Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020 PDF

SEPTEMBER 2020
Mason Clark
RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE
MILITARY LEARNING AND

THE FUTURE OF WAR SERIES
Mason Clark, Institute for the Study of War

MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR SERIES
Cover: Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces
Valery Gerasimov arrives for the Victory Day parade, which
marks the anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in
World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia May
9, 2019. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mason Clark is the Russia Team Lead and Research Analyst on the Russia and Ukraine portfolio at the
Institute for the Study of War. His work focuses on Russian military adaptation and learning in Syria. His
work has been cited by Task & Purpose, Defense One, the Kyiv Post, the New York Times, BBC, and others.
He has briefed multiple senior military and civilian decision makers on Russian military development and the
Kremlin’s global campaigns. Mason received a B.A. with Honors in International Studies with a focus on US
Foreign Policy and Russian from American University’s School of International Service.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank the incredible team at ISW and the Critical Threats Project (CTP), without
whom this report would not have been possible. As always, enormous thanks to ISW President Kim Kagan
and her invaluable help situating this report in the wider debate. The author is particularly grateful for the
mentorship and analytical feedback of CTP Director Fred Kagan and ISW Non-resident National Security
Research Fellow Nataliya Bugayova. National Security Fellow Jenny Cafarella provided invaluable feedback on
structure and the war in Syria. Special thanks to Russia Research Assistant George Barros for his analytical
support. The author would like to thank John Dunford, Amy Kramer, and Jason Zhou for their feedback and
suggestions during the writing of this report. The work of former ISW interns Kayla Grose, Aidan Therrien,
Aleksei Zimnitca, Michaela Walker, and Katie Flanagan contributed to the research and references in this
report. The author wishes to express great appreciation for the editing and production team, including Caitlin
Forrest, Lisa Suchy, and Jacob Taylor. Last but not least, the author would like to thank former ISW Russia
research assistants Catherine Harris and Jack Ulses for asking the author to read Russian military journals as
an intern. The author would not have come close to the insight of this report without their initial encourage-
ment and support.
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SEPTEMBER 2020
Table of Contents
8 Executive Summary
11 Introduction
11 Confusion about Russian Hybrid War in the West
14 Russian Hybrid War Theory
15 The Russian View of Future War: Unconventional, Diverse, and Rapid
15 Hybrid War
15
Definitions and Characteristics of Hybrid War
16
The Kremlin Perceives a Hybrid War Against Russia
18
Russia Assesses Hybrid War Requires Further Centralizing Russian Decision-making
19
The Russian Military is Actively Preparing for Whole-of-Society Hybrid War
20
Kinetic Conflict in Hybrid Wars
21
Information Operations Increasingly Permeate and are Supported
by All Other Military Actions
22
Participants in Conflicts are Diversifying
24
New Technology and New Actors Require Simultaneous, Distributed Operations
25 Implications
28 Endnotes
UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 7
Executive Summary
America’s current strategy for responding to the Russian threat is based on a misunderstanding of the
Russian approach to war and exposes the United States and its allies to a high risk of strategic defeats.
The 2018 US National Defense Strategy gives primacy to deterring major conventional great power wars. Russia
also seeks to avoid such wars even as it designs a different way of waging war to achieve its revisionist objectives. The
US largely views this Russian approach, hybrid war, as a set of activities below the level of conventional conflict.
But Russia includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war. If the US con-
tinues to focus on deterring the kind of war Russia does not intend to fight while underestimating the role military
force can and must play in preventing Moscow from accomplishing its aims through hybrid war, then the US will
likely suffer serious strategic defeats even as its defense strategy technically succeeds.
The Kremlin is even now waging a hybrid war information, and diplomatic means, as well as the
against the United States. The Kremlin assesses use of military forces extending above the upper
that hybrid wars already dominate 21st century threshold of the “gray zone” concept that more
conflict and will continue to do so. The Kremlin accurately captures the Chinese approach to war.
believes it must adapt to win this struggle, pro-
The Kremlin considers conflicts including
foundly shaping Russian military development and
Belarus, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Venezuela to
assessments of the future of war.
be hybrid wars. The Russian Armed Forces openly
Russian hybrid wars include the use of significant discuss several ongoing conflicts as hybrid wars. The
conventional forces and conflict. The Russian Kremlin is actively refining and utilizing its theory
military defines a “hybrid war” as a strategic-level of hybrid war in Europe and around the world. It
effort to shape the governance and geostrategic ori- uses a blend of means and instruments, including
entation of a target state in which all actions, up to and conventional military forces. Russian Air Force air-
including the use of conventional military forces in regional con- craft in Syria constitute its most important means
flicts, are subordinate to an information campaign. of influencing that conflict, although it has also
deployed Russian Army Military Police and special
The Russians define hybrid war precisely and coher-
forces (SPETSNAZ) troops as well. Russian hybrid
ently as a type of war, rather than a set of means to
war efforts in Belarus include sending three battal-
conduct state policy. The U.S discussion of hybrid
ion tactical groups from Russian Airborne Forces
war overly focuses on the means short of conven-
divisions to exercise there, along with Tu-160
tional forces and conflict that the Russians have most
nuclear-capable bombers. Russia’s engagement in
famously used. The Russian soldiers without insignia
Libya, by contrast, has been primarily through its
(“little green men”) who helped seize Crimea in 2014,
private military companies (PMCs), which are also
and the proxies Russia uses in eastern Ukraine, are
operating in Syria. The Kremlin adjusts the kinds
most often the focus of Western assessments about how
of forces it commits to hybrid conflicts according
to respond to Russian hybrid war.
to its assessment of the conflict’s requirements. The
The Russian conception of hybrid war is much Kremlin does not shy away from sending and using
more expansive. It covers the entire “compe- units from its conventional military forces just
tition space,” including subversive, economic, because it has defined the war as hybrid.
8 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG
SEPTEMBER 2020
Russia sees hybrid wars as the main line of future • Improve the Kremlin’s capability to employ
military development, rather than a temporary PMCs and other supposedly deniable proxy
phenomenon. The Russian military maintains forces.
theoretical space for the idea of a traditional con-
ventional war and does not assert that all conflicts • Subordinate kinetic operations to information
are now inherently hybrid. It instead argues that operations — which the Kremlin assesses is the
conventional war is a legacy type of conflict that is ongoing foundational change in the character
increasingly unlikely in the 21st century due to tech- of war — in planning processes and execution.
nological changes and strategic power balances. The The United States must revise its strategy for con-
Kremlin further asserts that Russia should shape fronting the Russian threat and re-examine the
its military and national security tools to optimize tools and resources it will need to support that
for hybrid wars not only because they are increas- strategy in light of a more accurate understand-
ingly common, but also because they are now more ing of the Russian concept of hybrid wars. The US
practical and effective than traditional conventional must avoid imposing its own conceptual boundar-
warfare. ies on the Russian threat — particularly regarding
The Russian military is therefore adapting to the Russian theory of hybrid war. The Kremlin has
improve its capabilities to conduct hybrid wars. established a continuum between and among mil-
The Russian military is not attempting to hide its itary and non-military means to conduct unified
intent to conduct offensive hybrid wars. Russian campaigns — hybrid wars — to achieve its strategic
military theorists write extensively and openly on objectives. The United States must also recognize
general strategies and doctrine for offensive hybrid that deterring major conventional and nuclear
wars, and additionally discuss the development of war with Russia is not a sufficient objective to pre-
individual hybrid means. The Kremlin’s ongoing serve US interests in the face of Russian hybrid war
adaptations include efforts to: efforts. And it must accept that US and NATO con-
ventional military forces must play an essential role
• Centralize all potential Russian decision-mak- in any counter-hybrid war strategy.
ing bodies — civilian, military, media, and
economic — to coordinate whole-of-govern- The United States should take several actions to
ment efforts. support this revision of its strategy and approach
to Russia.
• Adapt traditional military theories and doc- • Analyze the Kremlin’s decisions within the Russian
trine to enable the Russian military to conduct
hybrid wars as a core mission. framework of hybrid war to understand and mitigate
Russian lines of effort. Obfuscating the nature and
• Conduct society-wide information campaigns purpose of Kremlin activities is a key objec-
to improve “patriotic consciousness,” which tive of hybrid war, and US confusion about
the Kremlin assesses is essential in hybrid war. the term and the Russian approach to such
conflicts hinders the development of effective
• Increase the adaptability and strength of counterstrategies.
Russian information campaigns to successfully
conduct hybrid wars over many years. • Confront Russian hybrid wars in their entirety as
synthetic threats instead of confronting individual
• Improve the conventional expeditionary capa- Russian lines of effort separately and partially.
bilities of the Russian Armed Forces to enhance
their capability to deploy abroad in support of • Counter the Kremlin globally as well as in Europe.
hybrid wars. Putin is not playing three-dimensional chess,
but instead playing many games of checkers
Russian Hybrid Warfare
simultaneously. The US policy and military • Recognize and plan for the military requirements
community should increase its analysis of to confront hybrid threats. The United States
the Kremlin’s hybrid wars outside Europe, should be prepared to confront Russian hybrid
including in Syria, Libya, and Venezuela while wars with the conventional forces that will be
retaining necessary focus on Ukraine, Belarus, required and avoid establishing false red lines
and the Baltic States. for the use of Western forces against Russian
aggressions.
• Pursue whole-of-government coordination of infor-
mation and kinetic operations. • Recognize that Russia also aims to avoid major great
power war. The US must of course continue to
• Reinforce Western norms and institutions — key deter both nuclear and full-scale conventional
targets of Russian hybrid wars. The United States war with Russia. But it must revise its strategy
should not allow the Kremlin to normalize its to recognize that Russia also seeks to avoid such
malign behavior and worldview. conflicts while nevertheless accomplishing it
• Work to align the Russia policy of the United States goals.
and its allies. The United States should particu-
larly seek to standardize across NATO the red
• Shift its military posture to confront the global nature
of the Kremlin threat.
lines that would lead to responses to Russian
actions. • Enable deployed US forces to combat Russian hybrid
wars with non-kinetic means. Conventional forces
• Actively challenge Russian information campaigns. can act as a platform for additional cyber, civ-
The Kremlin’s information campaign is its il-military relations, intelligence, technical,
center of gravity in each hybrid war. The United and special operations assets which are essen-
States cannot win hybrid wars with Russia if it tial in hybrid wars.
loses in the information space.
The challenges presented by Russian hybrid war and
• Deprive Russian PMCs and proxy forces of their preparations for the future of war are not insur-
deniability. The United States and its allies mountable. The West must not throw up its hands
must relentlessly work to at the challenge of confronting
expose the connections an unfamiliar conception of the
between these forces and future of war. The Kremlin is
the Kremlin and highlight If the US focuses on optimizing for its expectations of
that they are direct tools
of Russian military policy deterring the kind of war the future of war, not ours, and
the West must fully understand
to reduce the Kremlin’s Russia does not intend the Russian threat to successfully
freedom of action. to fight, underestimating confront the Kremlin.
the role of military force
in hybrid war, then the
US will likely suffer
defeats even as its strategy
technically succeeds.
SEPTEMBER 2020
Introduction
Russia sees itself as fighting an ongoing hybrid ambivalent state of semi-war or competition. From
war against the United States and is shaping its the Russian perspective, the entire “gray zone” is
military and non-military tools of state power potentially a component of hybrid war, which addi-
to win this war. The Russian military defines a tionally includes the use of military forces extending
“hybrid war” as a strategic-level effort to shape the above the upper threshold of the “gray zone” into
governance and geostrategic orientation of a target what the US and China would both regard as con-
state in which all actions, up to and including the ventional war.
use of conventional military forces in regional con-
The US must therefore profoundly reorient its geo-
flicts, are subordinate to an information campaign.
strategic thinking about Russia. It must proceed
Russia considers the Venezuelan Presidential crisis,
from the reality that the Kremlin sees itself as cur-
the ongoing Libyan conflict, the Syrian Civil War,
rently fighting a war against the US and its allies
and the current crisis in Belarus as examples of
and is extrapolating experience from fighting this
hybrid war. The Russian military is actively focusing
war to shape its preparations for future war. The
its preparation for future conflicts on increas-
US must additionally avoid imposing its own con-
ing the capabilities it assesses are necessary to win
ceptual boundaries on an evolving Russian theory
hybrid wars.
that explicitly rejects them. It must particularly rec-
Russian strategic thought identifies “hybrid wars” ognize the key differences between hybrid war and
as the main line of future military development, gray zone conflict and the incorporation of major
rather than a temporary phenomenon. The Russian conventional military operations into the Russian
military maintains theoretical space for the idea of a notion of hybrid war. Only then can the US begin to
traditional conventional war and does not assert that devise a suitable approach to counter the real threat
all conflicts are now inherently “hybrid.” It instead Russia poses.
argues that conventional war is a legacy type of con-
flict that is increasingly unlikely in the 21st century
due to technological changes and strategic power
Confusion about Russian
balances. The Kremlin further asserts that Russia Hybrid War in the West
should shape its military and national security tools Hybrid war, “гибридная война” in Russian, is a
to optimize for hybrid wars not only because they coherently defined term for a typology of war — not
are increasingly common, but also because they are simply a set of means to conduct state policy — in
now more practical and effective than traditional Russian military thought with explicit and specific
conventional warfare. meaning. The muddling of the term in Western
The Kremlin rejects many distinctions the US discourse has led some to reject it entirely or to
makes among various sorts of conflict, synthesizing propose their own definitions of it.1 Western dis-
those types of conflict under the singular framework cussion of hybrid war in general uses the term
of hybrid wars. The Russian hybrid war frame- primarily to discuss means, whereas it denotes a cat-
work specifically includes the use of conventional egory of war for the Kremlin. The Russian usage of
military operations and lacks a boundary between the term is neither muddled nor confused. The
“deniable” proxy operations and disinformation United States cannot understand Russian national
on the one hand and conventional conflict on the security policy, let alone Russia’s military policy,
other. Russian conceptions of hybrid war are thus without clearly understanding the Russian concep-
incompatible with the idea of “gray zone” warfare, tion of hybrid war.
which depends on a relatively clear threshold above Western discussions of the nature of the Russian
which a conflict is “war,” but below which there is an military threat often split the problem set into two
parts. One part is the threat of conventional war respond to Russian conventional forces being used
against NATO. The other consists of strictly infor- to shape, support, and conduct hybrid wars. These
mation-focused and subversive Russian actions in studies have informed how the United States and
which the deployment of “little green men” (a term NATO understands the interaction between kinetic
for the Russian troops in unmarked uniforms that conflict and the information space, and have nar-
enabled Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea) is the rowed the problem in ways that miss the Kremlin’s
upper bound of kinetic operations. This split con- intent.5 The 2018 National Defense Strategy, for
ception does not capture the Russian view of “hybrid example, focused largely on the conventional mil-
war,” which includes conventional maneuver war as itary balance, arguing that Russia is eroding the
well as activities American theorists assign to the United States’ “competitive military edge” and
“gray zone.”2 Several studies accurately note that the recommending improved conventional military
Kremlin will use “hybrid means” in any conven- capabilities in response.6 This recommendation
tional war, but do not fully explore the inverse — that is not wrong, but it is insufficient. It understates
the Kremlin conducts conventional military oper- Russian efforts to circumvent rather than directly
ations in what the US considers the “competition challenge NATO’s capabilities.
space.”3 This inaccurately split conception of the
One consequence of studies that overvalue the
Russian threat obscures the Kremlin’s conception
Russian conventional threat and undervalue the
of its own campaigns; it risks leading Western pol-
hybrid war threat is an excessive focus on nuclear
icymakers to focus on components of the Russian
or strategic deterrence.7 NATO’s conventional force
military threat separately when they are in fact part
posture in Eastern Europe is necessary and important
of a cohesive whole.4 A strategy to confront Russia
to deter any potential Russian conventional threat.
based on responding to incomplete, discrete por-
Russia certainly could develop and use conventional
tions of the problem set is doomed to fail.
forces against its western neighbors if the United
Constraining the notion of hybrid war to activities States and its allies did not maintain adequately
below the threshold of conventional conflict leads equipped and trained forces to help those neighbors
Western analysis of the Kremlin to focus too much defend themselves. These conventional forces can
on the Russian military’s conventional threat to additionally serve as baseplates for additional assets
NATO and Europe. The false dichotomy between to directly contest Russian hybrid operations.8 But
hybrid means and conventional means leads many the assumption that keeping conventional forces in
in the West to expect that conventional forces will the eastern NATO states postured to defend against
be used — and must be matched — by conventional a conventional Russian invasion will also protect
forces in conventional ways. Western analysis NATO’s eastern flank from Russian hybrid oper-
therefore does not devote enough attention to the ations is not well-founded. Russian theory and
Russian Armed Forces’ conventional units capabil- doctrine increasingly assume that Russia cannot
ity and intent to conduct hybrid operations directly or should not engage in force-on-force conflict
themselves and not just through subversive actors against NATO, but that it can and should achieve its
or other elements of the Russian state. Studies goals — even against NATO states — through hybrid
attempting to examine the relationship between efforts that nevertheless include elements of con-
hybrid efforts and conventional units have thus ventional war.
explored how NATO’s conventional units can con-
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) gives primacy
front Russian hybrid efforts conducted primarily by
to deterring major conventional conflict between
Russian proxy forces, as in Ukraine. But Russian
great powers. But Russia also seeks to avoid major
hybrid warfare efforts often aim to succeed without
conventional wars between great powers even as
engaging NATO conventional units; such studies do
it designs a way of waging war that would achieve
not address how NATO should respond in that case
its objectives. The NDS thus creates a hidden risk
and fail to adequately consider how to identify and
that Russia can achieve its political objectives via
SEPTEMBER 2020
hybrid warfare, to the great harm of the US and its Russia will apply these lessons to combating con-
allies, even as the US formally achieves the objec- ventional NATO forces, rather than understanding
tive of deterring major great power war. Russia does these lessons as components of the Russian theory
not intend to fight a conventional great power war. of hybrid war.13
If the US focuses on deterring conventional great
Western decision makers must shift their conception
power war while underestimating the role military
of Russian hybrid war from a term that identifies a
force can and must play in preventing Moscow from
set of means — the focus of most existing studies — to a
accomplishing its aims below the threshold of major
definition of a type of war. Numerous analysts in the
conventional war, then the US can suffer serious
Western policy community have accurately assessed
strategic defeats even as its defense strategy techni-
the Kremlin’s changing means of achieving its policy
cally succeeds.
objectives, the majority of which fall below the level
Studies of the Russian military threat to Europe are of conventional war.14 Several salient reports have
necessary but insufficient for another reason: they highlighted key lines of effort within the Kremlin’s
do not capture the global scope of the Kremlin’s hybrid wars and suggested excellent recommenda-
intent to use conventional assets as part of hybrid tions to counter them — discussed further in the
warfare. Several valuable case studies of Russian
9
conclusion of this paper. Many reports, however,
hybrid wars focus exclusively on conflicts in the dismiss defining hybrid war as a hopeless endeavor
former Soviet Union, neglect- and instead describe it as one
ing the Kremlin’s global aims term among many defining the
and conception of hybrid war. 10
same phenomena; others add
Russia will be hard-pressed to Russia sees hybrid war as a further terms to the dense dis-
pose a major conventional mili- type of conflict rather than cussion of what the Kremlin
tary threat to the West outside its would consider the means of a
own borders. Russia has already
the means of waging it. hybrid war.15 The existing liter-
posed a tremendous challenge to ature on Russian hybrid war has
the US and its international coa- not engaged with the Russian
lition against the Islamic State in Syria, however, by conception of the term as a type of war, rather than
incorporating the use of limited conventional mil- simply a set of means. This is not meant to argue
itary power in its hybrid wars. Russia’s conception that the United States and its allies should not con-
of hybrid war thus enables Moscow to pose mili- tinue to develop their own frameworks — but the
tary challenges to the US and its allies in areas far US cannot throw out important Russian terms
beyond what Russian conventional military forces due to flawed Western definitions. The US and its
could otherwise reach. allies must understand the Kremlin’s conception
of hybrid wars to successfully counter the means
Western decision makers and military personnel
involved in those wars — or the West risks winning
must study Putin’s Russia with a full understand-
individual battles but losing a war it isn’t aware of.
ing of Russian intent, not only Russian capabilities.
Intelligence analysis of Russian military capabil- This report aims to identify the shift in the US
ities without analysis of Russian intent is valuable mindset that is necessary to confront Russian hybrid
but often misleading. 11 Western analyses of Russian war in current and future conflicts. Western writing
military learning and development often correctly has analyzed the key building blocks of the Russian
identify Russian capabilities and weaknesses but do military threat but has so far failed to synthesize these
not envision how Russia will employ its increas- building blocks with the Russian military’s views
ingly modernized force in ways consistent with the of the future of war. The West cannot successfully
Kremlin’s intent and views of hybrid warfare. 12
counter the Russian threat without understanding
Discussions of Russian lessons learned in Syria and Russian military thinking holistically.
Ukraine, for example, often focus strictly on how
Russian Hybrid War Theory officers discussing how they will synchronize their
actions with information campaigns, and retired
This report analyzes the public-facing Russian officers and military professors providing histori-
military discussion of hybrid war and Russian assess- cal context for modern lessons, among others. The
ments of the future of war from 2015 to 2020. This public discussion is an iterative process, enabling
public discussion is very likely a good indicator of authors to reference and learn from each other. The
overall Russian military thinking, even that which is entire discussion echoes the development of Soviet
concealed from public view. military theory and doctrine in the Interwar Years
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely (1918–39) in its scope, nuance, and extent.
conducting both internal and public discussions Unclassified Russian military discussion primarily
of hybrid war and the future of war. Much of the occurs in two types of sources: military doctrine
Russian discussion of hybrid war is conducted in the journals and Kremlin-run news outlets. The
open military journals analyzed for this report. The Russian militarily mainly uses monthly military
Russian military is almost certainly additionally dis- journals as the forum for discussing past opera-
cussing the details of hybrid war in classified forums tions and planning future doctrine revisions. This
and directly conducting lessons learned assessments report focuses on two premier Russian journals,
on ongoing hybrid wars such as the Kremlin’s Military Thought (Voennaia Mysl’) and Army Collection
campaign in Ukraine. However, unclassified pub- (Armeiskii Sbornik).
lications reach a larger audience in the Russian
military than classified documents and influence Military Thought is the official journal of the Russian
the thinking of greater numbers of Russian offi- General Staff and the key Russian forum for
cers. The theories and development priorities the debate on doctrine and projections of the future
MoD chooses to publish in respected journals and of war.16 Military Thought primarily publishes content
the priorities outlined by senior officers in speeches produced by professors or students at military acad-
demonstrate the Russian Armed Forces’ clear pri- emies — who are often captains, majors, or more
oritization of studying the conduct of hybrid wars. senior officers — and staffers in research and plan-
ning organizations, rather than work by active-duty
Open discussion of hybrid war and the future of line officers. Their articles predominantly focus
war benefits the quality of the Russian learning on grand strategy and the future of war. Authors
process. The barrier to entry for authorship is lower commonly discuss development priorities, theoret-
in unclassified publications than in classified dis- ical tactical problems, and preparations for future
cussions, which are likely limited to select groups operations. Military Thought authors frame their pro-
of officers and planners. Inputs into the open dis- jections as informed by recent conflicts but rarely
cussion include officers with command experience explicitly discuss operations in Syria or Ukraine.
discussing experience from the war in Syria — which Articles in Military Thought often discuss specific
the Kremlin considers a hybrid war — in military changes to formal Russian doctrine, proposing
newspapers, military academics projecting the rewritten passages on specific topics and strategic
future of conflict in military journals, lower-ranking policy suggestions for the Kremlin.
The Russian Ministry of Defense additionally pub-
lishes Army Collection, a similarly analytical but less
Russian military officers and theoretical journal.17 Active duty officers, most
academics are building an extensive commonly writing on behalf of their respective mil-
body of hybrid war theory and lessons itary branches, produce most of the articles in Army
Collection. These articles tend to emphasize tactical
learned in professional military problems and operational planning over strategic
journals. forecasting. Army Collection articles frequently discuss
SEPTEMBER 2020
how traditional kinetic actions interact with the These sources include:
growing importance of information operations in
hybrid wars. Army Collection articles also commonly • Red Star: The official newspaper of the Ministry
of Defense, with a wide distribution within the
include references to specific actions in Syria or
Russian Armed Forces.18
ongoing military exercises, and each issue includes
several news items on ongoing operations. • VPK: A military newspaper that often publishes
Kremlin-run media outlets, primarily military-run transcripts of key speeches by Russian generals,
newspapers, are also forums for Russian mili- including annual speeches by Gerasimov.19
tary discussion. Content within these non-journal
sources can be roughly divided into three groups:
• Rossiyskaya Gazeta: The official newspaper of
record of the Russian government.20
transcripts of speeches and lectures by key officers,
including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and • The Russian International Affairs Council: A
Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov; news Kremlin-run think tank founded by Vladimir
reports on Russian actions in Syria and domestic Putin that publishes strategic analysis of the
military exercises; and interviews with Russian mil- Syrian conflict.21
itary personnel on their experiences in Syria.
• Kremlin-run media outlets including but
not limited to TVZvezda, TASS, Ria Novosti, and
Kommersant: Kremlin-backed outlets that often
publish interviews with active duty and retired
Russian military personnel.
The Russian View of Future War:

Unconventional, Diverse, and Rapid
The Russian military assesses war is becoming for all future conflicts, an operational approach
increasingly unconventional, faster, and diverse within a wider conventional war, a set of means to
in means and participants. Russia’s senior military achieve state policy, or “gray zone” activity that does
analysts and planners believe Russia is fighting an not meet the threshold of war. The Kremlin con-
ongoing Western hybrid war against Russia. The siders hybrid war a whole-of-government activity,
Kremlin assesses that the likelihood of a conven- up to and including the use of conventional military
tional war against Russia is decreasing, and that forces.
Russia should optimize for other types of con-
Russian analysts frame the objective of a hybrid war
flict — namely hybrid wars — to best prepare for the
as gaining the ability to determine the long-term
future of war.
governance and strategic orientation of a target
state. In the Russian view, victorious states or coa-
Hybrid War litions in hybrid wars successfully impose their
worldview, values, interests, and understanding
Definitions and Characteristics of Hybrid War of the “fair” distribution of resources on a target
state. Victorious states or coalitions then gain the
The Russian Armed Forces define hybrid war as a war
power, and in the Russian view the right, to deter-
in which all efforts, including military operations,
mine a country’s future. 23 Senior Combined Arms
are subordinate to an information campaign.22 The
Academy researcher Valery Kiselev asserts hybrid
Kremlin does not view hybrid war as a descriptor
wars aim to fragment states and change their gov- against Russia since the end of the Cold War. The
ernments as a means to the end of shaping a target Kremlin asserts it is in a defensive, civilizational
state’s orientation. 24 The Russian military consid- struggle against the West’s efforts to dominate the
ers determining the governance of a target state a world. The Kremlin believes it must adapt to win
political objective, while the broader objective of a this struggle, a worldview which profoundly shapes
hybrid war — gaining control over the fundamental Russian military development and assessments of
worldview and orientation of a state — is an infor- the future of war.
mation objective, requiring hybrid wars to therefore
The Kremlin considers many diverse conflicts to
center on information campaigns.25 Russian ana-
be components of this Western hybrid war against
lysts believe hybrid wars are almost uniformly
Russia. Russian military thinkers argue the US
lengthy conflicts, as aggressors use a combination
is attempting to retain its unipolar status by any
of “crushing and starving” to undermine the oppo-
means necessary, using NATO to consolidate this
nent, targeting both their resource base and political
dominance and restrain Russia.30 Russian analysts
will.26 Russian writers use these same descriptors to
additionally frame globalization as a concerted
describe the West’s “hybrid wars” and “color revo-
Western effort to dominate the world since 1991.31
lutions.” 27
Russian analysts argue the hybrid war between the
Russian military writers make clear that not all US and Russia is similar to the Cold War due to its
individual uses of the means Western writers often focus on shaping the “basic moral core of humanity,”
describe as “hybrid war” rise to the threshold of a but is between civilizations rather than ideologies.32
hybrid war. Russian analysts assert that a conflict
Senior leaders of the Russian Armed Forces assert
only rises to the threshold of a hybrid war if the
this view as well — it is not a fringe or hardline
aggressor state explicitly sets reshaping the strate-
view. Gerasimov stated in March 2019 that the US
gic orientation and “worldview” of a target state as
and its allies are developing offensive capabilities
its goal.28 Much like the West’s large body of work
including “global strike, multi-domain battle, color
discussing hybrid means under the varied terms of
revolutions, and soft power” to eliminate unwanted
gray zone conflict, hybrid war, hostile measures,
governments, undermine the concept of sovereignty,
and others, the Russian military utilizes several
and change lawfully elected governments — citing
often vague terms to describe hybrid means — loosely
Belarus, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, and Venezuela as
defined as any actions beyond traditional kinetic
examples.33 Russian military thinkers conceive of all
operations. Examples include “hybrid conflict,”
of these varied Western actions as elements of the
“hybrid means,” “asymmetric operations,” “infor-
hybrid war against Russia, with Kiselev claiming
mation warfare,” “non-military struggle,” and
“the theory of hybrid war developed in the bowels of
“non-traditional war.”29 The Russian military
the Pentagon.”34 The Kremlin’s false assessment of
identifies a wide set of means, discussed below,
Western responsibility for the creation of the theory
as characteristic instruments in a hybrid war, but
of hybrid war is essential to understanding the
identify that states can employ these means outside
Kremlin’s own conception of its efforts — discussed
of a hybrid war. The Russian Armed Forces use the
further below.
scale of the objectives of a conflict — not the means
used — to delineate the line between hybrid war and Russian military thinkers assert the United States
international competition, rather than discussing a adapted to the increasing cost of conventional oper-
“gray zone” between war and peace. ations by developing the means to enable hybrid
wars. In the Russian view, Western hybrid wars are
The Kremlin Perceives a Hybrid War a change from the previous US model of “invasions
to restore democracy.”35 Dvornikov claimed in July
Against Russia
2018 that the 1991 Gulf War is the most recent fully
The Kremlin holds an institutional worldview that conventional Western war, and the West now achieves
the US has led the West in an ongoing hybrid war its political goals by making the enemy submit to its
SEPTEMBER 2020
will using other methods.36 He claims the goal of This Russian conception that the West is already
these Western hybrid wars, conducted using a mix waging a hybrid war against Russia drives much of
of state forces with international legal cover and Russia’s assessments of the future of war. Bartosh
non-state actors, is to create an obedient target stated in October 2018 that Russia must reconceive
government in a given territory. Russian analysts
37
what it considers war, as a hybrid war is being waged
claim NATO previously “chose a victim” and forced against Russia daily. 45 Senior Russian analysts claim
other states to join large scale military operation, that the West’s “quest for world domination” neces-
as in Yugoslavia and Iraq, to eliminate unwanted sitates reassessing what constitutes war, as Western
states. Russian analysts claim the West now uses actions would not be considered a war under tradi-
hybrid wars to achieve its goals.38 Gerasimov stated tional definitions. 46 The Russian military believes it
in March 2016 that the “falsification of events [and] must adapt to the increasing prominence of hybrid
restriction of activity of mass media… can be com- wars or lose Russia’s civilizational struggle for sur-
parable to the results of large-scale use of troops and vival against the West.
forces.”39 Gerasimov cites as examples the Western
Russia’s narrative regarding US and Western
“incitement of nationalism in Ukraine,” referring
involvement in global conflicts certainly serves the
to the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution, and the Arab
propaganda interests of the Kremlin and often
Spring, arguing Western governments can now
mischaracterizes US intent and capabilities, but
achieve regime change through
this narrative genuinely shapes
hybrid wars primarily utiliz-
Russian military thinking and
ing information warfare rather
The Russians believe the planning. This deeply paranoid
than conventional forces.40
and frankly hyperbolic world-
Prominent hybrid-war theo- West is waging hybrid view ignores conflicts without
rist Alexander Bartosh further
claims the West is refining this
war against them in great powers, bypasses other
Ukraine, Libya, Syria, actors including China, and
model in ongoing operations
presents a truly distorted sense
in Latin America, the Middle and elsewhere. of the nature of events the US
East, and the Balkans —
with
is driving around the world.
other Russian authors specifi-
Readers may reasonably question
cally citing the NATO interventions in Libya, the
whether this worldview is an intentional Russian
former Yugoslavia, and the ongoing Syrian war as
information operation or propaganda cover. The
key examples of Western hybrid war.41
Kremlin could intend to use this rhetoric to shape
The Kremlin considers the perceived Western Russian public opinion against the US or obfuscate
hybrid war against Assad in Syria as a component of Russian discussions of how to conduct their own
the West’s wider, ongoing hybrid war against Russia. hybrid wars by ascribing all offensive actions to the
Russian analysts assert that, much like the Cold War, West, but it is driving Russian military thinking.
the alleged Western hybrid war against Russia will
The worldview that the West is engaged in hybrid
extend into smaller hybrid wars against other states,
war against Russia permeates official Russian mil-
like Syria.42 Gerasimov identifies Syria as an example
itary planning and discussions. Discussion of the
of the West’s new approach to eliminating unwanted
Western hybrid war against Russia is not confined to
countries — undermining sovereignty and changing
blatant propaganda outlets like RT and Sputnik. The
the lawfully elected governments of states — along-
arguments and analysis that inform this worldview
side Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, and Venezuela.43 Bartosh
are published in Military Thought – the most authorita-
argues these diverse Western hybrid wars serve a
tive discussion forum of the Russian Armed Forces.
dual purpose of pressuring Russia and allowing the
The highest-ranking officers of the Russian military
West to further develop and refine its hybrid war
argue this worldview in public speeches outlin-
approaches. 44
ing the yearly priorities of the armed forces. The
researchers cited above are respected military aca- between the government, corporations, financial
demics and leaders of high-profile military research structures, and influential individuals. 48 Bartosh
institutions, not fringe analysts or junior officers. argues hybrid warfare strategies must incorporate a
Russian military analysts additionally openly discuss “totality of means,” in which the varied stakehold-
how to wage offensive hybrid wars. The Russian ers of these assets jointly plan and execute hybrid
military is not hiding its intent wars using both the information
to use hybrid means offensively, space and kinetic operations.49
or discussing the Kremlin’s Russian military analysts per-
own actions in the language of Russian military analysts sistently argue that the military
accusation.47 The Kremlin will openly discuss how to wage and civilian government should
struggle to counteract the relent- offensive hybrid wars, and jointly improve strategic situa-
less, high-level publications and tional awareness and forecasting
statements by the most senior are not concealing their capabilities.50
figures in the Russian military intent to use hybrid means The Russian Ministry of Defense
indoctrinating their subordi-
nates on this worldview if it is
offensively. claims it has already created a
central body to manage Russian
truly an information operation.
security policy. Chief of the
The Russian conception of an ongoing defensive General Staff Gerasimov stated in December 2017
hybrid war against the West shapes strategic Russian that Russia successfully created a new structure for
priorities and assessments of the future of war. At whole-of-government management — the National
most, the Kremlin truly believes it is in a defensive Defense Control Center (NDCC) — and utilized
struggle against a Western hybrid war and is shaping this new structure to manage Russia’s involve-
its preparations for the future of war on this assessment in the Syrian Civil War.51 The MoD launched
ment. At the absolute least, the Kremlin has created the NDCC in April 2014 as a central command,
a fake tail to blame the West — and that tail is now coordination, and planning center located in the
wagging the dog, driving concept and execution. Ministry of Defense Headquarters in Moscow.52
Russian planners assessed the NDCC was necessary
Russia Assesses Hybrid War Requires Further to fill a perceived gap in Russia’s central planning
Centralizing Russian Decision-making and foresight capabilities that emerged following
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.53 Red Star
The Kremlin assesses it must improve its capability reported in February 2017 that the NDCC connects
to conduct hybrid war to respond to the perceived 73 federal executive authorities, authorities from all
ongoing American hybrid war against Russia. 85 of Russia’s federation subjects, and 1,320 state
Russian theorists further argue that hybrid wars, corporations and defense enterprises into “a single
spearheaded by the West, will dominate the future of system of interdepartmental interaction.”54 The
war and that the Kremlin must make whole-of-gov- Kremlin’s creation of this unified structure for both
ernment changes to better wage this type of warfare. security and civilian ministries reflects how highly
Russian military theorists and analysts prioritize the Russians prioritize centralized governance for
centralized decision-making as the key enabler of hybrid war. The Kremlin assessed the need for the
successful hybrid wars. NDCC prior to both the war in Syria and Russia’s
Russian writers assert hybrid war necessitates invasion of Ukraine in 2014, with Putin issuing
centralizing all potential Russian decision-mak- the formal order to create the NDCC in December
ing bodies to coordinate whole-of-government 2013, though the NDCC was used for the first time
efforts. The prominent theorist Bartosh argued in those two conflicts.55
in October 2018 that Russia must create a single Central Kremlin management of hybrid war likely
governing center to centralize decision making extends beyond the NDCC. Gerasimov stated in
SEPTEMBER 2020
March 2016 that every government ministry, not argues that improving socio-economic conditions,
just the Ministry of Defense, must have a clear reducing corruption, and centralizing control of
management structure and be able to respond to the economy are key actions the Kremlin can take
crises in hours to support hybrid warfare, reflect- to prepare for hybrid war to reduce wear on the
ing Russian conceptual discussions of the need for economy.62
unified control of hybrid wars.56 The Kremlin is
The Russian military also stresses the need to improve
additionally expanding the pool of assets engaged in
the strength and adaptability of Russian information
national security to include all of Russian society,
campaigns.63 Bartosh states, “strategies, concepts,
including government, business, culture, and
[and] ideologies” undergo intensive wear in hybrid
media institutions.57
warfare as well, necessitating constant updates to
Russian information campaigns used in a hybrid
The Russian Military is Actively Preparing for war.64 The Russian military prioritizes instilling a
Whole-of-Society Hybrid War unified ideology to mitigate wear on the Russian
The Russian military is spearheading the devel- population in the information space. The Russian
opment of hybrid warfare theory and strategy, military highlights American “war weariness” over
including recommending actions to shape Russian Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of failure to
society beyond the armed forces. Russian writers properly mitigate wear in the information space.65
assert that traditional military principles remain Russian military writers do not go into further
relevant in hybrid war and can guide Russian adap- detail on these whole-of-government priorities to
tations to conduct hybrid wars. Bartosh argues that increase resistance to wear. Other Kremlin organi-
conventional war theory can be applied to hybrid zations, including the Presidential Administration
warfare, describing the varied ideological, eco- and Kremlin-run media organizations like RT and
nomic, military, and diplomatic aspects of hybrid Sputnik, are likely prioritizing resistance to wear on
war as “fronts,” a seminal, defining aspect of Soviet Russian information campaigns.66
military thought.58 He asserts that the essential dif- The Russian military, not just the Kremlin, is
ference between hybrid and conventional war is actively preparing to conduct society-wide infor-
that armed forces are not the only prerequisite for mation campaigns in support of hybrid wars.
victory in hybrid wars.59 The head researcher of the The Russian MoD created the Military-Political
Russian General Staff argued in January 2017 that Directorate in July 2018, a structure to create and
future wars involving primarily non-state actors instill the unified ideology necessary to conduct
and terrorists will still follow the traditional mil- hybrid wars.67 Col. Gen. Andrei Kartapolov, who
itary principles used in previous conflicts, rather leads the Directorate, published an essay justi-
than necessitating a new intellectual framework.60 fying the Directorate’s creation and outlining its
Russian military analysts assert that the Armed priorities in September 2018.68 Kartapolov stated
Forces must work with the rest of Russian govern- that “we want to take a lot from the Soviet system,”
ment and society to improve Russia’s capabilities to claiming the forms and methods of the Directorate
resist hybrid war’s wear and attrition on informa- will continue Soviet structures while the content
tion campaigns and Russian society. Bartosh argues will change. 69 Russian military planners recom-
the multidimensional and long-lasting nature of mended in September 2017 that “[Christian]
hybrid war increases the threat of economic, phys- Orthodoxy, state interests, military-patriotic tra-
ical, and moral wear on combatants.61 Bartosh ditions, national psychology and culture… can
“...falsification of events [and] restriction of activity of mass media… can be

comparable to the results of large-scale use of troops and forces.”
– Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov
be the state-patriotic doctrine of a new system.”70 used under the cover of legal frameworks such as
Kartapolov argued Russia must ensure the “infor- peacekeeping, requiring new strategies for the
mation protection” of military personnel and create deployment of troops to include considerations of
a stable conviction in both the military and broader legal cover.76 Russian officers cynically assert that
society of why they must serve Russia, often called “diplomatic covers,” like United Nations Security
“The Motherland” in such literature, in future Council (UNSC) approval for peacekeeping or mul-
conflicts.71 Kartapolov contextualized this priority tinational NATO operations, are simply methods
historically, arguing Russia cannot endure a repeat to enable individual states to deploy conventional
of the collapse of the Imperial Russian Army due to military forces, regardless of the stated nature of
“Bolshevik agitation.”72 This effort is not limited to the deployment. The Kremlin is actively integrat-
targeting the military. Kartapolov stated one of the ing the Russian military into several international
Directorate’s most important tasks will be work with security organizations, likely to grant the diplomatic
the population and youth, arguing “today’s student cover Russian officers believe is necessary for the
is a future soldier.”73 use of conventional forces in hybrid wars.77 Russian
analysts assess unconventional forces, including
The Russian military is not attempting to hide its
nonstate actors and state-run special forces, are
intent to conduct hybrid wars but is not openly
active throughout hybrid wars.78 The diversification
discussing some ongoing conflicts — such as its cam-
of participants in kinetic operations will be dis-
paign against Ukraine — that it defines as hybrid
cussed in detail below.
wars. Russian military theorists write extensively
and openly on general strategies and doctrine for The West must understand and appreciate that the
offensive hybrid wars, as well as discuss the develop- Russian conception of hybrid warfare includes con-
ment of individual hybrid means. Bartosh highlights ventional forces. Much of Western writing on the
the need to formulate the objectives of each hybrid Russian threat, as previously discussed, overly sep-
war clearly and to study weak points in the internal arates the threat of the Russian military from the
and external security of the enemy country before threat of the Kremlin’s subversive, “gray zone” cam-
forming a “complex” of hybrid threats to deploy, paigns. The Kremlin’s offensive hybrid wars include
taking into account local specifics.74 Further actions the threat of utilizing conventional forces. Russian
should then focus on influencing the narrowly vul- military thinkers do not believe that conventional,
nerable areas of the opponent, anticipating the kinetic operations will decline in importance.
enemy’s likely counter strategy, employing “con- The Kremlin continues to prioritize conventional
sistent destructive impact on the key areas of military development, but does so with the expecta-
government” and deploying undeclared conven- tion that future kinetic actions will predominantly
tional military forces into the target state. 75 All support hybrid wars.
of these components clearly match the Kremlin’s
past and ongoing efforts in Ukraine, and much
of Russian hybrid war theory is likely informed by
Kinetic Conflict in
the Ukraine conflict. Talking about lessons learned Hybrid Wars
from the Ukraine conflict in a public forum or in Russian military writers discuss the future of kinetic
military journals is likely not politically acceptable conflict both in its own right and in the context of
to the Kremlin. hybrid war. Russian assessments of the future of
The Russian military considers kinetic military kinetic conflict focus on the increase in its speed,
operations, including the use of conventional mil- the diversifying participants and means of war, the
itary forces, an integral part of hybrid war. Russian blurring of boundaries between the levels of war,
analysts argue that states most often deploy conven- and the subsequent necessity of improved command
tional forces as the concluding step of a hybrid war. and control. Russian writers often discuss ele-
The Russian military argues these forces are often ments of the changing nature of kinetic conflict
SEPTEMBER 2020
Above: ITAR-TASS: TRANSBAIKAL TERRITORY, RUSSIA. JULY 17, 2013. Russia's president Vladimir Putin, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, L-R, watch military manoeuvres of formations and military units of the Central and Eastern Military Districts
at Tsugol firing range. (Photo ITAR-TASS/ Alexei Nikolsky) (Photo by Alexei Nikolsky\TASS via Getty Images)
independently, but primarily nest their discussions military must adapt to new “non-traditional” means
in Russia’s theory of hybrid war. Understanding the that fundamentally alter the nature of conflict. The
Kremlin’s intended means to wage hybrid wars is Russian military assesses these fundamental changes
essential to understanding Russian hybrid war as a will be particularly important in hybrid wars — which
whole. are inherently centered on the information opera-
tions that will permeate all future conflict.81
Information Operations Increasingly Permeate Discussion of information operations permeates
and are Supported by All Other Military Actions the Russian military discourse. Gerasimov stated
Russian officers and researchers argue the key in March 2017 that non-military efforts have four
change in future conflicts will be a reversal of the times the impact on the political outcomes of war
historical pattern of non-military measures sup- than conventional military efforts, a point echoed
porting military operations: kinetic operations throughout Russian writing.82 Kiselev asserts that
now support information campaigns, particularly information warfare is becoming the most import-
impacting the use of kinetic operations in hybrid ant sphere of military operations, as both an
wars.79 Russian researchers do not assess that a independent battlefield and an enabler of successful
new form of “non-traditional” conflict is emerg- kinetic actions.83 Russian analysts assess that con-
ing. They instead argue that non-traditional means frontations between combat systems increasingly
are increasingly modifying how war as a whole is transpire in the information space.84 Russian ana-
fought.80 Russian researchers articulate that “tradi- lysts conducting an early after-action report (AAR)
tional” and “non-traditional” war will not coexist of the Russian deployment to Syria in January 2016
as separate categories, instead arguing the Russian concluded that Russia must sharply increase its
attention to the information space to enable success- Russian writers give it and the detail of their discus-
ful kinetic operations, demonstrating an immediate sion. Russian writers can openly discuss principles
recognition of this priority after only 3 months of other priorities such as superiority of manage-
of operations.85 Dvornikov similarly stated in July ment and approaches to combating jihadist groups,
2018 that information warfare against militants two key lessons from Russia’s deployment to Syria,
was essential to Russian success in Syria.86 Russian but do not openly discuss information opera-
analysts caveat that information and “hybrid” oper- tions.94 The Russian military is choosing not to
ations have always been part of conventional war discuss openly the details of integrating kinetic and
but are now increasing in prominence — reversing information operations despite the importance of
the previous relationship of information opera- this integration during Russian operations in Syria
tions supporting kinetic operations, as argued by and other ongoing hybrid wars such as Ukraine and
Gerasimov.87 Libya. The Kremlin and the Russian military are
certainly conducting internal analyses of and prepa-
The Russian military views this new relationship
rations for information warfare, but the Russian
between information and kinetic operations as a
military cannot openly discuss exact methods of
two-way street: kinetic operations are now inher-
misdirection and information operations without
ently subordinate the information campaign of a
exposing sensitive information.
hybrid war; no kinetic operation can succeed unless
it is nested in and enabled by the overall infor- The lack of open Russian discussion of informa-
mation campaign. The Russian military therefore tion warfare does not reduce its importance in
extensively discusses how kinetic operations must the Russian conception of the future of war. That
be enabled via prior successful information opera- said, conducting only secret studies of information
tions.88 A kinetic operation cannot serve its purpose operations will impede developing new doctrine
of enabling the overall information campaign if it is and training the new generation of personnel. The
not planned and conducted with support from the Russian military assesses kinetic operations now
information campaign.89 Russian analysts exten- fundamentally support information campaigns.
sively discuss the Russian intervention in Syria, Russian writers additionally acknowledge Russia is
which the Kremlin considers a hybrid war, as an preparing to shape the information space in future
example of successfully setting conditions in the conflicts to affect opposing forces directly. The West
information space for kinetic operations — which must prepare for future Russian military operations
themselves were secondary to the overall informa- to both be oriented on supporting information
tion campaign.90 campaigns and be increasingly prefaced by compre-
hensive information operations.
Russian theorists argue that the increasing prom-
inence of information operations has turned
traditional kinetic operations into the final measure Participants in Conflicts are Diversifying
of defeat after full information superiority has been The Russian military assesses the forces involved in
achieved.91 Russian analysts state “information supe- conflict are diversifying. Bartosh asserts that states
riority” is now essential to enable successful kinetic are losing their monopoly on the use of violence to
operations.92 Russian analysts argue that “not only state-supported groups and independent actors, and
the initial phase of military operations, but also the that Russia must adapt to increasingly unconven-
outcome of the whole campaign depends on the tional opponents. 95 Russian analysts assess future
skillful, clearly calculated and reasoned” informa- conflicts will be increasingly multisided, much like
tion operations.93 The Russian military assesses that the war in Syria.96 Kiselev argues “illegal armed
a kinetic operation cannot succeed without a suc- forces” — the general Russian term for militant and
cessful information operation to enable it. insurgent groups — and Private Military Companies
Information warfare stands out in the Russian dis- (PMCs) are the key kinetic actors in hybrid wars,
course for the disparity between the importance almost always directed by states. 97 The Kremlin
SEPTEMBER 2020
assesses the increasing prominence of these actors claimed in March 2018 that Western states backed
requires the Kremlin to increasingly prioritize both opposition forces to overthrow Assad instead of car-
the employment of these proxy forces and prepare rying out direct military conflict, and will attempt to
to combat them in the development of hybrid war do so to other states in the future.105 Kiselev claimed
strategies.98 in March 2017 that IAFs and PMCs are usually indi-
rectly led by states as part of hybrid wars, asserting
Russian writers extensively discuss the increasing
they are often one of the first kinetic steps in a hybrid
utility of private military companies (PMCs) in
war.106 This contrasts with the Western view that at
general terms. Russian analysts conceive of PMCs
least some non-state actors and armed groups are
as inherently government assets, asserting that their
fundamentally independent and act without state
main customers are states even if individual PMCs
direction, even if they receive some state support.
occasionally serve private interests.99 Russian analysts
link this assessment to both the historical Russian The Kremlin forecasts a jihadist threat to Central
employment of Cossack groups and, in a modern Asia and Russia and is integrating this concern into
context, the large number of contractors employed assessments of likely future conflicts. Shoigu stated
by the United States in Iraq and in August 2016 that groups like
Afghanistan. Russian analysts
100
ISIS can provoke “crisis situa-
argue PMCs are useful due to tions as in Syria… in any country,
their lower cost and perceived
Russian analysts see including in the post-Soviet
deniability relative to tradi- private military companies states of Central Asia and the
tional armed forces. Russian
101
as inherently government Caucasus.”107 Gerasimov warned
General Staff researchers openly in December 2017 that the bulk
argued in January 2015 — before assets...their main of ISIS fighters fled Syria to
the widespread deployment of customers are states. Libya or Southwest Asia to try
Russian PMCs abroad in 2015 and establish a new caliphate.108
and 2016 — that PMCs grant the Lieutenant General Alexander
state’s foreign policy “immunity from the norms Lapin, at the time of publication commander of
of international law” because states can respond to the Central Military District and responsible for
any criticism by answering “the state does not inter- responding to threats from Central Asia, par-
fere in the internal affairs of private companies.”102 ticularly warns of the threat of ISIS regrouping
This argument prefaced eventual Kremlin denials in Afghanistan or Central Asia and calls for an
of Russian government links to Russian PMCs in increased Russian military presence in the region.109
Syria.103 The Russian military continues to actively
The Russian perception that IAFs are almost always
discuss the use of PMCs in military operations and
weaponized against Russia by foreign actors, not
hybrid wars — despite the fact that PMCs are illegal
distinct local groups with their own agendas, will
under the Russian constitution. Russian researchers
likely lead Russian planning and training astray.
additionally note that MoD support for PMCs can
The Russian military will misunderstand the threat
solve the weaknesses of PMCs caused by their lack
of jihadist and insurgent groups if it focuses its
of resources and coordination, which the Russian
preparations to combat militant groups on counter-
military has provided for PMC deployments around
ing a broader hybrid war directed by another state.
the world, including in Syria, Libya, and several
Russian military writers acknowledge many IAFs
states in Sub-Saharan Africa.104
are, or begin as, local actors not intrinsically linked
Russian analysts additionally consider “illegal armed to other states.110 However, discussions of and
forces,” or IAFs, to be integral parts of hybrid wars. exercises practicing combat against IAFs predom-
The Russian military uses “illegal armed forces” as inantly focus on IAFs as backed by states. Russian
a catch-all term for militants, terrorist groups, and military exercises increasingly frame the simulated
conventional but non-state formations. Gerasimov opponent as an IAF with foreign backing that has
seized territory somewhere in Russia or Central war and unit area of responsibility boundaries to
Asia and is attempting to destabilize the region.111 fully confront diverse threats. Changing front-
Russian authors additionally discuss how they can lines and weapon ranges additionally require units
apply lessons learned fighting IAFs with interna- to shift their areas of responsibility up a level and
tional backing to the potential jihadist threat to think strategically; Russian analysts, as a successful
Central Asia, and the Kremlin expects this threat example of this shift, cite American divisions now
to be exacerbated by foreign actors.112 The Russian taking on the responsibilities of larger, corps-sized
shift away from exercises practicing large-scale units.115 Long-range weapons additionally make the
combat against conventional forces (usually NATO) dividing lines between areas of responsibility of
is a key indicator of the Russian concern that IAFs different units and even lines of contact with the
are destabilizing actors. The Russian military’s enemy less definite, necessitating improved com-
focus on combating IAFs backed by international munications over increased distances at all echelons
support has likely granted Russia advantages in its of the Russian Armed Forces.116
efforts against groups in Syria, Libya, and other
Russian analysts forecast that tactical actions will
conflicts in which some local groups are in fact
have an outsized impact relative to their scale in the
vigorously state backed. That said, the Russian mili-
future because kinetic operations during modern
tary’s overemphasis on IAFs as tools of international
hybrid wars contain different participants than past
hybrid warfare and overgeneralization of the term
wars. The kinetic operations in hybrid wars are
IAF to describe diverse organizations may impede
predominantly local clashes defined by the limited
its ability to understand the particulars of IAFs in
resources of unconventional combatants, instead
future conflicts.
of regular fighting on conventional front lines.117
Russian analysts assess the nonlinearity of hybrid
New Technology and New Actors Require wars and limited scale of capabilities of uncon-
Simultaneous, Distributed Operations ventional forces means these tactical events — even
Russian writers assess that unconventional forces when involving conventional Russian forces — can
that do not fight on static frontlines and increas- have strategic implications, as the entire kinetic
ing weapon ranges are blurring the lines between focus of a hybrid war may be fought by small units
the levels of war. Gerasimov stated in March 2018 in limited geographical areas. 118 For example,
that operations are “changing from sequential pro-regime operations in Syria against opposition
and concentrated actions to continuous and dis- forces around Russia’s Hmeimim Airbase in late
tributed, carried out simultaneously in all spheres 2015 occurred with low numbers of troops in small
of confrontation, as well as in remote theaters of tactical actions.119 However, Russian analysts note
military operations.”113 The steadily increasing that these relatively minor actions forced Russia to
ranges of weapons at all levels of war — includ- establish a security perimeter around Hmeimim
ing strategic bombers, ICBMs, strike aircraft, and before building up its forces for further operations
multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) — addi- against opposition-held terrain, a notable strategic
tionally blur the lines between levels of war. 114 The change in the Russian plan.120 Russian analysts assess
Russian military assesses these collective changes that the potential strategic implications of tactical
require Russian officers to improve their command actions increase the need for a common operating
and communication capabilities — identically to the picture and improved communications across ech-
Kremlin’s assessed need for improved centralized elons and units.
management in hybrid wars as a whole.
Russian analysts assess the combined effect of the
erosion of cohesive frontlines above the tactical
level and increasing weapon ranges necessitates
a common operating picture across the levels of
SEPTEMBER 2020
Implications
The West must understand the Russian military’s preparing to fight a set of actions the Kremlin does
worldview and development priorities to prop- not consider itself to have carried out — and does
erly confront the Russian challenge. The US must not intend to carry out in the future.
avoid imposing its own conceptual boundaries on
The Kremlin is not going to confront the West on
the Russian threat — and particularly avoid impos-
the West’s terms. Western preparations for the type
ing its own boundaries on the Russian theory of
of war it would like to prepare for further exposes
hybrid war. The US and its allies cannot successfully
the United States and its allies to ongoing Russian
prepare to counter an aggressive Russian policy it
efforts to offset US and NATO advantages. This
does not understand.
report does not argue against a robust conventional
Accepting that Russia and the West are in a war of NATO presence in Europe. The US and NATO must
any kind is an understandably difficult undertak- take steps to mitigate the minor but still present risk
ing. The Russian conception of an ongoing global of a conventional war with Russia. Western states
war contradicts the mainstream are similarly studying the impact
Western understanding of the of Russian cyber operations and
delineation between war and subversive activities. The United
peace. Shifting the West’s per-
The US must not impose States cannot rely on either of
ception of the Russian threat its own conceptual these preparations in isolation,
to understand this Kremlin boundaries on the Russian however. NATO cannot con-
framing will be challenging, front Russian hybrid campaigns
but the United States and its theory and practice of around the world using only a
allies must understand how the hybrid war. strong conventional force posture
Kremlin conceptualizes its own in the Baltic States. NATO also
actions to confront it. It only cannot counter Russian activi-
takes one side waging war to have war. The United ties in Europe or beyond solely with increased cyber
States and its allies must study and confront the defenses and information operations.
Kremlin’s hybrid wars as the strategic, cohesive,
The United States’ key priority regarding the
multi-domain wars the Kremlin conducts them
Russian military must be to profoundly reori-
as. The United States cannot beat the Kremlin in
ent its understanding of the Russian threat and
something the Kremlin views as a war while the US
the nature of hybrid wars. The United States must
conceptualizes it as occurring in the “competition
understand the Russian concept of hybrid wars on
space.” The United States and its allies have identi-
Russian terms to successfully develop counterstrat-
fied several key methods to counter specific hybrid
egies and confront the Russian threat. This is not
means but have yet to conceptualize a cohesive under-
to say the United States should conceptualize and
standing of and response to Russian hybrid wars.
plan its own efforts in the structure of hybrid wars.
The West must revise its prioritization of the Russian Rather, it must understand the threat the Kremlin’s
capabilities it prepares to counter and the vulnera- hybrid wars pose and respond in appropriate ways.
bilities it should exploit. The West’s divergent focus
This rethink is a necessary condition-setting step
on a conventional Russian invasion of European
to developing effective responses to Russian hybrid
allies and subversive Russian actions with little to
war. The United States should take several actions
no kinetic fighting are out of date. The West is not
to support this reassessment of the Russian threat.
even preparing to fight a past war with Russia, it is
• Analyze the Kremlin’s decisions within the Russian • Promote cross-government coordination, particu-
framework of hybrid war to understand and mitigate larly between information and kinetic assets. The
Russian lines of effort. The United States must Kremlin’s assessment of an increasing need for
identify the Kremlin’s ongoing hybrid wars cross-government coordination in the future
and assess their likely objectives. While the US of war applies to the US as well. The US cannot
should not constrain itself to confronting indi- form comprehensive responses to Russian
vidual Kremlin hybrid wars against target states hybrid war without increased coordination and
(Ukraine, Libya, etc.), the United States must planning. Congress should take on a key role
understand the Kremlin’s conception of these in facilitating this collaboration by bringing
conflicts as efforts to change the long-term attention to the Russian threat through hear-
geostrategic orientation of the target state. ings and appropriate legislation.
• Avoid overly focusing on the Kremlin’s hybrid • Reinforce Western norms and institutions
— key
wars in Europe and counter the Kremlin globally. targets of Russian hybrid wars. The Kremlin
Paraphrasing the National Defense University’s fundamentally views its hybrid war with the
Dr. Francis Hoffman, Putin is not playing United States as a struggle over global norms
three-dimensional chess, but is instead playing and values. Do not allow the Kremlin to nor-
many games of checkers simultaneously.121 The malize its malign behavior and worldview. The
United States naturally focuses on the Russian United States must not allow the Kremlin to
threat to its European allies and NATO, but abuse existing international frameworks and
must not lose sight of the Kremlin’s global institutions to advance its hybrid wars — such
ambitions. The US policy and military com- as seeking to label its expeditionary forces
munity should increase its analysis of the “peacekeepers.”
Kremlin’s hybrid wars outside of Europe,
including in Syria, Libya, and Venezuela. The United States should also take several discrete
actions to confront the Kremlin’s hybrid wars under
• Confront entire Russian hybrid wars as synthetic the cohesive framework above.
threats instead of confronting discrete Russian lines
of effort. The US must ensure its own language • Work to align the Russia policy of the United States and
its allies. The Kremlin seeks to exploit divides
of “domains” does not overly compartmental-
between the United States and its allies, partic-
ize its responses to the Kremlin’s hybrid wars.
ularly in NATO. The United States must work
The United States must understand that the
with its allies to align their policy on Russia.
Kremlin views all domains — including kinetic
The United States should particularly seek to
military operations — as supporting efforts
standardize red lines regarding responses to
to the information campaign in each hybrid
Russian actions across NATO.
war. The United States and its allies will not
be able to deter the Kremlin’s hybrid wars in
their entirety. The United States can deter, and
• Actively challenge Russian information campaigns.
The Kremlin’s information campaign is its
already is deterring, key lines of effort within center of gravity in each hybrid war. The
Kremlin hybrid wars, including cyberattacks, United States cannot win in hybrid wars with
establishing international basing, and weapon Russia if it loses in the information space. The
sales. The United States should ensure these United States and its allies should increase
existing efforts synthesize to enable effective their counter-messaging capabilities to refute
responses to the Kremlin’s hybrid wars. Kremlin information operations. The United
States must protect its sources and tradecraft
SEPTEMBER 2020
but should increase its willingness to openly allies should reassess their global force posture
use information to confront Kremlin informa- to prepare to counter Russian hybrid efforts.
tion campaigns — which thrive in the absence The US need not deploy its own military forces
of counter-messaging. The United States must everywhere Russia undertakes hybrid war, but
additionally increase its understanding of, and it must find and develop allied and partner
planning for, the effects of its actions across military forces to perform the military tasks
all domains in the information space to avoid essential to confronting the hybrid war military
unintentionally enabling Russian information threat — even as it works with all partners and
campaigns. allies to address the non-military aspects of the
hybrid war campaign.
• Deprive Russian PMCs and proxy forces of their deni-
ability. The Kremlin is openly utilizing PMCs • Enable new and existing force deployments to
such as the Wagner Group and proxy forces combat Russian hybrid wars with non-kinetic means.
such as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Conventional military units deployed by the
Republics in Ukraine to wage its hybrid wars. United States and its allies are necessary but
The Kremlin exploits the West’s lack of under- insufficient to combat Russian hybrid wars.
standing of these groups to maintain deniability Conventional forces cannot inherently deter
in hybrid wars and reduce the risk of a Western or combat hybrid operations. Conventional
military response — which would likely result if forces can, however, act as a baseplate for
the Kremlin openly used conventional forces additional cyber, civil-military relations, intel-
in similar missions. The United States and its ligence, technical, and special operations assets
allies must relentlessly work to expose the con- that are essential in hybrid wars. The Russian
nections between these forces and the Kremlin military is actively evaluating how its forces can
and highlight that they are direct tools of support hybrid wars without large-scale con-
Russian military policy to reduce the Kremlin’s ventional actions, and the United States and its
freedom of action. allies must do the same.
• Recognize and plan for the military requirements The challenges presented by Russian hybrid war
to confront hybrid threats. Russian hybrid war and preparations for the future of war are not
is not confined to the information and cyber insurmountable. To quote Gerasimov himself, “no
domains. The US must therefore turn away matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how
from the inclination to decide that confront- well-developed his forces and means of armed con-
ing hybrid wars is primarily a non-military flict may be, forms and methods for overcoming
line of effort and carefully evaluate the military them can be found. He will always have vulner-
elements of a counter-hybrid war undertaking. abilities and that means that adequate means of
The United States should be prepared to con- opposing him exist.”122 The West must not throw up
front Russian hybrid wars with conventional its hands at the challenge of confronting an unfa-
forces and avoid establishing false red lines. miliar conception of the future of war. The Kremlin
is optimizing for its expectations of the future of
• Shift its military posture to confront the global nature war, not the West’s, and the United States must fully
of the Kremlin threat. Russian hybrid wars are understand the Russian threat to successfully con-
not confined to Europe and cannot be coun- front the Kremlin.
tered by conventional deployments alone,
although conventional deployments to Europe
remain essential. The United States and its
Endnotes
1. Hugo Klijin with Engin Yüksel, “Russia’s Hybrid Doctrine: Is the West 7. Frank A. Rose, “As Russia and China Improve their Conventional Military
Barking Up the Wrong Tree?,” Clingendael Magazine, November 28, 2019, Capabilities, Should the US Rethink its Assumptions on Extended
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/russias-hybrid-doctrine-west- Nuclear Deterrence?” Brookings Institute, October 23, 2018, https://www.
barking-wrong-tree; Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Pitches brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-chi-
“Information” Operations as a Form of War,” New York Times, March 2, na-improve-their-conventional-military-capabilities-should-the-us-re-
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/europe/russia-hy- think-its-assumptions-on-extended-nuclear-deterrence/.
brid-war-gerasimov.html; Dr. Damien Van Puyvelde, “Hybrid War - 8. Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin,
Does it Even Exist?” NATO Review, May 7, 2015, https://www.nato.int/ Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, “Russia’s Hostile
docu/review/articles/2015/05/07/hybrid-war-does-it-even-exist/index. Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the
html#:~:text=The%2520term%2520’hybrid%2520warfare’%2520ap- Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition,” RAND Corporation, 2020,
peared,in%2520the%25202006%2520Lebanon%2520War.&tex- https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2539.html.
t=When%2520any%2520threat%2520or%2520use,%25E2%2580%259C-
reality%25E2%2580%259D%2520of%2520modern%2520warfare. 9. Richard Sokolsky, “The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications
for European Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 13,
2. Makissa Dalton, Kathleen H. Hicks, Lindsey R. Sheppard, Michael Matlaga, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-mil-
and Joseph Federici, “Gray Zone Project,” Center for Strategic and International itary-balance-implications-for-european-security-pub-68222; Scott
Studies, August 13, 2019, https://www.csis.org/grayzone. Boston, Michael Johnson, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Yvonne K.
3. The competition space, also known as the competition continuum, is a Crane, “Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe,” RAND
framework the United States increasingly employs to reject the artificial dis- Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.
tinction between armed conflict and peace without significant military com- html; David A. Shlapak, Michael Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on
petition that the United States has traditionally followed. Discussions of the NATO’s Eastern Flank,” RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/
competition space reject a dichotomy between war and peace, and instead pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html); Catherine Harris, Frederick W.
describe ongoing international competition conducted through a mix- Kagan, “Russia’s Military Posture: Ground Forces Order of Battle,” Institute
ture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed con- for the Study of War, March 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/
flict. “Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.
June 3, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_ pdf; Michael Kofman, “Fixing NATO Deterrence In The East Or: How I
jg/jdn1_19.pdf; “Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook,” Asymmetric Learned To Stop Worrying And Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat By Russia,”
Warfare Group, December 2016 https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG- War on the Rocks, May 12, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-
RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf. nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-
4. Western governments understandably focus on the potential of Russian love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/.
non-military subversion, including election interference. Key stud- 10. Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin,
ies of Russian hybrid actions in Ukraine and the threat to Europe cor- Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, “Russia’s
rectly capture many elements of Russian strategy but do not fully contex- Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against
tualize non-military actions. These assessments often artificially sepa- NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition,”
rate Russian hybrid efforts from the threat of the Russian military. Several RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
books on the Russian threat highlight the Kremlin’s perception that it is RR2539.html; Quentin Buckholz, Djivo Djurovic, Patrick Kelley,
fighting a defensive hybrid war against the West, discussed below. Western Michelle Kretsch, Thomas Lind, and Sajid Shapoo, “Checkmating
authors have additionally discussed the differences in Western and Russian Russia’s Assertiveness in Eastern Europe,” RAND Corporation/SIPA, May
conceptions of hybrid war. Other Western scholars have published on the 2017, https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/capstone-projects/
synthesis of Russian military and hybrid activities. Robert S. Mueller III, checkmating-russia%E2%80%99s-assertiveness-eastern-europe.
“Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 11. “Russia’s Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Presidential Election,” US Department of Justice, March 2019, https://www.jus- Aspirations,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/
tice.gov/storage/report.pdf; Heather A. Conley, “The Kremlin Playbook,” documents/news/military%20power%20publications/russia%20mili-
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 13, 2016 https://www.csis. tary%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
org/analysis/kremlin-playbook; “Little Green Men, a Primer on Modern
Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,” US Army Special 12. Stephen J. Blank, “The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective,” US
Operations Command, August 6, 2016, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/ Army War College, September 2019, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/
documents/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf; Mark Galeotti, Russian Political pubs/3705.pdf; John R. Deni, “Current Russia Military Affairs,” US Army
War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid, (New York: Routledge, February 12, 2019); War College, July 2018 “https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3545.
Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare: Resurgence and Politicisation, (London: pdf; Richard Sokolsky, “The New NATO-Russia Military Balance:
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(Not Gerasimov) Doctrine In Action,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, March 13, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/13/
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primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254. ty-pub-68222.
5. A successful Kremlin hybrid campaign will not allow the United States to 13. Dave Majumdar “How The Russian Military Turned War-Torn Syria Into
deploy a full brigade combat team against Russian forces, for example, so A Testing Playground,” Task & Purpose, July 31, 2018, https://taskandpur-
discussion of Russian “new generation warfare” predicated on this scale pose.com/russian-military-syria-weapons-testing; “Fighting In Syria Has
of conflict is insufficient. Several key studies and frameworks, including Made Russia’s Military Better,” The National Interest, October 21, 2019, https://
Multi-Domain Operations, remain predicated on NATO’s ability to deploy nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/fighting-syria-has-made-russias-mili-
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valuable recommendations to counter Russian forces that NATO should org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CAP-paper-212-Russia-in-the-Middle-
certainly pursue. However, an approach reliant on finding and fixing East-Print.pdf; “Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook,” Asymmetric
Russian forces that the Kremlin does not intend to use in the manner dis- Warfare Group, December 2016 https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-
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Handbook,” Asymmetric Warfare Group, December 2016 https://info.pub- 14. Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin,
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Future,”] Army Collection, December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017,
doc/45952340. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910.
27. Kiselev asserts that color revolutions — a term the Kremlin uses to describe 47. The Russian and Soviet military has historically discussed sensitive top-
a series of revolutions against Russia-amenable leaders in Eastern Europe ics publicly by framing them as descriptions of what other militaries are
in the early 21st century — and hybrid wars are equivalent. Russian military allegedly pursuing – such as the use of nuclear weapons. The Russian
writers use “color revolution” as a term to describe the specific hybrid cam- Military is openly discussing formulating strategies for offensive hybrid
paigns the West has waged focused on popular protests, including the actual wars, however. No Russian military publications openly identify ongoing
color revolutions in the former Soviet Union as well as the Arab Spring. Kremlin-run hybrid campaigns, instead discussing hybrid warfare in gen-
This report synthesizes these two terms into the single term “hybrid war,” eral terms. Several recommendations on how to conduct hybrid wars can be
which Russian military writers use more commonly, to avoid confusion. V. easily mapped to Russian actions in Ukraine, however.
Kiselev, [“Hybrid War as a New Type of War of the Future,”] Army Collection,
December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45952340. 48. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”]
Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
28. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”] doc/53754116.
Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
doc/53754116; V. Kiselev, [“Hybrid War as a New Type of War of the 49. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”]
Future,”] Army Collection, December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
doc/45952340; Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the doc/53754116.
Essence and Content of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military 50. Alexander Mikhailovsky, Haris Sayfetdinov, [“Operational Basis for
Thought, January 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910; V. Creating a Promising Image of the Control System of the Armed Forces of
Kiselev, [“Hybrid War as a New Type of War of the Future,”] Army Collection, the Russian Federation,”] Military Thought, November 2015, https://dlib.east-
December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45952340. view.com/browse/doc/49990011; Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian
29. Valery Gerasimov, [“On the Experience of Syria,”] VPK, March 7, 2016, Armed Forces will be in,”] Military Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.eastview.
https://vpk-news((.))ru/articles/29579; Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the com/browse/doc/50729309.
Russian Armed Forces will be in,”] Military Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.
51. Valery Gerasimov, [“On the Implementation of the Decrees of the President 69. Andrei Kartapolov, [“Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov: ‘We Will
of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2012 N603, 604 and the Development Borrow the Best from the Soviet System, but we will Change the
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”] Military Thought, December Content,’”] Zvezda, September 10, 2018, https://zvezdaweekly((.))ru/news/
2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50729913. t/2018910933-EN4aF.html.
52. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. [“National Defense 70. V. Meleshenko, R. Gaynulov, [“On the Moral-Psychological Preparation of
Management Center of the Russian Federation,”] https://structure.mil((.)) the Russian Special Forces,”] Army Collection, September 2017, https://dlib.
ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=11206@egOrganization; eastview.com/browse/doc/49380172.
“Russia’s National Defense Control Center Officially Takes Up Combat 71. Andrei Kartapolov, [“Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov: ‘We Will
Duty,” TASS, December 1, 2014, https://tass((.))com/russia/764480. Borrow the Best from the Soviet System, but we will Change the
53. Alexander Mikhailovsky, Haris Sayfetdinov, [“Operational Basis for Content,’”] Zvezda, September 10, 2018, https://zvezdaweekly((.))ru/news/
Creating a Promising Image of the Control System of the Armed Forces of t/2018910933-EN4aF.html.
the Russian Federation,”] Military Thought, November 2015, https://dlib.east- 72. Andrei Kartapolov, [“Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov: ‘We Will
view.com/browse/doc/49990011. Borrow the Best from the Soviet System, but we will Change the
54. Alexander Tikhonov, [“The Army – The Pride of Russia,”] Red Star, February Content,’”] Zvezda, September 10, 2018, https://zvezdaweekly((.))ru/news/
27, 2017, http://archive.redstar((.))ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-56-33/ t/2018910933-EN4aF.html.
item/32381-armiya-gordost-rossii. 73. Andrei Kartapolov, [“Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov: ‘We Will
55. [“The National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation will Borrow the Best from the Soviet System, but we will Change the
Coordinate All Federal Departments,”] TASS, January 20, 2014, https:// Content,’”] Zvezda, September 10, 2018, https://zvezdaweekly((.))ru/news/
tass((.))ru/politika/898610. t/2018910933-EN4aF.html.
56. Valery Gerasimov, [“On the Experience of Syria,”] VPK, March 7, 2016, 74. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”]
https://vpk-news((.))ru/articles/29579. Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
57. Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations doc/53754116.
Since 2014,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.under- 75. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”]
standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20 Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf. doc/53754116.
58. Bartosh’s use of “fronts” refers to the Russian equivalent of Western “Army 76. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”]
Groups”—a high-echelon military unit comprising one or more armies. Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
This is not equivalent to the usage of the word “front” as a theater of opera- doc/53754116.
tions. For example, the Soviet forces in the 1945 Battle for Berlin, the final 77. Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations
battle on what Western sources term the “Eastern Front” of World War 2, Since 2014,” Military Learning and the Future of Wars Series, Institute
were comprised of multiple “fronts,” each comprised of multiple armies. for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/
Fronts were integral to the Soviet doctrine of “deep battle,” a strategic con- sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20
cept focused on impacting enemy forces throughout the depth of the bat- Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf.
tlefield utilizing multiple front-size formations simultaneously. Deep bat-
tle was intended to achieve victory through multiple parallel and successive 78. Valery Gerasimov, [“Vectors of Military Strategy
operations, rather than a single operation. Bartosh’s description of what the Development,”] Red Star, March 4, 2019, http://redstar((.))ru/
US would term “lines of effort” or “domains” as fronts fits into this frame- vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/?attempt=1.
work – with multiple high-echelon “fronts” carrying out the simultaneous 79. Valery Gerasimov, [“On the Experience of Syria,”] VPK, March 7, 2016,
and successive operations necessary to achieve victory in a given campaign, https://vpk-news((.))ru/articles/29579; Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov,
or in Bartosh’s case in a given hybrid war. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy [“Evolution of the Essence and Content of the Concept of “War” in the 21st
and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”] Military Thought, October 2018, Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754116; David Glantz, Soviet doc/50724910.
Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, (Great Britain: Frank Cass and 80. Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the Essence and Content
Company Limited, 1991); David Glantz, Soviet Offensive Ground Doctrine Since of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017,
1945, Air University Review, March-April 1983; “Russia’s Military Power: https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910.
Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations,” Defense Intelligence 81. Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July 28, 2018, https://
Agency, 2017, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/military%20 vpk-news((.))ru/articles/43971; Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian
power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017. Armed Forces will be in,”] Military Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.east-
pdf; Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky, (London, view.com/browse/doc/50729309; Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov,
Brassey’s Defense, 1987). [“Evolution of the Essence and Content of the Concept of “War” in the 21st
59. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”] Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ doc/50724910 Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in
doc/53754116. Hybrid Warfare,”] Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/
60. Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the Essence and Content browse/doc/53754116.
of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017, 82. Bartosh cites a closed March 4, 2017 Gerasimov speech at a conference
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910. at the Academy of Military Sciences. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and
61. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.east-
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093. view.com/browse/doc/53754093; [“The General Meeting of the Academy
62. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation was held at the Academy of
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093. the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,”] MPGU, March 4, 2017, http://
mpgu((.))su/novosti/v-akademii-generalnogo-shtaba-vs-rf-sostoyalos-ob-
63. Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations shhee-sobranie-akademii-voennyih-nauk-rossiyskoy-federatsii/.
Since 2014,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.under-
standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20 83. Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian Armed Forces will be in,”] Military
Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf. Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50729309.
64. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military 84. Alexander Vdovin, [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093. to Combat Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside
of Russia,”] Military Thought, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
65. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military doc/53754059.
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093.
85. P. Dulnev, V. Litvinenko, [“With Accumulated Experience – Into the
66. Nataliya Bugayova, “Putin’s Offset: The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Adaptations Future,”] Army Collection, January 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
Since 2014,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2020, http://www.under- doc/45952771.
standingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20
Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf. 86. Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July 28, 2018, https://
vpk-news((.))ru/articles/43971.
67. Mason Clark with Catherine Harris, “Russia’s New Tool for Wielding
Information,” Institute for the Study of War, January 15, 2019, http://iswresearch. 87. Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the Essence and Content
blogspot.com/2019/01/russias-tools-for-wielding-information.html. of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017,
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910.
68. Andrei Kartapolov, [“Colonel-General Andrei Kartapolov: ‘We Will
Borrow the Best from the Soviet System, but we will Change the 88. Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian Armed Forces will be in,”] Military
Content,’”] Zvezda, September 10, 2018, https://zvezdaweekly((.))ru/news/ Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50729309;
t/2018910933-EN4aF.html. Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the Essence and Content
of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017,
SEPTEMBER 2020
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910; P. Dulnev, V. Litvinenko, the-hybrid-role-of-russian-mercenaries-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-mos-

[“With Accumulated Experience – Into the Future,”] Army Collection, January cows-scramble-for-africa/; Sergey Sukhankin, [“Russia’s PMCs in the
2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45952771. Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,”] The
89. Alexander Bartosh, [“Strategy and Counter Strategy in Hybrid Warfare,”] Jamestown Foundation, December 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/rus-
Military Thought, October 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ sian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-
doc/53754116; V. Kiselev, [“Hybrid War as a New Type of War of the and-beyond/; Paul Stronski, “Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private
Future,”] Army Collection, December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ Military Companies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2020,
doc/45952340; Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-rus-
Essence and Content of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military sia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954; “Russia, Wagner Group
Thought, January 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910; Continue Military Involvement in Libya,” Department of Defense, July 24,
Alexander Vdovin, [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2287821/
to Combat Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside russia-wagner-group-continue-military-involvement-in-libya/.
of Russia,”] Military Thought, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ 105. Oleg Vladykin, [“Military Science Looks to the Future,”]
doc/53754059. Red Star, March 26, 2018, http://redstar((.))ru/
90. Oleg Vladykin, [“Military Science Looks to the Future,”] Red Star, March voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?attempt=2.
26, 2018, http://redstar.ru/voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?at- 106. Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian Armed Forces will be in,”] Military
tempt=2; V. Kiselev, [“Hybrid War as a New Type of War of the Future,”] Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50729309; V.
Army Collection, December 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ Kiselev, [“Terrorism – An Integral Part of the Hybrid War,”] Army Collection,
doc/45952340; Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July May 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46523778.
28, 2018, https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/43971. 107. [“Generalized Experience,”] Army Collection, August 2016, https://dlib.east-
91. Sergey Chekinov, Sergey Bogdanov, [“Evolution of the Essence and Content view.com/browse/doc/46975184.
of the Concept of “War” in the 21st Century,”] Military Thought, January 2017, 108. Viktor Baranets, [“Chief of Staff of the Russian Military, General
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50724910. Gerasimov: ‘We Broke the Strength of Terrorism,’”] KP, December 12,
92. P. Dulnev, V. Litvinenko, [“With Accumulated Experience – Into the 2017, https://www.kp((.))ru/daily/26775/3808693/.
Future,”] Army Collection, January 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ 109. Alexander Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, https://vpk-
doc/45952771. news((.))ru/articles/42359; Yuri Belousov, [“We Have the Winning Gene,”]
93. Sergei Pechurov, Alexander Sidorin, [“Lessons from Coalition Wars in Red Star, May 4, 2018 http://redstar((.))ru/v-nas-vstroen-gen-pobeditelya/;
Interpreting Western Military Theory,”] Military Thought, April 2017, https:// Alexander Lapin, [“Afghanistan Again?”] VPK, May 28, 2018, https://vpk-
dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50728611. news((.))ru/articles/42857.
94. A forthcoming paper from ISW on the Russian military’s lessons learned in 110. V. Kiselev, G. Pimensky, and V. Popov, [“Trends and Opportunities,”] Army
Syria will expand on these topics. Collection, February 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46094794;
95. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military Valery Kiselev, [“What Wars the Russian Armed Forces will be in,”] Military
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093. Thought, March 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/50729309; V.
Kiselev, [“Terrorism – An Integral Part of the Hybrid War,”] Army Collection,
96. Alexander Vdovin, [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means May 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46523778; Alexander
to Combat Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside Vdovin, [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means to Combat
of Russia,”] Military Thought, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside of Russia,”]
doc/53754059. Military Thought, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754059.
97. The implications of the Russian overgeneralization of varied groups 111. Nataliya Bugayova and Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Military Exercises
under the term “IAFs” is discussed in depth below in the context of Syria. as Geopolitical Tools,” Institute for the Study of War, September 4, 2019, http://
Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/09/russia-in-review-military-exercises-as.
Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093; V. html.
Kiselev, [“Terrorism – An Integral Part of the Hybrid War,”] Army Collection,
May 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46523778. 112. V. Semiryaga, [“Learning the Afghan Experience,”] Army Collection, April
2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/48718059; Alexander Vdovin,
98. Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: World [“An Adaptive Approach to the Use of Forces and Means to Combat
Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military Thought, Terrorists from the Experience of Armed Conflicts Outside of Russia,”]
January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562; Viktor Military Thought, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754059;
Baranets, [“Chief of Staff of the Russian Military, General Gerasimov: Alexander Lapin, [“Afghanistan Again?”] VPK, May 28, 2018, https://vpk-
‘We Broke the Strength of Terrorism,’”] KP, December 12, 2017, https:// news((.))ru/articles/42857.
www.kp((.))ru/daily/26775/3808693/; Oleg Vladykin, [“Military Science
Looks to the Future,”] Red Star, March 26, 2018, http://redstar((.))ru/ 113. Gerasimov does not deny the value of the traditional Russian empha-
voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?attempt=2. sis on sequential operations and conventional mass, rather stating that
the increasing diversity and complexity of conflicts will preclude carefully
99. Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: World structured, large-scale sequential operations as an option. Oleg Vladykin,
Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military Thought, [“Military Science Looks to the Future,”] Red Star, March 26, 2018, http://
January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562. redstar((.))ru/voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?attempt=2.
100. Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: World 114. V. Kiselev, A. Kostenko, [“Not by Quantity, but by Ability,”] Army Collection,
Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military Thought, January 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45952768.
January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562.
115. V. Kiselev, A. Kostenko, [“Not by Quantity, but by Ability,”] Army Collection,
101. Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: World January 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45952768.
Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military Thought,
January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562. 116. P. Dulnev, V. Litvinenko, [“With Accumulated Experience – Into the
Future,”] Army Collection, January 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
102. Oleg Vladykin, [“Military Science Looks to the Future,”] Red Star, March doc/45952771.
26, 2018, http://redstar((.))ru/voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?at-
tempt=2; Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: 117. Yevgeny Popkov, [“Features of Tactical Intelligence in a Hybrid
World Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military War,”], Military Thought, August 2017, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
Thought, January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562. doc/50729508.
103. Oleg Vladykin, [“Military Science Looks to the Future,”] Red Star, March 118. Alexander Bartosh, [“Friction and Turbulence in Hybrid War,”] Military
26, 2018, http://redstar((.))ru/voennaya-nauka-smotrit-v-budushhee/?at- Thought, January 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/53754093.
tempt=2; Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: 119. V. Kislev, [“Some Results of Battle Actions in Syria,”] Army Collection, July
World Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military 2016, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46850940.
Thought, January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562. 120. Alexander Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, https://vpk-
104. Sergei Belokon, Alexei Bytyev, [“Private Military Companies: World news((.))ru/articles/42359; Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”]
Historical Experience and Modern Prospects for Russia,”] Military VPK, July 28, 2018, https://vpk-news((.))ru/articles/43971.
Thought, January 2015, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/49996562; 121. U.S Congress, House, Armed Services, The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare
Sergey Sukhankin, [“Russian PMCs and Irregulars: Past Battles and and Key Challenges 115 Cong., 1st sess., 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/
New Endeavors,”] The Jamestown Foundation, May 13, 2020, https://james- content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25088/html/CHRG-115hhrg25088.htm.
town.org/program/russian-pmcs-and-irregulars-past-battles-and-
new-endeavors/; Sergey Sukhankin, [“The “Hybrid” Role of Russian 122. Valery Gerasimov, [“The Value of Science is in the Foresight,”] VPK, March
Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa,”] The 2013, http://vpk-news((.))ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf.
Jamestown Foundation, January 10, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/
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