Aycan Katıtaş

2007100016

Gün Kut

POLS 435.01 17.01.2011

A FAILED ATTEMPT FOR A CONFLICT RESOLUTION - CYPRUS

“Three decades of efforts to reunify Cyprus are about to end, leaving a stark choice
ahead between a hostile, de facto partition of the island and a collaborative federation between
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities living in two constituent states,” states the
International Crisis Group in its report of 2009.(ICG, 2009, p.1) The report depicts a thorough
analysis of the Cyprus Issue including the interactions between the internal and external
actors, the issue’s historicity and predicts the changes that are about to occur if the hardliner
Derviş Eroğlu wins the Presidency in the upcoming elections. Two years have passed; Eroğlu
actually won the elections yet not much change is observed in the direction the issue evolves
due to the continued negotiations between Christophias and Eroğlu. It is perceived that the
conflict resolution process appears to be more convoluted since actors other than the Turkish
and Greek Cypriots are also at play. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent remarks
backing the Greek Cypriots while pointing the finger at the Turkish side stands as the solid
proof. Merkel, with her declaration, strengthens the hand of one side of the conflict and
distorts the natural balance of the negotiations (Radikal,2011.) Greece, by consulting the
United Nations (UN) for the Greek Cypriot’s right of self-determination in 1954 and Turkey,
by claiming its right to intervene in 1974 as the guarantor state, emerge as two external actors
that are now indispensable for the peace process. All these examples lead to the conclusion
that “Outside powers arguably have half the keys to a Cyprus solution in their hands.”(ICG,
2009, p.ii)
The outside powers at play emphasize the importance of grasping the Cyprus Issue
under the framework of a Two-Level Game, a famous theory brought to the field by Putnam.
Putnam articulates on the fact that “at the international level, national governments seek to
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressure, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments,” while indicating that the construction of coalitions at
the national level are of equal importance, therefore neither levels can’t be ignored when
analyzing the issue at hand (Putnam, 1988, p.434) Although for an exhaustive analysis one

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has to take into account both the domestic and international factors at once, this paper focuses
on the one level, the international level, to discuss the roles of the external actors,
notwithstanding the importance of internal factors indicated such as “the underlying cause of
tension in Cyprus may be attributed to the basic communal frictions which were fostered by
this heritage of different ethnic backgrounds”(Boyd, 1966, p.2.) A quick glance at the
international system in which the conflict takes place and evolves reveals that four actors turn
out to be the most important: Turkey, Greece, the EU and the UN. Since this system,
configured by the different vested interests and actions of these four different actors,
determines the win-sets of the domestic actors in the conflict resolution process, an analysis of
these four actors’ stance proves to be fruitful in understanding the current and future prospects
of a solution. On that matter, this paper aims to analyze how these external actors and their
differing interests go on to shape the fate of the Cyprus issue’s peace process. The first part of
the paper will give a brief historical account of the conflict evolution, putting special
emphasis on how the history was shaped by these four actor’s actions. The second part will
evaluate the problem from the perspectives of Greece and Turkey, the most important and
embedded external actors in the peace process, the former supporting and influencing the
major part of the decisions of the Greek Cypriots, the latter of the Turkish Cypriots. The third
part will focus on another important actor, the European Union (EU) and whether the Union’s
vested interests allow it to play the role of a neutral mediator in the peacekeeping process. The
fourth part will concern of the UN. The paper will conclude by giving insight about what’s
expected in the future.

The history provides factual information that brings to light the way the conflict
evolved through the inclusion of different actors at differing stages. The roots of the conflict
can be traced back to 1919, the annexation of the island by the British Empire who later
claimed the rights to rule Cyprus, based on the legal status decided in the Lausanne Treaty, 24
July 1923 (Boyd, 1966, p.2.) Cyprus was announced as a Crown Colony in 1925. Turkey
seemed to be neglecting the Cyprus issue, uneager to intervene, as the island was seen as a
British property. On the contrary, Greece undertook an active role in propagating Enosis as
the President of Greece Sophokles Venizelos announced the will of Cyprus to merge with the
homeland Greece in his speech given in the parliament in February 16,1951. The church held
a plebiscite “in 1950 in which %96 favored union with Greece and ignored the Turkish
Cypriot’s fears and rights.” (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.354) EOKA was found in 1954, an
underground foundation who claimed the Enosis movement as its primary purpose. Initially,

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EOKA’s actions were directed against the colonial power of Britain. However, after Britain
affronted the Turkish Cypriot soldiers and polices against the attacks, EOKA diverted its
aggression on the Turkish Cypriot forces. As these fights turned into guerilla wars, the
Turkish government abandoned its passive stance and announced that its will to have a say
over the Cyprus issue in 1955. Towards the end of 1956, Turkey came up with the project
Taksim, in which Turkish Cypriots are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination. As
a counterattack, Greece announced its intention to take the issue in the international arena. In
5 December 1958, the UN General Assembly agreed to a Resolution stating that participating
parties to the conflict should find a “peaceful, democratic and equitable” solution and that the
UN will contribute to reach this end. 1958 marks the year of the UN becoming a part in the
Cyprus peace process. (Türk, 2003, p.4-7)

Menderes and Karamanlis, the two Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, met in
Zurich in February 5, 1959 for an agreement. On 19 February 1959 in London, with Great
Britain’s participation, three sides had reaffirmed the points of Zurich Agreement and signed
the London Agreement. These points consisted of a mutual agreement about forming an
independent Cyprus republic. 16 August 1960 marks the date of the foundation of the
Republic of Cyprus, free from Great Britain’s mandate alongside with a constitution of its
own. The Treaty of Guarantee gave Britain, Turkey and Greece the right to protect the
independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as “the United Kingdom,
Greece, and Turkey assured ‘the independence and territorial integrity and security’ of
Cyprus… and guaranteed (that) the basic articles of the Constitution Treaty of Alliance were
also signed between Turkey and Greece.” (Boyd, 1966, p.3) The constitution built a
Presidential rule over the island; it was very much like a federal state. A balance for
distribution of power between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was found; although the
Turkish Cypriots constituted the minority on the island, they enjoyed equal rights. The
Turkish Cypriots relinquished their wish of Taksim; the Greek side gave up on their hope of
Enosis concurrently (at least on the surface.) The favorable conditions of the peaceful state on
the island didn’t last long. On 30 November 1963, Makarios, via a memorandum, stated that
thirteen amendments in the Constitution were necessary. “These changes, thirteen in all,
would have, among other things, eliminated the restrictive presidential and vice presidential
vetoes, provided greater unity in the House of Representatives, restricted the rights of the
separate Turkish community, and reduced significantly the Turkish representation in the
police force, in the armed services, and in the civil service.” (Boyd, 1966, p.3) The President

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of the Turkish Cypriots Fazıl Küçük didn’t take long to turn down the offer. Not taking no for
an answer, EOKA started to attack the Turkish Cypriots in 21 December 1963, which
eventually led to the event of the “Bloody Noel.” Turkey intervened with warning flights,
unable to do more because of the international pressure. At the end of year 1963, a “green
line” was established between two communities, parting them physically (Türk, 2003, p.7-
12.) The period starting with the year 1968 when Denktaş came to power and has been still
going on is named as the Negotiation period. Negotiations took off between Klerides and
Denktaş, alongside with the Turkish official Orhan Aldıkaçtı, the Greek official Mihail
Dekleris and the UN General Secretariat Cyprus Special Representative (Koç, 2005, p.208.)
To everyone’s dismay, no constructive solution could be found and tension continued to rise
between the two communities.

The intra-communal tension reached the climax with the Greek coup to overthrow
Makarios under the leadership of Sampson. Makarios, in his speech in the UN Security
Council, claimed that the island was under the Turkish occupation in 19 July 1974. Due to a
number of domestic and foreign policy reasons, Turkey could not afford not to act anymore.
The Turkish society’s voice and the media pressure about the necessity of a humanitarian
action toward the Turkish Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots cries of help from Turkey and the
dangerous possibility of the island getting closer and uniting with Greece motivated Turkey in
a way that rendered non-action impossible. In light of these events, Ecevit, by then the Prime
Minister of Turkey, went to London to fulfill the requirements of the Treaty of Guarantee,
which required a state to consult the two other guarantor states before taking on a military
action. Britain was not keen to intervene in the situation. When Ecevit returned home, he was
embezzled to find that the Parliament has already decided on a military intervention. The
intervention took place in 20 July 1974. After a series of diplomatic talks in Geneva, named
as first and second Geneva Conferences, no solution was reached (Koç, 2005, p. 208-210,
232.) The terror on the island exacerbated and Turkey decided to intervene for the second
time on 14 August 1974 and took control of %34 of the island.1 Calling this an “occupation”
immediately, as a response, Greece withdrew its forced from the integrated military structure
of NATO. Consequently, the US decided to put an economic embargo on Turkey (Adamson,
2001, p.295.)

                                                                                                                       
1
   This  figure  varies  from  one  source  to  another  and  is  sometimes  indicated  as  %37.  

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 The Turkish Cypriots formed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 13 February
1975. Under the UN General Secretary’s provision, the negotiations took place for a solution
to be reached. This provision eased the tension and in 1977, Makarios and Denktaş reached a
consensus called the “Four Points”. In this consensus, the ideas of a solution of “two
communities” and a “federal state” formed the basis. (Topur, 2002, p.149, 150) Negotiations
did not flow smoothly between Kyprianou and Denktaş, as both adhered to the school of
hardliners and Papandeou, on the Greek side, was propagating that the island was under
Turkish occupation and no solution other than one that favors Greece’s interests should be
reached under this condition. Turkey concurrently voiced her wish and took actions to
structure the negotiations in favor of her interests. While the discussions and disagreements
were going on, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was found on 15 November 1983,
based on the argumentation of the Turkish Cypriots of the right of self-determination (Topur,
2002, p.166.)

The Cyprus Issue’s EU history starts with Turkey’s Association Agreement of 1963
following the accession of Britain into the Union in 1972. With the Greek accession in 1981,
the Cyprus Issue took its place among the many problems of the EU. However, the EU as an
external actor consolidated itself in the conflict through the accession of the Republic of
Cyprus. Long after The Republic of Cyprus applied for membership in 1990, the Annan Plan
was put forward to resolve the dispute. The notorious Annan Plan and its referendum
proposed a viable solution to the Cyprus Issue. The plan required the establishment a bi-
communal federal state and contained elements that resembled the clauses of the 1960
Constitution in essence. The Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan by %76 whereas the Turkish
counterparts overwhelmingly voted “Yes” for the solution in the referendum in 2004 (ICG,
2009, p.32.) Contrary to expectations of the Turkish Cypriots, just few days after the plan, on
May 1 2004, Cyprus acquired the EU membership and the road to peace again changed track.

The history of the Cyprus Issue is crucial to grasp the dominating role of the external
actors at nearly each stage of the conflict resolution process. The context, shaped by the
international actors, sometimes acted in favor of the Greek Cypriots whereas sometimes
strengthened the hands of the Turkish counterparts. By each new addition, the solution
converged more towards a deadlock as each new member contributed to the quagmire a new
dynamic through its own vested interest. Regarding the chronology of events, an analysis of

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the four most important members’ interests and stance towards the solution is vital in
disentangling the policy dynamics that lie underneath each action.

Turkey and Greece emerge as the most important among the four and since they are so
entangled in the Issue, it proves to be more fruitful to consider them together. “The cultural
ties of the Greek Cypriots date back to the Hellenic period of the golden age of Greece; the
Turkish bonds may be traced from the sixteenth century when Turkey took over the rule of
the island from the Venetians.” (Boyd, 1966, p.2) Such strong historicity makes it impossible
for Turkey and Greece not to meddle in the situation. Both parties opened up the way of a
possible political and military intervention by signing the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960.
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are said to be attached to their “motherlands” and expect
them to be present when faced a crisis over the topics of “identity, security, national interests
and historical enmity.” (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.357) Apart from this attachment, considering
the historical relationship between Turkey and Greece enlightens the perception of the two
countries towards each other that turns out to be influential on how they approach the Issue.
For over long years, Turkey and Greece have perceived each other as threats. Issues of Megali
Idea, Aegean islands and borderlines have always caused unease between two countries. Until
1999, Greece pursued an “Open Crisis Politics” against Turkey; Athens exhibited its enmity
towards Turkey in each international platform whenever possible and tried to weaken
Turkey’s hand by blocking many opportunities basing the decision on the past, such as EU
membership (Koç, 2005, p.456.) This enmity between the two countries has been embodied
over their policies on the island. Delineation of the perceptions of the two sides demonstrates
how these perceptions have an effect on the conflict resolution process. Hadjipavlou indicates
in her paper “Among Greek Cypriots, 88.7% believe that Turkish expansionism was highly
responsible for the creation and perpetuation of the conflict” (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.357.) She
continues by stating that the Greek Cypriots think that the Turkish Cypriots still seek out for
partition and they can’t break their ties with Turkey (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.358) On the other
hand, the Turkish Cypriots suspect that the Greek Cypriots look out for Enosis and “believe
that Greece’s expansionism contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus
conflict.” (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.357)

Turkey and Greece’s conflicting interests and perceptions hamper the way of finding a
solution. Turkey makes it difficult by not giving up on some of its own interests and
pressuring the Turkish Cypriots to take their stance on the issue. These interests include

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keeping as much power to herself over the island as possible, preserving her military forces
on the island, a hardened position on the territorial issues, keeping the role of the guarantor
state and the unwillingness to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a state before a solution is
reached. Turkey reiterates that the signing of the Additional Protocol is enough for the
normalization process to begin. In addition, Turkey wishes for a faster pace in the peace
process since the current status quo of no solution causes many problems for her in the
international arena. While Greece’s interests are the same when it comes to being powerful
over the issues of the island, they collide with almost all the other ones. Greece states that as a
prerequisite of the normalization process, all Turkish ports and airports should be opened to
the Republic of Cyprus; a signature alone does not suffice. Greece also seeks for a slower
pace in the peace process since the status quo benefits her. Other demands of Greece are
returning the properties that belonged to the Greek Cypriots in the past back to the Greek
Cypriots, no further Turkish immigration to the island, the recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus by Turkey and the removal of Turkish troops from the island. Greece also desires that
as a result of negotiations no new state is formed and the Republic of Cyprus remains with
small adjustments (ICG, 2009, p.22-26.) The Zurich Agreement is a solid proof of how
Turkey and Greece’s contradicting interest result in a solution that does not please both the
Turkish and the Greek Cypriots. Both Cypriot sides perceive the Zurich Agreement as the
source of the conflict. The Agreement lost its legitimacy for the people as their opinions were
not asked during the preparation and the result was not a social contract agreed by both sides.
The Cypriots does not recognize the Agreement as the ideal solution to the problem and state
that it only caused more tension between the two communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p.358.)
These two countries’ contradicting interests and their attitude of going one’s way are the main
reason why the world observes a deadlock on the issue.

Both Turkey and Greece from time to time score a point in their win-set in the
negotiations through the engagement in international or regional entities. Greece, by the
Greek accession to the EU, gained access to a platform where she could express her interest
thoroughly to easily gain support from the Member States whereas Turkey, deprived of
membership, lost an important portion in their win-set in negotiations (ISRO, 2008, p.2.)
However, Turkey exploits her NATO membership to counter the benefits that Greece gained
by the EU membership during the negotiations. A stalemate in the conflict means less NATO-
EU cooperation due to Turkey’s constant efforts to block the Republic of Cyprus’
membership in NATO and the prospects of military cooperation where Cyprus is involved

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(ICG, 2009, p.1.)  History does no more than to complicate the matter, as Turkey and Greece
find themselves historically bounded by the role of the protector over their communities since
no country is able to erase the memories of the bloody and unfortunate events of the past. If
the leaders of the two communities were left on their own without the pressure of interests
from their motherlands and history, they could most probably come together and negotiate
without bearing in mind Turkey and Greece’s stakes.

Another actor that emanates is the EU and her influence surely cannot be disregarded.
International Strategic Research Foundation illustrates the significance of the EU by looking
at the matter at hand through the lenses of the concept of Europeanization. According to the
Foundation, Europeanization is the paradigm that underlie the Cyprus Issue becoming a dead-
lock key issue in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, through the participation of the
EU Presidents with their resolutions in summits and the loss of incentive by Greece for a
constructive solution (ISRO, 2008, p.1.) Turkey still remains as a candidate country for the
EU who has been trying to get into the Union for a long period of time. The crucial point is
that, “even straightforward chapters may come up against objections (for Turkey) from
member-states like the Republic of Cyprus, as long as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved”
(Aybet, 2006, p.546.) The Cyprus Issue strengthens the win-set of the Turkish Cypriots since
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus as members of the EU both block Turkey’s integration
process to deviate the peace process in their favor. The asymmetry between the EU’s
influence over the issue and the weight of Greece and the Republic inside the Union are the
root causes of this problem.

Another factor to be considered is the role of the EU in the negotiations. It’s advocated
by the ICG that “(the EU) cannot mediate, since three parties in the dispute are full member
states, and the other two parties – the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey – are either
deprived of political representation in the EU or are outside it.”(ICG, 2009, p.27) The EU lost
its legitimacy to play the role of the mediator in the conflict since the Union failed to keep its
distance and took sides, a natural outcome of the membership of Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus. Despite this, the EU continues to influence the peace process track and engage in
actions that change the on-going patterns. As an example stands the accession of the Republic
of Cyprus to the Union before a solution to the conflict has been reached. The Republic of
Cyprus’ official application to the EU is considered to be against the law by the Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey. In the Treaty of Guarantee and the Zurich Agreement, it’s prohibited
that Republic of Cyprus merges with another state politically and economically. The notion of

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the state also includes international organizations that have state-like structures, as the EU. In
addition, through the accession, the Turkish Cypriots are alienated from any decision
mechanism on the island concerning the EU, which contradicts the agreement made between
the two communities. (Topur, 2002, p.374, 375) The EU’s sincerity in finding a solution to
the dispute is questioned since Agenda 2000 states that Cyprus will be let in if it succeeds to
fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, a solution is vital and necessary but Cyprus will become a
member even though a solution is not reached by then. (Topur, 2002, p.384)

The EU, through an analysis of its declarations, recognizes that the solution lies at the
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island and the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus
by Turkey. The EU presents this as Turkey’s only choice to become a member and insists that
the recognition will facilitate the Turkish accession process; to the unrealistic point that the
doors of the Union will be wide open to Turkey. It is now known that even though Turkey
realizes this wish, she still falls short of fulfilling the accession criteria in many aspects. The
Cyprus Issue serves nothing but the aims of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece using it as
leverage in the accession negotiations. Moreover, the EU benefits of the Cyprus Issue by
using as a delaying tool to mask its unwillingness to accept Turkey into the Union due to
many other irrelevant reasons. The EU exploits the Issue in order to further delay the Turkish
accession process (Koç, 2005, p.435-455.) The optimism achieved by the Helsinki Summit
and the start of the accession negotiations in 2005 fades away through comprehending this
reality. Although the political criteria for Turkey’s accession has been set by the Copenhagen
criteria and does not refer to the Cyprus Issue, finding a solution for the Cyprus Issue is
constantly brought forward as a compulsory political criteria to fulfill before accession.
(Topur, 2002, p.397) In general, the EU appears as the protagonist for the Greek Cypriots and
Greece and the antagonist for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. When the Republic of Cyprus
applied on behalf of the whole island, the EU’s welcoming stance and the accession
procreated a contradiction over the identities in the island. The Northern Cyprus was and still
continues to be under the rule of Turkish Cypriots who are not recognized by the Greek
counterparts yet gained EU membership de-facto (Sertoğlu, Öztürk, 2003, p.62.) Reasons
behind the Republic of Cyprus’ accession to the EU reveal that the EU has been used to gain a
winning hand in the process of conflict resolution. Sertoğlu and Öztürk point at the statistics
concerning the trade deficit, stating that the trade deficit increased after the Republic of
Cyprus joined the EU and the service sector which forms the most important part of the
Republic of Cyprus’s economic activities would be damaged in order to comply with the

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acquis communautaire. Therefore, economic factors can’t be the main reason of accession.
Conversly, Sertoğlu and Öztürk consider the political advantages of joining the EU: “(the)
chance to exert greater power on Turkey about the disagreements between South Cyprus and
Turkey; improved security for South Cyprus in military and national security areas with
respect to its relations with Turkey because EU military power would support South Cyprus
since South Cyprus would be an EU member; in possible future disagreements between South
Cyprus and Turkey, Turkey's intervention in the island as in 1974 would be impossible in
practice because Cyprus would be a part of the EU territory”(Sertoğlu, Öztürk, 2003, p.63-66)
Regarding these points, the membership to the EU appears to be very beneficial for the
Republic of Cyprus. Hence, one can claim that the political benefits were at play rather than
the economical benefits. The EU’s ignorance of the positive attitude of Turkish Cypriots in
the referendum of Annan Plan (ICG, 2009, p.27) and the constant pressure on Turkey to
comply with the Additional Protocol also render the EU a blocking stone in the process while
strengthening the hand of Greece and the Greek Cypriots in the negotiations.

Last but not least, the UN emerges as the final actor considered. Via the Greek
accession to the UN and Greece’s bringing the matter of Greek Cypriot’s right to claim
independence by uniting with Greece in 1954, the UN was integrated to the peace process.
Also, through Greece and Turkey’s making the Cyprus Issue a security concern over years,
the UN found in itself the legitimacy to intervene. In the 60s, the UN actively participated in
the conflict solution process by sending peacekeeping forces in order to preserve the peace on
the island. “The mandate of UNFICYP as enunciated by the Security Council was to use its
best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the
maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.” (Boyd,
1966, p.10) In addition, the UN Resolutions have been influential in shaping the trajectory.
Resolution 3212’s preamble’s wording as “Having considered the question of Cyprus,
Gravely concerned about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a threat to
international peace and security, Mindful of the need to solve this crisis without delay by
peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations…” (UN
Security Council, 1974) denotes the perceptions and key concepts of the UN towards the
Issue. The Charter and the universal principles that the UN adheres shape the UN’s role and
place in the conflict. Consequently, the actions that the UN takes are reflections of these
principles. The UN stresses the necessity of a bi-communal, federal state solution, alongside

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with reaching it by mutual agreement and negotiations. (Türk, 2003, p.169) The UN
Secretariat has monitored the process over a long period of time and came up with several
solutions, such as Cuellar’s Agreement Schema (1985), Gali’s Opinion Sequences (1991) and
the Annan’s Plan (2002) (Türk, 2003, p.173.) Although each proposition (obviously) failed to
result in building peace, the solutions have constantly reiterated the importance of reaching an
agreement, especially alongside with a bi-communal, federal solution. This has worked for the
Greek Cypriot’s disadvantage who opted for a slower conflict resolution process and
benefited from the status quo and strengthened the hands of the Turkish Cypriots.

In conclusion, the paper aimed to serve the Two-Level Games analogy by describing
the actors at play at the international level. Although both parties have much to lose from an
impasse and much to gain from a solution, the Cyprus Issue remains to be unsolved today.
Notwithstanding the importance of the internal actors’ dynamics and interactions, one can
credit the external actor’s crucial effect on how the conflict is shaped and the internal actor’s
hands are strengthened due to the actions of these actors. Turkey and Greece widen the scope
of the problem by imposing their conflicting interests on both sides and pressuring both
communities to find a solution that will serve their own ends rather than an ideal one for both
communities. The EU obstructs the process by strengthening the hands of the Greek Cypriots
asymmetrically through the comfort zone of the EU membership, causing dismay for the
Turkish Cypriots by driving the conflict in a legal impasse. The UN has advocated a fast and
effective solution for both communities. The UN’s pressure, apart from the ones in 1974, has
been fruitful in general for the Turkish Cypriots. This paper only demonstrates the shaping of
the conflict by the significant international influential actors. Further research should be done
to integrate this study into a possible game-theoretical one that captures the internal dynamics
of the interactions between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots. One can conclude that the
intervening of all the external actors, thus all the differing interest, complicates the prospect of
a solution. Hence is deduced that a genuine solution could only come from the candid
negotiations between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, minding the external pressure as
minimum as possible. Although this requires determination and mutual trust from both
communities, there is still hope for a future peaceful Cyprus.

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