SALVADOR, JOSHUA PHILIPPE S.

2C

CARPIO MORALES v CA
GR NO. 217126-27
November 10, 2015

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso before the
ombudsman against Binay Jr. and other public officers of the City of Makati. The
complaint charged them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019, also known as “Anti-Graft
and Corrupt and Practices Act” regarding to 5 phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
A special panel of investigators was then created by the Ombudsman in order to
execute a fact-finding investigation charged them with 6 administrative cases for
Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and 6 criminal cases for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public Documents.
Before Binay and the other petitioner’s filing of their counter affidavits, the Ombudsman
issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay and the others under preventive
suspension for not more than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the case.
The Ombudsman stated that all the grounds for preventive suspension is present in the
case at bar to place Binay and the others to suspension. The Ombudsman stated that
Binay et al’s was guilt was strong that
1. The losing bidders and members of the Bids and awards Committee of Makati
City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building
Project:
2. The documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
3. The disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and Binay et al were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The said charges if proven to be true would result to their removal from public office
under the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was also said
that Binay Jr. et al’s position in the public office was used to influence possible
witnesses in this case.
Binay Jr. contended the allegations and stated that he could not be administratively
liable since Phases 1 and 2 were undertaken before he was elected Mayor in Makati in
2010 and Phases 3 to 5 transpired during his first term and that his re-election as Mayor
of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any
event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to
show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did
not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of his prayer for injunctive
relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against
him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction pursuant to
its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this
Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of
defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the Ombudsman Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary

2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Temporary
Restraining Order and eventually, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine. NO

RULING:

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over
the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court except the
Supreme Court from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range
of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While
the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy...
against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason
that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law,"
whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers 3 things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor
its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified
by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from its
freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to its functions; hence, its
budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within
the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, to free it from the "insidious
tentacles of politics."
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an
incident of judicial power that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding,
it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office.
Despite the usage of the general phrase "no writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the
Supreme Court.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that
the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
The condonation doctrine which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment
of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual,
resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due
in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also in
part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent
election or appointment condones the prior misconduct
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is
really no established weight of authority in the United States favoring the doctrine of
condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election
denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In
fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen states in
the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine. The Ombudsman aptly cites several
rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to
demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state
jurisdictions
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's
decision-making. They are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of
interpretation." Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether the condonation doctrine,
as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up
against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude
this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare
decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the
Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society
within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, what we
can decide, we can undecide."
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the
Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference
in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as
jurisprudential doctrine, was and still remains the above-cited postulates of Pascual,
which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by
their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core
premise of condonation that is, an elective official's re-election cuts the right to remove
him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term was adopted hook, line,
and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never
tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is as it
should be dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the
Court undertakes an examination of our current laws to determine if there is legal basis
for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the
land; thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read considering the
Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government;
hence, its interpretation must consider the complexities, realities, and politics attendant
to the operation of the political branches of government. To begin with, the concept of
public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President considering Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses:
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one
class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered
obsolete by the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the
cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.