Case # 1

G.R. No. 199151-56

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, et al, Respondents

Facts:

This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the resolution by public
respondent Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issue without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and to reinstate the six informations
for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
filed against all private respondents for allegedly conspiring and defrauding the government in the
amount of P89 million through ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and materials and unaccounted
supplies and materials.

The first assailed Resolution granted the motions to quash or dismiss filed by private respondent and the
subsequent Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and granted the motions to quash
filed by respondent premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation amounting to a violation of their constitutional rights to due process of law and to a speedy
disposition of the cases, when it look the office of the Ombudsman almost (15) years to file their case
before the court.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the right of the private respondents to speedy disposition of their
cases?

Ruling:

This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay.
It is clear that from the time the first Resolution was issued by the Office of the Ombudsman onApril 12,
1996, it took more than thirteen (13) years to review and file the Informations on October 6, 2009.
Otherwise stated, from the time the complaint was filed on December 28, 1994, it took petitioner almost
fifteen (15) years to file the Informations.

As to the second and third reasons, the Court cannot agree with the petitioner that the delay in the
proceedings could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision through
the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in addition to the steady
stream of cases which it had to resolve. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree
of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its
normal work activity - any of which have not been adequately proven by the petitioner in the case at bar
- there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier
resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the private respondents.

Neither are the last alleged causes of delay tolerable. Reasoning that the Office of the Ombudsman was
in the midst of transferring to a new building is a lame excuse not to have resolved the matter at the
earliest opportunity. In addition, the prolonged investigation of the case from 1998 to 2009 by three
Ombudsmen with divergent views as to what charges should be filed and the persons to be indicted
cannot be sufficient justification for the unreasonable length of time it took to resolve the controversy.

In view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman's resolution of the case, as
well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that respondent's
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the institutional
vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it is resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally
expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case

Case # 2

G.R. No. 173637 April 21, 2009

DANTE T. TAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts of the case:

This case involved the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. Petitioner was arraigned on January
16, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Petitioner moved to dismiss criminal case due to failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.
He was claiming for his right to speedy trial.

The Prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to
defer the trial of until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence
and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. RTC ordered the dismissal
of Criminal Case 119830. Hence Appeal to the CA. CA reinstated Criminal Case 119830 RTC to conduct
further proceeding.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices
who decided the case. Petitioner, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Trial Court correctly dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of violation of the
Petitioner’s right to speedy trial?

Ruling:

The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
To this, we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned.

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be
given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said
right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional
guarantee.

More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the
preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to
have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty
of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."
Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Case # 3

G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the
case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered
by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition.
The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the
People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without
the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action. Moreover, it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes of the original trial.

Issue:

Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated.

Held:

The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a
speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects
pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the
petition. Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a
valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to
contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus
the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.