Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic
Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic
Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic
Republic
204 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and assisted by the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035, entitled "Republic of the Philippines
vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages .
The principal defendants in the said Civil Case No. 0035 are Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 on the theory
that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of
public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; 3 (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent,
by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations
beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants; 4 (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as
public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; 5
(4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with
grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds; 6 and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing
himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders
and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially
held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez
and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained. 7
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court in its resolution, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he
is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b)
as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of
particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand
and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with
culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein relative to the averments in
paragraphs 2, 9(a), 15, 7 and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint so that he can intelligently prepare his
responsive pleading and prepare for trial.
The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents (except the respondent Sandiganbayan),
opposed the motion. After the petitioner had filed his reply thereto, the respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated on 21 April 1990 a resolution denying the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars on the
ground that the particulars sought by petitioner are evidentiary in nature.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan in its
resolution. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035
pertaining to him state only conclusions of fact and law, inferences of facts from facts not pleaded and mere
presumptions, not ultimate facts as required by the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed resolutions.
RULING:
A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff ‘s cause or
causes of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in a
methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to
inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the
plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of
the plaintiffs claim of liability.
Yes, the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions.
Paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that “Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of
public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and
power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic
plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.” In the light of the rules on pleading and case law cited above, the
allegations that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with the other defendants “embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth” and that said defendants acted “in flagrant breach of public
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines”, are conclusions of law unsupported by
factual premises.
Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner’s acts in execution of the alleged “systematic
plan to accumulate illgotten wealth”, or which are supposed to constitute “flagrant breach of public trust”,
“gross and scandalous abuse of right and power”, and “violations of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines”. The complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the
particular rights he abused.
Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that “defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his
position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties
as such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos facilitated
and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds as stated in
the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino
people.” In like manner, the allegation that petitioner “took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of
the Commission on Audit,” that he “failed to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman,” and acting
in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, “facilitated and made possible the withdrawals,
disbursements, and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, to the grave
and irreparable damage and injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino people”, are mere conclusions of law,
Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation as to how such duty came about, or what petitioner’s duties
were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged
withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public funds and properties, nor an allegation from where the
withdrawals and disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that they came from the national
treasury. On top of that, the complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which would show that
whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions were made, were indeed subject to audit by the COA.
The Chairman of the COA does not participate in or personally audit all disbursements and
withdrawals of government funds, as well as transactions involving government property. The averments in
the particular paragraph of the complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or personally audited
all disbursements and withdrawals of government funds, and all transactions involving government property.
Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds could not have
been, as held by respondent Sandiganbayan, “within the peculiar and intimate knowledge of petitioner as
Chairman of the COA."
The complaint further avers in paragraph 17 that "(t)he following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to be instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, order and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators,
directors, or members of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and
prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco Tantuico x x x."Again, the allegation that petitioner
acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing himself “to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff” or “to be (an)
incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled” by the Marcoses and
Romualdezes, is a conclusion of law without factual basis.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to
be, a dummy, nominee or agent. Besides, there is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed
himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to
do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies.
Moreover, Annex “A" of the complaint lists down sixty-one (61) corporations which are supposed to be
beneficially owned or controlled by the Marcoses and Romualdezes. However, the complaint does not state
which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or
agent, More significantly, the petitioner’s name does not even appear in Annex “B" of the complaint, which is a
listing of the alleged “Positions and Participations of Some Defendants”.
The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore,
deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual
premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, it can
be said the petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of corporations, dates,
amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may,
in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues
at the trial.
Thus, it has been held that the purpose or object of a bill of particulars is—
“x x x to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up
and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the
court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial
may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial
may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing
for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify,
particular-ize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A
general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that
cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill."
Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars
because the ultimate facts constituting the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a
bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint
are averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his
responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the complaint
pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or
presumptions, unsupported by factual premises.
petition is granted.