HUME’S DIALOGUES

CONCERNING NATURAL
RELIGION
Proseminarska naloga pri predmetu Empirizem

UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI,
FILOZOFSKA FAKULTETA
Ajla Šarić
Mentor: dr. Miran Božović
Contents

1. Contents......................................................................................................................................1
2. Introduction................................................................................................................................2
3. The relationship between religious faith and philosophical scepticism.....................................3
4. The argument from design.........................................................................................................4
5. Problem of Evil – the „best“ of all possible worlds...................................................................7
5.1 The Epicurean paradox.........................................................................................................8
5.2 The potential resolution of the Epicurean paradox...............................................................8
6. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................9
7. Sources.......................................................................................................................................10

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2. Introduction

Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are written in a form of a debate between three
philosophers, where each of them (as we can expect) has opposing views considering the issue at
hand, which is the puzzling question – can God's nature be rationally explained?
The fourth character present in the dialogues (Pamphilus, the student of Cleanthes) acts only as a
mere narrator, and even though we might presume he reflects Hume's state of mind when it
comes to God and the nature of his existence, we can easily conclude this cannot possibly be the
case, since he ends up supporting Cleanthes' teleological argument. In fact, it is rather difficult to
fathom whether any of the philosophers engaging in the debate carry a significant resemblance
with Hume's personal beliefs (considering the fact that Hume's stances lean towards atheism),
but I believe the majority of readers may find it that sceptical Philo acts as a voice of reason
throughout the entire work, which is also why most scholars agreed that Hume channeled some
of his own perspectives throughout him.

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3. The relationship between religious faith and philosophical scepticism

In the first part of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Demea quotes Chrysippus' old saying
that students of philosophy should learn about the nature of gods only after they have studied and
comprehended logic, ethics, and physics. Demea argues that religious principles are profound
and complex, which is why he applies the same method when it comes to educating his own
children. While his method is sound in the sense of offering young minds a plethora of different
doctrines (whether they stand on solid ground or can easily be disputed as hideous) for the
purpose of providing them the ability to grasp and comprehend the entire phenomena of natural
religion (based on the wide spectre of acquired ideas); I find it that the presumption he holds to
be the outcome of the situation is rather unlikely. While Demea thinks such a method of
education would assure young minds to embrace the authority of Faith, the gradual development
of the ability of critical thinking is more likely to result in denunciation of most religious ideas.
This is where, in the first part of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the issue of scepticism
comes into the picture.
Even though Philo supports Demea's sceptic views on limits of human reason, he himself
ridicules Pyrrhonian scepticism when it comes to everyday life. The idea of this is, as Pyle states,
that „on many subjects, it seems, belief is involuntary and suspension of judgment impossible“1.
Philo's disregard of Pyrrhonian scepticism could indicate the connection between Philo's
character and Hume's point of view since his relationship with scepticism was also fairly
complex. Although he was widely considered a sceptic, in his earlier work, he did not rush to
defend scepticism; in fact, he judged it as „strained“ and „ridiculous“. But, when it comes to the
Enquiry Considering Human Understanding, Hume takes more of a settled position considering
this matter – he draws a parallel between scepticism antecedent to all study and philosophy,
cultivated by Descartes, and one consequent to science and inquiry. Hume also considered that
all of the qualities of objects that can be perceived by senses, such as shape or color are
secondary qualities, and that they do not exist exclusively in the objects alone, but also in the
perceptions of the mind; without a particular archetype, they present. Following that logic (that
all of the qualities of objects perceived by the senses rest in the mind of the perceiver), it can
easily be concluded that the extension depends on sensible ideas. But when it comes to radical
scepticism, both the one that was deployed by Descartes and Pyrrho in the fourth century BC,
Hume was pretty clear: no durable good can ever come from it. If we were ever to ask such a
sceptic what does he propose by all of his curious researches, he'd fail to answer. More so, even a
Pyrrhonian himself wouldn't be certain how exactly is his philosophy beneficial for society. In
the last pages of the Enquiry, Hume agreed that there is one positive thing that came from
Pyrrhonism – a mitigated version of scepticism often referred to as the academical philosophy.
He considers this form of scepticism was made when some unclear doubts found in the excessive
scepticism were corrected by common sense and reflection. Even when our judgement is
confined to a common life, those who are inclined to philosophy will not be left in a position

1
Andrew Pyle, Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion': A Reader's Guide (London: Continuum 2006)

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where they cannot continue their research or it becomes pointless, because, as Hume proclaimed,
“philosophical decisions are nothing but reflections of common life, methodized and corrected”.
Cleanthes uses the impossibility of radical scepticism in matters that are not beyond everyday
life as an argument and proposes that theism could also be judged as a scientific theory. The
issue with this proposition is the lack of substantial evidence that could be examined when it
comes to matters of theistic belief. While I have rational reasons to suppress my judgment when
it comes to believing that the multiplication of positive factors results in a positive product; or
that there is a force of attraction between any two masses, particles or bodies in the form of
gravitation, my belief stems from more than one factor that justifies the presence of the belief. If
I was ever to become concerned about the phenomenon of gravitation and the certainty of
scientific theories covering it, I can easily grab one of my friends and throw them out through the
window to gain some empirical evidence about this force of attraction. If in this ordeal, some
divine power would enter the stage to defy the force of gravitation and rescue my friend from
meeting a tragic end, these two forces could be examined and judged in an equal manner, where
they could be placed on solid ground and treated as sound. Otherwise, I would simply find it
hard to suppress my scepticism when it comes to theistic belief the same way I suppress it when
it comes to any scientific theory. However, Cleanthes argues that if we were to engage in
scepticism when it comes to complex issues (in this case, that would be theories supporting
theism), and withhold it when we encounter simpler, uncluttered matters, it would be the
equivalent of „rejecting Newton’s explanation of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow,
because that explanation gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light“2. Essentially, Cleanthes
suggests that engaging in scepticism while examining teleological „evidence“, ultimately
dismissing it, could be approached the same way as denying scientific theories because of our
lack of ability to comprehend them. I find Cleanthes' argument flawed because we simply cannot
approach matters that are beyond this world the same way we approach ones that are manifested
all around us. In other words, it would be irrational to compare dismissing Newton's explanation
of the phenomenon we can experience and witness, with dismissing a theory concerning an
invisible being supported by evidence that cannot be examined practically.

4. The argument from design

Before Cleanthes presents the argument from design for the first time, Demea argues that the
subject of their discussion is not the existence of God (which he holds as certain), but his nature.
As the discourse moves further in that direction, Cleanthes mentions his teleological argument
for the first time, suggesting that whole worlds is „is nothing but one big machine subdivided
into an infinite number of smaller ones, which in their turn could be subdivided to a degree
beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain“2. The crux of this argument rests
within the idea that every intelligent design has an intelligent designer that launched it into

2
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

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existence (e.g. a watch that was made by a watchmaker), and that everything has a cause
(indicating that God is the final Cause). This analogy is problematic in multiple ways.
First of all, we can easily notice that everything in this world has a consistent pattern of
development that suggests complex things are derived from simple ones. In the opposite case,
instead of writing this paper using this advanced technological device, I would be carving it onto
a rock with a sharp object. At the same time, I would be listening to stories about the good old
days told by my grandmother, but instead of mentioning how my grandfather proposed to her by
a romantic letter, she would state how he sent her a text using his Android smartphone. If we can
instantly dismiss this idea as hideous, we can also propose a question – how is it that God, this
omnipotent, all-knowing being that possesses the intelligence we cannot possibly compare to
anything we have encountered in this world – decided to create something less complex in the
form of the world itself?
Secondly, we can examine the effort all craftsmen put into their designs. For example, if a
gunsmith is building a gun, he will certainly put many aspects into account – he wants the device
to be resistant enough not to shatter if it was by any case dropped to the ground; to fire
ammunition at the speed of at least 2500 feet per second; to provide the best possible aim in the
given situation. Essentially, a good gunsmith will deploy his best effort to produce a machine
that serves its purpose in a manner that satisfies a set of standards. If we were to imagine God as
a gunsmith, and human beings, his most perfect creation, as that gun, we can easily say that he is
either an incompetent craftsman or a deranged madman that likes to spend his time building
weapons that can hardly serve any purpose efficiently. The human body, presumably created in
His own image3, is flawed in a lot of ways every simple man can think of. We are less resistant
than most species of bacteria, the amount of offspring we can produce at once is fairly limited;
unaided by the pharmaceutical industry, we are unable to defeat even the simplest obstacles such
as influenza.
The final objection to the teleological argument considering intelligent design is the purpose of
the design itself. A watchmaker assembles a device that displays time; electrical, mechanical and
software engineers work together to produce a machine that can perform calculations ranging
from basic arithmetics to complex mathematics faster (and with more accuracy) than the human
mind, and a gunsmith provides us a weapon we can use to incapacitate, if required, another
living being. All three of these objects are the embodiment of the intelligent design, and each of
them carries a purpose. If we view humanity as a form of intelligent design, we must ask
ourselves: shouldn't the human existence carry a significant purpose as well? Of course, we can
always say that procreation for the sake of preserving the species is the purpose of human
existence, however, this is a fundamental feature of all living organisms. If we are, indeed, God's
most perfect creation, wouldn't it be dishearteningly pathetic that the purpose of our existence is
the same as the purpose of existence characteristic to a cockroach or a little fly?
However, with everything stated above, we must also take into account Demea's stance that
God's nature is simply incomprehensible (which is why comparing his nature to that of a man is
a flawed method to begin with), and Philo's objection to Cleanthes' argument considering the
3
Genesis 1:27

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analogy between God's intelligent design and that of a man (that he ignored differences between
the two). Even when that is considered, we would still fall back to the issue exposed in Part V of
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion – arguments that can support monotheism can hardly
ever be found in human experience, and even if such would be used as a starting point, finding
„any grounds within experience in favor of monotheism over polytheism, or for the existence of
a continuing divine providence against the rival hypotheses of an indifferent or an absent god“1
would be impossible.

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5. Problem of Evil – the „best“ of all possible worlds

Demea mentions the idea that every man seeks protection because of his awareness of his own
weakness and ill-fated demise. The part of his argument that holds undeniable accuracy is the
one that explains, with great precision, how gods stemmed into existence of the human mind – if
we imagine ourselves as a simple Neanderthal, who, hypothetically, witnessed the ordeal in
which his firstborn was struck by a lighting and killed instantly, it would only be natural for him
to think of this as a form of a punishment by some superior Being(s), over dismissing it as
nothing but common cruelty of nature. The comfort of such belief lays within ignorance as much
as it does within the hope that he himself could avoid such punishment if he was to succumb to
those powerful beings in the sky and please whatever desires they may have. The troublesome
part of the argument, is, however, his claim that such wretchedness of human existence secures
the truth of religion in the hearts of people. Gods were, indeed, originally the product of fear –
but it is hard to understand how could the modern man carry sympathy towards the Entity he
fears, even despite knowing the disgusting nature of his potential behavior.
First gods emerged into existence as beings worshipped for protection, but love that is present in
all monotheistic religions of our time was not as prominent. If Abrahamic God was a man (with
whom he apparently carries some resemblance), a man that intentionally kills thousands of
people at a time, mutilates them or launches them into existence crippled without a sound
explanation or benefit, chooses to favor a selected group of people over all others, or casts them
out of his house into the eternal punishment because he gets angry when someone touches his
apples – we would certainly have great reasons to fear him. However, at the same time, we could
by no means have any reason to fancy or love that man. While our first impulse would almost
certainly be to succumb to his power to secure our uncertain existence, the deepest and most
prominent instinct within us would be, naturally, to obliterate him.
This is why I firmly believe even the people that spread the word of God with the strongest
passion, latently despise every aspect of his potential existence. No one is capable to, with great
honesty, ignore the fact that if the existence of the Abrahamic God was the absolute truth, he
would be the personification of the most sickening sins and crimes known to mankind. Even his
apparent acts of mercy are wrapped in a veil of wretchedness – if I was to severe someone's
limbs one by one, and sew them back on, the action of salvation I would provide in the form of
saving that person from a limbless life could hardly be viewed as an action of kindness. God's
way of putting out fires he himself started is not the image of his omnipotent kindliness, but
merely the one of calculated sadism.
Demea and Philo both agree on the atrocities that are everlastingly present in our world and
Demea states: „The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war goes
on among all living creatures. Need, hunger, and deprivation stimulate the strong and
courageous; fear, anxiety and terror agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life
brings distress to the new-born infant and to its wretched mother; weakness, impotence and

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distress accompany each stage of that life: and eventually it reaches its end in agony and
horror.“2
However, Cleanthes, the experimental theist, claims that he himself cannot say he is able to
experience the misery of the world in the manner they have presented it, which can be seen as his
reaction to the apparent lack of arguments to explain the evil that is present within it.
5.1 The Epicurean paradox
Epicurus's unanswered questions come into picture during the discussion of evil, as a form of the
argument that aims at conceiving a negative conclusion considering God's existence:
Is God willing to prevent evil but unable to do so? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is God able to prevent evil but unwilling to do so? Then he is malevolent (or at least less than
perfectly good).
If God is both willing and able to prevent evil then why is there evil in the world?
5.2 The potential resolution of the Epicurean paradox
Even Cleanthes agrees that if the Epicurean paradox cannot be resolved, and if the relationship
between God's morality and the presence of evil in the world cannot be explained, a threat would
be posed to every traditional form of theism known to us, and the attributes that are commonly
assigned to God in its tradition would fail short at being rational.
A potential solution is offered within interpreting the nature of evil as relative. In other words,
our conception of evil could be interpreted as the limited, human perception that does not match
with the nature of the universe. As Paul Russel puts it, „from the divine perspective, viewing the
universe as one system, the removal of such ills or afflictions would produce greater ill or
diminish the total amount of good in the world“4.
Following this strategy, we could conclude that evil is either non-existent in the world, or it is the
unavoidable necessity that transforms our universe into the perfect „whole“. In theory, this
argument can be viewed as plausible, but when it comes to praxis, denying the human experience
of evil or throwing it aside as inaccurate and irrelevant is simply impossible. While my
perception of an external object may be relative and dependent on more than one internal factor,
I can hardly believe the same can be true for, let's say, a situation in which I would witness a
child being systematically abused by his parents. Theoretically, their actions would not be
interpreted and perceived as evil through the relative moral laws of the universe, but our senses
will always lead us in the direction that suggests that no greater good or necessity can be found
in inflicting pain to an innocent child, consequently making this action the unnecessary evil.

4
Paul Russel, „Hume on Religion“ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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6. Conclusion

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are concluded in an inconsistent fashion: Philo ends up
admitting, that up to some degree, he can agree with Cleanthes and his teleological argument. He
does not dispute seeing some resemblance in the intelligent design of the universe, and that of a
man. However, if we take into account Philo's previous stances and his evident scepticism, it is
clear that his agreement can hardly be interpreted as honest, and certainly carries a particular
dose of irony.
Personally, I believe that through the Dialogues, Hume was slowly painting a magnificent
picture that presents its spectators with a wide range of different views considering the nature of
God's existence and arguments that different supporters of theism may use in their favor – only
to show, ultimately, that every single one of those arguments fails short to establish any solid
ground on the nature (and consequently, possibility) of God's existence.

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7. Sources

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

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