LEGAL FORMS

NOTARIAL LAW

1. LUSTESTICA v. BERNABE
AC NO. 6258 | August 24, 2010
BY: YCO

DOCTRINE:
Notaries public are required to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and
presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence certificate and to enter the residence
certificate’s number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification.

FACTS:
Complainant filed a complaint against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed
of Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
(complainant’s father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the
time of execution of the said document.

In his Answer, the respondent admitted the fact of the death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia
P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed,
however, that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero
were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of Donation. He also claimed that he exerted
efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him and represented
themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is negligent in discharging his duties as a notary public.

RULING:
YES. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public
interest. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.

The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his
duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to
comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties’
presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the
respondent’s admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the
Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons
who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.

Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his

Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were "known to him" to be the same
persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them and did not
ascertain their identities as he attested.

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the requirements
under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the party to the
instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the residence certificate’s
number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification.The unfilled spaces in the
Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers should have been clearly established that
the respondent did not perform this legal duty.

Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabe’s second infraction, the Court found the IBP’s
recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate with his demonstrated predisposition to
undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer lightly. The Court emphasized that this is the
respondent's second offense (meron pa kasing isang incident na nag-notarize si Atty. Bernabe ng
document na wala yung isa sa mga affiants na naging cause rin ng suspension niya) and while he
does not appear to have any participation in the falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution
was his gross negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him
as the donors. This is highlighted by his admission in his Answer that he did not personally know the
parties and was not acquainted with them. The blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he
did not even require these parties to produce documents that would prove that they are the same
persons they claim to be.

Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.

2. JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA
AC NO. 9514 | April 10, 2013
BY: ANG

DOCTRINE:
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their
valid identification cards.

FACTS:
Respondent, Atty. Quirino Revilla, Jr., notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by his sisters-in-
law. Bernard Jandoquile filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Revilla Jr. for violating
the disqualification rule of the Notarial Law and for not requiring the three affiants (his 2
sisters-in-law and their houseboy) in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification
cards. Atty. Revilla did not deny but admitted complainant’s material allegations contending
that this single act is not sufficient ground for disbarment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of affinity and at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification
cards is a ground for disbarment.

RULING:
NO. Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The court agrees with him, that his violation is not
sufficient ground for disbarment. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it
behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document.

On the second charge, Atty. Revilla, Jr. cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the
affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule
is supported by the definition of a “jurat” under Sec 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A “Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in
person before the notary public and presents instruments or documents; (b) is personally
known to the notary public OR identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; (d) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

In this case, respondent knows the three affiants personally, thus he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But respondent is not without fault
for failing to indicate such fact in the “jurat” of the complaint-affidavit. While he has a valid
defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule. VERDICT: REPRIMANDED & DISQUALIFIED TO NOTARIZE FOR 3
MONTHS.

3. AQUINO vs. PASCUA

AC NO. 5095 | 28 NOV 2007
By: BONDOC

DOCTRINE:A lawyer is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register affidavit-complaints.

FACTS: A Letter-complaint was filed by Father Ranhilio C Aquino, joined by Lina M. Garan
and other above-named complainants against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a notary public in
Cagayan. It was alleged that Atty. Pascua made it appear that he had notarized the “Affidavit
Complaint of one Joseph Acorda entering the same as “Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book
III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998” and the “Affidavit-Complaint of one Remigio
Domingo entering the same as “Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.

Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they
were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Patli.

The Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation recommending the
suspension of Atty Pascua for six months and the revocation of his notarial commission. The
report partly reproduced as follows: “Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not
intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly
notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of
his staff. The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and
1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. A member of the Bar may be disciplined or
disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct for failing to register in his
Notarial Register the aforesaid affidavit-complaints

RULING: Yes.
The Court adopts the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. “Misconduct” generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, the Court
revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the
practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial
book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.

Atty. Edwin Pascua was declared guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) months. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same was imposed upon him.

4. LINCO vs LACEBAL
AC NO. 7241 | 17 Oct 2011
BY: BUENAVENTURA

DOCTRINE:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by
a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.

FACTS:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the
registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters,
located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta,
Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.

Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation allegedly executed by her husband in favor
of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that
Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared
before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainant’s husband died on
July 29, 2003.

By virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled
TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 and issued a new TCT No. 29251 in the name of
Alexander David T. Linco.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent’s
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children’s
rights but also in violation of the law.

The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the
Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Lacebal violated the Notarial Law and his duties under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. There is no question as to respondent’s guilt. The records sufficiently established that
Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30,
2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he
notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after
the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize
the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco
should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the
deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to

accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation,
considering the affiant’s absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the
notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco
personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could
not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003.
Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to
the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize
a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.

5. BUENSUCESO VS. BARRERA

AC. No. 3727, Dec 11, 1992
Janina Candido
DOCTRINE:

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who
are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts
and administrative offices generally.

FACTS:
Complainants Nelson Buensuceso, Cornelio De Runa, Gloria de la Pena, Jose Andrada and
Salvacion Jablo instituted administrative case against respondent Atty. Joelito T. Barrera for
unauthorized notarization of documents. The basic allegation of complainants is that long after the
notarial commission of respondent Atty. Barrera expired in 1978, the latter continued to perform acts
of notarization. The complaint and the comment were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP Iloilo Chapter, in its report found that the five (5) documents as well as four (4) other
documents which have been the subject of a separate administrative complaint filed by one Atty.
Teodosio and lodged before the IBP Iloilo Chapter, were all notarized by respondent Atty. Barrera
between 8 July 1989 and 12 October 1990. Respondent has adduced no records showing that his
notarial commission had been renewed or that any application for such renewal had been filed, after
1978.

Respondent, in his comment, does not deny that he had notarized the five (5) mentioned documents.
He, however, maintains that his failure to apply for a renewal of his notarial commission was due to
excusable inadvertence and negligence. His fault, according to him, if any, was caused by his
secretary to whom he had entrusted the task of making sure that his notarial commission was
renewed annually. He states that he had no intention to violate the notarial law nor intentionally to
mislead and injure the public. Upon learning from his "adversaries" that his notarial commission had
expired, he completely ceased all notarial activities and, to protect the validity of documents he had
notarized during the period in question, he filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, a petition
for confirmation of his notarial acts and status as a notary public, dated 2 October 1991.

By a manifestation, complainants Buensuceso, et al. withdrew their administrative complaint against

respondent Barrera.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Barrera is still guilty of gross misconduct given the fact of withdrawal made by the
Complainants

RULING:

YES. The Court is not, of course, bound by such withdrawal, particularly in view of the character of the
acts or omissions with which respondent Atty. Barrera was charged, which acts or omissions engage
the public interest in marked degree.

The Court observes that respondent Atty. Barrera has treated the requirements for issuance of a
commission, and renewal of a commission, as notary public as a casual formality. In the instant case,
more than twelve (12) years lapsed before respondent Atty. Barrera "realized" that his commission as
a notary public had expired in 1978 and had not thereafter been renewed. His effort to shift
responsibility from his shoulders to those of his hapless secretary do not strike the Court as the kind
of diligence properly required of a member of the Bar in performing his duties as notary public.
Respondent Atty. Barrera's behavior constituted violation of law and gross misconduct on his part.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Joelito Barrera from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year from notice of this Resolution.

6. SPS. SANTUYO versus ATTY EDWIN HIDALGO

A.C. NO. 5838 - January 17, 2005
De Arce

FACTS:

In a verified complaint, Complainants Sps. Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused
respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer's
oath and the notarial law contending that on December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered
by a deed of sale which was notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register.
6 years after, the said deed of sale became a subject of a case (Estafa through Falsification of a
Public Document) between the complainants and one Danilo German.

On trial, German presented an affidavit executed by Respondent denying the authenticity of his
signature in the deed of sale and further stating that the spouses forged his notarial signature on the
said deed.

In response, complainants averred that respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondent's notarial dry seal and further argued that not being persons who were learned in the
technicalities surrounding a notarial act, they could not have forged the signature of herein
respondent.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that
he notarized several documents , the same did not include the subject deed of sale. However he
claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the
dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm .
Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and
made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have
remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing
complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter's husband and co-complainant only about six
years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed
that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the
strokes were smooth and mild.Ï‚

Upon the report of the IBP’s investigation, it noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on
the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the
investigation of the present case. However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he
allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his
notarial dry seal and notarial register. It recommended that respondent's commission as notary public
be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a
commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent was negligent in performing his notarial functions

HELD:

YES. Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have
wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as
notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to
the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondent's signature which is the only one left
for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having
allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was
supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.

WHEREFORE, Respondent is found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary
public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if
he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a
period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent
acts would be dealt with more severely.
 7. Tigno vs Sps. Aquino
G.R. No. 129416, November 25, 2004
JYDM

Doctrine: The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the
notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but
does so anyway, then the document should be treated as not properly notarized.

FACTS
Spouses Aquino brought a complaint against Isidro Bustria seeking to enforce an alleged
sale of a 120,000 sqm fishpond located in Pangasinan. They entered into a compromise
agreement whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos
agreed to grant him the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven 7
years. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida Tigno. Tigno attempted to
repurchase the property but was opposed by the spouses and was subsequently denied by
the RTC.

Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein they
alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale.
The spouses presented two instrumental witnesses to the sale (De Francia and former
Judge Cariño, who notarized the same) testifying the occasion of the execution and signing
of the deed of sale by Bustria. The Aquinos offered for admission the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Bustria but was opposed by Tigno on the ground that it was a false
and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that
its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown. RTC refused
to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno. CA reversed the
decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate court ratiocinated that
there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and
De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale was notarized properly which makes it admissible as
evidence.

RULING:
NO. There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by
way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.

But the authority of Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale is an even more
substantial defect. As provided under RA 296, MTC and MCTC judges are empowered to
perform the functions of notaries public ex officio, but the Court explicitly declared that
municipal court judges such as Cariño may notarize only documents connected with the
exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties
of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. It must be deemed the Deed
of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily
derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated
as not properly notarized.

The Deed of Sale therefore is a private instrument. Being a private document, the Deed of
Sale is now subject to the requirement that before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved. The Deed of Sale
was offered in evidence by Aquinos, hence, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its
authenticity and due execution. However, the SC observed that no receipts were ever
presented by the respondents to prove its authenticity.

9. SIGMA HOMEBUILDING CORPORATION vs. INTER-ALIA MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 177898 August 13, 2008
(AYA)

FACTS:

Sigma Homebuilding Corporation filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation

of titles, reconveyance and damages against respondents, namely, Inter Alia Management
Corporation et al. in the RTC of Trece Martires City, Cavite. Sigma alleged that its real
properties in Cavite were sold by its assistant vice-president, Augusto Parcero, to Inter-Alia
without its knowledge and consent and without the requisite board resolution authorizing the
same. Inter-Alia, in turn, sold them to DBR. DBR then sold the same to Intercon which
conveyed them to Hasting.

Summonses were served on all respondents, except Inter-Alia as it no longer held

office at its given address. For its part, Hasting filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint stated no cause of action, among others. In its comment/opposition to
Hasting’s motion to dismiss, Sigma merely insisted that it had a cause of action but did not
controvert Hasting’s material assertions. Respondent Intercon filed an answer. The other
respondents, however, were not able to file their respective responsive pleadings.

RTC: DISMISSED the complaint for failure to state a cause of action

CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s decision; denied MR

SC: elevated by way of petition for review on certiorari; DENIED for failure to show that the
CA had committed any reversible error in the assailed judgment; denied MR

CA: petition for the annulment of the RTC judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
(Rule 47); DENIED outright; denied MR

SC: by way of petition for review on certiorari; DENIED for late filing[1]; denied MR with
finality

But Sigma stubbornly refuses to give up. In a letter-appeal, it implored the SC to take
another hard look at the merits of its case. It reiterated that it was effectively deprived of its
right to due process when the RTC dismissed the complaint against the other respondents. It
also pleaded for a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the letter-appeal may be given merit

RULING:

NO. The letter-appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration
which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Worse, it was filed despite the fact
that an entry of judgment had already been made. It was obviously a ruse meant to evade
the effects of the final and executory resolutions of this Court.

Moreover, even if we were to grant petitioner’s letter-appeal based on its alleged substantial
compliance with the pertinent rules of procedure, the substantive aspect of its arguments left
much to be desired.

Sigma cannot successfully argue that the dismissal of the complaint motu proprio
against the other respondents effectively deprived it of its right to due process. A perusal of
the complaint reveals that all the other respondents were not even real parties in interest in
this case, to begin with. The only real parties in interest in this particular controversy were
Sigma and Hasting for they were the only ones who stood to be benefitted or injured, as the
case may be, by the judgment in the suit.

Furthermore, the CA was correct in holding that, as petitioner had already availed of
the remedy of appeal, it could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment. A
peition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted
indiscriminately by the Court.

Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of

justice that, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party should not be deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that undesirable result. Thus, we deem it fit to finally put an end to the present
controversy.

[1] Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari. It was denied in
a resolution dated June 18, 2007 for failure of petitioner’s counsel to submit his IBP O.R. No. showing
proof of payment of IBP dues for the current year (as the IBP O.R. No. is dated November 20, 2006)
and for submitting an affidavit of service of the motion that fails to comply with the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice on competent evidence of affiant’s identity. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution. Its counsel contended that while his IBP O.R. is dated November
20, 2006, he actually made two (2) payments on said date—one for the year 2006 and past years and
another for the year 2007. Said counsel admitted his non-compliance with the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice on competent evidence of affiant’s identity. However, he explained that the
same was due to mere inadvertence on his part and that he subsequently filed a petition for
review with due compliance with the rules. Petitioner’s motion was denied on October 3, 2007.

10. DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE,

NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI, and JUANITO
V. LEGASPI, complainants, vs. ATTY. JOSE R.
DIMAANO, JR., respondent.
A.C. No. 7781. September 12, 2008.

DOCTRINE:
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their
offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be
remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon
its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing
documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notarized documents will be eroded.

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement

of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L.
Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they
did not appear and acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing
officer; and (3) their purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the acknowledgment
portion of the notarized document when he made it appear, among other things, that complainants
“personally came and appeared before him” and that they affixed their signatures on the document in
his presence.

In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the document in question, but
admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained that “he notarized [the] document in good faith
relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the
community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct.” Navarro would not,
according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years.
Finally, respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that the falsified document
had been revoked and canceled.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty Dimaano Jr violated the Notarial Law.

RULING:

YES.
It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on
a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally
appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, for under Section
1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be considered authentic
if the acknowledgment is made in accordance with the following requirements:

“(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.”

Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, notaries
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required
by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before
the notaries public the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to
enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity.

Hence, Atty Dimaano Jr was DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period
of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act shall be dealt with more severely.
 11. AMORA VS COMELEC

GR No. 192280 | January 25, 2011

BY: PAGKANLUNGAN

FACTS: Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol on December
1, 2009. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the
post in 2004 and in 2007.

On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora.
Olandria alleged that Amora’s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in
executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary
public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his
identity. Consequently, Amora’s COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary
public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the
League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under
oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

Amora filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied, hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification

RULING: YES. There was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly
sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of
the Omnibus Election Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria’s petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as
enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective
notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold
that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of
qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

The COMELEC likewise failed to consider another reason to dismiss Olandria’s petition which is the
fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his
COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of
the core issue. He said that according to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a
sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were
not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other
as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the
presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the COMELEC should
not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada and remained inflexible in the face of Amora’s
victory and proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

12. CHARLES B. BAYLON vs. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO

555 SCRA 248, A.C. No. 6962, June 25, 2008

BY: PANGILINAN
DOCTRINE:

Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public; Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity; Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.

FACTS:

Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife,
Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA authorizing his wife to mortgage his real
property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the
SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and also when it was notarized by the respondent on
June 26, 1996. To support his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he
presented (1) a certification from the Government of Singapore showing that he was
vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification from the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to
January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant
presented a report from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the
questioned signature on the SPA was not written by him.

The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was
mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due
to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage obligations.

An administrative complaint was filed by the complainant at the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed
principal thereof.

The respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to
notarize it when the complainant’s wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the
absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the
complainant’s wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom
she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith
that the person introduced to him was the complainant because said person presented to
him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his
claims, the respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud,
deceit or falsehood

The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board of Governors

that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his notarial
commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for one year.

The IBP-Board of Governors adobpted and approved the said recommendation with
modification— suspending Almo from the practice of law for one (1) year and his notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent was negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary
public in this case.

RULING:

Yes, the Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed
been negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v.

Rafanan, the Court explained that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never
to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA
which in this case authorized the complainant’s wife to mortgage the subject real property,
the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the
person who represented himself and was represented to be the complainant. He should not
have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the
ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days. As a matter of fact,
recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity
of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of
competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted in the IBP hearing on February 21,
2005 that he had already previously notarized some documents for the complainant, he
should have compared the complainant’s signatures in those documents with the impostor’s
signature before he notarized the questioned SPA.

Wherefore, the notarial commission of respondent Almo is revoked. He is likewise

disqualified to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two years.
 13. GOKIOCO v. MATEO
A.M. No. 4179 - November 11, 2004
PANLAQUI
DOCTRINE:
Notaries public should be truthful in carrying out their functions. They must observe with the highest
degree of care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties in order to preserve the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system. Courts, agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by notaries public appended to instruments.

FACTS:
Complainant Alice Gokioco filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Rafael Mateo for falsification of
a public document. She discovered that a civil complaint was subscribed and sworn to by See Chua-
Gokioco before respondent on November 10, 1992, while the death certificate issued by the local civil
registrar disclosed that See Chua-Gokioco had died on October 7, 1992. Complainant alleged that
respondent, as the long time counsel for the family, notarized and filed the said complaint, fully aware
of the death of See Chua-Gokioco.

In his comment, respondent Atty. Rafael Mateo denied that he is a long time counsel of the family and
maintained that he notarized and filed the complaint on November 10, 1992 without any personal
knowledge of the fact of death of Mrs. Gokioco, and that the death was only brought to the attention of
the court only during the pre-trial conference.

The IBP’s investigation, report and recommendation disclosed that respondent failed to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
Thus, respondent’s act of making it appear that See Chua-Gokioco verified the civil complaint on the
date of its filing, when in fact she did not, means that respondent effectively notarized a document
when the affiant did not sign or subscribe to the said civil complaint in the presence of the notary
public on the date stated in the civil complaint, because on the date stated, the affiant was dead or
otherwise absent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent failed to make the proper entry in his notarial register in the manner
required by law

RULING:
Yes, respondent failed to make the proper entry.

Sec. 246 of the Notarial Law provides that, “the notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledging the
instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in
connection therewith…” Such failure on the part of the notary public constitutes a ground for the
revocation of his commission, as provided under Sec. 249 (b) of the Notarial Law.

It cannot be stressed enough that notaries public should be truthful in carrying out their functions.
They must observe with the highest degree of care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system. Courts,
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by notaries
public appended to instruments.

While the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was no proof that respondent had
any dishonest or selfish motive in notarizing the civil complaint despite the fact that the affiant was
absent on the date of its alleged notarization, it does not agree, however that respondent’s conduct
deserves a mere reprimand. The jurat must truthfully reflect all the information stated therein since the
courts and the public rely on such representations. There is also no rule stating that the verification
can be subscribed and sworn to at exactly the same day as the filing of the complaint.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for which he must be
suspended.
 14. BATIC v. GALAPON
AM NO. MTJ-99-1239
BY: SALVADOR

DOCTRINE:
Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act within the competence of a regular
notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer and (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality
or circuit.

FACTS:
Complainant Franz Ellert, husband of Lualhati, filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Galapon for having prepared and notarized a Deed of Sale in the name of Lualhati,
depriving him of his share in their conjugal properties. In his Answer, Judge Galapon claimed
that he did not prepare the document and that his participation was limited to its
acknowledgment, for which the corresponding fee was collected by and paid to the clerk of
court. He says that he was constrained to notarize the document because the only notary
public in Dulag, Leyte was not in town and the vendor was compelled to go to him because
the vendee was in a hurry. He adds that he at that time sincerely believed that when no
notary public is available, the Municipal Trial Courts may act as ex-officio notary public,
provided the fees shall be for the government. Citing Circular No. 1-90, the Court
Administrator found respondent to have exceeded his authority because when he did so,
there was a notary public in respondent’s station, although temporarily out of town.
Moreover, the notarized document contained no certification "attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit." The Executive Judge of RTC favored
then the respondent as Circular No. 1-90 had not yet been issued, and since at that time the
prohibitions in law as to whether municipal judges can notarize documents were still unclear,
Judge Gil said that Judge Galapon in good faith believed that he had the authority to
notarize the document. Thus, he recommended that the case against the respondent be
dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judges can act as a notary public

RULING:
YES.

Although it is provided under Rule 5.07. that a judge shall not engage in the private practice
of law, this rule admits of an exception. Judges may notarize only documents connected with
the exercise of their official duties, or, in municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, they may perform any act within the competence of a regular notary public
subject to certain requirements. Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers
or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act within
the competence of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for
the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer and (2)
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit. While the respondent explains that he sincerely
believed that when no notary public is available, the Municipal Trial Courts may act as ex-
officio notary public, provided the fees shall be for the government, such is not enough to
exonerate him from liability. The rule is that municipal court judges may notarize only
documents connected with the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not
connected with any official duties of Judge Garapon, and there was no reason for him to
notarize it and his acts do not fall under the exception because at the time of his notarization
of the Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in Dulag, Leyte.