of
the relationships engram and exogram, as singular entities or as
classes of things, it is essential to consider their idiosyncratic
diachronic, biographical and historical aspects (Sutton 2008).
Their lack of superimposition, due to a distinctive individual
and dyadic character, is related to their inherent developmental
asynchronicity and asymmetry. One needs to consider engrams
and exograms not as crystallized entities but as intensive, inter-
active, folded and plicated membranes. Exograms are poly-
valent fields not simply equipotential and as such morphing
contextual and contingent cultural tableaux create instabilities

in them that produce spiking singularities to emerge. These
singularities, when they are strong enough, produce cata-
strophic changes that require morphogenetic restructuring
of the form in its internal tectonics and external morphology.
This I would argue is where the methodologies of aesthetic
form production, where use value is not a priority, and the
processes of purposeful tool production, linked as it is to a
specific job and use, diverge. As I am describing it here,
artistic and architectural production in their most utopian
condition, unfettered by for instance client requirements,
as knowledge production embraces the catastrophe and the
variable uncertain forms it yields.
The ‘becoming-cultured brain’ calls for on one hand a
sympathetic historical materialism of a dynamic and active
brain-artefact interface (BAI), which has enabled human be-
ings to further optimize their environments for a more effi-
cient habitation of their world and on the other realizes that
mutual engagement can lead to destabilized results as well
(Malafouris 2010). The power of architecture on one hand
continues positivist progression endemic to theories of the
ontogeny of tool production is countered by its other poten-
tial as a creative and destabilizing force. In an architectural
context BAI could be defined as a specified and engineered
technological mediation be it a material structure, process,
congregation of objects, socio-material apparatuses or process,
that facilitates the arrangement of a dynamic relationship or
tuning between neural and cultural plasticity. Importantly
in cognitive capitalism BAIs are a subset of a whole host
of arrangements under the heading of Cognitive Ergonomics
through which design platforms optimize cognition-tool
interfaces to optimize cognitive laboring (Neidich 2002).
I question the politics of this univocal concept of BAIs as
proposed here through an understanding of the importance
of noisy forms at odds with this positivistic ontogeny BAIs
and the material engagement approach they are imbedded in
3 53
must be open as the ‘Becoming Cultural Brain’ model is to

the power of noise, chaos, and entropy. For every exogram
and engram contains with it unfulfilled promises and possi-
bilities that emerge at points of instability such in phase
changes. It is these instabilities as they morph into singularities
that have the potential to disrupt the conditions that create
the presentation of the exogram or the engram. That in fact
allows them to become the other. For a normalized exogram,
at the service of governmentality, is a synchronized assem-
blage of parts, an ecology of epistemic agents of thought
externalized which are complexified in specific relational
conformations and proportionalities to each other and to the
cognitive processes that are implicitly in use by regimes of
subjection. This as we mentioned above is the top-down
effect of Neuropower. They are like twins and their desire
to maintain the web of relations that constitute their relation-
ship creates a field of checks and balances, which stabilize
their co-determinant structure. In the process of subjection
the machinery of control becomes incorporated in the
subjects thinking process as automatic self-regulation.
Modification of the cognitive life

of the life of things
Two brief explanations should hopefully suffice in illus-
trating how architecture might deregulate this self-regula-
tion by acting to delink and disassemble the crystallized
condition of the collective engram-exogram assemblage.
Rem Koolhaas’ Junkspace offers a radically different idea
of understanding the condition of space then the model
of Malafouris. ‘Junkspace’ is the apotheosis of moderniza-
tion with its rational program based as it is on science
and universality.
Junkspace is its apotheosis, or meltdown…although its

individual parts are the outcome of brilliant interven-
tions, hyper technical, lucidly planned by human intelli-
gence, imagination and infinite computation, their sum
spells the end of Enlightenment, its resurrection as farce,
a low grade purgatory… Junkspace is the product of the
encounter between escalator and air-conditioning, con-
ceived in an incubator of sheetrock… Junkspace is… a
colossal security blanket that covers the earth, the sum of
all decisions not taken, issues not faced, choices not
made, priorities left undefined, contradictions perpetu-
ated, compromises embraced, corruption tolerated.
(Koolhaas 2010, 137)
And what are the apparatuses of Junkspace. What are its en-
gram-exogram assemblages? Is there a positivist treatise on
their design history? According to Koolhaas there is no de-
sign but only creative proliferation that will in the end pro-
duce an alternative history of things in transition. “Where
once detailing suggested the coming together, possibly for-
ever, of disparate materials, it is now a transient coupling,
waiting to be undone, unscrewed, a temporary embrace that
none of its constituent parts may survive” (ibid. 140).
On the one hand such junkspace is the example par excel-

lence of culture as a generator of diverse populations of
evanescent concretions of objects and forms tethered together
by chance. It is about a Situationist derive through tangled
and unhomely forms that through creative sensori-motor cou-
plings produce tethered singularities and new regularities.
New assemblages of forms are created through different
points of view created in human junkspace interactions. As
such junkspace creates epistemological tools based on an-
other paradigm, which is anti-positivistic. Tools that unleash
the potential are implicit in chaotic and anarchic space.
3 55
The second example concerns the role of generational under-

standings of the uses of social media in the production of
paradigm shifts that defined the political crisis known as the
Egyptian Arab-Spring. The new uses of social media created
a technological divide between digital natives, those born
after the introduction of digital technologies and Internet
immigrants, those that were born before the introduction of
digital technologies. Their differences allowed for a cata-
strophic field change with important consequences for those
who only understood the urban space in the form of a static
model defined by its buildings and plazas and those who un-
derstood it rather as a fluid and dynamic condition, defined
as it was by mobile phones, as a place to roam and congregate.
As such the points of powers radiation no longer emanated
from public buildings, the Murabak Head Quarters were set
ablaze, but rather from mobile hubs and their constantly re-
configured net-landscape. As such these mobile hubs and the
resulting exographic interconnectivities formed fields of dy-
namic modulation in which transient consubstantiation of
interactivity created morphing complexified exographic
interfaces that were sampled by one population but not the
other. This difference produced a crisis in surveillance capa-
bilities of the government that had relied on them to track sub-
jects and therefore a disruption in their information gathering
capabilities. As such the digital natives were able to creatively
reconstruct the fields of meaning as dynamic manifolds in
the urban and architectural designed spaces thereby gaining
control of the urban situation. Importantly this disruption of
the crystallized and instrumentalized distributions of sensi-
bility and their consubstantiated engramic memory fields
came under siege and a state of emergency ensued. Policing
forms of normalization that had used certain systems of con-
trol and depended upon the engram-exographic system of
flows historically set in place and who themselves were con-
stituted by those systems as means to engage in a specified
form of understanding were at a neurologic disadvantage.
They were neurobiologically blind for as we saw in the

opening remarks by Jameson they had not grown the organs
of perception necessary to understand the new hyperspace
or in this case the new dynamic fields of communication;
their neuroplasticity had been sculpted by a less dynamic
and non-topological field of space and time relations. As
such a crisis and state of exception of thought occurred
and a crisis of governmentality resulted. What is the state
of exception and how can this theory be of use to us here?
As George Schwab states in his forward to Carl Schmitt’s
Political Theology, “In short, ‘the exception” said Schmitt,
“is that which can not be subsumed.” A state of suspension
of government ensues, and a state of exception is produced
(Schmitt 2005).
From Taylorism to Hebbinism

Key to our understanding of labor and neural modulation in
cognitive capitalism is the concept of Hebbinism; an epistemo-
logical tool to understand the conditions of worker efficiency
when the factory of the mind is at stake Hebbinism is replacing
Taylorism in practices of cognitive laboring and production.
In 1910 Charles Taylor wrote his Principles of Scientific Man-
agement and laid out the fundamentals through which the mass
of rule of thumb methods could be replaced by scientific princi-
ples in order to improve the efficiency of the laborer’s perform-
ance and thus increase profits for their respective company.
His various methods, from separating the duties of manage-
ment from that of the laborer to accentuate the capacities for
which they were each best suited, instituting scientific time
and performance studies to sufficiently study each task, like
shoveling ore, which would then be communicated and taught
to the laborer, planning the sequences of performance to ob-
tain the best and most efficient results, the addition of monetary
incentives for reaching production goals were tethered to the
goals and aims of Fordist work environments. (Taylor 2011)
3 57
The term Hebbinism is associated with name of the renowned

neuroscientist D.O. Hebb, in a general way to describe the
results of those practices and theories discovered by the
heterogeneous forms of research mentioned above and ap-
plied to the production of a more efficient cognitive laborer
or cognitariat. In cognitive capitalism we are all mental la-
borers working for free. In Hebbian efficiency neurons that
fire together wire together, neural network dynamics opti-
mize through the force of repetition, contingency and syn-
chronicity are sculpted (Deacon 1997, 202). Please note
here that these are the very same strategies of marketers and
consumer neuroscientists alike are using to produce desire.
His, now classical, principle was suggested as a possible
neurophysiological basis for operant conditioning: “when
an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and re-
peatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth
process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells
such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is in-
creased.” (Bienenstock et al. 1982, 34-35) This law has been
used in ways so as to understand the way the world interacts
with the brain in the process of epigenesis. It is tethered to
the neural plastic potential of the brain as those synapses
that are potentiated by synchronous and repetitive stimula-
tion whether man made or occurring freely in nature will
develop increased efficiency and will be selected for while
those that are not will degenerate and undergo what is re-
ferred to as cell death or apoptosis. “As a consequence, a
given afferent message will cause the long-term stabilization
of a matching set of synapses from the maximally connected
neuronal network, while the others will regress.”(Changeux
et al. 1993, 376) Ostensibly the consequences of this inter-
action with the environment over time will produce a finely
tuned parsimonious brain.
In Hebbinism the conditions of the perceptual and epistemo-

logical field are reconfigured in the brain’s image in order to
maximize the efficiency and decrease entropy in the cogni-
tariats decision-making processes. I call this process cogni-
tive ergonomics (Neidich, 2002). Essential to the argument
at hand is that the cognitariat is produced by a process of
Hebbinism linked as it is to the overall process of cognitive
ergonomics in order to produce the perfect citizen consumer
who not only shops but produces good and meaningful data.
“The internet is a machine designed for the efficient and au-
tomated collection, transmission, and manipulation of infor-
mation, and its legions of programmers are intent on finding
the “ best method”-the perfect algorithm-to carry out every
mental movement of what we’ve come to describe as “
knowledge work.” (Carr 2008) Software agents are playing
an increased role in this development and track through the
use of, for instance, cookies our every decision and spew
their results right back at us with consuming suggestions
and individually tailored Google search pages. Assuming
the worst or the best, what affect might this have for the way
in which our brains are sculpted? Furthermore I would like
to take this argument a step further through a quote from
Andy Clark’s book Mindware, in which search engines
might in themselves directly affect the way the immature
and plastic brain of the child is sculpted.
“Imagine that you begin using the web at age 4. Dedicated

software agents track and adapt to your emerging interests
and random explorations. They then help direct your at-
tention to new ideas, web pages and products. Over the
next 70 years you and your software agents are locked
in a complex dance of coevolutionary change and learn-
ing, each influencing and being influenced by, the other.
In such a case, in a very real sense, the software entities
look less like part of your problem-solving environment
then part of you. The intelligent system that now confronts
3 59
the wider world is biological-you-plus-the-software-

agents. These external bundles of code are contributing
rather like the various subpersonal cognitive functions
active in your brain.” (Clark 2001, 115)
Thus Hebbinism unlike its predecessor Taylorism operates

simultaneously on three fronts. First it elaborates an envi-
ronment in which the very stimuli and their arrangements
are organized for the most efficient use by the cognatariat
of the brain’s cognitive potentials. Secondly, through the
analysis of Big Data results, which mirrors the variability
of the brains of its subjects, it constructs profiles used to
hone in on future decisions. Thirdly it modulates the workers
neural architectures no matter how young.
Neuropower and the Statisticon

Neuropower plays an important role in the Statisticon.
We have already looked into its indirect effects, through
the modulation of distributions of sensibility, upon the
neural plasticity of the brain. To this first condition
I would like to add a second method of subjectivation,
resulting from research in consumer neuroscience, upon
the powers of decision-making and prognostication located
in the brain’s frontal lobe (Terranova 2011). Time does not
allow a thorough investigation but I go into this in more
detail in a forthcoming essay for my book Resistance is
Fertile, Merve 2014. What I would like to say at the start
is that the predictive algorithms such as Bayesean infer-
ences are being used in a variety of fields such as cognitive
neuroscience to understand free choice decisions in uncer-
tain circumstances as well as in such fields as engineering,
philosophy, robotics, economics and law. This desire to
affect uncertainty to increase the efficiency of future deci-
sions is related to neural powers desire to create a normal-
ized future subject.
Essential to the expression of Neuropower over Noopolitics

is what is referred to as top-down processing. As opposed to
bottom-up processing in which varied stimulations inscribe
themselves on what are referred to as the primary cortices of
the brain, like visual and auditory cortex, where the initial
processing of incoming information is begun, top-down pro-
cessing refers to how this incoming data is modulated by
higher brain centers like frontal lobe. In this way incoming
information can be deemed as important or unimportant to
the organisms future contingent activity and acted upon to
be either intensified or edited out. “Indeed, there is ample
evidence that the processing of stimuli is controlled by top–
down influences that strongly shape the intrinsic dynamics
of thalamocortical networks and constantly create predictions
about forthcoming sensory events. We discuss recent experi-
ments indicating that such predictions might be embodied in
the temporal structure of both stimulus-evoked and ongoing
activity, and that synchronous oscillations are particularly im-
portant in this process.” (Engel et al 2001, 704) In bottom-up
processing primary cortical areas are directly linked to the sen-
sorial distributed field, which in our consumer society is de-
signed to attract constituted desire, and are therefore the site of
policing action. In Neuropower the emphasis of power shifts to
top-down processing is focused upon especially the frontal cor-
tices responsible for decision making and prognostication (Platt
2008 and 2009). In both cases through what are referred to as
reentrant processes specific networks are stimulated repeti-
tively and by highly synchronized activity. “Reentry is defined
as the recurrent parallel exchange of neural signals between
neuronal groups or maps taking place at many different levels
of brain organization: locally within populations of neurons,
within a single brain area, and across brain areas.
The importance of reentry as a mechanism of neural integra-
tion has been realized.” (Tononi 1994, 129) This type of
activity has the greatest sculpting effect on the neuroplastic
potential of the brain and as such forms of governmentality
3 61
have added this effect of top-down processing to their ar-

mamentarium. I would like to speculate that re-entry is an
intra-cerebral and inter-cerebral mechanism and when seen
in the context of extended cognition does not respect the
skull as a boundary of its operation. In fact in the context
of dynamic process oriented engram-exogram complexes
re-entry is the apparatus that binds the two together. In a
dynamic and mobile informationalized world the impor-
tance of mechanisms of the dynamic neural intergration is
ever ascending in importance.
From the Datascapes

to the Statisticon
Articulatory architectonics is a necessary prelude to the total

quantification and intensive datafication of the designed
space and as such is linked to a more advanced condition
prognostication. Articulated environments allow one to
make assumptions of which paths to follow in order to fa-
cilitate future encounters. Neuropower is concerned not with
the production of subjectivity in the present but in the cre-
ation of a perfect consumer of the future. Articulation has
moved from proscribed architectural determinations of set
pathways to promote social encounters within space/time to
that of proscribed contemplative decision making processes
or epistemic trajectories in the minds eye. Computational-
ized spaces like those suggested by the likes of Kas Ooster-
huis at the Hyperbody Group at TU Delft, also have the
potential to create a pervasive electronic tracking system.
Individuals moving in algorithmic environments searching
in the datascapes either with apparatuses like Google glasses,
smartphones linked to QR coders or through physically
compressing new smart materials that are digitally linked
to massive data collecting programs. The idea of an ar-
chitectural ‘program’ thus takes on a more sinister guise.
Over time these produce massive singular data profiles

that understand possible future movements decisions in
particular contexts better then the person themselves.
“Imagine a city that is described only by data. A city that
wants to be explored only as information. A city that knows
no prescribed ideology, no representation, no context.
Only huge, pure data. Overall, datascapes can also be de-
scribed as highly sophisticated 3D data-maps that resemble
or allude to urban forms or landscape surfaces and spaces.
They extrapolate quantifiable data, turning information into
abstract spaces.” (Maas 1999) What seems to be a kind of
Utopian vision for the future city in 1999 becomes a dystopic
nightmare of the future. Tracked movements as mere interfer-
ence patterns become differential equations that create maps
of an individuals or population’s movements and trajectories
in the city as statistics that can, as we remarked, be re-sold
as information. “The prospect of so many new (and new kinds
of) sensors cannot help beguile those groups and individuals,
ever with us, whose notions of safety-or business models-hinge
on near-universal surveillance. Law enforcement and public-
safety organizations planet wide can be numbered among
them, as well as the ecosystem of vendors, consultants, and
other private concerns that depend on them for survival.
Beyond these, it would already be hard to number the busi-
nesses fairly salivating over all the niches, opportunities, and
potential revenue streams opened up by everyware. The project
of everyware is nothing less than the colonization of everyday
life by information technology.” (Greenfield 2006, 26)
The Statisticon is an advanced condition of data mining,

some of which is already here and some yet to come,
where upon data mining is no longer limited to the Internet
and World Wide Web, in which it is used by Google and
Facebook to track users and this information is sold to
corporations, but is a generalized condition of living
labor operating in the designed and built space of cities.
BIBL IOG RA PHY 3 63
With the advent of smartphones with apps that track corporeal

function, credit card swiping that tracks shopping profiles
has been added Google glasses that monitor gaze of mobile
agents and new kinds of smart buildings that create new
information vistas to gaze upon but also create environments
of data tracking and hunting.
What does this mean for future of digital architecture? When

built space becomes a totally interactive and monitored datas-
cape data collection possibilities will abound and idea of crowd
sourcing will have new meaning. The perfect consumer is
no longer someone who is the perfect shopper, whose mind
now is self-regulated and constantly on the lookout for dis-
counts and shopping events. The perfect consumer of the
future will be a cognitive laborer whose contemplation and
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agents, which are connected to datascapes that produce sim-
ulated realities and environments tailored to our data profiles?
As such will collective assemblages of engram-exogram
complexes be folded into these datascapes in which brain-
mind-environment becomes a single interactive condition
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B IOGRA PH IES 369
INA BLOM is a Professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Classics, History

of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo. Her fields of research are
modernism/avant-garde studies and contemporary art, with a particular
focus on media aesthetics and the relationship between art and technology.
She is currently head of The Archive in Motion – an interdisciplinary
research project studying changes in social memory under the impact of
new media technologies. Her most recent monograph is On the Style Site:
Art, Sociality and Media Culture (Sternberg Press, 2007).
YANN MOULIER BOUTANG is currently Professor of Economics at UTC.
Since 2007 he has taught Humanities, Social Sciences and Digital Culture
at the Superior School of Art and Design of Saint Etienne. He is the
Director of the quarterly Multitudes and he is on the editorial board of
journals such as Traces, Subjectivity, Cosmopolitiques, Vraiment Durable.
He published Cognitive Capitalism (Polity Press, 2012) and in 1998 he
wrote his PhD on the origin of wage labor and modern Slavery.
MARIA CHEKHONADSIKH is a researcher, curator and editor of
Moscow Art Magazine.
ARNE DE BOEVER is Assistant Professor of American Studies at the
California Institute of the Arts, where he also directs the MA Aesthetics
and Politics program. He has written two books: States of Exception
in the Contemporary Novel (Continuum, 2012) and Narrative Care:
Biopolitics and the Novel (Bloomsbury, 2013). He is co-editor of Gilbert
Simondon: Being and Technology (Edinburgh UP, 2012) and The
Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism (Archive Books, 2013).
He also edits Parrhesia: A Journal for Critical Philosophy and the
Critical Theory/Philosophy section of the Los Angeles Review of Books.
PASCAL GIELEN is director of the research center Arts in Society at
the Groningen University where he is Professor sociology of art. He
leads also the research group and book series “Arts in Society” (Fontys
School for the Arts, Tilburg). Gielen has written several books on
contemporary art, cultural heritage and cultural politics. In 2009 he
edited together with Paul De Bruyne the book Being an Artist in Post-
Fordist Times and he published The Murmuring of the Artistic Multitude:
Global Art, Memory and Post-Fordism. In 2011 De Bruyne and Gielen
edited Community Art: The Politics of Trespassing and in 2012 their
book Teaching Art in the Neoliberal Realm: Realism versus Cynicism
came out. In February 2013 Institutional Attitudes. Instituting Art in
a Flat World (ed. Gielen) will be released.
3 70
SANFORD KWINTER , Co-Director, Master in Design Studies Program.

Kwinter is Professor of Architectural Theory and Criticism at the Harvard
Graduate School of Design. He is a writer and editor who holds a PhD
in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. He was cofounder
and editor of the journal ZONE and Zone Books for 20 years. His books
include: Architectures of Time: Towards a Theory of the Event in Modernist
Culture (MIT Press, 2001), Far From Equilibrium: Essays on Technology
and Design Culture (Actar, 2008) and Requiem: For the City at the End of
the Millennium and the forthcoming Soft Systems on the life sciences and
and their impact on design.
MAURIZIO LAZZARATO is an Italian sociologist and philosopher
researching areas such as labor ontology, biopolitics, immaterial labor
and cognitive capitalism. He is an expert on Gabriel Tarde and cofounder
of Multitudes, who has been specializing in the analysis of cognitive
capitalism, and its discontents, hence his work on the P2P-concept
of Multitudes, the coordination format in political and economic
resistance, etc. His work is historically situated in the Italian movement
of autonomous Marxism.
KARL LYDÉN is a writer and critic, and member of the editorial board
of Site Magazine. He is the Swedish translator of Michel Foucault’s
Il faut défendre la société (2008) and Le gouvernement de soi et des
autres (2014), and his writings on art has appeared in Mousse Magazine
and kunstkritikk.com. He is an alumni of The Whitney Independent
Study Program and The Jan van Eyck Academie.
WARREN NEIDICH is a Berlin and Los Angeles based post-conceptual
artist and theorist. He is recipient of two The Fulbright Specialist
Program Awards first in 2011 and then again in 2013. In 2010 he received
the Vilem Flusser Theory Award. His art works have been exhibited
internationally at such institutions as The Whitney Museum of American
Art, PS1, MOMA, The Walker Art Center, Museum Ludwig, The ICA
London and Townhouse Gallery, Cairo. Dr. Neidich is the author of
Blow-up: Photography, Cinema and the Brain (DAP, 2002) Cognitive
Architecture: From Biopolitics to Noo-Politics (010 Publishers, 2009)
The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part One (Archive
Books, 2013). His Resistance is Fertile is forthcoming in 2014 published
by Merve Verlag, Berlin.
3 71
MATTEO PASQUINELLI (PhD, London) is a philosopher. He wrote the

book Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons (2008) and lectures
frequently at the intersection of philosophy, media theory and life sciences.
His texts have been translated in many languages and he has contributed
to journals and newspapers such as Springerin, Multitudes, Fibreculture,
Theory Culture & Society, Leonardo, Lugar Comum, Rethinking Marxism,
Open!, Libération, Il manifesto, Der Freitag. Together with Wietske Maas
he wrote the Manifesto of Urban Cannibalism. At NGBK Berlin he is
co-curating the forthcoming exhibition The Ultimate Capital is the Sun.
ALEXEI PENZIN is Reader in Art at the University of Wolverhampton
(UK) and Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy (Moscow). His
major fields of interest are philosophical anthropology, Marxism, Soviet
and post-Soviet studies, and the philosophy of art. Penzin has authored
numerous articles and is currently completing a book titled Rex Exsomnis:
Sleep and Subjectivity in Capitalist Modernity. Alexei Penzin is a member
of the group “Chto Delat / What is to be done?” (www.chtodelat.org)
PATRICIA REED is an artist and writer based in Berlin. Her exhibitions
include those at: Witte de With, Rotterdam; Haus der Kulturen der Welt,
Berlin; Kunsthaus Langenthal, Switzerland; Botkyrka Konsthall,
Stockholm; 0047 Projects, Oslo; Limerick Art Gallery, Ireland; Audain
Gallery, Vancouver; Program, Berlin, Württembergischer Kunstverein,
Stuttgart and Los Angeles Contemporary Exhibitions, L.A. As a writer,
Reed has contributed articles and essays to numerous publications
including: Fillip, Art Papers, C Magazine, Cognitive Architecture,
And The Seasons, A Joy Forever, Critical Spatial Practice, Intangible
Economies, The Archive as Productive Space of Conflict and #Accelerate.
Lectures include those at Archive Kabinett, Berlin (on Militant Romanti-
cism); Artists Space, New York (on Economies of Common Infinitude);
Art Berlin Contemporary (on Ethics of Misunderstanding); Winter School
Middle East, Kuwait City (on The Production of Eccentric Space). She
plays host to the Inclinations speaker-series, at Or Gallery Berlin.
JOHN ROBERTS is Professor of Art & Aesthetics at the University of
Wolverhampton. He is the author of several books, including The Art
of Interruption: Realism, Photography and the Everyday (Manchester
University Press, 1998); The Philistine Controversy (with D. Beech,
Verso, 2002); The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in
Art After the Readymade (Verso, 2007), and The Necessity of Errors
(Verso, 2011). He has also contributed to a wide range of journals and
magazines, including: Radical Philosophy, New Left Review, Third
Text, New Literary History, Oxford Art Journal, Chto Delat, Parallax,
Manifesta, Philosophy in Photography, Journal of Modern Craft and
Journal of Visual Art Practice. He lives in London.
3 72
LISS C. WERNER is a licensed German architect based in Berlin,

Adjunct Professor a DIA, Hochschule Anhalt Dessau, George N. Pauly
Fellow 2012 (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh), founder of Tactile
Architecture – office für Systemarchitektur, and the editor of [En]Coding
Architecture – the book. Werner practiced in the UK, Russia and
Germany, lectured, spoke and exhibited internationally at MIT, CalArts,
University of Southern California, Texas Tech University, The Bartlett,
TU Berlin, Syracuse University, Kunstuniversität Linz, Tongji Univer-
sity, ESARQ Barcelona, Venice Biennale 2012. Her research focuses
on cybernetics + architecture investigating in the current discourse of
computational architecture towards a relationship focused discipline.
Werner chaired [En]Coding Architecture at CMU, EXP at Florida
International University (Miami), EPFX at SciArc (Los Angeles) and
Architectural Ecologies (Vienna). Werner holds a Ba(hons), Diploma of
Architecture and Master of Architecture from the Bartlett. Further she
studied at RMIT, is a Dr. Phil (A.B.D.) researcher at Humboldt-University,
Berlin and a member of the American Society of Cybernetics.
CHARLES T. WOLFE is a Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy

and Moral Sciences and Sarton Centre for History of Science, Ghent
University. He works primarily on early modern philosophy and the
life sciences—especially medicine, biology and natural history—focusing
on themes such as the man-machine, organism, vitalism, materialism,
monsters and determinism, and figures including La Mettrie and Diderot,
but also Georges Canguilhem. A former co-editor of Multitudes
and Chimères, he has published in journals such as Early Science
and Medicine, Perspectives on Science, Progress in Biophysics and
Molecular Biology, Dix-huitième siècle and Chimères, CTheory, Flash Art
and Multitudes. His edited volumes include: Monsters and Philosophy
(2005); a special issue of Science in Context on Vitalism without
Metaphysics? (2008); The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge
(with O. Gal, 2010); The Concept of Organism (with P. Huneman, HPLS,
special issue, 2010); Vitalism and the scientific image, 1800-2010 (with
S. Normandin, 2013), and Brain Theory (forthcoming 2014). His current
project is a monograph on the conceptual foundations of vitalism.
We would like to acknowledge the Institute of Cultural Inquiry, Berlin and
the Office of Aesthetic Occupation for their support in the production of
the second Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism conference held in
Berlin (March 7th-9th, 2013).
PSYCHOPATHOLOGIES.WORDPRESS.COM
The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part Two

is the second volume in a series which maps out the complex
terrain of cognitive capitalism as an ontogeny in which its
earlier phase has transitioned into a later phase that we are now
beginning to experience. This volume collects together papers
from a conference of the same name held at the Institute of
Cultural Inquiry, Berlin, in the spring of 2013
The first part of the book delineates the recent emergence
of characteristic psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism,
which have resulted from the unique concatenation of social-
political-psychological-economic relations that have produced
distinct stresses and forms of derangement upon the factory
of the brain. This leads to the second stream, referred to as
“the cognitive turn” in cognitive capitalism. For example, as
a result of the necessity for an efficient brain-mind to labor
in the advanced and constantly accelerating conditions of
the knowledge economy highly sophisticated and nuanced
forms of attention have become compulsory well beyond what
was considered essential in the older regimes of the modern.
As such new dispositifs of normalization and governmental-
ization have arisen to, on the one hand, diffuse the attention
necessary for multi-tasking, and on the other, to enhance the
production of a hyper-attention. It is upon these and other
similar conditions that this book concentrates. It calls for the
identification of the causative factors of these psychopathologies
as well as attempting to invent the counter conditions with
which to thwart their emergence.
This book is the beginning of an antidiscursive discourse
with which to create an emancipatory materialism produced
not only in the world but in the brain as well.
WARREN NEIDICH is an artist and writer working between

Berlin and Los Angeles. In 2013 he received the Fulbright Scholarship
Award, Fine Arts Division, American University Cairo. In 2011 he co-edited
Cognitive Architecture: From Biopolitics to Noopolitics.
ISBN 978-3-943620-16-0 15.00 EUROS

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What is the overall topic of discussion in the document?

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What are some of the psychopathologies discussed in relation to cognitive capitalism?

What are some of the psychopathologies discussed in relation to cognitive capitalism?

Part Two Final File First Edition_cover part two 5/21/14 9:43 PM Pagina 2

Edited by Warren Neidich

The Psychopathologies of Cognitive

Yann Moulier Boutang

Alexei Penzin in conversation

The Cognitive Turn in

The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism is an ongoing

The idea of specifically focusing on the psychopathologies

and Christian Marazzi, amongst others. I was especially

What is Cognitive Capitalism and Three Disclaimers?

Cognitive capitalism heralds a mutation of post-Fordist

This condition leads to specialized symptomologies mani-

John Roberts, in his essay “The Psychopathologies of the

Cognitive capitalism is defined by an early phase and a later

Could not one instead argue that the so called machinic

Importantly, we must understand what challenges we face

Cultural plasticity is a term that denotes the degree to which

The development of new possibilities for the elaboration

on the process of subjectivization present a looking glass

Karl Lydén delineates the heroic act of parrhēsia in which

This book is divided into three parts; 1. Cognitive Capitalism

The early phase of cognitive capitalism is delineated by

Financialization of capital describes the process whereby

Maurizio Lazzarato in his essay “Does Cognitive Capitalism

This art of cartographies has the potential to jumpstart

Patricia Reed in her contribution describes what Marx

Machinic intelligence today concerns creating laboring

The authors of this collection give new life to the concept

Subjection of the forces of invention needs to compete with

For Arne De Boever, psychopathologies—and specifically

Two kinds of pathology are endemic, according to Pascal Gielen,

The later phase of cognitive capitalism is delineated by its

Matteo Pasquinelli’s essay, “The Power of Abstraction

Crucial to our understanding of the relation between biopower

But as Catherine Malabou has noted plasticity’s native land

Pasquinelli’s understands that “abstraction is intended also as

Sanford Kwinter elaborates upon this further as it relates

Liss C. Werner’s text “Towards A*cognitive Architecture: A

Charles T. Wolfe adds another dimension to this problem

Because of the importance of these claims in understanding

This is a parsimonious explanation Together they create the

This volume embarks upon a journey that is now in its beginning

Changeux, J.P. and Dehaene, S., 1993. “Neuronal Models of Cognitive

Deacon, Terrence, 2003. “Multilevel Selection and Language Evolution”

Deheane, Stanislas, 2004. “Evolution of human cortical circuits for

Deleuze, Gilles, 2003. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.

Lazzarato, Maurizio, 2011. The Making of the Indebted Man.

Malabou, Catherine, 2005. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality

Moulier Boutang, Yann, 2011. Cognitive Capitalism. Malden: Polity

Neidich, Warren, 2014 (forthcoming). Resistance is Fertile. Berlin:

Sporns, Olaf and Tononi, Giulio, 1994. “Selectionism and Instructionist

Vercellone, Carlo, 2007. “From Formal Subsumption to General Intellect:

Vygotsky, L.S., 1978. Mind and Society. Cambridge: Harvard

Video and Autobiography vs.

For the crux of the epistolary genre was ultimately