Signs of Imagination

Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music
Author(s): Thomas Turino

Source: Ethnomusicology , Spring - Summer, 1999, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring - Summer,
1999), pp. 221-255
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of Society for Ethnomusicology
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VOL. 43, NO. 2 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY SPRING/SUMMER 1999
Signs of Imagination, Identity,

and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic
Theory for Music
THOMAS TURINO / University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
People in many societies intuitively recognize the emotional power of

music in their personal, family, and community life. If ethnomusicolo-
gists have come to agree on anything over the last decade it is that music
is a key resource for realizing personal and collective identities which, in
turn, are crucial for social, political, and economic participation. These ob-
servations are integrally related, and they form the basis of the central ques-
tion for musicology: "Why music?"
Like the habitus, identities are at once individual and social; they are
the affective intersection of life experiences variably salient in any given
instance. Identity is comprised of what we know best about our relations
to self, others, and the world, and yet is often constituted of the things we
are least able to talk about. Identity is grounded in multiple ways of know-
ing with affective and direct experiential knowledge often being paramount.
The crucial link between identity formation and arts like music lies in the
specific semiotic character of these activities which make them particular-
ly affective and direct ways of knowing.
Recent scholars of ethnomusicology have succeeded in illustrating the
intimate interfaces of sound structures, social structures, and identity (e.g.
Seeger 1980, 1986; Pefia 1985; Feld 1988; Pacini Hernandez 1995; Sugar-
man 1997). It seems to me that the challenge for the next generation is to
develop a theory of music in relation to what is usually called "emotion"-
our inadequate gloss for that mammoth realm of human experience that
falls outside language-based thinking and communication. Such a theory is
necessary if we are to move beyond mere description of the central roles
music and dance play in collective events ranging from spirit possession
ceremonies, mass nationalist rallies, and weddings, to the teen dances tak-
ing place on a Friday night.
? 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
221

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222 Ethnomusicology, Spring/Summer 1999
My purpose in this paper is to begin sketching a theory of music, emo-

tion, and identity based on the semiotics of the American philosopher and
scientist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). The semiotic tools discussed
are applicable to all expressive practices; here I will focus on music, dance,
and propositional language with the understanding that other expressive
media have their own unique qualities and capacities and require some
separate analysis and application. Initially, Peircian semiotic theory is daunt-
ing for the amount of new terminology it requires. Sometimes, however,
new words are needed to think new thoughts and to approach old prob-
lems in radically new ways. Working intensively with only a small portion
of Peircean theory for over fifteen years, I have become convinced that its
potential is nothing short of revolutionary for understanding the social ef-
fects of music, art, expressive culture, and people's myriad ways of expe-
riencing the world.' My purpose is not simply to present a system that al-
lows us to categorize signs more precisely, although this is a necessary step,
but to elaborate the distinct workings and potentials of different sign types
in human life.
Peircian Semiotics
In dramatic contrast to the autonomous systems approach of S

an-based structural linguistics, Peirce developed a theory of signs
stand how people are connected to, and experience, the worl
structuralism used language as the primary modelling system, Pe
the concept of sign in the widest, most flexible way as som
stands for something else to someone in some way, thus allowing
different types of signs outside propositional language (e.g. Peirce
It has always been surprising to me that in the great musical sem
of the 1970s, scholars chose the Saussurian line and attempted to
similarities between music and language. A basic premise in my w
the most important theoretical insights about the social power of
be derived from outlining the differences between propositional,
co-referential language, and non-propositional sign modes such as
dance.2
Sign, Object, Interpretant, and Semiotic Chaining

For Peirce, semiotic processes (semiosis) have three basic elements: (1)
the sign, something that stands for something else to someone in some way;
(2) the object, which is the "something else," or entity, stood for by the
sign, be it an abstract concept or a concrete object;3 and (3) the interpret-
ant, which is the effect created by bringing the sign and object together in
the mind of a perceiver (1955:99; see Fig. 1).

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Turino: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music 223
Figure 1.
Sign or Representamen = Something actually

functioning as a sign.
Interpretant = Object = What the sign

What the sign creates in the observer; stands for.
the effect the sign has in/on the observer,
including feeling and sensation, physical
reaction, as well as ideas articulated and
processed in language.
Some Basic Principles

1. There can be an infinite unfolding of signs in the mind, a kind of chaining process.
2. Thirds include Seconds and Firsts; Seconds include Firsts; Firsts can only determine a First
(whatever is a Third determines a Third, or degenerately a Second or a First, etc.).
3. A fully developed general purpose language must have icons, indices, and symbols, accord-
ing to Peirce.
Semiosis involves a type of chaining process through time in which the

interpretant at one temporal stage becomes the sign for a new object at the
next stage of semiosis, creating a new interpretant which becomes the next
sign in the next instant, ad infinitum until that "train of thought" is inter-
rupted by another chain of thought, or by arriving at a belief or conclusion.
In each instant in the chain, the new sign stands for a new object creating
a new interpretant-multiple examples of this process will be provided in
what follows. Contrasting with general postmodernist views, in Peircian
theory signs are neither unmoored from the objects they signify, nor are
signs necessarily only linked to other signs.4 Both these ideas, derived from
Saussure's problematic binary conception of linguistic signs, collapse the
basic triadic character of semiosis and the different moments of semiotic
chaining-that is, how sign-object relations at one stage create a distinct
effect (interpretant) which becomes the sign at the next stage in the chain
(Peirce 1991:239). Peirce emphasized that a sign is not a self-evident idea
or entity but is the catalyst for an effect.
As conceptualized within Peircian semiotics, "chains of semiosis" move
between particularly sensory and direct types of signs and effects to those

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that are mediated by language (Peirce 1991:70-75). It is my thesis that the

power of music to create emotional responses and to realize personal and
social identities is based in the fact that musical signs are typically of the
direct, less-mediated type. Music involves signs of feeling and experience
rather than the types of mediational signs that are about something else.
Interpretants and the Mind-Body Dichotomy

Moving past the inadequate Cartesian mind-body and emotions-thought
dichotomies, there are three basic kinds of dynamic interpretants5-three
general classes of effects created by sign-object relations (e.g. Peirce
1958:393; 1960:5.475; see Fitzgerald 1966:71-90). Peirce called the first
type an emotional interpretant, a direct, unreflected-upon feeling caused
by a sign. Since other types of interpretants can also involve emotion, this
term is confusing; sense, feeling, or sentiment interpretant might be clos-
er to Peirce's idea. The second type is an energetic interpretant, a physi-
cal reaction caused by a sign, be it unnoticed foot tapping to music, an
accelerated heartbeat from a police siren, or unreflexively drawing a finger
back from a hot stove. The third type is a sign-interpretant, that is, a lin-
guistic-based concept. All three interpretant types involve signs and all three
involve perception and mental activity. This framework thus gives us tools
for describing different types of mental activity, or "thought," be it language-
based or not, and hence eschews the strict mind-body dichotomy as it has
typically been conceptualized.6 Moreover, for Peirce, the concept of mean-
ing, a long-debated problem in regard to musical meaning, is pragmatical-
ly simplified by defining it as the actual effect of a sign, that is, the direct
feeling, physical reaction, or language-based concept inspired in the per-
ceiver by a musical sign (Peirce 1955:30-36).
When a Tree Falls in the Forest
The first step in semiotic analysis is to determine what is the sign, wh

is the object, what is the effect, and to whom, in any instance. While seem
ingly simple, this basic step is often overlooked leading to the postmodern
conflation mentioned earlier. A fundamental premise in the Peircian fram
work is that a sign has to create an effect, an interpretant, within a livin
being; this precludes abstract assigning of meanings, and in fact the hypo
thetical manufacturing of signs and objects in social analysis. When a t
falls in the forest it creates waves through the air, a potential sign, but t
waves do not function as a sign unless there is someone there to be affect
ed by them. Likewise, musical signs are sonic events that create an eff
in a perceiver; not everything happening in music necessarily functions as
signs all the time (something might not be apprehended, might not ca

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an effect). But within the Peircian framework if aspects of music create an

effect, signs are necessarily involved. In this context, ethnography becomes
crucial to social and musical semiotic analysis since it allows us to identify
what the signs are, in relation to what object, for whom, and in which ways.
Peircian Categories for Signs and

Sign-Object-Interpretant Relationships
Peirce developed three trichotomies of concepts for analyzing differ-
ent aspects of a sign and distinct types of relationships between the three
basic components of semiosis: sign-object-interpretant. Combining one
component from each of the three trichotomies to more fully comprehend
the nature of a given sign, Peirce arrived at ten basic sign types (e.g. Peirce
1955:98-119; 1991:23-33;1958:390-393; 1960:2.43-2.308). These range
from signs that produce particularly direct effects without need for the
mediation of linguistically-based thought, to signs, objects, and interpret-
ants grounded in language. I will first go through all the concepts briefly
and then return to those that have the most potential for explaining mu-
sic's power to create affect and forge social identities.
Trichotomy I: The Sign Itself
The first trichotomy involves the nature of the sign itself (see Fig.2).
Every chain of semiosis begins with the qualisign: a pure quality embed-
ded in a sign such as redness, or the quality of a particular musical sound,
or the quality of a harmonic or melodic relation. This aspect helps deter-
mine the identity and semiotic potential of the sign. The second concept
in Trichotomy I is the sinsign which is the actual specific instance of a sign,
e.g., each individual appearance of the word 'the' on this page or the red-
ness of a particular rose. The third term is the legisign which is the sign as
a general type, e.g., "The Star Spangled Banner" as a piece apart from any
given performance of it, or the word 'the' apart from any instance of it, or
the concept of "the color red."
Both qualisigns and legisigns are dependent on actual realizations (the
sinsign), just as any realization is dependent on the qualities of the sign
(qualisigns) which allow us to apprehend it. Particularly important, the
social meaning of a given instance of a sign is also informed by its belong-
ing to general nested classes of phenomena (legisigns). Thus, the effects
of a given performance of the "Star Spangled Banner" (sinsign) are informed
by being related to the piece as a general class (legisign) so that we recog-
nize it and relate it to former hearings. "The Star Spangled Banner" is also
nested within other general classes of phenomena such as 'American na-
tionalistic music,' and 'music'; these are other potential legisigns for a giv-

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Figure 2.
Trichotomy I: of the sign itself.
1. Qualisign (tone)
2. Sinsign (token)
Sign 3. Legisign (type)
Trichotomy m: of the way

a sign is interpreted as Trichotomy II: of the relation
representing its object. between sign and object.
1. Rheme 1. Icon
2. Dicent - 2. Index
3. Argument 3. Symbol
Interpretant Object
1. emotional 1. Immediate object = "the object as the

interpretant sign represents it-contained within
Dynamical Interpretant 2. energetic the sign."
interpretant 2. Dynamical object = the object outside
3. a "sign" the sign; "the reality which by some
means contrives to determine the sign."
Note:
The sign must indicate the dynamical

object by a "hint," and this hint
(contained within the sign) is the
immediate object.
en performance. As socially-relative categories by which phenomena a

conceptually grouped, legisigns are a foundational aspect of culture.
Trichotomy II: Sign-Object Relations

Peirce's second trichotomy of concepts, involving the icon, index, and
symbol, specifies three ways that the sign and object are related in a perceiv-
er. This is the aspect of Peirce's work that has received the most attention.
The term icon refers to a sign that is related to its object through some
type of resemblance between them. The degree, basis, and even accuracy
of resemblance is not so much at issue as the fact that resemblance calls
forth the object when perceiving the sign. Thus, if a literal musical qu
tion or even the vaguest trace of another piece brings that piece to
iconicity is involved-the experienced quotation or trace is the sinsig

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piece as general class (legisign) is the object. Motivic unity and most aspects
of musical form operate iconically. This much is obvious. More important-
ly, common musical devices such as a rising melodic line, accelerando, and
crescendo may create tension and excitement in a listener because they
sound like so many human voices we have heard rising in pitch, speed, and
volume when the speaker becomes excited. For most listeners, such signs
are typically not processed in terms of language-based thought but are sim-
ply felt because of a direct identity established by resemblance between
the musical signs and other expressions of excitement.
Peirce suggests three types of icons: an image, a diagram, and a met-
aphor (1955:104-105). In an image, the sign-object relation is based in sim-
ple qualities shared; a musical "trace" or quote in one piece calling forth
another piece would be of this type, as are most musical icons. A diagram
involves analogous relations of the parts between sign and object as the ba-
sis of similarity between them; a map is of this type. In metaphors, juxta-
posed linguistic signs, which are not iconically related to their objects or
to each other, posit some parallelism or similarity between the objects of
the signs-e.g., "A mountain of a man" suggests that 'the man' is 'large,'
'hard,' or 'durable.' The concept of metaphor has become popular in an-
thropology and ethnomusicology to denote iconicity in general and even
other types of semiotic relations.7 Often lacking clear definition, the term
has lost its usefulness for semiotic and cultural analysis whereas, as with
Peirce's other formulations, his definition of metaphor more precisely pin-
points what is going on semiotically.
The second concept in Trichotomy II is index which refers to a sign
that is related to its object through co-occurrence in actual experience.
Smoke can serve as an index of fire, a TV show's theme song can come to
serve as an index for the program, a V7-I progression may index musical
closure in European societies, the "Star Spangled Banner" may serve as an
index for baseball games, Fourth of July parades, school assemblies, or
imperialism depending on the experiences of the perceiver. The power of
indices derives from the fact that the sign-object relations are based in co-
occurrences within one's own life experiences, and thus become intimately
bound as experience.
Peirce uses the term symbol in a particular way that differs, and must
be actively divorced, from standard usage.8 The Peircian symbol is a sign
that is related to its object through the use of language rather than being
fully dependent on iconicity or indexicality. Symbols are themselves of a
general type (legisigns) whose objects are also general classes of phenom-
ena (Peirce 1955:102). Most linguistic signs-words-are symbols,9 and
language is the only semiotic mode that, in and of itself, has symbolic ca-
pability.10 Language also uses iconic and indexical processes but it is par-

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ticularly in propositional speech, and in the semantico-referential functions

of language (i.e., language used to refer to and define other parts of lan-
guage) where its symbolic capacities differentiate it radically from other
semiotic modes like music.
After the early stages of language acquisition, we learn the objec

words through linguistic explanations, those objects being general conce
which are also articulated through symbols. For example when we e
that 'a cat is a furry animal,' both 'furry' and 'animal' are general langu
bound concepts. We can experience what the feeling of furriness is
patting an actual cat, but we can not designate the general feeling with
symbols anymore than we can reproduce the sensation through them
symbolic function of language is what allows us to think in, and ex
generalities. Yet because they are mediational signs which do not re
ble, or can be removed from direct connections with their objects,
bols can not reproduce the feelings and experiences of those objects.
bols are signs about other things, whereas icons and indices are sig
identity (resemblance, commonality) and direct connections.
Whereas the meanings of indices are dependent on the experienc
the perceiver, and thus can be quite fluid and varied, the meanings of s
bols are relatively fixed through social agreement. Dictionaries, math bo
and Morse Code manuals document the conventional meanings of sym
If symbols are to serve their special function of signification in gen
relatively context-free, ways, their meanings must be basically fixe
agreed upon, or, as in this paper, (linguistic) arguments must be ma
why their meanings should be altered or refined. Icons and indices
distinct semiotic functions and operate differently.
For the most part, musical sounds that function as signs operate at
iconic and indexical levels. The sound of a particular Indian raga x
become a symbol for 'morning' (object) if the relationship is establ
in general terms through language as, for example, through verbal
nation in an American classroom, and if, upon hearing raga x subseq
ly, a student thinks the general concept 'morning.' But note that in the i
setting up of this relationship, the sound of the raga was the object of
guistic signs referring to the music and linking it to the general concep
a given time of day. More typically, musical sign-object relations are es
lished without the mediation of symbols. When growing up in Indi
young girl frequently heard a particular set of musical sounds (raga
ing played in the morning over the radio in her home, she might come
experience the sensation of 'morning' or 'home,' or myriad other t
indexed by the sounds when hearing them later in life.
The affective potential of signs is highly dependent on the manner
which the sign and object are linked. The wealth as well as depth of

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ciations with raga x are likely to be quite different for the Indian girl grow-
ing up with it because of the number and variety of indexical associations,
as compared to the American student studying the raga largely through
propositional and semantico-referential speech in a given class. Indices are
experienced as "real" because they are rooted, often redundantly, in one's
own life experiences and, as memory, become the actual mortar of personal
and social identity. When given indices are tied to the affective foundations
of ones personal or communal life-home, family, childhood, a lover, war
experiences--they have special potential for creating direct emotional ef-
fects because they are often unreflexively apprehended as "real" or "true"
parts of the experiences signified. By contrast, symbols are general, medi-
ational signs about rather than of the experiences they express.
Trichotomy III: How the Sign Is Interpreted
Peirce's third trichotomy--rheme, dicent, and argument--involves the

way a given sign is interpreted as representing its object. A rheme is a sign
that is interpreted as representing its object as a qualitative possibility
(Peirce 1955:103). A rheme is a sign that is not judged as true or false but
as something that is simply possible. Peirce used the example that any sin-
gle word, say common nouns like 'cat,' 'god' 'unicorn' or 'nation,' are
rhemes because they suggest the possibility of these entities without (in
themselves) asserting the truth or falsity of that possibility (1958:392). Like-
wise, a painting of an unknown or imaginary person or scene may be in-
terpreted as a rheme.
The second concept in Trichotomy III is the dicent. This is a sign which
is understood to represent its object in respect to actual existence (Peirce
1955:103). The most important feature here is that a dicent is interpreted
as really being affected by its object. A weathervane is a dicent-index for
'wind direction' (object) because the wind direction actually affects the
position of the weathervane (it is indexical because of co-occurrence of
wind and weathervane). A linguistic proposition is a dicent-symbol because
the truth of the sign is interpreted as really being affected by the relations
of the objects expressed through symbols."
Dicent-indices are among the most direct and convincing sign types
because typically they are interpreted as being real, true, or natural. They
are often taken for granted and apprehended with a part of our awareness
that does not involve linguistic-based signs (i.e., at the levels of feeling or
energetic interpretants). The field of kinesics--"body language"--theorized
by Gregory Bateson (1972), Ray Birdwhistell (e.g., 1960, 1970), and Edward
Hall (1977) is largely the study of dicent-indexical signs.12 "Body language"
is a dicent sign because it is interpreted as being the direct result of a per-
son's actual attitude (object) and is thus apprehended as actually being

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affected by that object. Facial expression, body position, and gesture typi-
cally create effects at the levels of emotional or energetic interpretants.13
It is true that signs that usually operate as dicent-indices such as tone
of voice and "body language" can be manipulated, for example by actors,
used-car salesmen, politicians, and false lovers. In daily interactions, some-
one who becomes known for being able to do this, however, is branded a
phoney. Such people are particularly mistrusted because we are used to
taking dicent-indices at face value and are especially offended when peo-
ple manipulate these types of signs.
The third concept in Trichotomy III is argument, involving both sym-
bolic propositions as well as the language-based premises upon which the
propositions can be interpreted and assessed. Argument is largely within
the propositional, semantico-referential linguistic domain and is not partic-
ularly relevant to the analysis of musical signs. Rhemes and dicent signs,
however, are key to artistic practice and meaning, and I will emphasize
these two types later in the discussion.
The Combination of Components from the Three Trichotomies

Above I have already begun to illustrate how the components from the
three trichotomies must be put together to better comprehend the full
character of a given sign. Described in respect to the three trichotomies, a
common noun is a rhematic-symbolic-legisign. It is symbolic because the
sign-object relation is determined through language and because both sign
and object are of a general type. The term legisign is redundant in this case
because all symbols are legisigns. As explained above a noun is a rheme
because it is interpreted as standing for a possible type of object rather than
a specific existential object. As another example, a sudden, very loud sound
in music might function as a rhematic-iconic-legisign with objects like
'thunder,' or 'explosion.' The rhematic aspect here is that these are possi-
ble objects rather than any specific instance of thunder or explosion. The
iconic aspect is that the sign and object are related in the mind through
resemblance. This is a legisign when the loud musical sound is a general
type of icon for such objects.
A weathervane is a dicent-indexical-legisign. It is a dicent because the
'direction of the wind,' which is the object of the sign actually affects the
sign (the direction of the weathervane); it is indexical because the sign and
object are related through co-occurrence, and it is a legisign because weath-
ervanes are a general type of cultural phenomenon (we have seen them
before). Peirce defined a weathercock as a dicent-indexical-sinsign
(1955:115), and any given instance is, indeed, a sinsign. I believe, howev-
er, that our understanding of the significance of the direction of the weath-
ervane depends on its status as a general type of sign that we have seen

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before and hence know how to interpret, i.e., its character as a legisign.
This is more than a matter of labelling. My emphasis on legisign in this case
is key to my analysis of how I understand the sign to be functioning. When
framed to be taken literally, facial expressions, vocal quality, the manner
of articulation involved in plucking a guitar or blowing a sax can all func-
tion as dicent-indexical-legisigns.
Any given instance of a sign involves quality (the qualisign) which al-
lows us to recognize it, and is a sinsign. These features can usually simply
be assumed. Most sinsigns in culture, which is to say most sinsigns, signify
because they are immediately related to one or more general classes of
phenomena-legisigns. The way sinsigns stand for their legisigns-i.e., the
way they are categorized and grouped with other sinsigns to form a gener-
al type-is usually a culturally relative matter and is often key to cultural
analysis. This is true for "body language" as well as weathervanes. The
meanings of a smile are not self-evident cross-culturally or even across dif-
ferent social frames within the same society (Birdwhistell 1970). We learn
to interpret smiles by linking them to general classes of dicent-indexical
signs that we have experienced before in given contexts, that is, we un-
derstand them because they are legisigns.
All signs can be analyzed in relation to aspects from the three trichot-
omies, producing ten basic sign types (see Figure 3). In discussion, how-
ever, signs are best identified by emphasizing the element(s) most promi-
nent to their function in a given instance of semiosis or for a given purpose
in analysis. The same sign, then, might be called simply icon, or rhematic-
icon, or rhematic-iconic-legisign depending on what the analysis or descrip-
tion requires.
The Three Basic Categories: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness

We have now gone through the three basic trichotomies and suggest-
ed how ten possible sign types can be identified from the combination of
their components. This entire semiotic framework is predicated on Peirce's
three most basic categories for all phenomena (Peirce 1955:74-97). These
are Firstness, something in and of itself without relation to any second
entity; Secondness, relations between two entities without the mediation
of a third; and Thirdness, involving the mediational capabilities of a per-
son to bring a first and a second entity into synthetic or general relation-
ships with each other.
The initial term in each of Peirce's three trichotomies (qualisign, icon,
rheme) and Trichotomy I (of the sign itself), pertain to Firstness which is
the realm of oneness, quality and possibility. The second terms in the tri-
chotomies (sinsign, index, dicent) and Trichotomy II (relations between
sign and object) pertain to Secondness, and this is the realm of actual ex-

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isting relations and reality connections.14 The third terms (legisign, symbol,
argument) and Trichotomy III (how the sign is interpreted) are in the realm
of Thirdness and are the most highly mediated, general signs appropriate
for abstraction. The three types of interpretants outlined earlier also per-
tain to Firstness (emotional interpretant), Secondness (energetic interpret-
ant), and Thirdness (language-based concepts).
While all semiotic processes involve Thirdness (the sign and object
brought together in the interpretant by a perceiver), Peirce's classifications
of signs and of the trichotomies themselves move from relative Firstness
to Thirdness. Qualisigns (the quality embedded in a sign regardless of
whether it functions as one) pertain to Firstness while argument (symbol-
ic propositions and premises) is largely Thirdness.15
Within the Peircian semiotic framework there are multiple combina-
tions of relative Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. An indexical-legisign
is a type of sign that combines the elements of Secondness (index, direct
connection) and Thirdness (legisign, general type). Iconic and indexical
legisigns are thus a kind of compromise solution falling mid-way between
signs that function in the most direct unmediated way (iconic sinsign) and
signs that function at the most general context-free level (argument) as
shown in Figure 3. The vast majority of musical signs are of three compro-
mise types: rhematic-iconic-legisigns; rhematic-indexical-legisigns; dicent-
indexical-legisigns. The aspect of generality provided by the legisign for
each is, in fact, the cultural component, and a major defining facet of cul-
ture universally. The grouping of phenomena into general categories or
types which, as we know, varies across cultural groups, is a primary foun-
dation of culture just as token-type ("practice-structure," "parole-langue")
dialectics are crucial to cultural transformation.
Semiotic Hierarchies and a Theory of Musical Affect

Within the Peircian framework, higher level signs and effects (Thirds,
Seconds) contain the lower levels (Seconds, Firsts) (see Figure 3).16 In or-
der to understand music's special potential for creating emotional effects,
I am interested in probing the instances in which semiotic chaining is halted
before reaching the level of Thirdness (symbol, argument, linguistic-based
interpretants).
Signs which are Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds, will be more likely to cre-
ate effects at the same or lower levels of interpretant types. Thus, icons
(Firsts) will most likely produce emotional, sensory interpretants (Firsts)
at that point in the semiotic chain. Indices (Seconds) will produce ener-
getic (Seconds) or alternatively feeling interpretants (Firsts). These types
of signs, in and of themselves, will usually not produce higher language-

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Figure 3.
Class Trichotomy Trichotomy Trichotomy 10 Classes

of Sign 1 2 3 of Signs
I A A A Qualisign (iconic rheme) Firstness

II B A A Rhematic iconic sinsign
III B B A Rhematic indexical sinsign
IV B B B Dicent indexical sinsign
V C A A Rhematic iconic legisign
VI C B A Rhematic indexical legisign
VII C B B Dicent indexical legisign
VIII C C A Rhematic symbolic legisign
IX C C B Dicent symbolic legisign
X C C C Argument Thirdness
A=Firstness; B=Secondness; C=Thirdness

1l=Firstness; 2=Secondness; 3=Thirdness
I II HI
Firsts Qualisign Icon I Rheme
Seconds Sinsign Index ~ Dicent
Thirds Legisign Symbol Argument
inclusion possible inclusion
mediated interpretants (Thirds) at the point in the chain where they are
being processed.
This notion is key to my theory of music, emotion and direct experi-
ence. Since musical signs usually operate at the levels of Firstness and Sec-
ondness they will produce interpretants at these same levels in the chain
where they occur. In contexts where these types of signs prevail and are
the center of attention-for example in certain rituals, concerts, and danc-
es-emotional and direct energetic effects can be prolonged, and move-
ment to the level of Thirdness (language-mediated thought) postponed.17
Peirce shows that any general-purpose semiotic system must have
icons, indices, and symbols, which is the case for language but not for semi-
otic modes like music and dance. Peirce was particularly interested in higher
level signs, their operations, and effects. My emphasis diverges in that I am

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interested in exploring the lower level signs of possibility and direct expe-
rience for the ways they create emotion and social identification. My theo-
ry of musical affectivity is based on the hypothesis that the affective poten-
tial of signs is inversely proportional to the degree of mediation, generality,
and abstraction. To reiterate, lower level signs are more likely to create
emotional and energetic interpretants, whereas signs involving symbols are
more likely to generate language-based responses and reasoning--effects
often described as "rational" or "conscious" responses. The point here is
that different types of signs have different potentials.
Musical Signs of Identity, Emotion, and Experience

Iconicity of Style: Signs of Identity
Icons are, at root, signs of identity in that they rely on some type of
resemblance between sign and object, as, in fact, do all relationships of
identity. Steven Feld (1988) has discussed how iconicity functions to cre-
ate social identity and aesthetic systems based on identification within the
social and ecological environment. Musical forms that "sound like," that is
resemble, in some way, other parts of social experience are received as
true, good, and natural (Becker and Becker 1981).18 The dense "in sync but
out of phase" quality of Kaluli or African Pygmy singing--individual varia-
tions and improvisations merging within the dense collective perfor-
mance-'"sound like" the broader quality of social relations and are, in fact,
based on the same ethics. I have made a similar case for Aymara panpipe
performance in Peru (1989, 1993). Feelings of iconicity or "naturalness"
created through the correspondence of style across different practices are
involved here.
The subtle rhythmic patterns-basic to how we speak, how we walk

how we dance, how we play music-are unspoken signs of who we ar
whom we resemble, and thus whom we are with. Conversely, divergen
in kinesic and other features of social style directly identify outsiders, th
who are not like us. Such signs are typically felt as relative comfort or di
comfort with others in daily interaction. Sonic and kinesic iconicity, or la
thereof, however, comes to the fore in participatory musical and dance oc
casions because in such occasions these signs are the focal point of attentio
Indices: Signs of Experience and Emotion

While some attention has been paid to the emotion-producing poten-
tial of iconicity in art, little theoretical work has been done in relation to
indexicality. In fact, iconic and indexical signs typically operate together

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in expressive cultural practices, and indices have their own special poten-
tials for producing emotional response and social identification.
One source for the affective power of musical indices is the fact that
they are able to condense great quantities and varieties of meaning-even
contradictory meanings-within a single sign. Indices signify through co-oc-
currence with their object in real-time situations. Once such indexical rela-
tions have been established, however, actual co-presence of sign and object
is no longer required; the index may still call to mind objects previously ex-
perientially attached. But when former indexically related objects are not
present, or even when they are, new elements in the situation may become
linked to the same sign. Of key significance to a theory of musical affectiv-
ity, indices continually take on new layers of meaning while potentially also
carrying along former associations-a kind of semantic snowballing.
Hypothetically, the song that comes to index a romantic relationship,
"our song," may have a very positive emotional salience for the lovers when
things are going well. This song initially may have been established as an
indexical sign for the relationship (or the other) if the lovers heard it on
their first date, their first dance, or when making love for the first time.
Hearing it on subsequent occasions while the relationship was flowering
it might have taken on additional objects in relation to those occasions, and
continue to have a powerful positive emotional salience. It might carry both
this salience and great sadness if the relationship ends in heartbreak. Hear-
ing the song later in life, feelings of 'new love,' 'the many times together,'
and 'heartbreak,' might be called up simultaneously creating a complex
response. The multiple, sometimes conflicting, objects creating the inter-
pretant by multivocal indices are not usually processed, at least initially, in
terms of symbolic concepts. Rather we are moved to react in a visceral way
because of the very complexity and incoherent form of the objects present-
ed. Due to the very density of the objects called forth by the sign, we ex-
perience layers of feeling which will tend to remain undifferentiated and
simply felt. The emotional power of such signs, of course, depends on the
salience of the objects indexed.
Indexical relations are grounded in personal experience; the members
of social groups will share indices proportional to common experiences.
Thus, indexical communication is most prominent in intimate groups such
as married couples, families, close friends, and further down the continu-
um, in small close-knit communities or neighborhoods. Indices are ground-
ed in one's personal and social life and thus are constitutive of identity-
both in the sense of being part-and-parcel of ones personal past, as well as
being signs of shared social experience. Moreover, the ability to commu-
nicate indexically within a family, a community, or a group of friends, what

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Edward Hall calls "High-Context" communication, in-and-of-itself makes

common experiences, and thus identity, patent.'9
The mass media and advertising redundantly create indexical signs,
signifying [conjuring up] common experience and identity, beyond small-
scale, face to face groups. This process underpins Benedict Anderson's idea
of "imagined communities" in significant ways (1983). Nonetheless, the
meanings attached to indices are not general or fixed. Unlike the meanings
of symbols, which can be confirmed by consulting a dictionary or a math
book, indices are fluid, multileveled, and highly context-dependent.20 The
effects of indices can be guided by controlling the contexts of reception
but they can not be guaranteed. This semantically ambiguous quality of
indices is precisely the point of Louise Meintjes' article about the varied
reception of Paul Simon's Graceland album among different groups inside
and outside South Africa (1990). In spite of their rather unpredictable con-
sequences, indices are frequently harnessed for the construction of social
identities-in advertising, in mass political rallies and propaganda, and in
ritual and ceremonies-because of their emotion-producing potentials and
as pre-existing signs of identity.
Like the intimate "our song" example, or the case of the Indian raga
discussed earlier, indices often carry personal meanings, and thus our
emotional investment in them tends to be higher than for general signs
(symbols), especially when attached to significant aspects of our lives. They
are "our signs," and they are the primary sign types that signify our per-
sonal and collective histories. As Frith observes, the music of adolescence
and the teen years, when people are struggling with identity and other
intense personal issues, tends to remain the most emotionally salient
throughout an individual's life (1987); musical indices are at work here.
Most importantly, as signs of Secondness, indices signify our personal and
collective experiences in a particularly direct manner, they are "really" at-
tached to events and aspects of our lives, and hence are experienced as real;
they are signs of our lives, not signs about them.
The Semiotic Potentials of Music
Music integrates the affective and identity-forming potentials of b

icons and indices in special ways, and is thus a central resource in
and propaganda aimed at creating social unity, participation, and pu
In terms of the density of sign complexes music also has special poten
Any musical unit is comprised of a number of components inclu
pitch, scale type, timbre, rhythmic motion, tempo, melodic shape, me
dynamics, harmony (where applicable), specific melodies, quotes, g
all sounding simultaneously. Any of these parameters can and often do

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tion as discrete icons, indices, rhemes, and dicent signs which may be
meaningfully combined to produce a macrolevel sign, although the signifi-
cance of certain components may be foregrounded in the musical context.
This multi-componential aspect of music can not be overemphasized as
a basis of music's affective and semiotic potential. Within any given sec-
tion of music the timbre may function as an icon or index with certain
effects. The rhythm, meter, tempo, mode, melodic shape, and texture like-
wise may each function as discrete signs that compliment, chafe, or con-
tradict the other signs sounding at the same time-contributing to the
power of a particular meaning, to new insights, or to emotional tension,
respectively. This aspect is in addition to other sequential juxtapositions
of musical signs through time.
I have discussed the semantic snowballing of musical indices, that is,
one sign or sign complex gathering multiple objects to it simultaneously.
The feature I am describing here is different. Music has the potential of
comprising many signs simultaneously which, like other art forms, makes
it a particularly rich semiotic mode. The multicomponential nature of music
functions in the same way, and can be a multiplication of "semantic snow-
balling" in relation to the interpretant: the ambiguity or density of the sign
complex discourages a response in Thirdness and encourages unanalyzed
feeling. It is this multi-componential, and yet non-linear character of musi-
cal "sign bundles" that allow for a different type of flexibility in the creation
of complex, densely meaningful musical signs that compound the conden-
sation of meaning, the polysemy, and the affective potential.
Social Frames and Interpretation: Rhematic and

Dicent Signs in Art
Because the concepts in Trichotomy III involve the manner in which

a sign is interpreted, they depend on the social frame defining the type of
interaction taking place. Gregory Bateson (1972), elaborated the concept
of frame as metacommunicative conventions about how signs within a
given interaction or context are to be interpreted. Erving Goffman (1974)
and Richard Bauman (1977) extended this idea through the study of cues
that signalled specific frames. Thus, a wink and other facial expressions
might cue a "joking frame" indicating that a proposition spoken should not
be taken literally as a dicent. Within a joking frame, linguistic propositions
are interpreted as rhemes-signs of imaginative possibility. Similarly, we
understand that the action on a theatrical stage should not be taken at face
value whereas usually (i.e., without cues to the contrary) linguistic propo-
sitions, facial expressions, and body language in daily interaction are un-
derstood to be literal, and are interpreted as dicent signs of people's actu-

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al attitudes. Even in theatrical contexts where we know "people are only

acting," signs like facial expression and tone of voice that usually function
as dicents may still be affective because of our habitual way of receiving
them.
Many signs in art are rhemes. A painting of an imaginary being or an

imaginary or unknown person may be interpreted as a rhematic-icon be-
cause the painting only suggests the possibility of such objects without
positing their actual existence. The use of musical icons representing 'bird
calls,' 'bombs,' 'thunder,' or more abstract qualities such as a 'pastoral set-
ting' are rhemes in that they signify these things as qualitative possibilities
not specific existential instances. As signs interpreted as representing pos-
sible or purely qualitative objects, rhemes are crucial to the semiotic func-
tions of art because they allow for the play of imagination and creativity.
Rhemes can denote and represent what does not exist ('unicorn'), or what
does not exist yet ('rocket ships' in early science fiction), but they are cru-
cial to bringing new possibilities into existence by imagining and represent-
ing the possibility materially in art objects or performances.
While the rheme allows for the concretization of imagined possibilities
in art forms, dicent signs are particularly powerful and convincing because
they are interpreted as being really affected by the object they signify; they
have a built-in "truth" value. A photograph or a realistic painting socially
framed as a portrait of an actual person (e.g., with a linguistic title such as
"King Henry") are interpreted as dicent-indices. The social frame 'portrait'
suggests that the camera or painter captured the image of the object ('the
person') through co-occurrence with that (posing) person, and that the
photo or painting was actually affected by the appearance of the object
reproduced in the sign. Like a reflection in a mirror, portraits and especial-
ly photographs have a strong iconic component, but at the next stage in
the semiotic chain it is their identity as dicent-indices that make us inter-
pret them as real representations, as "true."
Dicent-indices are central to the power of musical performance. Roland
Barthes' influential concept of "the grain of the voice" -the direct connec-
tion of body to body through certain ineffable sonic qualities of perfor-
mance-is grounded on dicent signs (1977). In musical performance we
often interpret the volume, articulation, and quality of musical instruments
or voices as signs of the "true" sincerity, emotional state, care, or training
of the performer (possible objects). Facial expression, gesture, and physi-
cal attitudes are likewise important dicents for the "inner" attitudes of per-
formers ranging from 'cool control' to 'deeply felt passion.' Directly paral-
lel to "body language" and "tone of voice" in everyday interactions, we often
interpret sonic signs of vocal and instrumental quality as actually being
affected by the actual attitude of the performer (object) and thus under-

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stand them as "true." Vocal quality is particularly convincing in this regard

whereas instruments comprise a second layer of mediation between the
performer and listener. This may be why vocal music is so predominant in
popular music.
In my classes, undergraduates are particularly offended if I suggest that
their favorite popular singer may not have actually experienced what she
is singing about or may not, at the time of performance, be in the emotional
state signified to the listener through the sonic qualities that they interpret
as dicent-indices. They often do not accept my analogy that professional
singers can operate like actors who train themselves to reproduce given
emotional cues for the effectiveness of their art. When my students take
such cues literally, these signs are operating as dicents rather than rhemes
of possible emotional experiences; they are thus more affectively power-
ful because they are interpreted as real.
For many music genres in our society, especially in the popular music
field, a common assumption is that musicians really mean and are experi-
encing what they express through "the grain of the voice" and through
physical cues.21 That is, unlike acting, musical performance in many popu-
lar genres is framed to be taken literally as emotional expression. In short,
these types of sonic and physical dicent signs are powerful for us because
they are interpreted as being the direct result of the feelings they express,
and because they operate below the level of propositional speech which
is more likely to invite us to assess truth or falsity. We know words can lie
or be mistaken. Within many social frames, popular musical performance
often being one of them, we habitually take dicent signs at face value and
we believe them.
Like paintings and photos, however, the social framing of diffe

types of musical performances, recordings, genres, and artists may
them to be interpreted as rhemes, or conversely dicent signs, in rel
to the artists' attitudes during "the performance." In genres such as blu
"folk," soul, and "roots rock," performance is typically framed in relati
to authenticity of feeling (dicents). In other genres where artifice is mo
pronounced, or where aesthetic ideologies emphasize the separation o
and life (see Bourdieu 1984), the interpretation of emotional cues as rhem
(i.e., signs of possible emotions) may be more likely. Whether a sign
tions as a rheme or dicent in relation to emotional cues, however, de
on the experience, knowledge, attitude, and even desire to suspend d
lief, on the part of the perceiver as well as on the skill of the artist to
municate with emotional cues. When my students take their favorite st
signs of emotion literally they are operating as dicents, whereas w
question their literalness, the signs are operating for me as rhemes and
are less convincing.

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Musical recordings are likewise framed differently in relation to their

character as dicent signs or rhemes in relation to "live performance." When
framed as "field recordings" or "live concert recordings" we are more like-
ly to interpret the sounds as dicent-indices with the microphone(s) having
a similar relation to the object as a camera lens. Earlier in the history of
recording, the label "high fidelity" was meant to frame a given recording
as a dicent-index in relation to "live" performance. The interpretation of
recordings as rhemes or dicents of live performance, however, depends on
sonic cues (e.g., audible double tracking, electronic effects, "naturalness")
as to the degree of studio manipulation. I have often heard people assess a
recording in regard to whether the band could actually reproduce the same
sound "live" on stage; within certain styles this remains an important cri-
teria of authenticity. In music framed as studio art (e.g., the late work of
the Beatles or computer music) however, there is no pretension of repre-
senting a "live" performance and we respond to the music rhematically in
relation to various possible objects. "Studio music" is based in a different
aesthetic and is assessed according to different criteria than participatory
music, live stage performance, or "high-fidelity" recordings framed as di-
cent-indices of live performance.
The point here is that the power of musical dicent signs will depend
on the framing of the genre, style of representation, and perceptible levels
of mediation. Thus, Kaluli field recordings, and Bruce Springsteen or Aretha
Franklin recordings are constructed to be interpreted as dicents of actual
performance whereas much of David Bowie's work, disco of the 1970s, and
Cage's electronic music are not (Frith 1987). Whether musical signs will
be interpreted as dicents or rhemes of the performers' actual feelings will
often be influenced by whether the form of presentation as a whole is in-
terpreted (framed) as rheme or dicent. Nonetheless, as in theatrical presen-
tations, we may still respond to certain musical signs (e.g., an emotive cry)
as dicents regardless of the frame and level of mediation because of our
habitual way of interpreting such signs.
Dicent Signs and Social/Musical Synchrony

Much of what Feld (1988) has discussed as iconicity, such as in-sync-
but-out-of-phase singing among the Kaluli, does indeed have a strong icon-
ic component; we feel a likeness with others and with our social environ-
ment. A more important source of social relations and identity generated
through musical performance, however, are dicent-indices. It is important
to remember that the same signs can function at different levels, and may
have different semiotic potentials, within the semiotic chain. Hence, look-
ing in a mirror has a strong iconic component, we "look like" the image of

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ourselves that we have seen before in mirrors. When I look in a mirror and
see a smudge of dirt on my cheek and automatically move to wipe it off,
however, I am reacting to the mirror image as a dicent-index, a sign of actual
relations and fact; I automatically believe what I see. It is this "truth value"
of dicent-indices that provides particular power for musical signs of social
identity.
Edward Hall's discussion of rhythmic synchrony-moving and/or
sounding together-is key to the way dicent-indices create actual experi-
ences of social identity, unity, and participation (1977; see also McNeill
1995). In music and dance when things are clicking, timing, attack, articu-
lation, and body motion are guided in relation to other performers in the
situation. Culturally specific styles of fitting in with others during perfor-
mance, be it strict rhythmic unison, Keil's rhythmic "participatory discrep-
ancies," or interlocking, likewise comprise experiential signs of the quali-
ty of the relations involved.
The signs that emerge from each performer's manner of interacting
sonically and kinesically affect and are directly affected by the kinesic and
sonic signs of others. These signs are dicent-indices to the extent that they
signify levels of stylistic competence and the nature of the social relation-
ships within performance (object) and are simultaneously affected by those
relationships and degrees of shared cultural knowledge (competence).
When music makers and dancers are in sync, such signs move beyond
felt resemblances to experienced fact of social connections and unity.
While dicent-indices function like this in everyday interactions through
"body language," tone of voice, etc., these signs have particular power in
participatory music and dance performance because non-propositional
sonic and kinesic signs are the focal point of attention. Thus direct kinesic
and sonic response to others may well be experienced as a deep type of
communion, although one can rarely fully express the feeling in words.
Here we come to a prime difference between emotional and energet-
ic interpretants, on the one hand, and the effects of symbols on the other.
What Feld, Keil, Hall, and others point to is the deeply felt, yet often un-
spoken, experiences of being of a group through the "naturalness" of iconic
signs and the direct experience of dicent-indices. Propositions and linguis-
tic arguments about identity may even become emotionally heated, but
because they call for mediated, word-based evaluations, they do not pro-
vide the feeling or direct experience of belonging; rather they are claims
and arguments about belonging. The other arts involve iconicity and index-
icality and have their distinct potentials for creating emotion and identity.
But they typically do not engage large groups of people collectively in the
actual doing of the activity that results in the experience of social synchro-
ny. This is one of the special potentials of participatory music and dance.

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Some Musical Examples

Jimi Hendrix's Woodstock performance of "The Star Spangled Banner"
provides an excellent example of how musical meaning and affect are cre-
ated through icons and indices. In what I (following Greg Urban) will call
creative indexing, Hendrix musically shifts the meaning of the national
anthem much as was accomplished by patching the seat of blue jeans with
the American flag during the Vietnam era. Creative indexing involves the
juxtaposition of two or more indices in novel ways that play off of the orig-
inal meanings of the signs. Another example would be the wearing of a
tuxedo (indexing formality) with red tennis sneakers (informality). The
original meanings of the indices creatively combined is further dependent
on their identity as legisigns, that is, signs of a general type as defined within
specific cultural contexts. Here, the legisign can only operate within groups
who share the same experiences with the indices, hence, the meaning of
the legisign may be quite varied across specific groups.
In Hendrix's musical performance, the very use of the loud electric
guitar with feedback and distortion (an indexical legisign of the rock
counter-culture and all that it, in turn, signified in the late 1960s) for the
performance of the anthem (indexically associated with nationalistic con-
texts) creates a new meaning specifically within the broader social context
of the time. For me as a listener, "text-painting" such as the use of bomb
sounds for the line "bombs bursting in air" (the text was not sung but is
generally known), and sounds iconic for planes, sirens, and destruction
added to the significance of the anti-war protest. At one point "Taps" was
quoted, and in that context functioned as an icon (the quote) that carried
indexical meaning through its usual association with funerals. Shifts of ac-
cent, rhythm, and phrasing, and the use of rock-riff conventions expressed
sarcasm, again as creative indices at the microlevel in support of the mac-
rolevel sign (the piece as a whole). My guess is that these aspects of artic-
ulation that expressed sarcasm will operate for many listeners as dicent signs
(i.e. signs directly affected by Hendrix's inner feelings), but this would have
to be verified through discussions with listeners.
Upon hearing a recording of this performance in 1989, the indexical
meaning of the performance and its various microcomponents would be
compounded in multileveled and conflicting ways ("snowballing" effect)
if you had been at Woodstock, met a girl, and fallen in love; listened to the
piece on records with her remembering Woodstock; and later lost her af-
ter being drafted and going to Vietnam. It might likewise be compounded
in a starkly contrasting manner if you had lost your son in Vietnam and had
thus developed a hatred of hippies.
Using this example in university music classes, I found that the young-
er students, not yet born during the late sixties, reacted in a variety of ways.

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For some, the performance indexed the World Series! For others it was
deeply offensive because of the disrespect communicated by the creative
juxtaposition of distortion (dicent signs probably operating here) and the
national anthem; still others found the creative index funny or somehow
disturbing (direct energetic interpretant = laughter). For an older man in
the class, whose son was hurt by using drugs during that time, the perfor-
mance indexed, and actually was iconic for, being under the influence of
drugs (he said: "it sounds like being high on drugs"). This is what I meant
earlier by the "looseness of reference" of high context (iconic and indexi-
cal) signs. The same sign may have radically distinctive meanings depend-
ing on personal experiences and situational context. What was striking in
the class, however, was the depth of emotional response that the record-
ing elicited.
While the Hendrix performance itself is a particularly "programmatic"
one that might be dismissed as atypical, the affective power of meaningful
moments in music is due to the same process of combining multiple icon-
ic and indexical legisigns, as well as dicents, in artful ways. The passage
from the third to the fourth movements in Beethoven's Fifth Symphony,
which for years frequently produced a physical response in me (chills in
the spine), is a particularly clear example. In this passage a swirling or stag-
gering sensation was created by the juxtaposition of ascending and descend-
ing melodic motion. The placement of rests and then their absence gave
me the sense that the motion was accelerating. In this fashion, the melody
rose out of the soft, low, dark timpani and strings, shifting from minor to
major. At the end of the transition, a crescendo was added to the static and
yet agitated bowing of strings, and arrival to the fourth movement was
marked by the entrance of loud brass. Here, creative indexing (e.g., the
major/minor and timbre contrasts) along with the use of mutually reinforc-
ing conventions (e.g., crescendo with or following ascent) were involved
in creating music that had a particularly powerful, emotional and energet-
ic effect on me as a listener. The same types of processes and conventions
(legisigns) are used in music generally to produce their effects.
In the Hendrix and Beethoven examples, it was the juxtapositions of
signs within the piece that produced the overall effects. In other cases a
mere moment of music, apart from internal structural relations, may have
a powerful effect. For example, several years ago upon hearing only the
opening chords of Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young's song "Ohio" on the
radio I had a strong emotional reaction as well as a physical response (tin-
gling of my spine), that was totally incommensurate with my feelings about
the song when it was popular, or with feelings that I reflexively recognize
about the deaths at Kent State. The fact that I responded upon hearing only
the opening chords indicates that Meyer's (1956) psychological theory

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regarding the inhibition of expectations to create musical affect does not

apply (although, conversely, his theory may be understood in regard to
indexical processes). I was driving my car and not paying much attention
to the radio at the moment the piece came on, but it created strong emo-
tional and energetic interpretants almost instantly.
I am still not sure of all that was being indexed by the opening chords
of "Ohio," but this is precisely why the music was able to produce such a
strong affective response: perhaps an important period of my life, politi-
cal feelings of that time, or some other events were being recalled by an
extremely condensed sign. The quality of the opening chords as iconic for
a particular feeling may also have been involved. Since I can not link the
objects of this sign with symbolic concepts, I am unable to say what was
indexed. The objects were, nonetheless, lodged in me since a strong reac-
tion was produced.
The objects indexed by "Ohio" were of a different part of my memory
and experience not approachable through symbols, only through the more
basic iconic and indexical signs. The fact that certain parts of ourselves are
only available through pre-symbolic signs is precisely why we need art and
music, media that operate largely at the iconic and indexical levels. It is also
why humans need distinct realms of practice which foreground the differ-
ent semiotic levels of iconicity, indexicality, and symbolism to achieve
subjective integration of the "whole" person. The distinct functions of dif-
ferent types of signs to link varied parts of ourselves and our experiences
explains why pre-symbolic systems like art, music, and dance have been
maintained in societies universally, even when the "more complete" semi-
otic mode of language (having icons, indices, and symbols) is available.
My experience with the song "Ohio" was real and, I would guess, not
atypical. For music scholars this type of phenomenon is only banal if we
choose to ignore how music is really operating for most people in the so-
cial world. The import increases when we consider that the affective po-
tential of music is constantly utilized, and in some cases manipulated, for
a variety of highly significant social ends including the mobilization of col-
lectivities to create or defend a nation.
Rhemes as Signs of Possible Identities: The Case of

Zimbabwean Nationalism
Perhaps Benedict Anderson's (1983) celebrated idea of "imagi

munities" has been so widely applied to other types of identity fo
because it pinpoints the fluid, constructed, semiotic nature of s
tity in units that can not rely on face-to-face interaction. The gen
is relevant in some ways to the dispersed transnational immigr

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and diasporic identities that have become increasingly common in the

contemporary world.
As signs of possibility and imagination, rhemes are key to the construc-
tion of new social formations-they make the imagined possibility materi-
ally patent and public, thus helping to bring the possibility to fruition. Taken
as a whole, a painting of a winged horse is an icon which might create the
sense of an imagined ideal (object) such as 'flight/freedom' plus 'strength/
nobility.' The icon at the macrolevel is actually constructed through cre-
ative indexing: indices of birds22 fused with the image of a powerful horse.
Musical styles can function very much like the picture of a winged horse.
In fusing the indices of various pre-existing social groups into a single rhe-
matic-icon, the resulting sonic image projects the imagined possibility of
forging a new synthetic social group and identity.
Basic to nationalist movements generally are the processes of modernist
cultural reformism-the blending of 'the best' of local culture and foreign
'modern' culture to forge images of a new 'modern' yet locally distinct
"nation" (Gellner 1983; Chatterjee 1986; Buchanan 1995). This process is
based on the manipulation and new combinations of indices to create a
rhematic-icon as the macrolevel sign for a new social identity.
Beginning around 1960, Robert Mugabe and the young middle-class
nationalist leadership in Zimbabwe consciously set about to construct a
unified African nation and party out of the disparate localist-indigenous
groups in order to challenge white domination.23 Initially they did this
through mass rallies, and observers of the time did not miss the fact that
Mugabe's emphasis on indigenous music, dance, and ritual was specifical-
ly directed towards creating an emotional tie between the masses and the
movement (e.g., Shamuyarira 1965:67-68; Bhebe 1989); the emotional
potency of these types of semiotic practices has been theorized above.
In the rallies, music and dance traditions that indexed specific indige-
nous social groups ('tribes') and regions were repeatedly juxtaposed on
stage, and framed by symbolic discourse about the party and nation.
Through repeated juxtaposition of these localist signs in a new context,
their objects (specific regions and social groups) may become indexically
linked to each other with the intention of creating a concrete image of a
new composite social unit. When framed by symbolic discourse about party
and nation within the rallies, they may become indexically linked to this
new imagined entity: "the Zimbabwean nation.'"24 Although not theorized
in Peircian terms, this was the explicit intention of the nationalist leader-
ship; they consciously tried to control the new linking of pre-existing lo-
calist indices of identity to the new objects of party and "nation."
In the context of these rallies, in 1963 a new musical genre called the
gallop was created by the cultural arm of the nationalist party. They were

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also involved with creating a new national costume that would blend 'old'
indigenous elements with 'modern' style. Like the costume, the gallop is
described as incorporating indigenous rhythms and musical features into
the context of a 'modem' electric guitar band. The creative juxtaposition
of localist and modernist indices, typical of modernist reformism, was in-
tended to serve as an icon for the new locally unique, yet 'modern' nation.
Although undertaken for professional as well as political reasons later,
Thomas Mapfumo's incorporation of mbira and other indigenous Shona
genres into his guitar band repertory repeated this pattern.
By realizing a visual and/or sonic image in the world through an artis-
tic style (rhematic-icon), the new imagined entity becomes real in-so-far as
it now has a public, concrete representation. Whereas the winged horse
will probably remain in storybooks and people's dreams, the rhematic-icon-
ic image of new imagined identities, when perceived as a unified image,
and experienced as a unified quality, can influence how people perceive
or construct their own identities dialectically. In short, rhematic-icons can
be used to realize imagined realities, and through their actual representa-
tion can influence social reality by showing the way to what might be pos-
sible. But because they operate initially at the level of Firstness, icons tend
to create emotional interpretants. The indexical components of such icons
(wings, horses, musical indices for certain existing social groups and plac-
es) add the level of Secondness, that is, of existential phenomenon, a real-
ity component.
When properly constructed within the proper social context, such
complex rhematic-icons can be felt (affect as interpretant) to represent
reality: possibility can be felt (Firstness) or experienced (Secondness) as
reality. At the right time and place, the image of a winged horse, the devil,
a new social identity, or even a radically different political order might be
made convincing through iconic and indexical means. Church leaders,
politicians, and revolutionaries have long taken advantage of this.
Immigrant and diasporic communities similarly blend indices from the
original home, the new home, and from members of the same diaspora
elsewhere to create new composite signs to articulate who they are. For
the people involved, the perception of theses signs may differ, however,
when artistic styles emerge from grassroots processes rather than being
consciously constructed by political vanguards.
Dicent-Indices As Signs of Actual Identity: The Case of

Peruvian Chicha
The Peruvian cumbia andina, or chicha, genre provides a ty

ample of how creative indexing operated in the creation of a n

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genre that stood for an emerging social identity. In contrast to the Zimba-
bwean case, the creation of chicha was not consciously constructed by a
political elite, but rather came into existence more organically out of the
experiences of highland Andean migrants, and especially their children, in
the "foreign" locale of Lima.
Chicha involved the juxtaposition of musical components such as scale
types, phrase structure, and melodic shape from the highland wayno (a
song genre indexing Andean social identity) with the rhythm of the urban
cumbia (indexing urbanity among highland migrants), and finally electric
instrumentation (guitars, bass, synthesizers) as an index for youth and
modernity. The meaning of each of these specific indices depended on the
fact that they were also legisigns. It is the particular significance of "cum-
bianess," "waynoness" and electric instruments as types specifically among
the migrants that allowed them to signify what they did.25
Chicha largely pertained to the teenage children of Andean migrants
in Lima. Although using other terminology, Peruvians themselves recog-
nized that chicha serves as a logical sign for the identity of second-genera-
tion Andean migrants in Lima. It organically fused indices that mirrored their
ambiguous social position. Chicha fans were of highland parentage but not
highlanders themselves; they were born in Lima but were not accepted as
true Limefios. Out of this position a new sense of identity emerged for the
children of Andean migrants that coalesced around chicha. The rock in-
fluences in the instrumentation indexed the age set of cumbia andina fans,
and the vocal style functioned as a dicent sign for the youth and class of
the star singers (Turino 1990).
The same process of creative indexing was involved in constructing
what, at one level, may be understood as an rhematic-icon for the new social
group. The organic emergence of chicha, however, has led some Peruvian
migrants to actually interpret the style as a dicent-indexical sign. When
signs, in this case a musical style, are interpreted as organically emerging
out of a particular social position, they function as dicent-indices which are
really affected by their object-that social position. In this case the music
is experienced directly as real signs of an existing identity. This may be an
important distinction for analyzing the effects of processes used in the
purposeful construction of new possible identities in contrast to cases
where styles emerged as a result of pre-existing identities and sensibilities
perceived to have organically given birth to those practices and styles.
The notion of "authenticity" has been highly contested recently in
popular music studies and ethnomusicology as the basis for evaluating
styles. Authenticity relates directly to how signs are interpreted within given
social contexts (i.e., their character as rhemes or dicents). Dicents are in-
terpreted as authentic and "true" because, like the weathervane, they are

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understood as being directly affected and often the result of what they sig-
nify. While this is a subjectively and culturally specific matter, the rheme/
dicent contrast gives us a basis to think through claims about authenticity
and the effects of "authentic" expressive cultural practices in relation to
identity.
Thirdness and Musical Experience

By stressing the importance of Firstness (icons, rhemes) and Second-
ness (indices and dicents) in the preceding sections I do not mean to den-
igrate symbolic processes and Thirdness (legisigns, symbols, argument).
Obviously symbols-language-are profoundly important for human under-
standing and social life. In relation to music, symbols are necessary to con-
ceptualize and discuss aesthetics and affectivity in general or comparative
ways, as I am bound to do in this paper. Through good discussion, sym-
bols may open new possibilities for understanding broader human experi-
ence and the other sign modes themselves.
After being trained about music through symbols, some individuals and
social groups take particular pleasure in experiencing music at the level of
symbolic thinking and discourse. Leonard Meyer offers some interesting
observations in this regard:
Whether a piece of music gives rise to affective experience or to intellectual

experience depends upon the disposition and training of the listener. ... Belief
[framing] also probably plays an important role in determining the character of
the response. Those who have been taught to believe that musical experience
is primarily emotional and who are therefore disposed to respond affectively will
probably do so. Those listeners who have learned to understand music in tech-
nical terms will tend to make musical processes an object of conscious [read:
symbolic] consideration. This probably accounts for the fact that most trained
critics and aestheticians favor the formalist position. Thus while the trained
musician consciously waits for the expected resolution of a dominant seventh
chord the untrained, but practiced, listener feels the delay as affect (1956:40).
It is not surprising that technical musical training that relies heavily on

symbols creates listeners who sometimes respond at the level of Thirdness.
Meyer's clear division between an "intellectual" and an "affective" response
precisely underlines what I have been suggesting about the different na-
ture and effects of signs in Peirce's three categories, although I would like
to avoid his thought-emotion dichotomy.26
Leonard Meyer's comments also speak to the semiotic ambiguity and
the almost mystical quality that music may have for average "untrained"
listeners. This is precisely because such listeners do not have symbols to
rationalize or "domesticate" musical events at the level of Thirdness, that
is, to understand them as a part of generalizable, predictable, mediated

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categories and processes. Even people who do have a vocabulary to talk

about music can not always domesticate musical experience with symbols,
as in my case with the song "Ohio," or they may choose to compartmen-
talize different types of experiences. Ultimately, it is the more ambiguous
nature of indices and the fact that icons and indices are not organized in a
distributional-grammatical system that allows them to be juxtaposed with-
in sign complexes that compound the polysemy.27
Experiencing music through symbolic discourse is certainly valid and
it can be useful. My point is simply that it is extremely different than expe-
riences of Firstness and Secondness and it is a minority musical experience
in our society and for most societies in the world. Thus, if we want to
understand what music is doing, can do, for most people we will attend to
these other types of semiotic processes and categories of experience.
Conclusions
Peirce's semiotic theory helps in the analysis of signifying

forms. But its even greater significance is as an avenue for unde
musical affectivity, different parts of ourselves and experiences
special potentials of music for the construction of personal and soci
tities. The frequently mentioned "mysterious," "untalkable" quality
sic (its lack of domestication by symbols), allows for a heighten
ness of reference, and personal and group appropriation. Music h
multiplicity of potentially meaningful parameters sounding sim
ly, and its status as a potential collective activity helps explain it
lar power to create affect and group identities.
Each sign component discussed has specific potentials. Sym
argument are necessary for general and theoretical discussion a
pand synthetic understanding. The special power of symbols and arg
in relation to these ends is specifically based on the precision w
the symbols and premises are defined (i.e., rooting out polysem
paper is entirely an exercise in symbolic discourse and argumen
level signs have other potentials which, conversely, are importan
in their openness and fluidity for interpretation. Icons are signs of
and, in combination with rhemes, allow for the concretization of im
tion which is key for making new realities possible. Writers who ha
Peircian theory to think about music and art have emphasized iconi
rhemes, signs of Firstness (see Kaelin 1983). In this paper I have
sized signs of Secondness, indices and dicents as signs of reality
tions, social relations, and direct experience.
Although thinking in terms of Peirce's three basic categories
nomena, pinpointing the "natural" quality of icons, and the sno

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multileveled, polysemic, ambiguous, condensed, and personalized nature

of indices helps me understand music's affective potential, speaking in such
terms can ultimately only point to the general ways such experiences hap-
pen. Even when Peircian analysis does shed new light, it does not satisfy,
and it cannot demystify our most profound musical experiences. When
people shift to symbolic thinking and discourse to communicate about deep
feelings and experiences, the feeling and reality of those experiences dis-
appear and we are not satisfied. This is because we have moved to a more
highly mediated, generalized mode of discourse, away from signs of direct
feeling and experience. This is Charles Seeger's dilemma about the "untalk-
ables" of music, and the very point of my paper. Symbols do not pertain to
all parts of ourselves, and they fall short in the realm of feeling and direct
experience.
This is why we need music.
Acknowledgements
I was first introduced to Peirce and the potential of his theories for thinking about mu-
sic by Professor Greg Urban during graduate school at the University of Texas, a gift I grate-
fully acknowledge. An earlier version of this paper was given at a special colloquium at the
University Chicago in 1989. Two expanded versions were written for specific seminars at the
University of Illinois in 1995 and 1996. This version was written for a colloquium at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin in February 1998; I would like to thank my host, Veit Erlmann.
Too numerous to name, many students and colleagues have offered criticism and help-
ful comments on the earlier versions which gave rise to this one. I would like to especially
thank Joanna Bosse, James Lea, Fernando Rios, and Chris Scales for the ongoing dialogue, as
well as Charles Capwell, Steve Hill, Chris Morosin, Jon Sterne, and Rob Templeman for cen-
tral insights offered and inspired.
Notes
1. I have concentrated on Peirce's work about signs and his basic philosophica
ries, which comprise only part of his abundant philosophical and scientific writing
realms, at least, I have tried to be true to his mode of thinking. At times I extend hi
to suit my purposes of developing a theory of music, emotion, and experience. I con
elaborate the workings of iconic, indexical, rhematic, and dicent signs.
2. "Semantico-referential" denotes the capacity of using language to refer to, def
meaning of, and actually create, other signs in language.
3. Peirce suggests two types of objects. One is the existential object out in th
which he called the dynamical object (an actual tree stood for by the word tree)
ond type is the immediate object, the object as the sign represents it and as contain
in the mind. Thus, the general mental concept 'tree' is the immediate object for
tree. The immediate object more or less corresponds with Saussure's "signified" w
binary concept of the sign.
4. There seems to be a general notion that the relationship between "signifie
"signifieds" has changed due to historical conditions in the so-called postmodern pe
example, Grossberg writes that "not only can we no longer confidently read the m
ideology of a text off its surfaces, but even the notion of a single identifiable fixed tex

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lematic-it is also a matter of historically different conditions, of the changing spatial and
temporal complexity of the cultural terrain itself" (1988:19). While I agree with ideas about
the fluidity of certain types of signs, I do not think that the character of semiotic processes
has changed historically. Within the Peircian framework, certain types of signs must have
relatively fixed meanings to function (e.g., symbols), whereas others are by nature fluid and
contextually contingent (e.g., indices), and this is so regardless of historical period. In my view,
what has happened is a recent emphasis on, and attention to, fluid sign types whereas previ-
ously writers (e.g., Saussure and the structuralism that followed) overemphasized relatively
fixed types. It was an analytical error to assume that all sign types functioned like Peircian
symbols, which are akin to Saussure's idea of the sign comprising a unified "signifier" and
"signified."
5. Peirce defines the dynamical interpretant as "the direct affect actually produced by a
sign upon an interpreter of it" (Peirce 1960:4.536).
6. Emotional and energetic interpretants can become signs inspiring language-based
interpretants at later stages in the chain of semiosis. For example, a loud explosion nearby
(sign) might cause an immediate sensation (emotional interpretant--sign) setting off an adren-
alin flow (energetic interpretant--sign) making one jump (energetic interpretant--sign) gen-
erating another unreflexive action such as spinning around to look for the source of the noise
(energetic interpretant---sign) which might lead to blurting out, 'What the hell was that?!'
(energetic interpretant--sign) generating language-based attempts at an answer (language-
interpretant--sign .. .). All of this can happen in an instant and involves different aspects of
the nervous system. Even when reaching the linguistic-based signs and interpretants, earlier
interpretants and signs, such as lingering sensations of surprise or fear, fast heartbeat, etc. can
reinsert themselves in the chain (be noticed and cause a new effect) if they are strong enough.
Thus a linear progression from emotional to energetic to language-based interpretants can not
be assumed, and it becomes pointless to differentiate mind and body since the brain and
nervous system are part of the body.
7. For example, in ethnomusicology the concept of metaphor has sometimes been used
in cases where the hierarchical organization of an ensemble is seen as metaphoric for the
broader social structure (e.g., Waterman 1990). In Peircian terms this would simply be an
image-icon if the hierarchy in the ensemble called forth the object of 'general social hierar-
chy' for a perceiver. This case does not involve the creative juxtaposition of signs which posit
a similarity between their distinct objects, but rather a perceived similarity between sign and
object.
8. In fact, the word symbol is used in so many ways and its meaning has become so vague
that it no longer serves well for semiotic and cultural analysis. I prefer and strictly use Peirce's
specific concept. I also understand the reluctance to accept new technical meanings for such
a widespread, general term. To understand the Peircian framework, however, such transla-
tion is necessary and, I have found, ultimately beneficial.
9. Some parts of speech, however, are not symbols. For example, pronouns in general,
and especially demonstrative pronouns function as indices to other words in the utterance,
or to elements in the environment: 'that chair.' Demonstrative pronouns are not symbols
because they have no general object. Likewise, articles are not symbols.
10. This is why we must use language to communicate in general, relatively context-
free, terms about everything else-Charles Seeger's (1977:16-30) linguocentric predicament
for musicology.
11. Peirce noted that linguistic propositions are all dicent signs, in this case, dicent sym-
bols. Peirce goes on to discuss the dicent sign as a proposition that "professes to be really
affected by the actual existent or real law to which it refers" (1955:104). Thus, the proposi-
tion, 'the rose is red' is affected by the "laws" or conventional meanings behind the concepts
of 'rose' and 'red' and to the existence of those qualities in an actual flower.
12. A "wince" initially functions iconically to express pain or displeasure because it
"looks like" other expressions of displeasure. Primarily it is indexically related to emotional

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states through co-occurrence. All indices depend on an initial iconic moment of recognition
linking token and type to form the legisign. Earlier I gave the example that a rising melodic
line and crescendo might function iconically in relation to excited speaking voices. This is
true at an early part of the semiotic chain, but the real impact of these signs is based on the
fact that rising pitch and volume when speaking co-occurs with excited states and we inter-
pret these signs as being the result of excitement (the object). Thus at a later point in the
chain the legisigns 'rising pitch' and 'crescendo' function as dicent-indices, and it is this char-
acter that explains their affective potential.
13. Often the effects of such signs are described as "unconscious" or "subconscious";
"consciousness" being delimited by linguistic thought and communication (e.g., Bateson
1972:141). From a Peircian perspective, for signs to function they have to be apprehended,
although not necessarily through linguistic-based interpretants. The concepts emotional and
energetic interpretant are useful in that they allow us to talk about different types of aware-
ness and semiotic effect, avoiding the typical mind-body, emotions-thought, and conscious-
unconscious dichotomies. All three types of interpretants involve mental (which is also a
physical) activity.
14. It is no accident that among all Peirce's categories the signs in Trichotomy II have
received the most attention in social and ethnomusicological theory, and that the second terms
in the latter two trichotomies are particularly important for sociomusical analysis. Secondness
is the realm of connections to the world, and the "reality" functions of signs.
15. The actual semiotic status of the qualisign is a matter for further reflection and
debate. From one point of view it is pure Firstness and does not function as a sign at all in-
and-of itself until it is embedded in an actual sign, sinsign, at the level of Secondness. None-
theless, it represents semiotic potential of pure quality which may be analyzed apart from its
actual embodiment.
16. Logically it can be seen that Firsts stand alone; Seconds involve a direct unmedia
relation between a first and a second; and Thirds bring a first and a second into a mediat
synthetic relationship. Thus higher level entities logically contain the lower.
17. Peirce has convincingly demonstrated that his three basic categories could be
plied to all phenomena (e.g. 1992:145-284). It is certainly possible to extend them to e
riential states in individuals. A state of Firstness is when there is no consciousness of self, ot
or world-when "trains of thought," or "chains of semiosis" have not begun or are kept
beginning. Such states are achievable, for example, through certain meditation practi
well as other activities including dance and musical performance. This state can not b
prehended until after the fact, in memory; recognize it and you are already outside of it
it is gone. States of Secondness involve experiences of intense concentration on one t
person, or activity (your instrument, your dance partner, your lover, a tennis ball) such
no mediating language-based thoughts about self or the entity of attention occur. In
experiences of Secondness are what Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi calls "flow" (1988). He has e
orated a theory of "flow," particularly useful for musicians, involving an escalating balan
challenge and competence which he finds essential to intense, sustained experiences of c
centration (Secondness). States of Firstness and Secondness, are often deeply satisfying an
relaxing because the self and mundane matters of the world are temporarily transcended
"thought" about). States of Thirdness involve language-based propositional and seman
referential thought and social interchanges.
18. More accurately, the signs of highly iconic musical forms are often simply taken
granted because they match one's broader experience and sense of reality when pro
performed according to the cultural norms of the style ("good music"). This taken-for-gr
ed quality is underlined in "poor performance," that is, when the iconicity is disrupted,
often generating criticism.
19. Hall proposes a continuum between what he calls "High-Context" and "Low-C
text" communication. "High-Context" communication is when much of the information
contained within the context, including the context of individual memory, rather than i

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code. Without using Peircian terminology, what he is referring to is indexical process. In "Low-
Context" communication most of the information is carried by the code, which presupposes
its basis in Peircian symbols.
20. From the Peircian perspective, postmodernist assertions about the new fluidity of
signs-the unmooring of signifier from signified-are non-sensical. Regardless of the histori-
cal period, indices have always been rather fluid, polysemic, multileveled, and non-guaran-
teed. Symbols, if they are to function well as symbols, by contrast, must be relatively tightly
bound to their objects ("look it up in the dictionary"). The problem is that postmodernist
semiotic discussions do not distinguish between the distinct nature of different sign types.
21. In Distinction (1984), Pierre Bourdieu theorizes this strong connection between art
and life in popular aesthetics, and contrasts it specifically with elite European aesthetics which
are based on the notion of the separateness of art and life.
22. Here the wing of a bird is an index for the whole animal because of co-occurrence.
23. Robert Mugabe, who became the leader of the victorious ZANU(PF) party and pres-
ident of Zimbabwe after independence in 1980, served as Publicity Secretary of the early
nationalist parties. He played a central role in initiating cultural nationalism.
24. As in this case, the analysis of how different types of signs function in relation to
each other for given purposes is crucial since each (e.g., rhematic icons, indices, and sym-
bols) have different potentials. In the 1960s in Zimbabwe, the noun "nation" was certainly a
rhematic-symbolic-legisign; not only was it general but at the time it was a yet unrealized
possibility.
25. Among people in the highlands, 'wayno' does not signify 'highlands' but more
specific things. Likewise, in Colombia, its place of origin, 'cumbia' does not necessarily in-
dex urbanity any more than electric instruments signify 'modernity' in the United States.
26. In many places, musical training largely consists of iconic-indexical processes: di-
rect imitation of a teacher or model with few words spoken. In some situations, Indian clas-
sical music for example, learning takes place through direct imitation, yet there is also a
(somewhat separate) tradition of theorizing about music through symbolic discourse. Certain
social groups, the Aymara of southern Peru for instance, do not have a highly developed sym-
bolic system for talking about music and do not seem interested in doing so. They also do
not have formal music training; people primarily learn by doing within actual festival perfor-
mances. It is also interesting that, unlike that of their Quechua neighbors, Aymara music is
primarily instrumental. It would be interesting to do cross-cultural and cross-group studies on
the relative use of symbols in musical life (training, discourses about, song texts) and prefer-
ences for the different sign modes in musical experience.
27. The distributional or grammatical meaning of words reduces polysemy. For exam-
ple, the meaning of a linguistic form that may either serve as a verb or a noun will be distin-
guished by grammatical marking, word order, suffixes, etc., to indicate its identity: "The light
light lights lightly."
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Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music

Author(s): Thomas Turino

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