HANNAH SERANA vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A.
No. 3019, as amended.

It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating
the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all
times accountable to the people.

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

2. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude
estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is
one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section
4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.

3. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

DANILO A. DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs
prayed for.

SENATOR LEILA DE LIMA vs. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials
is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits
are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1606.

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It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to

hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted
by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision, does not operate to strip the R
TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by
Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials
were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes
government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs,
while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials
and employees.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA – CUERDO

 G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the
law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court
or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."

CE CASECNAN WATER AND ENERGY COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE

OF NUEVA ECIJA
G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1. It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is
conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks
jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it.

2. The RTC injunction case is a local tax case.

The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner also
implicitly questions the propriety of the assessment of such RPT. This is because in
ruling as to whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule on the
propriety of the assessment. In other words, in filing an action for injunction to restrain
collection, petitioner was in effect also challenging the validity of the RPT assessment.

OMAIRA LOMONDOT AND SARIPA LOMONDOT vs. HON. RASAD G.

BALINDONG
G.R. No. 192463 July13, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, we stated that:

x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment
of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a
Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from
final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a
 Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed
of Muslim CA Justices.

Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was
rendered on April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision
came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to
follow the Tomawis ruling.

MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG

G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:

As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects-consistent with the non-
establishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of
practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from
adopting, much less exercising, any religion, including Islam.

The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it
conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it
still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This
is manifest error on the part of the Shari'a District Court. It is an elementary principle that
a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor,
sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this
corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-as the Shari'a District Court
has done-without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State
enshrined in the Constitution.

LOLOY UNDURAN vs. RAMON ABERASTURI

G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute
upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.
Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court
would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an administrative agency may
exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, it is apt to underscore the
provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the primary government agency
responsible for the recognition of their ancestral domain and rights

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA

G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. The
courts, as well as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions, have their
respective jurisdiction as may be granted by law. In connection with the courts'
jurisdiction vis-a-vis jurisdiction of administrative bodies, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction takes into play.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. EMMANUEL C.

CARPIO
G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:

The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

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Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue. Such
dismissal is one without prejudice and does not bar the refiling of the same action; hence,
it is not appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached, the
residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper venue, and such
order of dismissal could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the perfection of an
appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC did not acquire
residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may rule on DBP's
application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016
BRION, J.:

Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting
legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise
of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and
occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as
the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.

The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on
the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment
case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and
completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly
issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON

STRAIT vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as
representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a
representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest.
The person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to
be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of
an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and
(b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA – CUERDO

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter –
precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration
of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees
with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents'
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the
very same case.

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, ET AL. vs. SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO

PIMENTEL III
G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018
TIJAM, J.:
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part,
an innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as the court's expanded
jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as political if such act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

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With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition invoking the
Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the Congress' extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of

martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the
Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination
of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution
provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under
Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the power
vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend such
proclamation or suspension.

GABRIEL L. DUERO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:

While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from
challenging the court's jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right
and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with
caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002
CORONA, J.:

Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by
parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent
positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith.14
There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction
throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for
them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. EDDY NG KOK

WEI
G.R. No. 139791 December 12, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have
held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and
submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.6

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the
Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction
over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s
jurisdiction.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

The Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts
concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that
parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was
that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of
estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN Jr., ET AL. vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO., INC.
G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003
PUNO, J.:

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming
jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Court's primary jurisdiction.

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL vs. HON. JOSE ATIENZA, Jr.
G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

We shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN

FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL
G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the
writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or
compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent
cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION vs. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION

DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
LEONEN, J.:

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has
provided several exceptions to the doctrine.75 One of these exceptions is the exigency of
the situation being litigated.76 Here, the controversy between the parties has been
dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial dispute—an
ejectment case—is, by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have been
resolved with expediency.
Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which
petitioner raises in this case.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS

G.R. No. 220832 February 28, 2018
TJAM, J.:

Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the
RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.30 The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous
and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.31 Absent any showing of any
special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition will
cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.

GEORGE KATON v. MANUEL PALANCA, Jr.

G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint
motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court's lack of
jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action

ALBERTO PAT-OG, Sr. vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION

G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter
at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In
this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to
the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC. v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018
LEONEN, J.:

"where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the
money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation."

This finds support in numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that the test to
determine whether an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is to
ascertain the nature of the principal action or relief sought. Thus, if the principal relief
sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of
money or real property and the money claim is only a consequence of the principal relief,
then the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

EVANGELINE ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION

G.R. No.138822 January 23, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of
the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by
respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to
evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter
of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim based on her
failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court,
asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from
docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to
answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim.
Pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.

LEONIDES MERCADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 169576 October 17, 2008
CORONA, J.:

A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be
compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily
connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS

G.R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III
G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would
still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the
only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees
for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated
in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS

G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010
BRION, J.:

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a
petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural
requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in
full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from
would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.

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Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were
established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system.50 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary
periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays,
and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

ALONZO GIPA vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

G.R. No. 177425 June 18, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his
failure to abide by the rules." Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule
have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting
such departure. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they failed to
pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period allowed
by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the payment of
the appeal fee is unwarranted.

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS vs THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND

ROLANDO OGSOS, JR.
G.R. No. 221062 October 5, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the
initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees
are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the
claimant to defraud the government.

WOODROW B. CAMASO vs. TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC.

G.R. No. 223290 November 7, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided
that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the
part of the claimant to defraud the government.

DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION CO. (PHIL.), INC. vs. HON.

RICARDO P. PRESBITERO, JR.
G.R. No. 174202 April 7, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a
single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as
a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s] the
policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly
burdening the dockets of the courts."

This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision and
Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in
the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner seeks the same relief
through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This violates the rule against
forum shopping.

IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002
PARDO, J.:

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit."18 In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings M-3630.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An

indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action.

xxxxxxx

A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if
complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115838 July 18, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-
principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-
principals, as in this case.

xxxxxxxxx

Thus, the Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc.13 that
–

"x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by
the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously'."

VICTOR ORQUIOLA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:

No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a

case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and
by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. MERCEDES OLIVER

G.R. No. 135796 & 141213 March 28, 2005
AGNIR, JR., W.

Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by
order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties. Hence, the
Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court for denying Chinabank's motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested that
petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver One. A person who is not a
party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of liability to
himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.

DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, Jr.

G.R. No. 176973 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead an indispensable party
is not a mere procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right of a disregarded party to
its constitutional rights to due process. Having Olympia’s interest being subjected to a
judicially-approved agreement, absent any participation in the proceeding leading to the
same, is procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being violative of its right to due process. In
fine, a holding that is based on a compromise agreement that springs from a void
proceeding for want of jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party can never
become binding, final nor executory and it may be "ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head."

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN

G.R. No. 191667 April 17, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met
namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and
(2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 166302 July 28, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be

had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to
vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the
right to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

DOMINGO CARABEO vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO

G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice
of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already
deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his
death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal
having been perfected.
 SPOUSES JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO
JOAQUIN
G.R. No. 162788 July 28, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of
due process.

ROGER V. NAVARRO v. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO

G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
BRION, J.:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them
may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief
can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to
have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA vs. CORONACION PARILLA

G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At
any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added
on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is
to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO vs ANTONIO T. VILAR

G.R. No. 225546 March 06, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties

is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
 PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. vs. KLAUS K.
SCHONFELD
G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case
of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule
set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum,
not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them.

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL

BANK
G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
TINGA, J.:

The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, that foreclosure and
attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of
physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be
accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so minded.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA
YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may
be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the
defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the
improper venue.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. SPOUSES VICTORIANO AND

MELANIE RAMOS
 G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017
REYES, JR., J:

[I]n cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a
written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on
the ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the
validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to
recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of
the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule,
the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases,
similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

ARTURO C. ALBA, JR. vs. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO

G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.:

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the

following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive
answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

xxxxxxx

Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action;

otherwise, it would be barred forever.

If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it would be
abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate
on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket
fees and to file a certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the said counterclaim.
 LIM TECK CHUAN v. SERAFIN UY
G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J.:

A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this
reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in spite of
said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CPR PROMOTIONS AND

MARKETING, INC.
G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.:

It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at

the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As
it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation,
that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another
counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately,
respondents' belated (assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to
timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess,
if any, is already barred.

NELSON P. VALDEZ vs. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR.

A.C. No. 7353 November 16, 2015

the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where
a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION)
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
CORONA, J.:

When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their
alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial. An
unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily
accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good
faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what
allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made for the
purpose of delay. In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated
assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an
obviously contrived defense.

Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily
within the pleader's knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.
Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments
contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION vs. HON. REYNALDO M. ALON

G.R. No. 142896 September 12, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

A negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation

or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact
is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the
two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of
action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present,
and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other.

ELSA D. MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING

G.R. No. 186720 February 8, 2012
REYES, J.:
1. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all
the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However,
the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of
the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court
has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

2. Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not

a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged
in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct. It was based on this principle that this Court had also allowed herein
petitioner, via our Resolution dated April 22, 2009, a chance to submit a verification
that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of us
dismissing the petition outright.

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS vs. CELSO M. PALER

G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010
CORONA, J.:

The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity

created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the
Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who
personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.
With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is
that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.
In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman
to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf.
There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to
controvert Paler’s allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.

ROMEO BASAN vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 174365-66 February 04, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the
signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be
deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete
with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when
under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner
Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with
substantial justice to overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses.18 Indeed, the application of
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.

ANICETO UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015
JARDELEZA, J.:

We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification
is not curable by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where
we exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping
are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure— which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS A. ARROJADO

G.R. No. 207041 November 9, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written
statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof are the
complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of
the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with
the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations
therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a
civil action which alleges a plaintiff’s cause or cause of action

POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. ROMELIA REY

G.R. No. 190203 November 07, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.:
In previous cases, we held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.40 The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority
of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or
certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition."

In this case, the verification and certification42 attached to the petition before the CA was
signed by William C. Go, the President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one of the
officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception. While the petition was not
accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate, his authority was ratified by the Board in its
Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007. Thus, even if he was not authorized to execute
the Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification
by the board of directors retroactively confirms and affirms his authority and gives us
more reason to uphold that authority.

HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL vs. SECUNDINA CEBRERO

G.R. No. 222737 November 12, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. The reason for this is that
the plaintiff or the principal knows better than anyone, whether a petition has previously
been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. If, for any reason, the
principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly
authorized.

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 207970 January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or defense is based,
which is also known as the actionable document, the pleader of such document is
required either to set forth the substance of such instrument or document in the pleading,
and to attach the original or a copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then
be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading. The adverse
party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the actionable document
unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not
appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection
of the original instrument is refused.
GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 187487 June 29, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court clarifies that while the "[f]ailure to deny the genuineness and due execution of
an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of
fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of
consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his answer or reply and prove
at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express
the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," none of these defenses were adequately argued or
proven during the proceedings of this case.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 160242 May 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery
against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of
recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in
the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party
complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.

BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 117434 February 9, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:

The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that
"the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him." In another case,
we held that "When the law makes use of the phrase 'genuineness and due execution of
the instrument' it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit,
or of different import on its face from the one executed." It is equally true, however, that -

Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve
other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the
rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it
cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which
does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. JOHN TANSIPEK

G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009
 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

It is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case –
is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had
previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of
the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged
invalidity of the default order.

SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO

AND ELIZABETH RABAJA
G.R. No. 199990 February 04, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

Second, Spouses Rabaja’s appeal with the RTC never sought relief in returning the
garnished amount. Such issue simply emerged in the RTC decision. This is highly
improper because the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in
the complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause
of action.

If Spouses Rabaja would have any objection on the manner and propriety of the
execution, then they must institute their opposition to the execution proceeding a separate
case. Spouses Rabaja can invoke the Civil Code provisions on legal compensation or set-
off under Articles 1278, 1279 and 1270. The two obligations appear to have respectively
offset each other, compensation having taken effect by operation of law pursuant to the
said provisions of the Civil Code, since all the requisites provided in Art. 1279 of the said
Code for automatic compensation are duly present.

FARIDA YAP BITTE v. SPS. FRED AND ROSA ELSA SERRANO JONAS
GR No. 212256 December 09, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

Accordingly, the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale had the burden of
proving its authenticity and due execution. Unfortunately, Spouses Bitte were declared as
in default and, for said reason, they failed to discharge such burden in the court below.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC erred in applying the presumption of
regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents as distinguished from private
documents.

Without the presumption of regularity accorded to the deed coupled with the default of
the party relying much on the same, the purported sale cannot be considered. It is as if
there was no deed of sale between Spouses Bitte and Spouses Jonas.
The genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale in favor of Spouses Bitte not
having been established, the said deed can be considered non-existent.

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO vs UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT,

INC.
G.R. No. 211113 June 29, 2015
PEREZ, J.:

As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file
amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed
during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial. Our case law had long
taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice
so that every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the
multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the
motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts
are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court
grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.

G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity

of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their
rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the
amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the
time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.1âwphi1

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally

allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such
as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

HENRY CHING TIU vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. NO. 151932 August 19, 2009
PERALTA, J.:

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the
limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as
enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action
or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher
interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of actions and proceedings.

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the

furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits
without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial
and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the
merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.

GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

G.R. No. 193650 October 8, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized.1âwphi1 Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not
provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion
to an address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time.
Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail,
which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-
day period had expired.

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. vs. PABLO R. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt.
In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.

In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private
courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules,
we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is
established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead,
"the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading."
Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by
the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
 LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:

Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due process.
That is why in one case, although the Court considered publication in the Philippines of
the summons (against the contention that it should be made in the foreign state where
defendant was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered insufficient
because no copy of the summons was sent to the last known correct address in the
Philippines.

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. JACKSON

TAN
G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:

For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation

through the person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service
of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other
than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is
particularly true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the
person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the
corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches
was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD. vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO

G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14
(old rule) has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general
manager of a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have
been served at the firm's principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Inc. Co., Inc. vs.
Dizon, it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the insurance
firm's Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been obviated had the
summons been served at the firm's principal office.

And in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et
al.28 the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, "strictest"
compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on
Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule otherwise,
lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay
in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner
at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its
principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

PEDRO T. SANTOS, Jr. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
CORONA, J.:

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman
or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper
which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented
by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known address."

The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be
executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies
of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered
mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:

We discarded the trial courts basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondents substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed
with petitioners assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited
and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE v. Spouses HELEN BOYON and
ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.:

1. Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former

cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the
proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
 and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent
facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing
requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.
2. The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive
step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons
personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts
of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person
who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that
such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.
3. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against
the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an individual is
named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece
of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.

In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece
of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not
assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that
an action for specific performance is an action in personam.

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.:

It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized
by the rules.

Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict compliance with
statute or rule on substituted service, thus:

The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or constructive service

must be strictly pursued. There must be strict compliance with the requirements of
statutes authorizing substituted or constructive service.

Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in certain situations

authorized in the place of personal service when the latter is inconvenient or
impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be
shown in order to support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive
service. Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the general ground that the
subject matter of the suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as to
whether the requisites of the statute have been complied with, and such compliance
must appear on the record. 38 The fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of
attempted service does not render the service effectual if in fact the process was not
served in accordance with the requirements of the statute.

YUK LING ONG vs. BENJAMIN T. CO

G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address “[t]he
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing
of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to
higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses.”

FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence"
are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the
summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may
be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons
intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction.

DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. REINATO G. QUILALA

G.R. NO. 168723 July 9, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:

Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is

restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that
expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in

the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this Court, the
filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO SAYSON, JR. vs. NISSIN-
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181517 July 06, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over NURC, although the corporation may have actually received the
summons. To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules,
aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice.

At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be
heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process. Corporations would be easily deprived of
their right to present their defense in a multi-million peso suit, if the Court would
disregard the mandate of the Rules on the service of summons.

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT

G.R. No. 206147 January 13, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:

Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court

jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack
of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive
pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer
despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired
through voluntary appearance.

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. vs. TIARA COMMERCIAL

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:

There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack
of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before
the court without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her
objection regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. When a
defendant, however, appears before the court for the specific purpose of questioning
the court's jurisdiction over him or her, this is a special appearance and does not vest
the court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court provides that so long as a defendant raises the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other grounds of objection. In such case,
there is no voluntary appearance.

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 158836 September 30, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is
equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in
a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. ANA KARI CARMENCITA

NUSTAD
G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
TIJAM, J.:

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is]
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT

G.R. No. 202069 March 07, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:

To be sure, the 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of movant but for
the adverse party, in order to avoid surprises and grant the latter sufficient time to
study the motion and enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein. The duty to
ensure receipt by the adverse party at least three days before the proposed hearing
date necessarily falls on the movant.

Nevertheless, considering the nature of the case and the issues involved therein, the
Court finds that relaxation of the Rules was called for. It is well settled that
procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the
"strict and rigid application, [of procedural rules] which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed."

MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE vs. HON. ROLINE M.

GINEZ-JABALDE
G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015
LEONEN, J.:
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of
Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still
be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other
party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time
to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton
was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of
his right to procedural due process.

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY vs. CYNTHIA B. BANA

G.R. No. 23218 March 7, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the
complaint to which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited
to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same
resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim
in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the
same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15
days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss.

RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. JOSEPH CHENG

G.R. No. 175507 October 08, 2014
LEONEN, J.:

The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the
merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the
general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the
only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that
the dismissal is without prejudice.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. MAXIMO D. SISON

G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010
VELASCO JR., J.:

It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where
their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a
doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must
leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court
to decide the issues without the judges' active participation. When judges actively
participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and
have become adversarial instead.
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a

motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of
the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations.
One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in
disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of
the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.

DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to
afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even
after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of
the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and
even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was
allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all
the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress
again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to
make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is
not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

LINCOLN L. YAO v. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003
CORONA, J.:

Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in
petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown
that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise
qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors
rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.

NILO V. CHIPONGIAN v. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO

G.R. No. 162692 August 26, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the
lower court of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his right in the paraphernal
properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1,
supra, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente,
as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was a final
determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both
paragraphs, which are boldly underscored above for easier reference, the dismissal
was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely
disposing of his intervention.

DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES

G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
NARVASA, C.J.:

Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted
and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely
falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use
of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open
court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the
Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions
for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater
distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc."

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA vs. RAUL RISOS

G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of

taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by
the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as
when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge
would be able to observe the witness’ deportment to enable him to properly assess his
credibility. This is especially true when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the
prosecution’s case.

While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to prove
its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general
rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules

HARRY L. GO vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before
the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to
the prosecution's case against the accused.

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA vs.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be
treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces
no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,33
compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party
damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of
discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve
to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse
party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling
party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing
expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court
can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties
perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or
altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only
constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. OUR LADY OF

LOURDES HOSPITAL
G.R. No. 193158 November 11, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties
any facts or matter that are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject
of the pending action. Like other modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the
purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in
ascertaining the facts involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision on
production and inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the
court (in this case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and
material facts in connection with the case pending before it. It must be shown,
therefore, that the documents sought to be produced, inspected and/or
copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in
the action.

LILIA S. DUQUE vs. SPOUSES BARTOLOME D. YU

G.R. No. 226130 February 19, 2018
VELASCO JR., J.:

Clearly, once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15 days within
which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the
matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule,
however, admits of an exception, that is, when the party to whom such request for
admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an
earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have
already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the
latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party
cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and, thereafter, assume or even
demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. The
rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates
of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already
been alleged in the pleadings; or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a
useless, pointless process which petitioner should not be subjected to."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO,

JR.
G.R. No. 199501 March 6, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No.
225-0-92) was consolidated with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by
Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve common questions
of law and fact, each action retains its separate and distinct character. The reversion
suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the recovery of
possession case determines which private party has the better right of possession over
the subject property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different
remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate judgments. The consolidation is
merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession
proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by
the trial court.

Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the
other is not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is
no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case
which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound
discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory
under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a
party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. HON. EDILBERTO

G. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial
should be undertaken only with great caution and sparingly. There should be one full
and comprehensive trial covering all disputed matters, and parties cannot, as of right,
have a trial divided. It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far as
possible, and

separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even under a statute permitting
trials of separate issues, neither party has an absolute right to have a separate trial of
an issue involved. The trial of all issues together is especially appropriate in an action
at law wherein the issues are not complicated, x x x, or where the issues are basically
the same x x x

x x x Separate trials of issues should be ordered where such separation will avoid
prejudice, further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.

PAZ T. BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119010 September 5, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon
the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior
leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused
still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has
discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the
court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
And, unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which is not present in the instant case, the trial court's denial of prior leave to file
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any
judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the
appellate court.

MAMERTA LOPEZ CLAUDIO vs. SPOUSES FEDERICO AND NORMA

SARAZA
G.R. No. 213286 August 26, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the
parties in an action to the effect that the evidence, which his adversary produced, is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. In the case at bench, the petitioners' evidence, together with such inferences and
conclusions as may be reasonably drawn therefrom, amply supports the allegations in
their complaint necessary to their claim against Spouses Saraza. The evidence in chief
of the petitioner clearly made out a very strong case against them which would
warrant recovery from them.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 220598 April 18, 2017
BERSAMIN, J.:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 209324 December 09, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Any review by the appellate court of the propriety of the summary judgment rendered
by the trial court based on these pleadings would not involve an evaluation of the
probative value of any evidence, but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether
the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents.
Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law,
and not questions of fact, which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41,
but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE. T. ADOLFO

G.R. No. 201427 March 18, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a
motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear
that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on
the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by
respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite
the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683,
petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is
pending, because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is indeed
conjugal or paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.

While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
action,51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-
2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain
such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. CV No.
78971. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement
by the appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is
respondent’s paraphernal property. “In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or
conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an
inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury
to another. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or
legislative officers or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or
by representations, express or implied or in pais.”

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES (FASAP) vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 178083 March 13, 2018
BERSAMIN, J.:

The harmless error rule obtains during review of the things done by either the trial
court or by any of the parties themselves in the course of trial, and any error thereby
found does not affect the substantial rights or even the merits of the case. The Court
has had occasions to apply the rule in the correction of a misspelled name due to
clerical error; the signing of the decedents' names in the notice of appeal by the heirs;
the trial court's treatment of the testimony of the party as an adverse witness during
cross-examination by his own counsel; and the failure of the trial court to give the
plaintiffs the opportunity to orally argue against a motion. All of the errors extant in
the mentioned situations did not have the effect of altering the dispositions rendered
by the respective trial courts. Evidently, therefore, the rule had no appropriate
application herein.

MARIO J. MENDEZONA vs. ULIO H. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:

It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered
evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have
occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was
made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to
know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-
parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a
failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there
is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize
available discovery procedures.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LI KA KIM alias ED

G.R. No. 148586 May 25, 200
VITUG, J.:

The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that -
(a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching,
and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.

Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellant’s passport could have
easily been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of
appellant’s passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant
was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the
crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial
and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately
concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.

NAPOLEON D. SENIT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016
REYES, J.:

"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it." The Court agrees with the CA in its decision
which held that "a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was
available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the
petitioner’s] substantive rights do not exist."

WILFREDO DE VERA vs. SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, SR.

G.R. No. 179457 June 22, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

The above-quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then,
the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction;
all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the
amount involved. Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and academic the factual issues raised in
the respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to review on
appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership
and possession with damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the MTC Decision
itself.

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES

G.R. No. 162217 July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or
easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a
matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of
discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review
by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in
the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the
decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate
jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA
has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not.

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly
differs from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court
of the RTC is burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by
verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal
to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This
requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon
order of the CA when deemed necessary.
 TEDDY MARAVILLA vs. JOSEPH RIOS
G.R. No. 196875 August 19, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a
petition for review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.

ALICIA C. GALINDEZ vs. SALVACION FIRMALAN

G.R. No. 187186 June 06, 2018
LEONEN, J.:

Moreover, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that findings
of fact of a quasi-judicial agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be
binding on the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in
upholding the findings of fact of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and of the Office of the President.

ANALYN DE LOS SANTOS vs. JOEL LUCENIO

G.R. No. 215659 March 19, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This provision embodies the settled principle that, on appeal, the parties are not
allowed to change their "theory of the case," which is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary as:

A comprehensive and orderly menial arrangement of principle and facts,

conceived and constructed for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree of a
court in favor of a litigant; the particular line of reasoning of either party to a suit,
the purpose being to bring together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence
and to correlate them in a way that produces in the decision maker's mind a
definite result or conclusion favored by the advocate.

In other words, an issue not alleged in the complaint nor raised before the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as this goes against the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process. In the same way, a defense not pleaded in the answer
cannot also be raised for the first time on appeal.

LOLITA ESPIRITU SANTO MENDOZA vs. SPS. RAMON, SR. AND

NATIVIDAD PALUGOD
G.R. No. 220517 June 20, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:
There are, however, recognized exceptions where the Court may review questions of
fact. These are: (1) when the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the CA went beyond the issues of the case in making its findings, which are
further contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the conclusions do not
cite the specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (10) when the CA's findings of fact, supposedly premised on the absence
of evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record;35 or (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

LOURDES VALDERAMA vs. SONIA ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 223660 April 02, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must
rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed
or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of
fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising
it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT (COA) PROPER
G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 201
BERSAMIN, J.:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.

SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA vs. HUMBERTO D.

MEER
G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002
 PUNO, J.:

The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform

procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of
municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase
"any court", it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.

The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through
resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the
Court of Appeals.

THOMASITES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (TCIS) v. RUTH

N. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 203642 January 18, 2016
REYES, J.:

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for
relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first,
the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment,
order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6)
months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance
with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act
of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any
further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some
definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.

LETICIA DIONA vs. SONNY A. BALANGUE

G.R. No. 173559 January 07, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a

remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on
his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party's own neglect in
promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest.

ALBERTO T. LASALA vs. THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 171582 August 19, 2015
 BRION, J.:

Since a petition for annulment of judgment is an equitable and exceptional relief, the
Rules of Court under Rule 47 put in place stringent requirements that must be
complied with before this remedy may prosper.

First, it is only available when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Second, an annulment may only be based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Moreover, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Lastly, if grounded on extrinsic fraud, the petition must be filed within four years
from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.

CAMILO SIBAL vs. PEDRO BUQUEL

G.R. No. 197825 January 11, 2016
PERALTA, J.:

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature

that it may be availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to
be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud,
and only when other remedies are wanting.6 In the present case, Sibal was able to
avail of other remedies when he filed before the RTC a motion to quash the writ of
execution and a motion to annul judgment.

AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:

As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution
pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh
the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being
an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression
and inequity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
REGALADO, J.:

We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this very basic procedure alone, involving
just the mechanical process of arraignment outlined in Section 1, there was the
necessary degree of compliance by the court below. Other considerations reveal how
flawed the supposed arraignment actually was. For instance, there is no showing
whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each
complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly
prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the fact
that appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would
definitely and in any event be given the death penalty under the "New Law," as the
trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised that his
plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death sentence as
he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PANFILO M. LACSON

G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six

(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is
to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and
finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL. vs. MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL.

G.R. No. 160067 November 17, 2010
PEREZ, J.:

Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates

commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the
continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule
119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. In
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Viewed in the context of the above discussed
procedural antecedents as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor
Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer to another
government office, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's
claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the
Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.

MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209195 September 17, 2014
BRION, J.:

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged

when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity
is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence. We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court’s
pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al.is inapplicable in the present case simply because
more than two accused are involved in the present case. The requirement of absolute
necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each
case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.

ANTONIO CABADOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 186001 October 2, 2009
ABAD, J.:

The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution's
presentation of evidence against the accused and, second, the accused's presentation
of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the
same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own
initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the
criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the
accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.

But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the
proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a
demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment. On
occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the
accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer
to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled
that it is.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
 G.R. No. 149588 September 29, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a
criminal case. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being
no basis in law or in the rules.

In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which rendered the
assailed decision had jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.15 In this case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable law
was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved on August 14, 1981, which pertinently
provides:

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

ARMILYN MORILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198270 December 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due
process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse
of discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the
accused in double jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution
cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately
final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.

JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 227038 July 31, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time
of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

JAYLORD DIMAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 216922 April 18, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are
present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. As explained in People v.
Salanguit:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he carne inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to a lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 229380 June 06, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time
of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.