G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office,
and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817,
1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628,
1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751,
1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814,
1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849,
1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding,
they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for
the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult
to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article.
In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the
law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court
of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar.
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies
thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe
to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could
have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could
attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In
civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application.
I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The
Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity,
it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when
a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe
to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could
have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could
attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In
civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application.
I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The
Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the
people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity,
it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when
a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be
recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs.
City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec,
95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486;
Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs.
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110
Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of
the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective
dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report
has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other
presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7,
Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of
all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel.
White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmed in toto
the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter
the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts
of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of
workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"Philsa") is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner
for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of
P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents
Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.1
After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia
on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign
principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on
February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the
reduction of some of their benefits and privileges.2 On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer
allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to
60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they
refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-
Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.3
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the
return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of
their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner
Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1. Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution. 4
The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers.5 On the other
hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the
license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment
Office (hereinafter the "LRO"). 6 In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an
employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing
Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be
heard simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate
recommendations for the two aspects of the case. 7
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising
from the employer-employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two
causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the
LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim
and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both
the WAAO and the LRO.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of
private respondents' complaint. During these hearings, private respondents supported their
complaint with the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its
turn to present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents
filed a motion to decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record. 8
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 9 , the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants,
jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:
1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each
complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid separation pay;
2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone, representing the
salary deduction from his March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only,
representing their differential pay for the months of February and March, 1985; and
4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorney's fees.
All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency equivalent to the
prevailing exchange rate according to the Central Bank at the time of payment.
All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." 10
Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on
matters involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relationship of overseas
Filipino workers may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the
"NLRC)11 . Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private
respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.
In a decision dated July 26, 1989 12 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA
Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to
private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the
complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the
text of the decision which would justify the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in
a Resolution dated October 25; 1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However,
in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in
form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88
requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23,
1989." 13
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on
private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988
14 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order,
the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful
deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA International
Placement and Services Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts
of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of
workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount of
P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson
plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.
Moreover, respondent's license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect
immediately and to remain as such until full refund and restitution of the above-stated amounts
have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00)
PESOS plus restitution.
SO ORDERED."
In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of
private respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated
October 10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or
canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry
(now Department) of Labor and Employment. 15 Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991,16 public respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the
reversal of the questioned Orders:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND IN ANY EVENT, THE
LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT
SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT
IMPROVED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL
DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS
ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA,
subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is
guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts
allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. 17 As we have previously held:
"It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only
and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer
performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of
jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality." 18
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess
of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a
trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 19
On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling
of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial
evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also
presented documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized
representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by
the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of
private respondents despite the many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may
be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tañada vs. Tuvera 20 , the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties."
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following
administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-
Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of
hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; 21 b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the
suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the
national government; 22 c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the
recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; 23 d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for
importation from the People's Republic of China;24 and e) Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of
other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. 25 In all these cited
cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they
were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987. 26
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the
same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under
the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:
"ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. — Any person applying with a private fee-charging
employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has
obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee
shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The
Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees." (italic supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. 27 Considering that POEA Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative
Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative
sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32
and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much
less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and
Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative
sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under
the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of
the administrative sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3
of the Administrative Code of 1987, "(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons." Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2
was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for
the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is
not among those requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed
only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private
employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in
Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,29 the
administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and
still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be
enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of
Customs 30 is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders
were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of
persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the
exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an
administrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a
circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the
POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact
which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the
August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two
(2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:
"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count.
The first contract was duly approved by the Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound
by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere intention of respondents to
increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding increase in wage is
clear violation of the contract as approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the same,
the amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence,
must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83,
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed
salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a
ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.
As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically intended by
respondent to be signed by complainants which, however, was not consummated due to the
adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to commit
contract substitution for a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office
to repress such acts by teaching agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation." 31
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries
considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge.
Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC
absolving it from private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already attained
finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC
decision by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality
by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said
NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-
employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said
money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and
separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the
POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of
private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability
for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment
violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." 32
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for
salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the
complaint. 33 While there may be questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of
the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the
claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar
the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a
ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the
necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement
agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. 34 As such, even without a written complaint
from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement
agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding
administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-
employee relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in
the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered. 35 It is thus
clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims
initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the
same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the
money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the
administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or
withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/
withholding of salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative
sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA
and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable
for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction
of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of
contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while
the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2)
months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the
amount in both instances.36 Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the license of
petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay
fine in the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to
private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders
of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified,
the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is
hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private
respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur
G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO COLLEGES & GENERAL
HOSPITAL, INC.); MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA
MORA, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-
JAGUROS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila;
ELENA VILLEGAS thru VICTORIA VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES thru JACINTA
MAGALLANES, respondents.
Bernardo P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its resolution dated
June 3, 1991.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers,
Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College,
Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador
Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, docketed as Civil Case No.
90-52745. Among other things, they alleged therein that:
"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition
proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in the school. They
solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking the students to endorse the same
with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180 signatures.
"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were
summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal
because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed such an
organization.
"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students would be
barred from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline,
who told them 'it's not true unless you violate the rules and regulations of the school and if you
still insist with your student council.'
"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing,
the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they
would be barred from enrollment for the second semester because they supposedly harassed a
female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak before the students, and also because
the school has an arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to
allow their students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable
Dismissal, and warned them that if she herself were to give it, it would be marked `expelled.'
"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that
they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union
of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the
student organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof
of these accusations but were not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has
people investigating for (sic) them but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof
to support her allegations.
"6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of counsel
FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano,
President of the College, demanding that the constitutional requirements of due process be
complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the students, and requesting that a conference be
held prior to 17 November 1989, as the enrollment deadline was fast approaching . . .:
"6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held, attended by Dr.
Moral, Dean Vitug, Mr. Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due, however, to the
inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem in the absence of the College President and their
legal counsel, the meeting was reset to November 22, 1989 upon Dr. Moral's request. However,
notice was sent to the students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical College resetting the
meeting to November 27, 1989 stating that the President will attend personally therein . . .
"6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the school's legal counsel and the
President who allegedly just arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested that the
meeting be reset. A verbal altercation occurred between the parties due to the delaying tactics
of the school officials and the failure to resolve the problem by their continuous refusal to
discuss the merits of the accusations against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral,
Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador Santos, ended with the school officials' request that it be reset
for 29 November 19B9 and that the students bring their parents or guardian with them at said
meeting. The students agreed to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of
the matters discussed and agreed during the meeting. The school officials refused to sign it,
however . . .
"6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally
refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school
officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the
school officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . . . Dr. Moral informed them
that the Board of Trustees will have to decide on these requests.
"6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had
refused to grant the parents' request." 2
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990,
enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and
setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990. 3
Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on the ground
that private respondents are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal right to the relief
demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, the pertinent parts of which, read:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if they are not
allowed to enroll. At least they will miss another semester.
"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the withdrawal of the
other students and the school will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a
speculation, and may not take place.
"In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction, ordering the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first semester of school
year 1990-1991, upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each.
"xxx xxx xxx
"SO ORDERED." 4
On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. 5
On June 13, 1990, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order of June 4, 1990 was
denied. 6
Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of merit. 7 Said the
court:
"The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly anchored on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration,
Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-76353, May 2, 1988; 161 SCRA 7 where it was held that
—
'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,
that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the
entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the 'written contracts' required for
college teachers are for 'one semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the first
semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the
intervening teachers . . .
"However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al., G.R. No.
89317, May 20, 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its
decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the 'termination of contract' theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions [See Art. XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]
'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private School which provides that '(w)hen a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for collegiate courses,' which the Court in
Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that
his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.
'The 'termination of contract' theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools
wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment
of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a
student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more
than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is
given his credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section
VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:
'137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate
courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the
beginning of classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full
or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount
due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the
second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The
student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week
of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall
be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of attendance.'
'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled
for only one semester, and that after the semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely
on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the
student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus,
Paragraph 107 states:
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its
specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for
enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his (sic) complete his course without prejudice
to his right to transfer.'
'This 'presumption' has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the 'Education
Act of 1982.' Section 9 of this act provides:
'SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following
rights:
xxx xxx xxx
12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations.' " 8
On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of merit. 9 Hence,
the present petition.
Petitioners raise this lone issue:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO
GOVERN AND INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE
PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER
THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE." 10
Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May
2, 1988, the contract between them and private respondents was validly terminated upon the
end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned
in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20,
1990, when the termination of the contract between them had long become fait accompli.
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R. No.
L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974). Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the arguments of petitioners.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who
relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the
termination of contract theory. We had an opportunity to resolve a similar issue in National
Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case, petitioner claimed that as a government
corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development
Corporation, a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a
government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are
governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the
ruling in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that employees of government owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations, we rejected
this claim of petitioner and held that:
"It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given
retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under
the same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this
Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to
exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in
government-owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation
(NASECO)." 13
In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that
it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 14 discussed
exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:
"The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may
only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for
no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It
should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg,
4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA
230).
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of extreme
urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant's favor where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right
against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one and where the effect of
the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a
new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear
case, free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA
235.)." 15
In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the
first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial
court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which
ordered petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school year
1990-1190." 16 Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but
will go a step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private
respondents do not possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not
obliged legally to re-admit them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial
court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence of Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-
Reyes and Justice Cancio C. Garcia.
2. Pp. 47-51, Rollo.
3. P. 55, Rollo.
4. Pp. 63-64, Rollo.
5. P. 75, Rollo.
6. Pp. 76-77, Rollo.
7. P. 41, Rollo.
8. Pp. 37-41, Rollo.
9. P. 45, Rollo.
10. P. 238, Rollo.
11. G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 (1988).
12. G.R. No. 64313, 134 SCRA 172 (1985).
13. At pp. 132-133.
14. G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 (1989).
15. At pp. 503-504.
16. P. 75, Rollo.

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff,
and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of
facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties,
it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law
course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in
the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law
studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college,
Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law
and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law
studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean
Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the
deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the
defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him
after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole
amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the
first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the
fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied
to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of
his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the
needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which
defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without
those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which
plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to
sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent
of my scholarship cash.

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No.
38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full
or partial scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in
extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged.
But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned
continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships
are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their
credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the period of
the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being
denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of
Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in
defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of
Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and
that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said
refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing
the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the
court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did
pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in
1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000
as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as
expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools,
namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the
memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for
P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff
and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court
resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum
of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not
mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was
more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its
brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by
the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question
whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad
Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend
personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane.
Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public
policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound
principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter,
Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered
into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public
policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127,
the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of
the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It
might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as
alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one
of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of
contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation,
or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949,
it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of
Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And
finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived
it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa
has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which
have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received
some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our
educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not
to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit
or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis
supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at
the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs,
and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs.HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him
in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the
Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third
Judicial Region, Branch 45,1 City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which
dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil
wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto
attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral part hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce
Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part hereof.
5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A
copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made an
integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a
civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto
attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of the
JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his
remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part
hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname
withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that
the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her
marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y.
Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by a
competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared
entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’
Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was
later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as
respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper
proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her
husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the name "Edelina
Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to her husband
Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina
Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well
as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein
petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with
respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the
requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition of
the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not have
any causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such
remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it
isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
15 November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her
petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special
Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court
dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or
disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the
trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The
Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already
her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering
that the first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi,
was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to
Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered
asvalid at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same
valid because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of
re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not
even a requisite to make a marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011,
considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished
with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of
whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the
husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage.
Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a
marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a
marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is
required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in
the issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as
with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further
claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to the
OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a
summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised the
following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification
thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which
proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a
divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry
and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first
exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to
the special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal.
Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues raised
therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly
filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to
issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25
February 1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before a married
woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made
inaccordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband
pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue copy
of her marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be
required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar
conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her
annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the
annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post
which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the
OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant
must present the original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the
Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant may
choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or resume the use of her maiden surname.
From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under
her married name, all she needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified true
copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over
the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport
under her second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a passport be denied,
the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of
the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in
due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10
Appeal
In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or
restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the
Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial
of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
Petitioner’s argument that her application "cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled
or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal",7 as instead
she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law
provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her
first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and
like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce
decree under that national law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can
only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the
national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the
proper remedies available.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional member in l!eu of Associate Justice Estela M. Pelas-Bernabe per S.O.
No. 1754 dated 18 August 2014.
1 The Petition before the RTC was initially raffled to Branch 46, but was later transferred to
Branch 45.
2 Rollo, pp. 10-12.
3 Id. at 38-39.
4 Id. at 52-53.
5 Id. at 60.
6 Id. at 31-32.
7 Petitioner's Reply, rollo, p. 138.
8 Id.
9 418 Phil. 723 (2001).
10 Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
11 Republic v. Orbecido Ill, 509 Phil. 108 (2005).
12 Rollo, pp. 52 and 31.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, *
respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973
the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent
as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the
same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue
on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386)
was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with
her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only
petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with
the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage
to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on
11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February
1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be
resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged
by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision
she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the
case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the
issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing
but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We
deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the
trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that
she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner
and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual
issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and
same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject
matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the
subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there
is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void
its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as Blandina Padlan in the
proceedings before the lower courts.
1 No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.
2 Id., p. 367.
3 Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlement, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the
same Code provided that the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
4 Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC- Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of
Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.
5 Art. 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
6 Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.
7 Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate
children, such as widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
illegitimate children or their descendent, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
8 Decision penned by Justice Pacita Cañazares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J.
Callejo Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.
9 Id., p. 42.
10 Id., p. 180.
11 Rollo, p. 196.
12 CA Rollo, p. 29.
13 G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
14 CA Rollo, p. 30.
15 Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.
16 Rollo, p. 206.
17 Brief of Oppositors-Appellant, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.
18 Brief of Appellee: Id., p. 17.
19 Rollo, pp. 225-226.
20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
1979 Ed., Vol. III, p. 264.
21 Rollo, pp. 129-132.
22 Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA,
Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875
dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between
respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well
as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner
was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against
defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and
void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the
amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees
in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No.
D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE
NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED
MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation.
She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this
issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the
petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and
whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were
naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However,
after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and
the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence
she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had
this citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not
therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the
Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the
U.S. and who are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x
x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or
contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American
citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of
naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree.18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the
marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and
the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest
nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest
in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a
cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce
the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
₱200,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its
proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 14-24. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion and concurred in by Associate
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. De los Santos.
2 Records, pp. 164-168. Penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.
3 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
4 Records, p. 4.
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 1-3.
8 Id. at 10-12.
9 Id. at 19.
10 Id. at 167-168.
11 Rollo, p. 54.
12 Id. at 6-7.
13 Id. at 8-9.
14 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 146021, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA
261, 267-268.
15 Id.
16 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
17 Id. at 22.
18 Records, p. 1.
19 Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 123.
20 Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 (2001).
21 Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617 (2003).
22 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra.
23 Garcia v. Recio, supra at 736.
24 Records, p. 7.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Rollo, p. 23.
27 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2.
28 RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Sec. 1.
29 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted
by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May
5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place
of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect
to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner
on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends
to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered
the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47
letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest
in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied
by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and
concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
2 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
3 Id. at 391-393.
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred
in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
5 Records, p. 125.
6 Id. at 137.
7 Id. at 116.
8 Id. at 1-5.
9 Id. at 10-24.
10 Id. at 30-35.
11 Id. at 38.
12 Id. at 39-138.
13 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
14 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
15 See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
16 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
17 Records, p. 259.
18 Id. at 260.
19 Id. at 262-267.
20 Id. at 270-272.
21 Id. at 288.
22 Id. at 301.
23 Id. at 302-303.
24 Id. at 306-311.
25 Id. at 318-320.
26 Id. at 339-349.
27 Id. at 350-354.
28 Id. at 391-393.
29 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
30 Supra note 14.
31 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
32 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of
fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not
December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on
June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988.
33 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
34 See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
35 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
36 Id. at 75.
37 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
38 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
39 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)
40 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
41 Id. at 199-200.
42 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
43 See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
44 Records, pp. 76-78.
45 Id. at 60-75.
46 Id. at 79.
47 Id. at 80.
48 Id. at 81-83.
49 Id. at 84.
50 The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case
because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded ₱200,000.00 as provided for under B.P.
Blg 129, Section 19(4).
51 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order
issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of
the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:
xxxx
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of Las Pinas,
Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x
52 Supra note 14.
53 Id. at 139, 143-144.
54 Id. at 144.
55 Supra note 31.
56 Id. at 664.
57 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
58 Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA
114, 121.
59 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.
60 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
61 Id. at 447.
62 Supra note 58.
63 Id. at 119-121.
64 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
65 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
66 Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
67 Supra note 14 at 144.
68 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
69 Id. at 264-265, 268.
70 Supra note 60.
71 Id. at 448-449.
72 Records, pp. 118-124.
73 Supra note 60 at 451.
74 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
75 Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
77 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
78 Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.
79 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
80 Id. at 686.
81 Id. at 679, 686-687.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come
to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928,
he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to
the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p.
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making
of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where
he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection
with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not
be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention
as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any
one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to
see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would
have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi
theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they
look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied
by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's
last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial
process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained
in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them
as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign
law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918,
pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means
the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept
this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere,
the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946
should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that,
since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders
of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of
Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the
owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international
comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will
then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs
vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply
in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to
be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar
to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca
assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another
Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to
Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March
25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders
and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old,
to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996,
the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC,
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court.
In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application
for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5,
2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship,
as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of
an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to
the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27
Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time
the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have
that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events
of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a
year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE
PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured
by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli
is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition
on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five
years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was
purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10,
1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no
error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as
this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in
question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter
1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by
the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual
sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or
confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would
also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or
confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued
only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC)
obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a
perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed
with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22,
1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said
divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix
(Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October
11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of
the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No.
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose,
before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident
in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by
Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor
challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with
respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce
while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of
the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the
outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of
the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties
at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital
vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to
each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them
free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during
the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated
Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December
1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not
merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept
and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists
if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age
on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement.
In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity
of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
2 Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.
3 Id. at 40-41.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
5 Id. at 575-583.
6 Id. at 145.
7 See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R.
No. 155635), p. 213.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
9 Id. at 214-217.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
11 Id. at 154.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
13 Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
14 Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.
15 Id. at 236-237.
16 Id. at 126-144.
17 Id. at 156-204.
18 Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
19 Id. at 338.
20 Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
22 Id. at 592-593.
23 Id. at 38.
24 Id. at 852-869.
25 Id. at 850-851.
26 Supra note 5, at 583.
27 G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
28 Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116825
March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
30 Id. at 22-23.
31 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
32 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18, 1995 with expiration date on
January 17, 2005.
34 Supra note 15.
35 Adopted on April 15, 1999.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
37 Id. at 147, 214-215.
38 Supra note 10.
39 Supra note 31.
40 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
41 G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
42 Id. at 501-502.
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
44 Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
45 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
48 Van Dorn, supra note 44.
49 G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252; citations omitted.
50 Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
—
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the
oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to
submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of
the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court
resolved to deny the motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F.
Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula")
were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with
his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and
the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew
a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines
Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of
age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s
Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively
to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo
was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will
disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so
the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she
is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties,
and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in
equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon
her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the
court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987,
the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court
for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death,
is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light
of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43
We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente,
Torres, Jr. and Hofilena, JJ., concurring.
2 In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and
Testament of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888
(Petition for the Grant of Letters of Administration for the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T.
Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18, 1987, Judge Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
3 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
4 Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
5 Ibid.
6 This was issued pursuant to Lorenzo’s petition, Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court.
Exhs. "H" and "H-3" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.
7 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
8 Ibid.
9 Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.
10 Exh. "B-1" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.
11 Exh. "D", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.
12 Exh. "E", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
13 Exh. "F", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
14 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
15 Comment, Rollo, p. 147.
16 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
17 Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4; Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
18 Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.
19 Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.
23 Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
24 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
25 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
26 Ibid., p. 53.
27 RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.
28 Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
29 Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, "The following cannot adopt: xxx
(3) a married person, without the consent of the other spouse; xxx", the trial court reasoned that
since the divorce obtained by Lorenzo did not dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the
adoption of Raul and Luz was void, as Paula did not give her consent to it.
30 Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.
31 Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.
32 Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.
33 On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this Court a verified complaint against the
members of the Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Associate Justices Justo P.
Torres, Jr., Celia Lipana-Reyes + and Hector Hofilena for "gross ignorance of the law, manifest
incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p. 15)."
34 Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate
Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena (Former Special Thirteenth Division).
35 Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.
36 Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the case when it
issued the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration; (2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case
has been repealed by Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code and (3) That Alicia and her children
not are entitled to any share in the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p. 19).
37 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961).
38 Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
39 In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).
40 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
41 300 SCRA 406 (1998).
42 174 SCRA 653 (1989).
43 The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
civil code is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction" is NOT applicable in the case
at bar as Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce.
44 Article 15, Civil Code provides "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." (Underscoring ours)
45 Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens
who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey
Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate
to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due
to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4
As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal
of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located
at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property);
(2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444
shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices,
as ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary
administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current
account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order
dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a
new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle
(¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to
release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard
left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint
for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over
the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted
in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving
children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also
alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set
aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby
ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging
that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE
DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR",
ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon
the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all
time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein
determined," and the same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not
aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in
accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent
with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-
bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of
Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was
his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition
because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will
bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P.
129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129
may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it
has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the
fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause
and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s
declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have
distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that
petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order
to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early
as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint
was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by
saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to
Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was
prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s.
Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the
fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the
time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding
No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed
orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she
came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other
recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment
was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always
contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to
the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently
or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in
entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the
safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care
and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar
transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the
CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others,
that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and
probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September
7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who
are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided
in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside
the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or
of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according
to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of
as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence
presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court
cannot accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine
laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was
already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As
asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal
staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was
incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable
diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed
to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April
7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced
respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the
negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was
prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the
Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the
foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the
latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of
the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in
accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile
of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the
pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith
in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears
to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey
was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit
the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard
of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not
rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the
circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the
Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond
her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and
it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a
miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide
judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the
law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall
hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides
that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101,
Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary"
and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with
as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444
shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to
Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left
to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed
on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland
which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property
which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v.
Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove
the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel
for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record
before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of
the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention
that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or
validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner.
Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the
law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x
x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot
prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and
how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit
lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public
utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v.
Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public
domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution
under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in
Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the
public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a
former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the
Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if
any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution
dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an
official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 CA rollo, pp. 84-88.
2 Id. at 89-91.
3 Id. at 92.
4 Supra, note 2.
5 CA rollo, pp. 93-94.
6 Id. at 95-98.
7 Id. at 99-100.
8 Id. at 101.
9 Id. at 102-103.
10 Id. at 104-106.
11 Id. at 107.
12 Id. at 108-109.
13 Id. at 114-116.
14 RTC Order dated December 6, 1991, CA rollo, p. 48.
15 CA rollo, pp. 117-121.
16 Id. at 71-81.
17 Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Associate
Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Mariano M. Umali
(retired).
18 CA rollo, p. 553.
19 Id. at 617-618.
20 Rollo, p. 36.
21 Id. at 174.
22 Id. at 183.
23 Reyes v. Barretto-Datu, 125 Phil 501 (1967).
24 Kilayko v. Tengco, G.R. No. L-45425, March 27, 1992, 207 SCRA 600.
25 89 Phil. 730 (1951).
26 Id. at 741.
27 Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643 (1996).
28 Stilianpulos v. The City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879 (1999).
29 Article 1391, Civil Code.
30 Rollo, p. 46, 183.
31 Id. at 157-158.
32 See RTC-Branch 138 Order dated December 6, 1991, pp. 194-198, CA rollo.
33 332 Phil. 948 (1996).
34 Id. at 961-962.
35 Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 336 (2002).
36 Lao v. Genato, G.R. No. L-56451, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 77.
37 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342 (2000).
38 Bohanan v. Bohanan, 106 Phil. 997 (1960).
39 Rollo, p. 156.
40 426 Phil. 111 (2002).
41 CA rollo, pp. 551-553.
42 Pael v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222 (2000).
43 CA rollo, p. 48.
44 Supra., Bohanan case, note 38.
45 27 Phil. 209 (1914).
46 126 Phil. 726 (1967).
47 Id. at 732.
48 150-B Phil. 140 (1972).
49 United Church Board of World Ministries v. Sebastian, No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159
SCRA 446; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906 (1998); Lee v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793
(2001).