[ G.R. No.

 188680, February 15, 2016 ] before the RTC of Palawan an Information [8] against Alonzabe
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised
LITA G. ALONZABE, PETITIONER, V. HON. Penal Code, as amended. The crime was said to be committed
TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. AND JESUS MAGTANGGOL as follows:
USMAN, RESPONDENTS; UDK -14243 - LITA G.
ALONZABE, PETITIONER, V. JESUS MAGTANGGOL That sometime during the period between November 23, 2001
USMAN, RESPONDENT and May 23, 2002, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Narra,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused having received 306
Sirs/Mesdames: sacks of different kinds of fertilizer and 110 bottles or kilos of
different kinds of pesticide from CHING USMAN TRADING,
INC. thru Agricultural Supplies Section Manager JESUS
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a
MAGTANGGOL J. USMAN, amounting to PI69,780.00, for
Resolution dated February 15, 2016 which reads as follows:
the purpose of selling the same, with the express obligation to
deliver the proceeds thereof or to return the unsold fertilizer
"G.R. No. 188680 - LITA G. ALONZABE, Petitioner, v.
and pesticide after 30 days to the said owner, but the said
HON. TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and JESUS MAGTANGGOL
accused, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there
USMAN, Respondents; UDK -14243 - LITA G.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
ALONZABE, Petitioner, v. JESUS MAGTANGGOL
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
USMAN, Respondent.
aforestated amount, and that despite repeated demands made
by Jesus Magtanggol J. Usman for her to deliver the proceeds
The consolidated cases [1] now before the Court center upon the
or to return the fertilizer and the pesticide, she failed and
petition for review on certiorari filed by Lita G. Alonzabe,
[2] refused and still fails and refuses to do the same, to the
 which seeks the reversal of the Decision [3] dated December
damage and prejudice of CHING USMAN TRADING, INC.,
21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84209.
in the amount of ONE 'HUNDRED SIXTY-NINE
Said decision affirmed the April 2, 2004 Order[4] of the
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (PI
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Branch 52 in
69,780.00) Philippine currency.
Criminal Case No. 18359, which denied reconsideration of a
previous order of the trial court that disallowed Alonzabe's The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18359.
motion to quash the information in said case.
Alonzabe thereafter filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the
The Fact case. She averred that she was completely surprised to know
of the filing of the case considering that she had been paying
On March 12, 2003, Jesus Magtanggol Usman filed before the the amount of the goods that she allegedly misappropriated for
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan a complaint- her benefit and such payments were duly received by Usman.
affidavit (Sakdal-Salaysay)[5] against Alonzabe, charging the Alonzabe opted not to file her counter-affidavit as Usman
latter of committing estafa punishable under Article 315, purportedly assured her that the case will not be pursued if she
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. pays her outstanding obligation. Her honest intention and good
faith to comply with the trust receipt agreements were further
Usman alleged that he is the manager of the Agricultural supported by the fact that she made payments even after the
Supplies Section of the Ching Usman Trading, Inc. In view of filing of the Information for estafa, which were acknowledged
the tight competition in their business and in order to increase by Usman. Alonzabe argued that the prior agreements with
their sales, he was permitted by his superiors to entrust their Usman were therefore novated by their new agreement, thus
stocks of fertilizers and pesticides to certain individuals for the eliminating the element of deceit. Alonzabe argued that the
latter to sell to farmers in exchange of a commission or for case was merely civil in nature.
profit. If said individuals are unable to sell the products, they
are obligated to return the same after a period of usually 30 The trial court denied the above motion.
days. Alonzabe was one such individual.
On November 11, 2003, Alonzabe filed a Motion for Bill of
From November 23, 2001 up to May 23, 2002, Usman alleged Particulars, which sought to clarify the alleged ambiguity as to
that he gave Alonzabe a total of 306 sacks of different kinds of the exact quantity of pesticides involved and the total amount
fertilizers and 110 bottles or kilos of various kinds of of the merchandise, given her subsequent payment of
pesticides worth P169,780.00. Alonzabe signed trust receipt P90,000.00 that should have been deducted from the
agreements[6]  as proof that the products were indeed entrusted P169,780.00 stated in the information. The trial court granted
to her. Said agreements were summarized[7] as follows: this motion and Usman submitted his compliance.
           
On January 27, 2004, Alonzabe filed a Motion to Quash the
Xxx
information as the facts charged therein do not constitute an
offense. She stated that the trust receipt agreements that were
the basis of the Information against her were worded as
Usman claimed that the 30-day deadlines stated in the follows:
agreements were not complied with as Alonzabe kept on
asking for extensions of time for her to remit the proceeds of
The merchandise specified at the opposite portion thereof and
the products she sold. After the lapse of many months that
in consideration hereof, the undersigned hereby agrees to hold
Alonzabe failed to deliver on her promise to pay, Usman
said merchandise in storage as the property of the
sought the advice of the president of their company. The latter
TRUSTOR. With the liberty to sell the same for cash for the
wrote to Alonzabe, asking for the payment of goods already
TRUSTOR'S account and to hand the portion of the
sold and the return of the products unsold. Alonzabe, however,
proceeds from the sale of the merchandise as represented by
failed to reply within the period granted to her. Thus, Usman
the TRUSTOR'S billing price for merchandise received or
was constrained to file the complaint against her.
to return the said merchandise in good and saleable
condition within from [sic] date of delivery if not sold.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, Alonzabe did
not file a counter-affidavit.
In case of controversy, or litigation, Venue shall be in
_______________
Subsequently, on June 4, 2003, the provincial prosecutor filed
Trustee
_______________ elements necessary to establish the crime charged, i.e., estafa
Signature.[9] through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of
the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
Alonzabe pointed out that the trust receipt agreements did not
it was not essential or indispensable that the information
provide for the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of
particularly mentioned that the TRAs were violated as the
the value of the goods. However, she claimed that when the
violation thereof only served to highlight the manner or mode
balances of the value of the goods were billed, she paid an
by which Alonzabe perpetrated the act of alleged defraudation.
unconscionable interest of 3% per day in addition to the
principal obligation. She attached to her motion copies of
The Court of Appeals posited that Alonzabe had nobody to
provisional receipts that purportedly showed payments of said
blame but herself when she opted not to file a counter-affidavit
interest rate.[10] Alonzabe then argued that "[i]t is axiomatic
before the prosecutor. Her allegations that she made
from the foregoing revelation that the trust receipt agreements
substantial payments to Usman and that the trust receipt
were executed as a security for the goods entrusted to the
agreements and the usurious daily interest rates on her
accused, hence the transaction was that of loan." [11]
principal obligation evidence a pure loan transaction were all
held to be belated claims that the prosecutor could not have
Usman opposed the above motion, arguing inter alia that the
considered. Said claims were matters of defense that are best
provisional receipts attached by Alonzabe to her motion to
ventilated during a trial on the merits of the case.
quash were matters aliunde that should not be considered by
the trial court in resolving such motion. Usman averred that
Furthermore, the appellate court ruled that a special civil
the prosecution has not made any admission regarding the
action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
entries on the provisional receipts. What was so far admitted
denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper
was the partial payment of P90,000.00, which payment neither
procedure to be followed in such a case is for the accused to
changed the nature of the accusation against Alonzabe nor
enter a plea, go to a trial and reiterate the special defenses
served to novate her criminal liability to convert it to a civil
contained in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the
one.
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law.
Usman stressed that Alonzabe changed the theory of her
defense by directly attacking the nature of the trust receipt
Alonzabe filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
agreements, the voluntariness and due execution of which she
decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
was yet to deny. The provisional receipts were not integral
Resolution[15] dated May 15, 2009.
parts of the trust receipt agreements such that the said receipts
cannot be considered in the determination of the true nature of
The Rulins of the Court
the said agreements. Assuming that the provisional receipts
may be taken into account, the same only prove the fact of
Alonzabe brought the case before this Court, invoking the
payment and nothing more. Usman added that he shall prove
following issues: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
that the amounts paid by way of interests were intended to
when it dismissed the petition; and (2) whether or not the
serve as penalty or liquidated damages for the delay in the
Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the ruling of the RTC that
settlement of the misappropriated amounts. Also, the interest
the information charges an offense. [16]
rate of 3% was computed on a monthly basis, not on a daily
basis.
Alonzabe maintains that the facts charged in the Information
filed against her do not constitute an offense that warrants the
In an Order[12] dated February 19, 2004, the RTC denied
continuous prosecution of the case. She laments that the
Alonzabe's Motion to Quash. The trial court ruled that the
appellate court merely examined the Information itself without
allegations stated in the motion were evidentiary in nature and
giving due regard to the trust receipt agreements, which were
can only be threshed out in a fullblown trial.
the very source of the debtor-creditor relationship between her
and Usman, as well as the basis of the indictment against her.
Alonzabe moved for a reconsideration of the above order, but
The unconscionable interest rates should have also been given
the RTC denied the same in an Order [13] dated April 2, 2004.
weight.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In his comment to the petition, Usman contends that Alonzabe
failed to show that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
Alonzabe elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a
latter's petition for certiorari. Usman argues that an order
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore the
which included a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
same is neither appealable nor can it be the subject of a
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. She
petition for certiorari. He avers that the RTC properly denied
argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
Alonzabe's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her
the prosecution was entitled to prove Alonzabe's defalcation of
motion for reconsideration to the order denying her motion to
the property and money entrusted to her.
quash.
The Court finds Alonzabe's petition to be without merit. The
On November 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's denial of
Alonzabe's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
Alonzabe's motion to quash the information in Criminal Case
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
No. 18349.
Subsequently, in the assailed Decision dated December 21,
As held in Los Baños v. Pedro,[17] a motion to quash is the
2007, the Court of Appeals found no merit in Alonzabe's
mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea,
petition and disposed of the same in this wise:
the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition
point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the
is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the challenged Order of the
information. The motion is a hypothetical admission of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
facts alleged in the information, for which reason, the court
(Branch 52), dated April 2, 2004, is hereby AFFIRMED. [14]
cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the
The appellate court held that the information filed by the face of the information. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
public prosecutor shows that the same clearly alleges all the Court enumerates the grounds for a motion to quash a
complaint or information, the first of which is when "the facts jurisprudential guidelines heretofore stated, the above
charged do not constitute an offense."[18] arguments of Alonzabe cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Such allegations are matters of defense that should be properly
As early as People v. De la Rosa,[19] the Court pronounced that heard by and fully considered by the trial court in the criminal
"[a]s a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground case for estafa.
that the allegations of the information do not constitute the
offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be The Court of Appeals likewise did not err in dismissing
resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and Alonzabe's petition for certiorari for being an improper
veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the remedy. We reiterate our ruling in Querijero v. Palmes-
case of People v. Navarro,[20] additional facts not alleged in the Limitar  [25] that:
information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution
may be invoked in support of the motion to quash." At the outset, we must reiterate the fundamental principle that
an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and,
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition
Information against Alonzabe duly charged the crime of estafa for certiorari.
through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of
the Revised Penal Code.[21] In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that "a special
civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
As found by the appellate court, the Information contained the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established
following details: (1) Alonzabe received goods in trust or rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is
under obligation to sell the same and to deliver the proceeds rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
thereof or return the unsold goods to Usman after 30 days; (2) to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and,
she misappropriated the goods or its proceeds in the amount of when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
P169,780.00; (3) Usman's company, the Ching Usman in the manner authorized by law."
Trading, Inc. sustained damage or prejudice arising from the
misappropriation or conversion; and (4) repeated demands However, on a number of occasions, this Court had sanctioned
were made by Usman upon Alonzabe to deliver the proceeds a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
or return the goods. interlocutory order in the following circumstances:

The above details correspond to the following elements of the (1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of
crime of estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that
money, goods, or other personal property be received by the (2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery relief;
of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or (3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of (4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender.[22] (5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making
it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
In her motion to quash, what Alonzabe tried to impress upon thereof. (Citations omitted.)
the trial court is that the imposition of an allegedly
The Court finds that Alonzabe failed to prove the existence of
unconscionable interest rate of 3% per day on the unpaid
any of the above exceptional circumstances in the instant case.
balance of the value of the goods delivered to her by Usman
On the contrary, we find no error on the part of the trial court
indicate that the transaction between her and Usman was
and the Court of Appeals in denying Alonzabe's Motion to
actually that of a loan. Also, in her motion for reconsideration
Quash.
of the RTC Order dated February 19, 2004 that denied her
motion to quash, Alonzabe insisted that her alleged criminal
Consequently, the Information for estafa filed against her in
liability arising from the trust receipt agreements she entered
Criminal Case No. 18359 remains valid.
into with Usman established "a debtor-creditor relationship,
making the transaction a loan." [23] In the same vein, Alonzabe
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly failing to appreciate
December 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
the true nature of the trust receipt agreements she entered into
No. 84209 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
with Usman. In her memorandum before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner.
Alonzabe contended that "[t]he merchandise/goods allegedly
misapplied and converted to [her] personal benefit were not
SO ORDERED." JARDELEZA, J., acting member per SO.
held in trust for purposes of selling the same but rather
No. 2311 dated January 14, 2016.
covered by loan security as evidenced by the trust receipt
agreement (TRA's for brevity)." [24]

The above arguments were correctly disregarded by the RTC

and the Court of Appeals. By claiming that her transactions
with Usman were not really trust receipt agreements but
partook of the nature of loan agreements, Alonzabe was
clearly arguing that she did not receive the goods delivered to
her in trust or under obligation to sell the same and to deliver
the proceeds thereof or return the unsold goods to Usman after
30 days.

Thus, far from hypothetically admitting the veracity of the

allegations contained in the Information against her, Alonzabe
sought to establish a fact contrary thereto. Following
 spree. Appellant and his friends were seated on the next table,
having their own drinking spree, as well. [5]

Edwin who then already appeared drunk, insulted the disc

jockey (DJ) while browsing the song book. Appellant
suddenly blurted that Edwin had punched the DJ. Edwin then
turned to appellant and insulted the latter too. Appellant got
enraged and started throwing bottles and glasses in the bar. He
(Dante) tried to calm down the two (2), after which he
escorted appellant out.[6]

Outside, appellant lingered on for a few more minutes before

he eventually left. But only after around fifteen (15) minutes,
[ G.R. No. 225063, November 28, 2019 ] appellant came back this time, armed with a knife. Appellant
headed straight to Edwin who saw appellant walking up to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANGEL JULIO Y him, exclaiming "Patay ka ngayon." Edwin tried to parry
MATER appellant's stabbing thrust but failed. Appellant hit Edwin
straight in the chest. When Edwin managed to stand up,
Sirs and Mesdames: appellant stabbed him another time, shouting "Mamatay ka
na" After dealing the second blow, appellant walked out. He
(Dante) clearly saw the incident since he was only about three
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a (3) meters away from the two (2) protagonists. [7]
Resolution dated November 28, 2019 which reads as follows:
PO1 Rodel Buenaventura together with Barangay Tanods
"G.R. No. 225063- (People of the Philippines vs. Angel Manolito Lagahit and Cesario Loazada, responded to the
Julio y Mater) incident and scoured the area to track down appellant whom
they eventually sighted in an alley. Right there and then, POl
This appeal assails the Decision [1] dated June 29, 2015 of the Buenaventura arrested appellant.[8]
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06706 affirming the
trial court's verdict of conviction for murder against appellant Meanwhile, Edwin was rushed to the Las Pifias District
Angel Mater Julio alias "Bogel." Hospital then to the Pasig General Hospital where he died. [9]
The Facts and the Plea The prosecution offered in evidence the Investigation
Report, Sinumpaang Salaysay of Pastor Miranda (father of
By Information dated August 16, 2010, appellant was charged Edwin), Sinumpaang Salaysay of Dante Santos, Pinagsamang
with murder for the death of Edwin Santiago Miranda, viz.:  Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aresto of PO1 Buenaventura
That on or about the 1st day of October (sic) 2012, in the City and barangay tanods Lagahit and Loazada, Death Certificate
of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within [the] jurisdiction of the of Edwin, Certificate of Post-mortem Examination,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without photographs of the victim, and list of expenses. [10]
justifiable motive, with intent to kill, and with treachery,
evident premeditation, and use of superior strength, did, then Version of the Defense
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and use personal violence upon one EDWIN Appellant testified that on October 1, 2012, he celebrated his
SANTIAGO MIRANDA, by then and there stabbing him for sixtieth (60th) birthday with his compadres at his nephew's
several times on the different parts of his body, thereby house which is about a five (5) to ten (10)-minute walk from
inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which directly Padrino's. They had already consumed two (2) big bottles of
caused his death. Emperador Light before they proceeded to the Padrino's Bar
for their singing spree. There, he saw Edwin holding the
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] microphone. He knew Edwin had the habit of teasing and
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 275, mocking him whenever he and his grandchildren pass by
Las Piñas City. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Edwin's house. So to avoid any contact with Edwin that night,
[3]
 During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (1) he chose a table for him and his friends that was not too close
the jurisdiction of the court; (2) the identity of accused- to Edwin's.[11]
appellant; (3) if SPO1 Edwin Amutan and PO3 Mark Tino
were placed on the witness stand, they will testify in That evening, he consumed three (3) to four (4) bottles of San
accordance with their Investigation Report; (4) if Manolito Miguel Light. Later in the night, Edwin approached their table
Lagahit, Cesario Loazada, and PO1 Rodel Buenaventura were and asked Ed Reyes to sing. Ed obliged. After his number, Ed
placed on the witness stand, they will testify in accordance returned the microphone to Edwin. Then, he (appellant) asked
with their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aresto; Edwin if he, too, could sing. Edwin replied, "Huwag ka nang
and (5) if Dr. Roberto Rey San Diego was placed on the kumanta," then cursed "putang ina mo!" and broke a bottle of
witness stand, he will testify in accordance with Edwin's beer. He stood up but passed out due to intoxication. The next
Certificate of Death and Certificate of Post-Mortem thing he remembered, he was in an alley about twenty (20) to
Examination.[4] twenty-five (25) meters away from the bar, confessing to his
brother Nemencio Julio that he may have done something
During the trial, the parties further stipulated on the expenses wrong. The police shortly arrived and handcuffed him.[12]
incurred by the victim's family for his wake and burial which
amounted to P142,263.00. The Trial Court's Decision

Version of the Prosecution By Decision[13] dated January 30, 2014, the trial court rendered
a verdict of conviction, thus:
Dante Santos testified that on October 1, 2012, around 11:30 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
in the evening, he was the supervisor on duty at the Padrino's rendered finding the accused ANGEL MATER JULIO @
Bar and Restaurant, Las Piñas City. There, the victim Edwin BOGEL GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Santiago Miranda and his friends were having a drinking murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
of the deceased Edwin Santiago Miranda the sums of maximum period to death, if committed with any of the
P75,000[.00] as civil indemnity, P50,000[.00] as moral following attendant circumstances:
damages, P30,000[.00] as exemplary damages, and 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
P142,263.00 (as) actual damages. the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The trial court found Dante's testimony to be consistent and xxxx
categorical when he identified appellant as the one who slayed 5. With evident premeditation
Edwin. It further appreciated treachery to have attended the
It requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2)
killing. It concluded that appellant's sudden and unexpected
the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by
attack gave no opportunity for Edwin to repel it or defend
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
himself.
of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing does not amount
to parricide or infanticide.[22]
As for evident premeditation, the trial court ruled that a fifteen
(15) minute gap from the time appellant got escorted out of the
Here, appellant vigorously disclaims the presence of the
bar until he came back was too short a time for him to have
second and third elements.
meditated or reflected upon his decision to slay his foe. It also
did not consider abuse of superior strength as attendant
Second Element:
circumstance.[15]
Appellant was positively identified
as the victim's assailant
The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Prosecution eyewitness Dante testified that after he escorted
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering the appellant out of the bar, the latter lingered on a few more
verdict of conviction despite Dante's alleged failure to minutes before he finally left for home. Appellant though
positively identify him as the assailant. Dante's attention could returned fifteen (15) minutes later, headed straight to, and
not have been entirely focused on him since there were other stabbed Edwin in the chest, uttering "Patay ka ngayon."
customers present in the bar that night. Also, Dante could not Although Edwin tried to parry the blow, he did not succeed.
have possibly witnessed the actual stabbing itself amidst the And when Edwin stood up, appellant stabbed him again
commotion and confusion that ensued.[16] blurting "Mamatay ka na."
Appellant further faulted the trial court for appreciating the Appellant, nevertheless, attacks Dante's testimony on two (2)
qualifying circumstance of treachery. According to the trial grounds: first, Dante could not have been entirely focused on
court, suddenness of the attack alone here did not equate to him since there were other customers present in the bar that
treachery. More, Edwin's heated altercation with appellant night; and second, the commotion caused by the stabbing
which preceded the stabbing incident should have already incident would have led to confusion, making it difficult, if not
sufficiently alerted Edwin about appellant's possible reprisal.
[17] impossible for Dante to have witnessed the stabbing incident.

The argument does not persuade.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
through State Solicitor Carlos G. Reynes countered that the To start off, appellant has not categorically denied the
prosecution had sufficiently established that treachery attended accusation that it was he who killed Edwin. All he said was he
the killing of Edwin.[18] passed out and the next thing he remembered was he was in an
alley confessing to his brother that he may have done
The Court of Appeals' Ruling something wrong. This statement is at best equivocal. Taken
in light of Dante's positive identification of appellant as the
The Court of Appeals affirmed through its assailed Decision one who slayed Edwin, appellant's statement equates to an
dated June 29, 2015. It held that the totality of the admission of guilt.
prosecution's evidence specifically Dante's eyewitness account
pointed to only one conclusion, i.e. - appellant's sudden and Be that as it may, records show that even in the midst of
unexpected attack on Edwin amounted to treachery which commotion and confusion, Dante did see up close the stabbing
qualified the killing to murder. incident involving the two (2) protagonists since he was only
about three (3) meters away when it all happened. Notably, he
The Present Appeal was already familiar with both appellant and Edwin because
he tried to pacify them earlier during their heated altercation
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and inside the bar. Thereafter, he even escorted appellant out.
prays anew for his acquittal. In compliance with Resolution Further, Dante was not shown to have been impelled by any
dated July 27, 2016,[19] both appellant[20] and the ulterior motive to falsely testify against appellant on such
OSG[21] manifested that in lieu of supplemental briefs, they heinous crime as murder. More important, both the trial court
were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of and the Court of Appeals gave credence to Dante's
Appeals. straightforward and consistent eyewitness account. Indeed,
when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the trial court's
Issue factual findings, calibration of the testimonies, and assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's anchored thereon are accorded the highest respect if not
conviction for murder? conclusiveness. Especially, when such findings carried the full
concurrence of the appellate court, as in this case. [23]
Ruling
On this score, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the correctly concluded that appellant's bare denial cannot prevail
Revised Penal Code, viz: over his positive identification by the prosecution eyewitness
ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within Dante. Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty evidence, is a negative and self-serving defense which carries
no greater evidentiary value than the declaration of a credible knife heading straight to him. This is precisely the reason why
witness upon affirmative matters. The Court has invariably Edwin was able to move to parry appellant's attack although
held that denial, to be credited, must rest on strong evidence of Edwin did not succeed. This simply goes to show that when
non-culpability on the part of the accused which is glaringly appellant suddenly launched his attack on Edwin, the latter
absent here.[24] was not totally defenseless, nay unable to defend himself or
evade the attack on his person. Surely, there is no treachery
Third element: when the victim is placed on guard, as when a heated
Treachery did not attend argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was
the killing standing face to face with his assailant. [30]

At the outset, while the Information here alleged that treachery In People v. Salvador,[31] the Court rejected the presence of
attended the killing of Edwin, it did not, however, aver the treachery due to the prior verbal altercation between therein
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery in appellants and Esicio Alonso inside a dance hall. The rough
violation of Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, viz.: argument continued outside the dance hall where appellants
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. - The acts or omissions ganged up on Esicio and the latter got fatally wounded. The
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying Court did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and treachery since the attack could not have been unforeseen.
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in Appellants therein were only convicted of homicide.
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged In any case, the prosecution here did not offer proof that
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for appellant purposely sought the means employed to insure the
the court to pronounce judgment. (9a) killing without harm to himself. In People v. Colonia,[32] the
Court ruled out treachery as attendant circumstance in the
Surely, the mere mention of the word treachery, without more,
killing of the victim since he was not totally defenseless. It
is nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of fact. [25]
was established that the victim and accused Eduardo had a
prior heated argument. This sufficiently forewarned the victim
In any event, failure to allege the factual circumstances
of the possible reprisal from Eduardo's group.
required in the Information is a ground for a motion to quash
under Section 3 (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court:
Likewise, in People v. Pilpa,[33] assailants attacked the victim
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The "accused may move to quash the
along a national highway while the latter was having a
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
conversation with five (5) other persons, including a barangay
tanod. Given these circumstances, the Court ruled that the
xxxx
assailants did not make any preparation to kill the victim in
such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
without risk to themselves. The victim was with five (5)
form;
persons who could have helped him as they had in fact helped
him repel the attack. The Court thus convicted appellant
xxxx therein of homicide only.
Too, a motion for bill of particulars [26] would have been proper
to address the insufficiency of the allegations in the Here, Edwin was having a drinking spree with his friends
Information. As it was though, appellant never filed a motion when appellant walked up straight to him and stabbed him to
to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars on this ground. death. The fact that appellant was in the company of friends in
Consequently, he is deemed to have waived the same. a busy establishment increased the risk against him. The Court
fails to see how the mode of attack appellant adopted could
In People v. Solar,[27] the Court modified appellant's have been purposely sought to guarantee the criminal act
conviction from Homicide to Murder for failure to raise the without risk to himself. In sum, the courts below erred in
insufficiency of the information by either filing a motion to appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance in this
quash for failure of the information to conform substantially to case.
the prescribed form or by filing a motion for bill of particulars.
Thus, he was deemed to have waived the defects in the The killing was not shown
Information. to have been evidently premeditated

The Court, therefore, now goes Into the evidence on record to For evident premeditation to be considered as qualifying or
determine whether treachery did attend the killing here. aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b)
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
defense which the offended party might make.[28] In fine, the overcome the resolution of his will.[34]
elements of treachery are: (a) the employment of means of
execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to Here, the trial court correctly ruled out the aggravating
defend or retaliate; and, (b) said means of execution were circumstance of evident premeditation in the absence of a
deliberately or consciously adopted.[29] These elements are sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
both absent here. execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution
Here, appellant's attack on Edwin was not unexpected at all. It of his will. The fifteen (15) minute difference from the time
was preceded by their heated verbal altercation early on inside appellant got escorted out of the bar until he stepped back into
the bar. Appellant also threw bottles and glasses inside the bar. the bar was too short for appellant to have meditated and
These preceding incidents should have already alerted Edwin reflected on the consequences of his decision to finish off the
that his life was at risk in the hands of this violent and enraged victim. In People v. Villanueva,[35] the Court did not
man right there and then or anytime soon. Notably, when appreciate evident premeditation since the time interval of
appellant walked back into the bar, Edwin was facing thirty (30) minutes between the altercation at the Highlander
appellant's direction and actually saw appellant arrive with a Store and the actual assault on Otoleo was too brief to have
enabled appellant Villanueva to ponder over the consequences G.R. CR HC No. 06706
of his intended action. is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Abuse of superior strength ANGEL JULIO y MATER is found guilty of Homicide and

is also absent here sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
Abuse of superior strength connotes a notorious inequality of (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous moral damages; and P142,263.00 as actual damages. These
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior finality of this resolution until fully paid.
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person SO ORDERED." Inting, J., designated as additional
attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance member per S.O. No. 2726 dated October 25, 2019.
depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. [36]

Here, the fact that appellant was armed and the victim was not
does not necessarily prove abuse of superior strength.
In People v. Villanueva and Sayson,[37] the Court held that the
fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia, armed with a
knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not automatically
merit the conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Similarly, that appellant was armed with a knife when he

returned to the bar and headed straight to Edwin and stabbed
him in the chest is not abuse of superior strength.

In the absence of any qualifying circumstance attendant to the

killing of Edwin Santiago Miranda, appellant may only be
convicted of homicide. Under Sections 4[38]and 5,[39] Rule 120
of the 1997 Rules of Court, when there is a variance between
the offense charged in the Information and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged. Since the prosecution was not able to prove any
qualifying circumstance here, the accused should only be
sentenced to the lesser crime of homicide which is necessarily
included in murder. At any rate, this variance between the
offense alleged and the offense proven did not violate
petitioner's substantial rights. Appellant's right to be informed
of the charge against him has not been violated because where
an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly
informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser
crimes or offenses included therein.[40]

Penalty

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is

punishable with reclusion temporal, viz.:
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be
punished by reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law[41] and in the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,,
appellant should be sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years (14), eight
(8)months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

On the monetary awards, the Court affirms the award of moral

damages of P50,000.00 and actual damages of P142,263.00.
[42]
 The award of civil indemnity of P75,000.00 must be
reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[43] On the other hand, the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 must be deleted since no
aggravating circumstance was proved. A six percent (6%)
interest per annum on the monetary awards is also imposed
from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated June 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
 amount as (may be) allowed by law.

CONTRARY to (and) in violation of R.A. 8353.[5]

The forty-four (44) Informations bore the following

details, viz:

xxx

The cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon.

Arraignment and Plea

On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all the

charges.[6] Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and jointly
tried.

During the trial, complainant AAA, her attending doctor

Rubee Ann Go-Gotil, her two aunts BBB and CCC, SPED
Teacher DDD, and sign language experts Joshua Asuela, Jr.
and Roygie Gantalao testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, appellant Dante Cubay alone testified for the defense.

The Prosecution's Version

[ G.R. No. 224597, July 29, 2019 ] Complainant is a congenital deaf mute.[7] Her hearing
impairment was classified as "profound" and her level of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF- education in formal sign language, low, i.e. that of a grade two
APPELLEE, VS. DANTE CUBAY Y UGSALAN, (2) pupil. But she is teachable in the informal or basic sign
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. language.
DECISION
In 2003, complainant started studying at XXX Special
Education (SPED) Center - a special school for children with
disabilities, i.e. mental, visual, and hearing impairment.[8] The
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
SPED Center and dormitory were located inside XXX
Elementary School, XXX, Bukidnon. The school required
The Case SPED students to stay in the dormitory. Complainant stayed in
the dormitory during school days and went home to her
grandfather's house at XXX, Bukidnon on weekends.[9]
This appeal[1] seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[2] dated November 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals Appellant is the school watchman assigned at XXX
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01145-MIN, which affirmed the trial Elementary School, XXX SPED Center, and the SPED
court's verdict of conviction[3] against accused-appellant Dante dormitory. His wife is the dormitory's caretaker. [10]
Cubay y Ugsalan for forty-four (44) counts of rape. Its
dispositive portion reads: Complainant's aunt, BBB is a SPED teacher in XXX SPED
Center.[11] One time, complainant's teacher DDD told BBB that
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Judgment she (DDD) saw complainant eating snacks with appellant. To
dated 30 January 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of quell rumors about complainant and appellant, BBB convinced
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 in Criminal Case Nos. her father (complainant's grandfather) to have complainant
08-05-3536 to 08-05-3579 finding accused-appellant Dante move in with her.[12] Complainant initially agreed but when her
Cubay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of forty-four (44) grandfather came to fetch her, she refused to go because she
counts of rape is AFFIRMED in toto. was afraid her grandfather would scold her. Three (3) days
later, she voluntarily went to her grandfather's house which
SO ORDERED.[4] was closer to the house of her other aunt CCC. [13]
The Informations
Complainant's physical and behavioral changes, including her
frequent headache and stomach ache aroused her aunts'
Appellant Dante Cubay y Ugsalan was charged with forty-four suspicion. Then CCC learned complainant had missed her
(44) counts of rape under separate Informations which, except menstrual period, CCC caused complainant to take a
for the material dates, uniformly read, thus: pregnancy test which yielded a positive result. [14] When asked
who the father of her child was and who molested her,
That on or about the 7th day of September, 2007, in the
complainant motioned the name "Dante," herein appellant. She
evening, at XXX, province of Bukidnon, Philippines
then charged appellant with rape before the XXX Police
particularly at the Special Education Dormitory (SPED) and
Station.[15]
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
With the assistance of sign language interpreters Joshua
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], (an) 18 year-
Asuela, Jr. and Roygie Gantalao, complainant testified that
old (who) suffered (a) physical defect (hearing impaired)
sometime in September 2007, while she was studying inside
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA] in such
her dormitory room, appellant entered her room, undressed
her, touched her body, and inserted his penis in her vagina. Complainant charged him with rape only because her aunt
She pushed appellant, but it was in vain. [16] The incident was BBB had threatened her.[28]
repeated several times, specifically on September 7, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28, 2007; The defense offered in evidence the stuff toy (Exhibit "1"); a
October 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, 2007 November 6, 7, 8, ladies' watch (Exhibit "2"); and a picture (Exhibit "3").[29]
9, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2007; December 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,
2007; and January 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 2008. The rape The Trial Court's Ruling
incidents happened at night during school days inside
complainant's dormitory room. Complainant consequently By Joint Judgment[30] dated January 30, 2013, the trial court
conceived and gave birth to a child in June 2009. [17] found appellant guilty of forty-four (44) counts of rape, thus:

On January 28, 2008, Dr. Rubee Ann Go-Gotil examined WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the court finds
complainant and found old healed hymenal lacerations at 3 DANTE CUB AY y Ugsalan GUILTY beyond reasonable
and 9 o'clock positions. She also confirmed complainant's doubt of rape of AAA for 44 counts and hereby sentences him
pregnancy. Her Living Case Report[18] contained her findings. to suffer the penalty each of RECLUSION PERPETUA in
Criminal Case Numbers 08-05-3536 up to Criminal Case No.
The prosecution presented as documentary evidence: Living 08-05-3579 and he is further ordered:
Case Report dated January 29, 2008[19] (Exhibit "A");
Certification dated January 30, 2008 [20] (Exhibit "B"); and A - To pay AAA -
Complainant's Sworn Statement dated January 27,
2008[21] (Exhibit "C"). 1. Civil Indemnity - Php 75,000.00 each for forty-four
counts of rape aforementioned;
The Defense's Version
2. Moral Damages - Php 50,000.00 each for 44 counts
of rape aforementioned;
Appellant denied the charges. He admitted he had sexual
congress with complainant for more than forty-four (44) times
3. Exemplary damages - Php 25,000.00 each for forty-
but asserted they were all consensual. Complainant filed the
four counts of rape aforementioned;
rape charges only because her pregnancy and illicit affair with
him brought embarrassment to her family.
B - In every case -
On February 27, 2007, he got employed as watchman of XXX
SPED School and Dormitory in XXX Elementary School. He 4. Recognition of the child of AAA;
worked from 7:30 in the evening until 4:30 in the morning and
resided in the school dormitory. His wife also worked and 5. To support the offspring of AAA; and
resided in the SPED dormitory as caretaker tasked to look
after the blind students. He met complainant on the same day C-
he got employed. She and her friend EEE frequently roamed
around the school premises and visited him in his post at night. 6. Pay the costs.
Complainant communicated with him through sign language
which EEE, a polio victim with no hearing impairment, would Accused is credited (for) his preventive detention at the
interpret to him.[22] PDRC-Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, and the remainder of his
penalties shall be served at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm,
On February 28, 2007, complainant spoke signs to appellant. B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, where he properly belongs.
EEE said complainant was telling him he was handsome and
she liked him. He knew complainant liked him because she SO ORDERED.[31]
even wrote him a letter which his wife had torn. Complainant The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
told him she wanted them to be friends even after he confided
to her he was already married. They had since become lovers.
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him
Complainant visited him in his post every night. She became
guilty of forty-four (44) counts of rape despite the
close to him and even gave him a stuff toy, watch, and a photo
prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond
of them together with dedication at the back. [23]
reasonable doubt. Appellant essentially argued: (1)
Complainant's testimony did not deserve credence as it was
On October 3, 2007, complainant went to his sleeping quarters
uncorroborated, implausible, and replete with inconsistencies.
and gave him a watch and a stuff toy. [24] Because of the heavy
More, complainant's testimony was only conveyed to the court
rains that night, his companion who occupied the quarters with
by sign language interpreters who were engaged by
him did not arrive. He told complainant to go home but the
complainant's family and who appeared biased in favor of the
latter refused and even slept beside him. Complainant pinched
prosecution. (2) The trial court erred in allowing the
him, then they started kissing, tickling, and hugging each
prosecution to propound leading questions on complainant. (3)
other. They eventually had sexual intercourse. Complainant
There was no rape because his sexual congress with
never resisted but consented to everything they did. She even
complainant was consensual, they being lovers. Although
sucked his lips when he inserted his sex organ into hers. After
complainant had impaired hearing, she was capable of giving
October 3, 2007, they had many more nights of sexual
consent to the sexual intercourse. She was already eighteen
congress in his quarters, all with complainant's full consent.
(18) years old during all their forty-four (44) sexual
Complainant was already of legal age when they started
encounters. She had normal mental faculties during all those
having sexual intercourse.[25] He had sexual intercourse with
times.[32]
complainant more than forty-four (44) times. [26] EEE and his
wife's male cousin named Rey knew about his sexual congress
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
with complainant as they, too, were lovers.[27]
through State Solicitor Alberto T. Talampas maintained that
the prosecution was able to prove to a moral certainty that prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his
appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant for forty-four substantial rights. (Emphasis added)
(44) times through force, threat, or intimidation. Her
consistent and positive identification of appellant as the man Here, appellant was charged with forty-four (44) counts of
who raped her prevails over appellant's self-serving denial and rape. The elements of rape are as follows: (1) the offender had
uncorroborated sweetheart theory.[33] carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender
accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when
the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
or when she was under twelve (12) years of age or was
demented.
By Decision[34] dated November 24, 2015, the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
We quote anew the forty-four (44) separate Informations,
which except for the material dates, uniformly read:
The Present Appeal
That on or about the 7th day of September, 2007, in the
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and evening, at XXX, province of Bukidnon, Philippines
prays anew for his acquittal. In compliance with particularly at the Special Education Dormitory (SPED) and
Resolution[35] dated July 13, 2016, both appellant and the OSG within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
manifested[36] that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
adopting their respective briefs before the Court of Appeals. feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], (an) 18 year-
old (who) suffered (a) physical defect (hearing impaired)
Issues against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA] in such
amount as (may be) allowed by law.
Did the Information validly charge the crime of rape?
CONTRARY to (and) in violation of R.A. 8353.[41]
Assuming the affirmative, was the prosecution able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the forty-four (44) counts of rape? The Informations conspicuously lack the second element of
rape, i.e. the accused employed force or intimidation, or that
Ruling the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve
(12) years of age, or was demented.
The Informations do not charge the crime of rape.
Surely, being a deaf-mute does not necessarily take the place
The principal purpose of an Information is to ensure that the of the element of force or intimidation or having been
accused is formally informed of the facts and acts constituting deprived of reason, unconscious, or demented. The allegation
the offense charged[37] in accordance with the rights of the that "the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
accused enshrined in the Constitution.[38] Toward this end, the feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, an 18 year-old
Rules of Court requires that the Information clearly accurately (who) suffered a physical defect (hearing impaired) against her
allege every element of the offense charged. Section 6, Rule will, xxx" does not equate to force or intimidation either.
110 pertinently provides:
In fine, the Informations do not validly charge the crime of
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A rape or any offense at all. The same, for sure, cannot be the
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of basis of a valid judgment of conviction.
the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; We are not unmindful of the rule that by his plea, an accused
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the is deemed to have waived all objections to the information.
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense This rule, however, is correct only insofar as formal objections
was committed.[39] (Emphasis supplied) to the pleadings are concerned. By express provision of
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and by established
Where the Information is insufficient, it cannot be the basis of
jurisprudence, the validity of the Information vis-a-vis the
any valid conviction. Quimvel v. People of the
essential issue of whether or not it sufficiently charges an
Philippines[40] decrees:
offense goes into the very foundation of jurisdiction, hence,
The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be may be raised and addressed at any stage of the proceedings.
set out in the Information is to enable the accused to suitably Sections 9 and 3 of Rule 117 relevantly provide:
prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
therefor. - The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
charged are substantial matters and the right of an
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
accused to question his conviction based on facts not
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
alleged in the information cannot be waived. As further
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
explained in Andaya v. People:
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3
No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of of this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense unless it is charged in the information on which he Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the
is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense
against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the
allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and offense charged;
 information would not amount to a waiver of any objection
xxxx based on said ground or irregularity. (Emphasis supplied)

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; So must it be.
and
The elements of rape were not established
xxxx
Even assuming the Informations validly charged the crime of
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or rape, a verdict of acquittal here is still in order.
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In convicting appellant of forty-four (44) counts of rape, the
(Emphasis supplied) trial court and the Court of Appeals mainly relied on
complainant's testimony on direct and cross. The full text of
In some cases, the Court considered the omission of the her testimony reads:
essential element of "force or intimidation" to be non-fatal in
view of its recital in the complaint itself which at any rate Q: Do you recall what did Dante do to you?
formed part of the Information.[42] A: Yes Dante entered my room and I was raped by Dante.[45]

But this is not the case here. Both the Information and xxx xxx xxx
Complaint did not allege the essential element of "force or Q: Where did this happen?
intimidation," specifically, that the accused employed force or
intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, A: In the room in the dormitory where I was sleeping.
unconscious, under twelve (12) years of age, or was demented.
Q: When you said rape, what do you mean by that?
For easy reference, the Complaint reads, thus:
A: Undressed, touched my body and then I pushed him, I was
The undersigned offended party, hereby accuses Dante U.
afraid.
Cubay, 40 years old, married a caretaker of XXX Central
School, a resident of XXX, Bukidnon for the crime of RAPE, Q: You mean he inserted his penis to your vagina?
committed as follows, to wit:
A: Yes sir.[46]
That every ten (o'clock) in the evening during school days of
xxx xxx xxx
September 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 2007, October 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 2007, Q: Now, if you can recall, how many times did he rape you?
November 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2007, December 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 2007 and January 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 2008 at SPED A: September, October, November, December and January.[47]
Dormitory, XXX, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and xxx xxx xxx
within the (jurisdiction) of this Honorable Office of the
Department of Justice, the (above-named) accused did then Q: And do you recall if these incidents of rape happened
and there willfully, unlawfully, maliciously intend and with during school days?
lewd desire rape the minor who is a hearing impaired and had A: Yes sir.[48]
given her money and other things thus sex was not freely
given. The thing speaks for itself. On the whole, AAA's testimony is
noticeably terse, vague, equivocal, and seriously wanting in
CONTRARY TO LAW, under ART. 335 of the RPC.[43] details pertaining to the presence of the essential element of
To repeat, an Information which does not sufficiently charge force or intimidation. AAA's testimony only bears the element
an offense is fatally defective and warrants the acquittal of the of carnal knowledge.
accused.
That AAA pushed appellant when he "undressed, touched my
[44]
Guelos v. People  explains the significance of the propriety body. . ., I was afraid" is at best equivocal. Again, this hardly
and sufficiency of the charge made in the information, viz: equates with "force or intimidation" within the penal provision
defining and penalizing rape.
In People v. Flores, Jr., as reiterated in the more recent cases
of People v. Pangilinan and People v. Dadulla, the Court For one, the act of pushing did not emanate from appellant but
ruled that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed from AAA. For another, "pushing" is equivocal subject to
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot different interpretations depending on the attendant
be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative circumstances. It may mean a gentle "no, " "not yet," "wait,"
that the complaint or information filed against the accused be "I am shy," "not here," and many more possible interpretations
complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must or meanings. One thing is sure though: under the attendant
fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have circumstances, it cannot be deemed sufficient proof
been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an of resistance or unconsented sex.
offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the complaint or information. In In any event, People v. Tionloc[49] decrees that resistance must
other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation be manifested and tenacious, viz:
of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no In People v. Amogis this Court held that resistance must be
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the
offense. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised resistance required and expected of a woman defending her
Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient,
an objection to the insufficiency or defect in the "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's
evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be
unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman Q: When you say hearing impaired child, who is a special
who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable child, you mean to say she is not a normal child?
silence of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual
A: Normal but she cannot hear and cannot talk that is why
contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged
they are called special because they are not like us that can
him with rape.
hear and can talk.
The short and long of it is this: The evidence on record
Q: In your lectures and in your dealings with her you treat her
indubitably show that then eighteen (18) year old AAA, albeit
as normal but they are not sensitive as to the use of her
she is a deaf-mute with low capacity to learn formal sign
sense of hearing?
language, is in truth, mentally capable of giving or
withholding consent. A: Yes Your Honor.

For even though AAA is a deaf-mute and certified to be only Q: So they are considered special in the sense that, they are
at Grade 2 level in formal sign language education does not normal but they could not hear?
mean she is suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or A: They cannot talk because they cannot hear.[55]
retardation which has the effect of hindering her capacity to
give consent. People v. Butiong[50] elucidates: Her relatives acknowledged her to be normal and capable of
engaging into romantic relations, albeit they opposed the idea
Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, as she was still studying at that time.[56]
provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the
eyes of the law of giving consent. xxx Q: But you considered (your) niece as normal except that she
has hearing impaired?
xxx  xxx  xxx A: Yes Sir.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Justice Aquino Q: Do you not want her happy and have relationship with a
discusses the concept of committing rape against the female's person who is of the opposite sex?
will or without her consent, to wit:
A: Maybe in that time. For me it is not proper time that she
engaged in that, because she still studying.[57]
xxx xxx  xxx
In another vein, AAA's broadly sweeping statement that "I
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental was raped . . . in September, October, November, December,
abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a and January" is a conclusion of law. On this score, We have
feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with consistently ruled that the victim's bare statement that the
an insane woman was considered rape. But a deaf-mute is accused raped her again on the succeeding dates is a
not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances conclusion of law which cannot serve as sole basis for
must be proven. Intercourse with a deaf-mute is not rape appellant's conviction. People v. Nuyte[58] lucidly teaches:
of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof
that she is an imbecile. xxx (Emphasis supplied) AAA's bare statements that appellant repeated what he had
done on her previously were not enough to establish beyond
Notably, AAA had reached Grade VI of elementary education reasonable doubt the incidents subject of Criminal Case Nos.
and her teacher assessed her to be an average student and a FC-00-781, FC-00-784 and FC-00-785. Said declarations were
normal child, viz:[51] mere general conclusions. The prosecution must endeavor to
present in detailed fashion the manner by which each of the
Q: Ms. AAA finished Grade 6 Elementary (Education) the crimes was committed. "Every charge of rape is a separate and
lessons you thought (sic) from the start of the school year distinct crime and each must be proved beyond reasonable
from June up to January? doubt." There is no reason why the foregoing principle should
A: Yes Sir.[52] not be applied in the aforementioned cases. Prescinding
therefrom, appellant should be acquitted in these cases.
xxx xxx xxx
To emphasize, sexual intercourse here between appellant and
Q: The education that you thought (sic) AAA include the AAA happened at least forty-four (44) times over only a
education on Morals and Values, is that correct? period of five (5) months. And through all these times, AAA
A: Yes Sir.[53] never complained. She did not even want to leave the
dormitory where all her forty-four (44) sexual encounters with
xxx xxx xxx appellant happened. She was even seen by one of her teachers
"eating snacks with appellant," hence her aunt BBB, also a
Q: Now in your teaching, you being instructor or teacher of
SPED teacher, proposed to AAA's grandfather to pull AAA
AAA as per your experience, can you consider her to be
from the dormitory and make her live with her (BBB) because
intelligent pupil?
she did not want ugly rumors to spread.[59]
A: Yes Sir.
Too, AAA testified she did not go with her grandfather the
Q: Meaning she can understand the lessons that you thought
first time the latter came to pull her out from the dormitory
(sic)?
because "he might scold her." For what? If we put it in
A: She is average in my assessment. context, it was because of the "ugly rumor spreading" about
her and appellant.
Q: But in your assessment, she could determine what is right
and what is wrong and what is good and what is bad? Finally, AAA revealed the supposed rape (forty-four [44]
A: Yes Sir. [54] counts altogether) only when her relatives discovered she was
pregnant.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing circumstances taken singly or collectively, are asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the cases
exculpatory evidence which compel no less than a verdict of against him considering that the elements thereof took place in
acquittal. Pasig City.

It is settled that in every criminal prosecution, the accused is On November 14, 2014, the RTC treated the Motion to
presumed innocent until the contrary is established by the Dismiss as a Motion to Quash and granted the same, but
prosecution. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing directed De Guzman to return the subject vehicle and gadgets
an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [60] Its evidence to Microlab within five (5) days from receipt of the Order. [3]
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. When the evidence fails to In a Decision[4] dated March 17, 2016, the Court of
establish all the elements of the crime, as in this case, the Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC ruling and
verdict must be one of acquittal.[61] remanded the case thereto for the hearing on the merits of its
criminal and civil aspect. First, the appellate court affirmed
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision the propriety of the appeal filed by Microlab instead of a
dated November 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, considering that
CR-HC No. 01145-MIN is REVERSED and SET the November 14, 2014 Order of the trial court granting De
ASIDE and a new one rendered ACQUITTING DANTE Guzman's motion to quash was a final order that disposes of
CUBAY Y UGSALAN of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 08-05- the case and terminates the proceedings with finality, and is
3536 to 08-05-3579. therefore, properly reviewable by appeal. Second, the CA held
that the RTC erred in sustaining the motion to quash because it
The Court ORDERS the Superintendent of the Davao Prison considered a ground which was not raised by De Guzman
and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte to immediately therein. While De Guzman raised the sole ground of lack of
release DANTE CUBAY Y UGSALAN unless he is being jurisdiction, the trial court granted the motion on the ground
detained for some other cause; and to submit his compliance that the facts raised in the complaint do not constitute an
report within five (5) days from notice. offense, reasoning that the element of taking without consent
of the owner does not exist. Third, contrary to De Guzman's
Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately. assertion, the CA maintained that the trial court had territorial
jurisdiction over the cases since Microlab's place of business is
SO ORDERED. in Pasay City, the same office where the subject properties
were assigned to De Guzman. Fourth, the CA also held that
contrary to the ruling of the RTC, De Guzman was properly
indicted for the crimes charged. De Guzman only had material
possession over the subject properties entrusted to him as an
employee of Microlab, hence, his failure to return the same
despite demand constituted theft since his possession turned
into an unlawful one. In legal effect, therefore, the two (2)
informations for theft and carnapping still stand due to the trial
court's error in quashing the same, without prejudice to the
[ G.R. No. 227266, July 23, 2018 ] trial on the merits.

EMMANUEL R. DE GUZMAN V. PEOPLE OF THE Further, in a Resolution[5] dated September 19, 2016, the CA
PHILIPPINES AND MICROLAB rejected De Guzman's assertion that Microlab had no legal
standing to appeal the case because the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) had no participation in the filing of the appeal.
Sirs/Mesdames: According to the appellate court, the exceptions to said general
rule applies in this case, namely: (1) that there was a denial of
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a due process to the prosecution when the handling prosecutor
Resolution dated 23 July 2018 which reads as follows: deliberately failed to make the needed indorsement to the OSG
for the filing of the appeal even as he consistently affixed his
"G.R. No. 227266 (Emmanuel R. De Guzman v. People of conformity in the notice of appeal, brief, and reply; and (2)
the Philippines and Microlab). - In two (2) that the trial court committed grave error when it abated and
Informations[1] filed before the Regional Trial dismissed the informations on grounds not stated in the motion
Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, petitioner Emmanuel to quash. Finally, the CA ruled that double jeopardy has not
De Guzman y Raflores, a business development manager of set in since the element that the dismissal was without the
respondent Microlab, a company engaged in the business of accused's express consent is lacking in view of the fact that
indenting and importing hospital and medical equipment and here, the case was dismissed upon De Guzman's filing of his
instruments, was charged with the crimes of Theft under motion to quash.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and Carnapping under
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known Consequently, De Guzman filed the instant petition invoking
as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, for unlawfully taking and the following arguments: (1) only the OSG, and not the private
stealing, on September 15, 2013, one (1) Apple Ipad-2 worth offended party, may represent the People on appeal; (2) the
P40,990.00, one (1) Blackberry 9790 cellphone worth instant case does not fall among the exceptions to said general
P18,160.08, and one (1) Hyundai i10 GL, 2013 model, service rule; (3) the Morillo[6] case does not apply here for in the
car, all owned by Microlab. According to the prosecution, De instant case, trial on the merits has not ensued and that here,
Guzman was entrusted with said properties as perks to his the OSG explicitly stated that the appeal should not have been
position. When he resigned in 2013, however, he refused to given due course since it did not file any appeal nor deputized
return the same despite demand from Microlab. Upon Microlab to file the same on its behalf; (4) Microlab should
arraignment, De Guzman pleaded not guilty. On September have filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules instead of an
16, 2014, De Guzman filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss [2]  appeal; (5) double jeopardy has already set in; (6) the trial
court was correct in granting relief other than that prayed for
in De Guzman's motion to dismiss since he prayed for "other
just and equitable reliefs;" (7) De Guzman's possession of the
properties is lawful; and (8) it was De Guzman, and not
Microlab, who was deprived of due process.[7]

The petition is devoid of merit.

After a cursory review of the findings of the appellate court,

the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the same. First, it
must be noted that Microlab correctly filed its appeal before
the CA instead of a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 in view of the fact that the RTC Order appealed from
was a final order that disposed of the case with finality.

Second, contrary to the assertion of De Guzman, the CA aptly

gave  due course to the appeal filed by Microlab even in the
absence of the  intervention of the OSG. True, the general rule
is that if a criminal case is  dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, the appeal must be  instituted by the OSG
on behalf of the State. Our pronouncement in Morillo v.
People, et al.,[8] however, provides exceptions for said rule
where the Court  permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the intervention of the  OSG, such as when there is
denial of due process of law to the prosecution  and the State
or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the 
State and the private offended party, when there is grave error
committed by  the judge, or when the interest of substantial
justice so requires. Such is the  case before Us. As duly found
by the appellate court, it is in the interest of  substantial justice
to give due course to Microlab's appeal due to the fact  that the
trial court gravely erred in granting De Guzman's motion to
quash,  resulting in a denial of due process to Microlab. This is
due to the fact that  for unknown reasons, the handling
prosecutor deliberately failed to transmit  the requisite
endorsement to the OSG, despite his continued conformity to 
the notice of appeal, brief and reply of Microlab. Equally
important is the  fact that the RTC, in contravention with the
express mandate of Section 2,  Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
which provides that in a motion to quash, the  court shall
consider no other ground than those stated in the motion,
granted  De Guzman's motion to quash, not based on the sole
argument of lack of  jurisdiction raised therein, but on the
premise that the facts in the complaint  do not constitute an
offense. To the Court, these circumstances warrant a 
relaxation of the rigid rules of procedure requiring only the
OSG to appeal  the case on behalf of the prosecution.

Third, there is no merit in De Guzman's contention that double

jeopardy has already set in. Double jeopardy attaches if the
following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant
was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was .
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
9 A perusal of the records of the instant case clearly shows
that the case was dismissed by the trial court at the instance of
De Guzman who filed a motion to quash. Thus, the fourth
element of double jeopardy is lacking as De Guzman's filing
of said motion constitutes his consent to the dismissal of the
case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

is DENIED for failure of Emmanuel R. De Guzman to show
any reversible error in the assailed CA decision.

SO ORDERED."
 Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in giving him undue preference,
benefit or advantage by processing and approving the loans of
a total of 491 of De Guzman's borrowers, amounting to
P241,053,600.00, under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program,
notwithstanding their lmowledge that the said borrowers were
neither qualified or under the territorial jurisdiction of the
Tarlac Field Office.[5]

It was also alleged that the said GSIS employees, using the
same modus, approved 53 borrowers of De Guzman's land
development project called Teresa Homes, amounting to
P52,107,000.00, despite their knowledge that the lots covered
were intended for commercial purposes and by causing over-
appraisal in the amount of P33,242,848.36 of the land and
improvements offered as collaterals.[6]

On September 15, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution, which found probable
cause to indict De Guzman and the said employees of GSIS
for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. De Guzman's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in its Joint
Order dated November 14, 2005.[7]

Initially, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Tarlac City. However, upon motion of GSIS, this was
withdrawn for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to
the Ombudsman's Order dated March 14, 2006. However, due
to the delay that attended the remand of the case records, the
two Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on September
19, 2011.[8]

On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute

resolution finding probable cause and directing the issuance of
warrants of arrest of all the accused. On. July 10, 2012,
Amado Inocentes (Inocentes), one of the indicted GSIS
employees, filed an Omnibus Motion (1) for determination of
probable cause; (2) to quash the Information against him; and
(3) to dismiss the case on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy disposition of cases. Inocentes' Omnibus Motion
was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
February 8, 2013. In due course, the accused posted their
[ G.R. Nos. 232693-94, August 23, 2017 ] respective cash bonds and were arraigned.[9]

JOSE Q. DE GUZMAN, JR. VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE Inocentes then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
PHILIPPINES, HON. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO, IN Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 205963-64 and
HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF entitled Inocentes v. People, assailing the denial'of his
SANDIGANBAYAN SEVENTH [7TH] DIVISION
Omnibus Motion. On July 7, 2016, the Court issued a
Decision,[10] which granted the petition for certiorari of
Inocentes. The Court opined that seven years had lapsed from
Sirs and Mesdames: the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the
filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan; that the
same is unreasonable and violates Inocentes' right to speedy
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a
disposition of his cases. [11]
Resolution dated 23 August 2017 which reads as follows:
On February 8, 2017, De Guzman filed a Motion to Dismiss,
"G.R. Nos. 232693-94 (Jose Q. De Guzman, Jr. vs. The [12]
 citing the Decision of this Court in Inocentes v. People. He
People of the Philippines, Hon. Alexander G. Gesmundo, in
insisted that the cases against him should likewise be
his capacity as Chairperson of Sandiganbayan Seventh [7th]
dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of the law of the case.
Division). - This is a Petition for Certiorari [1] under Rule 65 of
He further argued that Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules
the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
of Court, which essentially mandates that a favorable appeal
Resolutions dated March 20, 2017[2] and May 22,
by one of several accused affects all the accused, should apply
2017[3] issued by the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division in SB-
in his case.[13]
12-CRM-0127 to 0128.    
On March 20, 2017, the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division
In 2004, a complaint was filed with the Deputy Ombudsman
issued the herein assailed Resolution, [14] which, inter alia,
for Luzon, which essentially alleged that in October 2001,
denied De Guzman's motion to  dismiss  for being filed  out of
several employees[4] of the Government Service Insurance
time  and for lack of merit.     The     Sandiganbayan opined
System (GSIS) Tarlac Field Office conspired with Jose Q. De
that: (1) the doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable to the charges against him. He was insensitive to the implications
De Guzman's cases;[15] (2) De Guzman failed to raise his right and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed
to speedy disposition of cases against him at the earliest against him by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate
opportunity;[16] and (3) he is not similarly situated with the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the
Inocentes.[17] De Guzman sought a reconsideration of the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been
Resolution dated March 20, 2017,[18] but it was denied by the without his objection and, hence, impliedly with his
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[19] dated May 22, 2017. acquiescence.[22]

Aggrieved, De Guzman filed this petition for certiorari While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition
claiming that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although
in refusing to dismiss the cases against him despite the Court's this Court has always zealously espoused protection from
ruling in Inocentes v. People. oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party
involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual
In sum, the issue presented to the Court for resolution is rights should not work against and preclude the people's
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of equally important right to public justice. The delay in the
discretion in refusing to dismiss the cases against De Guzman. disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused, but the
people as well.[23] Since De Guzman has completely failed to
Ruling of the Court assert his right seasonably, it is only proper and equitable to
give the parties, the accused and the people, fair opportunity to
The petition is dismissed. obtain, and for the court to dispense, substantial justice.

A petition for certiorari, such as the one before the Court, will Moreover, the motion to dismiss filed by De Guzman with the
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved Sandiganbayan is essentially a motion to quash the
to exist.[20] The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross Information filed by the Ombudsman. It should be noted that a
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual violation of the right to speedy disposition  of cases  ousts  the 
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in prosecution   of its  authority to  file  an Information,[24] which
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an is a ground for the quashal of an Information under Section
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or 3(d) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. A motion to quash the
hostility.[21] In this case, there was no'hint of whimsicality or Information may be filed at any time before the accused enters
gross and patent abuse of discretion on the part of the his plea.
Sandiganbayan when it denied De Guzman's motion to
dismiss the charges against him. In this case, De Guzman has long entered his plea and is
already participating in the proceedings for the presentation of
As aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, De Guzman will not the prosecution's evidence when he filed his motion to
benefit from the provisions of Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of dismiss. Accordingly, De Guzman's motion to quash (in the
the Rules of Court, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken by guise of a motion to dismiss) is filed beyond the reglementary
one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did period.
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter." Simply put, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
Section 1 l(a) mandates that an appeal by one of several petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions
accused may benefit the other accused if the appeal is dated March 20, 2017 and May 22, 2017 issued by the
favorable and applicable to the rest of the accused. Sandiganbayan Seventh Division in SB-12-CRM-0127 to
0128 are AFFIRMED." (Caguioa, J., on leave.)
In seeking the benefit of Section 1 l(a), De Guzman points out
that in Inocentes v. People, the Court ordered the dismissal of
the criminal charges against Inocentes, who is one of the
accused in the cases before the Sandiganbayan. As pointed out
by the Sandiganbayan, the provision is specifically applicable
to an appeal from a judgment or final order. The action
brought by De Guzman before this Court is a special civil
action for certiorari, not an appeal.

More importantly, the Court notes that De Guzman only raised

his right to speedy disposition of the cases against him only in
February 2017, after he was already arraigned and only after
the Court has issued its ruling in Inocentes in July 2016. De
Guzman had ample opportunity to raise his right to speedy
disposition of cases as early as May 2012 when the
Sandiganbayan issued its resolution finding probable cause to
indict the accused in the case below. However, despite the
numerous pleadings filed by De Guzman, he failed to invoke
his right to speedy disposition of cases.

Unlike Inocentes who raised his right to speedy disposition of

cases at the earliest opportunity, i.e., a couple of months after
the Sandiganbayan's finding, of probable cause, in his
Omnibus Motion, which is essentially a motion to quash, De
Guzman invoked his right five years after. His silence for five
years amounts to a waiver of his right to speedy disposition of
 complainant Marilou G. Camba (Marilou) through the Baptist
Church in Meycauayan, Bulacan, of which they are all
members.[4]

Between August to October 1996, Ernesto and Marilou

entered into several transactions over several pieces of jewelry
to be sold by Ernesto for Marilou on a consignment basis.
Upon receipt of the jewelry, Ernesto would sign for the same
and try to sell the jewelry within two weeks. If he is able to
sell them for a price higher than what was indicated in the
receipt, he is entitled to receive the profits. Any unsold
jewelry, however, must be returned to Marilou at the end of
the two-week period. Thus, on August 12, 21 and September
2, 1996, the parties transacted over jewelry worth
approximately P148,050[5]

Nevertheless, on October 2, 1996, and without turning over

any proceeds or unsold jewelry, Spouses Moraga went to
Marilou's house to ask for more pieces of jewelry to sell.
When Marilou demanded that they first remit the proceeds or
return all the unsold jewelry subject of their previous
transactions, Elsie issued six checks amounting to P214,750.
Thereafter, Marilou agreed to give them additional pieces of
jewelry on the condition that Spouses Moraga either sell them
and remit the proceeds or return all unsold jewelry within one
week from receipt.[6]

On October 23, 1996, Elsie paid for one set of jewelry and
returned another set. Four sets, however, still remained in her
possession. When Marilou tried to deposit the checks issued
by Elsie, these were dishonored due to the closure of the
account. Marilou thereafter demanded payment from the
spouses.[7] When the latter failed to pay despite formal
demand, Marilou filed suit with the Office of the Prosecutor. [8]

In her complaint-affidavit,[9] Marilou alleged that she incurred

the following damages due to Spouses Moraga's failure to
return the jewelry or turn over the proceeds of their sale:
Date of transaction Amount of Damage
1. August 12, 1996 P73,900.00
2. August 21, 1996 35,650.00
3. September 2, 1996 16,500.00
4. October 2, 1996 50,000.00
Total P17[6],050.00[10]
In addition, Marilou claims to have paid P3 0,000 as
acceptance fee and P1,000 for every court appearance for the
services of her counsel.[11] She also testified that P170,000 out
of the initial P214,750 debt remained unpaid. [12]

In an Information dated May 14, 1997, Spouses Moraga were

[ G.R. No. 193866, September 14, 2017 ] charged with estafa by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Malolos, Bulacan.[13] The Information states:
SPOUSES ERNESTO M. MORAGA AND ELSIE C. That on or about the 12th day of August up to the 2 nd day of
MORAGA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES October, 1996, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, by
Sirs/Mesdames:
means of false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations,
received in trust from Marilou G. Camba assorted pieces of
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a jewelry valued at P214,750.00 for the purpose of selling the
Resolution dated September 14,2017 which reads as follows: same on commission basis, with the obligation of turning over
the proceeds of the same or returning the said pieces of
"G.R. No. 193866 (Spouses Ernesto M. Moraga and Elsie C. jewelry, if not sold, but the said accused, once in possession of
Moraga v. People of the Philippines).-This is a petition for the said pieces of jewelry and in[]spite of repeated demands to
review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated return the same or turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof,
September 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
CR No. 27728 which affirmed with modification the intent of gain and grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
Decision[3] dated August 6, 2003 of Branch 79 of the Regional misappropriate, misapply and convert to their own personal
Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. use and benefit the said pieces of jewelry valued at
748-M-97. The RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of P214,750.00, belonging to the said Marilou G. Camba, to the
estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal damage and prejudice of the said Marilou G. Camba in the
Code (RPC). said amount of P214,750.00.
Petitioners, spouses Ernesto (Ernesto) and Elsie (Elsie) Contrary to law.[14]
Moraga [collectively, Spouses Moraga], met private
Ernesto and Elsie were arraigned on December 1, 1997 [15] and Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 748-M-97 is AFFIRMED with
September 16, 1999,[16] respectively. Both pleaded not guilty modification in that accused-appellant Spouses Moraga are
to the crime charged.[17] Marilou testified for the prosecution hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
while the spouses appeared as witnesses for the defense. [18] years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
In his defense, Ernesto claimed that, save for two pieces of fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and pay
jewelry worth P41,000, he paid for all the pieces of jewelry he private complainant the amount of P175,050.00
received on August 2 and 21, 1996. [19] He admitted signing the
receipts prepared solely by Marilou but qualified that they SO ORDERED.[28] (Emphasis in the original.)
agreed that the jewelry will be paid in "4 gives." [20] Ernesto The CA held that conspiracy was established in this case since
averred that only three pieces of jewelry remain unpaid, Elsie not only accompanied Ernesto when he first obtained
valued at P20,000, P22,000, and P7,000, respectively, for a jewelry from Marilou, she herself later on asked for additional
total of P49,000.[21] He claims that he refused to pay for the pieces of jewelry from Marilou. Further, Elsie issued checks to
aforesaid jewelry because Marilou refused to issue the pay for the jewelry previously obtained by Ernesto. [29]
corresponding receipts.[22]
However, the CA agreed that Spouses Moraga should have
Elsie, on the other hand, admitted issuing checks on been charged with four separate crimes instead of one crime in
September 12, 1996 to settle Ernesto's liability to Marilou. a single information. Their acts were neither continuous nor a
Although these checks were dishonored, Elsie claims she was result of a single criminal intent or impulse, hence, it cannot
still able to pay Marilou the amounts covered by these checks, qualify as a continuous crime. [30] Notwithstanding such error,
only that the receipts evidencing her payment were lost. She the CA held that Spouses Moraga can no longer be convicted
also admitted taking pieces of jewelry worth P66,700 from of four separate crimes of estafa because they were only
Marilou on October 2, 1996 but that she only has a remaining charged with one crime in the Information. In any case,
unpaid balance of P50,000."[23] Spouses Moraga are barred from raising the defect in the
Information as an issue since they only raised it in their appeal
In its Decision[24] dated August 6, 2003, the RTC found to the CA. The CA opined that Spouses Moraga's failure to
Spouses Moraga guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive file a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash before
portion reads: their arraignment on the ground that they were charged with
RESPONSIVE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court more than one offense is a waiver of said ground. [31]
hereby renders judgment finding both accused Sps. Ernesto
Moraga and Elsie Moraga of #64 Sampaguia St., Michael Based on the evidence presented, the CA ruled that Spouses
Subd. Meycauayan, Bulacan GUILTY beyond reasonable Moraga were correctly convicted of estafa under paragraph
doubt of the Crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized under l(b) of Article 315, instead of paragraph 2(d).[32] It, however,
the provisions of Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised lowered the total amount of damages in concurrence with the
Penal Code, sentencing both accused as follows: Solicitor General, who averred that the amount of damages is
only P175,050 as opposed to the P191,050 imposed by the
(1. To suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six RTC.[33]
) (6) months and one (1) day of [Prision Correctional] as
minimum to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Spouses Moraga now
of [Prision Correctional] as maximum. However, as assail their conviction before us.
provided for under the Revised Penal Code, the accused
shall further suffer the penalty of imprisonment of sixteen The issues presented are:
(16) years because the law provides for additional one (1)
year of imprisonment for every ten thousand pesos
I. Whether the case should have been
(P10,000.00) in excess of twenty two thousand pesos
dismissed because of the defective
(P22,000.00) not to exceed twenty (20) years. So
Information; and
P191,050.00 less P22,000.00 equals P169,000.00 divided
by P10,000.00 equals P16,905 or sixteen (16) years.
  II. . Whether conspiracy between Spouses
(2. To indemnify the complainant Marilou G. Camba jointly Moraga was proven.
) the sum of P191,050.00 and;
  We deny the petition.
(3.
To pay the costs.
) I

Spouses Moraga do not contest the ruling of the CA that four

SO ORDERED.[25] (Emphasis in the original.) separate informations should have been filed instead of one.
Indeed, Spouses Moraga's receipt of several pieces of jewelry
The RTC found that: (1) Ernesto, per his admission, received
on separate dates constitute distinct, not continuing, crimes. A
from Marilou several pieces of jewelry to sell on consignment
continuing crime is a single crime committed through a series
basis; (2) only one set worth P22,000 was returned to Marilou;
of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.[34] As
(3) On October 2, 1996, Spouses Moraga convinced Marilou
aptly pointed out by the CA, each transaction entered into by
to give them additional pieces of jewelry by issuing checks as
Spouses Moraga constitutes a crime in itself. Our ruling
assurances of payment; (4) the checks issued to Marilou were
in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals[35] is apropos:
dishonored; (5) partial payment is not a defense to the
The abstractions were not made at the same time and on
consummated crime of estafa; and (6) novation is not a ground
the same occasion, but on variable dates[.] Each day of
for extinguishing criminal liability.[26]
conversion constitutes a single act with an independent
existence and criminal intent of its own. All the conversions
Spouses Moraga appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA.
are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal
resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by
In its Decision[27] dated September 17, 2010, the CA denied
itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying
the appeal and affirmed with modification the ruling of the
deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent
RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads:
cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". In the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision
above formulation of Cuello Calor, We cannot consider a
dated August 6, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 79, Malolos,
defalcation on a certain day as merely constitutive of partial automatically resulted to the dismissal of the criminal charges
execution of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised against them. Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 117 provide:
Penal Code. As earlier pointed out, an individual abstraction Sec. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion
or misappropriation results in a complete to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation . complaint or information be filed except as provided in
Private respondent cannot be held to have Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in
entertained continuously the same criminal intent in making custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no
the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent order is made or if having been made, no new information is
abstractions on the following days and months until December filed within the time specified in the order or within such
30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of further time as the court may allow for good cause, the
any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in
day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession custody for another charge.
and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise
only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to
business day but not in futuro since petitioner company another prosecution; exception. - An order sustaining the
operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the
could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits specified in Section 3(g) and (i) of this Rule.
to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be said that II
the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed only one
information for every single day of abstraction and bank The guilt of Ernesto for the crime of estafa under paragraph
deposit made by private respondent. The similarity of pattern 1(b), Article 315 was established in this case since all the
resorted to by private respondent in making the diversions elements thereof are present. [42] First, he received jewelry from
does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to Marilou for the purpose of selling it. Ernesto must turn over
divisible crimes.[36] (Italics in the original, underscoring the proceeds of their sale to Marilou; otherwise, he must return
supplied. Citation omitted.) the jewelry. Second, he failed to turn over either the proceeds
The CA duly observed that Marilou, in a letter [37] dated of the sale or the unsold pieces of jewelry to Marilou. Third,
November 15, 1996, already made a demand upon Ernesto to Marilou suffered damages as a result thereof. Fourth, Marilou
return the pieces of jewelry consigned to him under the first made a demand upon Ernesto to return the jewelry or turn over
transaction or turn over the proceeds of its sale. [38] Ernesto the proceeds of its sale, but such demand went unheeded.
failed to comply with the demand. Hence, all the elements of
the crime of estafa under paragraph l(b), Article 315[39] were Spouses Moraga, however, argue that Elsie's guilt for the
present even as to the first transaction alone. Since there are crime charged has not been proven. They assail the finding
four separate transactions involved, they should not have been that Elsie conspired with Ernesto to commit the crime
covered by one information. Four informations should have of estafa.
been filed instead.
The question of whether conspiracy was proven is
Under Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an accused undoubtedly a question of fact. Time and again, we have held
may move to quash the information when "more than one that save for certain exceptions,[43] a petition for review
offense is charged except when a single punishment for on certiorari should only raise questions of law. [44] None of
various offenses is prescribed by law." these exceptions were alleged or shown to exist by Spouses
Moraga. Thus, we defer to the factual findings of the RTC, as
Spouses Moraga claim that the prosecution has the burden to affirmed by the CA, given that they were in a better position to
correct the information and that its failure to do so is ground observe and determine matters of credibility of the witnesses,
for the dismissal of the criminal charges against them. having heard them and observed their deportment during trial.
[45]

We disagree.
In any case, we have gone over the records of the case and
First. There is nothing in the rules which provides that find no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the CA on
charging more than one offense in a single information is a the issue of conspiracy. Although the defense portrays Elsie as
ground for the outright dismissal of the criminal charge. [40] In a wife who merely helped her husband settle his debts, her
fact, absent any timely objection, the rules allow for a own testimony belies their claim of her lack of involvement in
conviction for as many offenses as are charged (in a single the transaction with Marilou:
complaint or information) and proved. Section 3, Rule 120 q- Why did you give [Marilou] those checks?
provides:    
When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint a- Because when I first got jewelries from her sir, I issued a
or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, checks (sic) for payment to the jewelries that I got on
the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged September 12, 1996.
and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense,    
setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each q- Can you clarify that, did I get it right that you get (sic)
offense. jewelries on Sept. 12, 1996?
   
Second. Section 9 of Rule 117 clearly states that, save for
a- That was the balance of Mr. Ernesto Moraga and she
specific exceptions,[41] failure of the accused to assert any
required me to issue check for that balance. [46] (Emphasis
ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
supplied.)
or information shall be deemed a waiver of said objection.
In proving conspiracy, the evidence must show a common
Spouses Moraga do not appear to allege that any of the
design or purpose to commit the crime among the co-
exceptions under Section 9, Rule 117 apply here; their failure
principals.47 In addition, it must be shown that each of the
to raise an objection under Section 3(f) of Rule 117 prior to
accused performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
trial was thus correctly deemed a waiver of the objection under
the conspiracy. Here, Elsie admitted that not only did she pay
such ground.
for the pieces of jewelry, she herself obtained them. Thus,
Spouses Moraga's claim that Elsie simply helped Ernesto is
Third. Even assuming that Spouses Moraga were able to
erroneous. Elsie herself has shown her active participation in
timely raise such an objection, this would not have
the crime charged. In fact, she was as vital to the success of
their ploy as Ernesto. Without her issuance of the checks,
Marilou would not have given Spouses Moraga additional WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 17,
pieces of jewelry or desisted from demanding the return of the 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
pieces of jewelry previously obtained. Clearly then, we cannot 27728 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
put the blame on Ernesto alone. petitioners-spouses Ernesto and Elsie Moraga are sentenced to
a penalty of imprisonment of two years, four months and one
III day of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to
The CA correctly modified the amount of damages to be paid pay private complainant Marilou G. Camba the amount of
by Spouses Moraga. The total amount, however, still needs P176,050.
further correction. While the CA held that the amount for the
August 12 transaction is what was indicated in the receipt, SO ORDERED."
which is P73,900,[49] it seems that it still used P72,900, one of
the figures given by Marilou in her testimony, [50] in computing
the total amount of damages. Thus, the CA held that the total
amount of damages is P175,050. The CA should have used the
amount of P73,900 instead, which should then result in the
correct sum of damages of P176,050.[51] Consequently, a
modification of the amount of damages that Spouses Moraga
should pay is in order.

The term of imprisonment imposed should likewise be

modified. The CA imposed an indeterminate penalty of two
years, four months and one day to four years and two months
of prision correccional as minimum to 15 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. As held in People v. Temporada:[52]
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00,
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum.
The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or
anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium
(i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for
the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional since this is within the range of prision
correccional minimum and medium.

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the

prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year
of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20
years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum is not prision mayor minimum as apparently
assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period
in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this
procedure, the maximum period of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental
penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the
court.[53] (Italics in the original, citations omitted.)
Since it is within the minimum term imposable for estafa in
accordance with Temporada, the CA correctly imposed the
minimum term of imprisonment at two years, four months and
one day to four years and two months of prision correccional.

With respect to the maximum term of imprisonment, an

additional year of imprisonment shall be imposed for every
P10,000 in excess of P22,000. However, the maximum term of
imprisonment shall in no case exceed 20
years. Temporada instructs that the incremental penalty is
computed by deducting P22,000 from the amount defrauded.
The difference shall then be divided by P10,000.[54] Here, the
amount involved is P176,050. The difference between said
amount and P22,000 is P154,050. The difference divided by
P10,000 results in an additional penalty of 15 years of
imprisonment. After adding that to the prescribed maximum
period, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed should
be increased to 20 years.
 Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a
Resolution dated January 29, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 237211 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-

Appellee, v. Albit Humiding, Accused-Appellant). - Assailed
in this appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated 31 August 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08471, which
affirmed the Decision[3] dated 02 May 2016 of Branch 14,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao, in Crim. Case
No. 2043, and found accused-appellant Albit
Humiding[4] (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) committed against the victim, John
Dulladul (John).

Antecedents

In an Information dated 27 February 2012, accused-appellant

was charged with murder, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the afternoon of February 23, 2012 at

Mompolia, Hingyon, Ifugao, and within the juridiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
treachery and with intent to kill, DID then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously hack one John Dulladul on
different parts of his upper body with the use of an Ifugao
bolo, resulting in the victim's instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, and to the damage and prejudice of

the victim's heirs.[5]

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[6] After

pre-trial,[7] trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On 23 February 2012, Lopez Indopia (Lopez) called on his

neighbors, Pilando Payyudon (Pilando), Manuel Pugong
(Manuel), Lopez Lunag (Lunag), John Duladul (John) and
accused-appellant, for a numpadang-a or bayanihan. Lopez
solicited his neighbors' help in hauling lumber from the forest
to his house at Luhadan Brgy. Mompolia, Hingyon, Ifugao. [8]

Lopez prepared food and drinks for the occasion. [9] After

having some food and drinks, a few of the neighbors left
Lopez, John and accused-appellant who continued conversing
with each other. During this time, John asked for tobacco from
Lopez, who stood up and went inside his house to get some. [10]

On the way to Lopez' house, accused-appellant took

a bolo hanging from the wall of Berlinda Pugong's (Berlinda)
house. As Lopez was about to give John the tobacco, accused-
appellant struck John with the bolo from behind without
warning, causing the latter to fall. [11] Accused-appellant hacked
the victim again while the latter was lying on the ground.
[12]
 Lopez asked accused-appellant why he attacked John, but
__________ with nary a word, the latter turned toward Lopez and
attempted to hack him. Fearing for his life, Lopez ran away.
[13]
[ G.R. No. 237211, January 29, 2020 ]  Meanwhile, John succumbed to multiple hack wounds on
the upper part of his body.[14]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, V. ALBIT HUMIDING, ACCUSED- Upon report of the incident, police officers, including SPO1
APPELLANT Edward Nanglegan (SPO1 Nanglegan), responded to the crime
scene. They interviewed witnesses who confirmed that
accused-appellant killed John.[15]
Sirs and Mesdames:
While searching for accused-appellant, police officers heard a
loud voice some 150 meters away. [16] They tracked the voice
from a forested area, where they found accused-appellant
lying down. SPO1 Nanglegan recognized accused-appellant The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a
and arrested him for the killing of John.[17] court appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the
requisites of an offense. It is a fundamentally factual issue.
Version of the Defense This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. This Court only
undertakes a factual calibration of the case in the following
The defense offered the lone testimony of accused-appellant. exceptional instances: (1) when the inference made is
While admitting that he participated in the bayanihan, manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is
[18]
 accused-appellant claimed that after their drinking session grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
at noon, he went to his grandfather's house, some 1.5 entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
kilometers from Lopez's house, to sleep off his drowsiness. judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension
[19]
 He was thus surprised when the police officers came to his of facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
grandfather's house later that day to arrest him. He voluntarily went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
went with them to the police station.[20] the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
Ruling of the RTC evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
On 02 May 2016, RTC[21] found accused-appellant guilty disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
Also, the RTC ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
[25]
John the amounts of: 1) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2)  None of these instances was shown to exist in this case.
Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) Php30,000.00 as There is no indication that the trial court overlooked,
exemplary damages. misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Its findings were likewise affirmed
The RTC found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to prove by the CA. Hence, this Court defers to the RTC in this respect,
that John was killed by accused-appellant. It also concluded especially considering that it was in the best position to assess
that John's killing was attended with treachery since he was and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by
unsuspectingly attacked by accused-appellant from the back, both parties.[26]
depriving him of any chance to defend himself. Finally, it
disregarded accused-appellant's denial and alibi since he was At the onset, this Court sees no merit in accused-appellant's
positively identified by both Lopez and Berlinda as John's argument questioning the sufficiency of the allegations in the
killer. information. In the recent case of People v. Solar,[27] this Court
pronounced that the Information must specify the ultimate
Ruling of the CA facts related to the qualifying or aggravating circumstance
alleged therein. Otherwise, the Information may be subject to
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings and ruled that a motion to quash, or a motion for bill of particulars. Hence,
treachery was sufficiently proven based on the swiftness of mere allegation of the attendant qualifying circumstance of
accused-appellant's attack, depriving John of any opportunity "treachery," without stating the ultimate facts, or without
to defend himself. John had no idea that accused-appellant referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding
would hack him as they were part of the bayanihan, and they probable cause against the acccused, and attaching the same to
were even drinking with each other prior to the attack. Neither the Information, as in this case, is no longer sufficient.
did it appear that John provoked accused-appellant or had an
altercation with the latter.[22] This Court likewise ruled in Solar that insofar as judgments or
decisions which are pending appeal, the same shall be judged
The CA dismissed accused-appellant's objection to the depending on whether the accused waived the right to question
sufficiency of the information. It concluded that the the defective statement of aggravating or qualifying
allegations in the information against accused-appellant were circumstance in the Information.
sufficient to apprise him of the nature of the charge against
him and enable him to formulate his defense of denial. The Under Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an accused
appellate court also ruled that accused-appellant's objection to may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
the information was raised late in the proceedings. It opined properly plead and prepare for trial.[28] Likewise, Rule 117
that accused-appellant should have carried out his objection thereof allows an accused to file a motion to quash a patently
through a motion to quash before arraignment. [23] insufficient or defective information.[29] In both instances, Our
procedural rules require the accused to avail of these remedies
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction with prior to arraignment. Hence, in order to successfully object to
modifications in that: 1) accused-appellant is not eligible for the Information, the objection must not only be meritorious,
parole; 2) the award of exemplary damages is increased from but must also be timely exercised.
Php30,000.00 to Php75,000.00; 3) temperate damages in the
amount of Php25,000.00 is likewise awarded; and 4) all the In this case, this Court notes that accused-appellant belatedly
damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six raised his objection to the sufficiency of the allegations in the
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Decision until Information. Not only did accused-appellant fail to move for a
fully paid.[24] bill of particulars or quash the information before his
arraignment, he also participated in the trial and only raised
Hence, the present appeal. his objection to the Information on appeal. Certainly, this
Court cannot accord merit to accused-appellant's plea without
Ruling of the Court unduly prejudicing the State, which, on account of accused-
appellant's failure, was also deprived of the opportunity to
The appeal lacks merit. amend the Information[30] or submit a bill of particulars. [31]
We now discuss the propriety of accused-appellant's eyewitnesses establishes, with moral certainty, that accused-
conviction. After reviewing the records, this Court is appellant treacherously took John's life. Hence, his conviction
convinced that accused-appellant's guilt has been established for murder must stand.
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of Lopez and
Berlinda clearly narrated how accused-appellant suddenly As to the penalty, the CA included in the dispositive portion of
attacked John with a bolo until the latter succumbed to his its decision, the phrase, "appellant is NOT ELIGIBLE for
death. Accused-appellant has not proferred any reason for parole."[41] In accordance with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC,[42] the
Lopez and Berlinda to falsely testify against him. [32] On this phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be used to
note, this Court likewise agrees with the RTC's observation qualify the penalty imposed on accused-appellant if there is no
that for a small and tight-knit community, it is against human aggravating circumstance that would warrant the imposition of
nature for neighbors to falsely accuse a fellow resident of the death penalty. It is already understood that convicted
killing someone therefrom.[33] persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible
for parole. Since no such modifying circumstance, other than
Accused-appellant's alibi and denial that he immediately left treachery, was established in this case, the phrase "appellant is
after the drinking session with Lopez and John and that he was NOT ELIGIBLE for parole" should be deleted.
in his grandfather's house when the killing happened is
worthless in the face of positive identification. [34] Alibi and Furthermore, the CA's award of temperate damages in the
denial are outweighed by positive identification that is amount of Php 25,000.00 should be increased to Php
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the 50,000.00. In People v. Jugueta,[43] this Court fixed the amount
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and of Php 50,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder
denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight presented in the trial court.
in law.[35] In this case, the RTC and CA did not err in
disregarding accused-appellant's denial since he failed to WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
present any other evidence to corroborate the same. Accordingly, the Decision dated 31 August 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08471, finding accused-
Likewise, even if this Court assumes that accused-appellant appellant Albit Humiding GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
was indeed in his grandfather's house after the drinking of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
session with John and the other participants in the bayanihan, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and
physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been is ORDERED to pay the heirs of John Dulladul the amounts
present at the time of the commission of the crime. For a of Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as moral
defense of alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must prove not damages, Php 75,000.00 as exemplary damages and Php
only that he was somewhere else when the crime was 50,000.00 as temperate damages. Legal interest of six percent
committed but he must also satisfactorily establish that it was (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. [44]
time of its commission.[36] Physical impossibility refers to
distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and SO ORDERED."
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. It
must be demonstrated that he was so far away and could not
have been physically present at the crime scene and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[37]

In the past, this Court has declared that the distances of two
(2), three (3), or even five (5) kilometers were not too far to
preclude the possibility that the accused was present at
the locus criminis. Accused-appellant himself admitted that his
grandfather's house is only 1.5 kilometers away from Lopez's
house.[38] In the absence of any other evidence supporting
accused-appellant's alibi, this Court cannot deem it physically
impossible for accused-appellant to have killed John before
staying at his grandfather's house.

With respect to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, this

Court shares the RTC and CA's view. Berlinda saw accused-
appellant get the bolo from her house and hack John from the
back, causing him to fall to the ground. Lopez was also
surprised when he witnessed accused-appellant suddenly strike
John with a bolo. From these circumstances, it can be deduced
that John had no clue that he would be attacked by accused-
appellant. Jurisprudence posits that a swift and unexpected
attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without
risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an
indication that treachery is present.[39] The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.[40] To this Court, the narration of the two (2)
 Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a
Resolution dated November 20, 2019, which reads as follows:

“G.R. No. 237203 (People of the Philippines v. Gerardo dela

Peña y Valencia) – This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside
the Decision[1] dated 26 September 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06835, which affirmed
with modification the Judgment[2] dated 12 February 2014 of
Branch 38, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines
Norte, finding Gerardo V. Dela Peña (accused-appellant)
guilty of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Antecedents

Accused-appellant, along with his co-accused, Armenio Dela

Peña (Armenio), and five (5) unnamed suspects, were charged
with murder under an Information[3] dated 03 August 2001, to
wit:

That on or about 11:00 in the evening of April 29, 2001 at

Barangay Manlucugan, municipality of Vinzons, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed
with a Cal. 45 pistol, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot one Melchor [dela] Peña y Jordas on his
left face and neck which caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage of the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

It was only in 2013 when accused-appellant was arrested. On

arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty, [4] and trial on the
merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Prosecution witness Pedro Dela Peña (Pedro) testified that on

21 April 2001, he and his brothers, Melchor, Alex, and Robert,
all surnamed Peña, went to Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons,
Camarines Norte, to celebrate the town fiesta. At around 11:00
pm, while watching the party from outside the dance hall with
his barrio mates, he saw Melchor standing near a well-lit
pavement about three (3) meters away. Their uncle, accused-
appellant in this case, suddenly appeared on Melchor’s right
side, and touched Melchor’s shoulder. Accused-appellant then
moved to the left, took out his .45 caliber pistol, and shot
Melchor on his left cheek. When Melchor fell to the ground,
Armenio, now deceased, shot him on the nape using a .45
caliber pistol.[5] Accused-appellant and Armenio were
accompanied by five (5) unidentified men as their back-up. [6]

Pedro’s testimony was corroborated by Alex, who also

witnessed the shooting, as he was standing five (5) meters
away from the incident. He testified having clearly seen the
shooting because of the light coming from the electric post. [7]

Pedro and Alex alleged that Gerardo and Armenio were

[ G.R. No. 237203, November 20, 2019 ] members of the New People’s Army, who suspected Melchor
of being an intelligence asset of the military, which prompted
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GERARDO DELA them to shoot the latter. [8]
PEÑA Y VALENCIA
Based on the death certificate, Melchor’s cause of death was
hemmorhagic shock due to gunshot wound.[9]
Sirs and Mesdames:
Version of the Defense

Emilio Abejoro, then Chief Tanod for Barangay Manlucugan,

was assigned to secure the dance celebration. He testified that Pedro and Alex, were detailed, consistent, candid and
on the date and time of the incident, he was at the gate of the straightforward in stating that they saw how Melchor was shot
dance hall when he heard the gunshot. A commotion ensued by accused-appellant. On the other hand, accused-appellant's
and people ran away. He did not see Pedro among those bare allegation that their testimonies were too incredible to be
present at the dance hall, and only saw him thirty (30) minutes believed deserves no credit. Again, it is well-settled that the
after the incident.[10] trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
Ruling of the RTC effect, due to the unique opportunity afforded to these courts
to observe the witnesses in court and perceive their demeanor,
In a Judgment[11]  dated 12 February 2014, the RTC found conduct, and attitude.[22]
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, viz:
Contrary to accused-appellant's allegation, both witnesses
WHEREFORE,, the prosecution having proven beyond were able to positively identify him as the person who shot
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused Gerardo [dela] Peña Melchor on his left cheek. In light of the witnesses' positive
y Valencia of the crime of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to identification of the accused-appellant, the latter's
reclusion perpetua. Likewise, he is adjudged to pay the heirs uncorroborated defense of alibi and denial must fail. It is
of the victim the following damages: puzzling that accused-appellant himself did not even take the
  stand to deny the positive assertions of Pedro and Alex or to
xxx substantiate his defenses. [23] True, accused-appellant had the
SO ORDERED.[12] right to opt out of testifying on his own behalf. However, this
leaves the Court with no choice but to disregard his already
Ruling of the CA inherently weak defenses. It has been held time and again that
the defense of alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy
to contrive and difficult to disprove.[24] Likewise, a denial is
By a Decision[13] promulgated on 26 September 2017, the CA inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive
denied the appeal and affirmed with modification[14] the ruling declarations of eyewitnesses who testified on affirmative
of the RTC. The CA held that the prosecution succeeded in matters that the accused-appellant was at the scene of the
proving Gerardo's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It affirmed crime, and was the perpetrator thereof.[25]
the penalty imposed but modified the amount of damages
awarded as follows: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary It is also worth mentioning that the accused-appellant evaded
damages in the amount of PhP75,000.00 each, temperate arrest for more than ten (10) years. Flight is an indication of
damages[15] in the amount of Php50,000.00. All awards are guilt. Jurisprudence tells us that the flight of an accused, in the
subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from date of absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance
finality of judgment until fully paid to conform with recent from which an inference of guilt may be established. A truly
jurisprudence.[16] innocent person would normally grasp the first available
opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. [26]
Issue
Accused-appellant points out to the testimonies of Pedro and
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in Alex that Melchor was shot twice, once by accused-appellant
affirming accused-appellant's conviction for murder under on the cheek, and once by Armenio on the nape. To accused-
Article 248 of the RPC. appellant, this is inconsistent with the findings on the post-
mortem report and the certificate of death.[27] We disagree. It is
Ruling of the Court settled that a certificate of death merely establishes the fact of
death and its immediate, antecedent and underlying causes,
The appeal lacks merit. and is not meant to detail every injury sustained by the
deceased.[28]
To sustain a conviction for murder, as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the RPC,[17] the prosecution must Verily, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the following elements: (1) that a person was killed; establish the fact of the shooting, and the identity of the
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was accused-appellant as the perpetrator thereof.
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide Anent the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation
or infanticide.[18] and treachery, it is settled that in criminal cases, the State must
specifically allege in the information the details of the crime,
At the outset, it is important to note that the findings of the as well as the details of any circumstance aggravating the
trial courts are given the highest degree of respect, [19] and this accused's liability for the crime. It is no longer sufficient to
rule becomes even more compelling when the factual findings merely allege that the crime is qualified by "treachery" or
carry the full concurrence of the CA,[20] as in the instant case. "evident premeditation". The information must also contain
Such findings are final and conclusive on appeal, unless there supporting factual averments constituting the alleged attendant
is a demonstrable error in appreciation, or a misapprehension circumstances in the crime committed.[29]
of the facts as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
[21]
However, it also bears stressing that the procedural remedies
available to the accused who believes that the Information is
Accused-appellant, however, failed to substantiate any vague or defective must be availed of prior to arraignment.
circumstance to warrant a review of the findings of the RTC Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that
and the CA. the accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him to properly plead and prepare for
The CA correctly held that accused-appellant committed the trial.[30] Meanwhile, Rule 117 of the Rules allows an accused
crime of murder. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to file a motion to quash a patently insufficient or defective
information prior to arraignment.[31] To successfully avail of SALABAS, RESPONDENTS.
either remedy, the objection must not only be meritorious, but
it must also be timely exercised. [32] Here, accused-appellant [G.R. NO. 182090]
did not raise his objection to the sufficiency of the allegations
in the Information, thus, he is deemed to have waived the ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE SALABAS,
same. PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, HON.
MANUEL B. GAITE, P/INSP. CLARENCE DONGAIL,
P/INSP. JONATHAN LORILLA,[1] PO3 ALLEN
The Court is not convinced that evident premeditation was
WINSTON HULLEZA AND PO2 BERNARDO CIMATU,
established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to RESPONDENTS.
what transpired during the shooting. There was no evidence
adduced to show that the accused-appellant had decided to kill RESOLUTION
Melchor, that he had previously planned and prepared how to
commit the crime, and that sufficient time had lapsed between
the decision to commit the crime and the actual commission LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
thereof. Absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of
planning, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from the
qualify the offense.[33] October 2, 2006 Resolution[2] of Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzalez, ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros
As regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it is Oriental to file an amended Information for Kidnapping and
settled that the same must be proven by clear and convincing Murder against the following persons:
evidence. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods 1. P/Insp. Clarence Dongail;
or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and 2. Manolo G. Escalante;
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising 3. Ronnie Herrera;
from the defense which the offended party might make. [34] 4. SPO2 Freddie Natividad;
5. SPO4 Jimmy Fortaleza;
6. July ("Kirhat" Dela Rosa) Flores;
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that
7. Carlo "Caloy" De Los Santos;
the killing of Melchor was attended with the qualifying
8. PO1 Bernardo Cimatu;
circumstance of treachery. The testimonies of the witnesses of 9. PO2 Allen Winston Hulleza;
the prosecution established that the victim was merely 10. Insp. Jonathan Laurella;
standing, observing the dance party, and enjoying 11. Lorraine "Lulu" Abay;
the fiesta celebration, when the accused-appellant suddenly 12. Manerto Cañete;
approached him unprovoked, without warning and swiftly and 13. Elma Cañete
deliberately shot him, giving him no chance to defend himself, 14. Elson Cañete; and
retaliate, or escape. The essence of treachery is the sudden and 15. Jude Montilla[3]
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. [35] This From this Resolution, Jimmy Fortaleza and Freddie
is clearly present in the instant case. Natividad filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, while Clarence Dongail, Jonathan Lorilla, Allen
Indeed, the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating Winston Hulleza, and Bernardo Cimatu appealed to the
circumstance of treachery. Hence, the CA did not commit any Office of the President. When the Court of Appeals
dismissed[4] the Petition for Certiorari, Fortaleza and
reversible error in affirming the findings of the RTC that
Natividad filed a Petition for Review with this Court, which
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder beyond
was docketed as G.R. No. 179287. The Office of the
reasonable doubt. President, on the other hand, set aside the October 2, 2006
Resolution of the Department of Justice. To assail this
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is Decision[5] dated September 19, 2007 and the subsequent
hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 26 Resolution[6] dated January 9, 2008 denying her Motion for
September 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC Reconsideration, complainant Elizabeth Orola-Salabas filed a
No. 06835, finding accused-appellant Gerardo V. Dela Peña Petition for Certiorari with this Court which was docketed as
guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised G.R. No. 182090.
Penal Code, is AFFIRMED in toto.
The procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
SO ORDERED." (Leonen, J., on official business.)
Maximo Lomoljo, Jr., Ricardo Suganob, and Eleuterio Salabas
were allegedly kidnapped in Bacolod City on August 31,
2003. A few days later, their dead bodies were found in
different places in Negros Oriental. Several criminal
complaints were filed in relation to this incident. The first was
filed against Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Clarence
Dongail alias Dodong and fifteen other John Does before the
Bacolod City Prosecution Office. Investigating Prosecutor
Rosanna V. Saril-Toledano issued a Resolution dated October
24, 2003 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.
[ G.R. No. 179287, February 01, 2016 ]
On October 16, 2003, Elizabeth Orola-Salabas, wife of
Eleuterio, filed an Amended Criminal Complaint
PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA AND SPO2 FREDDIE A. against P/Insp. Dongail, Manolo Escalante and fifteen other
NATIVIDAD, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RAUL M. John Does for Kidnapping with Murder before the Municipal
GONZALEZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY Trial Court (MTC) of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The
OF JUSTICE AND ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10-03-437.
However, on January 13, 2004, the MTC issued a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is
Resolution[7] dismissing the Amended Criminal Complaint for hereby MODIFIED. The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros
lack of factual and legal merit. Oriental is hereby ordered to file an amended Information for
Kidnapping with Murder against the following respondents:
On March 1, 2004, Orola-Salabas filed another Amended P/INSP. CLARENCE DONGAIL, MANOLO G.
Affidavit Complaint for Kidnapping with Murder before the ESCALANTE, RONNIE HERRERA, SPO2 FREDDIE
Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office against P/Insp. NATIVIDAD, SPO4 JIMMY FORTALEZA, JULY ("Kirhat"
Dongail, Ramonito Estanislao, Manolo Escalante, Ronnie dela Rosa) FLORES, CARLO "Caloy" DE LOS SANTOS,
Herrera, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Freddie Natividad, PO1 BERNARDO CIMATU, PO2 ALLEN WINSTON
PCI Jimmy Fortaleza, Police Officer (PO) 1 Bernardo HULLEZA, INSP. JONATHAN [LORILLA], LORRAINE
Cimatu, PO2 Allen Winston Hulleza, Insp. Jonathan "LULU" ABAY, MANERTO, ELMA, ELSON ALL
Lorilla, SPO1 Agustilo Hulleza, Jr., Lorraine Abay, July SURNAME(D) CANETE, and JUDE MONTILLA and report
Flores, Carlo de los Santos, Mamerto Canete, Elma Cañete, the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.[8]
Bruno Canete, Elson Canete and Warlito Canete. The
Complaint was docketed as I.S. Case No. 2004-78. On August PCI Jimmy Fortaleza and SPO2 Freddie Natividad filed a
9, 2004, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Joseph A. Elmaco issued Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
a Resolution finding probable cause against P/Insp. challenging the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of
Dongail and Ramonito Estanislao and "15 other 'John Does' Justice on the following grounds: (1) the Secretary of Justice
for the death of victim Eleuterio Salabas." The case against erred in entertaining the case despite the fact that complainant
respondents Manolo Escalante, Ronnie Herrera, SPO2 Freddie Orola-Salabas did not file a Petition for Review; (2)
Natividad, SPO4 Jimmy Fortaleza, PO1 Bernard Cimatu, the August 9, 2004 resolution of the Negros Oriental
PO2 Allen Winston Hulleza, Inspector Jonathan Lorilla, Provincial Prosecution Office had already become final; and
SPO1 Agustilo (SOLA) Hulleza, Jr., Lorraine 'Lulu' Abay, (3) PCI Jimmy Fortaleza and SPO2 Freddie Natividad were
July 'Kirhat' Flores, Carlos de los Santos, Mamerto Canete, not informed of the alleged Petition for Review. The Petition
Elma Canete, Bruno Canete, Elson Canete, and Warlito was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02203.
Canete were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
In the meantime, PS/Insp. Clarence Dongail, P/Insp.
P/Insp. Dongail filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Jonathan Laurella, PO3 Allen Winston Hulleza and PO2
On October 1, 2004, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Elmaco Bernardo Cimatu appealed the same October 2, 2006
issued an Order discharging P/Insp. Dongail from the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Office of the
criminal complaint. An Information for Kidnapping with President. The appeal was docketed as O.P. Case No. 06-J-
Murder was thereafter filed against Ramonito Estanislao and 380.
fifteen John Does before the Regional Trial Court of
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The case was assigned to On August 16, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Branch 64 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 04-094-G. Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for lack of
merit. The appellate court held that the Secretary of Justice has
On December 2, 2004, Orola-Salabas filed an Urgent Motion the power of supervision and control over prosecutors and
for Reinvestigation, praying for the inclusion in the therefore can motu proprio take cognizance of a case pending
Information of P/Insp. Dongail, Manolo Escalante, Ronnie before or resolved by the Provincial Prosecution Office. The
Herrera, SPO2 Freddie Natividad, PCI Jimmy Court of Appeals also noted that the power of supervision and
Fortaleza, PO1 Bernardo Cimatu, PO2 Allen Winston control over prosecutors applies not only in the conduct of the
Hulleza, Insp. Jonathan Lorilla, SPO1 Agustilo Hulleza, Jr., preliminary investigation, but also in the conduct of the
Lorraine Abay, July Flores, Carlo de los Santos, Mamerto reinvestigation. Pursuant to the Order of the RTC ordering
Cañete, Elma Canete, Bruno Cañete, Elson Cañete, and reinvestigation, it is clear that the reinvestigation stage has not
Warlito Cañete. The RTC issued an Order directing Asst. been terminated, and the power of control of the Secretary of
Provincial Prosecutor Macarieto I. Trayvilla to conduct the Justice, allowing it to act on the reinvestigation motu proprio,
reinvestigation. continues to apply. Finally, since the case involves the
exercise of the Secretary of Justice's power of control and does
On December 13, 2004, the Department of Justice sent a letter not involve a Petition for Review, the requirement of
directing the Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office to furnishing copies of said Petition for Review to the
forward the records of I.S. Case No. 2004-78 to the DOJ for respondents do not apply in the case at bar.
automatic review.
PCI Jimmy Fortaleza and SPO2 Freddie Natividad filed with
On December 28, 2004, the Negros Oriental Provincial this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 challenging the
Prosecution Office, without conducting a reinvestigation, August 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
issued a Resolution affirming in toto the August 9, 2004 and Petition was docketed as G.R. No 179287.
October 1, 2004 Resolutions of Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Joseph A. Elmaco. On September 19, 2007, the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, rendered its Decision in
On January 24, 2005, Orola-Salabas filed an Urgent Motion to O.P. Case No. 06-J-380 setting aside the October 2, 2006
Compel Prosecutor Macareto I. Trayvilla to Conduct Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent portions
Reinvestigation. On January 27, 2005, the RTC issued an of the Decision read:
Order granting said Motion. Upon the failure of Prosecutor
Trayvilla to conduct the reinvestigation, Orola-Salabas filed an
Even if the DOJ has the power of control and supervision over
Urgent Motion Directing Prosecutor Trayvilla to Explain Why
its provincial prosecutor and any decision rendered by the
He Should Not Be Cited For Contempt.
latter may be reviewed by the former, there is yet no new
decision in this case to be reviewed. The second investigation
On October 2, 2006, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued
has yet to be commenced by the provincial prosecutor when
the aforementioned Resolution modifying the August 9,
the DOJ ordered the transmittal of the case for its automatic
2004 resolution of the Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution
review. At the outset, DOJ's Resolution of 02 October 2006
Office (which found probable cause against P/Insp.
was in defiance of the order of the court which had already
Dongail and Estanislao only and dismissed the case against
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Besides, the DOJ should
the other respondents). The dispositive portion of the
have exercised its automatic power of review after the October
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice states:
1, 2004 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros
Oriental and not after the proper Information was filed with judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
court and the latter has properly acquired its jurisdiction over of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
the case. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
x x x x same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 02 October 2006 reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
Resolution of the Department of Justice is hereby set aside. who reviewed the records of the investigation.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental is hereby
directed to comply with the January 27, 2005 Order of the Thus, according to Orola-Salabas, when the Informations were
Regional Trial Court of Guihulnean, Negros Oriental and to filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental in the
immediately proceed with the reinvestigation of the case.[9] RTC of Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, Branch 64, in
compliance with the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the
On January 9, 2008, the Office of the President, through Secretary of Justice, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite, denied Orola- case to the exclusion of all other courts or agencies.
Salabas's Motion for Reconsideration.[10]
We disagree with petitioner on this point. In People v.
On March 31, 2008, Orola-Salabas filed with this Court a Espinosa,[15] we stressed that the court does not lose control of
Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision dated September the proceedings by reason of a reinvestigation or review
19, 2007 and Resolution dated January 9, 2007 of the Office conducted by either the DOJ or the Office of the President. On
of the President. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. the contrary, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may
182090. grant or deny a motion to dismiss based on such
reinvestigation or review:
On April 30, 2008, this Court issued a Resolution" in G.R.
No. 179287 denying the Petition for Review for failure of Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at
warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President.
However, we should stress that the court does not lose control
On June 2, 2008, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had
No. 179287 with G.R. No. 182090.[12] assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of
the reviewing prosecuting authority. Neither is it deprived of
PCI Jimmy Fortaleza and SPO2 Freddie Natividad did not its jurisdiction by such resolution. The principles established
file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's April 30, in Crespo v. Mogul still stands, as follows:
2008 Resolution denying the Petition in G.R. No. 179287.
Consequently, said Resolution of this Court has become final Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it
and executory. We shall therefore proceed to rule on the was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Petition in G.R. No. 182090. Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
In her Petition for Certiorari, Orola-Salabas assail the discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
September 19, 2007 Decision and January 9, 2008 Resolution trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
of the Office of the President on the following grounds: case.[16]

I
In her second Assignment of Error, Orola-Salabas claims that
the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
Ermita and Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite, acted in grave
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed September 19, 2007
JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE APPEAL
Decision and January 9, 2008 Resolution as it disregarded the
AFTER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HA[D]
August 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals which,
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AN ACT
incidentally, has been affirmed by this Court in its final and
WHICH [WA]S CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY
executory April 30, 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 179287.
OUTSIDE THEIR POWERS AS IT CONSTITUTE AN
ENCROACHMENT UPON JUDICIAL POWER.
The second assignment of error in effect argues that the
determination by the Court of Appeals on the question of the
II validity of the Secretary of Justice Resolution should be
considered the law of the case and should remain established
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE in all other steps of the prosecution process. The doctrine of
OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE DECISION OF the law of the case is well settled in jurisprudence:
THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE POWER
AND AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
ISSUING HIS RESOLUTION INDICTING PRIVATE
former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is
RESPONDENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[13]
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues
Orola-Salabas assert the settled doctrine in the leading case to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
of Crespo v. Mogulu[14] that: or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v.
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests Bacon, an American case, thusly:
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not
only prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to On a more substantive point, we cannot adhere to the position
strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become of the Office of the President that the entire case should be
and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or remanded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental on
above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on the ground that the Secretary of Justice may not exercise its
convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there power to review where there was allegedly no new resolution
would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and rendered by the local prosecutor. As can be gleaned from the
reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It records, the Secretary of Justice conducted an automatic
would be intolerable if parties litigants were allowed to review of the Provincial Prosecutor's affirmance of former
speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the resolutions issued by previous investigating prosecutors
chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on without conducting an actual reinvestigation of the case.
solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case.
An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would It is established in jurisprudence that the Secretary of Justice
result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up has the statutory power of control and supervision over
his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so prosecutors. In the recent case of Department of Justice v.
choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The Alaon,[21] we reiterated that:
administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a
practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.[17] There is no quarrel about the- Secretary of Justice's power of
review over the actions of his subordinates, specifically public
The doctrine of the law of the case applies even if the prior prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the
resort to the appellate court is in a certiorari proceeding, [18] as Secretary of Justice's authority of supervision and control over
in the case at bar. If this doctrine were to be applied, the the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject only to
previous opinion by the Court of Appeals-that the October 2, specified guidelines.
2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was valid should
govern on subsequent appeal. Chapter 7, section 38, paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 292
or The Administrative Code of 1987, defines the
However, the doctrine of the law of the case requires that the administrative relationship that is supervision and control:
appeal be that of the same parties, and that the pronouncement
by the appellate court be with full opportunity to be heard SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. —
accorded to said parties: Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws
defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined
when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its as follows:
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid (1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall
down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full performance of duty; restrain the commission of
opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions
the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
and should not be reopened on remand of the case to execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards,
determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law guidelines, plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is
of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.[19] relationship of particular agencies, the word "control" shall
encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph.
G.R. No. 179287 and G.R. No. 182090 do not, however,
involve the same parties. Of the fifteen persons required by the
October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice to be In Noblejas v. Judge Salas, we defined control as the power
included in the Information for Kidnapping and Murder, (of the department head) to alter, modify or nullify or set aside
only Jimmy Fortaleza and Freddie Natividad filed a Petition what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, were heard thereon, duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
and whose arguments were considered in the Resolution dated the latter. The power of control implies the right of the
April 30, 2008 in G.R. No. 179287. Clarence Dongail, President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the
Jonathan Lorilla, Allen Winston Hulleza and Bernardo exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
Cimatu, on the other hand, appealed to the Office of the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
President, and are the parties in G.R. No. 182090, to the such officers. (Citations omitted.)
exclusion of Jimmy Fortaleza and Freddie Natividad and the
other respondents. The doctrine of the law of the case does Moreover, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
not, therefore, apply here in G.R No. 182090. recognizes the Secretary of Justice's power to review the
actions of the investigating prosecutor, even motu proprio, to
Corollary thereto, however, the Office of the President cannot wit:
order the reinvestigation of the charges with respect to Jimmy
Fortaleza, Freddie Natividad, and the nine other accused who SECTION 4. Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor and its
did not participate in the appeal before the Office of the Review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
President, namely: Jimmy Fortaleza, Freddie Natividad, the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
Manolo G. Escalante, Ronnie Herrera, July ("Kirhat" Dela information. He shall certify under oath in the information that
Rosa) Flores, Carlo "Caloy" De Los Santos, Lorraine "Lulu" he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
Abay, Manerto Canete, Elma Canete, Elson Canete, and Jude personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that
Montilla. Due process prevents the grant of additional awards there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
to parties who did not appeal [20] or who resorted to other committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that
remedies and such additional award constitutes grave abuse of the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
part of the Office of the President. submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the
record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief [ A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases 4013-RTJ], November 19, 2014 ]
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution
GASPAR BANDOY, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE
within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
immediately inform the parties of such action.
45, AND ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 46,
BOTH AT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE,
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, RESPONDENT.
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
DECISION
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal

of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by MENDOZA, J.:
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable For review before the Court is this administrative case against
cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the
against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45[1] and 46,[2] San Jose,
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for
preliminary investigation. Grave Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-
1928,[3] entitled “People of the Philippines v. Gaspar Bandoy,
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio” and Criminal Case No.
Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Z-1910, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of Jesus, Jr.”
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint, [4] that
corresponding information without conducting another he was one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De
of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The Jesus, Jr.), which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC,
same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge
by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge.  Bandoy claimed
supplied.) that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him
for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal
complaint against him for Violation of Article XXII, Section
Verily, the Secretary of Justice was empowered to review the
261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election
actions of the Provincial Fiscal during the preliminary
Code (Ballot Switching).  The said case was likewise raffled to
investigation or the reinvestigation. We note by analogy,
RTC-Br. 44.
however, that in Department of Justice v. Alaon, the Court
declared that respondents should be given due notice of the
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former
review proceedings before the Secretary of Justice and be
Mayor Joel Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while
afforded adequate opportunity to be heard therein.
De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public
elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board
In the case at bar, we find that there is nothing on record to
of Election Inspectors; that they were both assigned in
show that respondents were given notice and an opportunity to
Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De
be heard before the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, we
Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely associated with the rival
remand the case to the Secretary of Justice with respect to
mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire),
respondents Dongail, Lorilla, Hulleza, and Cimatu for further
son of House representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong.
proceedings, with the caveat that any resolution of the
Villarosa) and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor
Secretary of Justice on the matter shall be subject to the
Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said
approval of the trial court.
local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot
switching, which was captured on video by a member of the
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Office of the President
media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant
dated September 19, 2007 and its Resolution dated January 9,
from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr.
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
was caught in possession of some ballots inside his backpack;
the Secretary of Justice for further proceedings with respect to
and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was
respondents Clarence Dongail, Jonathan Lorilla, Allen
criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. 
Winston Hulleza and Bernardo Cimatu.
Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was
issued against De Jesus, Jr.[5]
No pronouncement as to costs.
According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
personally appeared before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico
Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention
against him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election
Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo).  Apparently,
De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of
arrest against him.  Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large
until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then
Las Pinas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva. [6]  Because
complainant Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal
Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended “no bail”
leaving them incarcerated for more than two years. [7]
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang
abuse of his authority by displaying manifest bias and piyansa (as a consequence thereof).”[19]  Judge Jacinto, Jr.
partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several even refused to issue a warrant of arrest when he was asked
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, originally because he was not handling the case anymore. [20]
scheduled on April 23, 2008, [8] but was reset for seven times
until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly Bandoy, in his Reply,[21] brought to the attention of the Court
inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers on July 6, 2011.[9] that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to thwart the enemies of his
supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were against ten individuals.[22]  He also divulged that the audit team
mostly due to De Jesus, Jr.’s non-appearance for failure to from the Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr.
locate him at his given address.  Despite these supposed and given accommodations in “Aroma Center,” one of the
obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and properties of Mayor Villarosa. [23]  Bandoy was thankful that
seemingly tolerated his continuous non-appearance in the Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials
court’s subsequent scheduled hearings.  Another example of wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of arrest.
[24]
Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s supposed unreasonable bias towards  Bandoy showed a timeline of events supposedly depicting
Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge
serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.’s obvious Jacinto, Jr., evaded arraignment on numerous occasions
dilatory tactics and unjustified absences when his appearance effectively delaying the progress of the case for ballot
was necessary. switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his
chambers.[25]  He further reiterated his plea not to let Judge
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.
and filed a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to have the serious illegal detention case against In his Rejoinder,[26] Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again
them dismissed.  Meanwhile, co-accused Atty. Lorenzo filed a assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44.[27]  He
separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) and won the clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten
case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case
her.  At first, the DOJ denied their petition.  Upon against them, but only after a finding of probable cause by the
reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice public prosecutor handling it.  Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that
Secretary Leila De Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which
Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge
the case against Bandoy and his co-accused. [10]  Accordingly, was a non-bailable offense. [28]  He likewise denied seeking any
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit team in
Withdraw Information. their property, the Aroma Family Hotel.  He explained that the
audit team paid him a “courtesy call” where he assured the
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,[11] dated July 5, 2011, denied the team of his cooperation.[29]  He again restated that the police
motion to withdraw information.  In the end, Bandoy was only officials merely coordinated with him as was customary
able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. because he was the Executive Judge of the municipality.[30] 
finally resolved[12] to allow him to post a bail bond of Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoy’s accusations against
P100,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00.[13]  Bandoy added him were designed to oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches
that Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge
Jacinto, Jr.’s child. of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental
Mindoro.[31]
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala,
while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became In its Report,[32] dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court
the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44.  It was during this Administrator (OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy’s
time that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest
dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit
reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy.  Meanwhile, team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the
the case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was Villarosas for failure to present proof.[33]  The OCA observed,
dismissed on October 25, 2012,[14] while their bail for the however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations
serious illegal detention case was cancelled. [15] of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of
De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that chambers.  As such, the OCA equated his silence to
made him initiate this present administrative case was because admission.[34]  Thus, the OCA recommended that:
Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor’s assignments
on account of the latter’s compulsory retirement from service 1. The administrative complaint against
on December 1, 2012, which would include their pending Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch
serious illegal detention case.  He claimed that Judge Jacinto, 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose,
Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his Occidental Mindoro, be RE-
co-accused even though there was no warrant of arrest against DOCKETED as regular administrative
them.[16]  He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. matter; and
handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear that they
would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and 2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be
partiality from him. found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure
In his Comment,[17] Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of and, accordingly, be FINED in the amount
the Villarosa clan.[18]  He also denied having a hand in the of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) with
order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
and the CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, the same or similar act shall be dealt with
merely consulted him on how to go about the order of more severely. [35]
cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued.  He explained
“wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang
nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po
The Court’s Ruling
akong parang may kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela
 Canon 2,[47] Rule 2.01[48] and Canon 3[49] of the Code of
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA. Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that judges, as officers of
the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates with evenly and fairly.  Not only must they be honest and
that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial
professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence in the dispensation of justice.  Judges should make sure that
are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. [36] their acts are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the
minds of the public.  When they fail to do so, such acts may
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law.  cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the general.[50]  As held in Joselito Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo
public and the Court the duty to maintain professional Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City:[51]
competence at all times.[37]
Well-known is the judicial norm that “judges should not only
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an be impartial but should also appear impartial.” Jurisprudence
allegation that he arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers.  repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less
He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other
delve into it.  Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
face the issues being imputed against him, which was quite become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a
irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just,
of the bench, that was being challenged.  As aptly observed by correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner
the OCA, “the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself.  It is integrity.
against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in
the face of false accusations.” [38]  His silence introduces doubt This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable. metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
application of the law and procedure, the Court finds Judge intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their
116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) official conduct should be beyond reproach.
thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in
open court, to wit:
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De
Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without
Section 1.  Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The appropriate action coming from the court.  Judge Jacinto, Jr.
accused must be arraigned before the court where the should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De
complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial.  The Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk not.  The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor
by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and partiality that
information, reading the same in the language or dialect should be addressed and corrected.
known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty.  The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of
then those named in the complaint or information. Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance
of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. 
(Emphasis supplied) Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be
imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more
not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly.  Each than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
litigation “where the issues are joined x x x and without which months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part
the proceedings cannot advance further.” [39] of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule public office, including government-owned or controlled
116 constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[40]  There is gross corporations.
ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge
was “gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.”[41] It may also The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases
be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered
apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [42]  Gross ignorance of the law under review and evaluation.  Thus, a fine of P40,000.00[52] is
or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. deemed appropriate under the  circumstances.
[43]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S.

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
public and the legal profession to know the very law that they Procedure and of Bias and Partiality.  Accordingly, he
are supposed to apply in a given controversy. [44]  They are is FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00)
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
basic law, and to maintain the desired professional
competence.[45]  When a judge displays an utter lack of SO ORDERED.
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts.  A judge owes the public and the Court
the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. [46]
[ A.C. No. 8911, July 08, 2019 ]

IN RE: ATTY. ROMULO P. ATENCIA: REFERRAL BY

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF A LAWYER'S
UNETHICAL CONDUCT AS INDICATED IN ITS
DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 2011 IN CA-G.R. CR-
HC NO. 03322 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
AURORA TATAC, ET AL.).

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative

complaint[1] filed against respondent former Judge Romulo P.
Atencia (respondent) for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

On December 16, 2003, respondent, then Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43
(RTC), presided over the arraignment of accused Aurora Tatac
(Tatac), Maria Gaela (Gaela), and Maritess Cunanan
(Cunanan; collectively, accused) in Criminal Case Nos. 3265,
3266, and 3267 for transporting dangerous drugs, and
thereafter, ordered a joint trial of the cases upon his
determination that the cases involved a commonality of
evidence.[2]

On February 11, 2004, respondent tendered his resignation as

Presiding Judge of the RTC due to health reasons, which took
effect on April 30, 2004.[3]

On April 21, 2006, or almost two (2) years after he resigned,

respondent entered his appearance in the same criminal cases
as substitute counsel for accused Tatac, Gaela, and Cunanan.

After trial, the RTC convicted the accused, prompting Tatac

and Gaela to appeal to the CA with respondent as counsel. [4]

On appeal, the CA acquitted the accused [5] but noted that

respondent committed an ethical infraction because of his
acceptance of the cause of the accused, who had earlier
appeared before him when he was still a judge, viz.:

First, a word on the perceived unethical conduct of former

Judge Romulo Atencia who, after presiding over the initial
stages of the case, including the arraignment of the accused,
was later engaged as counsel for the same accused.

x x x x

x x x [H]is acceptance of the cause of the accused-

appellants, who had earlier appeared before him when he The Issue Before the Court
was still a judge, seriously taints his stature as a lawyer. It
cannot be helped that his acceptance of the same case which
he presided over may not have been made with the most The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
pristine of intentions. While a lawyer should not reject, except respondent should be held administratively liable for violation
for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the of Rule 6.03 of the CPR.
oppressed, it is also true that he should avoid conflict of
interest. Moreover, former Judge Romulo Atencia's tenure as The Court's Ruling
judge of the same court may have been a significant factor for
the accused-appellants' decision to engage his services. A
lawyer should never allow himself to be perceived as able to Rule 6.03 of the CPR states:
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
xxxx service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

In this regard, the CA observed that the matter should be

referred6 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for In Olazo v. Tinga,[23] the Court held that Rule 6.03
further investigation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of contemplates of a situation where a lawyer, formerly in the
the Rules of Court (Rules). [7] government service, accepted engagement or employment in a
matter which, by virtue of his public office, had previously
Subsequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) [24]

for appropriate action.[8]

The rationale for the prohibition under Rule 6.03 is this:
In a Memorandum[9] dated March 11, 2011, the OBC private lawyers who, during their tenure in government
recommended: (1) the docketing of the complaint; and (2) that service, had possessed the power to influence the outcome of
respondent be required to comment. [10] Pursuant to the OBC's the proceedings, are bound to enjoy an undue advantage over
recommendation, the Court issued a Resolution [11] dated April other private lawyers because of their substantial access to
11, 2011, approving the formal docketing of the complaint confidential information on the matter (including the
against respondent and requiring him to comment on his submissions of a counter-party), as well as to the government's
alleged unethical conduct.[12] resources dedicated to process/resolve the same (including
contacts in the institution where the matter is pending). Thus,
In his Comment,[13] respondent refuted the charges against to obviate the temptation of these government lawyers to
him, claiming that there is no prohibition against a former exploit the information, contacts, and influence garnered while
judge to accept as his client somebody who was an accused in in the service when they leave for private practice, the
his sala when he was still judge.[14] Respondent also argued prohibition under Rule 6.03 was formulated.
that his participation was limited to the arraignment of the
accused and to the issuance of the order directing the joint trial In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
of the cases due to commonality of evidence. [15] Sandiganbayan (PCGG),[25] the Court took pains to trace the
roots of Rule 6.03 and discussed the so-called "revolving
In a Resolution[16] dated November 28, 2011, the Court door" concern, which was the original impetus behind the
referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and prohibition under Rule 6.03:
recommendation.[17]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a
The IBP's Report and Recommendation lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public
respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to
In a Report and Recommendation[18] dated June 10, 2013, the 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable for violating Rule 6.03 of the CPR, and As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and
others temporarily enter government service from private life
The Investigating Commissioner noted that as a former judge and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where
of the court where the cases were then pending, respondent is they can exploit information, contacts, and influence
considered to have "intervened" when he accepted to be the garnered in government service." These concerns were
counsel for the accused. Indeed, as a judge, respondent had the classified as "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
power to influence the proceedings, regardless of his limited interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where
participation in the case as aforementioned. Thus, he is the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a
prohibited from accepting any engagement from the accused client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
involving the same matter.[19] the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and
the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the
In a Resolution[20] dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
Governors adopted the aforesaid report and recommendation. unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
[21]
government lawyers, x x x To deal with problems peculiar to
former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
However, during the pendency of this case, or on July 6, 2017, disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and
respondent unfortunately passed away.[22] "congruent-interest representation conflicts." The rationale
for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the general rule is that "the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction
government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of respondent public official ceases to hold office during the
the government client that later could be to the advantage pendency of the respondent's case;[33] jurisdiction once
of parties who might later become private practice clients. acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the
Canon 36 provides, viz.: case." In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,[34] it was explained that:

26. Retirement from judicial position or public employment This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any respondent public official had ceased in office during the
matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either
judicial capacity. to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public
employment in connection with any matter he has official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. leaves the government which he has served well and
[26]
 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.[35]
According to the PCGG case, Rule 6.03 of CPR retained the
general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics "but replaced the expansive phrase The above rule, however, is not without exceptions.
"investigated and passed upon " with the word In Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero,[36] the Court ruled that the
"intervened."[27] Notably, the word "intervened" was held to death of the respondent necessitates the dismissal of the
only include "an act of a person who has the power to administrative case upon a consideration of any of the
influence the subject proceedings." The intervention cannot be following factors: first, the observance of respondent's right to
insubstantial and insignificant. It does not "includ[e] due process; second, the presence of exceptional
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence." [28] humanitarian reasons', and third, it may also depend on the
kind of penalty imposed.[37]
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent not only presided
over the arraignment proceedings involving the accused but Here, the Court would have merely reprimanded respondent
also ordered the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 3265, 3266, for his ethical violation. However, since this penalty cannot
and 3267 upon his determination that the cases involved a anymore be implemented because respondent had already
commonality of evidence. Accordingly, he performed acts that passed away, and further taking into account equitable and
influenced the outcome of the proceedings. To be sure, the humanitarian considerations, the Court finds it proper to
arraignment[29] is an essential stage of criminal prosecution dismiss the administrative complaint against him.
where discretionary matters (such as plea bargaining or a
motion to suspend arraignment [30]) may be raised, and without WHEREFORE,  the administrative complaint against
which the criminal cases cannot proceed. Furthermore, by respondent former Judge Romulo P. Atencia is
conducting the arraignment of the accused, respondent had hereby DISMISSED.
necessarily examined the records forwarded by the prosecutor
and consequently, determined the existence of probable cause; SO ORDERED.
otherwise, the case would have already been dismissed. [31]
Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-
Meanwhile, in ordering the joint trial, respondent had to Javier, JJ., concur.
examine the records of these cases in order to determine the
commonality of evidence. Case law states that joint trial is ____
permissible where the actions arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. [32] Given
respondent's directive for joint trial, the presentation of
evidence must now cover ail the charges against and the
defenses for all the accused, unlike before when they were to
be taken individually.

Thus, given the significance of these acts to the outcome of the

proceedings, respondent's acts fall within the ambit of the
prohibition under Rule 6.03. Hence, he should not have
accepted the engagement to be the private counsel of the
accused in the same criminal cases in which he had previously
intervened while in the government service.

However, due to respondent's supervening death, the Court

finds it apt to dismiss the instant administrative complaint. The
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019

SIMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if

the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object to its validity
before arraignment.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the April

29, 2013 Decision2 and December 10, 2013 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01564, which
upheld the Regional Trial Court September 15, 2010
Decision.4 The trial court found Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Article II, Section
15 of Republic Act No. 91655 and sentenced him to six (6)
months of rehabilitation at a government-approved facility.

In an Information dated April 20, 2006, Lapi, Allen Sacare

(Sacare), and Kenneth Lim (Lim) were charged with violation
of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Information read:

That on or about the 17th day of April, 2006, in the City of

Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused conspiring, confederating
and acting in concert, not being authorized by law to smoke,
consume, administer to oneself, ingest or use a dangerous
drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in ingesting and introducing to their bodies a
dangerous drug known as methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu and after confirmatory test on the qualitative
examination of the urine sample on the three accused, they
were found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine, a
dangerous drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. DT-042-2006,
DT-043-2006 and DT-045-2006, respectively, in violation of
the aforementioned law.

Act contrary to law.6

On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded not guilty to

the crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim changed their
pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation for six (6)
months at a government-recognized center. Only Lapi was
subjected to trial on the merits. 7

According to the prosecution, at around 1:50 p.m. on April 17,

2006, operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special
Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in
Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, and even obligated by law to subject him to drug screening
Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (PO2 Villeran) heard noises laboratory examination."23
from one (1) of the houses. He "peeped through its
window"8 and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot Lapi filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 24 but it was denied by
session."9 the Court of Appeals in its December 10, 2013 Resolution. 25

PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, Hence, Lapi filed this Petition.26
but the door was locked. He then tried to enter through the
kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to flee, but Petitioner argues that while he raises factual questions, his
PO2 Villeran restrained the person.10 case falls under the exceptions under the Rules of Court. He
claims that the Court of Appeals' factual findings "are totally
Then, PO2 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room" 11 and saw bereft of support in the records and so glaringly erroneous as
that the pot session was ongoing. He entered the room and to constitute a serious abuse of discretion." 27
introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim
tried to escape, but were caught b PO2 Villeran's team Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity
members, who were waiting by the main door.12 of his arrest before entering his plea, his warrantless arrest was
illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be
Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the men used against him. He argues that PO2 Villeran committed "a
were then brought to the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special malevolent intrusion of privacy"28 when he peeped through the
Operation Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. window; had he not done so, he would not see what the people
They were later brought to the Philippine National Police in the house did.29 He contends that this intrusion into his
Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests. 13 privacy "cannot be equated in plain view[;] therefore[,]
petitioner cannot be considered caught in flagrante
The initial laboratory report found that Lapi, Sacare, and Lim delicto."30 He submits that to "rule otherwise would be like
tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), giving authority to every police officer to intrude into the
while their companions, Noel Canlas and Carmelo private homes of anyone in order to catch suspended drug
Limbaco,14 tested negative. Another test conducted yielded the offenders."31
same results.15
Respondent, on the other hand, counters that petitioner prays
In his defense, Lapi alleged that on April 17, 2006, he was in for a review of the facts and evidence, which is beyond the
Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City to deliver a mahjong province of a petition for review on certiorari. 32 It asserts that
set to a certain Antonio Kadunggo. On his way home, two (2) the warrantless arrest was valid, as "[t]he act of having a pot
persons approached him and searched his pocket. They took session is clearly the overt act required under the law, which
his money, handcuffed him, and boarded him on a tricycle indicates that petitioner is actually committing an offense." 33 It
with four (4) other persons whom he did not know. 16 argues that what prompted PO2 Villeran to enter the house
was not the noise from one (1) of the houses, but what he saw
Lapi stated that upon reaching the Taculing Police petitioner and his companions were doing in the house where
Headquarters, he and the others were subjected to a drug test. they were apprehended.34
They were then escorted to their detention cell without being
informed of the test results. Rolando Cordova, a barbecue Further, respondent claims that since petitioner was not the
vendor in the area, corroborated Lapi's testimony. 17 owner of that house, he had no "reasonable expectation of
privacy that must be upheld."35 It submits that "[a] houseguest
In its September 15, 2010 Decision,18 the Regional Trial Court who was merely present in the house with the consent of the
found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against householder cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy
him was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto.19 in his host's home."36

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision This Court is asked to resolve the Issue of whether or not the
read: warrantless arrest against petitioner Simeon M. Lapi was
valid. However, this Court must first pass upon the procedural
WHEREFORE, finding accused Simeon Lapi y Mahipus question of whether or not the Petition should be denied for
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 15, raising questions of fact.
Article II of R.A. 9165 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) as charged,
judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon him the penalty of I
a minimum of Six (6) Months rehabilitation in any
government recognized government center, this being
apparently his first offense, to start within fifteen (15) here- This Court is not a trier of facts. 37 A petition for review on
from. certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must, as a
general rule, only raise questions of law. 38 Parties may only
The doctor-in-charge of said rehabilitation facility is also raise issues that can be determined without having to review or
required to render a written report of the progress of the reevaluate the evidence on record.39 This Court generally gives
program and the termination of the rehabilitation of the weight to the factual findings of the lower courts "because of
accused. the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their
SO ORDERED.20 testimony."40

In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional

21 right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. 41 To
Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals.
prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence presented in
relation to the elements of the crime charged. 42 Thus, the
In its April 29, 2013 Decision, 22 the Court of Appeals denied
finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact. 43 For this
the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision.
reason, the entire records of a criminal case are thrown open
for this Court's review. In Ferrer v. People:44
The Court of Appeals ruled that PO2 Villeran, upon seeing the
pot session, "had reasonable ground to believe that [Lapi was]
under the influence of dangerous drugs. Thus, he was justified
It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws   (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and
the whole case wide open for review and that it becomes the
duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors   (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
or not.45 without further search;

3.
This Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual 4. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
findings of the lower courts, or even arriving at a different regulated by the government, the vehicle's
conclusion, "if it is not convinced that [the findings] are inherent mobility reduces expectation of
conformable to the evidence of record and to its own privacy especially when its transit in public
impressions of the credibility of the witnesses."46 The lower thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
court actual findings will not bind this Court if facts that could suspicion amounting to probable cause that
affect the result of the case "were overlooked and the occupant committed a criminal activity;
disregarded[.]"47
5. Consented warrantless search;
An examination of the factual findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals shows no error that requires this Court's 6. Customs search;
review. On this ground, the Petition can be outright dismissed.
7. Stop and Frisk; and
II
8. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.50

Even if this Court reviews the substantial merits of this case,

the Petition is still denied. The Court of Appeals did not err in
affirming the trial court's finding of guilt beyond reasonable
For a warrantless arrest to be valid, the arrest must have been
doubt.
committed under the following circumstances:
A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable
RULE 113
searches and seizures is sacrosanct. No less than the
Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into the
ARREST
citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects without a warrant
issued by a judge finding probable cause:
....
Article III
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
Bill of Rights
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
....
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable commit an offense;
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
probable cause to believe based on personal
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
be arrested has committed it; and
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.48
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
warrantless searches and seizures. This presupposes that the while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
State may do so as long as they are reasonable. People v. transferred from one confinement to another.
Aruta49 outlines the situations where a warrantless search and
seizure may be declared valid:
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.51
jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a
elements of which are: "pot session."52 PO2 Villeran, respondent's primary witness,
testified that on the day of the incident, he and other police
  (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid operatives were conducting a "stake-out operation" in Purok
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. He stated:
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
While I was passing on that house and upon hearing that there
was a noise inside the house, I peeped on the window and I
  (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the was able to see three persons sitting with a small table on the
police who had the right to be where they are; middle of them, one of those person (sic) was holding an
alumin[u]m foil which was rolled and was used as a straw and
placed on his mouth while there was another foil with a not raising the objection before his arraignment.
lighted lighter in the bottom of that foil with the fume from
that foil he was sniffing through his mouth and after that he It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless
passed that aluminum foil from him to another.53 arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused
arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him.
Petitioner was arrested and subjected to drug testing. When he
Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue
tested positive for shabu, he was subsequently charged with
of his alleged illegal arrest, because of his voluntary
having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested
9165,54 which reads:
by the voluntary and counsel assisted plea he entered during
arraignment and by his active participation in the trial
SECTION 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person
thereafter.61
apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of
any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be
imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a goverrnnent center for the first offense, In Bolasa, the accused were charged with possession of illegal
subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If drugs. This Court not only contended with the validity of the
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, warrantless arrest, but also examined the validity of the
he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from subsequent search of the accused and the seizure of items in
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine their possession. As with certain constitutional rights, 62 the
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver
Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal
found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any arrest.63
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. Petitioner does not deny that his drug test yielded positive for
illegal drugs. What he questions is the alleged illegality of his
arrest.
Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since
Petitioner, however, has already waived the right to question
PO2 Villeran had to peep through the window to ascertain that
the validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him
something illegal was occurring. He posits that his case is
during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale
similar to that of People v. Bolasa.55 In Bolasa, the police were
of illegal drugs. Thus the trial court and the Court of Appeals
tipped off by an informant that people were packing drugs in a
did not err in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
certain house. Upon reaching it, the police officers peeked into
violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165.
a window, where they saw a man and a woman repacking
marijuana. The officers entered the house, introduced
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013
themselves as police officers, and arrested the pair. This Court
Decision and December 10, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
held that the arrests and the subsequent searches and seizures
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01564 are AFFIRMED.
were invalid as the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that the people in the house were committing a
SO ORDERED.
crime.
Peralta, (Chairperson), Caguioa,* A. Reyes,
Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the
Jr., and Carandang,** JJ., concur.
validity of his arrest before arraignment. 56 He did not move to
quash the Information against him before entering his
plea.57 He was assisted by counsel when he entered his
plea.58 Likewise, he was able to present his
evidence.59 In People v. Alunday:60

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a

warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to
move for the quashing of the information against him before
his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when
he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We
have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused.

Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a

plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively participated in his
trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest
only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed
to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during
his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by