PDIC v. CA, G.R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003
PDIC v. CA, G.R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003
PDIC v. CA, G.R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 30, finding petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) liable, as statutory
insurer, for the value of 20 Golden Time Deposits belonging to respondents Jose Abad, Leonor Abad, Sabina Abad,
Josephine "Josie" Beata Abad-Orlina, Cecilia Abad, Pio Abad, Dominic Abad, and Teodora Abad at the Manila
Banking Corporation (MBC), Iloilo Branch.
Prior to May 22, 1997, respondents had, individually or jointly with each other, 71 certificates of time deposits
denominated as "Golden Time Deposits" (GTD) with an aggregate face value of P1,115,889.96. 1
On May 22, 1987, a Friday, the Monetary Board (MB) of the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, issued Resolution 5052 prohibiting MBC to do business in the Philippines, and placing its assets and affairs
under receivership. The Resolution, however, was not served on MBC until Tuesday the following week, or on May
26, 1987, when the designated Receiver took over. 3
On May 25, 1987, the next banking day following the issuance of the MB Resolution, respondent Jose Abad was at
the MBC at 9:00 a.m. for the purpose of pre-terminating the 71 aforementioned GTDs and re-depositing the fund
represented thereby into 28 new GTDs in denominations of P40,000.00 or less under the names of herein
respondents individually or jointly with each other. 4 Of the 28 new GTDs, Jose Abad pre-terminated 8 and withdrew
the value thereof in the total amount of P320,000.00. 5
Respondents thereafter filed their claims with the PDIC for the payment of the remaining 20 insured GTDs. 6
On February 11, 1988, PDIC paid respondents the value of 3 claims in the total amount of P120,000.00. PDIC,
however, withheld payment of the 17 remaining claims after Washington Solidum, Deputy Receiver of MBC-Iloilo,
submitted a report to the PDIC7 that there was massive conversion and substitution of trust and deposit accounts on
May 25, 1987 at MBC-Iloilo.8 The pertinent portions of the report stated:
On May 25, 1987 (Monday) or a day prior to the official announcement and take-over by CB of the assets
and liabilities of The Manila Banking Corporation, the Iloilo Branch was found to have recorded an unusually
heavy movements in terms of volume and amount for all types of deposits and trust accounts. It appears
that the impending receivership of TMBC was somehow already known to many depositors on account of
the massive withdrawals paid on this day which practically wiped out the branch's entire cash position. . . .
. . . The intention was to maximize the availment of PDIC coverage limited to P40,000 by spreading out big
accounts to as many certificates under various nominees. . . .9
Because of the report, PDIC entertained serious reservation in recognizing respondents' GTDs as deposit liabilities
of MBC-Iloilo. Thus, on August 30, 1991, it filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondents with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, for a judicial declaration determination of the insurability of respondents'
GTDs at MBC-Iloilo.10
In their Answer filed on October 24, 1991 and Amended Answer 11 filed on January 9, 1992, respondents set up
a counterclaim against PDIC whereby they asked for payment of their insured deposits. 12
In its Decision of February 22, 1994,13 Branch 30 of the Iloilo RTC declared the 20 GTDs of respondents to be
deposit liabilities of MBC, hence, are liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer. It accordingly disposed as follows:
1. Declaring the 28 GTDs of the Abads which were issued by the TMBC-Iloilo on May 25, 1987 as deposits
or deposit liabilities of the bank as the term is defined under Section 3 (f) of R.A. No. 3591, as amended;
2. Declaring PDIC, being the statutory insurer of bank deposits, liable to the Abads for the value of the
remaining 20 GTDs, the other 8 having been paid already by TMBC Iloilo on May 25,1987;
3. Ordering PDIC to pay the Abads the value of said 20 GTDs less the value of 3 GTDs it paid on February
11, 1988, and the amounts it may have paid the Abads pursuant to the Order of this Court dated September
8, 1992;
4. Ordering PDIC to pay immediately the Abads the balance of its admitted liability as contained in the
aforesaid Order of September 8, 1992, should there be any, subject to liquidation when this case shall have
been finally decide; and
5. Ordering PDIC to pay legal interest on the remaining insured deposits of the Abads from February 11,
1988 until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by the assailed Decision of October 21, 1996, 14 affirmed the trial court's decision
except as to the award of legal interest which it deleted.
Hence, PDIC's present Petition for Review which sets forth this lone assignment of error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE AMOUNT REPRESENTED IN THE FACES OF THE SO CALLED "GOLDEN TIME DEPOSITS" WERE
INSURED DEPOSITS EVEN AS THEY WERE MERE DERIVATIVES OF RESPONDENTS' PREVIOUS ACCOUNT
BALANCES WHICH WERE PRE-TERMINATED/TERMINATED AT THE TIME THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION WAS ALREADY IN SERIOUS FINANCIAL DISTRESS.
In its supplement to the petition, PDIC adds the following assignment of error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS FOR PAYMENT OF INSURED DEPOSITS FOR
THE REASON THAT AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF DOES NOT ESSENTIALLY ENTAIL AN
EXECUTORY PROCESS AS THE ONLY RELIEF THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IS A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PETITIONER UNDER R.A. 3591, AS AMENDED,
PARTICULARLY SECTION 3(F) THEREOF AS CONSIDERED AGAINST THE SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MATTER IN ISSUE SOUGHT TO BE CONSTRUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
OTHER MATTERS THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED BY PETITIONER IN THE PROCESSING OF
RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS.
Under its charter,15 PDIC (hereafter petitioner) is liable only for deposits received by a bank "in the usual course of
business."16 Being of the firm conviction that, as the reported May 25, 1987 bank transactions were so massive,
hence, irregular, petitioner essentially seeks a judicial declaration that such transactions were not made "in the
usual course of business" and, therefore, it cannot be made liable for deposits subject thereof. 17
Petitioner points that as MBC was prohibited from doing further business by MB Resolution 505 as of May 22, 1987,
all transactions subsequent to such date were not done "in the usual course of business."
Petitioner further posits that there was no consideration for the 20 GTDs subject of respondents' claim. In support of
this submission, it states that prior to March 25, 1987, when the 20 GTDs were made, MBC had been experiencing
liquidity problems, e.g., at the start of banking operations on March 25, 1987, it had only P2,841,711.90 cash on
hand and at the end of the day it was left with P27,805.81 consisting mostly of mutilated bills and coins. 18 Hence,
even if respondents had wanted to convert the face amounts of the GTDs to cash, MBC could not have complied
with it.
Petitioner theorizes that after MBC had exhausted its cash and could no longer sustain further withdrawal
transactions, it instead issued new GTDs as "payment" for the pre-terminated GTDs of respondents to make sure
that all the newly-issued GTDs have face amounts which are within the statutory coverage of deposit insurance.
Petitioner concludes that since no cash was given by respondents and none was received by MBC when the new
GTDs were transacted, there was no consideration therefor and, thus, they were not validly transacted "in the usual
course of business" and no liability for deposit insurance was created. 19
While the MB issued Resolution 505 on May 22, 1987, a copy thereof was served on MBC only on May 26, 1987.
MBC and its clients could be given the benefit of the doubt that they were not aware that the MB resolution had
been passed, given the necessity of confidentiality of placing a banking institution under receivership. 20
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by the
Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure the protection
of the banking institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire
consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In
the process, fortunes may be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
community. (Emphasis supplied).21
Mere conjectures that MBC had actual knowledge of its impending closure do not suffice. The MB resolution could
not thus have nullified respondents' transactions which occurred prior to May 26, 1987.
That no actual money in bills and/or coins was handed by respondents to MBC does not mean that the transactions
on the new GTDs did not involve money and that there was no consideration therefor. For the outstanding balance
of respondents' 71 GTDs in MBC prior to May 26, 1987 22 in the amount of P1,115,889.15 as earlier mentioned
was re-deposited by respondents under 28 new GTDs. Admittedly, MBC had P2,841,711.90 cash on hand — more
than double the outstanding balance of respondent's 71 GTDs — at the start of the banking day on May 25, 1987.
Since respondent Jose Abad was at MBC soon after it opened at 9:00 a.m. of that day, petitioner should not
presume that MBC had no cash to cover the new GTDs of respondents and conclude that there was no
consideration for said GTDs.
Petitioner having failed to overcome the presumption that the ordinary course of business was followed, 23 this Court
finds that the 28 new GTDs were deposited "in the usual course of business" of MBC.
In its second assignment of error, petitioner posits that the trial court erred in ordering it to pay the balance of the
deposit insurance to respondents, maintaining that the instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaratory relief
which does not essentially entail an executory process, and the only relief that should have been granted by the trial
court is a declaration of the parties' rights and duties. As such, petitioner continues, no order of payment may arise
from the case as this is beyond the office of declaratory relief proceedings. 24
Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. There is nothing in
its nature, however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action. 25
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a
counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action
is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56
of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary
some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules
governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may
serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. 26
Petitioner additionally submits that the issue of determining the amount of deposit insurance due respondents was
never tried on the merits since the trial dwelt only on the "determination of the viability or validity of the deposits" and
no evidence on record sustains the holding that the amount of deposit due respondents had been finally
determined.27 This issue was not raised in the court a quo, however, hence, it cannot be raised for the first time in
the petition at bar.28
Finally, petitioner faults respondents for availing of the statutory limits of the PDIC law, presupposing that, based on
the conduct of respondent Jose Abad on March 25, 1987, he and his co respondents "somehow knew" of the
impending closure of MBC. Petitioner ascribes bad faith to respondent Jose Abad in transacting the questioned
deposits, and seeks to disqualify him from availing the benefits under the law. 29
Good faith is presumed. This, petitioner failed to overcome since it offered mere presumptions as evidence of bad
faith.
SO ORDERED.