The Copyright Divide

Public Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series

Research Paper No. 01-21
The Copyright Divide
Peter K. Yu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the

Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=460740
THE COPYRIGHT DIVIDE
Peter K. Yu*
INTRODUCTION
A strong, robust, and dynamic copyright regime requires support, and problems arise
when support is deficient. Today, there is a wide gap between copyright holders and users of
copyrighted works. While copyright holders are eager to protect what they have, many users
neither understand copyright law nor believe in the copyright system. As a result, copyright
piracy is rampant, and illegal file sharing has become the norm, rather than the exception.1
To protect itself against Internet pirates, the recording industry filed high-profile lawsuits
against students at Princeton University, Michigan Technological University, and Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute in April 2003, seeking billions of dollars in damages.2 Since then, the
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) has launched a mass litigation campaign
against file swappers across the country. Taking advantage of the subpoena power granted under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)3 and the precedent set by RIAA v. Verizon
Internet Services,4 the recording industry sent out a large number of federal subpoenas, with new
subpoenas approved virtually every day.5
On September 8, 2003, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against individuals who illegally
downloaded and distributed a large amount of music via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such
*
Copyright © 2003 Peter K. Yu. All Rights Reserved. Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Intellectual Property &
Communications Law Program, Michigan State University-DCL College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, Information
Studies and Media & Faculty Associate, James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for Telecommunication Management & Law, College of
Communication Arts & Sciences, Michigan State University; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy,
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. The Author presented previous drafts of this Article at the Second Annual
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, West Teachers of Color
Conference / Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty in Seattle, and the International Law Weekend at Loyola Law
School—Los Angeles. He is grateful for comments and suggestions from participants in these conferences, in particular Graeme
Dinwoodie, Shubha Ghosh, Paul Heald, Laurence Helfer, Justin Hughes, Mark Lemley, Peter Menell, Susan Scafidi, Alfred Yen, and
Diane Zimmerman.
1
See generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
2
See Frank Ahrens, 4 Students Sued over Music Sites, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2003, at E1; Jon Healey, Students Hit with Song Piracy
Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at 1.
3
17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000).
4
In re Verizon Internet Services, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6777 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
5
See Benny Evangelista, Firm Sleuths out Illegal File Sharers, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., July 21, 2003, at E1.
as KaZaA, Grokster, iMesh, and Gnutella. 6 In addition, the trade association offered a
complementary Clean Slate Program that grants offenders “amnesty” from RIAA’s lawsuits if
they admit their wrongdoing, remove all illegal music files from their computers, and promise
not to illegally copy and distribute music again.7
Although the industry’s recent approach was controversial and resulted in major
criticisms from legislators, academics, civil libertarians, consumer advocates, and university
officials, the copyright holders’ aggressive tactics are not new. In fact, copyright holders have
been known for using, or encouraging their government to use, coercive power to protect their
creative works. Only a decade ago, the U.S. copyright industries have lobbied their government
to use strong-armed tactics to coerce China into protecting intellectual property rights. 8
Succumbing to U.S. trade pressure, the Chinese authorities eventually raided pirate factories9 and
handed out harsh penalties, including the death penalty and life imprisonment in severe cases—
on their citizens.10
The similarities between the RIAA and China stories were more than a coincidence. In
fact, they could be linked to a third story, which happened two centuries ago when the United
States was still a less developed country. At that time, book piracy was rampant, and the United
States was considered one of the most notorious pirating nations in the world.11 Nevertheless,
despite these striking similarities, copyright scholars rarely examine the three stories together. In
fact, copyright scholars rarely undertake comparative analysis,12 except on a few selected issues,
such as moral rights,13 database protection,14 and fair use.15
6
See Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1; see also Peter K. Yu, Music Industry Hits
Wrong Note Against Piracy, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 14, 2003, at 13A (discussing the RIAA’s litigation strategy).
7
See Clean Slate Program Description, available at http://www.musicunited.org/cleanSlateDesc.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
8
See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE
CIVILIZATION (1995); ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA: THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT
(1996); PETER K. YU, THE SECOND COMING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property No. 11, 2002); William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 135 (1997)
[hereinafter Alford, Making the World Safe for What?]; Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1996); Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S.
Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081 (1996); Patrick H. Hu,
“Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81 (1996); Susan
Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade: A
Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners]; Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives].
9
See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 143.
10
See ALFORD, supra note 8, at 91 (stating that China had imposed death penalty on at least four individuals, life sentences on no
fewer than five others, and imprisonment on some 500 people for trademark violations); Tom Korski, China Sentences Three to Life in
Prison for CD Piracy in Harshest Sanction So Far, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Dec. 11, 1997).
11
See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 (1996)
(noting that the United States used to be the biggest pirate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); Alford, Making the
World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 146 (stating that the United States has been “notorious for its singular” and “cavalier attitude
toward the intellectual property of foreigners” during the time when it was a less developed country); Thomas Bender & David
Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1997) (stating that the
United States failed to observe foreign intellectual property rights during its formative period and did not sign any international
intellectual property agreements until the end of the nineteenth century).
12
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 429, 441 (2001) (noting that “the mere fact that national courts are now engaging in serious copyright choice of law analysis
and that they are contemplating the application of foreign law requires us to know foreign law more intimately and thus enhances the
need for comparative work”); id. at 453 (noting that “the increasingly multidimensional nature of international intellectual property
This Article completes this long-neglected project. It brings together eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century America, twentieth-century China, and twenty-first-century cyberspace and
analyzes them using a cross-cultural, cross-systemic, cross-temporal, and cross-sectoral approach.
This Article not only highlights the striking similarities among the three stories, but also argues
that these similarities provide insight into the war on piracy, intellectual property law reforms,
and international harmonization efforts.
Part I of this Article focuses on book piracy in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century

America. This Part explores why the United States offered very limited copyright protection to
foreign authors despite their efforts in “promot[ing] the Progress of Science,”16 the constitutional
basis of the U.S. copyright system. This Part notes that the support for protection of foreign
authors substantially increased as American literature flourished and as local authors began to
attract readers (and pirates) abroad.
Part II describes software piracy in post-Mao China. Tracing the development of the
piracy problem since China’s reopening in the late 1970s, this Part notes that the problem has
been significantly reduced since the late 1990s. This Part attributes the improvement in
intellectual property protection to the increased awareness and understanding of intellectual
property rights in China and the development of stakeholders in the Chinese copyright system,
litigation may mean that only a comparativist can fully appreciate these dimensions and accord them the proper weight”); see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
733, 777 (2001) (noting that “[c]ultural assimilation and the ability of digitized works to evade national regulation make it significantly
more likely that modern copyright litigation will entail analysis of different national laws”); Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game:
What Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 218, 232-41 (2003)
[hereinafter Yu, The Harmonization Game] (noting the need for courts and lawyers to have “a deeper understanding of foreign legal
systems and laws”).
13
For discussions of the tension between U.S. copyright and moral rights in Europe, see, for example, PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 165-96 (1994); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics,
and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France
and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 86-100 (1996). Cf. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (providing limited moral rights to visual
art); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1998) (California Art Preservation Act); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-14.59 (McKinney
1984) (New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act).
14
For discussions of the expediency and constitutionality of U.S. database protection legislation, see generally Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in
Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605
(2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?; Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database
Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999);
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Peter K. Yu, Evolving Legal
Protection for Databases, GIGALAW.COM, Dec. 2000, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2000/yu-2000-12.html.
15
See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 87 (2000) (arguing that “an
international fair use doctrine does not currently exist in the international law of copyright and that such a doctrine is vital for
effectuating traditional copyright policy in a global market for copyrighted works as well as for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting
intellectual property under the free trade system”); Tyler G. Newby, Note, What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American
Fair Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (1999) (discussing the distinctiveness of the fair use
doctrine under U.S. copyright law). Compare Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse
engineering for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the unprotected functional elements of a computer program qualifies as fair
use), with Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs art. 6(1), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42
(permitting reverse engineering only for the purpose of “obtain[ing] the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs”).
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
including the emergence of the indigenous software industry and a large Internet user
community.17
Part III examines music piracy in cyberspace today. This Part explores the impact of
digital technology on music distribution and the extensive Internet piracy problem. 18 It also
discusses the recent responses by the recording industry, including its MP3 19 and Napster
litigation, 20 the enactment of the DMCA, 21 and the development of copy-protection
technologies. 22 In addition, this Part addresses the recent development of peer-to-peer file-
sharing technologies, the impact of these technologies on the ability of copyright holders to
protect their works,23 and the increased public consciousness of intellectual property issues.24
Part IV looks at the three stories together and analyzes them using a cross-cultural, cross-
systemic, cross-temporal, and cross-sectoral approach. Part IV.A points out that, in each of the
three stories, a copyright divide exists between the stakeholders and nonstakeholders.25 Viewed
from this perspective, copyright piracy can be seen as a battle between the stakeholders and
nonstakeholders over the change and retention of the status quo. Unless the nonstakeholders
understand why copyright needs to be protected and until they become the stakeholders or
potential stakeholders, they would not be eager to abide by copyright laws and consent to
stronger copyright protection.26
Part IV.B analyzes the various factors commentators have used to distinguish the three
stories. This Part argues that none of these factors alone accounts for the problem.27 Rather,
these factors are collectively responsible for the problem, even though some factors at times
might be more influential and determinative than others. This Part considers a variety of factors
that contribute to the creation and enlargement of the copyright divide. This Part argues that
policymakers will not be able to stem the piracy problem until they can develop a comprehensive
approach that targets the various factors, as compared to a piecemeal policy that focuses on one
or two exaggerated factors.28
To guide this policy change, Part IV.C outlines four different areas on which
policymakers should focus their remedial efforts. 29 First, the stakeholders must educate the
nonstakeholders about the copyright system. They need to make the nonstakeholders understand
what the copyright system protects and how the system could benefit the nonstakeholders in the
long run. Second, the stakeholders need to help the nonstakeholders develop a stake in the
system and understand how the nonstakeholders can get their products protected and receive
royalties. By doing so, the stakeholders can transform the nonstakeholders into stakeholders or
17
See infra text accompanying notes 305-310.
18
19
See TeeVee Toons v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
20
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
21
Pub. L. No. 105-204 (1998).
22
23
24
See infra text accompanying notes 491-Error! Bookmark not defined..
25
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
26
27
28
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
29
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
potential stakeholders. Third, it is important for the stakeholders to help strengthen intellectual
property laws and develop enforcement mechanisms. Finally, if products are needed, yet
unaffordable by the majority users, the stakeholders should develop honest alternatives.
Part V concludes by taking a critical look at the need for international harmonization and
the limits of coercive tactics used by the copyright industries to fight piracy in China and on the
Internet. While this Part concedes that coercive tactics are sometimes needed to undermine the
influence of those factors that militate against copyright law reforms and to prevent the
development of an entrenched pirate industry, these tactics are of very limited use once reform
barriers are removed or the pirate industry substantially undermined.30
I. BOOK PIRACY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
Until the Second World War the United States had little reason to take pride in its
international copyright relations; in fact, it had a great deal to be ashamed of. With few
exceptions its role in international copyright was marked by intellectual shortsightedness,
political isolationism, and narrow economic self-interest.
— Barbara A. Ringer31
We care because if no intellectual property protection exists regarding technical and

entertainment information, then we have little to sell to the rest of the world. In the old days
of selling cars, steel, and aluminum to the rest of the world, the kind of patent, trademark and
copyright laws implemented by other nations did not make a lot of difference. Their
intellectual property laws were their business. Now it is our business.
— J. Thomas McCarthy32
The first story begins shortly after the United States declared independence. At that time,
most of the books sold in the country were imported, and newspapers and periodicals carried
much of the local literary output in serialized form. 33 Although the press was regulated, 34
copyright laws were virtually nonexistent. 35 Rather, printers and publishers protected their
markets by securing agreements among themselves.36 These agreements were further protected
by physical and communication barriers among the colonies.37
As communication and transportation improved and the demand for literature increased,
local publishers became concerned about the lack of protection for works published outside their
home states and the inconsistent copyright protection across the country. Led by Noah Webster,
30
See discussion infra Part V.
31
Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051
(1968) [hereinafter Ringer, The Role of the United States].
32
J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property—America’s Overlooked Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995).
33
S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS § 2.17, at 24 (2d ed. 1989).
34
As Stephen Stewart noted: “Although the Pilgrim Fathers undertook their voyage to the American colonies to escape from
religious oppression, the regulation of the press and printing generally was not very different there. ‘The traditional European idea of
monopolising the press to cement the social order was successfully transplanted to the American shores.’” Id. (quoting DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 330 (1958)).
35
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1968) (noting that “[c]opyright was not secured by law
in colonial America”).
36
Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in ABA, 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 124 (1977).
37
Id. (noting “the fundamental difficulties of colonial transportation and communication”).
the author of the first American dictionary, publishers began to lobby the federal and state
legislatures to enact copyright legislation.38
The first state to enact such legislation was Connecticut, which passed An Act for the
Encouragement of Literature and Genius in January 1783.39 Modeled after the English Statute of
Anne,40 the Connecticut statute granted U.S. authors and their heirs and assigns “the sole liberty
of printing, publishing and vending” any new books, pamphlets, maps, or charts within the State
of Connecticut for two renewable terms of fourteen years.41 Taking the cue from Connecticut,
Massachusetts42 and Maryland43 soon enacted their own copyright legislation. The Connecticut
statute eventually served as a model for Georgia and New York,44 whereas New Hampshire and
Rhode Island copied the Massachusetts statute.45
In May 1783, the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending the various
states to secure to U.S. authors or publishers, as well as their executors, administrators, and
assigns, copyright protection in books for a minimum term of fourteen years and to grant a
minimum renewal term of fourteen years to authors, if then living, or their heirs and assigns.46 In
response to this recommendation, New Jersey, 47 New Hampshire, 48 Rhode Island, 49
Pennsylvania, 50 South Carolina, 51 Virginia, 52 North Carolina, 53 Georgia, 54 and New York 55
38
STEWART, supra note 33, § 2.17, at 24 n.4 (noting Webster’s success in persuading Congress to assist his campaign for state
copyright legislation); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY 44 (2001) (noting that Webster “was the most effective lobbyist”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing
Copyright’s Mythology, 6 Green Bag 2d 37, 37-40 (2002) (discussing Webber’s lobbying efforts). As Professor Nachbar noted:
“Webster not only sowed the seeds of American statutory copyright law, he also started an American copyright tradition: seeking and
obtaining from Congress extensions to the term of copyright.” Id. at 38. Nonetheless, Nachbar conceded: “Although Webster’s
accomplishments were profound, it’s not at all clear that the adoption of general copyright laws in these early States is among his
achievements.” Id.
39
An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (Jan. 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1783-1906, at 11 (Thorvald Solberg, ed., 2d rev. ed. 1906) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS].
40
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies,
During the Times Therein Mentioned, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1709).
41
Id.
42
See An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of Publishing Their Literary Productions for
Twenty-one Years (Mar. 17, 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 39, at 14.
43
See An Act Respecting Literary Property (Apr. 21, 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 15.
44
PATTERSON, supra note 35, at 186.
45
Id. at 184.
46
Resolution Passed by the Colonial Congress, Recommending the Several States to Secure to the Authors or Publishers of New
Books the Copyright of Such Books (May 2, 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 11. The resolution
provided:
That it be recommended to several States, to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being
citizens of the United States, and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the copy right of such books for a certain time
not less than fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the term first
mentioned, and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the copy right of such books for another term of time not less
than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the original
authors, or publishers, their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under such restrictions as to the several
States may seem proper.
Id.
47
See An Act for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature (May 27, 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra
note 3939, at 16.
48
See An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, and for Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of
Publishing Their Literary Productions for Twenty Years (Nov. 7, 1793), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 18.
49
See An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of Publishing Their Literary Productions for
Twenty-one Years (Dec. 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 19.
50
See An Act for the Encouragement and Promotion of Learning by Vesting a Right to the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors
or Purchasers of Such Copies During the Time Therein Mentioned (Mar. 15, 1784), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
3939, at 20.
passed legislation to protect literary property. Concerned about the divergent protection offered
by other states, more than half of the state copyright statutes contained reciprocity clauses that
limited copyright protection to authors from states offering similar protection.56 By the time the
Constitutional Convention was held in 1787, all but Delaware had passed copyright legislation.57
Unlike the Articles of Confederation, which did not offer any protection to literary and
artistic property, the United States Constitution included a copyright clause, which provides:
“Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”58 Derived from proposals
introduced by James Madison59 and Charles Pinckney,60 this clause was adopted in its final form
without any debate. 61 As the brief and ambiguous passage in The Federalist suggests, 62
copyright was a “comparatively insignificant” issue in the public debate over the ratification of
the proposed constitution.63
Pursuant to this newfound enumerated power, Congress enacted the first copyright statute,
the Copyright Act of 179064 (“1790 Act”), which secured to authors, publishers, or their legal
representatives two fourteen-year terms of copyright protection in books, pamphlets, maps, and
51
See An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences (Mar. 26, 1784), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939,
at 21.
52
See An Act for Securing to the Authors of Literary Works an Exclusive Property Therein for a Limited Time (Oct. 1785),
reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 24.
53
See An Act for Securing Literary Property (Nov. 19, 1785), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 25.
54
See An Act for Encouragement of Literature and Genius (Feb. 3, 1786), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939,
at 27.
55
See An Act to Promote Literature (Apr. 29, 1786), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 3939, at 29.
56
STEWART, supra note 33, § 2.17, at 24.
57
“Since these statutes existed for less than a decade before being supplanted by the federal copyright act, and since some of them
by their own terms never became operative, the copyright they provided for apparently never came into existence.” PATTERSON, supra
note 3535, at 187-88.
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59
James Madison proposed to include the following powers in the list of Congress’s enumerated powers:
“To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time”
“To establish an university”
“To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries”
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 477 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
60
Charles Pinckney proposed to include the following powers in the list of Congress’s enumerated powers:
“To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences”
....
“To grant patents for useful inventions”
“To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time”
Id. at 478.
61
See id. at 580-81; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[A], at 1-4 (1998); Howard B.
Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV.
509, 515-16. For discussions of the origin of the Copyright Clause, see generally MARCI A. HAMILTON, THE HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Occasional Papers in Intellectual
Property No. 5, 1999); PATTERSON, supra note 3535, at 203-12; Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929); Ralph Oman, The Copyright Clause: “A Charter for a Living People,” 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99
(1987).
62
James Madison offered the following commentary in The Federalist:
The utility of [the copyright] power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in
Great Britain, to be a right of the common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make
effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the
instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63
Abrams, supra note 61, at 516 n.38.
64
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
charts. 65 Notorious for its discrimination against foreign authors, the Act limited copyright
protection to “a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein.”66 Section 5 of the
Act stated explicitly:
[N]othing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending,
reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written,
printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or
places without the jurisdiction of the United States.67
Although many commentators criticized the early development of U.S. copyright law for
its intention to meet the needs of a less developed country while exploiting the works of
developed countries,68 the 1790 Act was not created solely for this purpose. Rather, the lack of
copyright protection to foreign authors was commonplace in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.69 At that time, many countries “did not . . . regard the piracy of foreign
authors’ works as unfair or immoral. Some countries, in fact, openly countenanced piracy as
contributing to their educational and social needs and as reducing the prices of books for their
citizens.”70
Because the Americans and the British speak the same language, the lack of copyright
protection to foreign authors in the 1790 Act was particularly damaging to English authors.71
Even worse, English literature flourished in the post-revolutionary period and was extensively
65
Id. § 1.
66
Id. Despite the Act, “foreign authors enjoyed the same common law rights as the citizen, so long as their work remained
unpublished.” RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 168 (1925). Nevertheless, these common law rights were “cold
comfort at a time when publication was the only profitable way to disseminate a work.” Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra
note 31, at 1054-55.
67
Act of May 31, 1790, supra note 64, § 5.
68
See, e.g., RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS
BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 775 (6th ed. 1995) (pointing out that “[i]t is perhaps not
surprising that a have-not country should permit and even encourage poaching on foreign works”); PATTERSON, supra note 3535, at 199
(noting the need to protect the new nation against the established trade in England); E. PLOWMAN & M. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16 (1980) (“Complete with a piracy provision it can be viewed as the action of a
developing country to protect its burgeoning culture while exploiting the cultural products of more developed nations.”); Bender &
Sampliner, supra note 11, at 255 (1997) (arguing that the United States did not afford intellectual property protection for non-U.S.
citizens until it became a major industrial power).
Stephen Stewart noted the unfairness of these comments to less developed countries:
[Such commentary] seems less than fair to many developing countries like India, or the Latin American countries, who [sic]
accepted in their national laws general copyright principles from the beginning and even in 1971 only insisted on compulsory
licenses for strictly defined and limited purposes. The large scale piracy of the whole of English literature which took place
legally during the nineteenth century in the US would have been illegal under the laws of the leading developing countries
then and now.
STEWART, supra note 33, § 2.18, at 25 n.3.
69
See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 231 (2000) (noting that “the copyright law of many other
countries at that time was not any more protective of the rights of foreign authors” than the First U.S. Copyright Act); Henry G. Henn,
The Quest for International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 43 (1953) (“Until a century ago, the general rule, with a few
standout exceptions, was that domestic works were eligible for protection and foreign works were not.” (footnote omitted)); Sam
Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 12 (1986) (noting that piracy activities “had been a long-
established feature of European social and cultural life”); Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra note 31, at 1051 (noting that
“international copyright protection was the exception rather than the rule”).
70
SAMUELS, supra note 6969, at 231; see also 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 25 (1938) (“[I]n Belgium the general belief was that such unauthorized reprints of French books without any
payment to the authors was a perfectly honorable thing.”).
71
STEWART, supra note 33, § 2.18, at 25; see also LADAS, supra note 70, at 27 (noting that “systematic piracy was committed in the
United States of works published in all foreign countries, especially in England”); Henn, supra note 6969, at 52 (“The United States had
been among the most parochial of nations so far as copyright protection for published works is concerned. For over a hundred years, this
nation not only denied copyright protection to published works by foreigners, . . . but appeared to encourage the piracy of such works.”).
read throughout the United States.72 Between 1800 and 1860, almost half of the bestsellers in the
United States were pirated, mostly from English novels.73 Compared to a legitimate English
edition, an American pirated edition cost approximately one-tenth of the total cost.74
In the beginning, some English authors were able to secure from American publishers
courtesy copyright, an unwritten custom of self-restraint whereby each major publishing house
refrained from publishing editions of a foreign work that was the subject of a publishing
agreement another had reached with the author. 75 This system not only “protected the first
American publisher of a foreign work from the unfettered copying of his edition, [but also] gave
the author the opportunity of earning some remuneration, even if he were unable to prevent the
American publication of his work in the first place.”76 By virtue of courtesy copyright, some
English authors, such as Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope, “received large sums in respect
of the American sales of their works, although they did not enjoy protection under United States
copyright law.”77
However, courtesy copyright was of limited use outside the United States, 78 and it
became increasingly ineffective as competition in the United States became fierce and
publication was no longer limited to major publishing houses.79 Among the English authors who
were greatly concerned about the lack of copyright protection in the United States were Charles
Dickens,80 Anthony Trollope,81 and the famous duo Gilbert and Sullivan.82
In 1842, Lord Palmerston, the British prime minister, attempted to initiate high-level
contacts with the American government in an effort to induce the United States to agree to a
copyright treaty.83 His effort failed. In that same year, Charles Dickens traveled to the United
72
S. REP. NO. 134, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837), reprinted in R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW: BEING A
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND LAW OF COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOOKS 341 (1912) [hereinafter CLAY’S
REPORT]. Justice Holmes lamented the general lack of interest in American literature: “In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an
American book?” United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908) (quoting Sydney Smith writing in the
Edinburgh Review in 1820); see also SAMUELS, supra note 6969, at 231 (noting that very few American authors were accorded serious
attention in England in the early nineteenth century).
73
STEWART, supra note 33, § 2.18, at 25 (quoting JOHN WILLIAM TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1972)).
74
Id.; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 50 (noting that “[a] London reader who wanted a copy of Charles Dickens’s A Christmas
Carol would have to pay the equivalent of $2.50 in 1843 [while a]n American Dickens fan would have to pay only six cents per copy”).
75
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 13-14; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 52 (discussing courtesy copyrights).
76
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 14.
77
Id.
78
Id. (noting that courtesy copyright “was not really of great significance outside the American market”).
79
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 52-53 (discussing the emergence of cheap library editions). As Professor Vaidhyanathan
described:
The paper was uniformly cheap and flimsy, the typesetting sloppy, and the format hard to read. Some of the earlier editions
lacked covers to keep their costs low. But soon the cheap publishers realized that the spine was in many cases the most
attractive—and most visible—part of a book. So by the 1880s, most of the cheap books libraries appeared in cloth bindings at
a slightly higher price, but with the same cheap paper inside. Needless to say, none of these publishers were part of the eastern
seaboard elite club of publishers who were led by Henry Holt [a leading publisher at the time]. So none of them conformed to
the courtesy principle.
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 53.
80
See Gerhard Joseph, Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and the Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuzzlewit, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1992) (demonstrating how Dickens’s novel reflects the author’s distress over the United States’ lack of copyright
protection to British authors).
81
SAMUELS, supra note 69, at 238-39 (discussing Anthony Trollope’s copyright problems in the United States).
82
Id. at 232-34 (discussing Gilbert and Sullivan’s copyright problems in the United States); see also Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 439 (C.C.D.
Md. 1883) (The Iolanthe Case); Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885) (The Mikado Case); Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1886).
83
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 51.
States to plead for the protection of British works. Frustrated by his American experience,
Charles Dickens recounted his unsuccessful trip:
I spoke, as you know, of international copyright, at Boston; and I spoke of it again at

Hartford. My friends were paralysed with wonder at such audacious daring. The notion that
I, a man alone by himself, in America, should venture to suggest to the Americans that there
was one point on which they were neither just to their own countrymen nor to us, actually
struck the boldest dumb! It is nothing that of all men living I am the greatest loser by it. It is
nothing that I have to claim to speak and be heard. The wonder is that a breathing man can be
found with temerity enough to suggest to the Americans the possibility of their having done
wrong. I wish you could have seen the faces that I saw, down both sides of the table at
Hartford, when I began to talk about Scott. I wish you could have heard how I gave it out.
My blood so boiled as I thought of the monstrous injustice that I felt as if I were twelve feet
high when I thrust it down their throats.84
Unlike Charles Dickens, who “strongly declared his conviction that nothing would induce
an American to give up the power he possesses of pirating British literature,” Anthony Trollope
was more optimistic and did not blame the American people. 85 Rather, Trollope placed the
blame squarely on “the book-selling leviathans, and . . . those politicians whom the leviathans
[were] able to attach to their interests.”86
In 1837, Senator Henry Clay submitted a report 87 recommending the enactment of

international copyright legislation that sought to “extend U.S. copyright protection to British and
French authors under rigorous conditions.”88 The report included an address and petition by
several prominent British authors, 89 which maintained that British authors were “exposed to
injury in their reputation and property”90 and that their works were “liable to be mutilated and
altered, at the pleasure of [American] booksellers, or of any other persons who may have an
interest in reducing the price of the works, or in conciliating the supposed principles or prejudice
of purchasers in [the United States].”91 The petition also appealed to the national interests of
American authors and noted the lack of incentives for American publishers to afford to local
authors a fair remuneration for their labors when these publishers could obtain foreign works “by
unjust appropriation, instead of by equitable purchase.”92
In addition, the petition warned that the lack of effective protection to foreign authors
may confuse the American public “as to whether the books presented to them as the works of
British authors . . . are the actual and complete productions of the writers whose names they
bear.” 93 The petition concluded with an emotional reminder about Walter Scott, who was
extensively read in the United States and might have been able to survive from “the burden of
84
Letter from Charles Dickens to John Foster (Feb. 24, 1842), reprinted in Hamish Sandison, The Berne Convention and the
Universal Copyright Convention: The American Experience, 11 COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 89 (1986).
85
ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 308 (Michael Sadleir & Frederick Page eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1980) (1883).
86
Id. Trollope continued: “It is the large speculator who becomes powerful in the lobbies of the House, and understands how wise
it may be to incur a great expenditure either in the creation of a great business, or in protecting that which he has created from
competition.” Id.
87
CLAY’S REPORT, supra note 72.
88
Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra note 31, at 1055.
89
See CLAY’S REPORT, supra note 72.
90
Id. ¶ 1.
91
Id. ¶ 4.
92
Id. ¶ 8.
93
Id. ¶ 9.
debts and destructive toils” had he received remuneration from the American public for his
creative endeavors.94 Despite Senator Clay’s efforts, Congress had yet to grant protection to
foreign authors.95
In the meantime, American literature began to flourish, and stakeholders began to emerge
in the United States. At that time, many American authors, such as James Fenimore Cooper,
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Washington Irving, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,
Herman Melville, Edgar Allan Poe, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt
Whitman, had attracted readership in England and other European countries.96 Because most
copyright laws were made conditional upon reciprocity in other countries, American authors
continued to be denied their rights under foreign law just as foreign authors were denied rights
under U.S. law.97
Moreover, the lack of copyright protection had created a lot of cheap imports that
competed unfairly and directly against works written by indigenous authors.98 Thus, American
authors and a growing number of publishers became very concerned about the situation and
sought to obtain “a more level playing field for their editions of American works.”99 Some even
discussed openly how Congress had failed to serve the interests of the American people by
keeping foreign works cheap. As Mark Twain wrote in Century Magazine in 1886:
The statistics of any public library will show that of every hundred books read by our people,
about seventy are novels—and nine-tenths of them foreign ones. They fill the imagination
with an unhealthy fascination with foreign life, with its dukes and earls and kings, its fuss and
feathers, its graceful immoralities, its sugar-coated injustices and oppressions; and this
fascination breeds a more or less pronounced dissatisfaction with our country and form of
94
Id. ¶ 10.
95
“The Clay bill was reintroduced several times between 1837 and 1842, but never reached a vote.” Ringer, The Role of the United
States, supra note 31, at 1055. Likewise, “[u]nsuccessful attempts to establish copyright treaty relations with Great Britain were made in
1837, 1863, and again in 1880-81, foundering each time on the opposition of American publishers who believed that their financial
success depended upon being able to sell cheap reprints of British books.” Sandison, supra note 84, at 92.
96
SAMUELS, supra note 69, at 231.
97
Id. at 232. Max Kempelman noted the lack of protection granted to American authors in England:
Longfellow asserted a few years before his death that he had twenty-two publishers in England and Scotland, but that “only
four of them took the slightest notice of my existence, even so far as to send me a copy of the book.” Harriet Beecher Stowe
too is reported to have received no return whatever for her Uncle Tom’s Cabin, even though it sold more than 1/2 million
copies in Great Britain during its first year alone.
Max Kempelman, The United States and International Copyright, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 413 (1947). Nonetheless, as Professor
Samuels pointed out:
It was apparently possible under the existing laws for particularly resourceful Americans to obtain protection in England by
simultaneous publication there, or for resourceful British citizens to obtain protection in the United States by simultaneous
publication here, but protection apparently required that the author travel to the other country and reside there at the time of
publication. Or an author might be able to convey the publication rights to a citizen of the other country before publication;
but that rarely led to a very reasonable payment.
Id.
98
Max Kempelman explained in detail the plight of American authors:
The practice hurt American authors . . . for their works had to meet the unfair competition of British books which were
cheaper because they were not paid for. American readers were less inclined to read the novels of Cooper or Hawthorne for a
dollar when they could buy a novel of Scott or Dickens for a quarter. . . . American men of letters were, therefore, apart from
any other considerations, unable to rely on literature for a livelihood. Longfellow and Lowell were college professors;
Hawthorne was in the government service; Emerson engaged in lecturing. And American readers were weaned on a literature
not their own.
Id. at 413; see also Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra note 31, at 127 (“By protecting only works of American authors, the new
law sanctioned the unrestrained reprinting of popular English writers, to the disastrous competitive disadvantage of the very indigenous
American literature it was pledged to encourage.”).
99
government, and contempt for our republican commonplaces and simplicities; it also breeds a
longing for something “better” which presently crops out in the diseased shams and imitations
of the ideal foreign spectacle: Hence the “dude.”100
Fortunately, conditions upon which the rights of authors were based began to change in
Europe. 101 In 1828, Denmark issued a decree to extend the protection of authors’ rights to
foreign works on the condition of reciprocity.102 In addition, some countries began to negotiate
bilateral treaties on the basis of strict reciprocity.103 Prussia was the first country to enter into a
bilateral copyright treaty. From 1827 to 1829, it entered into thirty-two bilateral agreements with
other German States.104 In 1840, Austria and Sardinia became the first autonomous states to
enter into a bilateral copyright agreement. 105 Predominant powers like France 106 and Great
Britain 107 soon followed. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a network of bilateral
copyright conventions among major European powers had been established.108
Despite this network of copyright treaties, authors could expect very little uniformity in
their protection other than what was offered in their home country.109 This lack of uniformity
was further complicated by the fact that the duration of a copyright treaty was sometimes tied to
a broader commercial treaty. 110 Thus, copyright protection would be deeply affected if the
commercial treaty was revoked or renegotiated, and “authors were continuously exposed to the
danger of forfeiting protection of their rights.”111 Even worse, some copyright treaties contained
most-favored-nation clauses,112 which allowed a contracting party to enjoy the more favorable
benefits the other party granted to a third party in another treaty. Although these clauses did not
result in any loss of protection for authors, they made it difficult for authors to ascertain the level
100
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 61 (quoting Mark Twain).
101
Stephen Ladas described the changing conditions:
The nineteenth century brought profound changes in the conditions upon which the rights of authors were based. In the
political field, the liberty of the press, the destruction of the division of social classes, the dissemination of education, the
reinforcement of national unity by the use of national languages instead of separate dialects; in the social and economic field,
new processes of reproduction of literary and artistic works, the expansion of the press, the creation of new universities,
libraries, museums and expositions, the development of bookselling and the wider circulation of books, the learning of foreign
languages and the more general travelling of people from one country to another—all these facts created new conditions for
the works of authors and artists. Writing and the cultivation of the arts came to be a real profession and those engaged in it
expected to be supported by it and no longer by Maecenas and Royal Courts. As a result authors began to demand a fuller
protection of their rights, and to raise much outcry against the injustice done them by the pirating of their works in foreign
countries.
1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 24.
102
Id. at 22. “This [decree] is admitted to be the first provision for international protection of authors’ rights, and it is the first
enactment in which the principle of reciprocity is introduced in this field.” Id.
103
104
1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 44. “These early German agreements . . . were of a special character, as their purpose was to fill the
gap left by the failure of the legislature of the Germanic Confederation to enact a federal copyright law.” Ricketson, supra note 69, at
14-15.
105
106
France concluded a copyright convention with Sardinia in 1843. Id. “In 1851 France entered into conventions for the protection
of literary and artistic property with Great Britain, Portugal, and Hanover.” Id. at 45 (footnotes omitted).
107
In 1837, Great Britain passed the International Copyright Act of 1837. On the basis of this statute, Great Britain entered into a
copyright convention with Prussia in 1846. This Convention was further extended to ten German States in 1847 and two more in 1853.
Id. at 45. By 1886, Great Britain had entered into copyright conventions with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Id. at 49.
108
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 15. “By 1886, there was an intricate network of bilateral copyright conventions in force between the
majority of European states, as well as with several Latin American countries. Of these, France was party to the most agreements (13),
followed closely by Belgium (9), Italy and Spain (8 each), the United Kingdom (5) and Germany (5).” Id.
109
Id. at 16.
110
See 1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 66-67; Ricketson, supra note 69, at 15.
111
112
Id.; see Ricketson, supra note 69, at 15-16.
of protection they would receive in a particular country.113 As a result, authors, publishers, and
policymakers began to look for better solutions.
In 1852, France issued the Decree of March 28, 1852,114 unilaterally extending copyright
protection to all works regardless of their country of origin.115 The Decree can be attributed to
three factors. First, the French believed that authors’ rights were rooted in natural rights and
“should [therefore] not be subject to artificial restraints such as nationality and political
boundaries.”116 Second, France was concerned about its failure to negotiate bilateral treaties
with Belgium and the Netherlands—“the two principal ‘hotbeds’ of French piracies”117—and
“therefore hoped that the unilateral grant of protection to authors from these countries in France
would ‘shame’ them into responding in like manner.”118 Third, the French at that time believed
that “bargaining was not the best method of securing international protection of authors’ rights,
and that if France should begin declaring that piracy of a foreign work in France was a crime
punishable by the law, the other governments would be more willing to take the same step.”119
Although it is hard to assess the impact and effectiveness of the 1852 Decree, the decree seemed
to have improved France’s copyright relations with other countries,120 in particular Belgium and
the Netherlands, and accelerated the movement toward a multilateral copyright system.121
Driven by the impetus of the French Decree, authors and artists met at the Congress on
Literary and Artistic Property in Brussels in 1858 to discuss the international protection of
authors’ rights.122 More than three hundred members attended,123 and fourteen countries were
represented.124 Three years later, a new Congress was called in Antwerp to induce countries to
adopt uniform legislation that would provide authors “the greatest possible protection.” 125
Although no more international congresses were held for several years after the Antwerp
meeting, “important national meetings of authors and artists were held in several countries,
particularly France and Germany, and the number of bilateral conventions that were made during
this period increased rapidly.”126
Two decades later, artists met at another Congress in Antwerp to celebrate the
tercentenary of Rubens’s birth.127 While the Congress was in session, the attendees adopted a
113
114
Decree of March 28, 1852.
115
Id. “This remained a part of French law until the principle of reciprocity was introduced by Decree No. 67181 of Mar. 6, 1967.”
116
117
118
119
1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 27. The 1852 Decree prohibited the counterfeiting in French territory of works published in foreign
countries, as well as the sale, exportation, and transportation of counterfeit works. The Decree further required that no prosecution be
instituted in France unless the author complied with the formality requirement prescribed under French law.
120
“During the decade from 1852 to 1862 France was able to conclude twenty-three treaties for the reciprocal protection of authors’
rights. . . . In the previous decade she had been able to conclude but four treaties. Two of the treaties concluded after 1852 were with
Belgium (August 22, 1852) and Holland (March 29, 1855) . . . .” Id. at 29.
121
Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra note 31, at 1052 (noting that France’s unilateral initiative accelerated the movement
toward a multilateral copyright system even though it did not set a pattern).
122
See 1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 71-72 (discussing the Brussels Congress of 1858).
123
The attendees included “54 delegates of literary societies, 47 delegates of universities, 21 economists, 62 authors, 24 artists, 19
journalists, 29 lawyers, 29 librarians and printers, and about 40 members of political assemblies, magistrates etc.” Id.
124
“The countries represented were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Russia, Span, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland and the United States of America.” Id. at 72.
125
Id. (discussing the Congress of 1861).
126
127
1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 72-73 (discussing the Congress of 1877).
unanimous resolution to call upon the recently established Institute of International Law “to draft
a project of world law on the protection of artistic works.” 128 Despite the resolution and
subsequent meetings by the Institute, no further progress was made.129
At the Universal Exposition of 1878 in Paris, the Literary Congress, which was presided
over by French novelist Victor Hugo, met and decided to create an international association of
literary societies and authors.130 This association soon extended its membership to include artists
and expanded its role to cover both artistic and literary property. Reflecting its new, expanded
role, the Association changed its name to the International Literary and Artistic Association,
which is commonly known today as A.L.A.I., the abbreviation of its French name, Association
Littéraire et Artistique Internationale.
In 1882, the Association met in Rome, and Paul Schmidt of the German Publishers
Association proposed to establish a Union to protect literary property.131 He “called upon the
Executive Council of the Association to initiate a discussion of this matter by the press of all
countries” and to convene a conference that would include all interested parties and whose aim
would be to create a Union.132 The Association unanimously approved the proposal, and the
conference met in Berne in September 1883.133 At the Berne meeting, a draft convention, which
consisted of ten articles, was proposed, 134 and the government of Switzerland agreed to
communicate the project to “all civilized countries.”135
For the next three years, intergovernmental conferences were held in Berne.136 Although
the meetings were not well received in the very beginning and countries disagreed as to how they
should protect authors’ rights, the participant countries eventually became receptive to the idea
of having a multilateral convention. When the final conference met on September 5, 1886,
twelve countries participated in the conference. 137 Except Japan 138 and the United States, 139
128
Id.
129
Id. at 73.
130
Id. at 74.
131
Sam Ricketson considered Dr. Schmidt’s motion “cannily conceived.” As Ricketson described:
[The motion] began by saying that this was not the time or place to begin discussion of a new international instrument on
copyright. Widespread discussions and consultations were needed before this could be done, but with a view to beginning this
process, the motion charged the office of ALAI with the task of undertaking:
the necessary measures for initiating, in the press of all countries, as extensive and profound discussion as possible
on the question of the formation of a Union of literary property, and for arranging at a date to be subsequently fixed,
a conference composed of the organs and representatives of interested groups, to meet to discuss and settle a
scheme for the creation of a Union of literary property.
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 19-20.
132
133
Id.
134
135
Thorvald Solberg, The International Copyright Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68, 81 (1926). “The Swiss Government did not submit the
project adopted by the Congress of the International Association. It substituted a more complete draft convention of eighteen articles,
which, however, did not differ fundamentally from that of 1883.” 1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 77.
136
For a discussion of the intergovernmental conferences, see id. at 76-83.
137
These twelve countries included Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
138
Japan joined the Berne Convention in 1899 and became the first Asian country to do so.
139
Although the United States did not sign the original Berne Convention, its delegate, Boyd Winchester, held out the promise of
accession if the circumstances should become appropriate:
Whilst not prepare to join the proposed Convention as a full Signatory, the United States does not thereby wish to be
understood as opposing the measure in any way, but on the contrary, desires to reserve without prejudice the privilege of
future accession to the Convention, should it become expedient and practicable to do so . . . . This position and attitude of the
United States is one of expectancy and reserve.
which only attended the conference as observers, all the participant countries signed the final
instrument. 140 Upon ratification, 141 the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works142 (“Berne Convention”) entered into force on December 5, 1887.
The original Berne Convention was, by modern standards, “a modest beginning.” 143
Nonetheless, it created “the first truly multilateral copyright treaty in history . . . [and]
established some important basic principles.”144 First, the Convention created a “Union for the
protection of authors over their literary and artistic works,” 145 which has an independent
existence regardless of its membership146 and remains “open to all states without restrictions, as
long as they were prepared to comply with the obligations embodied therein.”147 Second, in lieu
of reciprocity, the Convention adopted the principle of national treatment, which requires
member states to grant to foreigners the same rights as they grant to their own nationals.148 Third,
the Convention provided merely minimum protection for translation149 and public performance
rights.150 By doing so, it provided member states freedom to augment protection through other
bilateral arrangements151 while leaving room for further expansion of these minimum rights in
subsequent revisions.152
Contemporaneously with the development of the Berne Union, countries in the American
continent were exploring the possibility of creating Pan-American copyright conventions in the
fashion of what European countries did in Berne.153 Backed by strong pressure from American
authors and a growing number of publishers, 154 Congress actively considered proposals to
provide reciprocal copyright protection to foreign authors within the United States. In 1891,
Congress finally enacted the International Copyright Act of March 3, 1891, 155 which was
commonly referred to as the Chace Act. Under this Act, foreign authors received copyright
protection when the President proclaimed that their home country provided American citizens
with “the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens” or that such a
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 29-30. Little did the other signatory countries know at that time that the United States would not join the
Berne Convention until more than a century later. The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989.
140
1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 82-83 (discussing the Final Conference of 1886).
141
Nine of the ten signatory countries ratified the Berne Convention. Liberia did not ratify the original Berne Convention, but
acceded to the Convention in 1908.
142
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, reprinted in 1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at
1123-34. For a comprehensive discussion of the Berne Convention, see generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, 1886-1986 (1987). See also Symposium, Conference Celebrating the Centenary of
the Berne Convention, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1986), for an excellent symposium on the Berne Convention.
143
144
Id.; see 1 LADAS, supra note 7070, at 86 (noting that the Berne Convention “was a great step ahead in securing to authors and
artists a more complete protection than they ever enjoyed up to that time in the international field.”).
145
Berne Convention, supra note 142, art. I.
146
STEWART, supra note 33, § 5.06, at 101.
147
148
Berne Convention, supra note 142, art. II.
149
The original Berne Convention required member states to protect translation rights for a minimum term of ten years. Id. art. V.
150
The original Berne Convention mandated that national treatment be applied to the public representation of dramatic or dramatico-
musical works, to the public performance of an unpublished musical work, and to the public performance of a published musical work
provided the author had expressly declared his intention to forbid public performance of the work. Id. art. IX.
151
Ricketson, supra note 69, at 22, 28.
152
The Berne Convention underwent revisions in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. For a short discussion of the various revisions
of the Berne Convention, see H.R. REP. NO. 609, 100th Cong. (1988).
153
154
155
Ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 [hereinafter Chace Act].
country is a party to an international agreement that provided reciprocal copyright protection to
its members and to which “the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party.”156
Concerned about the threat from foreign, particularly British, publishers,157 the American
publishing industries demanded a compromise. 158 Under the Chace Act, authors could only
secure copyright by registering the work before publication and by depositing two copies of the
work on or before the date of publication anywhere.159 As far as “books, photograph, chromo or
lithograph” were concerned, the Act included a manufacturing clause, requiring the two deposit
copies be “printed from type set within the limits of the United States, or from plates made
therefrom, or from negatives, or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United States,
or from transfers made therefrom.”160 Such a requirement “granted the foreign authors the rights
that they demanded, while still denying foreign publishers any rights.” 161 Because of the
manufacturing clause, many commentators found the Chace Act “illusory.”162
Since the introduction of the Chace Act, Congress has made major revisions to the
1909 163 and 1976 Copyright Acts 164 and has since abolished the manufacturing clause 165 and
made the copyright notice optional.166 At the international level, the United States has joined the
Mexico City Convention of 1902, 167 the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910, 168 the Universal
156
Id. § 13. Section 13 of the Chace Act provides:
That this act shall apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation when such foreign state or nation permits to
citizens of the United States of America the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens; or when
such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright,
by the terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party to such agreement.
Id. “This system [of Presidential proclamations] has proved cumbersome and ineffective in comparison with the simplicity, certainty,
and other advantages offered by multilateral arrangements.” Ringer, The Role of the United States, supra note 31, at 1058; see also
Roger C. Dixon, Universal Copyright Convention and United States Bilateral Copyright Arrangements, in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT
CONVENTION ANALYZED 113, 118-23 (T. Kupferman & M. Foner ed. 1955) (discussing the advantages of the Universal Copyright
Convention over the system of bilateral proclamation arrangements).
157
As Professor Samuels explained:
What [the American publishers] were really afraid of was that the foreign, primarily British, publishers, would “ride the
coattails” of the foreign authors’ rights. Once a British edition of a book had been printed, the British publishers would export
the edition to the United States, and, under power of the newly granted rights, would extend the monopoly that the British
publishers had obtained from their British authors. And since the net flow of works was still from England to the United
States, the threat to the powerful American publishing interests was great.
158
Initially, the printers’ unions in the major eastern cities opposed granting copyright protection to foreign authors. However, they
changed their position as printers were increasingly filled with American women:
As book prices spiraled downward, squeezing profits from the established firms, the newer “cheap books” publishers had to
cut costs as well. Many operated in cities where the printers’ unions were weak, and most quickly abandoned unionized white
men who were unwilling to print and bind books for pennies per day. Instead, many of the cheap publishers employed
nonunion women and shared and reused printing plates to set type. The printers’ unions realized that while the lack of
international copyright was protecting the jobs of more American printers, the workers who filled those jobs were the wrong
kind—women instead of men. By the late 1880s, the unions flipped sides and joined the major publishers and authors in
support of some measure of international copyright.
159
Chace Act, supra note 155, § 3.
160
Id.
161
162
Id. at 234; DEWOLF, supra note 66, at 169 (noting that the manufacturing clause “very much diminished the practical value of the”
grant of copyright protection to foreigners).
163
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
164
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (2000).
165
The manufacturing clause retired in 1986. See id. § 601.
166
See id. § 401(a).
167
Mexico City Convention of 1902, done Jan. 27, 1902, 35 Stat. 1934. On April 9, 1908, the Mexico City Convention of 1902
became effective between the United States and Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Henn,
supra note 6969, at 53.
Copyright Convention,169 and the Berne Convention170 and has ratified the 1996 WIPO Internet
Treaties.171 In addition, as a member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the United
States abides by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights172 and
is subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedure.173
Today, the United States is no longer the notorious pirate it was in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Rather, it has become the champion of literary and artistic property and
one of the predominant powers advocating strong intellectual property protection around the
world.174 Not only was it responsible for putting intellectual property on the international trade
agenda,175 but it also applies pressure continually and constantly to induce foreign countries, in
particular less developed countries, to reform their intellectual property regimes.176 Within a
hundred years, the United States has been transformed from the most notorious pirate to the most
dreadful police.177
II. SOFTWARE PIRACY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA
Although scholars both East and West credit the Chinese with having contributed
paper, movable type, and ink to humankind, China has yet to develop comprehensive
protection for what is created when one applies inked type to paper. To be sure, this has not
been for a lack of effort in promulgating formal legal protections for intellectual property. . . .
[Recent] developments notwithstanding, protection for intellectual property remains closer to
rhetoric than reality on the Chinese mainland, and problems persists across the Taiwan
Straits.
— William P. Alford178
168
Buenos Aires Convention of 1910, done Aug. 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, 155 L.N.T.S. 179. On July 13, 1914, the Buenos Aires
Convention became effective. Henn, supra note 69, at 55.
169
Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
170
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.); see also Peter Jaszi, A Garland of Reflections on Three International Copyright Topics, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47
(1989) (commenting on the short-term and long-term international effects of the United States’ adherence to the Berne Convention);
David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (1989) (expressing the
disappointment of the United States’ minimalist approach to implementing the Berne Convention).
171
WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996); WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec. 23, 1996).
172
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
173
Article 64 of the TRIPs Agreement requires that all intellectual property disputes arising under the Agreement be settled by the
dispute settlement procedure provided in the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs. Id. art. 64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221.
174
For an interesting discussion of why the United States underwent a 180-degree change in its approach toward intellectual property
protection, see McCarthy, supra note 32.
175
See Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary: A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 295, 337 (1996) (noting the United States’ success “in placing intellectual property on an arguably ‘international’ pedestal”);
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 97 (“Universal intellectual property standards embodied in the TRIPs Agreement had become
enforceable within the framework of a World Trade Organization, largely as a result of sustained pressures by a coalition of powerful
manufacturing associations in Europe, the United States, and Japan.” (footnote omitted)).
176
See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (2000) (granting the United States Trade Representative power to investigate and identify foreign
nations that do not provide adequate intellectual property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or equitable
market access); Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies
Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 29, 39 (1995) (discussing Special 301 actions in Taiwan, China, and Thailand); Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 140-48 (discussing the United States’ success in using section 301 sanctions to pressure China to
reform its intellectual property regime).
177
DEBORA J. HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICS OF EXPANDING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
79 (1999).
178
ALFORD, supra note 8, at 1.
We take copyright violations very seriously, but when it comes to copying a disk, most
Chinese people don’t see what’s wrong.
— Xu Guoji179
[Building a copyright system is] like building a house. . . . You can have the house structure
all set up, very beautiful. But then, you need electricity and water pipes. That takes more
time.
— Li Changxu180
The second story takes place on the other side of the Pacific Ocean more than a century
later. Like the first story, this story concerns a less developed country that is struggling to
compete with other members of the international trading community. Unlike the first story,
however, the protagonist of this story has a different political, social, economic, cultural,
ideological, and historical background. 181 Rather than being a newly independent state, the
country has more than 4000 years of history and is struggling with both internal and external
problems.
After decades of imperialism, warlordism, wars, famines, revolutions, and political

turmoil, China finally regained stability in the late 1970s. In December 1978, the Chinese
Communist Party reopened the country to the international community, reversing Mao Zedong’s
seclusion policy, which was in force since 1958.182 Unlike Mao, Deng Xiaoping believed in a
pragmatic approach. Instead of putting “politics in command,” Deng saw economic wealth as
the foundation of China’s power 183 and realized that China could not modernize in isolation
without the benefits of foreign science, technology, capital, and management skills.184 Thus,
Deng and other leaders vigorously pushed for the Four Modernizations,185 the establishment of
179
Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at D1 (quoting Xu Guoji, senior official in
Shanghai’s Industrial and Commercial Administration).
180
Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Intellectual Property: China Moves Against Piracy as U.S. Trade Battle Looms, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at 1 (quoting Li Changxu, head of China United Intellectual Property Investigation Center).
181
See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 16-37 (describing the various differences between China and the
West).
182
Professor Hsü described the improvement in China’s foreign trade since the open-door policy:
During the first decade of the People’s Republic (1949-59), China maintained diplomatic and commercial relations only with
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellite states. There was no trade between China and the United States. After the
Sino-Soviet split in 1960, China became extremely isolated in the international community, simultaneously facing both the
Soviet Union and the United States as potential enemies. It was not until after the visit of President Richard Nixon to China in
1972 that limited commercial relations began. In 1972 American-Chinese trade amounted to only $92 million, but it rapidly
grew to $1,189 million in 1978, $5,478 million in 1981, $8 billion in 1986, and $13.5 billion in 1988, amounting to
approximately 10 percent of China’s total foreign trade.
IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 858 (6th ed. 2000).
183
YONGNIAN ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION, IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 17 (1999); id. (“According to Deng, whether China could have a rightful place in the world of nations depended on China’s
domestic economic development.”).
184
HSÜ, supra note 182, at 858.
185
The Four Modernizations aimed to develop China’s world-class strength in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and
national defense by 2000. See HSÜ, supra note 182, at 803-14, for a comprehensive overview of the Four Modernizations.
Special Economic Zones,186 and the renewal of diplomatic and commercial ties with the United
States, Japan, and other Western developed countries.187
Among the earliest treaties signed shortly after China’s reopening was the Agreement on
Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China.188
This Agreement culminated from the improving relationship between the two countries189 and
covered a large variety of areas, which ranged from establishing businesses to enabling banking
transactions and from maintaining trade and diplomatic ties to facilitating cultural exchanges.190
In the context of intellectual property, this Agreement provided that “each Party shall
seek, under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural
persons of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and
trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.” 191 The Agreement also
provided that “each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its laws and regulations and
with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party
protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright protection correspondingly accorded by the
other Party.”192
By virtue of this Agreement, “China assumed an international legal obligation for

intellectual property rights protection [even] before it had established a domestic intellectual
property protection system.” 193 In 1980, China became a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). Five years later, China joined the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property.194 In addition, China promulgated a new trademark law195 in
1982 and a new patent statute 196 in 1984. Notwithstanding these new laws and multilateral
agreements, China afforded authors and inventors very limited protection.197
At that time, Chinese leaders were still very reluctant to introduce private property, as
they were concerned about the conflict intellectual property rights would create within the
186
The special economic zones seek to experiment with new economic forms within the framework of “socialist modernization.”
These zones allow for a substantial role for foreign investment in the private economy. Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong
Kong’s Succession to the ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 53, 104 n.293 (1999) [hereinafter Yu, Succession by Estoppel]; see also George T.
Crane, ‘Special Things in Special Ways’: National Economic Identity and China’s Special Economic Zones, in CHINESE NATIONALISM
148 (Jonathan Unger ed., 1996) (exploring China’s economic identity as revealed in debates surrounding the establishment and
expansion of special economic zones).
187
See id. at 858-69 for a discussion of the Open Door Policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978.
188
Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-
P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter 1979 Agreement].
189
See HSÜ, supra note 182, at 785 (discussing the straining relationship between China and the United States during the 1970s).
190
See id.
191
Id. art. VI (3), 31 U.S.T. at 4658.
192
Id. art. VI (5).
193
HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA: A COMPLETE GUIDE 5 (1999) [hereinafter XUE & ZHENG,
SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA].
194
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
195
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at
305 (1987).
196
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-1986, at 65
(1987).
197
Although the new trademark and patent laws granted individuals rights over their creations and inventions, these laws were
designed mainly to promote “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics.” ALFORD, supra note 8, at 70. Uneasy about the
introduction of private property and the potential conflict between intellectual property rights and the national interest, the Chinese
government placed substantial limits on the rights granted under the new statutes. Id.
socialist economic system. 198 Thus, instead of creating new rights to protect individual
authorship and inventions, 199 the new intellectual property statutes were drafted primarily to
rehabilitate authors, inventors, and scientists by enhancing their position through legal
recognition200 while promoting “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics.”201 Although the
trademark and patent laws granted individuals rights in their marks and inventions, these statutes
included so many limits that the original grants became insignificant.202 Intellectual property
protection remained ineffective, and piracy was rampant throughout the country.
Consider computer software, for example. As China reopened in the late 1970s, software
development units found the sale of infringing tapes and disks of their programs, as well as
plagiarized descriptions of these programs in public book stores by other units who had neither
contacted the developers nor sought their permission.203 Fearing that their software would be
copied once it was put on the market, many developers “literally kept the software in their desk
drawers.” 204 Even though some eventually decided to release their products by publishing
notices205 or warnings in newspapers, their remedial efforts were of very limited effectiveness.
After all, the consuming public knew that software developers could do nothing even if the
software was reproduced and its replica sold.206
Frustrated by the lack of computer software protection, the chief engineer of an enterprise
of the Ministry of Electronics Industry called for the establishment of a copyright system in
China to protect computer software in 1984.207 A few months later, executives from the IBM
Corp. submitted a draft for an Interim Copyright Law for the Protection of Software to the
Ministry of Electronics Industry, “express[ing] an urgent desire for the establishment of a
Chinese software protection system.”208 In 1985, Chinese experts from technical, foreign trade,
and research departments and universities reached “a unanimous consensus . . . that it was
essential for China to prepare a special protection regime for software in addition to possible
general copyright protection in the future Chinese Copyright Law.” 209 The State Council
subsequently appointed the Ministry of Electronics Industry “to organize a working group to
198
See ALFORD, supra note 8, at 70.
199
Under the General Principles of the Civil Law of 1986, “intellectual property rights are classified as a kind of civil right,
independent of property rights and personal rights.” XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193, at 4; see also
General Principles of the Civil Law of 1986, arts. 94-97, in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-1986, supra note 196.
200
ALFORD, supra note 8, at 70 (arguing that the intellectual property laws promulgated in the early 1980s were designed mainly to
promote “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics”); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 136-37 (discussing the
substantial limits on intellectual property rights granted under the early intellectual property statutes). Indeed, the State Council noted in
a White Paper released in 1994 that intellectual property laws aim “to rapidly develop social productive forces, promote overall social
progress, meet the needs of developing a socialist market economy and expedite China’s entry into the world economy.” INFORMATION
OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (1994), translated in
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 20, 1994, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
201
202
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 6, translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1983-1986, at
65 (1987).
203
XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 31.
204
Id.
205
“For example, the Sixth Institute of the Ministry of Electronic Industries, when marketing their newly developed Chinese
character base data system (Cdbase III), included a notice stating, ‘No reproduction, transfer or resale is permissible.’” Id. at 32.
206
Id.
207
As Professors Xue Hong and Zheng Chengsi elaborated: “The main reason he suggested such a system be established was that the
lack of satisfactory protection prevented software products being introduced to the Chinese market, and consequently the Chinese
software industry could not develop. This was the first time such a system had been called for in China.” Id. at 31.
208
Id. at 32.
209
Id.
prepare a document, either as regulations or in another form, for the protection of software in
China.”210
Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the drafting process was stalled by the changing
development of software protection in the international community, as countries started to
abandon earlier efforts to create a sui generis copyright regime for protecting software.211 In the
end, China met similar fate as that of many other less developed countries, and software
protection was created in response to U.S. trade pressure, rather than internal legislative
initiatives.212
Concerned about the extensive piracy in audiovisual products and computer software,
U.S. businesses lobbied their government heavily to increase pressure on China. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. government repeatedly threatened China with a series of
economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to
China’s entry into the WTO.213 Such threats eventually led to the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual
Property (“1992 MOU”) in 1992, 214 the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
(“1995 Agreement”) in 1995,215 and an accord that reiterated China’s commitment to intellectual
property protection in 1996.216
In retrospect, the 1992 MOU was effective in revamping China’s intellectual property
system. Pursuant to the 1992 MOU, 217 China acceded to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 218 and ratified the Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms.219 China also amended the 1990 Copyright Law and issued new implementing
regulations. 220 In addition, China subsequently adopted a new unfair competition law and
provided trade secret protection.221
210
Id.
211
Id. at 33.
212
PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA § 7.03, at 128 (1997).
213
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 140-51 (describing the United States’ use of section 301 sanctions and various
trade threats to induce China to protect intellectual property rights).
214
Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17,
1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677 (1995); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 142-43 (discussing the 1992
Memorandum of Understanding).
215
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
Agreement]; see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 145-48 (discussing the 1995 Agreement).
216
China Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, June 17, 1996, P.R.C.-U.S., available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/DATA/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2001); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 150-
51 (discussing the 1996 Accord).
217
See Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17,
1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677 (1995) [hereinafter 1992 MOU].
218
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828
U.N.T.S. 221; see also 1992 MOU, supra note 217, art. 3(1), 34 I.L.M. at 680-81 (stipulating that China would adhere to the Berne
Convention and would submit legislation authorizing such accession).
219
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct.
29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309; see also 1992 MOU, supra note 217, art. 3(2), 34 I.L.M. at 681 (stipulating that China would accede to and
ratify the Geneva Convention).
220
See 1992 MOU, supra note 217, art. 3(4), 34 I.L.M. at 681. The amended statute protects computer software programs as literary
works for fifty years, removes formalities on copyright protection, and extends protection to all works originating in a Berne Union
country, including sound recordings that have fallen into the public domain. See id. arts. 3(6)-(8), 34 I.L.M. at 682.
221
See id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 683.
Likewise, the 1995 Agreement was effective in helping China create an institutional
infrastructure that was conducive to protecting and enforcing rights created under the new
intellectual property regime. 222 The Agreement introduced the State Council Working
Conference on Intellectual Property Rights (“Working Conference”) 223 and established the
Enforcement Task Forces.224 To protect CDs, laser discs, and CD-ROMs, the 1995 Agreement
also established a unique copyright verification system,225 proposing to punish by administrative
and judicial means any manufacturer of audiovisual products who failed to comply with the
identifier requirement.226
In addition, the Agreement called for title registration of foreign audiovisual products and
computer software in CD-ROM format with the National Copyright Administration and local
copyright authorities. 227 The Agreement also required customs offices to intensify border
protection for all imports and exports of CDs, laser discs, CD-ROMS, and trademarked goods.228
Finally, the Agreement stipulated that relevant authorities would conduct training and education
on intellectual property protection throughout China.229 The Agreement further provided that the
Working Conference would develop a transparent legal system 230 while compiling and
publishing guidelines regarding application and protection in various areas of intellectual
property law.231
Notwithstanding these two agreements, software piracy remained rampant in China. As

the software industry indicated, 99% of computer software in China was pirated in the late
1990s.232 Because of this enormous piracy, some commentators labeled China a “one copy”
country, implying that a single copy of computer software would satisfy the demand of the entire
country through unlimited reproduction.233 Although Chinese authorities firmly denied the 99%
figure, a market survey conducted by China ComputerWorld in April 1998 indicated that “63 per
cent of CD-ROMS used by users with college degrees were pirated, though the piracy rate was
222
See 1995 Agreement, supra note 215.
223
This working conference was responsible for the central organization and coordination of protection and enforcement of all
intellectual property laws throughout the country. Id. § I[A], 34 I.L.M. at 887-89. In April 1998, the Chinese government replaced the
State Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights with the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO). See XUE & ZHENG,
SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 21-22.
224
Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights § I[B][1], in 1995 Agreement, supra note
215, 34 I.L.M. at 887, 890. The Task Forces comprised administrative and other authorities responsible for intellectual property
protection, including the National Copyright Administration, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Patent Office,
police at various levels, and customs officials. They were authorized to enter and search premises that allegedly infringe on intellectual
property rights, review books and records for evidence of infringement and damages, seal suspected goods, and confiscate materials and
implements used to make infringing goods. Id. § I[B][1][b], 34 I.L.M. at 890. If they found infringement, they could impose fines; order
a stoppage of production, reproduction and sale of infringing goods; revoke production permits; and confiscate and destroy the infringing
goods and the materials and implements used to manufacture those products. Id. § I[B][1][c], 34 I.L.M. at 890.
225
Id. § I[H], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
226
Id. § I[H][1][b], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
227
Id. § I[H][2][a], 34 I.L.M. at 903.
228
Id. § 1[G], 34 I.L.M. at 900-03.
229
Id. § II[A]-[B], 34 I.L.M. at 905-06.
230
Id. § II[C], 34 I.L.M. at 906 (stipulating that the Working Conference would “make publicly available the laws, provisions,
regulations, standards, edicts, decrees and interpretations regarding the authorization, management, and implementation of intellectual
property rights”).
231
Id. § II[D], 34 I.L.M. at 906-07.
232
233
See, e.g., Kenneth Ho, A Study in the Problem of Software Piracy in Hong Kong and China ¶ 2.6 (1995), available at
http://info.gov.hk/ipd/eng/information/studyaids/piracy_hk_china.htm (last visited May 26, 2002).
lower for users from other education backgrounds.”234 Even today, the U.S. software industry
lost more than $1 billion in China in annual retail software revenue.235
Commentators sometimes attributed China’s extensive piracy problem to the country’s

Confucian past and its pro-copying culture. For example, they alluded to the importance of the
past in the Chinese culture and how copyright “contradicts traditional Chinese moral
standards”236 by allowing a significant few to monopolize important materials needed by others
to understand their life, culture, and society.237 They also noted that the Chinese in the imperial
past did not consider copying or imitation a moral offense, but rather “a noble art”238—a “time-
honored learning process”239 through which people manifested respect for their ancestors.240 In
addition, they observed that the Chinese considered creativity a collective benefit to their
community and the posterity241 and discussed how Confucianism encouraged people to despise
commerce,242 as well as those who created works for sheer profit.243
While this culture-based explanation provides insight into one of the major barriers to
successful intellectual property law reforms in China, other factors are equally important. For
example, the socialist economic system makes it difficult for the Chinese to see the benefit of
intellectual property ownership. Under this system, property belongs to the State and the people,
rather than private owners. Authors therefore create literary and artistic works for the welfare of
the State, rather than for the purpose of generating economic benefits for themselves.244 It is no
234
XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 15 (citing Subdivision Market Research of CD-ROM
Publications, CHINA COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 13, 1998, at C15).
235
See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING & RESEARCH CORPORATION, SEVENTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 6
(2002) [hereinafter BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY], available at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/globallib/piracy/2002_Piracy_Stats.pdf; see also $22 Million of Alleged Counterfeit Microsoft Software Seized in
Pennsylvania; State Troopers, Following Leads About Stolen Laptops, Uncover Huge Worldwide Counterfeiting Operation, PR
NEWSWIRE, June 12, 2000, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting on the investigation and discovery of a
significant counterfeit distribution operation in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania).
236
Hu, supra note 8, at 104.
237
Yu, Piracy, Prejudice and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 17; see also ALFORD, supra note 8, at 20 (“The indispensability of the
past for personal moral growth dictated that there be broad access to the common heritage of all Chinese.”).
238
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 619
(1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement]. A case in point is the art of linmo, a technique of hand-copying a master’s work. As
Professor Feng described:
Hand-copying (linmo) of a master’s work is a pedagogical regimen in traditional Chinese painting and calligraphy. As
practised, linmo is usually done with the same tools and materials (brush, ink, pigments, paper, etc.) as the original. It differs
from tracing, in that it involves not only demanding skills and discipline, but vigorous mental process and effort to absorb and
express the master’s technique, style and spirit. Hence good linmo is considered an art on its own right.
FENG, supra note 212, at 62. Because of the importance of this art, the Copyright Law includes a special linmo exception. Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China 1990 art. 22(10), translated in 2 China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) P 11-700 (1993).
239
Hu, supra note 8, at 104.
240
See J. DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 30 (1995); see id. (“Chinese writers, artists, and creators in all areas of knowledge had significant reverence and attachment
for the past which resulted in legitimized copying.”); id. at 31 (“[F]orgeries were not always stigmatized; emulation was regarded as a
form of appreciation.”); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 254 (1952) (“Admiration induces imitation; the
closer the imitation, the narrower the dividing line between it and outright copying.”).
241
Hu, supra note 8, at 104; see also Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress Problems, and
Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140, 160 (1994) [hereinafter Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals]; see ALFORD, supra note 8,
at 29 (“[T]rue scholars wrote for edification and moral renewal, rather than profit.”).
242
Merchants were considered the lowest among the four social classes in a traditional Chinese society. These four classes were, in
descending order, scholar-official (shih), farmer (nung), artisan (kung), and merchant (shang).
243
ALFORD, supra note 8, at 29 (“[T]he Confucian disdain for commerce fostered an ideal . . . that true scholars wrote for edification
and moral renewal rather than profit.”); see also Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 15, 36-56 (1993) (discussing how Confucianism smothered the impulse to commercial profit).
244
Hu, supra note 8, at 104; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 11 (“The Soviet model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes
toward intellectual property and expounded the socialist belief that by inventing or creating, individuals were engaging in social
activities based on knowledge that belonged to all members of society.”).
wonder that many Chinese found the rationales behind intellectual property protection
counterintuitive.
Even worse, under the Socialist economic system, piracy—or, put it bluntly, stealing—is
more preferable to intellectual property ownership. As Professor Susan Tiefenbrun put it,
“owning property [in a Socialist economic system] is tantamount to a sin. Thus, stealing an
object that is owned by someone else is less corrupt than owning it outright yourself.”245 In fact,
many Chinese were reluctant to acknowledge their roles in creative and inventive activities, and
there existed a strong aversion of private property among the Chinese, especially after the
Cultural Revolution and the numerous mass campaigns and class struggles in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s.246
To rehabilitate the intelligentsia, post-Mao leaders sought to facilitate the endeavors of

the intelligentsia and enhance their positions through legal recognition. Nevertheless, due to
concerns about the conflict between intellectual property rights and the socialist economic
system, intellectual property statutes in China were filled with substantial limits, and rights in
individual creations and inventions were never fully developed. A case in point is Article 14 of
the Regulations of Computer Software Protection, 247 which specified the conditions for
determining the ownership of job-related software —the copyright in which was owned by the
software developer, as compared to the unit in which the developer was employed.248 Under
Article 14, the copyright in a software belonged to the developer if the software was not
developed in the course of one’s normal or assigned duty or when one did not use the materials
of the employing unit.249 However, given the importance of a work unit in a socialist economy
and the difficulty in securing sophisticated computer equipment or sizable capital in the early
1990s,250 the provision was of limited effectiveness. Indeed, as Professor Peter Feng pointed out,
the provision “contain[ed] a legislative blunder” 251 that resulted in “the notorious classroom
conundrum: who owns the copyright of software if it was developed outside one’s normal and
assigned duty, but with the assistance of the material means of the employing unit.”252
245
Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 37-38.
246
See ALFORD, supra note 8, at 64; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 21-22.
247
Computer Software Protection Rules 1991 art. 14, translated in 2 China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) P 11-704 (1993).
248
Article 14 provides:
If software developed by a citizen while working in an organisation is the product of work executed for the organisation,
is developed in accordance with the clearly stipulated development goals for work in the organisation, or is the predictable or
natural result of activities involved in the organisation’s work, then the software’s copyright belongs to the organisation.
If software developed by a citizen is not the result of work executed for the organisation, has no direct relationship to the
content of the work at the organisation in which the developer is engaged, and does not use the organisation’s material
technical conditions, the software’s copyright belongs to the developer himself.
Id.
249
Id.
250
251
FENG, supra note 212, § 7.10, at 132; see also HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY 45-46 (2002) (discussing the problems created by Article 14 of the Software Regulations).
252
FENG, supra note 212212, § 7.10, at 132. Most recently, article 14(2) of the Software Regulations was modified:
According to Article 13 of the MSR [Modified Software Regulations], in the following circumstances the copyright of the
software developed by a natural person during his or her term of employment in a legal person or an entity without legal status
shall vest in the legal person or the entity without legal status, and the legal person or the entity without legal status may grant
awards to the software developer:
1 where the software is the result of performing the employee’s duty with the development objective explicitly assigned
in the line of duty;
2 where the software developed is foreseen or natural result of carrying out the employee’s duty; and
Moreover, many Chinese were concerned that intellectual property rights would impose a
substantial burden on the country, especially if sensitive innovative technology like computer
software were to be protected. Since the Opium War in the 1840s, China had suffered from
foreign invasion and semi-colonization.253 Desperate to modernize the country, the Chinese had
subscribed to a self-strengthening worldview, under which attaining independence and liberating
the nation became the country’s first priority. 254 This worldview persisted even after the
establishment of the Communist regime. Thus, many Chinese continued to believe it was right
to freely reproduce or to tolerate the unauthorized reproduction of foreign works that would help
strengthen the country.255 Some of them even believed copying was needed, or even necessary,
for China to catch up with Western developed countries. Unlike what Westerners believe, many
Chinese consider software piracy beneficial to their country, because “it speeds the nation’s
modernization at little or no cost.”256
As China became stronger in the late 1990s, the self-strengthening worldview took on a
nationalist overtone, and pirated software became “patriotic software.” 257 This nationalist
overtone was further transformed into xenophobia, as the U.S.-China relations deteriorated and
the misguided U.S.-China foreign policy backfired. Such transformation was demonstrated
vividly in recent years by the hostile reaction to the United States’ bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade258 and the standoff over the collision between the Chinese jet fighter and a
U.S. reconnaissance plane. 259 As Geremie R. Barmé titled its book chapter “To Screw
Foreigners Is Patriotic,” there existed feelings that equated screwing foreigners with
patriotism.260 To the xenophobes, there was no better way to serve the country than to commit
software piracy, given the substantial damage piracy could inflict upon the U.S. economy.
In sum, many Chinese saw a higher stake in pirating foreign technologies than protecting
them. To many of them, intellectual property rights were not tools to promote the country’s
economic development, foreign investment, and interstate relations. 261 Rather, they were
weapons the West specially designed to protect their dominant position. Under a Trojan horse
theory, intellectual property rights would drain away China’s scarce economic resources, divide
3 where the software is developed through using the funds, exclusive facilities, unpublished exclusive information or
any other material and technical conditions of the legal person or other entity without legal personality and under the
responsibility of the legal person or other entity without legal personality.
XUE & ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 46.
253
See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 22-23.
254
Xiang Rui Gong, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: The Chinese View Under the Notion of One Country, Two Systems,
in THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 492 (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).
255
See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 271 (1986)
(noting the use and application by the Chinese of technology, techniques, and products developed in more advanced countries without
paying any royalties).
256
James Cox, U.S. Firms: Piracy Thrives in China, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, at 2B.
257
Id.
258
Although the United States insisted that the bombing was an accident and apologized for the incident, many Chinese considered
the bombing a deliberate attack to slow down China’s rise in world affairs and to warn China against challenging American hegemony.
STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND THE WORLD 81 (2000); see also John Pomfret & Michael
Lavis, China Suspends Some U.S. Ties; Protesters Trap Ambassador in Embassy, WASH. POST, May 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting on the
anti-American protests outside the U.S. embassy after the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade).
259
See John Pomfret, New Nationalism Drives Beijing; Hard Line Reflects Public Mood, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at A1
(attributing the recent standoff with Washington to the growing nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people); Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Many Voices for Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1 (noting that anti-American feelings are running high in China).
260
To highlight these possibilities, one commentator entitled a chapter of his book “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic.” GEREMIE R.
BARMÉ, IN THE RED: ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE 255-80 (1999).
261
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 189; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 62.
the country, and erode its cultural identity.262 They also would slow down China’s economic
progress and its rise in world affairs, and eventually would ensure that China would “follow the
path of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—toward economic decay, social unrest, and
political instability.”263
Shortly after the 1996 negotiations, however, the Clinton administration changed its
tactics and abandoned its coercive policy toward China.264 This policy change was partly due to
the failure of the coercive policy265 and partly due to the loss of interest from U.S. businesses in
continuing such a policy. 266 Ironically, just as the U.S. government backed away from its
coercive tactics, intellectual property protection in China began to improve.
Since 1996, China has introduced many new intellectual property statutes and regulations
and has entered into various international treaties. In 1996, China issued the Regulations on the
Certification and Protection of Famous Trademarks267and the Regulations on the Protection of
New Plant Varieties. 268 China also amended its Criminal Law by including a section on
intellectual property crimes. 269 In April 2000, China became a member of the International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants270 and subsequently enacted a law to protect
trademark holders against cybersquatters.271
In addition, China made various institutional reforms to improve the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights. In April 1998, China upgraded the State Patent
Bureau to the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), a ministry-level branch of the State
Council.272 China also developed training programs that facilitate research and training in the
262
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 189-90; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 61-62.
263
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 190 (quoting Harry Harding, Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights, in
LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S./CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 165, 172 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997)). But see RICHARD
BERNSTEIN & ROSS H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA 204 (Vintage Books 1998) (“The goal of the United States is not a
weak and poor China; it is a China that is stable and democratic, that does not upset the balance of power in Asia, and that plays within
the rules on such matters as trade and arms proliferation.”); Lee H. Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND
AMERICAN INTERESTS 1, 4 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994) (“China’s stability is in the U.S. interest.”).
264
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 154.
265
See id. (discussing the failure of the 1996 Agreement and the cycle of futility).
266
Steven Mufson, Piracy Still Runs Rampant in China, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at E3 (reporting that U.S. industries, which
drive the American international trade policy, opposed sanctions on China despite a persistent piracy problem).
267
China: Laws Being Promulgated to Protect IPR, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 10, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13647865 [hereinafter
China: Laws Being Promulgated].
268
China: Laws Being Promulgated, supra note 267.
269
Id.; see also Mary L. Riley, Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in PROTECTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 91, 96-97 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997) (discussing the 1997 amendments to the criminal law).
270
Shoukang Guo, China: Status Report on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants in the PRC, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L.
Daily (BNA), at D5 (Sept. 1, 2000). For discussions of intellectual property protection for new plant varieties in China, see generally
Lester Ross & Libin Zhang, Agricultural Development and Intellectual Property Protection for Plant Varieties: China Joins the UPOV,
17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 226 (2000); Chengfei Ding, Note, The Protection for New Plant Varieties of American Businesses in China
After China Enters the WTO, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333 (2001).
271
Noah Smith, China: New Chinese Law Protects Trademarks from Internet Squatters; Patent Law Revised, Pat. Trademark &
Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Aug. 29, 2000).
272
The Web site of the State Intellectual Property Office is available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/. SIPO replaced the State Council
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights established by the 1995 Agreement. XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN
CHINA, supra note 193193, at 21-22. Working closely with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce and the State Press and
Publication Administration, SIPO is responsible for improving intellectual property protection and for coordinating regional intellectual
property rights department to intensify enforcement of laws and regulations. China: New IPR Commissioner Interviewed, CHINA BUS.
INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 14, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7561417. It is also responsible for building a patent information network,
assisting enterprises and research institutions to protect their own technology and products, and cooperating with other countries to speed
up China’s intellectual property protection to meet international standards. See id.; China to Launch Nationwide Patent Information
Network, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Jan. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3888595.
intellectual property field. 273 To meet the increasing demand for expertise in intellectual
property laws, Chinese universities began to offer courses and degrees in intellectual property
law.274 Some even set up their own intellectual property law departments.275
As China prepared to enter the WTO, it revamped its entire intellectual property system
at the turn of this century, amending copyright, 276 patent, 277 and trademark laws 278 while
adopting a new regulation on the protection of layout designs of integrated circuits.279 Consider
copyright protection, for example. Entered into force in late 2001, the new copyright law
amendments 280 strengthen copyright protection and improve the law’s compliance with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”).281
Under the revised copyright law, administrative agencies and courts are authorized to order
confiscation of illegal gains, pirated copies, and materials, tools, and equipment used to conduct
infringement activities. 282 Where the plaintiff’s damage or the infringer’s profits cannot be
determined, the revised law allows for statutory damages of up to RMB 500,000.283 In addition,
the law provides access to preliminary injunctions 284 and places the burden on the accused
infringer to prove the existence of a legitimate license.285 The law also addresses for the first
time copyright issues on the Internet286 and includes a reference to China’s contract law as a
basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations.287
Moreover, China recently modified the Regulations of Computer Software Protection,

which were enacted in 1991 in response to U.S. trade pressure. These modifications were badly
needed in light of China’s recent transition from a command economy to a market economy and
273
See, e.g., China: First IPR Protection Personnel Center Opens in Beijing, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 17, 1998, available
at 1998 WL 7561463; China: Training Centre to Help Strengthen IPR Protection, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Jan. 17, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 9840723.
274
Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 241, at 149 (“The People’s University, the Huazhong Science and Technology
University, and the Zhejiang University now offer a second bachelor degree in intellectual property law.”); Liangjun Xie, New School
Starts on Rights Track, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 16, 1993, available at Westlaw, 1993 WL 10866676 (reporting the opening of the
Intellectual Property Rights School at Beijing University); Shanghai Protects Intellectual Property, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 31,
1994, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting that Shanghai University has decided to open an intellectual property
department and to communicate with foreign universities in the field).
275
Universities offering second bachelor’s degrees in intellectual property law include the People’s University, the Huazhong Science
and Technology University, and the Zhejiang University. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Perspectives, supra note 241. Also, the
Beijing University has a school dedicated to intellectual property. See id.
276
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of
China, Laws and Regulations, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/xgfg_e/t20020416_5077.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
277
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China,
Laws and Regulations, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/zlflfg_e/t20020327_4704.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
278
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, translated in State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of
China, Laws and Regulations, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/xgfg_e/t20020416_5078.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
279
Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits of the People’s Republic of China, translated in State
Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, Laws and Regulations, available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/zlflfg_e/200204020002.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
280
For an excellent discussion of recent amendments to the Copyright Law, see generally Xiaoqing Feng & Frank Xianfeng Huang,
International Standards and Local Elements: New Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 917 (2002).
281
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 172.
282
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 276, arts. 47, 51.
283
Id. art. 48.
284
Id. art. 49.
285
Id. art. 52.
286
Id. arts. 10(12), 37(6), 41, 47.
287
Id. art. 53.
the increasing emphasis on a knowledge-based economy. In the late 1990s, many software
developers resigned from state enterprises and research institutes to work in the private sector,
taking with them software products developed during the course of employment with state
institutions.288 As a result, state enterprises were unfairly deprived of the opportunity to recoup
their investment while facing heavy competition from private software companies created by or
stocked with their former employees. Thus, ownership disputes over job-related software have
become a very hot issue, and the modified software regulations provide the much-needed relief
in the area.
On the enforcement front, the Chinese authorities, from time to time, have launched
large-scale crackdowns on pirated and counterfeit products. For example, the Chinese
government started an anti-counterfeiting campaign in November 2000 and followed it up with a
major crackdown on counterfeit products that posed health and safety risks, such as food, drugs,
medical supplies, and agricultural products.289 In 2002, the Chinese government initiated a new
anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy campaign, which in turn resulted in high numbers of seizures
of infringing goods.290 In addition, Chinese leaders, through public speeches and position papers,
stressed the importance of intellectual property as an economic strategy.291 There also appeared
books, television talk shows, media articles, and government and academic reports that
highlighted the importance of intellectual property protection to China’s economic
development.292
Notwithstanding these crackdowns and reforming efforts, significant problems remain

with the enforcement of intellectual property laws in China, especially at the grassroots level and
in rural areas. These problems were further exacerbated by such institutional problems as “local
protectionism and corruption, reluctance or inability on the part of enforcement officials to
impose deterrent level penalties, and a low number of criminal prosecutions.” 293 With the
proliferation of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, the Chinese authorities are expected to face
new and even tougher challenges.
Moreover, compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, intellectual property protection has
improved considerably in China. As the 2000 National Trade Estimate Report stated: “Today,
China has improved its legal framework—and it has virtually shut down the illegal production
288
XUE & ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 104-05.
289
OFFICE OF USTR, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 44, 58-59 (2002).
290
OFFICE OF USTR, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 46, 60 (2003).
291
Id. at 57. As two leading commentators in Chinese intellectual property law described:
On 11 July, 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a public speech titled “Safeguard and Promotion of the Healthy
Development of the Information Network Through Rule of Law”. In the speech, President Jiang emphasized the importance
of expediting the legislative process and strengthening enforcement on information networks. The speech will further promote
the development of Chinese Internet legislation and its enforcement.
XUE & ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at xl.
292
OFFICE OF USTR, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 46, 60 (2003).
293
OFFICE OF USTR, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NTE
REPORT]; see also Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 11 (2000) (“Although the
level of copyright piracy seems to have decreased recently in China due to aggressive campaigning by copyright owners, trademark
counterfeiting continues to increase.” (footnote omitted)); Tom Korski, AV Piracy Still “Rampant” Despite Crackdowns, Chinese
Authorities Say, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Jan. 21, 1998) (“[P]iracy of audio-visual products in China remains
‘rampant’ despite expanded police raids on black marketeers . . . .”).
and export of pirated music and video CDs and CD-ROMS. Indeed, today it is an importer of
such products from third countries.”294
One might wonder why intellectual property protection in China has improved even
though the U.S. government and American businesses backed away from their earlier coercive
tactics. After all, the logic behind the coercive U.S.-China intellectual property policy was that
the Chinese intellectual property regime could not sustain itself and, therefore, required foreign
pushes to rejuvenate the system. While these foreign pushes were undoubtedly helpful in
establishing the Chinese intellectual property system in the early 1990s, recent improvements in
intellectual property protection in China can be largely attributed to three other factors.
First, although foreign companies and governments were generally reluctant to take any
substantial effort to promote awareness of intellectual property rights among the Chinese people
and to communicate to them why better protection would be in their interest,295 foreign and local
businesses, trade associations, and industry groups have been very active in promoting awareness
and understanding among the Chinese people. A case in point is the joint effort by the Business
Software Alliance and the Chinese Software Alliance to promote the use of original software in
China.296 Thanks to these efforts, the Chinese have become increasingly aware of the basic
functions of, and the rationales behind, intellectual property rights. To many Chinese, these
rights are no longer alien, abstract, and incomprehensible. Rather, they are closely related to
their daily lives and the country’s domestic growth and international reputation.
Furthermore, by the late 1990s, the Chinese—perhaps influenced by the developments in

the United States and the European Union—have begun to realize the importance of a well-
developed information economy. 297 All of a sudden, the phrase “knowledge economy” has
become a catchphrase frequently seen in major Chinese newspapers, such as Guangming Daily
and The People’s Daily, and heard in presentations made by government officials.298 Chinese
businesses also quickly adopted words like “e-commerce” and “e-business” to enhance public
recognition and stock market value.299 In March 1998, the Chinese government established the
Ministry of Information Industry by combining the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
and the Ministry of Electronics Industry.300 Two years later, the National People’s Congress
294
2000 NTE REPORT, supra note 293, at 50.
295
Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 142 (noting that “[f]or all its much ballyhooed expressions of concern,
neither the U.S. government nor many of the companies driving [the American foreign intellectual property] policy . . . have made any
substantial attempt . . . to communicate to the Chinese why better intellectual property protection would be in their interest.”); Chow,
supra note 293, at 46 (noting that “brand owners are reluctant to commit the amount of resources necessary to achieve these goals or to
risk seriously offending the Chinese government”); see also Hu, supra note 8, at 111 (“[A]ctive involvement by U.S. companies and
lawyers, for example through special seminars, exchange programs, mock proceedings, and other assistance to the Chinese media, will
expedite the training process.”). One commentator argued that “U.S. companies must take a proactive stance and not be content to rely
on government for help.” Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the
People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 190 (1998).
296
China: First IPR Protection Personnel Center Opens in Beijing, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 17, 1998, available at 1998
WL 7561463.
297
XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 7 (noting that “[t]he Chinese government has become
enthusiastic about information-based economic development because it has become aware that the value of the global information
industry is more than US$1,000 billion, and that this will be the ‘first industry’ in the next century.”).
298
Id.
299
XUE & ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at xl.
300
unveiled a five-year plan that includes information technology among the major goals of China’s
long-term economic development.301
Second, the Chinese, in particular their leaders, have begun to notice the benefits of
protecting intellectual property rights. In April 1997, the Chinese government provided
assistance to set up special intellectual property affairs departments, create intellectual property
protection networks, and build a self-protection system in enterprises and institutes to which
intellectual property rights are particularly important. 302 These enterprises and institutes
included major oil and chemical corporations, computer companies, and prestigious universities
and scientific research institutes.303 The Ministry of Information Industry also was determined
“to create 30 large software companies with an annual revenue of RMB10 billion, and ten larger
companies with an annual revenue of RMB 30 billion.”304 Unlike what they did in the past, the
Chinese no longer consider intellectual property rights exploitative devices that help protect the
West’s dominant position. Rather, they begin to see how these tools can help promote national
growth.
Third, and most important of all, many Chinese have become stakeholders or potential
stakeholders. Intellectual property therefore matters to them. Since the mid-1990s, China’s
software industry has experienced a tremendous growth.305 By 1997, the value of the software
market has doubled from RMB 6.8 billion in 1995 to RMB 12.6 billion. 306 The Chinese
government also has been active in developing the local software industry, establishing software
bases in Liaoning, Hunan, Shandong, and Sichuan Provinces and in Beijing, Shanghai and
Zhuhai districts.307
While the software industry was growing, the Internet population exploded. In October
1997, there were only 299,000 computers connected to the Internet, and 620,000 Internet users.
Today, based on the July 2003 survey by the China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC), there were 25.72 million computers connected to the Internet, and 68 million Internet
users.308 Although the growth in the Chinese Internet user community recently slowed down,309
301
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).
302
See China: New Measure Will Be Taken to Protect IPR, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 4, 1997, available at 1997 WL
9842657; see also China Introduces Anti-Piracy Technology, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 15, 1999, available at 1999 WL
5618404 (reporting the efforts of the China Software Association to introduce new anti-piracy technology to local software producers).
303
China: New Measure Will Be Taken to Protect IPR, supra note 302.
304
305
For discussions of the blossoming software industry in China and the leaders’ eagerness to develop science and technology parks,
see generally China: Guangzhou to Establish “Silicon Valley,” CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Dec. 4, 1998, available at 1998 WL
22707603 (reporting the municipal government’s intention to develop an international science and technology park); China: Sales of
Software Stay Strong Despite Fakes, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS, June 20, 2000, available at Lexis, News Library, ASINFO File
(“Despite the damage done by piracy, China’s software industry is still moving ahead with sales in 1999 hitting 17.6 billion RMB yuan
(US$ 2.13 billion), an increase of 27.5 percent over 1998.”); China: Software Industry Booms in China, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK,
Oct. 30, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12878806 (reporting a 50% annual growth rate in the software industry over the past several years).
305
See ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 183, at 16; see also MARGARET M. PEARSON, CHINA’S NEW
BUSINESS ELITE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REFORM 21 (1997) (noting that the intentional decentralization of
economic authority by the state has been the “hallmark of the post-Mao reform strategy”).
306
XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 8 (citing PC World China, Mar. 9, 1998, at 15).
307
Id. at 9.
308
CNNIC, 12TH STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA § 4 (2003) [hereinafter CNNIC, 12TH
STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT], available at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/2003-7e/12th_Statistical_report.doc.
309
The number of Internet users rose from 33.7 million in January 2002 to 59.1 million in January 2003. See Semiannual Survey
Report on the Development of China’s Internet (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/rep200201-e.shtml (Jan. 2002);
Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China’s Internet (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/2003-
China already has surpassed all the major developed countries except the United States and now
boasts the second largest Internet population in the world, ahead of Japan, Germany, and the
United Kingdom.310
Moreover, the Chinese begin to perceive themselves as passive stakeholders. In other

words, they begin to perceive the danger of inadequate intellectual property protection and
understand how the lack thereof could impair the well-being of the country while slowing down
its development.311 They also realized the damage the lack of intellectual property protection
could inflict upon the country’s international reputation. Because intellectual property protection
remains a key issue in the WTO accession negotiation, the Chinese understand that the stakes for
the lack of intellectual property protection extend beyond the intellectual property arena,
covering almost every other area that implicates international trade, including agriculture,
banking, electronics, insurance, professional services, securities, telecommunications, and
textiles.
On November 10, 2001, member states of the WTO approved China’s accession to the
international trading body. 312 After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations, China finally
became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.313 Although the accession process was
complicated and involved many different factors, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that
China might still remain outside the WTO had it not strengthened its protection of intellectual
property rights. Indeed, some commentators considered the WTO membership a major impetus
for China’s recent improvements in intellectual property protection. As two leading
commentators in Chinese intellectual property law explained:
In general, China’s entry to the WTO significantly influenced the speed and scope of
the development of the Chinese IP law system. It is interesting to note that IP rights reforms
kept pace with Chinese WTO negotiations. When the negotiations encountered obstacles, the
IP rights reform slowed down; when the negotiations reached agreements to promote the
accession process, the IP rights reform accelerated noticeably. Since China has become a
member of the WTO, Chinese IP law reform has also peaked.314
When commentators analyze the effects of China’s entry into the WTO, they usually fall
into one of two camps—the optimists or the pessimists315 (or perhaps a hybrid between the two,
1e/index.shtml (Jan. 2003). By contrast, in the first six months of 2003, the number Internet users increased only from 59.1 million to 68
million. See CNNIC, 12TH STATISTICAL SURVEY REPORT, supra note 308.
310
Nielsen//Netratings Announces China Has World’s Second Largest Internet Population—56 Mln, CHINA IT & TELECOM REPORT,
Apr. 26, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
311
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 189-90; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 61.
For example, adulterated drugs and counterfeit products will lead to illness, extended injuries, and unnecessary deaths.
Emerging entrepreneurs, authors, and creative artists will be unable to capture the benefits of their inventions, innovations, and
creative endeavors. To make up for the potential infringement of their fellow citizens and organizations, businesses and
educational centers will have to pay more for the needed foreign technologies and materials. Consumers who receive worse
products despite paying the same price will be reluctant to consume in the open market. Foreign entities will be wary of
investing in China because of widespread intellectual property piracy. And worst of all, “the best and brightest from [China
will] feel compelled to leave their home country for the more remunerative systems in developed nations.”
Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 194-95 (footnotes omitted).
312
Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, WTO Approves China’s Entry, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A47.
313
China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.
314
XUE & ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at xxxix.
315
See Peter K. Yu, The Ramifications of China’s Entry into the WTO: Will the Global Community Benefit?, FINDLAW’S WRIT:
LEGAL COMMENTARY, Dec. 4, 2001, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011204_yu.html [hereinafter Yu, Ramifications of
China’s Entry into the WTO] (discussing the optimistic and pessimistic views of China’s entry into the WTO).
who considers China’s entry a “double-edged sword.”)316 The optimists believe China’s WTO
membership will lead to stronger intellectual property protection in the country. As they argued,
China’s accession to the WTO will lead to better economic conditions in the country. As a result,
consumers no longer will be attracted to low-priced counterfeits and, instead, will seek higher-
priced genuine and luxury goods.317 Using Taiwan as an example, these observers predicted that
“[p]irates and counterfeiters will . . . gradually move into legitimate businesses[,] and the focus
of counterfeiting and piracy will shift away from China to lesser developing countries, such as
Vietnam.”318
By contrast, the pessimists believe that the piracy and counterfeiting problem will worsen
in the first few years after China’s entry into the WTO. As access to the Chinese markets
increases, the increase of foreign investment and trade will enhance the economic conditions that
give rise to the piracy and counterfeiting problem in the first place.319 Reduced restrictions on
export privileges also will allow pirates and counterfeiters to trade more aggressively with
markets having “a strong appetite for low-priced counterfeit goods,” such as Southeast Asia and
Eastern Europe.320
Moreover, as the current legal reforms in China focus primarily on improving the
compliance of existing laws with the WTO regime, China’s recent accession to the WTO might
create a disincentive for the country to carry out further immediate reforms, especially in areas
where noncompliance is questionable, difficult to assess, or hard to prove before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body.321 In fact, its “increased stature as a WTO member will increase its
bargaining position and its leverage against any future pressure to improve its piracy
problem.”322
Since China reopened in late 1970s, protection of computer software has improved
considerably. Although software piracy has yet to be eradicated and significant barriers still
remain, this story seems to be developing in a promising direction. If the later chapters of the
story unfolds the same way as the earlier ones, perhaps this story might have an ending as happy
as the first.
316
See, e.g., GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY: THE MIDDLE KINGDOM EMERGES 176 (1997) (cautioning that
China’s accession to the WTO is “a double-edged sword”).
317
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CHINA 254 (2002).
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Professor Chow discussed the difficulties of proving China’s noncompliance of the enforcement obligations under the TRIPs
Agreement:
Part III of TRIPS creates specific enforcement obligations and raising the counterfeiting and piracy issue after China’s
admission into the WTO will most likely take place in the context of arguing that China’s enforcement efforts fail to satisfy
TRIPS enforcement obligations. The burden of proof and persuasion will be upon the complaining party. Meeting these
burdens will require the complaining party to gather evidence of China’s failure to meet its obligations—a task that could take
years given the complexity of the enforcement environment in China today—and would also require the party to prove its case
before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. Not only will this be a long process requiring several years, but there is no
guarantee that the party raising the dispute would succeed given that it now has all of the burdens of proof and going forward.
Id. at 253-54.
322
Id. at 254. As Professor Chow queried: “[I]f China can enter the world’s foremost commercial law regime and be recognized as a
member of the world trading community despite having the world’s most serious piracy problem, what incentive is there to improve the
problem and to commit the considerable resources that this would require?” Id.
III. MUSIC PIRACY IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CYBERSPACE
Unlike old-fashioned smugglers, the haven pirates never had to physically touch their booty.
Data had no substance.
— Bruce Sterling323
This is a very profound moment historically. This isn’t just about a bunch of kids stealing
music. It’s about an assault on everything that constitutes the cultural expression of our
society. If we fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture will
atrophy. And corporations won’t be the only ones hurt. Artists will have no incentive to
create. Worst-case scenario: The country will end up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages.
— Richard Parsons324
Even data pirates may have their good side; some may rob from the rich and give to the poor,
which may not seem so undesirable from the perspective of the poor. Others may rob from
monopolists and give to consumers, which may seem desirable from the perspective of
consumers. At the very least, the threat of data pirates may force policymakers to batter
down the hatches and run a tighter ship, which might be desirable to anyone on board. And
in some cases, data pirates may even force some politicians to walk the plank, which might be
desirable to nearly everybody.
— Dan L. Burk325
The final story returns to the United States, although it also happens in a territory called
the cyberspace,326 in which U.S. laws apply in many instances.327 Unlike the first story, however,
the United States is no longer the notorious pirate in this story. Rather, it has become the
champion of literary and artistic property and one of the predominant powers advocating strong
intellectual property protection around the world.328
Since the invention of Guttenberg’s printing press, one can reproduce copyrighted works
at will, although the cost, quality, and speed of reproduction may vary significantly. While
piracy occurred at times when copyists free rode on the efforts of other creative artists, 329
323
BRUCE STERLING, ISLANDS IN THE NET 37 (1988), quoted in Dan L. Burk, The Market for Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205, 205 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson ed., 1997)
[hereinafter BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE].
324
Chuck Philips, Time Warner Tunes in New Delivery Channel, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2000, at C1 (interviewing Richard Parsons,
President, Time Warner).
325
Burk, supra note 323, at 205.
326
Science-fiction writer William Gibson introduced the term “cyberspace” in the mid-1980s. See WILLIAM GIBSON,
NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
327
Commentators have emphasized ad nauseum how the Internet and new communications technologies have transformed the global
economy and the international political system. However, “information dos not flow in a vacuum, but in political space that is already
occupied.” ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 217 (3d ed. 2001). As Professor Lawrence Lessig
pointed out repeatedly, code is law and the Internet is regulable. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(Basic Books 1999). For articles advocating the self-governance of cyberspace, see David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on
Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, at http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/articles/post.shtml; I. Trotter Hardy,
The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town
Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413 (1997); Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: Understanding
the Internet Community, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 7, 1996, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/valauskas/index.html. But see Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (disputing the need to distinguish cyberspace and real-space
transactions and advocating the need to ground cyberspace transactions in real-space laws).
328
See Donald E. deKieffer, U.S. Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 97 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994); Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that the United States recently has been very aggressive in pushing for a universal intellectual
property regime that offers information and high-technology goods uniform protection throughout the world).
329
Professor Stewart Sterk described the free riding problem in the copyright context:
intellectual property law protected most authors and publishers, while others were able to
recuperate their investment by relying on the market headstart their investment had created.330
However, things changed as digital technology was developed. This revolutionary technology
greatly reduces the cost and speed of reproduction while substantially increasing the quality of
the reproduced work.331 As a result, digitally reproduced products compete directly with the
original productions.332
Consider, for example, sound recordings. Traditionally, sound recordings are made using
analog technology,333 which traced the original sound through mechanical pickups by running a
stylus through the grooves on the storage medium and by converting the stylus’s movements
back into electrical signals.334 As a result of the mechanical nature of this process, imperfections
in the original work, such as cracks, pops, and fuzz, significantly diminish the sound quality of
the copy.335 Even though home taping is available, many consumers prefer factory originals.
Indeed, “home copying of sound recordings was not a common occurrence” before
Philips introduced the audio cassette format in 1963. 336 Sound recordings were not even
protected until many years later, when Congress enacted the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971 337 to protect the recording industry against substantial losses caused by bootleg
If the author of a creative work cannot prevent copying, any potential copyist has an incentive to reproduce the creative work
so long as the market price for the work is greater than the marginal cost of reproduction. As a result, the market price for
copies of the work would approach the marginal cost of reproduction. If copies were indistinguishable in quality from the
original, the market price for the original, too, would approach the marginal cost of reproduction. At that price, however, the
author would realize no financial return on his investment in creating the work. In this world, only authors unconcerned with
financial return would produce creative works.
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (discussing the economic
rationale justifying copyright protection). See generally Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. & ECON.
147 (1975), for an excellent discussion of the free riding problem.
330
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs,
84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-308 (1970) (arguing that the rewards created by a market headstart may provide encourage incentives for
authors to create).
331
See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1005 (1994) (noting that
“[p]hotocopying machines at one time threatened to turn every individual into a mass publisher, but cyberspace seems actually to have
achieved that distinction in a way that photocopying never really did”); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (2002) (noting that “digital technology makes it
possible to make an unlimited number of perfect copies of music, books, or videos in digital form, and through the Internet individuals
may distribute those digital works around the world at the speed of light”); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104
YALE L.J. 1805, 1808-33 (1995) (arguing that the Internet has greatly reduced the production and reproduction costs of information).
332
See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL
DILEMMA] (discussing the threat to the copyright regime created by digital technology); see also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/.
333
See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 103-29 (2002) (discussing the shift
from analog to digital technology).
334
See Andrew S. Muroff, Comment, Some Rights Reserved: Music Copyright in Digital Age, 1997 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L.
REV. 1241, 1269-70.
335
Id. at 1270.
336
Joel L. Mckuin, Home Audio Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 318 (1994).
337
17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e), repealed by 1976 Copyright Act, 90 Stat. 2541; see also H.R. REP. NO. 487, 92d Cong.
5 (1971) (“[S]ound recordings are clearly within the scope of the ‘writings of an author’ capable of protection under the Constitution, and
that the extension of limited statutory protection to them is overdue.”).
recordings.338 Although the Sound Recording Amendment was subsequently incorporated into
the 1976 Copyright Act,339 it remained unclear as to whether home taping constituted fair use.340
In 1984, Universal Studios attempted to resolve the home taping question by bringing a
lawsuit against Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax videotape recorder, alleging contributory
copyright infringement regarding illegal home taping of off-the-air broadcasts.341 In a narrow
five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court held that off-the-air home taping for time-
shifting purposes constituted fair use.342 As the court reasoned, such home taping did not harm
the plaintiffs, because the use for those tapes was private and non-commercial and because the
plaintiffs did not prove sufficiently the future or potential harm from time-shifting.343
Shortly after Sony, digital audio reproduction technology emerged. This new technology
allows consumers to reproduce unlimited copies of prerecorded music in near-perfect quality.344
By translating the original sound recording into a series of 1’s and 0’s and reconverts these 1’s
and 0’s back into sound during playback, digital technology eliminates the imperfections
inherent in analog reproduction.345 By virtue of this new technology, consumers can now create
a chain of perfect digital copies of sound recordings through trading with friends, neighbors, or
even swap clubs.346
Concerned about this new technology, a group of songwriters and music publishers filed
a class-action lawsuit against Sony, the manufacturer of the digital audio recording device,
alleging contributory copyright infringement.347 While the litigation was underway, the parties
338
See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 3.19[C], at 137 (3d ed. 1999); Mckuin, supra note 336, at 319
(“By the early 1970s, it was calculated that 60% of records and tapes in New York were illegally pirated copies. Indeed, in 1971, a
bootleg recording of Jimi Hendrix made it to the top half of the LP charts.”); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7), 106, 114 (2000).
339
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803.
340
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[A] (“The issue of home taping is not new to the copyright sphere. The claims of
songwriters, music publishers, record companies (and even performers) that such activity constitutes infringement have long met denials
from user groups and electronics manufacturers, the issue never having been definitely resolved.” (footnotes omitted)); Mckuin, supra
note 336, at 319 (“Beyond the 1976 Act’s general fair use provision, nothing in its text or legislative history suggested that home taping
was considered a noninfringing activity.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669,
5679 (stating that the Copyright Act “is not intended to give taping any special status under the fair use provision or to sanction any
reproduction beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair use”). For a detailed discussion of whether home taping violates the
reproduction right, see generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[D].
341
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
342
See id.
343
See id.
344
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[A] (“Unlike traditional (analog) recordings, digital recordings produce perfect
fidelity no matter how many times they are copied.”).
345
See Muroff, supra note 334, at 1270. One commentator explained the digital recording mechanism as follows:
The important difference between analog and digital recording is that the duplication of a digital signal is far more precise than
the duplication of its analog equivalent. The digital stream of ones and zeros can be duplicated before it is converted to
analog. Once the stream of ones and zeros is duplicated, it can be recorded multiple times without a decrease in the quality of
the end recording. For example, the digital pattern “1101” can be copied by a digital audio tape recorder fifty times and the
final copy will still look like “1101” because of the precision of the digital electronics. By contrast, less precise analog
recording devices must record a stream of information that constantly fluctuates by variable amounts, so a signal representing
“5” may be recorded as “4.9998.” Each time the copy is copied, the analog signal will fluctuate more, leading to progressively
diminishing sound quality.
Jonathan Franklin, Pay to Play: Enacting a Performance Right in Sound Recordings in the Age of Digital Audio Broadcasting, 10 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83, 95 (1993).
346
See id. at 329-30; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[A] (“One original—if taped by its buyer who in turn
passed copies to three friends who in turn each made four copies for their own friends, and so on—could therefore supplant thousands of
factory sales.”).
347
Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991); see also Gary S. Lutzker, Dat’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1991—Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 164-74 (1992)
(discussing Cahn).
settled.348 On the one hand, the songwriters and music publishers were concerned that history
might repeat itself and that Sony might win again. 349 On the other hand, Sony and other
electronics manufacturers wanted to free their marketing plans from possible injunctions or
future liabilities.350
Eventually, this settlement agreement became the Audio Home Recordings Act of 1992
(“AHRA”). 351 AHRA prohibits legal actions for copyright infringement based on the
manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio equipment or media for private, non-
commercial recording.352 This prohibition not only protects the electronics industry from costly
copyright infringement litigation, but also reserves to consumers the right to use digital audio
recording equipment or media for non-commercial, analog or digital home audio taping.353
As a compensation to the recording industry, AHRA requires that digital audio recording
machines be equipped with a Serial Copy Management System (“SCMS”), which provides
copyright and generation status information and prevents the recording devices from producing a
chain of perfect digital copies through “serial copying.” 354 The AHRA also requires
manufacturers and importers of digital hardware and blank digital media to pay compensatory
royalties to those music creators and copyright holders who will be injured by the new digital
audio recording technology.355 Nonetheless, the SCMS allows for first-generation reproduction
used in home audio taping, thus accommodating the interests of individual consumers to perform
private, non-commercial home taping.356
In sum, AHRA protects both the copyright holders and the electronics industry. While
preventing serial copying and compensating copyright holders for less harmful duplication,
AHRA allows electronics manufacturers, importers, and distributors to “focus on selling a
product that meets consumer demands.”357 Thus, it is not surprising that Professor Marshall
Leaffer suggested that AHRA “may well become a model for future compromises between
copyright owners and manufacturers of further reprographic technologies.”358
Meanwhile, consumers learned that compact discs might soon replace digital audio tapes
as the state-of-the-art technology.359 They therefore were reluctant to invest in digital audio
equipment. As a result, the AHRA successfully protected the recording industry against the
348
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[B]; Lutzker, supra note 347, at 146.
349
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[B] (noting that the copyright holders “had the incentive to settle for less than full
control over the uses to which [digital audio tape] machines could be put, lest history repeat itself and Sony triumph again”).
350
Id.
351
Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4247 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
352
See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
353
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[C]; LEAFFER, supra note 338, § 8.30[B], at 370-72.
354
Serial copying is defined as “duplication in a digital format of a copyrighted musical work or sound recording from a digital
reproduction of a digital musical recording” without the authorization from the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(11).
355
See 17 U.S.C. § 1003.
356
See id. § 1002(a). Serial copying is defined as “the duplication in a digital format of a copyrighted musical recording” without the
authorization of the copyright holder. See id. § 1001(11).
357
LEAFFER, supra note 338, § 8.30[B], at 372.
358
Id.; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8B.01[D][3] (“Legislation providing for a compulsory license would appear to
be the most acceptable solution.”); id. (“AHRA simultaneously allows technological development to progress and home users to take
advantage of the benefits of digital technology, while it safeguards the interests of copyright owners by imposing royalty requirements
for the benefit of those whose works are affected.”).
359
Mckuin, supra note 336, at 321 (noting that consumers “had recently been told that the compact disc . . . would be state of the art
well into the future”).
digital threat, and the recording industry continued to blossom. In the mid-1990s, however, the
recording industry faced a new challenge, this time from the Internet.
The Internet is a decentralized, global network of computers that share information with
each other via common interface protocols. 360 Due to its “rudderless, decentralized, and
transnational” nature, regulation of the medium is inherently difficult.361 As Professor Michael
Froomkin explained:
Three technologies underlie the Internet’s resistance to control. First, the Internet is a packet
switching network, which makes it difficult for anyone, even a government, to block or
monitor information flows originating from large numbers of users. Second, users have
access to powerful military-grade cryptography that can, if used properly, make messages
unreadable to anyone but the intended recipient. Third, and resulting from the first two, users
of the Internet have access to powerful anonymizing tools. Together, these three technologies
mean that anonymous communication is within reach of anyone with access to a personal
computer and a link to the Internet unless a government practices very strict access control,
devotes vast resources to monitoring, or can persuade its population (whether by liability
rules or criminal law) to avoid using these tools.362
To make things more complicated, activities on the Internet involve parties in different
countries, and the resulting disputes often contain difficult jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws
issues.363 As Professor Jane Ginsburg noted during the early development of the Internet, which
was then referred to as the Global Information Infrastructure (“GII”):
360
For interesting discussion of the origins of the Internet, see generally TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL
DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB (2000); KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP
LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1998); JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET
YEARS IN A LIFETIME (2000); Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml
(Aug. 4, 2000).
361
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (2000); see also PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 100 (2001) (noting that “officials normally find it far more
difficult to silence critical voices on the new media compared with their ability to regulate and control the TV airwaves”); A. Michael
Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 323, at 129 (discussing the
difficulties of censorship on the Internet); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1373-74 (1996) (describing how efforts to control the flow of electronic information across physical borders will
likely fail).
362
Froomkin, supra, at 129-30 (footnote omitted). But see LESSIG, CODE, supra note 327 (arguing that the Internet is regulable
through codes).
363
For discussions of choice-of-law issues in intellectual property litigation, see generally EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1978); Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational
Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999); Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of
Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in
an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle
for Resurgent Comparativist Thought, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 436 (2001); Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network:
Strategies for International Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69 (1998) [hereinafter Geller, From Patchwork to
Network]; Paul Edward Geller, Mastering Conflicts of Laws in International Intellectual Property Litigation, IPL NEWSL. (ABA),
Summer 2000, at 7; Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws, and Internet Remedies, 22 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 125 (2000); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement
in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (1997); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383 (2000); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of Intermediaries, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 323, at 164; Peter K. Yu,
Conflict of Laws Issues in International Copyright Cases, GIGALAW.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-04.html
(Apr. 2001). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo. L.J. 883 (2002) (developing a new foundation for
choice-of-law scholarship in light of globalization and technological change); Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law,
A key feature of the GII is its ability to render works of authorship pervasively and
simultaneously accessible throughout the world. The principle of territoriality becomes
problematic if it means that posting a work on the GII calls into play the laws of every
country in which the work may be received when . . . these laws may differ substantively.
Should the rights in a work be determined by a multiplicity of inconsistent legal regimes
when the work is simultaneously communicated to scores of countries? Simply taking into
account one country’s law, the complexity of placing works in a digital network is already
daunting: should the task be further burdened by an obligation to assess the impact of the
laws of every country where the work might be received? Put more bluntly, for works on the
GII, there will be no physical territoriality; no way to stop works at the border, because there
will be no borders. Without physical territoriality, can legal territoriality persist?364
Even more problematic, the Internet allows individuals to become authors and publishers,
and many of those pioneer Internet users subscribed to an arguably anti-copyright, 365 anti-
establishment culture.366 As Stephen Levy noted, these pioneers—often called hackers—believe
“[a]ccess to computers . . . should be unlimited and total . . . [and a]ll information should be
free.” 367 To this group, a free exchange of information is needed to allow for greater overall
creativity. After all, who can fix a machine if he or she does not have access to the program code
or other needed information?
In general, hackers “believe that essential lessons can be learned about the systems—
about the world—from taking things apart, seeing how they work, and using this knowledge to
create new and even more interesting things. They resent any person, physical barrier, or law
that tries to keep them from doing this.”368 For example, when a hacker noticed in a Chinese
restaurant that some Chinese people ordered fantastic-looking dishes that were not available on
the English menu, he would go back to the restaurant armed with a Chinese dictionary, trying to
“hack” the Chinese menu:
[O]ne night [Bill Gosper] found a tiny little cellar place run by a small family. It was
fairly dull food, but he noticed some Chinese people eating fantastic-looking dishes. So he
figured he’d take [Peter] Sampson back there.
They went back loaded with Chinese dictionaries, and demanded a Chinese menu.
The chef, a Mr. Wong, reluctantly complied, and Gosper, Samson, and the others pored over
the menu as if it were an instruction set for a new machine. Samson [who learned a fair
amount of Chinese characters] supplied the translations, which were positively revelatory.
What was called “Beef with Tomato” on the English menu had a literal meaning of Barbarian
Eggplant Cowpork. “Wonton” had a Chinese equivalent of Cloud Gulp. There were
unbelievable things to discover in this system! So after deciding the most interesting things
to order (“Hibiscus Wing? Better order that, find out what that’s about”), they called over
Mr. Wong, and he jabbered frantically in Chinese disapproval of their selections. It turned
out he was reluctant to serve them the food Chinese-style, thinking that Americans couldn’t
90 GEO. L.J. 957 (2002) (responding to Professor Andrew Guzman); Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial
Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L.J. 941 (2002) (same).
364
Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure,
42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 318, 319-20 (1995).
365
“As every reality hacker knows: ‘Information wants to be free’ and ‘plagiarism saves time.’” See HALBERT, supra note 177, at
104 (quoting Gareth Branwyn, Street Noise, MONDO 2000, at 30 (1992)),
366
See generally PEKKA HIMANEN, THE HACKER ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF THE INFORMATION AGE (2001); STEVEN LEVY,
HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984).
367
LEVY, supra note 366, at 40.
368
Id.; see also id. at 217-18 (discussing how a hacker took some Atari chips home to test them out and considered his action “a neat
hack from the proprietary oppressors”).
take it. Mr. Wong had mistaken them for typically timid Americans—but these were
explorers! They had been inside the machine, and lived to tell the tale (they would tell it in
assembly language). Mr. Wong gave in. Out came the best Chinese meal that any of the
hackers had eaten to date.369
Because hackers believe strongly in the free flow of information, they mistrust authority
and find bureaucracies flawed. To many of them, “[b]ureaucrats hide behind arbitrary rules (as
opposed to the logical algorithms by which machines and computer programs operate): they
invoke those rules to consolidate power, and perceive the constructive impulse of hackers as a
threat.”370 In the now-famous A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry
Barlow captured this sentiment:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us
alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with
no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global
social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose
on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we
have true reason to fear.371
Despite their anti-establishment sentiment, hackers are different from thieves or computer
criminals. In fact, they have their own sense of fairness and follow their own codes of conduct.
For example, hackers would use “blue boxes”—hardware devices to make illegal phone calls—
“only for connecting to the computer—a practice which in the hacker mind justifies
lawbreaking—and not for personal gain in trivial matters like calling distant relatives.”372
369
Id. at 80-81.
370
Id. at 41.
371
JOHN PERRY BARLOW, A DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE (1995), available at
http://www.eff.org/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration. In the very beginning, the Internet was used exclusively
by government and military agencies, educational and research institutions, government contractors, scientists, and technological
specialists. See Peter K. Yu, The Neverending ccTLD Story, in ADDRESSING THE WORLD: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNET
COUNTRY CODE DOMAINS 1 (Erica Schlesinger Wass ed., 2003). As the medium became more commercial and global by nature, the
cyberspace was transformed into a different place, with a different look and feel. Consider, for example, the following nostalgic account
by Mike Godwin:
I believe virtual communities promise to restore to Americans at the end of the twentieth century what many of us feel
was lost in the decades at the beginning of the century—a stable sense of community, of place. Ask those who’ve been
members of such a virtual community, and they’ll tell you that what happens there is more than an exchange of electronic
impulses in the wires. It’s not just virtual barn raising. . . . It’s also the comfort from others that a man like Phil Catalfo of the
WELL can experience when he’s up late at night caring for a child suffering from leukemia, and he logs on to the WELL and
pours out his anguish and fears. People really do care for each other and fall in love over the Net, just as they do in geographic
communities. And that “virtual” correctedness is a real sign of hope in a nation that’s increasingly anxious about the
fragmentation of public life and the polarization of interest groups and the alienation of urban existence.
MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15 (1998). By the mid 1990s, cyberspace has become a
very different place. As Professor Lessig wrote:
Newbies are the silent majority of today’s Net. However much we romanticize the old days when the Net was a place for
conversation and exchange, this is not its function for most of its users now. Certainly, the world is into “chat,” but even
ignoring the large portion of that space devoted to sex, chat is not the stuff the WELL was made of. Most people do not
understand what chat or a MOO really is—maybe they have heard talk about them, but they do not understand what they are
about. They do not understand what life in the community of the WELL, or a MOO, is really like.
In its feel, cyberspace has changed. How it looks, what you can do there, how you are connected there—all this has
changed.
LESSIG, CODE, supra note 327, at 64 (footnotes omitted); see also LEVY, supra note 366, at 284 (noting that the third generation of
hackers “dreamed not only of the ultimate hack, but of fame, and big royalty checks”).
372
LEVY, supra note 366, at 250.
Because of this unique Internet culture and the lack of regulation in the new technological
medium, the Internet soon became a haven for music pirates, who downloaded music directly
from pirated Web sites, rather than purchasing it from retail outlets.373 In a way, many have
considered MP3s “a kind of protest movement against record companies, which many artists hate
because they control access to the music market.”374 As one commentator put it, “The MP3
movement is a rational revolt of passionate fans.”375 It offers opportunity for emerging artists,
whom the established music industry ignore due to limited production, manufacturing scarcity,
and narrow distribution channels.376
In the very beginning, music distribution over the Internet was very limited, because
sound recordings demanded a lot of storage space,377 and it took a long time (and probably many
attempts) to download a complete recording. 378 However, as new compression technologies
became available, the files became smaller, the rate of successful transfer higher, and the
downloading time drastically reduced. Today, one can transmit digitized music across the world
in a matter of seconds, and hundreds of thousands of users can access music instantaneously.379
The predominant compression technology is MP3, a standard, non-proprietary algorithm

that compresses sound recordings to about one-twelfth of its original size while maintaining
virtually identical sound quality.380 With the development of this new technology, users could
now store a minute’s worth of CD-quality digital audio in a megabyte of memory in their
computer hard drives.381 Coupled with the latest broadband technology, MP3 enabled users to
download an hour of music to their personal computers in just a few minutes.382
Already concerned about the illicit distribution of copyrighted music over the Internet,
the recording industry became particularly concerned when Diamond Multimedia introduced the
Rio portable music player. 383 Although pirated recordings had been freely available on the
373
Muroff, supra note 334, at 1273 (noting that “populated with ‘music downloading outposts’ which allow users to download . . . for
free either musical samples or full cuts of their favorite artists”).
374
The Big Five Hit the Web, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 63.
375
As Professor Vaidhyanathan explained:
Compact discs cost too much. Cutting-edge fans want the newest, coolest music as fast as possible. So they share music and
tips about music where they find each other—over the net. The free music strategy is, for lack of a better term, the Grateful
Dead business model: Give away free music to build a loyal following, establish a brand name, and charge handsomely for
the total entertainment package. . . . Free music has always been essential to the discursive communities that fuel the creative
process. These days, some small music labels such as Emusic.com and Chuck D’s Rapstation.com are experimenting with
“value-added” and “gate-keeper” business models, with modest taxation on consumers and artists (and thus modest profit
potential). They depend on open systems, like the Internet itself, to foster creativity and “buzz” about their products and
services.
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38, at 179-80.
376
Id. at 180.
377
For example, a typical digitally recorded song takes up about 40 megabytes of space. See Alixandra E. Smith, Harvard Crimson,
available at LEXIS library, ALLNWS file.
378
See Mark Grossman, Music to Whose Ears?, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 2, 1999, at B1 (“If MP3 technology didn’t exist, few
people would have the patience to wait hours to download recordings, and the music industry probably wouldn’t face the dilemma now
before it.”).
379
Muroff, supra note 334, at 1273.
380
See Michael S. Mensik & Jeffrey C. Groulx, From the Lightweight ‘Rio’ Flows Heavyweight Battle, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at
B5; see also RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “MP3’s popularity is due in
large part to the fact that it is a standard, non-proprietary compression algorithm freely available for use by anyone, unlike various
proprietary (and copyright-secure) competitor algorithms”).
381
Philip Manchester, The Fight for Protection, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 1999, at 4.
382
See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1074.
383
Judge O’Scannlain described in detail the function of the Rio portable music player:
Internet in the past, consumers still preferred to purchase CDs because they did not have
computer access all the time. However, with the release of this portable player, people could
listen to MP3 recordings anywhere, and they might no longer be interested in buying physical
CDs.
To protect itself, the recording industry brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and
distribution of the Rio player in RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.384 The industry
alleged that Diamond Multimedia violated the AHRA by manufacturing and distributing a
product that failed to meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices as specified in the
statute. 385 In addition, the industry sought payment of royalties Diamond Multimedia owed
under the AHRA.386 As the recording industry claimed, online distribution of pirated recordings
would discourage the purchase of legitimate recordings, and losses due to digital piracy would
soon surpass figures caused by other more traditional forms of piracy.387
In its defense, Diamond Multimedia argued that the Rio did not fall within the scope of
the AHRA and that computers were exempted from the statute. 388 The manufacturer also
pointed out that the player could be used for other beneficial noninfringing uses. 389 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, “[i]ndependent and wholly
Internet record labels routinely sell and provide free samples of their artists’ work online, while
many unsigned artists distribute their own material from their websites.”390 Likewise, the Rio
player allows users to access free-of-charge samples that are available for marketing purposes
and teasers that seek to entice listeners to purchase recordings that are available through mail
orders or for direct download.391
The Rio is a small device (roughly the size of an audio cassette) with headphones that allows a user to download MP3 audio
files from a computer and to listen to them elsewhere. . . . Generally, the Rio can store approximately one hour of music, or
sixteen hours of spoken material (e.g., downloaded newscasts or books on tape). With the addition of flash memory cards, the
Rio can store an additional half-hour or hour of music. The Rio’s sole output is an analog audio signal sent to the user via
headphones. The Rio cannot make duplicates of any digital audio file it stores, nor can it transfer or upload such a file to a
computer, to another device, or to the Internet. However, a flash memory card to which a digital audio file has been
downloaded can be removed from one Rio and played back in another.
Id. at 1073-75.
384
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
385
Id. at 1075. AHRA defined a “digital audio recording device” as
any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as
part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose
of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use.
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000). The Rio player failed to meet the requirement of the AHRA because the device did not employ a Serial
Copyright Management System that sends, receives, and acts upon information about the generation and copyright status of the files the
device played. See id. § 1002(a) (prohibiting the importation, manufacture, and distribution of any digital audio recording device that
does not conform to the Serial Copyright Management System or a system that has similar functional characteristics).
386
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (requiring manufacturers, distributors, and importers of digital
hardware and blank digital software to pay compensatory royalties to music creators and copyright holders).
387
Id. But see Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of Copyright
Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497, 506 (1998) (arguing that persons who are willing to purchase the item for free often will not
purchase the same item even if it is no longer freely available); id. at 509-10 (noting that the current price of recordings, which takes into
consideration home taping and piracy and the harms such activities cause, offsets in part the losses incurred by the industry from such
copying); see also ALFORD, supra note 8, at 129 n.13 (cautioning that loss figures supplied by the copyright industries and the U.S.
government should not be taken at face value); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 175-76 (arguing that the copyright
industries tend to overstate the extent of the piracy problem in China).
388
AHRA specifically provides that the term “digital musical recording” does not include “a material object . . . in which one or more
computer programs are fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B).
389
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1074.
390
Id.
391
Id.
The trial court denied the recording industry’s request for a preliminary injunction,
holding that the industry failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits392 and that
the balance of hardships did not tip in the industry’s favor.393 Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Rio player did not fall within the definition of digital audio recording devices as
defined by the AHRA. As the appellate court explained: “Unlike digital audio tape machines,
for example, whose primary purpose is to make digital audio copied recordings, the primary
purpose of a computer is to run various programs and to record the data necessary to run those
programs and perform various tasks.” 394 Thus, computers do not qualify as digital audio
recording devices, and Diamond Multimedia do not need to comply with the SCMS
requirement.395 In fact, as the Court observed in dicta, the AHRA “seems designed to allow files
to be ‘laundered’ by passage through a computer.”396
While Diamond Multimedia provided a victory for the hardware industry (and arguably
consumers), it opened the floodgate for future litigation by noting that AHRA did not cover
computers.397 After all, if computer equipment qualified as a digital audio recording device as
defined in the AHRA, the SCMS requirement and royalty payments would be the only remedies
available to copyright holders.
In January 2000, MP3.com launched its My.MP3.com service, which allowed subscribers
to play music over the Internet as long as they owned, borrowed, or purchased the CDs
containing the requested recordings.398 To facilitate this service, MP3.com purchased tens of
thousands of popular CDs and copied them onto their computer servers.399 Although MP3.com
purchased licenses to perform the music, it did not own any licenses to reproduce the
recordings. 400 As a result, major record companies and their artists brought suits against
MP3.com, alleging copyright infringement.401
In its defense, MP3.com claimed that its service constituted fair use,402 claiming that its
service provided a transformative “space shift” by allowing subscribers to enjoy the sound
392
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs have
established a probability that the Rio is a ‘digital audio recording device,’ Plaintiffs have not established a probability of success in
establishing that the Rio, if assessed by the Secretary of Commerce, would fail to satisfy Section 1002(a)(3)”).
393
As the court maintained:
Defendant has offered credible evidence that an injunction would substantially impact its projected revenues from the sale of
the Rio. Regardless of the accuracy of Defendant’s estimate ($ 200 million over the next two years), the Court is convinced
that Defendant would at a minimum suffer multi-million dollar losses. Moreover, because the Rio is capable of recording
legitimate digital music, an injunction would deprive the public of a device with significant beneficial uses.
Id. at 629 (citation omitted).
394
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
See, e.g., TeeVee Toons v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
398
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
399
Id.
400
Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 346-47 (2002).
401
See TeeVee Toons, 134 F. Supp. 2d 546; UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349.
402
See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (articulating for the first time the
concepts that evolved into the fair use doctrine). For comprehensive discussions of fair use, see generally WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661 (1988); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair
Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
recordings they owned without carrying physical CDs around.403 MP3.com also argued that the
My.MP3.com service benefited, rather than harmed, the plaintiffs by enhancing sales, since the
service required subscribers to demonstrate that they owned, borrowed, or purchased the CDs
containing the requested recordings.404 In addition, the defendant noted that its service did not
compete directly with the plaintiffs in the digital downloading market and, instead, “provide[d] a
useful service to consumers that, in its absence, will be served by ‘pirates.’”405
At trial, the court rejected all of the defendant’s arguments. Analyzing them under the
four criteria specified under the fair use provision of the 1976 Copyright Act,406 the court openly
rejected the defendant’s “space shifting” argument, maintaining that such a service was neither
transformative nor productive.407 As the court explained, the defendant’s argument was “simply
another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being retransmitted in another medium—
an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of transformation.”408 The court also found that the
second and third factors weighed against fair use because the recordings the defendant copied
were “close[] to the core of intended copyright protection”409 and that the defendant had copied
and replayed “the entirety of the copyrighted works.”410
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s market enhancement argument by noting that
“[a]ny allegedly positive impact of defendant’s activities on plaintiffs’ prior market in no way
frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works.”411 The court also maintained that a copyright “is not designed to afford
consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the copyright holders’ property
interests.” 412 MP3.com lost the lawsuits and was acquired shortly afterwards by Vivendi
Universal, which incorporated MP3.com into its subscription service413 and has since sold the
service to Roxio,414 a manufacturer of CD- and DVD-copying software.
403
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding
“time shifting” fair use).
404
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
405
Id.
406
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly define fair use, it lists four criteria that are to be applied to determine whether a
particular use is “fair”:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of a copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
407
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright . . . .” (citation and footnote omitted)).
408
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
fair use defense by the operator of a service that retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by television news agencies that copied
copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news organizations).
409
UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
410
Id. at 352.
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
See Litman, War Stories, supra note 400, at 347; see also Brad King, MP3.com Goes Major Labels League, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,45377,00.html (July 20, 2001); Brad King, MP3.com Goes Universal, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,43972,00.html (May 21, 2001); Justin Oppelaar, Vivendi U Uploads MP3 for $ 370 Mil.,
DAILY VARIETY, May 21, 2001, at 1.
414
Roxio Acquires PressPlay for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C6.
In another well-known lawsuit, the recording industry sued Napster for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement. 415 Napster counterargued that the users’ “file sharing”
constituted fair use. The Napster case, however, was more complicated than the MP3.com cases
because Napster did not reproduce copyrighted works itself. Rather, Napster facilitated
unauthorized copying, downloading, transmission, and distribution of the copyrighted works by
others.416
Napster was started as a project by a college student, Shawn Fanning, who was frustrated
by the difficulty in finding MP3 files on traditional Internet servers.417 To alleviate this difficulty,
Napster allowed users to search for music on the hard drives of other users and share music files
with them while they were on the network.418 As a result of this peer-to-peer network, Napster
successfully transformed faraway computers into a large file-sharing—or some would say
piracy—network.
At trial, the district court concluded that the recording companies had established a prima
facie case of direct copyright infringement by Napster users. As the court explained, “virtually
all Napster users engage in the unauthorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music.”419
The court then moved on to address the four fair use factors specified in the Copyright Act. The
court noted that the first factor weighed against fair use, because Napster’s users were neither
using the copyrighted works in a transformative way nor did they attempt to use the songs for
parody or for research. 420 Rather, users were merely copying and listening to the music. 421
Likewise, the second and third factors weighed against fair use, because music is creative in
nature and because users downloaded entire songs.422 Finally, although the court concluded that
the use was not “paradigmatic commercial activity,” the “vast scale” of file sharing facilitated by
Napster could not be considered private use or personal use “in the traditional sense.”423 As the
court explained, “Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have to buy
suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster use.”424 Even though the activity was
not for profit, it was certainly economic in nature.
To boost its case, the recording companies presented evidence of a decline in CD sales at
highly wired college campuses that subsequently banned Napster use.425 According to the study,
sales near these college campuses dropped by twelve to thirteen percent from 1997 to 2000,
415
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000). For discussions of Napster, see generally Peter
Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2002); Ku, supra note 331; Symposium, Beyond
Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (2000); Symposium, Beyond Napster—The Future of
the Digital Commons, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 257 (2002); Symposium, Napster: Innocent Innovation or Egregious Infringement?, 9 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 1 (2002); David G. Post, His Napster’s Voice, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 35 (2001); Damien A. Riehl, Peer-
to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1761 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility
of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247 (2001).
416
Id. at 911.
417
See id. at 901-02.
418
See id. 905-07.
419
Id. at 911.
420
Id. at 913-14.
421
Id.
422
Id. at 913.
423
Id. at 912.
424
Id.
425
Id. at 909-10.
although CD sales nationwide had risen by eighteen percent. 426 The study inferred that the
decline in sales resulted from MP3 downloads replacing CD purchases. The recording industry
also argued that the availability of free downloading reduced the market for competing
commercial downloading, and that this downloading deprived copyright holders of royalties for
downloading even if it enhanced CD sales.427 Based on this evidence, the court found that the
effect of the use upon the value of the work and potential markets for the work weighed against
fair use. According to the court, Napster harmed the market for copyrighted music by reducing
CD sales among college students and by raising barriers to entry in the market for digital
downloads.428
The district court ordered Napster to shut down. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit was more
sympathetic to Napster and found that Napster was capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses.429 Nonetheless, it concluded that “sufficient knowledge exist[ed] to impose
contributory liability when linked to demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system.”430 As
the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “[t]he record supports the district court’s finding that Napster has
actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it could
block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
material.”431
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the lower court, which subsequently ordered
Napster to police its system and to block access to infringing material after it was notified of that
material’s location.432 Unable to do so, Napster shut down its service in July 2001 and has since
filed for bankruptcy protection.433 In November 2002, Roxio purchased Napster’s name and
intellectual property assets.434 A few months later, Roxio acquired PressPlay, the online music
service, from Vivendi Universal and Sony Music.435 In October 2003, Roxio finally relaunched
Napster as a subscription-based service, featuring music from the major music labels.436
Although the recording industry, to a great extent, has succeeded in beating the pirates by
taking them to court and suing them into bankruptcy, the technologies have become increasingly
challenging to the industry. Since the MP3 and Napster litigation, a whole host of engines and
services—such as gnutella, Madster (formerly Aimster), KaZaA, AudioGalaxy,
Morpheus/MusicCity, Grokster, iMesh, Filetopia, BearShare, and LimeWire—has emerged, and
these “successors” can be used for the very same purposes as Napster.
From the industry’s perspective, these engines are even more problematic. Unlike
MP3.com and Napster, many of these engines and services do not have a centralized server.437
Rather, they allow users to transfer files among various locations. Some of them, like Freenet,
426
Ku, supra note 331, at 289 (citing MICHAEL FINE, SOUNDSCAN STUDY ON NAPSTER USE AND LOSS OF SALES 5 (2000)).
427
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
428
Id. at 913.
429
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
430
Id. at 1021.
431
Id. at 1022.
432
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
433
See Matt Richtel, Napster Says It Is Likely to Be Liquidated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at C2.
434
Roxio Buys Napster Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at C10.
435
Roxio Acquires PressPlay for $40 Million, supra note 414.
436
Benny Evangelista, Napster Back from the Dead, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2003, at B1; Jon Healey, Napster Returns—Not
Free but Legal, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at 5.
437
See Riehl, supra note 415, at 1773-79 (describing the architecture of gnutella-based engines).
also allow users to remain anonymous.438 Thus, enforcement has become a major problem, and
the outcome of these battles becomes even harder to predict. The industry forced Napster to shut
down its server, but there is little the industry could do to deal with gnutella and its uncountable
successors.
Moreover, as is demonstrated by the KaZaA litigation, jurisdictional issues might create

barriers to the industry’s litigation effort.439 In fact, because not every country is as protective of
the copyright industries as the United States and many countries still lack a sophisticated legal
system, foreign courts might have different laws, and their courts might come to different
conclusions even when they apply identical laws.440 Unless the recording industry is willing to
go after all the users (which will likely result in an enforcement fiasco and publicity disaster),
piracy will become rampant.
In light of this difficulty, the music industry looked for a fallback position and adopted
self-help measures, including copyright protection technologies, to protect itself against
widespread piracy on the Internet.441 Among such protection technologies include encryption,442
digital watermarking, 443 and the use of trusted systems. 444 Notwithstanding these self-help
measures, the entertainment industries remain vulnerable. 445 Although copy-protection
technologies allow copyright holders to lock up their creative works, these technologies lose
their protective function when they are decrypted. Even worse, once the technology is decrypted,
the copyrighted work becomes available not only to those “techies” who successfully broke the
code, but also to unsophisticated computer users around the world, through online downloads
and through peer-to-peer file swapping.
438
See id. at 1779-87 (describing Freenet).
439
As the Washington Post reported: “Kazaa is a multinational creation. The three young men who developed the software hail from
Estonia. They were commissioned to do the work by a company in the Netherlands. That company has since sold the software to
another based in the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu, whose executives work in Australia.” Ariana Eunjung Cha, File Swapper Eluding
Pursuers; Unlike Napster, Kazaa’s Global Nature Defies Legal Attacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at A1. But see In Web Disputes,
U.S. Law Rules the World, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 24, 2003, at D1 (noting that U.S. laws were applied in most Internet disputes).
440
See Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 218, 232-41 (2003). See also Patti Waldmeir, Material Published on the Internet and Thus Accessible Anywhere in
the World Is Increasingly Being Challenged Under the Laws of Individual Nation States, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2002, at 19
(noting the increasing willingness of national courts to assert jurisdiction over activities conducted on the Internet).
441
See Jessica Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 23, 35 (Niva Elkin-
Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).
442
See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 156:
Cryptography is a crucial enabling technology for IP management. The goal of encryption is to scramble objects so that they
are not understandable or usable until they are unscrambled. The technical terms for scrambling and unscrambling are
“encrypting” and “decrypting.” Encryption facilitates IP management by protecting content against disclosure or modification
both during transmission and while it is stored. If content is encrypted effectively, copying the files is nearly useless because
there is no access to the content without the decryption key. Software available off the shelf provides encryption that is for all
practical purposes unbreakable, although much of the encrypting software in use today is somewhat less robust.
443
“While [digital watermarking] does not prevent the content from being copied and redistributed, this technique can at least make
evident who owns the material and possibly aid in tracking the source of the redistribution.” Id. at 83.
444
See id. at 167-71; see also Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1251 (2000) (discussing hardware-based identifiers and trusted systems).
445
Although the industry might remain vulnerable, copy-protection technology does not necessarily need to be perfectly robust:
Most people are not technically knowledgeable enough to defeat even moderately sophisticated systems and, in any case, are
law-abiding citizens rather than determined adversaries. TPSs [Technical protection services] with what might be called
“curb-high deterrence”—systems that can be circumvented by a knowledgeable person—are sufficient in many instances.
They can deter the average user from engaging in illegal behavior and may deter those who may be ignorant about some
aspects of the law by causing them to think carefully about the appropriateness of their copying. Simply put, TPSs can help to
keep honest people honest.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 218.
To prevent the public from doing so, the copyright holders must constantly upgrade their
encryption technology. Such upgrading would, in turn, attract even more attention from hackers,
who are just too eager to crack the latest encryption technology available. Eventually, the
repeated encryption and decryption will create a vicious cycle in which the entertainment
industry and the hacker community are engaged in an endless copy-protection arms race. 446
Instead of devoting resources to develop artists and improve products, the industries would
invest their resources in developing encryption technology and in preventing consumers from
accessing copyrighted works. This strategy would hurt artists, the recording industry, and
consumers.
In fact, because the encryption technologies the industry used were easy to crack, some
record companies switched to low-technology or unconventional protective measures. For
example, when Epic Records distributed review copies of Tori Amos, Pearl Jam, and AudioSlave
albums in 2002, the label sent them inside portable CD players that had been glued shut.447
Likewise, before Madonna released her new single, American Life, the label started circulating a
spoofed version of the song on the Internet, featuring the singer saying “What the f___ do you
think you’re doing?”448 Unfortunately for the label, that strategy backfired when a hacker took
over the singer’s Web site, Madonna.com, posting real, downloadable MP3s of every song on the
album. Angry fans also responded by remixing Madonna’s tirade with other songs.449 Some
Web sites even held contests for these remixes.
To protect its technological self-help measures, the industry successfully lobbied

Congress for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),450 which was enacted in 1998 to
446
As Professor Ku explained:
[C]opy protection for digital content necessitates an expensive technological arms race . . . Given the difficulty of protecting
digital works from copying, copyright holders will be forced constantly to spend significant resources developing technology
just to keep the cat in the bag. These costs will in turn be passed on to the public, not to provide the public with access to new
works, but for the sole purpose of limiting access. Given that hackers appear to be as adept, if not more so, at picking the
locks of copyright protection as those trying to lock up digital works, the costs associated with a copy protection arms race
would be unending.
Ku, supra note 331, at 319-20 (footnote omitted); see also Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 217, 251 (discussing the “wasteful ‘arms race’ of technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its spending to
outperform the other’s technology”); Peter K. Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing the Copyright War by
Fighting Misdirected Battles, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, Aug. 15, 2002, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020815_yu.html [hereinafter Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are
Losing].
447
Lev Grossman, It’s All Free!, TIME, May 5, 2003, at 60.
448
Id.
449
See Nik Bonopartis, Firms Say the Swap Must Stop, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 16, 2003, at 1A.
450
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-204, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. (2000)). Professor Jessica Litman criticized the DMCA as follows:
The DMCA is long, internally inconsistent, difficult even for copyright experts to parse and harder still to explain. Most
importantly, it seeks for the first time to impose liability on ordinary citizens for violation of provisions that they have no
reason to suspect are part of the law, and to make noncommercial and noninfringing behavior illegal on the theory that that
will help to prevent piracy.
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 145 (2001). For comprehensive discussions of the DMCA, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright
Legislation]; David Nimmer, Back from the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 855 (2001); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000); David
Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA.
L. REV. 813 (2001); Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: A Proposed Amendment to Accommodate Free
Speech, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 61 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (2001).
strengthen copyright protection in the digital medium. The DMCA includes a provision
prohibiting the circumvention of encryption technology copyright holders use to protect their
creative works and the dissemination of information concerning how to defeat copy-protection
technologies.451 In addition, the DMCA provides a “safe harbor” for Internet service providers
to remove any hosted content that allegedly infringes upon the work of a copyright holder.452
The statute also protects the integrity of copyright management systems 453 and revised the
performance right regime in light of the changes in the digital environment.454
Since the enactment of the DMCA, commentators have widely criticized the statute for
stifling creativity.455 On the one hand, the DMCA creates a chilling effect by requiring Internet
service providers to remove content even if the reproduction of such materials is permissible
under existing copyright law. 456 On the other hand, the anti-circumvention provision of the
statute prevents people from engaging in actions that traditionally have been considered fair
use.457
A case in point is Professor Edward Felton of Princeton University, who successfully

decrypted copy-protection technologies designed by the Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SDMI).458 In September 2000, the SDMI issued a public challenge and offered $10,000 to those
who successfully broke their proposed copy-protection technologies.459 Professor Felten claimed
that he and his research team successfully broke the proposed technologies. When he planned to
present his findings at a scientific conference, the recording industry asked him to withdraw the
paper, citing potential violation of the DMCA.460 In response, Professor Felten filed a lawsuit
seeking a declaratory judgment,461 which was subsequently dismissed.462 Although the industry
451
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
452
17 U.S.C. § 512.
453
17 U.S.C. § 1202. As Professor Ginsburg summarized:
Section 1202 prohibits: (a) knowingly providing false copyright management information, with the intent to facilitate or
conceal infringement. The provision also prohibits (b) knowingly or intentionally altering or removing copyright management
information, knowing (or having reasonable grounds to know) that the alteration or removal will facilitate or conceal
infringement. Subsection (c) defines copyright management information. It includes: the name of the author; the name of the
copyright owner; and the “terms and conditions for use of the work.”
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” supra note 450, at 157; see id. at 157-60 (discussing the provision on
copyright management information); see also Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (examining the impact of copyright management mechanisms on the traditional notions of
freedom of thought and expression).
454
See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” supra note 450, at 166-70 (discussing the DMCA amendments
to the 1995 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act).
455
Shortly after the United States Copyright Office released its report on the effects of the DMCA, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STUDY
REQUIRED BY SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (2001), available at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html, more than 50 intellectual property law scholars expressed
disappointment over the report and urged Congress to conduct its own study. See IP Law Professors Urge Congress to Do Its Own
DMCA Study, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 16, 2001, at 200. The study is required by section 104 of the DMCA.
456
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 187-90 (2001)
[hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS]; LITMAN, supra note 450, at 145.
457
See LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 456, at 187-90; LITMAN, supra note 450, at 145.
458
SDMI is an association of electronic companies that were involved in designing copy-protection technologies that protect
copyrighted works against unauthorized access.
459
SDMI described its public challenge in a press release.
So here’s the invitation: Attack the proposed technologies. Crack them.
By successfully breaking the SDMI protected content, you will play a role in determining what technology SDMI will
adopt. And there is something more in it for you, too. If you can remove the watermark or defeat the other technology on our
proposed copyright protection system, you may earn up to $10,000.
SDMI, An Open Letter to the Digital Community, available at http://www.sdmi.org/pr/OL_Sept_6_2000.htm (Sept. 6, 2000).
460
David P. Hamilton, Digital-Copyright Law Faces New Fight, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at B10.
461
Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. June 26, 2001).
eventually backed down and Professor Felten was able to present his research, the incident
demonstrated the statute’s potential chilling effect.
Recently, the constitutionality of the DMCA was called into question in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley.463 The controversy arose when the motion picture industry used CSS to
control access to, and prevent the copying of, motion pictures recorded on DVDs. 464 In
September 1999, Jon Johansen, a Norwegian teenager, and two others created DeCSS, a program
capable of “ripping” DVDs, which then allowed users to play the data on noncompliant
computers as well as to copy the recordings.465 The DeCSS code was posted on the Web site of
the defendant’s magazine, 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, 466 and the defendant subsequently
provided hyperlinks to other sites posting the DeCSS code.467
In response to the defendant’s action, eight major movie studios brought suit to enjoin
2600 from posting the DeCSS program and related hyperlinks,468 citing the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA, which prohibits offering to the public or trafficking in any technology
designed to circumvent a technological measure that controls access to a work.469 In its defense,
the defendant argued that the posting of DeCSS code was speech protected by the First
Amendment.470
Although the trial court agreed that computer code was expressive,471 it concluded that
the DMCA is a content-neutral regulation that only incidentally affects expression472 and upheld
the statute because it furthers a substantial governmental interest—“the protection of copyrighted
works stored on digital media from the vastly expanded risk of piracy in this electronic age.”473
As the Court reasoned:
Once a decryption program like DeCSS is written, it quickly can be sent all over the world.
Every recipient is capable not only of decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs’ copyrighted
DVDs, but also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and thus enabling every recipient
to do the same. They likewise are capable of transmitting perfect copies of the decrypted
DVD. The process potentially is exponential rather than linear.474
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s judgment. As Judge Jon Newman, a well-respected judge in the copyright area,
explained, the court was torn between “two unattractive alternatives: either tolerate some
impairment of communication in order to permit Congress to prohibit decryption that may
462
Dave Wilson, Professor’s Suit Against RIAA Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at C3.
463
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
464
CSS is “an encryption based system that requires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a
computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs.” Universal City Studios, Inc v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
465
See id. at 311.
466
The Web site of the defendant’s magazine is available at http://www.2600.com.
467
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
468
Id. at 303.
469
17 USC § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
470
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
471
See id. at 326 (“It cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code may be regulated without reference to First
Amendment doctrine. The path from idea to human language to source code to object code is a continuum.”).
472
Id. at 329.
473
Id. at 330.
474
Id. at 331.
lawfully be prevented, or tolerate some decryption in order to avoid some impairment of
communication.”475 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit was convinced that Congress, rather than
the court, should resolve this dilemma. As Judge Newman concluded, the court’s “task is to
determine whether the legislative solution adopted by Congress, as applied to the Appellants by
the District Court’s injunction, is consistent with the limitations of the First Amendment, and
[the court was] satisfied that it is.”476
While the Corley litigation was on appeal, Russian cryptographer Dmitry Sklyarov was
arrested in the United States in July 2001, after giving a presentation to a computer hacker
convention on the software that removed security protection from Adobe e-books.477 He became
the first person to be charged with violating the DMCA and was eventually released after strong
protests in the United States and after he promised to testify for the U.S. government against his
former employer. 478 A trial ensued, accusing his Moscow-based employer, ElcomSoft, of
illegally selling software that permitted users to circumvent security features in an electronic
book. In December 2002, a federal jury acquitted ElcomSoft of all charges.479
Since the passage of the DMCA, the copyright industries have been heavily lobbying
Congress for further protection. For example, in late July, U.S. Representative Howard Berman
introduced the Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act, 480 which, if enacted, would allow movie
studios and record companies to hack into personal computers and peer-to-peer file-sharing
networks if the rightsholders suspect that infringing materials are being circulated without
authorization. Meanwhile, the industry also has been actively pursuing litigation against
potential infringers, such as Grokster, MusicCity, and KaZaA.481
In April 2003, the recording industry discovered newfound subpoena power under the
DMCA when it won RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 482 in which the court required the
Internet service provider to hand over names of individuals whom the industry accused of
illegally trading music.483 Using this newfound subpoena power, major record companies filed
high-profile lawsuits against students at Princeton University, Michigan Technological
University, and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, seeking billions of dollars in damages. 484
475
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 457-58 (2d Cir. 2001).
476
Id. at 458.
477
Jennifer Lee, U.S. Arrests Russian Cryptographer as Copyright Violator, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at C8 (reporting Sklyarov’s
arrest); see also Complaint, U.S. v. Sklyarov (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2001) (No. 5 01 257), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Sklyarov/20010707_complaint.html. See also Symposium, Implications of Enforcing the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: A Case Study, Focusing on United States v. Sklyarov, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805
(2002).
478
David Frith, A Promotion a Day Keeps Apple A-weigh, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at A12 (reporting that Sklyarov was
released in a deal that “saw him admit the facts of the case but not any illegal activity”).
479
Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared of Illegal Software Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at C4.
480
Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002); see also Rep. Howard L. Berman, The Truth About the Peer
to Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Why Copyright Owner Self-help Must Be Part of the P2P Piracy Solution, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL
COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021001_berman.html (Oct. 1, 2002) (explaining the need for the
legislation); Julie Hilden, Going After Individuals for Copyright Violations: The New Bill That Would Grant Copyright Owners a
“License to Hack” Peer-To-Peer Networks, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20020820.html (Aug. 20, 2002) (criticizing the legislation). Most recently, Rep. Berman suggested
that he might not reintroduce his controversial bill, in part due to the lack of support from the copyright industries. See Jon Healey, Rep.
Berman May Not Revive Internet Piracy Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at 3.
481
See, e.g., Matt Richtel, A New Suit Against Online Music Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at C4; John Davidson, Battle for the
Internet Bazaar, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 25, 2003, at 35.
482
258 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2003).
483
Id.
484
See Ahrens, 4 Students Sued over Music Sites, supra note 2; Jon Healey, Students Hit with Song Piracy Lawsuits, supra note 2.
Despite the companies’ high-profile efforts, they eventually settled with the students for meager
amounts.485 Ironically, one student was able to raise his entire $12,000 fine in less than six
weeks over the Internet, while another was working his way to complete a similar feat.486
Most recently, the recording industry launched a mass litigation campaign against file
swappers who make large number of songs available on peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.487
By mid-July, the industry has already sent out close to 1000 federal subpoenas, with roughly 75
new subpoenas approved every day.488 On September 8, 2003, the RIAA followed up its earlier
efforts by filing 261 lawsuits against individuals who illegally downloaded and distributed on
average more than 1000 copyrighted music files via peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as
KaZaA, Grokster, iMesh, and Gnutella.489 As of this writing, the RIAA has settled some of these
lawsuits, while continuing to litigate the others.490
The industry’s recent efforts were controversial, and the consuming public increasingly
see copyright as antithetical to the public domain, 491 the unprotected territory in which raw
materials reside. Consider, for example, the immediate reaction to the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Eldred v. Ashcroft.492 In Eldred, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,493 which extends copyright protection in the United
States for twenty years, bringing the copyright term to the life of the author plus seventy years.494
Shortly after the Court handed down its decision, strong, bitter reactions emerged from
supporters of the public domain movement. While many believed the Court had sold them out to
private corporations, like Disney, the more radical ones advocated civil disobedience as a
counteracting strategy.495
485
Jon Healey & P.J. Huffstutter, 4 Pay Steep Price for Free Music, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at 1 (reporting that students will pay
the recording industry damages in the range of $12,000 to $17,500).
486
See Jefferson Graham, Fined Student Gets Donations to Tune of $12K, USA TODAY, June 25, 2003, at 4D.
487
See Jefferson Graham, Swap Songs? You May Be on Record Industry’s Hit List, USA TODAY, July 22, 2003, at 1D.
488
See Benny Evangelista, Firm Sleuths out Illegal File Sharers, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., July 21, 2003, at E1.
489
See Harmon, The Price of Music, supra note 6.
490
See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Music Industry Will Talk Before Suing, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at E1; Mike Snider, Record Industry
Fires Warning Shot, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2003, at 2B.
491
See generally David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). Recent literature has emphasized the importance of the public domain and the danger of its
disappearance. See, e.g., LESSIG, CODE, supra note 327, at 66 (lamenting how the media and software industries are stifling innovation
in the New Economy); LITMAN, supra note 450 (showing how the increased domination of interest groups in the lawmaking processes
has made copyright law anti-public and incomprehensible); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 38 (describing how the increasing corporate
control over the use of software, digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copyright law away from its
original design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use]
(advocating the use of Justice Brandeis’s conception that information should be “free as the air to common use” as a conceptual baseline
to limit property rights in information products).
492
123 S. Ct. 769 (2003); see also Marci Hamilton, Now That the Supreme Court Has Declined to Limit Copyright Duration, Those
Who Want to Shorten the Term Need to Look at Other Options, Including Constitutional Amendment, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL
COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030213.html (Feb. 13, 2003); Peter K. Yu, Four Remaining Questions on
Copyright Law After Eldred, GIGALAW.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003/yu-2003-02.html (Feb. 2003); Peter K. Yu,
Mickey Mouse, Peter Pan, and the Tall Tale of Copyright Harmonization, IP L. & BUS., Apr. 2003, at 24.
493
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)).
494
17 U.S.C. § 304.
495
See Lord Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), reprinted in Extending Mickey’s Life: Eldred v.
Ashcroft and the Copyright Term Extension Debate (Peter K. Yu ed., 2003) (cautioning that an ill-advised copyright law eventually
would be “repealed by piratical booksellers”). But see Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next?, Salon.com
(Jan. 17, 2003), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/01/17/copyright/print.html (discouraging acts of civil disobedience by noting
that “[w]hile disobedience might be more fun, the power of civil discourse remains” in the post-Eldred era).
In recent years, the public awareness of intellectual property issues has increased
tremendously, thanks to the MP3, Napster, Eldred and KaZaA litigation. In the past, copyright
law was considered a complicated issue that was of primary interest and concern to intellectual
property lawyers, legal scholars, and technological developers. Today, however, the public see it
as something that affects their daily lives. With increasingly user-friendly technologies,
individuals have become authors and publishers and have taken on roles that traditionally
required commercial equipment.
As political support grows, legislative proposals that place a heavier emphasis on the
public domain have surfaced.496 To maintain the historical balance in the copyright system,
commentators have called for more attention to access issues and users’ rights while proposing
safeguards to limit copyright protection.497 Likewise, consumer advocates and civil libertarians
have alarmed the general public about the problems created by the growing use of encryption
technologies to protect copyright. 498 In addition, organizations such as the Digital Media
496
For example, Congressman Richard Boucher recently introduced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act in an effort to restore
historical balance in copyright law and to ensure proper labeling of copy-protected CDs. Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/dmcra108th.pdf. Senator Sam Brownback circulated among consumer
groups and within the Senate a draft bill requiring copyright holders to file suits before obtaining the identities of alleged infringers from
Internet service providers. See Farhad Manjoo, Can Anyone Stop the Music Cops?, SALON.COM, June 17, 2003, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/06/17/brownback_bill/index_np.html. Most recently, Reps. Zoe Lofgren and John Doolittle
introduced the Public Domain Enhancement Act, which, if enacted, would require copyright holders to pay a $1 fee to maintain their
copyrights fifty years after the original publication of their works. Brian Krebs, Bill Seeks to Loosen Copyright Law’s Grip, NEWSBYTES,
June 25, 2003.
497
See, e.g., LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 456, at 251 (proposing a regime whereby a published work will be protected
for a term of five years once registered, that the registration can be renewed fifteen times, and that the work will fall into the public
domain if the registration is not renewed); L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights
241 (1991) (noting that “[p]reserving the integrity of copyright law—including its law of users’ rights—is critical to our free society”);
Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 18 (2003) (noting the need
to adapt “pre-existing real space copyright use norms to electronic formats as a mechanism for protecting the legitimate interests of
copyright owners without depriving individuals of the customary real space access to information provided by bound books and
periodicals”); Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use, supra note 491 (advocating the use of Justice Brandeis’s concept that
information should be “free as the air to common use” to limit property rights in information products); Julie Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003-04 (1996) (calling for the
recognition of the right to read anonymously); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 277 (1996) (arguing that users must be allowed “to do the same things they are
able to do in a non-digitized environment”); Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 631 (emphasizing the need to construct a
“free use zone” that will “mak[e] explicit what is already accepted practice in a hard copy universe—that copyright owners do not have
rights to prohibit individuals from browsing and borrowing their works”); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 113-24 (discussing
the adverse impact of sui generis database protection on scientific research and education); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 14, at 796-821
(1999) (discussing the adverse impact of database protection laws on scientific, technical, and educational users of factual data and
information); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don’t Throw Out the Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 405 (noting the need to “maintain[] some approximation of our current cheap and simple access to copyrighted
works for research, scholarship and pleasure”); Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art’s Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003,
at A17 (proposing a scheme whereby copyright holders will have to pay a tax 50 years after a work is published and that the work will
fall into the public domain if the copyright holder fails to pay the tax for three years in a row).
498
See Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing, supra note 446; Kevin Hunt, Record Industry Opens
Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, May 23, 2002, at 21. After all, an encrypted CD may not function the same way as a
conventional CD. Previously available functions, including those to which consumers may have a legal right under the fair use provision,
may no longer exist. Even worse, an encrypted CD might not be playable on car stereos, some PCs, and old CD players, forcing
consumers to buy new ones they do not otherwise need or cannot afford. See Celine Dion and the Copycats, FIN. TIMES (London), July
19, 2002, at 11. Thus, it is not surprising that the recording industry has encountered a highly negative response—including a class-
action lawsuit by two California consumers—when Sony released Celine Dion’s latest album as an encrypted CD. Jon Healey & Jeff
Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, § 3, at 1 (reporting that “[t]wo California consumers
already have filed a class-action lawsuit against the five major record companies, alleging that copy-protected CDs are defective
products that shouldn’t be allowed on the market”). As some consumer advocates noted, the record companies need to label the CD
carefully to avoid confusion and to allow consumers to choose away from these encrypted CDs.
Association and the Digital Future Coalition have grown considerably, while organizations and
legal clinics that publicly defend users rights have emerged.499
Today, piracy remains rampant on the Internet. Global CD sales fell in 2001 for the first
time since the introduction of the CD format in the early 1980s.500 Billions of music files are
now downloaded per month, while global CD sales have dropped by nine per cent in 2002.501 If
piracy were to continue at this level, it would not be surprising if the United States regained its
century-old title as the most notorious pirate in the world. After all, the United States is the
world leader in developing cutting-edge reproduction technologies, and it possesses the largest
Internet population in the world.502
IV. MORAL OF THE STORIES
This Article brings together piracy stories in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America,
twentieth-century China, and twenty-first century cyberspace. Each of these stories takes place
at a different era in a different geographical region under different politico-socio-economic
conditions. The story involves different cultural traditions, levels of economic development,
political systems, historical practices, reprographic technologies, and copyright sectors.
When commentators analyze these stories, they tend to overemphasize a particular factor
or a combination of these factors. However, when one steps back and look at the comparative
picture, these explanations become inadequate. For example, extensive copyright piracy occurs
in both the East and the West even though Eastern and Western cultures diverge significantly.
Likewise, the piracy problem occurs in the United States at different eras, even though the
country today is very different from what it was two centuries ago.
So far, commentators have not provided a “grand unified theory” of copyright piracy.
Instead, they offered very careful analyses of each stories, discussing in detail the different
aspects of the problem—political, social, economic, cultural, and historical. While their analyses
are insightful and significant, policymakers and the general public have a very difficult time
understanding the crux of the piracy problem. To help us do so, this Article seeks to provide a
broad systemic framework that takes into account the various forces that are conducive to
creating and enlarging the copyright divide.
A. The Copyright Divide
Copyright law has always been about stakeholders.503 In the late nineteenth century,
Anthony Trollope blamed American book piracy on “the book-selling leviathans.”504 A century
499
See Rick Boucher, The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 95, 100 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews Jr., eds., 2002) [hereinafter COPY FIGHTS].
500
See Menell, supra note 333, at 119.
501
Renee Graham, Life in the Pop, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2003, at E4.
502
But see Mark Landler, For Music Industry, U.S. Is Only the Tip of a Piracy Iceberg, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A1 (noting
that “the recording industry’s problems with the illegal online distribution of music in the United States pale beside the rampant piracy
that goes on overseas”).
503
As my former colleague Justin Hughes wrote:
[I]deas about property have played a central role in shaping the American legal order. For every Pilgrim who came to the
New World in search of religious freedom, there was at least one colonist who came on the promise of a royal land grant or
one slave compelled to come as someone else’s property.
later, Professor Jessica Litman told us that “[t]he only way that copyright laws get passed in this
country is for all of the lawyers who represent the current stakeholders to get together and hash
out all of the details among themselves.”505 Since then, commentators have discussed at length
the gaps between the “copyright-rich” and “copyright-poor”506 and between the haves and have-
nots in the copyright system.507
These commentaries are very helpful in helping us understand the three piracy stories.
Today, a copyright divide exists between those who have stakes in the existing copyright regime
and those who do not. On the one side of the divide are the stakeholders, who are eager to
protect what they have under the existing regime. This group of players not only consider piracy
annoying, but see it as theft. On the other side of the divide are the nonstakeholders. These
nonstakeholderrs neither understand nor believe in the copyright system.
Using this construct, the extensive copyright piracy that take place in the above three
stories can be viewed as a battle between the stakeholders and nonstakeholders over the change
and retention of the status quo. Unless the nonstakeholders understand why copyright needs to
be protected and until they become stakeholders or potential stakeholders, they will not be eager
to abide by copyright laws or to consent to stronger copyright protection.
To be certain, the stakeholders can always lobby for stronger copyright protection,
including heavier penalties for copyright violations. However, their actions incurred heavy
political and economic costs on the enforcement authorities and would ultimately become
ineffective when the authorities lose interest in enforcing those penalties.508 Even worse, this
Justin Hughes, THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988); see also James V. Delong, Defending
Intellectual Property, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 499, at 17, 25:
We are a long way from the Jeffersonian ideal of a nation of yeoman farmers, tilling fields that we own. But it remains
difficult to refute the idea that a stable political system needs people with a stake in ensuring that its politics do not run off the
rails, and that one of the best safeguards is to be sure that people own property and thus have something to lose. Certainly, at
the local level, widespread property ownership in the form of homes seems to provide substantial stability and involvement in
government.
504
TROLLOPE, supra note 85, at 308.
505
Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 53 (1994); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright, Compromise].
506
507
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 19 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revising
Copyright Law] (noting that current copyright rules “make some parties ‘haves’ and others ‘have-nots’”); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers,
and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 162 (2001) (noting that “[a] blanket legitimization
of automated rights management systems, clickwrap licensing regimes, or other similar means to assert absolute property rights over a
work in cyberspace will . . . ultimately recreate patterns of resource allocation that institutionalize the status of the information “haves”
and the information “have nots”); Edward Samuels, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?, 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 221, 223 (2002) (“Copyright . . . represents the attempt by the haves (the companies that own all the copyrights) to keep
the goodies away from the have-nots (the consuming public).”); see also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 84 (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER] (noting the divide between information “haves” and “have nots” and rejecting “the
notion that copyright owners should be taxed—apart from all others—to facilitate the legitimate goal of “universal access”); NII
Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of the American Association of Law Libraries, the American Library Association, the
Association of Research Libraries, the Medical Library Association, and the Special Libraries Association) (expressing concern that
requiring “some form of payment for every use of a protected work . . . will take us a very long way towards becoming a nation of
information haves and information have-nots”), available at http://www.dfc.org//dfc1/Archives/n2/librarie.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2003); Tatiana Boncompagni, Copyright Haves, Have-Nots Take Fight To Hill, RECORDER, Aug. 18, 2000, at 3.
508
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 312 (discussing how copyright holders can shift the cost to the public by adopting weak
protection technology).
lack of enforcement might instill in the public a lack of confidence in and respect for the legal
system.509
As with all stakeholder-nonstakeholder problems, it is not easy to deal with the copyright
divide. After all, the stakeholders would be eager to protect what they have, while the
nonstakeholders would be eager to enlarge their share and become stakeholders. Fortunately, not
everybody steals or uses other illegal means to enlarge his or her share. Most people do so only
when they do not understand the law or when they do not believe in the system—for example,
when they perceive the system as grossly unfair.510
This is exactly what happens with the DMCA today.511 Drafted by copyright lobbyists,
the law is long, wordy, complex, cumbersome, counterintuitive, and internally inconsistent.512
The statute contains many pages and is full of exceptions and exceptions to exceptions. As a
result of this complicated and convoluted structure, it would take a sophisticated copyright
lawyer or a veteran intellectual property scholar a considerable amount of time to digest and
master the law.513 One could only imagine the amount of time the general public need to spend
to grasp the basic understanding of this statute, not to mention the fact that many of them have
very limited understanding of such basic copyright concepts as the idea-expression dichotomy,514
the first-sale doctrine,515 and the fair use privilege.516
Consider, for example, section 1201(d) of the DMCA,517 which provides a “shopping
right” for libraries and other nonprofit educational institutions. 518 The statute allows the
institutions to circumvent “solely in order to make a good faith determination of whether to
509
See id. at 212-13 (noting that “[w]hen popular attitudes and practices are out of synch with laws, the enforcement of laws becomes
more difficult, which may instill in people a lack of confidence in and respect for the legal system.”); see also Bartow, supra note 499, at
17 (arguing that “if the government wants its citizens to respect copyrights, the copyright laws as they are promulgated and enforced,
must be more consistent, comprehensible and respectful of individuals’ needs and experiences”).
510
See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can’t “Just Say Yes” to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237,
238-39 (1997) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Noncompliance]; Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 616 (“Intellectual
property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it to be
effective.”); Faison, supra note 179 (“We take copyright violations very seriously, but when it comes to copying a disk, most Chinese
people don’t see what’s wrong.” (quoting Xu Guoji, senior official in Shanghai’s Industrial and Commercial Administration)).
511
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-204 (1998); see also discussion supra Part III.
512
See Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, supra note 441, at 33.
513
See Bartow, supra note 499, at 25 (contending that “not even someone with a firm knowledge of the copyright law can confidently
expect to reliably identify the metes and bounds of copyright compliant behavior across disparate factual situations because copyright
laws are neither clear nor applied consistently or predictably”).
514
The idea-expression dichotomy “is the term of art used in copyright law to indicate the elements in a copyrighted work which the
grant of the copyright monopoly does not take from the public.” Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 563. It “‘strike[s] a definitional balance . . . by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.’” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For discussions of the idea-expression dichotomy, see generally Amy B.
Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66
IND. L.J. 175 (1990); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 560 (1982);
Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (1993); Edward Samuels, The
Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989). See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]t is convenient to define such a use by saying that others may ‘copy’ the ‘theme,’ or ‘ideas,’ or the like, of
a work, though not its ‘expression.’”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[T]here is a point in this
series of abstractions where [creative works] are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’
to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.”); Landes & Posner, supra note 329, at 347-49 (discussing the
economic rationale for the idea-expression dichotomy).
515
See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
516
See sources cited supra note 402.
517
17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2000).
518
See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” supra note 450, at 139.
acquire a copy of that work for the sole purpose of engaging in conduct permitted under [the
DMCA].”519 Nevertheless, the statute would only apply to situations in which “an identical copy
of that work is not reasonably available in another form."520 Imagine how often a library will
have to decide whether or not to acquire a work that exists only in access-protected form and
whose author or publisher is unwilling to make available sufficient information for potential
customers to make the purchasing decision!
When one takes into account the various provisions in the copyright statute, the
boundaries become even more unclear. Consider the following excerpt from the RIAA
concerning what consumers can do with their CDs:
Today, the general public has many misconceptions of copyright law. For example, some
maintain that downloading a copyrighted song for purposes of evaluation for up to 24 hours
would not constitute copyright infringement.521 Some have the wrong impression that posting
copyrighted materials for downloading on a foreign Web site is legally permissible because
U.S. copyright laws do not apply to countries abroad. 522 Some mistakenly assume that
anything posted on the Web or on a Usenet news group are in the public domain by virtue of
its presence there.523 And some wrongfully believe that software is available for copying
without liability if the copyright owner has ceased actively distributing it for more than many
years.524 In fact, there are many other copyright-related myths and urban legends circulating
on the Internet.
By the same token, many copyright holders fail to understand the limits of copyright and
insist on rights that they did not get under the copyright statute. For example, many major
publishers place on the cover page a legend noting that “[n]o part of this book may be
reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission.”525 Likewise,
many scholars include in the draft of their papers such admonitions as “Unauthorized
reproduction prohibited” or “No part of this paper may be reproduced or cited without the
permission of the author.”526
In many less developed countries, the lack of understanding of copyright law remains a
major barrier to successful intellectual property law reforms. A case in point is China. In the
1980s and the early 1990s, the Chinese people have very limited awareness of intellectual
property rights and do not understand the benefits of such protection or the harm resulting from
the lack of such protection. 527 Even worse, like the general populace, judges and law
enforcement officers in China neither understand intellectual property rights nor see the urgency
of protecting such rights.528 Coupled with the lack of rule of law529 and an acute shortage of
519
17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)(1).
520
Id. § 1201(d)(2).
521
522
Id.
523
Id.
524
Id. at 125.
525
Id. at 128.
526
Bartow, supra note 499, at 48.
527
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 221-25 (discussing the need to educate the Chinese populace about intellectual
property rights); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 71 (same).
528
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 213-21 (discussing the need to educate the Chinese judges and government
officials about intellectual property rights); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 71 (same); see also Robert
Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World [hereinafter Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual
competent judges and sophisticated lawyers, 530 the lack of awareness and understanding of
intellectual property rights has created a major barrier to effective intellectual property law
reforms in China.
Even if the nonstakeholders are aware of and understand copyright, a copyright divide
can exist if the nonstakeholders do not believe in the system. As Professor David Post wrote
powerfully in the Napster context:
Only when Napster users believe that it is in their interest to grant recognition to the “foreign”
copyrights held by Lieber and Stoller will they do so. Only when there is a constituency for
reciprocal copyright recognition Over There, among cyberspace’s new Hawthornes,
Melvilles, and Emersons, will we see it. There may be things we can do to speed that process
up; taking our cue from Dickens, a policy of nonrecognition of cyberspace copyrights here in
realspace, for example, under which we might deny copyright protection Over Here for
software and systems developed Over There, might be an interesting place to start.531
Countries differ in levels of wealth, economic structures, technological capabilities,

political systems, and cultural traditions. They need different copyright systems to promote the
creation and dissemination of intellectual works in their own countries.532 Unless and until a
country considers copyright protection in its national interest, it unlikely would strengthen
copyright protection in the country.
In retrospect, this is exactly what happened in the United States shortly after the Second
World War,533 in China in the late 1990s,534 and in many less developed and transition countries
today. In all these examples, one can find a strong correlation between increasing intellectual
property protection and a growing realization of self-interests in the intellectual property area.
Because of this realization, the United States underwent a complete change after the Second
World War, while China accelerated its intellectual property law reforms shortly before it joined
the WTO.
B. The Contributing Factors
When commentators analyze copyright piracy, they tend to focus on individual factors.
For example, commentators have examined cultural tradition, the level of economic development,
political system, historical practice, the type of reprographic technology, and the type of
copyright sector. This Section argues that none of these factors alone accounts for the extensive
piracy problem, although some of these factors at times are more influential and determinative
Property System Makes Sense], in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68, 85
(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] (“For a national
intellectual property system to work, there must first be a judicial system that works, a precondition that is often missing.”).
529
For discussions of the development of the rule of law in China, see, for example, RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE
COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (1997); CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996);
DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA’S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF
LAW (1994); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); MURRAY SCOTT TANNER, THE POLITICS
OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS (1999); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD
IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999).
530
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 214 (discussing the shortage of competent judges and experienced lawyers).
531
David G. Post, His Napster Voice, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 499, at 107, 121.
532
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
533
See discussion supra Part I.
534
See discussion supra Part II.
than others. Rather, all the different factors contribute to the creation and enlargement of the
copyright divide, and they should be considered as contributing factors. Until we can develop a
comprehensive approach that targets the various factors, as compared to a piecemeal policy that
focuses on one or two exaggerated factors, we might not be able to stem the piracy problem.
1. Cultural Tradition
Copyright has an intertwining relationship with cultural policy,535 and culture has always
been a powerful argument to account for the cause of extensive copyright piracy. For example,
commentators discussed at length the classic Greek and Roman beliefs that works were created
through “inspiration by the muses.” 536 They also examined the Confucian underpinnings of
Chinese society,537 the familial and community values embodied in Islam laws,538 and the hacker
culture that paves the way to widespread MP3 piracy.539 To many commentators, culture is the
primary cause of extensive copyright piracy in less developed countries and in cyberspace today.
However, if examined carefully, this cultural tradition argument is as unconvincing as the

argument that extensive MP3 piracy occurs in Western societies because of the communitarian
underpinnings in Judeo-Christian teachings. Communitarian philosophies were (and are) not
unique to the Greek and Roman republics, China, the Middle East, and hackers. They are found
in civilizations around the world.
Undeniably, cultural tradition might create barriers for copyright laws to emerge or
develop. A culture-based analysis also might provide insight into a community of which the
public have limited understanding. However, a different, or even pro-copying, culture does not
necessarily result in extensive copyright piracy. Consider China, for example. As Professor
William Alford pointed out in his seminal work, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense, the
Confucian culture militated against copyright protection in so far as it did not allow intellectual
property protection to take root.540 Yet, this non-Western culture had not prevented intellectual
property protection from functioning in the Chinese society once it is introduced—in this case by
535
See, e.g., Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 187, 187 (1997) (exploring
the importance of the cultural exception and arguing that each country “has a right—even a duty—to protect and develop its own
culture” despite the need to protect intellectual property); J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy,
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996) [hereinafter Reichman, Duration of Copyright] (noting the close ties between copyright and
cultural policy); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn
from Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 634 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Toward
a Nonzero-sum Approach].
536
WALTER BAPPERT, WEGE ZUM URHEBERRECHT 26-39 (1962) (positing that the classic Greeks and Romans, with pagan theories
of inspiration by the muses, could not conceive of rights based on individual authorship), quoted in Paul Edward Geller, Copyright
History and the Future: What’s Culture Got to Do with It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S.A. 209, 213 n.19 (2000).
537
538
See Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past
Each Other When We Say “Property”? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 345 (1996);
see also PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 66 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy
ed., 1999) (discussing how some teachers attribute plagiarism by Middle Eastern students to the emphasis of community and family
values in Middle Eastern cultures).
539
540
See ALFORD, supra note 8.
the United States. 541 Indeed, there is strong compatibility between copyright and
Confucianism, just as there is between Western human rights and Confucianism.543
542
Likewise, although many early members of the Internet community subscribe to the
hacker culture and the motto “Information wants to be free,”544 there is no evidence that these
members would necessarily steal or undertake other illegal acts to free up information. As
Jessica Litman pointed out insightfully:
People do seem to buy into copyright norms, but they don’t translate those norms into the
rules that the copyright statute does; they find it very hard to believe that there’s really a law
out there that says the stuff the copyright law says. . . . People don’t obey laws that they
don’t believe in. It isn’t necessarily that they behave lawlessly, or that they’ll steal whatever
they can if they think they can get away with it. Most people try to comply, at least
substantially, with what they believe the law to say. If they don’t believe the law says what it
in fact says, though, they won’t obey it—not because they are protesting its provisions, but
because it doesn’t stick in their heads.545
So far, copyright law “doesn’t stick in their heads” because it is long, complex,
cumbersome, and counterintuitive.546 Consider the following excerpt from the RIAA’s Web site
on what consumers can and cannot do with their music:
First, for your personal use, you can make analog copies of music. For instance, you
can make analog cassette tape recordings of music from another analog cassette, or from a
CD, or from the radio, or basically from any source. Essentially, all copying onto analog
media is generally allowed.
541
See YU, supra note 8, at 4-7 (discussing the importation of intellectual property rights into China by Western countries); Edmund
W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 178 (1994) (noting that “[o]utsiders can play a
constructive role by insisting that the [intellectual property] issues be addressed within a larger and principled framework.”).
542
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 224-25 (discussing the compatibility between the Chinese culture and Western
intellectual property notions); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 76-77 (same). Compare XIANFA art. 20 (1982)
(amended Mar. 29, 1993) (“The state promotes the development of natural and social sciences, disseminates knowledge of science and
technology, and commends and rewards achievements in scientific research as well as technological innovations and inventions.”), and
id. art. 47 (“The state encourages and assists creative endeavors conducive to the interests of the people that are made by citizens
engaged in education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural work.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress
shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
543
In the past decade, substantial research has been devoted to explore the common grounds between human rights and the Chinese
culture, in particular Confucianism. See, e.g., DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA
(2000); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998); CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds.,
1999); HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995).
544
Stewart Brand was often credited for coining the phrase. Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 625; David Stipp &
Stewart Brand, The Electric Kool-Aid Management Consultant, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 160 (characterizing the phrase “Information
wants to be free” as the “cyberhacker rallying cry”).
545
Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 510, at 238-39; see Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 616
(“Intellectual property is nothing more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it
to be effective.”); see also Bartow, supra note 499 (advocating the adaptation of pre-existing real space copyright use norms to electronic
formats as a mechanism for protecting the legitimate interests of copyright holders without depriving individuals of the customary real
space access to information provided by bound books and periodicals); Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235
(1991) (examining the difference between the prevailing public myth of copyright and existing copyright statute and case law); see also
Faison, supra note 179 (“We take copyright violations very seriously, but when it comes to copying a disk, most Chinese people don’t
see what’s wrong.” (quoting Xu Guoji, senior official in Shanghai’s Industrial and Commercial Administration)).
546
LITMAN, supra note 450, at 73. Ironically, the Clinton Administration claimed the passage of the DMCA as the success of its
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, which called for the creation of “predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple” rules.
See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), available at
http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm; see also Samuelson, supra note 450, at 524.
Second, again for your personal use, you can make some digital copies of music,
depending on the type of digital recorder used. For example, digitally copying music is
generally allowed with minidisc recorders, DAT recorders, digital cassette tape recorders, and
some (but not all) compact disc recorders (or CD-R recorders). As a general rule for CD-Rs,
if the CD-R recorder is a stand-alone machine designed to copy primarily audio, rather than
data or video, then the copying is allowed. If the CD-R recorder is a computer component, or
a computer peripheral device designed to be a multipurpose recorder (in other words, if it will
record data and video, as well as audio), then copying is not allowed.547
Since the turn of the twentieth century, copyright law was drafted primarily by copyright
lawyers who negotiate on behalf of their clients. As a result, the statute consists of bargains
stakeholders made in private meetings during an arduous negotiating process.548 Compared to a
commandment that says “Thou Shalt Not Steal” or “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” the current law would
be very difficult and time-consuming even for sophisticated copyright lawyers and veteran
intellectual property scholars to understand, not to mention the average users.549 This situation
may change, however, if the law becomes shorter, intuitive, and more commonsensical.550 Once
Internet users begin to understand copyright law, stronger copyright protection will follow, and
the piracy problem will be significantly reduced.
2. Level of Economic Development
Countries differ in terms of levels of wealth, economic structures, technological

capabilities, political systems, and cultural traditions.551 Different countries have different needs
and aspirations,552 and policymakers face different political pressures553 and make different value
547
548
See, e.g., id. at 47 (noting that “[m]uch of the complexity of this law is pertinent only to the specific industry-to-industry dealings
it addresses and is irrelevant to the general public”); Litman, Copyright, Compromise, supra note 505; Jessica D. Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation].
549
As Jessica Litman pointed out:
If ordinary people are to see copyrights as equivalent to tangible property, and accord copyright rules the respect they
give to other property rules, then we would need, at a minimum, to teach them the rules that govern intellectual property when
we teach them the rules that govern other personal property, which is to say in elementary school. The problem, though, is
that our current copyright statute could not be taught in elementary school, because elementary school students couldn’t
understand it. Indeed, their teachers couldn’t understand it. Copyright lawyers don’t understand it. If we are going to teach
the copyright law to schoolchildren, then we need the law to be sensible, intuitive, and short enough that schoolchildren can
hold its essential provisions in their heads. What we have now is not even close.
LITMAN, supra note 450, at 72. But see Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(footnote omitted):
“Thou shalt not steal.” has been an admonition followed since the dawn of civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern
world of business this admonition is not always followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action for copyright infringement
would have this court believe that stealing is rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be
excused. The conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright
laws of this country.
550
See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 125 (noting the need for the law to be “set forth in a clear and straightforward manner
that the general public can readily comprehend”).
551
MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 191
(1998); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 239; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 84.
552
RYAN, supra note 551, at 201; see also Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy,
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 333 (1993) (“Fundamental differences in concepts of ownership and legal regimes provide at
least some explanation as to why it has been so difficult to draft a multilateral intellectual property agreement. A favorable agreement
for one country could be unfavorable for another country.”).
553
See RYAN, supra note 551, at 144 (arguing that intellectual property protection, which involves a fundamental debate about
economic development strategy, may threaten the established relationships of businesses and the government); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER
AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 215 (1998) (arguing that intellectual property
protection may put the ruling elites in less developed countries in a very difficult, if not precarious, position); Robert Burrell, A Case
Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of Copyright on China by the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195, 207
judgments as to what would best promote creations and inventions in their own countries.554 In
light of these differences and the need to have a global intellectual property regime,555 the TRIPs
Agreement includes transitional provisions that delay implementation of the Agreement for five
years in less developed and transitional countries 556 and for eleven years in least developed
countries. 557 To help create “a sound and viable technological base” in these countries, the
Agreement also requires developed countries to provide incentives for their businesses and
institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least developed countries.558
Although these transitional provisions seem to suggest that less developed countries have
not developed to an economic level that makes intellectual property protection a cost-effective
and sound governmental policy, they do not do so. Instead, they suggest that less developed
countries have not developed to an economic level that makes implementation and enforcement
of the TRIPs Agreement a cost-effective and sound governmental policy.559 The debate about
the TRIPs Agreement is not really about whether a country should have intellectual property
protection, but whether a country should have a particular intellectual property system.
So far, the presumptions that stronger intellectual property protection will benefit less
developed countries 560 and that a universalized intellectual property regime would maximize
global welfare are questionable. 561 Equally doubtful is the assumption that the current
intellectual property system strikes the proper balance “between incentives to future production,
(Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998) (noting that “no Chinese leader could be seen bowing to pressure from the United
States [on the intellectual property front] without being in danger of undermining his own position, a difficulty which goes some way
towards explaining much of the brinkmanship which has characterised the negotiations between China and the United States on the
issue”); see also RYAN, supra note 551, at 75 (describing why the South Korean government was very sensitive to the political threat
posed by college students who were seriously concerned about increased textbook prices that result from efforts to curtail piracy); SELL,
supra, at 192 (describing how Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond’s administration was ousted in a no-confidence vote after it
attempted to strengthen the country’s copyright law).
554
See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 535, at 569.
555
See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831
(arguing that the Paris Convention incurs significant costs to less developed countries); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair
Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 25 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman, From
Free Riders to Fair Followers] (“[A]dherence to the TRIPS Agreement requires [less developed] countries to reconcile their own
economic development goals with its international intellectual property norms.”).
556
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 172, arts. 65(1)-(3).
557
Id. art. 66(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
558
Id. art. 66(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
559
See RYAN, supra note 551, at 75 (arguing that some governments have not developed to an economic level that makes Western
intellectual property protection a cost-effective and sound government policy); Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus
Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 68, 97 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS]
(discussing why a uniform intellectual property regime that requires strict equality in the duration of patents would ignore the different
elasticities, discount rates, and research and development productivities in different countries); Conferences: Intellectual Property
Lawyers Lament Supreme Court Federalism, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Nov. 22, 1999) (reporting that a
Ukrainian government minister told Judge Randall Rader that honoring U.S. intellectual property rights on products used in Ukraine
would cost half of the country’s gross national product).
560
SELL, supra note 553, at 221 (arguing that, “[w]hile the North claims that stronger intellectual property protection will benefit
developing countries, this relationship has yet to be demonstrated in either economic theory or empirical proof”); Frischtak, supra note
559, at 90 (noting that “[t]here is little in economic theory to support convergence of [intellectual property rights] systems on a cross-
country basis, particularly if convergence means an increase in the level of protection in developing and industrializing countries”). But
see Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD
TRADE 75 (1990) (asserting that the level of economic development is closely correlated to the existing level of intellectual property
protection).
561
See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?,
29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 109, 126 (1997); Frischtak, supra note 559, at 103-05 (urging countries to develop their intellectual
property rights regime according to their own needs); see also Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 152 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that an international regime may not yield overall welfare
benefits and that actors outside the regime may suffer).
the free flow of information and the preservation of the public domain in the interest of potential
future creators.”562 As Professor Jerome Reichman noted, “policymakers concerned to promote
investment in important new technologies often overstate the supposed benefits of specific
intellectual property regimes while ignoring the negative economic functions of these regimes in
relation to the complementary operations of competition law generally.”563
Indeed, as we learn from the recent debate on copyright term extension, 564 many
Americans disagree on the proper balance between intellectual property protection and the access
to information “needed to spur further innovation and ensure the citizenry’s full participation in
our democratic polity.”565 The European Union and the United States, the two leading advocates
of strong international intellectual property protection, also disagree on a large variety of
copyright issues, such as database protection,566 the protection of moral rights,567 fair use,568 the
562
BOYLE, supra note 11, at 124; see Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 555, at 24 (arguing that
policymakers in many developed countries take the existing levels of innovative strength for granted and mistakenly promote
protectionism); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988) (“While property
is initially a product of custom, and jurisdiction and legislation have merely developed it in the course of millennia, there is then no
reason to suppose that the particular forms it has assumed in the contemporary world are final.”).
563
J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International
Trade After the GATT’s Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 81 (1993).
564
For discussions of copyright term extension, see generally ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION:
DURATION, TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT POLICY (1998); EXTENDING MICKEY’S LIFE:
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE (Peter K. Yu ed., forthcoming 2003); Graeme W. Austin, Does
the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 17 (2002); Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the
Constitution: “Have I Stayed Too Long?” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000); Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,”
supra note 450, at 170-75; Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 655 (1996); Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded
Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright, in
GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s
First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 70-74 (2001); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective,
49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2002); William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed
to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law
of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (2001); Reichman, Duration of Copyright, supra note 535; Symposium, The
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000); Symposium, Eldred
v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002); Edward C. Walterscheid,
Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000).
565
William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia,
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 22 (1994) [hereinafter Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter]; see also XUE & ZHENG,
SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 193193, at 33-38 (discussing the different models of computer software protection);
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1987) (arguing that policymakers
and the judiciary should not automatically apply the existing copyright paradigm to computer software); John Perry Barlow, The
Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents & Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual
Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (arguing against the need for copyright in digital media).
566
For discussions of the expediency and constitutionality of U.S. database protection legislation, see generally sources cited supra
note 14.
567
For discussions of the tension between U.S. copyright and moral rights in Europe, see sources cited supra note 13.
568
first sale doctrine, 569 the work-made-for-hire arrangement, 570 and protection against private
copying in the digital environment.571
Although commentators sometimes attribute extensive copyright piracy to the level of

economic development, in particular the pirate countries’ limited financial resources,
technological backwardness, undeveloped legal system, and minimal stakes in a healthy global
intellectual property system, their attribution is unjustified. Economic development explains a
lot about our need for diversity and sensitivity in developing the international intellectual
property system,572 but very little about the cause of extensive copyright piracy.
In fact, however poor and backward they are, less developed countries have strong
incentives to develop a strong, robust, and dynamic copyright regime. Such a regime will
promote modernization and economic development,573 attract foreign investment,574 and create
569
See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPs, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few
Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333 (2000) (discussing the disagreement over the exhaustion issue during the negotiation of the
TRIPs Agreement).
570
J.H. Reichman, Duration of Copyright, supra note 535, at 631 (noting that “[a] more substantial discrepancy between American
copyright law and that of other Berne Union countries stems from the greater reliance of the former on the work-made-for-hire doctrine
in general and on the principle of corporate authorship in particular”); see id. at 631-33 (discussing the United States’ distinctive reliance
on the work-made-for-hire doctrine and corporate authorship).
571
Joseph S. Papovich, NAFTA’s Provisions Regarding Intellectual Property: Are They Working as Intended?—A U.S. Perspective,
23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 259 (1997) (noting that “[b]lank tape levies have been a matter of dispute for several years between the United
States and some European countries”); see also Lutzker, supra note 347, at 182-83 (discussing how foreign countries protect against
unauthorized private copying). Compare Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1009, with Directive 2001/29/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter EU Information Society Directive].
572
See ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 47 (1996) (arguing that less
developed countries may be able to modernize if “they manage to grasp the internal dynamic that operates in each of them and devise
appropriate economic and technological polices, without neglecting social and political aspects”); id. at 98-142 (outlining a proposal for
an intellectual property system in non-industrial countries); LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR THE
INDIVIDUALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 128 (1999) (arguing that countries with different levels
of economic development desire, need, and should have different intellectual property systems); Chiappetta, supra note 569 (arguing that
countries must “agree to disagree” during their negotiation of a multilateral intellectual property regime); Correa, supra note 561, at 129
(“Differentiation . . . looks desirable in that it permits countries in the Latin tradition to retain a system that responds to their own cultural
perceptions of creation and protects the moral and economic rights of all interested parties.”); Frischtak, supra note 559, at 89 (arguing
that countries should tailor their intellectual property system by taking into account their economic needs, productive and research
capabilities, and institutional and budgetary constraints); Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 89 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds.,
1988) (examining whether intellectual property protection is of net benefit to less developed countries); Oddi, supra note 555, at 866-74
(outlining a proposal for a patent system in less developed countries); Robert M. Sherwood et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in
Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473 (1999) (explaining how to restructure the patent
administration in ways that can maximize the contribution of inventors to economic growth and sustained development); Sherwood, Why
a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note 528, at 68 (“The first characteristic of the uniform system being
proposed is that the specific intellectual property systems of individual countries need not be identical.”); David Silverstein, Intellectual
Property Rights, Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth Distribution, Development and Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective
on Patent Law Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 156
(George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) (“[A] truly successful IP system must be culturally-specific and responsive to the different
economic and social realities of each country.”); id. at 171 (“[I]t cannot be taken for granted that a Western IP system will be either
beneficial to or successful in other countries with different cultures.”).
573
See Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note 528, at 83 (“Strong intellectual
property safeguards seem likely to speed rather than retard progress toward world-class achievement.”); Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 8, at 174 (noting the importance of intellectual property rights to a country’s strategy of economic development); Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 62 (arguing that China overlooked the importance of intellectual property rights to its
economic development).
574
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 192; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 62.
new jobs.575 It also will facilitate transfer of knowledge and technology,576 promote indigenous
authorship and creation,577 and generate considerable tax revenues for the country.578
3. Political System
Copyright protection goes hand in hand with the freedom a government gives its citizenry
to express opinion. Societies that have no respect for individual rights are unlikely to tolerate
private expressions or expressive activities.579 Thus, authoritarian societies have very limited
needs for an effective copyright system, as they do not need to provide incentives for people to
create expressions. Indeed, commentators have noted “an intimate link” between a country’s
respect for individual rights and its respect for a copyright system that values and promotes an
individual’s creative achievement.580 As Professor Marci Hamilton pointed out, one must accept,
at least, some version of individualism, reward, and commodification to believe in intellectual
property rights.581
Consider, for example, China, which has been widely criticized for its lack of intellectual
property protection and its authoritarian rule. Since its establishment in 1949, China has
exercised very strict control over the dissemination of information and the distribution of media
products,582 which it considered instruments of political indoctrination and mass mobilization.583
Today, the media business and the publishing industry remain the most heavily regulated
businesses in the country.584 One can find severe restrictions on imported films,585 books and
575
See Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 269, at 7, 9; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 192 (noting that effective
intellectual property protection can create jobs); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 63 (same); see also
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE ECONOMY 4 (1998) (estimating that a
60% decrease in piracy would translate into more than 79,000 jobs).
576
Although technology transfer is always mentioned alongside patent protection, technology can be transferred via books, videos,
and computer software. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 192; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8,
at 63.
577
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 192-93; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 63.
578
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 193; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 63-64.
579
See Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 565, at 17-18; see also Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property
Law in China: Basic Policy and New Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1997) [hereinafter Zhang, Intellectual
Property Law in China] (attributing the delay of implementing copyright law to “China’s concern about the control of publications”). As
Dean Garten explained:
If foreign governments do not seek to protect basic human rights, they are more likely to ignore or circumvent other basic laws
of great commercial relevance, such as those that protect intellectual property rights, combat corruption, and mandate the
disclosure of critical financial information. If the arrogance of governments that oppress their people transfers easily to other
areas.
Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 67, 75.
580
Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 618; see also Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, supra note
36, at 118 (“[W]e know, empirically, that strong copyright systems are characteristic of relatively free societies.”).
581
See Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 617 (“Individualism, as captured in the Western intellectual property system,
is the sine qua non for a society to recognize and honor personal liberty.”).
582
See YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE PARTY LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE 19 (1998)
[hereinafter ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY] (noting that the Chinese Communist Party “exercised strict control over its
publications from the very beginning”); Shaozhi Su, Chinese Communist Ideology and Media Control, in CHINA’S MEDIA, MEDIA’S
CHINA 75, 77 (1994) (noting that the Chinese Communist Party “pays utmost attention to ideology”). But see generally DANIEL C.
LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE: MEDIA, POLITICS, AND “THOUGHT WORK” IN REFORMED CHINA (1999) (describing how a
combination of property rights reforms, administrative fragmentation, and technological advance has caused the Chinese authorities to
lose some of its control over propagandistic communication).
583
ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 582, at 2; Su, supra note 582, at 77 (noting that media not only has the
ability to create an atmosphere conducive to political development, but also can help mobilize the masses and foster political struggle).
584
Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media Products in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN CHINA 127, 127 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997) [hereinafter Lee, Censorship and Approval Process]; Mary L. Riley, The
audiovisual products,586 and the Internet.587 Due to these restrictions, many media products are
unavailable despite heavy demand,588 and consumers have to settle for black market products or
pirated goods,589 which are often inferior to, and are sometimes indistinguishable from, genuine
products.590
As time passes, the Chinese market becomes saturated with infringing substitutes, and
foreign manufacturers and distributors have a difficult time entering the market, even if
restrictions are finally removed, or relaxed.591 Under this theory, one therefore would expect
government censorship to promote piracy. As one commentator acknowledged:
It is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can’t control the 50 pirate CD factories.
If they were turning out thousands of copies of the BBC documentary on the Tiananmen
Square protest—rather than bootleg copies of “The Lion King”—the factory managers would
be sharing a cell with other dissidents in a heartbeat.592
While government censorship in general encourages piracy, the converse is not

necessarily true. Piracy can flourish equally in a free society, in which regulation is limited and
citizens are free to commit piracy acts. The textbook example of a free society with a significant
piracy problem is the Internet. The Internet is “rudderless, decentralized, and transnational,” and
Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Riley, Regulation of the Media] (“Media and all media products, are heavily regulated in China.”).
585
See generally Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291-96 (1999)
(discussing the importation and censorship of non-Chinese films in China).
586
See Lee, Censorship and Approval Process, supra note 582, at 148; Riley, Regulation of the Media, supra note 582, at 377.
587
See Jack Linchuan Qiu, Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate Between the Cyberspaces, 4 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1
(1999); Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the Chinese Internet Industry, GIGALAW.COM, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03-p1.html (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment] (discussing
content regulations in the Chinese Internet Industry).
588
See Robert B. Frost, Jr., Comment, Intellectual Property Rights Disputes in the 1990s Between the People’s Republic of China
and the United States, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 132 (1995) (“[W]hen China stalled the import of the film, ‘True Lies,’ because
of the looming trade war, a cinema in Shenzhen had already begun showing a pirated copy.” (footnote omitted)); Erik Eckholm, Spider-
Man Springs into China with More Than Comics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at E2 (reporting that pirated video compact discs of X-
Men were available in China even though the film itself was not approved for commercial screening); see also OFFICE OF USTR, 2001
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 55 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 NTE REPORT] (“Pirates find ways to
get VCDs and DVDs of blockbuster films into the Chinese market almost immediately after the films are released theatrically in the
United States.”).
589
See Butterton, supra note 8, at 1105-06 (noting that the film import quota has “been a fertile ground for pirate practices”); Derek
Dessler, Comment, China’s Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving International Standards, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
181, 232 (1995) (“Commentators argue that . . . market access barriers facilitate intellectual property piracy and impede enforcement.”);
Frost, supra note 588, at 132 (“The United States claims that this limitation produces a vacuum effect which creates a large demand for
pirated films.”).
590
See 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 588, at 55 (noting that “consumers are often unaware that they are purchasing [intellectual
property right]-infringing goods”); Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 137 (noting that the piracy problem in
Shanghai “has reached such proportions that officials in Shanghai have found it necessary to take to the airwaves to inform citizens of
where they can shop without fear of purchasing fakes”).
591
As one commentator explained:
If the Chinese more fully relaxed or lifted barriers to market participation by foreign [intellectual property rights] owners,
those foreign owners could sell their own goods in China and thereby displace, at least to some extent, pirate products that
now have Chinese markets to themselves. Moreover, absent such barriers, some U.S. producers could both sell their
“authentic” products in the Chinese market, and also monitor, if not police, infringement themselves on an in-country basis.
Such market access adjustments would have application in a number of areas.
Butterton, supra note 8, at 1105.
592
James Shinn, The China Crunch; Three Crises Loom in the Next 30 Days, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at C1. But see Daniel C.K.
Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (2000) (“[T]here are real political and social costs
associated with any serious crackdown on a problem as massive as counterfeiting. Overcoming local protectionism will require the
expenditure of considerable political capital and divert limited resources from China’s myriad other pressing problems.”).
its architecture and structural resistance has made government regulation difficult. 593 It is
therefore understandable why the entertainment industry is very concerned about piracy on the
Internet.
Moreover, we should not ignore the effectiveness of authoritative governments in

controlling social problems, including copyright piracy. In the early 1990s, the Chinese
authorities—to the dismay of human rights advocates—enlisted the help of some of their
toughest law enforcers to clean up pirate factories. 594 To create a deterrent effect and to
demonstrate to the West their eagerness in eradicating piracy, the Chinese authorities also
imposed the death penalty and life imprisonment on infringers in severe cases.595
Indeed, commentators have expressed concerns over the deterioration of intellectual

property protection after China’s accession to the WTO.596 In the post-WTO environment,
China can no longer use traditional barriers and measures to protect its economy—for example,
restrictions on export privileges will be greatly reduced. As a result, pirates and counterfeiters
might trade more aggressively with markets that have “a strong appetite for low-priced
counterfeit goods,” such as Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.597 Thus, although the country
has fewer restrictions and barriers as a result of its entry to the WTO, intellectual property
protection in China might not necessarily improve.
4. Historical Practice
Unlike the first three factors, historical practice was rarely used to account for the cause
of extensive copyright piracy. Rather, it has been applied retroactively to explain why a country
failed to protect intellectual property in the past or why a country should be entitled to lower
intellectual property protection in the future. For example, developed countries, in particular the
United States, have used historical practice to explain why its past as a pirating nation should be
ignored.598 Likewise, less developed countries have used the same factor to explain why it is
unreasonable to expect drastic and immediate changes in their attitudes toward intellectual
property rights or to expect a sudden emergence of institutions that are needed to support and
nurture those attitudes. 599 In particular, these countries have used the historical practice
593
See Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, supra note 361, at 448.
594
See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 143.
595
See ALFORD, supra note 8, at 91 (stating that China has imposed death penalty on at least four individuals, life sentences on no
fewer than five others, and imprisonment on some 500 people for trademark violations); Tom Korski, China Sentences Three to Life in
Prison for CD Piracy in Harshest Sanction So Far, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Dec. 11, 1997).
596
For discussions of China’s entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001);
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD,
CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Yu, Ramifications of China’s Entry into the WTO, supra
note 315; Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 Colum. J. Asian L. (forthcoming 2003).
597
CHOW, supra note 317, at 254; YU, supra note 8, at 31.
598
Even though the United States’ historical indifference to foreign intellectual property rights does not necessarily justify China’s
abuse of intellectual property rights, “an appreciation of [the] nation’s own ‘sins’ would temper the moralism that infuses governmental
and industry rhetoric about Chinese infringement and inflames passions in both nations about the other’s intentions and integrity.”
Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 8, at 147.
599
Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 565, at 21; see Carole Ganz Brown & Francis W. Rushing,
Intellectual Property Rights in 1990s, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 1, 14 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole Ganz Brown eds., 1990) (“[I]ncreased protection is not to be
expected tomorrow, and the movement will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Strategies to advance protection should take long-
range approaches, say, a five to ten year time frame.”); Brauchli & Kahn, supra note 180, at 1 (“[Building a copyright system is] like
building a house. . . . You can have the house structure all set up, very beautiful. But then, you need electricity and water pipes. That
takes more time.” (quoting Li Changxu, head of China United Intellectual Property Investigation Center)); see also TRIPs Agreement,
argument to justify the need for extension of the transitional period. As they argue, these
transitional periods are important to less developed countries, because they will enable them to
attain the economic level needed to make copyright protection a cost-effective and sound
governmental policy.600
While it is true that civilization progresses and economy advances, copyright problems
do not diminish with the passage of time. Indeed, historical practice is of very limited relevance,
as new copyright problems emerge as society progresses and as new technologies are
developed.601 Consider the United States, for example. In their defense of the country’s past as
a pirating nation, commentators often point to the differences between the United States today
and what it was two centuries ago. According to these commentators, one should not hold the
country’s past against it, because times have changed and the country’s past is irrelevant. As
they explain, the country’s unfortunate past as a pirating nation was more a reflection of the
zeitgeist of that era, rather than a historical proof that piracy is a natural—and legitimate—course
of development for a less developed country.602 After all, it would be unfair and unappealing to
argue that the United States should stop complaining about slavery and human trafficking today
because of its prior acceptance of such an inhumane practice.
When the United States was a less developed country, countries did not offer copyright
protection to foreign authors and did not regard piracy of foreign works unfair or immoral.603
Indeed, “[s]ome countries . . . openly countenanced piracy as contributing to their educational
and social needs and as reducing the prices of books for their citizens.”604 Nevertheless, it is still
disturbing to find that the United States did not offer reciprocal protection to foreign authors
when others began to do so in the mid-nineteenth century. It is also troubling to find that the
United States did not participate in the international intellectual property regime until after the
Second World War.
Even for those who find the historical practice argument convincing, this argument has
been significantly weakened in light of recent developments concerning MP3 piracy in the
United States.605 As far as MP3 piracy is concerned, the United States is not that much different
from a less developed country or from the country itself two centuries ago. A recent study by the
Business Software Alliance indicated that the U.S. software industry had lost $1.96 billion in
United States alone in 2002, an amount slightly lower than the total retail software revenue lost
in China during the same period.606 The study also noted that pirated products constituted close
supra note 172, arts. 65-66, 33 I.L.M. at 1222 (providing a five-year transitional period for developing countries and an 11-year
transitional period for the least developed countries).
600
Consider for example Professor’s Endeshaw’s historical argument: “Historically, each of the advanced countries today was
determined to industrialize first before either ‘opening up’ to forces and interests that they might previously have dreaded and before
calling for a stronger international IP system.” ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES,
supra note 572, at 120.
601
See LITMAN, supra note 450, at 35-69; Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 548.
602
But see ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, supra note 572, at 120 (noting that
“[h]istorically, each of the advanced countries today was determined to industrialize first before either ‘opening up’ to forces and
interests that they might previously have dreaded and before calling for a stronger international IP system”).
603
604
605
Compare discussion supra Part I with discussion supra Part III.
606
INTERNATIONAL PLANNING & RESEARCH CORPORATION, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY: TRENDS
IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994-2002, at 9-10 (2003) [hereinafter BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY], available at
http://global.bsa.org/globalstudy/2003_GSPS.pdf; see also $22 Million of Alleged Counterfeit Microsoft Software Seized in Pennsylvania;
State Troopers, Following Leads About Stolen Laptops, Uncover Huge Worldwide Counterfeiting Operation, PR NEWSWIRE, June 12,
to a quarter of all computer software in use in the United States.607 While one understandably
might be skeptical of figures supplied by a self-interested industry, few people would deny that
there is a serious piracy problem on the Internet. Copyright piracy not only occurred in the past.
It is a significant problem today.
5. Type of Reprographic Technology
The copyright regime always lags behind the development of new technology, be it radio,
talking machines, television, cable television, satellite communications, or the Internet.608 Thus,
commentators sometimes attribute the piracy problem to the emergence of new technology and
call for the development of new paradigms, responses, and regulatory measures to address the
new technological development. Recent enactments include the DMCA, the EU Database
Directive,609 EU Information Society Directive,610 and the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties.611
As the U.S. copyright history informs us, copyright law always catches up with the
development of technology, especially if high stakes are involved. 612 As Professor Jessica
Litman pointed out:
the contours of [the dispute about intellectual property rights in the digital environment] don’t
look very different from the shape of very similar disputes that arose in the 1980s, when the
gods invented personal computers; or the 1970s, when they invented videocassette recorders;
or the 1960s, when they invented cable television; or the 1920s, when they invented
commercial broadcasting and talkies.613
Most of the time, the entrepreneurial developers of the new media would start “outside” the
copyright regime, as they “concentrate on getting market share first, and worry about profits—
and the rules for making them—later.”614 Thus, copyright law can stifle innovation, rather than
be influenced by new technology.615
A case in point is digital audio reproduction technology, which provides consumers with
an innovative technology that reproduces sound recordings with virtually perfect fidelity. In
light of the threat posed by the repeated home reproduction of sound recordings, the music
industry successfully lobbied Congress to enact the Audio Home Recordings Act of 1992.616 As
a result of this statute and the consumers’ uncertainty over the evolvement of audio reprographic
technology, copyright law successfully prevented a revolutionary change by digital audio
recording equipment and technology.
2000, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting on the investigation and discovery of a significant counterfeit
distribution operation in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania).
607
BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 606, at 7 (stating that 23% of all software in use in the United States are
pirated).
608
609
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996
O.J. (L 77) 20.
610
EU Information Society Directive, supra note 571.
611
WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996); WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec. 23, 1996).
612
613
Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 507, at 22.
614
Id. at 30.
615
Id. at 29-30 (“A variety of new media flourished and became remunerative when people invested in producing and distributing
them first, and sorted out how they were going to protect their intellectual property rights only after they had found their markets.”).
616
See discussion supra Part III.
In fact, if one looks back a few centuries ago, the first modern copyright law was
developed as a reaction to the emergence of a new reprographic technology, the printing press.617
Since the enactment of the first copyright statute in the United States in 1790, which protects
books, pamphlets, maps, and charts,618 copyright has been extended to different technologies,
including radio, talking machines, television, cable television, satellite communications, and
finally the Internet. While technology might explain the speed at which the piracy problem
grows, it says very little about the cause of extensive copyright piracy.
People sometimes assume that piracy would naturally occur whenever new technologies
emerge. This assumption is wrong. Piracy is the commercial infringement of copyrighted works
as prohibited under relevant copyright law. It depends on the interpretation of the copyright
statute. Although copyright law has recently been expanded to cover new technological medium,
there is no guarantee that the new technological medium will necessarily fall within the scope of
copyright protection. Until it does so, the reproduced version of the copyrighted work might not
constitute an actionable copy, and the reproduction of a copyrighted work in the new medium
might not be actionable.
In fact, there are strong historical precedents supporting this argument. A case in point is
White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 619 In White-Smith Publishing, the United States
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a player piano roll was a “copy” of the music
composition it represented. As the Court reasoned:
Various definitions [to the word “copy”] have been given by the experts called in the case.
The one which most commends itself to our judgment is perhaps as clear as can be made, and
defines a copy of a musical composition to be “a written or printed record of it in intelligible
notation.” It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a
tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the combination of musical
sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the author which is
heard. These musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical
sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is
generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the statutes under
consideration. A musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the mind
of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument. It is not susceptible of
being copied until it has been put in a form which other can see and read. The statute has not
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced,
however meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing of a
tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of the statute
to protect the composer.620
The Court therefore held that player piano rolls did not constitute “copies within the meaning of
the copyright act” and therefore did not qualify for copyright protection.621 Indeed, Congress
617
See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 39-40.
618
See supra discussion Part I (discussing the 1790 Act).
619
209 U.S. 1 (1908).
620
Id. at 17.
621
The Court nonetheless was concerned about the free-riding problem the decision might create:
It may be true that the use of these perforated rolls, in the absence of statutory protection, enables the manufacturers thereof to
enjoy the use of musical compositions for which they pay no value. But such considerations properly address themselves to
the legislative and not to the judicial branch of the Government.
Id. at 18.
had to “correct” the White-Smith Publishing Court’s interpretation by creating a special statutory
provision subjecting “mechanical” reproductions of musical works to a compulsory license.622
Similarly, the Court rejected the extension of the public performance right to cable
system operators. When television was first developed, people relied on television antennae to
pick up over-the-air signals. If the antennae were not strong enough, viewers would receive no
reception. 623 In the 1960s, Community Antennae Television (CATV) emerged by passing
signals on through wires to individual homes and began the era of cable television. Copyright
holders asserted that cable system operations were unauthorized public performance of creative
works. In a pair of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 624 and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,625 the Court ruled otherwise. The
Court held that cable system operators did not engage in the public performance of the
transmitted works. As the Court reasoned, a CATV system is similar to a “reception service”
“falls on the viewer’s side of the line. Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the
viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an
efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.”626 The Court therefore did not find copyright
infringement.
Copyright holders constantly claim that new technologies will destroy their market. In a
now famous quote from Jack Valenti, the motion picture industry lobbyist stated that the
videocassette recorder “is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston
Strangler is to the woman alone.” 627 By now, it is quite clear that Valenti is wrong;
videocassettes have transformed the motion picture industry, bringing to it new revenue and
business opportunities. In fact, commentators have noted other precedents:
In 17th century England, the emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death knell of
book stores; in the 20th century, photocopying was seen as the end of the publishing business,
and videotape the end of the movie business). Yet in each case, the new development
produced a new market far larger than the impact it had on the existing market. Lending
libraries gave inexpensive access to books that were too expensive to purchase, thereby
helping to make literacy widespread and vastly increasing the sale of books. Similarly, the
ability to photocopy makes the printed material in a library more valuable to consumers,
while videotapes have significantly increased viewing of movies. But the original market in
each case was also transformed, in some cases bringing a new cast of players and a new
power structure.628
6. Type of Copyright Sector
622
See Act of March 4, 1909, § 1(e), Ch. 320, 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
623
See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 423 (2002).
624
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
625
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
626
Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 399. As the Court explained:
It is true that a CATV system plays an “active” role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television
sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but the basic function the equipment serves is little
different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer. If an individual erected an antenna on
a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be “performing” the
programs he received on his television set. The result would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative
antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected and owned not
by its users but by an entrepreneur.
Id. at 399-400.
627
Adam Liptak, Is Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at B9.
628
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 78-79 (citations omitted).
Commentators sometimes differentiate the piracy problem based on the copyright sectors
in which the industries are involved. For example, some pointed out that extensive copyright
piracy on the Internet occurs primarily to sound recordings and audio-visual works, rather than
books.629 After all, in lack of user-friendly equipment and technology, many consumers are not
interested in reading books on the Internet. However, this argument ignores the varying living
standards around the world and the demand created by consumers. Textbook piracy remains a
key problem in Asia and Africa.
Even in the developed world, piracy in the print media remains a significant problem.630
A recent example concerns the latest novel in the Harry Potter series, which became number one
on the Amazon.com bestseller list even before the book appeared on the market. Shortly after
the book was released, pirated versions of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix appeared
on the Internet.631 Although most people consider electronic books difficult to read, they have
particular appeal for experienced file swappers, as the book files are smaller in size and therefore
faster to download than most music or movie files.
In fact, “[b]ooks and movies have begun to feel the effects. Electronic books are
appearing, with several Web sites selling full-length books in digital form, while others offer
reloadable book-sized portable display hardware.”632 As Professor Peter Menell pointed out:
[U]ltimately the publishing industry may be the most vulnerable content industry to
unauthorized reproduction and distribution because the content (text) will always be directly
perceptible (and hence subject to copying, even if through scanning or re-typing).
Furthermore, libraries have become interested in distributing eBooks through their websites. .
. . Whereas music and audiovisual content can be encrypted in such a way that the user
cannot see the content without authorization, the essence of books (the text) will always be
available to the extent that the books are sold in hard copy form. Therefore, would-be
copyists will be in a position to scan such content into digital form within hours of a book’s
release.633
Likewise, although movies were thus far relatively immune from widespread piracy
because of its large size and the long downloading time, the increase of bandwidth and the
emergence of more advanced compression technologies would soon make movie downloading as
commonplace as music downloading.634 Nonetheless, because of differences between the film
629
As a recent study by the National Research Council explained:
The problem . . . has hit music first for a variety of reasons. First, files containing high-fidelity music can be made small
enough that both storage and downloading are reasonable tasks. . . . Second, access to digitized music is abundant, and
demand for it is growing rapidly. . . . [Third,] music is popular with a demographic group (students in particular, young
people generally), many of whom have easy access to the required technology, the sophistication to use it, and an apparently
less than rigorous respect for the protections of copyright law. . . . Fourth, music can be enjoyed with the existing technology:
Good speakers are easily attached to a computer, producing near-CD quality sound, and a variety of portable players (e.g., the
Rio from Diamond Multimedia) are available that hold 30 minutes to an hour of music.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 77-78.
630
See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
631
See Amy Harmon, Harry Potter and the Internet Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at C1; Michael Pollitt, Like Music, Books
Have Now Fallen Prey to Internet Pirates Who Go to, INDEPENDENT (London), July 30, 2003, at 11.
632
633
Menell, supra note 333, at 129-30.
634
See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 95. As the report described:
Movies in digital form are currently saved from widespread illegal copying because of their large size, but this barrier is
likely to be overcome before too long. A number of sites have begun already to sell full-length movies in digital form, but at
upwards of 200 megabytes for a (compressed) movie, and 5 megabytes for even a trailer, the space requirements and
industry and the sound recording industry, the movie industry might be less vulnerable to
unauthorized distribution. 635 In fact, “digital technology may significantly improve the film
industry’s delivery and revenue models” by reducing the costs borne by consumers in renting
and purchasing movies.636
In sum, although we might be able to infer the extent and seriousness of the copyright
piracy problem by looking at the copyright sector, we will not be able to account for the cause of
the piracy problem. As the costs of creation vary with the types of work created, and the scale of
the piracy problem might differ with respect to the type of industries involved.637 It would take
less than a million dollars to record a major-label album,638 but millions or hundreds of millions
of dollars to make a motion picture.639
C. Bridging the Copyright Divide
To help bridge the copyright divide, this Section outlines four areas on which
policymakers—be they government leaders, intergovernmental agencies, or industry
executives—can focus their remedial efforts.
1. Educating Nonstakeholders
download times are still quite substantial. Others are exploring the possibility of Internet distribution of movies. Digital
movie piracy has also appeared; in 1999 pirated copies of “The Blair Witch Project,” “The Matrix,” and “American Pie” were
all available online. These copies are relatively low-quality, still sizable to download and store, and not easy to find (they are
generally traded in low-profile news groups and chat rooms). But the struggle over digital movies has clearly arrived and will
grow worse as storage capacity and transmission speeds increase.
Id. (footnote omitted).
635
Menell, supra note 333, at 123. As Professor Menell explained:
Thus far, the time to download feature films as well as the generally poor quality of the first wave of online copies distributed
has not significantly affected the market for film products. Relatively few consumers have the bandwidth, storage capacity,
expertise, and patience to acquire film content in this way. In fact, online availability of poor quality versions may help to
promote consumer interest. Furthermore, even as bandwidth and memory storage expand, the fact that consumers do not tend
to view films repeatedly in the way that they listen to music suggests that archiving will not play the same role in film as it
does in music.
Most importantly, the film industry can still control the important first waves of distribution without significant leakage
in unauthorized channels. They continue to hold tight controls over theatrical release, pay-per-view, and premium channel
distribution. Such versioning strategies will continue to work into the digital future. Moreover, the video market is already
built upon an encrypted format, which will hinder, although not entirely defeat, unauthorized distribution of films.
Furthermore, competitive pricing of DVDs and the potential for directors’ cuts (with previously unreleased scenes), behind-
the-scenes footage, game and merchandising tie-ins, and other added features will keep many consumers within the legitimate
market for content. As bandwidth and memory capacity expand and new devices, such as DVD burners, become more widely
diffused, the film industry will experience somewhat greater competition for the video market as well as marginal effects on
what they can charge for theatrical release, but the multi-faceted nature of its business model will be able to adapt reasonably
effectively.
Id. at 123-25.
636
Id. at 125.
637
See Breyer, supra note 330, at 351 (“One must know facts about a particular industry before one can accurately weigh the various
costs and benefits associated with copyright protection.”); Ku, supra note 331, at 305 (“[T]he costs associated with creation vary
depending upon the kind of work, [and] copyright may play a different role with respect to music than it does with motion pictures or
other works.”).
638
“By one estimate, the typical major-label artist spends $100,000 to $200,000 on studios, musicians, and other production costs to
record an album.” Ku, supra note 331, at 306 (citing Jon Healey, Breaking Down the Cost of Compact Discs ¶ 13, Silicon Valley.com
(Sept. 2, 2000), at http://www0.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/indepth/docs/cd09032000.htm).
639
“According to the MPAA, the average major studio film in 1999 cost $52 million to produce.” Id. (citing Jack Valenti, Copyright
& Creativity—The Jewel in America’s Trade Crown: A Call to the Congress to Protect and Preserve the Fastest Growing Economic
Asset of the United States ¶ 2, available at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2001/01_01_22b.htm (Jan. 22, 2001)). Indeed, blockbuster movies
might cause billions of dollars. For example, Pearl Harbor costs $135 million while the production costs of the Lord of the Rings trilogy
total $270 million. Ian Johns, Does My Budget Look Big in This?, TIMES (London), May 28, 2001.
Policymakers must educate the nonstakeholders about the copyright system. They need
to make the nonstakeholders understand what copyright is, how it is protected, and why they
need to protect such property. Policymakers also need to show the nonstakeholders the benefits
of copyright protection—how such protection can help them and how the lack thereof can hurt
them.
One might still remember the controversial “just say yes” to licensing campaign outlined
in the Information Infrastructure Task Force White Paper released by the Clinton
administration.640 As the White Paper explained:
Certain core concepts should be introduced at the elementary school level—at least during
initial instructions on computers or the Internet, but perhaps even before such instruction. For
example, the concepts of property and ownership are easily explained to children because
they can relate to the underlying notions of property—what is “mine” versus what is “not
mine,” just as they do for a jacket, a ball, or a pencil.641
Although commentators severely criticized this campaign,642 the White Paper underscored the
need and importance of education in the intellectual property arena. This need was recently
reemphasized by a study conducted by the National Research Council.643 As the study stated:
“A better understanding of the basic principles of copyright law would lead to greater respect for
this law and greater willingness to abide by it, as well as produce a more informed public better
able to engage in discussions about intellectual property and public policy.”644
In recent years, the copyright industries have been very active in educating the
consuming public. For example, the Business Software Alliance “has an ongoing campaign that
includes spot radio announcements, aimed primarily at software users in institutional
environments (in both the public and private sector).”645 The recording industry set up “Byte
Me” to stem the distribution of illegal copies of popular music in MP3 format.646 In addition,
“[e]ntertainment groups have sent thousands of letters to colleges and corporations, alerting them
to infringements,” and celebrities like Dixie Chicks and Missy Elliott appear on MTV and BET
to relay artists’ concerns. 647 Likewise, the FA©E Initiative of the Copyright Society of the
U.S.A. brings together copyright holders, copyright lawyers, and their representatives to educate
primary and secondary school students across the country about copyrights.648 Even Madonna
640
See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 507, at 208.
641
Id. at 205. Some commentators doubted about the appropriateness of this extensive campaign. As they explained:
One concern is that a federal government requirement for copyright education in schools would raise the issues of
whether federal funds should be allocated for such a purpose and whether the federal government should encourage
specific content to be included in curricula (which is traditionally determined at the local level). Having the federal
government pay for the campaign would raise concerns, because it would likely be seen as a subsidy of the
information industries. Why should taxpayers grant such a subsidy? Other government-funded public education
campaigns are motivated by issues of public health and safety, which are clearly not at issue here.
642
See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 299 (1996) (noting that the copyright awareness section
in the White Paper “is an excellent example of a good idea gone wrong”); Litman, Copyright Noncompliance, supra note 510 (criticizing
the White Paper).
643
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332.
644
Id. at 17.
645
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 308 n.3.
646
Id.
647
Entertainment Industry Widens War, USA Today, Feb. 13, 2003, at 9D.
648
FA©E stands for “Friends of Active Copyright Education.” The Web site of the FA©E Initiative is available at http://www.face-
copyright.org/. Professor David Lange believe it is “fundamentally wrong to insist that children internalize the proprietary and moral
admonished her fans “What the f___ do you think you’re doing?” when they tried to download
an illegal copy of her single.649
As the National Research Council stated in its recent study:
[T]o be effective, a program of copyright education must clearly communicate that the law is,
in its intent and spirit, attempting a fundamentally fair and equitable balancing of interests.
The program should emphasize the core goal of IP law, namely, the improvement of society
through the advancement of knowledge; should describe the difficult balance between control
and dissemination; and should make clear that, in the long term, all intellectual property
becomes a part of the shared intellectual heritage, available to everyone. Such a program
would describe both the rights granted exclusively to creators and the limits on those rights.
The program should include an introduction to fair use and other limitations on copyright law,
and their role in accomplishing the larger purpose of the law.650
Nonetheless, it is important not to oversimplify the copyright message. After all, these
“[o]versimplified messages . . . will obscure the genuine and legitimate debate about how far
copyright law extends.” 651 The educational program also must acknowledge the existing
difference between “the law as it appears on the books and the law as it is actually carried
out.” 652 To some extent, copyright law is similar to the laws concerning speed limits and
jaywalking. The law that appears on the books is very different from the law that is actually
carried out.
Education is very important, because “[r]espect for copyrights is not an inherent or

natural part of the cultural infrastructure,” but something that is acquired through a learning
process.653 By creating social and peer pressure, education also would help persuade others
away from conducting infringing activities.654 Indeed, education is essential in less developed
countries, especially those in lack of a copyright tradition, a sophisticated legal system, and
respect for the rule of law. Unfortunately, in those countries, neither the governments of
industrialized countries nor multinational corporations were interested in funding and organizing
these awareness and educational campaigns.655 Their lack of efforts may be attributable to two
values of the copyright system.” David Lange, The Public Domain: Reimagining The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 463,
471 (2003). As Professor Lange explained:
It is wrong to challenge school children with responsibility for copyright. Wrong for copyright to intrude into private lives.
Wrong to measure creativity by the standards of copyright. Wrong to lay impediments (moral, intellectual, legal) before
exercises of the imagination, whether great or small. Wrong, in short, to rob us of this vital aspect of our citizenship: the right
to think as we please and to speak as we think.
We must learn to reimagine the public domain. We must learn to ask questions from within the province of that new
status, a status like citizenship, measured by creativity and the imagination, and invoked by an exercise of either.
Id. at 482-83.
649
Grossman, It’s All Free!, supra note 447.
650
651
Id. at 309.
652
Id. at 305.
653
Bartow, supra note 499, at 23; see also Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malum in se and Malum
Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (suggesting that copyright law might not have a normative role). As Professor
Halpern elaborated:
Individual determinations of moral and ethical conduct require a moral and ethical context. The problem for intellectual
property law in general, and the law of copyright in particular, is the lack of such an underlying clear context. The nature of
American copyright law makes it difficult, if not impossible to find or to construct an unambiguous moral compass.
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 572 (2001).
654
655
reasons.656 First, the political system tends to reward short-term results, rather than long-term
results. Thus, policymakers, including CEOs of major corporations, are reluctant to focus on
long-term policies such as providing education at the grassroots level. Second, education is a
public good. Most governments and companies tend to free ride on each other’s efforts without
incurring any substantial investment.
2. Creating Stakeholders
Policymakers need to help the nonstakeholders develop a stake in the system and
understand how they can protect their products and receive royalties. For example, they need to
help the nonstakeholders develop a local pharmaceutical industry, or a record industry. By doing
so, they will be able to transform the nonstakeholders into stakeholders or potential stakeholders.
So far, companies in less developed countries are reluctant to protect intellectual property
rights of their foreign joint venture partners, because they have limited understanding of
intellectual property and are suspicious of the intentions behind what their foreign partners are
attempting to do. Once they learn more about intellectual property and understand their stakes
within the copyright system, they will change their perception and position.
A case in point is a U.S.-China joint venture, whose Chinese partner was unwilling to
allocate a portion of the joint venture profits to the foreign partner for design fees. 657 The
reaction of the Chinese partner was natural and understandable; it understood neither intellectual
property protection nor the intentions behind the foreign partner’s action. However, once the
foreign partner explained to the Chinese manufacturer that it could charge separately for its
design work and helped the manufacturer determine the cost of its own design processes, the
Chinese partner became receptive to the idea of allocating profits for intellectual property. It
even actively lobbied the local regulators for the right to design fees.
So far, the entertainment industry has a difficult time explaining why the general public
has a stake in the copyright system. True, the industry has repeatedly extolled the benefits of
strong copyright protection and how such protection can induce artists to create music, movies
and other projects that entertain the general public. However, the industry’s rhetoric was lost on
most consumers. Fortunately, the industry has begun to adopt other strategies to attract
consumers. For example, some software manufacturers offer post-sale benefits that are not
available to purchasers of counterfeit goods, such as warranty service, replacement part
guarantees, free upgrades, and contests or giveaways.658 Some music publishers also include
special photos, files, and interviews on their Web sites that are made only accessible to
purchasers of legitimate CDs.
656
657
See John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in
China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 409, 420 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
658
As one commentator recounted:
One joint venture publishing company which publishes popular comics chose to compete directly against their pirates.
Beyond wrapping the magazine in hard-to-reproduce plastic, the company has continuously upgraded the quality of the
comic’s graphics and paper relative to pirate editions, and included inexpensive, educational prizes with each issue. These
gambits have worked. Despite being significantly more expensive than the pirated version, this popular comic book has seen
increasing subscriptions and readership, and the company is planning to expand its operations.
Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 657, at 432; see also Doris Estelle Long, China’s IP Reforms Show Little Success, IP WORLDWIDE,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 6 (arguing that post-sale benefits would create incentives for the Chinese to buy legitimate products).
A good illustration of this strategy is the change of Warner Brothers’ changing attitudes
toward Harry Potter fan sites. A while ago, Warner Brothers threatened to sue a 15-year old
English schoolgirl over her Web site and domain name, www.harrypotterguide.co.uk. The
studio eventually backed down, after she organized a boycott of Potter merchandise in protest
through another Web site, potterwar.org.uk.659 Even today, one can visit the Potter War Web site
to see the remnant of this infamous war. Since the Potter War, Warner Brothers has changed its
position toward fan sites. Instead of threatening legal action to take over or shut down these web
sites, it has created a Webmaster Community page in its official Web site, thus allowing
webmasters to enroll their unofficial web sites and to download official banners, shields, and
seals.660 It has even attempted to entice younger fans by offering to link a selected number of
unofficial Web sites to its official Web page.661
Copyright holders sometimes assume that no one would voluntarily choose to pay for
copyrighted content if given the opportunity to free ride on the content. Thus, “most
consumers . . . will infringe copyrights at every opportunity unless they are dissuaded from doing
so by the fear of punishment.”662 Although it is understandable why copyright holders would
adopt this position, their perception is far from the reality. Indeed, anybody who has tried to
download music from pirated Web sites know how time-consuming and frustrating it could be to
locate what one wants in those Web sites.663 Just think about the typos you have to make to find
music you like, the “Host not responding” messages, and the slow connection speeds between
the host and your computer!
In April 2003, Apple Computer unveiled a new online music service, the iTunes Music
Store, offering low-priced music downloads from the five major record companies. 664
Customers seem to be happy about the service, and initial sales appear encouraging.665 As one
customer praised the service, “It’s solved all my problems. It’s so fast, and there’s no guilt, no
recriminations.”666 Notwithstanding the service’s early popularity, it remains interesting to see
how the service will develop. Unless record companies are willing to provide content, the Apple
659
The protest Web site is available at http: http://www.potterwar.org.uk/. See also The Potterwar Campaign, THE BRINGERS:
FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHTS OF FANS ONLINE, at http://web.ukonline.co.uk/bringers/temp/c-potter.html (n.d.).
660
See James Norman, Copyright Issues Become Kids’ Stuff, AGE (Melbourne), May 7, 2002, at 3.
661
See id.
662
Bartow, supra note 499, at 62.
663
As a recent study by the National Research Council described:
The [noncommercial] service is terrible and the experience can be extraordinarily frustrating. Search engines can assist in
finding songs by title, performer, and so on, but you have to know how to look: Can’t find what you’re looking for when you
type in “Neil Young”? Try “Niel Young.” In any collection, quality control is a problem; when the data are entered by
thousands of individual amateurs, the problem is worse.
When the links are found, the next question is, How long are you willing to keep trying, when receiving responses such
as “Host not responding,” “Could not login to FTP server; too many users—please try again later,” and “Unable to find the
directory or file; check the name and try again”? The computers containing the files are often personal machines that are both
unreliable and overloaded.
Even once connected, the speedy download times cited earlier are ideals that assume that both the computer on the other
end and its connection to the Internet are up to the task. The real-world experience is often not so good: Creating a Web site
with a few music files is easy; providing good service on a site with hundreds or thousands of songs is not: The hardware and
software requirements are considerably more complex.
664
Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at C2 (reporting that Apple
Computer plans to offer individual songs for $0.99 each and most albums for $9.99 each).
665
Amy Harmon, In Fight over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Carrot, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 1, at 1 (reporting that “[i]n
just over a month, the [Apple Music] service has sold more than 3 million tracks, far exceeding the record industry’s expectations”).
666
Id.
service eventually might end up with the same fate as other subscription-based services like
Rhapsody and PressPlay, which has now become part of the new Napster service.
3. Strengthening Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms
It is important for policymakers to help develop intellectual property laws and strengthen
enforcement mechanisms. Commentators have discussed at length the importance of intellectual
property laws and enforcement mechanisms. In fact, two of the main goals of the TRIPs
Agreement are to transform the international trading system from a coercion-based environment
to a rule-based system 667 and to institute a mechanism through which countries can resolve
international trade disputes before seeking retaliation.668
Today, most countries have intellectual property laws that comply with international
standards. However, very few of these countries provide strong enforcement of intellectual
property laws. Thus, policymakers need to work with their counterparts in these countries to
strengthen intellectual property laws and develop effective enforcement mechanisms. While the
U.S. government has used coercive tactics in the past to induce—and perhaps compel—foreign
countries to change their laws in the American image, past experience suggests that such changes
667
As Professors Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld described:
[One of the major breakthroughs in the Uruguay Round] was agreement on a strict and binding system of dispute settlement
and enforcement. Under the earlier GATT dispute settlement mechanisms, parties to disputes could frustrate the system both
at the beginning and at the end. In contrast, the new Understanding on Dispute Settlement, to which all members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) are required to belong, precludes objection by a potential defendant to initiation of a case beyond a
short delay, and precludes veto of a decision made by a panel, or, if that decision is appealed, by the Appellate Body. There is
also a complex system of enforcement, complete with fairly short deadlines and provision for retaliation, in case a member
state does not comply with a decision.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement
Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 276-77 (1997); see also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51,
76-78 (discussing how an adjudicative system would better promote compliance with GATT rules than would a negotiation/consensus
system). Professor John Jackson argued that the rule-based system is particularly important for the governance of international economic
affairs:
Economic affairs tend (at least in peace time) to affect more citizens directly than may political and
military affairs. Particularly as the world becomes more economically interdependent, more and more private
citizens find their jobs, their businesses, and their quality of life affected if not controlled by forces from outside
their country’s boundaries. Thus they are more affected by the economic policy pursued by their own country on
their behalf. In addition, the relationships become increasingly complex—to the point of being incomprehensible to
even the brilliant human mind. As a result, citizens assert themselves, at least within a democracy, and require their
representatives and government officials to respond to their needs and their perceived complaints. The result of this
is increasing citizen participation, and more parliamentary or congressional participation in the processes of
international economic policy, thus restricting the degree of power and discretion which the executive possess.
This makes international negotiations and bargaining increasingly difficult. However, if citizens are
going to make their demands heard and influential, a “power-oriented” negotiation process (often requiring secrecy,
and executive discretion so as to be able to formulate and implement the necessary compromises) becomes more
difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, the only appropriate way to turn seems to be toward a rule-oriented
system, whereby the various citizens, parliaments, executives and international organizations will all have their
inputs, arriving tortuously to a rule—which, however when established will enable business and other decentralized
decision makers to rely upon the stability and predictability of governmental activity in relation to the rule.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 111 (2d ed. 1997).
668
But see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
364 (1993) (“[I]f the major GATT countries are not ready to change their behavior, these stronger demands will only produce more
visible and dramatic legal failures. And if that were to happen, the credibility of GATT legal obligations would almost certainly
plunge.”).
would not be complete and sustainable until these countries consider themselves stakeholders or
potential stakeholders in the international intellectual property system.669
Moreover, digital rights management tools could be employed to help promote

enforcement of intellectual property laws. When the Internet was first developed, commentators
have discussed about how the new environment allowed for the creation of a “celestial
jukebox,”670 which Professor Paul Goldstein defined as “a technology-packed satellite orbiting
thousands of miles above Earth, awaiting subscriber’s order—like a nickel in the old jukebox,
and the punch of a button-to connect him to any number of selections from a vast storehouse via
a home or officer receiver.” Although this jukebox never materialized in the form commentators
envisioned and the Internet has made enforcement difficult at times, new communications
technologies provide effective ways for copyright holders to monitor uses, track users, enforce
rights, and collect royalties.
4. Developing Honest Alternatives
Policymakers, in particular those in the copyright industries, should help develop honest
alternatives if products are needed, yet unaffordable, by the local people. As Gene Hoffman, the
CEO of Emusic, Inc. said: “We think the best way to stop piracy is to make music so cheap it
isn’t worth copying.”671 Indeed, it would be hard to imagine why a foreign national who earns
fifty dollars a month would spend half of his or her monthly salary to buy a single book.672 It is
also disturbing to find that American software is more expensive abroad—and often in less
developed countries—than it is in the United States.673
Fortunately, many companies already understand this problem and have used bargain
pricing to fight piracy.674 For example, to make their products affordable, some movie studios
have released audiovisual products dubbed in the local language or with added foreign-language
subtitles. 675 On the one hand, these bargain products provide an affordable alternative that
accommodates local needs. On the other hand, by dubbing the original products in the local
language or including subtitles, the studios successfully make the discounted products from
entering the country as parallel imports by making the products unappealing to consumers in the
669
See SELL, supra note 553, at 13 (noting the sharp distinction between overt coercion and persuasion in the American foreign
intellectual property and antitrust policies); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 207-11; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives, supra note 8, at 71-72.
670
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 199.
671
672
See Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter, supra note 565, at 13 (emphasizing how unlikely a Chinese person
“earning fifty dollars a month would be to fork out more than a month’s salary to buy even such an outstanding work as Melville
Nimmer and Paul Geller’s treatise on worldwide copyright”); see also RYAN, supra note 551, at 80 (“Chinese officials defended the
book piracy by claiming that people are too poor to pay for Western books, ‘yet we must obtain this knowledge that we can develop our
economy.’”).
673
KENNETH HO, A STUDY IN THE PROBLEM OF SOFTWARE PIRACY IN HONG KONG AND CHINA ¶ 2.6 (1995) (last visited Feb. 7,
2000), available at http://info.gov.hk/ipd/eng/information/studyaids/piracy_hk_china.htm (noting that legitimate copies of software are
20% more expensive in Hong Kong than they are in the United States).
674
See RYAN, supra note 551, at 81; see also Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 657, at 433 (asserting that one approach to stop piracy
is to offer the affected people a legitimate way to earn a living).
675
Don Goves, Warner Bros., MGM Dips into China Vid Market, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1 (stating that Warner Bros. and
MGM have entered a licensing deal with a Chinese government-owned conglomerate to release low-priced video products dubbed in
Mandarin).
English-speaking world. This strategy therefore successfully prevents the bargain products from
entering the country as parallel imports.676
In theory, if policymakers focus on these four areas, they can bridge the copyright divide.
In reality, however, it is not easy to transform the nonstakeholders into stakeholders or potential
stakeholders. Even if policymakers were able to devise a comprehensive strategy, the process
might be further complicated by the existence of the diverse interests of the various stakeholders.
As commentators noted:
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from authors and
publishers, to consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and viewing public), to libraries and
educational institutions, to governmental and standards bodies. Each of the stakeholders has
a variety of concerns . . . that are at times aligned with those of other stakeholders, and at
other times opposed. An individual stakeholder may also play multiple roles with various
concerns. At different times, a single individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher,
or shareholder in publishing or entertainment companies; a member of an editorial board; or
an officer of a scholarly society that relies on publishing for revenue. The dominant concern
will depend on the part played at the moment.677
In today’s political reality, the United States likely will run into a chicken-and-egg
problem. As the U.S. copyright history has taught us, the copyright industries always actively
lobby for legislation that helps protect their economic interests. Because they are eager to
maximize profits for their shareholders, they unlikely will lobby for a regime that protects the
nonstakeholders. However, as Professor Jessica Litman pointed out, unless the nonstakeholders
have power to lobby for legislation that suits their needs, they would have a very difficult time
getting the legislation they want.678 In the end, the nonstakeholders will not become stakeholders
or potential stakeholders, and they will have no incentives whatsoever to support stronger
copyright protection. Unless U.S. policymakers are able to change the way copyright laws are
made and ensure that the lawmaking process consider the interests of the nonstakeholders just as
they would consider the interests of the stakeholders, the United States likely will face a vicious
cycle.
Ironically, this chicken-and-egg problem will be absent from, or largely reduced in, a
command economy, notwithstanding our general aversion toward authoritarian rule and the
general belief that copyright piracy flourishes in authoritarian societies. 679 In a command
676
For discussion of gray-market goods, see generally Margreth Barrett, The United States’ Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports
of Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911 (2000); Carl Baudenbacher, Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a Globalized World—
Recent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the United States, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 645 (1999);
Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 373
(1994); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1999); Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State
Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789 (2001); Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray
Market Equivalents: Should Product Differences Result in the Barring of Unauthorized Goods from the U.S. Markets?, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1029 (1990).
677
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 51. As the study elaborated:
[Stakeholders include] the computer owner (i.e., music consumer), computer manufacturers (of both hardware and software),
music publishers, and performers. Consumers have expectations about the ability to share and the ongoing use of content,
publishers are concerned about the overall market, and performers are concerned about their audience and royalties. Getting
significant content protection machinery in place and widely distributed would require a concerted and coordinated effort, yet
each of the players has its own goals and aims that may not necessarily align.
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
678
See generally LITMAN, supra note 450.
679
See discussion Part IV.A.3.
economy, the government can decide the type of economic policy it desires, the type of resources
it wants to allocate, or even whether the government wants to use copyright piracy as a
competitive strategy. Indeed, many industry executives were amazed by the efficiency the
Chinese authorities showed when they closed down pirate factories. How happy the recording
industry would be if copyright owners could close down MP3.com, Napster, and KaZaA without
long and arduous legal battles! Notwithstanding these differences, command economy exists
more in name than in practice today. Even China, one of the very few remaining Communist
countries in the world has recently joined the WTO and is making transition from a command
economy to a market economy.680
V. THE LIMITS OF COERCION
The above “action plan” suggests four different areas on which policymakers should
focus their remedial efforts. So far, none of them touch on the international harmonization
process and the coercive efforts made by copyright holders.
As the world becomes increasingly globalized, harmonization is badly needed to provide

stability, certainty, and efficiency. In the past decade, the international community, in particular
the European Union and the United States, has devoted substantial efforts to harmonizing its
intellectual property laws. 681 Unfortunately for many countries, especially those in the less
developed world, harmonization efforts have led to the development of one-size-fits-all
templates that ignore local needs and variations.682
Even worse, policymakers who are driving the harmonization process at times have lost
sight of the public interest and other important social goals. By ignoring the needs of less
developed countries, they enlarged the gap between developed and less developed countries683
and created tension and conflict within the international community. 684 The harmonization
process also took away possibilities for legal experimentation and innovation by fostering
uniformity and reducing interjurisdictional competition.685
When developing countries signed on to the WTO Agreements a decade ago, they were
divided and unclear as to what they wanted. Some of the issues involved in the Agreements,
such as intellectual property rights, were relatively new, and arguably of low priority, to these
countries. These days, however, less developed countries have become more vigilant, organized,
and sophisticated. Led by such heavyweights as Brazil, China, and India, these countries have a
better sense of what they want.686 They now understand the importance of the WTO bargains
and are willing to take a more aggressive collective stance.
680
See generally sources cited supra note 596.
681
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 172.
682
See Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global Elites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1
(2002).
683
See Peter K. Yu, Dis-networking Rules in the Networked World, STS NEXUS, Spring 2003, at 6 (Supp.).
684
See Peter K. Yu, How the International Intellectual Property System, Meant to Create Global Harmony, Has Created Conflict
Instead, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021114_yu.html (Nov. 14, 2002).
685
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 707-09 (2002).
686
See Sue Kirchhoff & James Cox, WTO Talks Break Down, Threatening Future Pact, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1B; Chris
Kraul, Split Derails WTO Talks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1.
The leading example of international harmonization effort in the intellectual property
field is the TRIPs Agreement. As commentators pointed out, the TRIPs Agreement was not
designed only to correct the international balance of trade or to lower customs trade barriers, but
to “remake international copyright law in the image of Western copyright law.”687 Thus, many
have considered the TRIPs Agreement “coercive” and “imperialistic.”688
People sometimes assume coercion is needed to induce compliance. After all, pirates are
business people who are motivated by profits and who monitor the market for business
opportunities. 689 In mathematical terms, “the total cost of the crime includes the cost of
producing and distributing the fakes and the cost of paying penalties, weighed against the
embarrassment of being caught, the probability of being convicted, and the severity or
inconvenience of any non-monetary penalties that are likely to be imposed.”690 Thus, coercion is
needed to dissuade pirates from unauthorized copying.
However, coercion is of limited use, as it neither transforms social norms nor engenders
respect for copyrights. 691 As Confucius, the Chinese philosopher, explained in the Analects
millennia ago: “Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and
they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among
them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord.”692
Consider, for example, the file-swapping community:
When 30 million people exchange music files over the Internet, federal judges can rule that
the file trading infringes copyrights and they can enjoin online services and technologies that
facilitate the file trading. What these jurists cannot accomplish, however, is to make those 30
million people “obey” the copyright laws, at least not as a matter of collective conscience.
Even more problematically, neither Congress nor the courts can seem to articulate in a
meaningful way what it means for an individual consumer to respect copyrights. There is a
growing disjuncture between the Copyright Act, copyright case law and the ways individuals
687
Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 238, at 614; see also Surendra J. Patel, Can the Intellectual Property Rights System Serve
the Interests of Indigenous Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 305, 316 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996) (arguing that TRIPs “universalize[s] the U.S. system of intellectual
property rights”).
688
See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 535, at 580.
689
Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 575, at 17; see also Bartow, supra note 499, at 62 (noting that “[l]arge-scale content owners seem
to hold the view that most consumers . . . will infringe copyrights at every opportunity unless they are dissuaded from doing so by the
fear of punishment”); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1577, 1591 (2000):
Insofar as the bad man obeys the law, he does so for instrumental reasons. Thus the bad man treats law as “external” in the
sense of being outside of his own values. Economic models of law typically accept the “bad man” approach and add an
element to it: rationality. A bad man who is rational decides whether or not to obey the law by calculating his own benefits
and costs, including the risk of punishment. The rational bad man breaks the law whenever the gain to him exceeds the risk of
punishment. Law and economics scholars typically make the rational bad man into the decisionmaker in their models. For the
bad man, law is a constraint and not a guide.
690
Id.
691
See Bartow, supra note 499, at 61-63; see also DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 332, at 59-60 (noting that legal solutions “should
take account of psychology and sociology; they must ultimately be viewed as fair and pragmatic by the majority of citizens”).
692
THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS bk. II, ¶ 3 (Arthur Waley trans., Vintage 1989) (footnote omitted); see also ALBERT EINSTEIN,
THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 206 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2000), quoted in Bartow, supra note 499, at 56 n.138 (“A man’s ethical
behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary. Man would
indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death.”); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives, supra note 8, at 32-34 (discussing the Chinese concept of li and fa).
(in their consumptive capacities) have traditionally used, and would prefer to continue to use,
copyrighted content.693
Even worse, “[h]eavy-handed rhetoric and enforcement practices bred less respect for the law,
not more, and left people feeling justified in flouting the law.”694
Nevertheless, coercion is sometimes needed for two reasons. First, coercion might be
needed to alleviate the influence of those individual factors that militate against intellectual
property law reforms. Consider, for example, the coercive U.S. foreign intellectual property
policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This coercive policy provided the needed foreign
pushes to strengthen intellectual property protection in China. For example, the 1992 MOU and
1995 Agreement were instrumental in establishing a new intellectual property regime in China
and the institutional infrastructure needed to protect and enforce rights created under that
regime.695 The trade threats and coercive tactics also increased the awareness of intellectual
property rights among the Chinese people, in particular government officials.696 In addition, the
U.S. tactics put intellectual property at the forefront of the U.S.-China bilateral trade agenda,
thus attracting interests of Chinese leaders in implementing legal reforms in the area697 while
providing the reformist leaders with the needed push that helps reduce resistance from their
conservative counterparts.698
Second, coercion is needed to prevent the development of, or even dismantle, an

entrenched pirate industry. Once entrenched, that pirate industry will lobby the local
government actively against stronger copyright protection even if such protection would be in
the country’s interest. 699 For example, in 1987, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond’s
administration was ousted in a no-confidence vote after it attempted to strengthen the country’s
693
Bartow, supra note 499, at 15-16.
694
695
See YU, supra note 8, at 15.
696
697
See Yu, Privacy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 8, at 24-28 (discussing the skepticism of the Chinese people about
intellectual property rights).
698
See Michael E. DeGolyer, Western Exposure, China Orientation: The Effects of Foreign Ties and Experience on Hong Kong, in
THE OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998 SUMMITS: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
SECURITY, TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 299, 300 (Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999) (“[Economic integration would]
help the reformers tilt the internal Chinese debate in directions that would minimize, if not avoid, future economic conflicts. It would
encourage and perhaps accelerate the inevitable transformation of China’s political regime.” (internal quotations omitted)); David E.
Sanger, Playing the Trade Card, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1 (reporting that the Clinton administration considers the WTO as a tool
to foster political change in China); see also MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41 (1999) (“[A]n international institution such as the WTO can help bolster China’s reform leadership
against powerful hard-liners. International institutions can tie the hands of leaders in ways that the ineffectual bilateral relationship is not
able to do so.”); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 196 (arguing that greater economic integration will result in stronger
intellectual property protection). But see James Mann, Our China Illusions, AM. PROSPECT, June 5, 2000, at 22 (“‘[H]elping the
reformers’ is a poor basis for American policy. It is too risky. It plays into (and, indeed, accentuates) China’s internal political
tensions.”).
699
Kitch, supra note 541, at 178. As Professor Kitch explained:
[A] country that has not fully participated in the international system creates incentives among its own citizens to engage in
activities that depend upon their ability to ignore patent rights. If patent protection is weak or non-existent, industries will
develop that rely for their existence on their ability to ignore the international patent system. Once these industries have
developed, they have an interest in resisting any change in the rules. Although it may be in the overall, long run interest of the
country to participate in both form and substance in the international patent system, the adversely affected industries will have
incentives to expend their political capital to keep that from happening. Thus even if full participation is as a theoretical
matter the optimum strategy in the long run, once a country departs from that strategy it may find that internal political forces
block a return to the optimum. Outsiders can play a constructive role by insisting that the issues be addressed within a larger
and principled framework.
Id.
copyright laws, which arguably would destroy a burgeoning pirate industry.700 After all, it is
logical for stakeholders to protect themselves against disenfranchisement.
Notwithstanding these benefits, international efforts would be of limited use once the
reform barriers are removed or the pirate industry substantially undermined. In the case of China,
most of the things that could be accomplished through a coercive bilateral policy have already
been achieved. A continuation of a coercive foreign intellectual property policy therefore would
be ineffective and futile.701 It is therefore not surprising that the U.S. coercive policy had led to a
now-famous “cycle of futility”:
The United States begins by threatening China with trade sanctions. In response, China
retaliates with countersanctions of a similar amount. After several months of bickering and
posturing, both countries come to an eleventh-hour compromise by signing a new intellectual
property agreement. While intellectual property protection improves during the first few
months immediately after the signing of the agreement, the piracy problem revives once
international attention is diverted and the foreign push dissipates. Within a short period of
time, American businesses again complain to the U.S. government, and the cycle repeats
itself.702
Even worse, the U.S. coercive policy would jeopardize the United States’ longstanding
interests in other areas such as international trade and human rights.703 Indeed, the United States
would be better off saving its hard-earned political capital for other difficult cross-border issues,
such as terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, illegal arms sales, environmental degradation, drug
trafficking, refugees, illegal immigration, and bribery and corruption.
To some extent, the recording industry is making exactly the same mistake today as the
Clinton administration in the mid-1990s. The industry fails to understand the limits of coercion.
To be fair, legal action is needed to protect the industry against egregious offenders, who would
not feel guilty about what they have done even if they know what they are doing is illegal.
However, an overuse of heavy-handed tactics and aggressive lawsuits will eventually backfire on
the industry.
Instead of bringing file swappers into the fold, the recording industry has now
antagonized its customers by fighting battles everywhere—against legal scholars, college
researchers, universities, students, cryptographers, technology developers, civil libertarians,
hackers and ultimately consumers.704 What began as a war on piracy has now become a war
against the whole world!705
700
SELL, supra note 553, at 192.
701
See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 140-51, 153-54 (discussing the cycle of futility); see also Gregory S. Feder,
Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can’t Make It Drink, 37 VA. J.
INT’L L. 223, 242 (1996) (noting the emergence of a cycle); Editorial, Surprise! A Deal with China, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1996, at A22
(“One of the Clinton Administration’s specialties is threatening a trade war and then striking a deal at the 11th hour.”).
702
Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 535, at 624 n.461. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 8, at 154 for a
discussion of this cycle.
703
See id. at 174 (arguing that the coercive U.S.-China intellectual property policy “backfires and jeopardizes the United States’
longstanding interests in promoting human rights and civil liberties in China”).
704
Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, supra note 1.
705
Cf. ERIC HOBSBAWM, ON THE EDGE OF THE NEW CENTURY 49 (2000) (cautioning that it is “a dangerous gamble” and “a
mistake” for a single power, however great and powerful it is, to control world politics).
Like the U.S. government a decade ago, the RIAA’s tactics have alienated its major
supporters. Although the recording industry was able to solicit support from the computer and
consumer electronics industry in their support of the DMCA, these industries soon expressed
regret and disappointment over the development and interpretation of the statute.706 Likewise,
despite the fact that Congress has been known for being protective of the entertainment industry,
its support for the industry is decreasing gradually. Most recently, Senator Norm Coleman called
for congressional hearings to investigate the recording industry’s enforcement tactics and to
examine whether the RIAA had abused the subpoena power granted under the DMCA. 707
Senator Coleman’s action was understandable, given the wide implications of RIAA’s lawsuits
on privacy and civil liberties, 708 two areas that are of great interest and importance to the
American public (and their legislators!).
More problematically, the RIAA’s tactics would backfire on the constituents the trade
group was charged to protect—record companies, musicians, artists, songwriters, and retailers.
Although the industry intended to coerce egregious offenders into submission, the industry’s
action eventually would drive pirates underground.709 Today, there already exist a large variety
of technologies that enable users to cover their identity. Freenet is a good example.710 By using
this technology, file swappers are able to encrypt their download requests by passing requests
from one computer to another in a way that makes it very difficult for others to determine who
wants the file and where they got it. These file swappers therefore will remain anonymous, as no
one knows what files are on a given computer.
To some extent, the RIAA’s approach is similar to the futile cat-and-mouse chase
between the Chinese authorities and online dissidents in China. No doubt, the Chinese
authorities have created a significant deterrent by cracking down repeatedly on cyber cafés,
handing out heavy jail sentences to online dissidents, and implementing new and restrictive laws
and regulations. 711 However, the heavy-handed tactics used by the Chinese authorities have
backfired on their efforts by heightening the cautiousness and sophistication of Chinese netizens.
Such ill-advised tactics also led to the proliferation of anti-monitoring technologies and the
increased reliance of Chinese users on proxy servers, offshore Web sites, and encrypted peer-to-
peer file sharing systems to avoid detection.
If the RIAA were to avoid the difficulty confronting the Chinese authorities, it would be
important for the recording industry to reassess its enforcement strategy and think hard about its
long-term goal. If the industry fails to do so, in the very near future the RIAA not only will have
to deal with KaZaA, Grokster, iMesh, and Gnutella, but also angry legislators, proxy servers,
offshore Web sites, and encrypted peer-to-peer file-sharing systems.
706
DRM Foes Turn Aside Hollywood Peace Gestures, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 5, 2002.
707
Amy Harmon, In Court, Verizon Challenges Music Industry’s Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at C2 (reporting that
Senator Coleman had scheduled a congressional hearing to privacy issues as well as the broader effect of technology on copyright
enforcement). As Senator Coleman noted: “If you’re taking someone else’s property, that’s wrong, that’s stealing. But in this country
we don’t cut off people’s hands when they steal. One question I have is whether the penalty here fits the crime.” Amy Harmon, Efforts
to Stop Music Swapping Draw More Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at C1.
708
See Sonia K. Katyal, A War on CD Piracy, a War on Our Rights, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at 17.
709
See Saul Hansell, Crackdown on Copyright Abuse May Send Music Traders into Software Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2003, at C1.
710
See Riehl, supra note 415, at 1779-87 (describing Freenet).
711
See generally Nina Hachigian, China’s Cyber-Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 118; Qiu, supra note 587, Jiang-yu
Wang, The Internet and E-Commerce in China: Regulations, Judicial Views, and Government Policies, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW.,
Jan. 2001, at 12; Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment, supra note 587.
CONCLUSION
Today, a copyright divide exists between the stakeholders and nonstakeholders in the
copyright system. While copyright holders are eager to protect what they have, many users
neither understand copyright law nor believe in the copyright system. As a result, copyright
piracy is rampant, and illegal file sharing has become the norm, rather the exception—especially
among teenagers and college students. As this Article demonstrates, this rampant piracy
problem can be seen as a battle between the stakeholders and nonstakeholders over the change
and retention of the status quo. Unless the nonstakeholders understand why copyright needs to
be protected and until they become the stakeholders or potential stakeholders, they would not be
eager to abide by copyright laws and consent to stronger copyright protection.
The problem today is not new, and extensive copyright piracy had taken place in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America and in China a decade ago. Although commentators
rarely analyze the three piracy stories together, this Article brings them together for the first time
using a cross-cultural, cross-systemic, cross-temporal, and cross-sectoral approach. This Article
argues that there are striking similarities among the three stories. More importantly, these
similarities will provide insight into the war on piracy, intellectual property law reforms, and
international harmonization efforts.
From time to time, commentators have emphasized various individual factors to

distinguish one piracy story from another. This Article argues that none of these factors alone
accounts for the problem, although some of these factors at times are more influential and
determinative than others. Rather, all the different factors contribute to the creation and
enlargement of the copyright divide, and they should be considered as contributing factors. Until
policymakers can develop a comprehensive approach that targets the various factors, as
compared to a piecemeal policy that focuses on one or two exaggerated factors, the extensive
piracy problem will remain.
First, the stakeholders must educate the nonstakeholders about the copyright system.
They need to make the nonstakeholders understand what the copyright system protects and how
the system could benefit the nonstakeholders in the long run. Second, the stakeholders need to
help the nonstakeholders develop a stake in the system and understand how the nonstakeholders
can get their products protected and receive royalties. By doing so, the stakeholders can
transform the nonstakeholders into stakeholders or potential stakeholders. Third, it is important
for the stakeholders to help strengthen intellectual property laws and develop enforcement
mechanisms. Finally, if products are needed, yet unaffordable by the majority users, the
stakeholders should develop honest alternatives.
Two centuries ago, the United States was one of the biggest pirating nations in the world.
By not granting copyright protection to foreign authors, the United States successfully free rode
on the creative efforts of others, in particular the British and the French. Today, however, the
United States has become the champion of literary and artistic property and one of the
predominant powers advocating strong intellectual property protection around the world. If the
stories about the twentieth-century China and the twenty-first-century cyberspace play out like
the story about eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, we will be looking at a very happy
ending in which the piracy problem will be greatly reduced and creative works will enjoy their
well-deserved copyright protection. While the good news is that both story plots seem to be
evolving in that direction, the bad news is that it will still take quite a while for the ending to be
written. Hopefully, the understanding of the copyright divide will help accelerate this plot-
writing process.

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Public Law & Legal Theory

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The Copyright Divide

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the

Part I of this Article focuses on book piracy in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century

I. BOOK PIRACY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

We care because if no intellectual property protection exists regarding technical and

I spoke, as you know, of international copyright, at Boston; and I spoke of it again at

In 1837, Senator Henry Clay submitted a report 87 recommending the enactment of

II. SOFTWARE PIRACY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA

After decades of imperialism, warlordism, wars, famines, revolutions, and political

By virtue of this Agreement, “China assumed an international legal obligation for

Notwithstanding these two agreements, software piracy remained rampant in China. As

Commentators sometimes attributed China’s extensive piracy problem to the country’s

To rehabilitate the intelligentsia, post-Mao leaders sought to facilitate the endeavors of

Moreover, China recently modified the Regulations of Computer Software Protection,

Notwithstanding these crackdowns and reforming efforts, significant problems remain

Furthermore, by the late 1990s, the Chinese—perhaps influenced by the developments in

Moreover, the Chinese begin to perceive themselves as passive stakeholders. In other

The predominant compression technology is MP3, a standard, non-proprietary algorithm

Moreover, as is demonstrated by the KaZaA litigation, jurisdictional issues might create

To protect its technological self-help measures, the industry successfully lobbied

A case in point is Professor Edward Felton of Princeton University, who successfully

IV. MORAL OF THE STORIES

A. The Copyright Divide

Countries differ in levels of wealth, economic structures, technological capabilities,

B. The Contributing Factors

However, if examined carefully, this cultural tradition argument is as unconvincing as the

2. Level of Economic Development

Countries differ in terms of levels of wealth, economic structures, technological

Although commentators sometimes attribute extensive copyright piracy to the level of

While government censorship in general encourages piracy, the converse is not

Moreover, we should not ignore the effectiveness of authoritative governments in

Indeed, commentators have expressed concerns over the deterioration of intellectual

5. Type of Reprographic Technology

C. Bridging the Copyright Divide

As the National Research Council stated in its recent study:

Education is very important, because “[r]espect for copyrights is not an inherent or

3. Strengthening Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms

Moreover, digital rights management tools could be employed to help promote

4. Developing Honest Alternatives

V. THE LIMITS OF COERCION

As the world becomes increasingly globalized, harmonization is badly needed to provide

Second, coercion is needed to prevent the development of, or even dismantle, an

From time to time, commentators have emphasized various individual factors to

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