Chapter 1 - Constructivism in Mathematics Education PDF

Chapter 1: Constructivism in Mathematics Education
Author(s): Nel Noddings

Source: Journal for Research in Mathematics Education. Monograph, Vol. 4, Constructivist
Views on the Teaching and Learning of Mathematics (1990), pp. 7-18+195-210
Published by: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
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Chapter 1: Constructivism in Mathematics Education
Nel Noddings
Stanford University
Constructivism is a popular position today not only in mathematics education (von Glasers-
feld, 1987a) but in developmental psychology, theories of the family, human sexuality,
psychology of gender (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988), and even computer technology
(Forman & Pufall, 1988). It is also the center of considerable controversy in mathematics
education (Brophy, 1986a; Confrey, 1986). In a spirit of support for what constructivists are
trying to accomplish, I want to discuss some strengths and weaknesses in the position. In
particular, I will suggest that constructivism is not a strong epistemological position despite
its adherents' claims. Indeed it might best be offered as a post-epistemological perspective.
I will begin by providing some background on constructivism; next I will discuss its
epistemological weaknesses and, finally, its great strengths as a pedagogical view.
Background
Constructivism may be characterized as both a cognitive position and a methodological
perspective (Noddings, 1973). As a methodological perspective in the social sciences,
constructivism assumes that human beings are knowing subjects, that human behavior is
mainly purposive, and that present-day human organisms have a highly developed capacity
for organizing knowledge (Magoon, 1977). These assumptions suggest methods-
ethnography, clinical interviews, overt thinking, and the like-specially designed to study
complex semi-autonomous systems.
As a cognitive position, constructivism holds that all knowledge is constructed and
that the instruments of construction include cognitive structures that are either innate
(Chomsky, 1968; 1971) or are themselves products of developmental construction (Piaget,
1953; 1970a; 1971a). The latter interpretation is more characteristic of constructivism as a
cognitive position, and it is the one held by most constructivists in mathematics education.
A philosophical shift in the 1960's and 70's from behaviorism to various forms of
structuralism and cognitivism induced exciting changes in psychology, sociology, linguistics,
and anthropology. It also revived and invigorated a whole field of study-psycholinguistics
(Slobin, 1971). Cognitive psychology renewed its interest in concept formation, complex
I want to thank Jim Greeno and Denis Phillips for helpful suggestions on a first draft.
8
problem solving, and the connection between cognitive structures and behavior. One form of
cognitivism became known as constructivism. Ulric Neisser describes it as follows:
The present approach is more closely related to that of Bartlett (1932, 1958) than to
any other contemporary psychologist, while its roots are at least as old as the "act
psychology" of the nineteenth century. The central assertion is that seeing, hearing,
and remembering are all acts of construction, which may make more or less use of
stimulus information depending on circumstances. (1967, p. 10)
Here we note something that will be important in the later discussion. According to
Neisser, all mental processes are constructive, and the line between perception and cognition
is blurred. Even the processes often regarded as passive, such as seeing and hearing, are
described as constructive. If Neisser is correct, then learners are necessarily performing acts
of construction even in situations of so-called rote learning. I will return to the problems this
raises for constructivist teaching when I discuss the connection between activity and learning,
but for now it is enough to note that constructivists in mathematics education do not disagree
with Neisser's description of cognitive activity. Von Glasersfeld (1987b), for example, says,
"perceiving, from a constructivist point of view, is always an active making rather than a
passive receiving..." (p. 217).
While Neisser traced his constructivism to act psychology, Piaget traced his more
directly to Kantian philosophy. In Insights and Illusions of Philosophy (1971b), he credited
Kant with the first description of an epistemological subject. Kant, that is, described the
structures by which any competent subject acquires or generates knowledge. Piaget followed
Kant in distinguishing between empirical knowledge (knowledge of the contingent world)
and logico-mathematical knowledge (knowledge of necessary truths). But he broke with
Kant in describing cognitive structures as products of development rather than innate
structures. This is a matter on which he also differed from Chomsky. Whereas Chomsky
holds that the linguistic structures of mind are innate, Piaget insisted that certain logical
structures, developed through the coordination of actions, precede linguistic development and
make the construction of linguistic structures possible (1971a). Although both Chomsky and
Piaget call for the development of competence theories that describe the structures of mind
(Noddings, 1974), Chomsky's view is anchored in the philosophical tradition of rationalism,
while Piaget's is much closer to the dynamic perspective of pragmatism.
In accepting the Kantian distinction between empirical and logico-mathematical
knowledge, Piaget accepted the difficult task of explaining the development of cognitive
mathematical structures. Here Piaget relied on the concept of reflective abstraction.
Reflective abstraction is different from classical abstraction in that it does not proceed from a
series of observations of contingent events or objects. Rather, it is a process of interiorizing
9
our physical operations on objects. As we move sets of objects about (put them together,
rearrange them, separate them), we interiorize properties of mathematical operations rather
than objects; we acquire implicit understanding of commutativity, associativity, and
reversibility. Here the claim is that there is an essential connection between purposive
activity and the development of cognitive structure. There is also a recognition (sometimes
overlooked by contemporary radical constructivists) that the objects play a role in reflective
abstraction; that is, epistemological subjects and objects are indissociably linked in
operational events. We cannot force certain results onto the objects we operate on. Our
operations are somehow constrained. There is an inevitability about the outcomes and
characteristics of operations. That is why the resulting structures are logico-mathematical
and why their workings are marked by necessity. This conclusion suggests a challenge to
those constructivists who emphasize the uniqueness of individual constructions, and I will
discuss the problems of conflating individual subject and epistemological subject a bit later.
Piaget's theories are, in the important sense just described, thoroughly constructivist.
Not only are intellectual processes themselves constructive-a point on which both Neisser
and Chomsky would agree-but cognitive structures themselves are products of continued
construction. Constructivism is rooted in the idea of an epistemological subject, an active
knowing mechanism that knows through continued construction. This active construction
implies both a base structure from which to begin construction (a structure of assimilation)
and a process of transformation or creation which is the construction. It implies, also, a
process of continual revision of structure (a process of accommodation). Finally, Piaget's
cognitive constructivism leads logically to methodological constructivism. The need to
identify and describe various cognitive structures in all phases of construction suggests
methods such as the clinical interview and prolonged observation that permit us to make
inferences about the structures that underlie behavior.
So far I have concentrated on constructivist writings and debates two decades old. A
search of current literature shows that the concept pops up everywhere. For example,
Thoresen (1988) has raised questions about the rigor and clarity of "constructivism" in
counseling psychology. But, although mathematics educators also cite some recent thinkers
on constructivism (see other chapters in this volume), there seem to be few epistemological
advances beyond Piaget. This is not to say that there have been no advances in the
psychological aspects of constructivism. Cognitive scientists and mathematics educators who
favor the cognitive science approach have moved well beyond Piaget in describing the way
"minds" operate to build representations, retrieve "frames," copy items from long term
memory, and match initial frames with the demands of a current problem. (See, for example,
Davis, 1984; Kintsch & Greeno, 1985; Papert, 1980; Simon, 1979). However, most of these
10
researchers are interested in the way our minds work, not in the epistemological status of the
mind's products. Further, their language-"copying," "non-destructive read outs," "frames,"
"retrieval"-is highly colored by work with computers. There is a shift from the organic
language of Piaget to machine language. Many such writers do not even use the word
constructivism, although they embrace the central idea that the operations of mind are
constructed. I intend no criticism in these remarks about cognitive science advances, but I
want to emphasize the psychological and pedagogical aspects of these advances; they are not
epistemological.
Constructivists in mathematics education contend that cognitive constructivism
implies pedagogical constructivism; that is, acceptance of constructivist premises about
knowledge and knowers implies a way of teaching that acknowledges learners as active
knowers. As Gerald Goldin notes in his chapter in this volume, it is clear that one can
embrace the pedagogical methods suggested by constructivists without accepting
constructivist premises. It may also be the case that a convinced philosophical constructivist
need not, logically, employ only so-called constructivist methods. That will be an important
issue when we discuss the connection between activity and learning.
Although there are conceptual differences in current constructivist views (and some of
these will be important in the coming analysis), constructivists generally agree on the
following:
1. All knowledge is constructed. Mathematical knowledge is constructed, at least in

part, through a process of reflective abstraction.
2. There exist cognitive structures that are activated in the processes of construction.
These structures account for the construction; that is, they explain the result of
cognitive activity in roughly the way a computer program accounts for the output of a
computer.
3. Cognitive structures are under continual development. Purposive activity induces

transformation of existing structures. The environment presses the organism to adapt.
4. Acknowledgment of constructivism as a cognitive position leads to the adoption of

methodological constructivism.
a. Methodological constructivism in research develops methods of study consonant

with the assumption of cognitive constructivism.
b. Pedagogical constructivism suggests methods of teaching consonant with

cognitive constructivism.
11
Constructivism as Epistemology
All knowledge is constructed (von Glasersfeld, 1987a). Is this an epistemological or a
psychological claim? Constructivists, following Piaget, usually reject this question as a form
of philosophical error. In this view epistemology and psychology are so intricately bound up
in each other that it makes no sense to try to separate them. Constructivists have an
important insight here-one shared in part by earlier pragmatists and contemporary
philosophers whose views of knowledge tend toward pragmatism. Wittgenstein, even in his
positivist days, dismissed epistemology as "the philosophy of psychology" (1961), and more
recently W. V. O. Quine has argued for the "naturalization of epistemology" (1969). Richard
Rorty (1979) goes even further and suggests that both traditional epistemology and the
various structuralisms of Piaget, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, Marx, and Freud are on a similar
wrong track (p. 249)-the quest for a description of nature through the workings of mind.
I think Rorty is right when he says that the attempt to construct or discover a
foundation for science (and all knowledge) is hopeless whether one depends on the structures
of perception (observation), self-evident truths, or cognition. But even if foundational
epistemology is rejected (and this is what constructivists should do), some epistemological
questions remain, and, of course, constructivists have not rejected epistemology. Thus our
initial question retains its point: What sort of assumption (epistemological, psychological, or
both) is being made when one says, "All knowledge is constructed"?
The question can be logically broken into two parts. First, what has the assumption to
do with judging the status of general knowledge claims? Given a statement offered as a bit of
knowledge, how does the claim about construction help us to decide what becomes part of
the bona fide body of knowledge and what does not? Second, if we focus on knowers, how
do we judge when they know and when they do not? These are two basic questions of
epistemology.
Let's consider, first, knowledge as a set of statements in the public domain. Here we
are not asking what it means to say: Joe knows p. We are asking, rather, what it means to
claim p as a bit of knowledge. One of the first questions we ask when we are faced with an
alleged knowledge claim is, "Who said that?" Ifp is a mathematical statement, we are more
likely to accept it if George Polya or John von Neumann is its source than if, say, Ronald
Reagan or a local high school student came up with it. The mathematicians have an authority
that the other two do not have.
But our judgment is not based on raw authority. The mathematicians' authority is not
like that of the pope (or, at least, it shouldn't be). We do not accept their word simply
because their office confers unassailable authority. Rather we accept p, tentatively, because
12
we know that mathematicians belong to a community that subjects all knowledge claims to
careful scrutiny, and the criteria for such scrutiny are laid out for all the community to see.
The fact (if it is one) that p was constructed is irrelevant as a criterion for its status as
knowledge. Constructivists are right when they suggest that the genesis ofp is not irrelevant
to the growth of mathematical knowledge, nor is it irrelevant to someone's learning about p .
Studying the construction ofp can lead to a host of objections, revisions, and new hypotheses
(Lakatos, 1976), and it can provide insight for learners. What the construction cannot do,
however, unless it is part of the proof itself, is to establish p's status as knowledge.
The fact thatp was constructed tells us nothing about truth, knowledge, the
justification of belief, or the nature of evidence-all traditional interests in epistemology.
Rather, the constructivist assumption should be followed by a break with epistemology.
Having accepted the basic constructivist premise, there is no point in looking for foundations
or using the language of absolute truth. The constructivist position is really post-
epistemological, and that is why it can be so powerful in inducing new methods of research
and teaching. It recognizes the power of the environment to press for adaptation, the
temporality of knowledge, and the existence of multiple selves behaving in consonance with
the rules of various subcultures. What is left of epistemological questions may be divided
among mathematics (its canons and methods), the sociology of knowledge (what groups have
the power to label p knowledge), and the psychology of learning and teaching.
Many of the traditional questions of epistemology would be shifted to mathematics
itself. Here, clearly, a body of knowledge is continually under construction, and some
nucleus of it is firmly established. Mathematicians need not answer the question what
knowledge is generally; they need only describe mathematical knowledge and the tests a
proposition must pass to be admitted to that body of knowledge. In an important sense, at
any given time, there is a world of mathematics already established to be discovered by
individual students. If a student picks up a bit of this pre-established material, does he or she
have knowledge? Under what circumstances?
These questions lead us to the second part of our question: How does the
constructivist assumption help us to decide whether a knower knows? All knowledge is
constructed. If Neisser's premise-that all mental acts are constructive-is accepted, then
this basic claim-as an epistemological claim-is trivial. We cannot distinguish between
knowledge and other mental products, or even errors, by virtue of their construction. A
difficulty that arises in constructivist talk is this: On the one hand, if students memorize p,
we often deny that the students have knowledge of p, even ifp is well established in the
public domain; if, on the other hand, students come up with q as a result of construction, we
sometimes accept q as knowledge even if it is demonstrably false.
13
Consider, first, constructions that are somehow faulty or lead to results that are
wrong. The most notorious is Erlwanger's Benny (1973). Benny had a system for converting
his answers to the ones on the answer sheet provided by the curriculum. His method was
systematic, and he could explain it. Converting 3/2 to .5, for example, involved adding 2 and
3 and prefixing a decimal point. That this rule also made it possible to convert 2/3 to .5 did
not seem to bother Benny.
Constructivists often point to the case of Benny because it illustrates how badly
mathematics can be learned when a curriculum does not encourage mathematical thinking.
But the problem here is not that Benny fails to construct (he could hardly avoid doing so) but,
rather, that the environment fails to press Benny to correct his misconceptions. The
constructivist teacher would prefer to help Benny by having him explore whether the result
3/2 = 2/3 is satisfactory. If it is not, then some change in his procedural rules is clearly
necessary. But old-fashioned behaviorists might simply put Benny on a schedule of practice
that includes very careful evaluation of his responses and immediate feedback. Benny, by
definition, would still be constructing, but constructivists consider constructions performed in
such situations to be less powerful than the sort generated by personal puzzlement, goal-
setting, testing hypotheses, etc.
In rejecting Benny's claims to knowledge, constructivists should abandon traditional

epistemological talk. Here is a construction. In a domain other than mathematics-with
some other, nonmathematical, objects-this construction of Benny's might make sense.

Indeed Benny's response to the curriculum that isolated him so completely was an adaptive
response. He succeeded at whatever game he was playing, but he was not playing the game
of mathematics. This suggests-and here is the great strength of pedagogical
constructivism-that the teacher's main function is to establish a mathematical environment.
A second, obverse, difficulty arises when constructivists want to deny that rote
responses represent knowledge. If a student recites a bit of arithmetical information, for
example, but does not understand where this information came from or how it can be used,
we often say the student does not "really know." We reject his statement as a knowledge
claim.
Now, traditional epistemology can do this because it has a criterion of justified true
belief that must be applied to every case of claiming to know. This assumes that things can
be true quite independently of any knower's activity. For A to know x x must be true, A
must believe x and A must have good reasons for believing x. The student who simply
parrots something may indeed be denied a claim to knowledge. (Even this is not a simple
matter, however, because we can find substantial philosophical reasons for accepting "the
teacher said so" as a good enough reason to support a student's claim! For more on
14
"epistemic dependence," see Siegel, 1988.) To reject as knowledge a claim that the
community accepts as true is a tricky business.
How can constructivists reject such a knowledge claim? They might begin by saying
that the student cannot give an adequate account of x. For example, how is x derived? But
we do not expect students to be able to give this sort of account of most x 's. "How did you
get it?" is the question we usually ask. The answers we accept to this question are based
inevitably on the already established body of mathematical knowledge and the canons of
thinking laid down by the mathematical community.
The constructivist suggests that we can make a decision on the basis of whether or not
x was constructed. But does this make sense? As a cognitive position, constructivism asserts
that all mental activity is constructive. Even when students are in what look to be rote
learning situations, they must perforce construct, because that is the way the mind operates.
So it seems to me that constructivists should talk about weak and strong acts of construction
rather than acts involving or not involving construction. In mathematical environments,
strong acts of construction would no doubt be those recognized by mathematicians as
mathematical; weak constructions would be those evaluated as limited in mathematical use.
(I have already discussed those-like Benny's-that might be judged faulty because they do
not belong at all to the applicable mathematical domain.)
Some genuine and very tough questions about teaching follow. Might it not be the
case, for example, that some students perform strong acts of construction no matter how the
material is presented? And might it not also be the case that, while the teacher is encouraging
exploration and genuine (strong) acts of construction, some students perform weak acts such
as quietly waiting for group consensus and then noting the answer?
Both aspects of the question about a knower's status need further analysis,
elaboration, and clarification. It is by no means clear that the current use of epistemological
language will be particularly helpful in this task. What is clear is that the emphasis on
construction forces us to probe deeply into students' activity. How firm a grasp do they have
on the material? What can they do with it? What misconceptions do they entertain? Even if
they are producing wrong answers, are they constructing in a way that is mathematically
recognizable? These are among the questions we need to ask in order to teach effectively,
and they are not epistemological.
Methodological Constructivism
Acceptance of the premise that knowledge and (many constructivists would say) reality itself
are constructed leads to methodological constructivism. In research this means that we have
to investigate our subjects' perceptions, purposes, premises, and ways of working things out if
15
we are to understand their behavior. Even at the contextual level, as we try to understand the
effects of physical and cultural environments on people, we have to look at their purposive
interaction with those environments. We no longer believe that people are simply caused to
behave in certain ways by an environment that is entirely external to and independent of their
cognitive processes.
For teachers, methodological constructivism becomes pedagogical constructivism. In
order to teach well, we need to know what our students are thinking, how they produce the
chain of little marks we see on their papers, and what they can do (or want to do) with the
material we present to them. But the cognitive premises of constructivism can dictate only
guidelines for good teaching. We cannot derive from them, any more than we can from any
other cognitive position, specific teaching methods.
Pedagogical constructivism suggests more sophisticated diagnostic tools-tools that
will uncover patterns of thinking, systematic errors, persistent misconceptions (see Confrey,
this volume). Further, the elaboration required in, say, thinking aloud in the presence of a
teacher encourages students to concentrate on the question or problem at hand. Conducted
well, such a session gives the teacher many opportunities to reassure students that they are
doing some things right, that their thinking has some power, that their errors are
correctable. Above all such a method can be used to create a mathematical environment-
one that will press for mathematical adaptation rather than a form suitable for another
environment.
Overt thinking is, or can be, a powerful teaching method as well as a diagnostic tool,
but teachers need not be confined to it by their constructivism. For example, if a teacher
learns through such a diagnostic session that Betsy is making a certain kind of error over and
over, it seems perfectly reasonable to show her how to do the procedure correctly and give
her a batch of practice exercises. It may indeed be reasonable to provide whole classes with
drill and practice at appropriate times. In particular if it is clear that performance errors (e.g.,
wrongly combining or simplifying radicals) are getting in the way of concentrating on more
significant problems, straightforward practice may actually facilitate genuine problem
solving.
I am not recommending that students be kept at drill and practice for days or years on
end (until, as some say, they've mastered the basics). Rather, I'm suggesting that teachers
anticipate some of the skills that students will likely need to construct important concepts and
principles. Students need building materials, tools, patterns, and sound work habits if they
are to construct mathematical objects and relationships. Some of these materials, tools, and
patterns can and should be created through strong acts of construction by the students
themselves; others might simply be accepted and tried out on trust (weak acts, but not faulty).
16
Constructivist premises imply that there will be many roads to most solutions or
instructional endpoints. We cannot, therefore, be sure that all students will find the
anticipated skills necessary or even useful in their constructions. But there is a high
probability that some particular skills will be needed in any given task. Any teacher who has
conducted an overt thinking session sympathizes with students who must agonize over every
step of a solution-often forgetting in the process why they are dividing, or solving a
proportion, or factoring an unwieldy expression. My point here is that we need not discard
all of the strategies recommended by theorists who espouse direct instruction (Brophy,
1986a; Good, Grouws, & Ebmeier, 1983) even if we disagree with them on fundamental
cognitive premises (Noddings, 1986).
Many mathematics educators recognize the power of "constructivist methods" in one-
to-one situations, but they also see that schoolteachers cannot work continuously in such
situations (Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, this volume). Classroom conditions force us to think
about instructional economies. Constructivist teachers have to keep their basic premises in
mind, but they should feel free to adapt a wide variety of methods for their own purposes.
Given our premises, we need to get thinking out into the open, to encourage students to
conceive their own mathematical purposes and execute their own plans, and to provide
situations and objects that may trigger conflict (disequilibrium) and reflective abstraction.
How can we do all this with a classroom full of students, and what pitfalls lie in our way?
Consider, first, the common constructivist recommendation that teachers make heavy
use of manipulatives. This recommendation was an early and plausible attempt to apply
Piagetian theory directly to teaching. If reflective abstraction proceeds from the operations
we perform on objects, then it makes sense to have our students work with objects. The
difficulty, of course, is that students must have a purpose for engaging in the manipulation of
objects. Otherwise, objects can be as mysterious as numerals; even Cuisenaire rods can
become "symbols made of colored wood" (Holt, 1964).
Understanding this possibility, we need, perhaps, to provide some direct instruction
on the use of various manipulatives and then simply make them available. In actual problem
solving situations, we probably should not guide students in their use. If we do, we are likely
to detach students from their own purposes and set them blindly to work on our own.
Caveats of this sort spring up everywhere in constructivist teaching. Students will construct,
but we want their constructions to be guided by mathematical purposes, not by the need to
figure out what teachers want or where they are headed.
Next, because teachers have to work with many children, it makes sense to ask
whether there is a way to approximate the one-to-one situation with a whole class. Can we
elicit genuine student thinking in the whole class situation? Several promising models have
17
appeared (see the essays in this volume and also Davis, 1984; Lampert, 1988; Schoenfeld,
1985; Steffe, Cobb, & von Glasersfeld, 1988). All of these methods share a common
characteristic: They are all highly interactive. Teachers both model and elicit, but they
model by asking questions, following leads, and conjecturing rather than presenting faultless
products. Teaching this way requires considerable mathematical knowledge as well as
pedagogical skill. How can teachers follow students' suggestions if they do not know enough
mathematics to perceive where the suggestions may lead? This is a problem for teacher
education.
But a caveat again arises directly out of the constructivist framework. While a lesson
of the sort advocated above is conducted, students will be "constructing." Some will be
performing strong (mathematical) acts of construction. Hearing evidence of such thinking,
teachers (and observers) may be delighted with the lesson. But other students (how many?)
may be performing weak acts on the problem at hand, and some may be "chasing deer in the
wildwood" as Virgil Mallory used to say. It would, therefore, seem unwise to rely on such
lessons day in and day out.
How else can we induce the engagement that is essential if students are to perform
powerful constructions? One possibility is to increase the amount of time students spend
working together (see Cobb, Wood, & Yackel; Maher & Alston, this volume). The use of
small groups in cooperative learning is becoming a popular strategy, and there are sound
cognitive reasons for allowing students to work together. Vygotsky (1978) posited group
interaction as one source in the development of mental operations; that is, he suggested that
children gradually internalize the talk that occurs in groups. They begin to challenge
themselves, ask for reasons, and in general monitor their own mental work as others do their
public speech. Cobb, Wood, and Yackel follow a line of thinking called "social
constructivism" that puts great emphasis on the processes of communicating and negotiating
in communities. A difficulty here is that, once again, we must somehow ensure that the
community is a mathematical community. To assume that the deliberations of any
community-conducted by some general plan of right action-will lead to acceptable
mathematical results suggests a traditional epistemology. In a post-epistemological
perspective, we recognize the canons and ways authorized by this particular community. (On
the possibility of construing epistemology as itself the study of human understanding, see
Toulmin, 1972.)
But group work is not a pedagogical panacea in any case (see Noddings, 1989). Some
students may participate eagerly while others sit out the session waiting for answers to
develop. Assigning rigid roles so that everyone has to participate can distract students'
attention from mathematics to the group process itself. Further, students can be rude and cruel
18
to one another, and teachers have to watch group operations to be sure that students are
learning to help and care for each other-not just to solve problems in expeditious ways.
Here, too, there is a large part for teacher education to play. The literature on small
groups and cooperative learning is growing rapidly. What kind of small group scheme should
teachers use? How should groups be constituted? For what kinds of task? Should there be
inter-group competition? Should teachers use individual or group evaluation? Will the end-
product be a group one or set of individual ones (Noddings, 1989)? Teachers need to be well-
informed in order to use these methods effectively. Further, constructivist teachers need
practice in selecting and justifying the forms that are compatible with constructivist premises.
The great strength of constructivism is that it leads us to think critically and
imaginatively about the teaching-learning process. Believing the premises of constructivism,

we no longer look for simple solutions, and we have a powerful set of criteria by which to
judge our possible choices of teaching method.
I will close by giving a simple example of a teacher's constructivist thinking. Suppose
I am concentrating on the central problem of getting my students' thinking out into the open.
As I mark a set of tests, I realize that, alas, students are not showing their work as I have
instructed them to do. Then I look at what I'm doing-taking off points here and there for
small or large errors. Aha! Suppose I switch to a positive scheme of grading? The next day,
and before every written exercise thereafter, I remind students that I'll be searching for
thoughts to reward. They will get points for useful pictures, charts, formulas, statements that
suggest either hypotheses or doubts, challenges to the question itself. And then I do this. No
more -2s and -10s. Their papers will, rather, be peppered with +2s and +10s together with
remarks encouraging attempts or explaining why an attempt failed. The result should be lots
more student talk on paper. (It worked for me, by the way.) This is just one example of
constructivist thinking applied to an everyday problem of schoolteaching, but it illustrates the
power of constructivism as a cognitive and methodological position.
Conclusion
Constructivism is, logically, a post-epistemological position. The standard questions of

epistemology cannot be answered-or even reasonably asked-from this perspective. Its
premises suggest, rather, abandonment of traditional epistemological language. This move
leads us to concentrate on constructivism as a cognitive position and methodological
perspective. As such, it can be powerful in helping us to study mathematical learning, to
develop appropriate teaching strategies, and to reflect on the everyday problems of
schoolteaching. But it requires considerably more analysis and elaboration in the community
of mathematics educators if it is to meet the kinds of legitimate objections I have noted here.
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Chapter 1: Constructivism in Mathematics Education

Author(s): Nel Noddings

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

1. All knowledge is constructed. Mathematical knowledge is constructed, at least in

3. Cognitive structures are under continual development. Purposive activity induces

4. Acknowledgment of constructivism as a cognitive position leads to the adoption of

a. Methodological constructivism in research develops methods of study consonant

b. Pedagogical constructivism suggests methods of teaching consonant with

In rejecting Benny's claims to knowledge, constructivists should abandon traditional

some other, nonmathematical, objects-this construction of Benny's might make sense.

imaginatively about the teaching-learning process. Believing the premises of constructivism,

power of constructivism as a cognitive and methodological position.

Constructivism is, logically, a post-epistemological position. The standard questions of

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