Contemporary Psychoanalysis

ISSN: 0010-7530 (Print) 2330-9091 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uucp20

Psychopathy and Human Evil: An Overview

Sheldon Itzkowitz

To cite this article: Sheldon Itzkowitz (2018): Psychopathy and Human Evil: An Overview,
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, DOI: 10.1080/00107530.2017.1418557

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00107530.2017.1418557

Published online: 31 Jan 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 6

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uucp20
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 2018, Vol. 0, No. 0: 1–24.
C William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis & Psychology and
the William Alanson White Psychoanalytic Society
ISSN: 0010-7530 print / 2330-9091 online
DOI: 10.1080/00107530.2017.1418557

SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL: AN

OVERVIEW

Abstract. The term “psychopath” usually conjures images of serial killers or acts
of genocide. Less frequently considered are those who are intelligent enough to
avoid detection by the criminal justice system while hiding in the boardrooms
of corporations or lurking in the halls of government institutions. This article
provides an overview of psychopathy and human evil by exploring the person-
ality characteristics, organization, and cognitive style of the psychopath, the role
of superego pathology, contributions from the field of attachment, and ways
in which dissociation plays a role in psychopathy and potential for confusion
this with the dissociative structuring of the mind. The article closes with a brief
discussion about “corporate” or “successful psychopaths” and how they have a
negative impact on culture and society.

Keywords: dissociation, superego pathology, attachment, Erich Fromm, successful

psychopath

M ost violence is not committed by the mentally ill … and most men-
tally ill people are not violent. The vast majority of murders are
committed by people with severe disorders of personality or character, not
people who are “insane” in the sense of being out of touch with reality, or
experiencing hallucinations or delusions. (Gilligan, 1997, p. 101)

Address correspondence to Sheldon Itzkowitz, Ph.D., ABPP, 295 Central Park West, New
York, NY, 10024. E-mail: [email protected]
The author wishes to acknowledge the body of literature on the neurobiology and genetics
of psychopathy, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.
I wish to express my gratitude to Drs. Elizabeth F. Howell & Barbara Nussbaum for their
valuable comments on earlier versions of this article.

1
2 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

The term “psychopath” elicits thoughts of serial killers, pedophiles,

sadistic, intentionally cruel persons, or acts of genocide at the hands of
tyrants such as Stalin or Hitler. However, psychopathy runs along a spec-
trum; not all psychopaths are serial killers or mass murderers. There are
psychopaths who may be thought of as “subclinical” (LeBreton, Binning,
& Adorno, 2005) or “successful” (Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2012)
unless they commit a fatal error. They are adept at avoiding exposure
to either the mental health or criminal justice systems. In fact, these
psychopaths are often highly successful and often achieve positions
of status in the world of governance or corporations, in which case
they have been referred to as “corporate” psychopaths (Boddy, 2010;
Wellons, 2012). In this article, I offer an overview, first addressing the
more pathological end of the spectrum, followed by a brief discussion
of the more “successful” end, those who share many of the same charac-
teristics but have enjoyed a different outcome in life. In this discussion,
to better understand the psychology of psychopaths, I link the following
foundational psychological processes: failures in healthy attachment
(e.g., disorganized attachment), problems in mentalization (including the
inhibition of reflective functioning), malignant narcissism, and dissocia-
tion. I highlight the work of key theoretical figures, notably Erich Fromm.

Serial Killers

It is an unfortunate truism that acquaintances and neighbors of the

subgroup of psychopaths known as serial killers are often surprised,
even shocked, when they discover the heinous crimes committed so
close to home. For example, Yamamoto (2016) writes of Lonnie David
Franklin, Jr. (a.k.a. the “Grimm Sleeper”),

… neighbors who live in the same South Los Angeles neighborhood as

the man accused of slaying nine women and one 15-year-old over two
decades are shocked, saying they could never imagine he would do any-
thing remotely like this … disbelief that Franklin could have killed women
and dumped their bodies in alleys and trash bins around Southern Califor-
nia. Rosie Hunter lived down the street from Franklin when she was 10
or 11 years old. All she remembers is a neighborhood mechanic always
helping people.

Or in an Associated Press (2009) article about Anthony Sowell,

PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 3

The man who lived in the house of rotting corpses never gave people a
reason to wonder what he was really doing behind closed doors. … The
suspected serial killer seemed so harmless that when he invited neighbors
over for a barbecue in his driveway, they came. So benign that when he
beckoned women inside his house that smelled of death, they apparently
went willingly.

“Genocide” writes Bollas (1995), “ … is the quintessential crime of

the twentieth century, and genocide is exemplified by the serial killer,
a genocidal being who swiftly dispatches his victims and converts the
human into the inhuman, creating meaningless deaths that sully the con-
cepts of living and dying” (p. 185). For Bollas, the serial killer is created
in childhood by severe relational trauma. Of the men who become se-
rial killers of “anonymous people” he states, they “ … have suffered a
kind of emotional death …” (p. 187). Bollas believes that the impact of
early trauma is overwhelming and drastic, and he explains, “In place of
a once live self, a new being emerges, identified with the killing of what
is good, the destruction of trust, love, and reparation” (p. 189).
How then do they walk among us, sit next to us at work, live in
our neighborhoods and even befriend us? How do we understand the
surprise and shock of neighbors or coworkers upon learning the “nice,
quiet man” living or sitting so close by is someone convicted of commit-
ting unthinkably violent and sadistic crimes? The emotional death that
Bollas describes is similar to the emptiness, isolation, and loneliness that
some understand as characteristic of dissociation. Can we conceptual-
ize the previously unknown aspect of this person that suddenly appears
and kills, as a well-hidden aspect of a psychopath in which attachment
has been dissociated (see Howell, this issue), or as a deeply dissociated
rageful self-state based on an internalized representation of the person’s
abuser when he or she was a child. Is this someone with a dissociative
disorder?

Defining Evil
Stone’s contemporary definition of evil, referring to, “the actions of
another person or group that evokes horror, revulsion, shock, and
fright.” (This issue, p. XXXX) is remarkably similar to Erich Fromm’s.
Fromm defined evil as an action performed consciously by an individual
or group that intentionally inflicts—or causes the victim(s) to suffer—
physical, psychological, or bodily harm, and where the perpetrator(s)
4 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

of evil suffers no real felt sense of remorse or regret over their actions,
having no concern for the harm they inflict (Fromm, 1964, 1991).

Erich Fromm’s Position on Evil

The term “malignant narcissism” was first coined by Erich Fromm (1964),
but many others, including Kernberg (1992), have since used it and sim-
ilar terms to refer to the actions of people who carry the diagnosis of
psychopath (Itzkowitz, 2017). Beginning with DSM-IV, the diagnosis of
psychopath was replaced by antisocial personality.
Fromm was a Marxist and a psychoanalyst. His Marxist leanings
grounded his theory of psychoanalysis and his concept of character
in human relations, class structure, and the significant impact of soci-
ety and culture. Where Freud believed that aggression and destructive-
ness were connected with a fixed quantity of instinctual energy, Fromm
saw character as part of the personality that is acquired and shaped
by interpersonal–relational experience (Funk, & Shaw, 1982). Thus, he
uncoupled the etiology of pathological hatred from the instincts and relo-
cated it in the harmful and corrupting elements of human experience as
embedded in society. For Fromm, hatred of oneself and hating others are
intricately connected and not disparate. As such he saw destructiveness
and the need to destroy as an end product of the obstruction of people’s
freedom to experience and express themselves to their fullest potential.
In 1947, Fromm wrote, “ … the degree of destructiveness is propor-
tionate to the degree to which the unfolding of the person’s capacities
is blocked” (p. 218). In this regard, he was referring to the powerful
negative role that cultures, societies, and governments can have by con-
trolling, obstructing, or constricting the development and evolution of
the minds and actions of individuals. Therefore, the breeding ground of
violence and destructiveness lay in cultures and societies that strangulate
individuals’ freedom and ability to thrive and evolve beyond their current
life situation.
Fromm (1964), years before Kohut, discussed two forms of narcissism,
the benign and the malignant. The benign form of narcissism is asso-
ciated with and emerges from a productive orientation to living. Joy,
self-satisfaction, pride, and narcissistic gratification are derived from the
fruits of one’s labor or production. Productivity is in the service of living.
Benign narcissism is self-correcting because the object of one’s narcis-
sism is the work, the materials, the process, even the outcome, and the
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 5

narcissism is balanced by the fulfillment and investment in the work it-

self. “[B]ut the very fact that the work itself makes it necessary to be
related to reality, constantly curbs the narcissism and keeps it within
bounds” (p. 77).
In contrast to benign narcissism is malignant narcissism, where pride,
joy and gratification derive from one’s possessions, body, looks, wealth,
house, job, etc., rather than anything one produces. It is a form of what
Fromm termed “nonproductivity” and it lacks the “corrective element”
seen in benign narcissism. For the nonproductive malignant narcissist,
one’s “greatness” or grandiosity lies in what one has and not in one’s
achievements. Therefore, the need to be related or connected to others is
limited and in the process of maintaining one’s “greatness” or grandiosity,
one becomes less related to reality (Fromm, 1964). One has to continually
feed and support such narcissism “ … in order to be better protected
from the danger that my narcissistically inflated ego might be revealed
as the product of my empty imagination. Malignant narcissism, thus, is
not self-limiting …” (p. 77).
In The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Fromm (1973) developed
and elaborated on his concepts of the biophilic and the necrophilic char-
acters and their orientations to living. Fromm’s necrophilic character is
someone who passionately embraces all that strips life of positive, human
passion and meaning. The necrophilic character is attracted to destruc-
tiveness, death, the technical and mechanical. Landis (1975) explains that
the necrophile is one who uses sadism as a power operation to domi-
nate and control others. He is driven by self-absorption, self-interest, and
greed. Fromm (1971) wrote, “ … it is the passion to transform that which
is alive into something unalive; to destroy for the sake of destruction;
the exclusive interest in all that is purely mechanical. It is the passion to
tear apart living structures” (p. 369). Like the psychopath, the destruc-
tiveness to others is of no concern to the necrophile. It is these qualities
of the necrophile that make him relevant to the current discussion of
psychopathy and human evil.
The biophilic orientation “ … develops from within the context of a
loving supportive family whose members are themselves biophilic; they
love life” (Itzkowitz, 2017 p. 85). Such families are not only loving, but
also infused with warmth, protectiveness and encouraging of curiosity
and growth. Cultures and societies can help facilitate a biophilic orienta-
tion. Funk and Shaw (1982) write,
6 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

… security in the sense that the basic material conditions for a dignified
life are not threatened; justice in the sense that nobody can be an end for
the purposes of another; and freedom in the sense that each man has the
possibility to be an active and responsible member of society. (p. 136)

Implicit in the development of Fromm’s biophilic orientation are a

family, community, and culture that facilitate and enhance the growth
of the individual’s sense of worth, esteem, pride, goodness, and respect.
Gilligan proposes that it is this positive sense of self that can serve as an
inoculation against the propensity for violence. He theorizes that there
are several precursors to violence, which he identifies as shame: a deep
personal and chronic sense of shame. In writing about violent men,
Gillian explains that they are people who feel “ … vulnerable not just to
‘loss of face’ but to the total loss of honor, prestige, respect and status—
the disintegration of identity …” (p. 112).
Gilligan (1997) notes that emotional health and the stability of a ro-
bust sense of self emerges through human interaction within community
and culture. He writes, “The relationship between culture and charac-
ter is an unavoidable socio-psychological reality” (p. 96). The elements
of selfhood, community, and culture are so connected for Gilligan that
they become psychically conjoined to the extent that a threat to the sur-
vival of one’s culture becomes tantamount to the survival of the self.
Violent, incarcerated men cling to a sense of self-esteem and respect to
avoid overwhelming feelings of shame and humiliation, which must be
avoided at all costs. Shame and loss of respect is tantamount to death:
“People will sacrifice anything to prevent the death and disintegration
of their individual or group identity” (p. 97). Membership in a subgroup
within the prison system helps bolster one’s sense of esteem, self-respect,
safety, and cohesiveness. When the subgroup is threatened or shamed,
members are likely to experience this as a threat to their individual iden-
tity and self-esteem. Likewise, when a member is threatened or assaulted,
the subgroup defends the shamed comrade to restore the status of both
the individual and the group and to maintain honor, respect, and group
cohesion. Gilligan (2009) quoting an inmate writes,

My life ain’t worth nothin’ if I take somebody disrespectin’ me and callin’

me punk asshole faggot and goin’ “Ha! Ha!” at me. Life ain’t worth livin’
if there ain’t nothin’ worth dyin’ for. If you ain’t got pride you got nothin’.
[p. 106]
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 7

The means by which respect, honor, and self-esteem are restored is by

violence, a causative factor of inmate-on-inmate violence.
Regarding group or social narcissism, Fromm similarly believed that
the majority of a group’s members, if not the whole, sustains the ide-
ology of the group. Adherence and devotion to group ideology forms
the basis of membership, and the feeling of belongingness inflates in-
dividual members’ narcissistic needs, and enhances group cohesiveness.
Cheliotis (2010) clarifies Fromm’s ideas offering another motivating fac-
tor for group adherence, being, “ … the desire to uphold or improve
one’s social standing according to the requirements of given cultural mi-
lieus and the overarching “metastructures” of politics and the economy”
(p. 338). He further clarifies that the underlying ideology of the group
need not be reasonable, and I’d extend this to include rational as well;
the ideology may in fact be pathological. It is developed and sustained by
the consensus and like-mindedness of the group. (See Prince, this issue.)
In “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” Freud (1921)
makes the argument that group membership often results in identification
with the authority of the leader, thereby swapping one’s conscience for
that of the leader. In the process, previous inhibitions are abandoned and
a new freedom to act in tandem with group mores provides increased
pleasure. He writes, “A group is an obedient herd, which could never
live without a master. It has such a thirst for obedience that it submits
instinctively to anyone who appoints himself its master” (p. 81). Obvi-
ously, the danger lies in submitting to the moral authority of a corrupt,
maniacal, psychopathic leader.
Returning to Fromm’s ideas on human evil, we discover his syn-
drome of decay that includes necrophilia, narcissism, and incestuous-
symbiosis. It combines malignant narcissism with the necrophilic orienta-
tion/character, i.e., the love of all that is dead and a regressive, symbiotic-
incestuous fixation, which “ … prompts men to destroy for the sake of
destruction, and to hate for the sake of hate” (Fromm, 1964, p. 19). By
“regressive symbiotic-incestuous” ties, Fromm is referring to all that inter-
feres with and prevents the person from living a fully independent life.
Fromm (1973) also used the term malignant aggression to refer to
cruelty and destructiveness that he believed specific to humankind. He
wrote, “ … man is the only primate that kills and tortures members
of his own species without any reason … and who feels satisfaction
in doing so” (p. 26). Fromm believed that malignant aggression and
8 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

destructiveness was a form of negative transcendence, well described

by Mauricio Cortina in his 2015 article, “The Greatness and Limitations
of Erich Fromm’s Humanism”:

Human destructiveness and extreme sadism can be understood as cases of

negative transcendence, i.e., if I don’t have the power to be a loving and
creative person, I have the possibility of turning to the perverse power
to kill and inflict untold suffering on my victims. These perversions may
come from histories of children who have been sadistically treated and hu-
miliated by one or more attachment figures and live in families or cultures
in which violence is rampant. (p. 396)

Malignant aggression can also serve as a form of sadistic control and

authoritarian domination. Examples can be seen in brutal dictators, such
as Stalin and Hitler, who Fromm considered necrophilic characters, in
genocide, and—I would add—psychopaths.

Personality Characteristics, Personality Organization, and Cognitive

Style of the Psychopath
The psychopath is described by many writers (Fonagy, 2003; Meloy,
1996; Meloy & Shiva, 2007, Hare, 1993; Stone, 2009) as someone who is
narcissistic, remorseless, lacking conscience and empathy, and pursues
self-gratification regardless of the cost, impact, or suffering they inflict on
others. They are emotionally shallow and superficial people who lack the
basic personal qualities and emotions necessary to create and maintain
deep, loving, intimate relationships. They want and crave excitement and
novelty, without which they become bored easily. Malignant narcissism
is core in this pathological disorder. Psychopaths’ dangerousness is dis-
guised by their capacity for presenting themselves as charming, likeable,
amusing, entertaining, quick-witted, and interesting people.
Kernberg (1971) cautions us that the external presentation of narcis-
sistic patients often hides deeper character pathology. He lists, “ … the
absence of deep object relationships in the present, and severe pathol-
ogy of their internalized object relationships as expressed in pathological
ego and superego structures” (p. 629) as qualities we must be aware of.
J. Reid Meloy (1996), a major contributor to the psychoanalytic study of
psychopathy and human evil (see this issue) describes the psychopath as
someone who is suffering, “ … a fundamental disidentification with hu-
manity” (p. 5). In describing psychopathic pathology, Meloy and Shiva
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 9

(2008) explain that at the core of the psychopath is significant narcissistic

pathology: “The dominant idealization of the self is that of a predator,
which diminishes rage and envy towards others; the dominant ideal-
ization of the object is one who will perfectly serve the interest of the
psychopath, often as prey” (p. 340).
Meloy (1996) and Meloy and Shiva (2008) explain that the psycho-
pathic character is organized at a primitive, narcissistic level. Failures in
the use of repression prevent the development and differentiation of the
agencies of mind (id, ego, and superego) necessary for neurotic person-
ality organization and the use of fantasy as a way of internalizing and
coping with external reality. At this primitive level of psychic organiza-
tion, splitting (dissociation as defense, not as an organization of mind)
and projective identification become primary defenses; and part objects,
not whole objects, populate the internal world of the psychopath. Con-
cepts of goodness and badness remain unintegrated, and “identifications
and internalizations,” when present, are usually “harsh or unpleasant.” As
a result, the psychopath is unable to maintain emotional stability solely
through the use of internalized fantasy. The debasement and depreca-
tion of others—and acting out in the form of cruelty, abuse, torture or the
annihilation of others—serves the crucial role of stabilizing his grandiose
self-structure. Pretense, deceit, deception, and violence are the tools of the
psychopath’s trade.
Meloy and Shiva (2008) explain that psychopaths are undersocialized
and immature with a limited range of affects. “Consciously felt emotions
include excitement, frustration, rage, boredom, envy, dysphoria, and
shame” (p. 342). They add: “More mature feelings that require whole-
object relatedness and a capacity for secure attachment are missing.
These include anger, fear, guilt, depression, sympathy, gratitude, empa-
thy, remorse, sadness, loneliness and reciprocal joy—emotions that are
broad, deep, and complex” (p. 342).
Blair et al. (1996) suggest the presence of a violence inhibition mech-
anism in normal human development. This mechanism is “activated
by distress cues” and is “ … responsible for the development of moral
emotions (e.g., guilt, empathy)” (p. 16) and the ability to differentiate
between “moral transgressions,” defined by the presence of a victim(s)
and “conventional transgressions, defined by the social disorder they
cause (e.g., talking in class, public nudity)” (p. 23). They studied groups
of autistic and psychopathic individuals with regard to the inhibition of
violence and found that autistic individuals were able to “ … pass tests of
10 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

violence inhibition mechanism performance showing that they are able

to … make the moral/conventional distinction and … show physiolog-
ical arousal to the distress of others” (p. 17). However, “ … psychopaths
fail tests of violence inhibition mechanism; they do not make the
moral/conventional distinction and are hypo-responsive to the distress
of others” (p. 17). These researchers conclude, “ … the psychopath
appears to lack the emotional apparatus to feel empathy …” (p. 22).
In his classic text, Neurotic Styles, Robert Shapiro (1973) examines
the characteristics and the thinking style of the psychopath. He explains
that the psychopath lies effortlessly, persuasively, and frequently. He
is insincere and,

… acts on whim, his aim is the quick, concrete gain, and his interests
and talents are in ways and means. From a long-range point of view,
his behavior is usually erratic, but, from the short-range point of view, it
is often quite competent.” (p. 157)

Regarding consensual morality, Shapiro believes the psychopath is

usually aware of societal moral values but is generally uninterested
in them except when they can be used and manipulated for his own
advantage.
Shapiro presents an interesting view of psychopathy as a variant
of an impulsive style. He questions whether conscience and moral
values such as justice, honesty, personal integrity, good faith, and being
responsible are possible when a person’s character style constitutes
impulsive functioning. He explains that moral values, principles, and
aims are abstract and highly developed concepts requiring a high degree
of emotional and cognitive development. In addition, they require the
capacities of self-reflection and delay of gratification and therefore run
counter to those who need and seek out more immediate forms of
gratification and reward.
Shapiro explains that having a normal conscience implies the success-
ful internalization of an external authority, usually a parental figure, and
adds that this implies the capacity to stand outside of oneself and view
oneself and one’s actions from the perspective of a socially internalized
moral code. This kind of critical, self-reflective ability is not characteristic
of impulsive individuals. When it does exist for them, Shapiro believes,
it is not in a highly developed form but in a more perfunctory, limited
manner.
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 11

The contemporary literature on attachment styles lends support to

Shapiro’s ideas about the psychopath’s impairment in reflective function.
Several studies (Dozier, Stovall-McClough, & Albus, 2008, Taubner,
White, Zimmermann, Fonagy, & Nolte, 2012; Fonagy, 1999; Fonagy,
Moran, & Target, 1993) indicate that attachment pathology, especially
disorganized attachment, disrupts and interferes with the child’s capacity
for mentalization and the development of reflective functioning. Left
untreated, this can result in the difficulty or inability to read the mental
state of others or to recognize others as separate centers of subjectivity,
thereby experiencing failures of empathy—a common finding among
psychopaths.

Superego Pathology
In traditional, structural theory, the etiology of psychopathy is under-
stood to be superego pathology (Greenacre, 1945; Kernberg„ 1970b,
1970a; Meloy, 1996). In accounting for anti-social behavior or psychopa-
thy, Shapiro notes that pathology of the superego, “ … is commonly at-
tributed to the absence, inconsistency, or excessive harshness of parental
authority” (p. 158). Further, superego pathology is related to “ … the
nature of the existing mode of thinking, and the prevailing forms of
emotional experience” (p. 158) that is available to the child during the
internalization process.
For Kernberg (1971), the pathology of and “distortions of ego and
superego structures” occur in pathological narcissism, along with patho-
logical internalized object relationships. In describing impulse-ridden
character types, Kaufman (1958) explains that superego pathology is in
evidence because it is functioning at an underdeveloped, primitive level
where the ability to function as a moral guide is impaired. He explains
that the capacity to feel guilt is the result of “ … a state of tension
between the ego and the superego” (p. 548), which then indicates
the presence of this intrapsychic agency. The psychopath’s inability to
experience guilt reveals pathology in this agency of mental functioning.
Kernberg (1992) coined the term “psychopathic transference” to ad-
dress the superego pathology of borderline patients. In a psychopathic
transference, patients attempt to deceive the analyst by lying, withhold-
ing information, etc., in a conscious effort to prevent the analyst from
being able to accurately assess their mental state. Kernberg cautions that
this tendency must be addressed directly for the treatment to be effective:
“ … it is for this technical reason—and not for any ‘moralistic’ one—that
12 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

the therapist has to address the problem of opening the field of com-
munication by resolving psychopathic transferences” (p. 13; emphasis
added).

The Role of Attachment

The centrality of mentalization and subsequent emergence of reflective
functioning, i.e., the child’s ability to recognize and know the mind
of an “other” cannot be overemphasized (Gergely, Fonagy, & Target,
2002; Yakeley, & Meloy 2012). Of particular note in this article is that
capacities for reflective functioning and emotional empathy emerging
from healthy, early attachment relationships are missing in the psy-
chopath (Taubner, White et al., 2012). For optimal development of
these capacities, the child’s attachment relationships must be free of
unremediated overwhelming and disorganizing early childhood trauma.
“Attachment trauma …” writes Schimmenti (2016), “ … can generate im-
pairments in several psychological domains, including affect regulation,
attachment, cognition, dissociation, and self-concept” (p. 339). Indeed,
Liotti (2004) has indicated that attachment disorganization results in the
collapse of the successful integration of consciousness “ … and may
be the first instance of dissociative reactions during life” (p. 483). Early
childhood relational trauma, particularly if persistent, sets the stage for
early emergence of dissociation, possibly the dissociative structuring of
the mind, and the impairment of reflective functioning and empathy.
In addition, failures in the caretaker’s capacity for mentalization, the
ability to know and reflect to the child an accurate, even if somewhat ex-
aggerated, representation of her or his self can lead to marked problems
in attachment and the child’s ability to develop an accurate representa-
tion of this child’s own experience. If the caretaker is troubled, disturbed,
and/or aggressive, the child is likely to become frightened by the care-
taker and thus internalize a distorted image of the caregiver, one that
is foreign, bad, or aggressive. Yakeley and Meloy (2012) explain that,
“The person is then forced to develop an identity around an alien, per-
secutory, internal object, or introject, that is unable to think or feel and
has to be defended against by violent means” (p. 235). So, the need for
attachment, because it creates feelings of danger and disorganization in
the young child, is primarily what is dissociated in psychopathy.
Levy and Orlans (2000) explain that the precursors of the adult
psychopath and the antisocial personality can be found in significant
problems in early attachment patterns and relatedness. Furthermore,
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 13

disordered behaviors such as absence of conscience, impulsivity, failures

in empathy, “enuresis, animal torture, fire-setting, pathological lying,
chronic day-dreaming, and violent fantasies” (p. 12) are early symptoms
of those who go on to become serial killers.
Researchers studying the role of attachment in personality disorders
(Dozier et al., 2008; Lorenzini & Fonagy, 2013; Taubner et al., 2012)
indicate that a higher rate of insecure attachment exists in people with
personality disorders (PD) than in the general population. In addition,
those with PD have experienced higher rates of significant childhood
trauma; early physical abuse is a risk factor in developing antisocial
PD in adulthood. Craparo, Schimmenti and Caretti (2013) note there
exists a link between early interpersonal–relational trauma, child abuse,
and disorders of attachment in the development of psychopathy. They
studied a group of convicted, violent offenders and found “ … convicted
male offenders with high levels of psychopathic traits were more likely
to have experienced abuse and neglect during childhood, and they
were even more likely to have experienced relational trauma at an
early age” (p. 4). Their findings indicate that those who display severe
psychopathic traits in adulthood are most likely to have experienced
significant early childhood trauma.
Taubner et al. (2012) studied the impact of mentalization on psycho-
pathic traits and found the ability to mentalize had a moderating effect on
levels of aggression, even in individuals who scored higher on traits of
psychopathy. Individuals with psychopathic tendencies who showed a
higher ability to mentalize displayed less proactive aggression than those
with average or low ability to mentalize. The authors concluded that dif-
ficulty or failure in mentalization contributes to “ … a pronounced deficit
in understanding self and others in high affective situations” (p. 18). Fon-
agy and Levinson (2004) studied groups of prisoners, PD patients, and
controls. They found that “prisoners were more likely to be dismissive in
their attachment patterns, and the prisoners’ capacity for reflective func-
tioning was more impaired than that of the PD patients” (p. 225). The
more violent offenders displayed the largest deficits in reflective func-
tioning. The authors concluded, “disavowal of attachment related expe-
riences” and impairment in reflective functioning were in part related to
severe childhood trauma. It appears that one outcome of healthy attach-
ment and the capacity for mentalization—the recognition of the “other”
as a separate, subjective, individual—is that it increases the development
14 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

of empathy and mitigates against nondefensive (primary) aggression and

violence, abilities that are either absent or defective in the psychopath.

The Role of Dissociation

Dissociation played a central role in the origins of psychoanalysis. In
their early writings, Freud and Breuer identified dissociation, caused by
early childhood trauma, often sexual, as the splitting of consciousness,
resulting in abnormal states of consciousness, hypnoid states, and
“double consciousness” (Breuer & Freud, 1893–1895/1964). However,
after breaking with Breuer, Freud shifted his attention from the impact
of interpersonal–relational trauma on the mind to the fantasy model and
replaced dissociation with repression as the central psychic mechanism
of defense (Howell, 2005; Howell & Itzkowitz, 2016). Had he not made
this shift, Freud might have discovered what later researchers and
writers (e.g., Schore, 2003; Bromberg, 2011) have indicated: in traumatic
dissociation, the mind/brain becomes overwhelmed, entering into a state
of emotional hyperarousal, causing a shift in the level of consciousness
and the inability to process experience symbolically. As a result, multiple
centers of consciousness begin to emerge and may remain dissociated
from each other as well as the rest of consciousness, thereby creating a
mind structured by dissociation.
Howell (2014) explains that when a child is engaged with caretak-
ers who are alternately sources of nurturance and trauma, the child
is confronted with incompatible affective states, both the need for
caretaking-attachment and an overwhelming, paralyzing fear. This fear
then intensifies the need for attachment to the caretaker/abuser. Because
this situation is untenable, the young child’s mind/brain responds to this
fear dissociatively, with a shift in consciousness to a trance-like state
where the abuser becomes a focus of attention in a depersonalized and
derealized way. This can involve the automatic unconscious mimicking,
internalization, and emulation of aspects of the abuser’s personality and
ways of relating—including the focus on the caretaker’s desires—during
trance-like states (Howell, 2014, Liotti, 2006). In this case, what is
imitated is internalized in an altered, dissociative state. When this occurs,
the mind itself becomes structured by dissociation, and multiple centers
of consciousness and dissociated self-states emerge. See Howell (2002,
2014) for more on the etiology of internal aggressive—persecutory
dissociated states.
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 15

Dissociation in DID versus Psychopathy

Contemporary writers such as Bromberg, (1998, 2006, 2011), Stern,

(2003), and Howell, (2005, 2011, 2014) are bringing the impact of trauma
and the dissociative structuring of the mind to the foreground of psy-
choanalysis. This allows us to differentiate between those who commit
crimes—even murders—in dissociated states and true psychopaths.
What I’ve described above is characteristic of DID. However, although
aggressive or perpetrating states are common in DID, my experience
(with a noncriminal population) indicates these states usually direct their
criticism and aggression against the self/body and are not homicidal.
Dissociated self-states are understood to contain thoughts, feelings, and
memories that are able to enter into a psychoanalytic relationship with a
clinician trained in working with (extreme) dissociative disorders. More
important, they are not without conscience and the capacity for experi-
encing guilt, which, by definition, precludes the person from being con-
sidered psychopathic. Finally, especially in the early phases of treatment,
the aggressive and perpetrating states of extremely dissociated patients
are frequently unconscious. In contrast, the true psychopath consciously,
carefully, and deliberately creates and carries out his aggressive, destruc-
tive, and hurtful plans.
Moskowitz (2004) describes the case of a California high-school
student “Andy,” who shot 15 people. Two died. Writes Moskowitz, “No
one saw it coming. As is often the case in adolescent mass murders,
Andy was considered quiet and nice, and those who knew him were
mystified that he could commit such an act” (p. 21). When discussing his
experience while committing the crime Andy explained, “I don’t think
crazy is the right word. It’s, like, an out-of- body experience—when I
was in my body, I was out of my body at the same time … I didn’t feel
like it was actually me doing it” (p. 21).
Moskowitz provides some illuminating statistics regarding violent
crime and dissociation.

Approximately 25% of prison or jail inmates demonstrate “pathological”

levels of dissociation … and that a somewhat smaller percentage meet
diagnostic criteria for a dissociative disorder. … A few studies specifically
addressed dissociative identity disorder (DID), with the most conservative
finding a prevalence of 6.3% in a hospitalized (psychiatric and medical)
male prison sample, most of whom had been convicted of violent offences.
(p. 9)
16 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

Stein (2007, 2016) has linked dissociation caused by childhood trauma

and criminal, violent behavior. She believes that most violent crimes are
committed by offenders who “ … operate somewhere between repetition
compulsion and dissociated enactment …” (Stein, 2007, p. 114). Further,
she believes that criminal profilers make the mistake of attributing willful
control to behavior that is dissociative in nature. Based on her research
and clinical experience, she suggests that dissociation is often ignored
and seriously underdiagnosed in the criminal justice system. Moreover,
she experienced a bias on the part of forensic clinicians against disso-
ciation. Stein writes, “If anything, the reluctance to chart dissociative
phenomena has hardened, companion to the belief that most inmates
are lying about either their abuse history, their symptoms, or the memory
of their crimes in order to twist things to their legal advantage” (p. 235).
This remains a thorny issue because deceit and deception are endemic
accoutrements of the psychopath; however, not all offenders or inmates
are psychopaths. According to Stein, dissociation, and dissociative
disorders are a more reasoned explanation for amnesia of post-violent
and criminal behavior: “ … offenders rarely claim not to have committed
crimes, only to not remembering committing them” (p. 233).
Stein (2001) offers an example of how dissociation can play a role in
criminal violence. She presents “Sonny” a man who, while in a disso-
ciated state killed a friend, Bobby. But “Sonny” also has other named
parts; “Robert,” “Lawrence,” “The Protector,” and “Junior.” It seems clear
that Sonny’s mind is structured by dissociation. She writes,

Not infrequently, Sonny blames Bobby’s murder on the “Protector” or fin-

gers him as an accomplice. Alternately, he claims that the “Protector” only
witnessed the murder. “He comes when I’m in physical danger. He came
the night when I murdered somebody.” (p. 446)

Sonny acknowledges the murder, but has no memory of the

experience.
Should we consider someone like Sonny a psychopath? Might the
killer part of Sonny be a dissociated psychopathic part? Unfortunately,
Stein doesn’t give us sufficient information to know if the killer part
has qualities more characteristic of a true psychopath. Therefore, it is
plausible to consider this an example of a dissociated, angry, rageful part
who, once triggered, distorted his experience of Bobby’s behavior, acted
impulsively, and killed him. As for Sonny, he admitted to the homicide,
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 17

even though he doesn’t recall it. Stein explains that he feels sadness and
guilt over what he did, ruling him out as a “true” psychopath.
It is important to note that Moskowitz (2004) cautions us against
precipitously conflating DID with psychopathy, as popular media and
culture tends to: “it is important to note that there is no evidence to
suggest that most persons with DID are violent to others; many are violent
to themselves, and others manage to avoid engaging in any form of
violent behavior whatsoever” (p. 9, emphasis added).

The “Corporate, Successful” Psychopath

Stein (2007) believes law-breaking exists on a continuum “ … that
includes completely legal forms of manipulation, corruption, and risk
taking, as well as specifically outlawed acts …” (p. 114). For example,
the current administration, cloaked in business attire, seems to have
overtaken aspects of our government in true Machiavellian style. In line
with the psychopathic personality and its cognitive style, this administra-
tion has intentionally created an atmosphere of deception, manipulation,
and evil that overtakes our daily lives and seeks to undermine and
sabotage our belief and reliance on consensual reality.
Clearly, not all psychopaths are serial killers, nor are all psychopaths
incarcerated. There are many who enjoy positions of fortune, fame, and
power while they conduct their personal, business, or professional lives
in a manner that would place them within the category of psychopathy.
In a recent study, Stevens et al. (2012) explain that successful psy-
chopaths are likely to engage in unethical decision making due to their
propensity to morally disengage “ … in response to ethical dilemmas in
the workplace” (p. 146). Yet they remain seen by others as charming and
likeable, perhaps due in part to their intellectual gifts and their manip-
ulative and superficial charm, despite their disagreeable and destructive
behavior. The authors define, in part, the success of the psychopath as
their ability “ … to avoid institutionalization, in either correctional or
mental health settings, and are able to remain in their communities or
organizations, despite their potential for wreaking havoc” (p. 141). In
this way, they remain hidden in plain sight.
These impostors use their cognitive skills to “size up their prey” and
hide behind a façade designed to seduce and manipulate their victims
into seeing them as who they wish/need them to be, “the ideal friend,
lover, partner” (Babiak & O’Toole, 2012). Some present themselves
as role models and pillars of the community while consciously—not
18 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

dissociatively—improving their lot in life at the cost to others, frequently

embezzling private, public, or corporate funds for their own use and
enjoyment. Think of Bernard Madoff, the Enron scandal, the banks that
sold “the shoddy mortgage-backed securities before the financial crisis
hit in 2008” (Henning, 2014): Bank of America and JP Morgan/Chase,
and the recent Wells Fargo scandal.
Boddy et al. (2010) state, “modern society is suffering from a plague
of poor leadership in both the private and public sectors of the econ-
omy” (p. 121). Although there is heterogeneity among psychopaths,
there are some common attributes they seem to share; failures in
empathy and a seeming lack of conscience. In discussing noncriminal
psychopaths, which would include both successful and corporate psy-
chopaths, Wellons (2012) describes two subtypes primary and secondary
psychopathy. Primary psychopaths are likely to show behavior often
equated with psychopathic business executives such as “arrogance,
callousness and manipulative behavior.” They tend to score high on tests
displaying “enhanced cognitive functioning.” Secondary psychopathy on
the other hand, is characterized by “impulsive-antisocial lifestyle traits.”
When compared with primary psychopathy, this group’s performance
suggests these, “ … individuals would be higher in the social deviance
aspects of psychopathology and might be more likely to act in impulsive,
irresponsible, and law-breaking ways while primary psychopaths were
cognitively capable of functioning within society” (p. 43).
Such “successful” or “corporate” psychopaths are able to function in
society and avoid incarceration. In a study of corporate professionals
(Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010), the prevalence of psychopathy, “ …
occurred in 3.9% of the sample, much higher than the 1% that is es-
timated to occur in the general population” (p. 44; emphasis added).
Those who scored high in psychopathy were perceived by their cowork-
ers as strategic thinkers and good communicators. However, they were
also seen as poor team players, with poor management skills and poor
performance reviews. Of significant interest is the fact that “Most of those
with high psychopathic traits were high-ranking executives” (p. 43). In
general, these corporate psychopaths are of concern because they lack
a healthy capacity for empathy, they act in their own self-interest—not
those of their colleagues, and not in the interests of the corporation or
society at large (Boddy, 2010; Wellon, 2012).
Consider the following examples. Gates, Ewing, Russell, & Watkins
(2017) reported that Volkswagen admitted to installing software in
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 19

11 million cars that produced deceptive emissions test data, specifi-

cally of nitrogen oxide (NOx). During testing, equipment that would
lower the cars NOx emissions was enabled so that the car appeared
to meet the appropriate emissions criteria. However, this same equip-
ment was turned down when the car was being operated normally.
The authors explain the possible reason for this was “ … most likely
to save fuel or to improve the car’s torque and acceleration.” How-
ever, NOx is an ingredient causing “ground level ozone or smog”
and respiratory diseases such as bronchitis and emphysema (see
https://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/text_version/chemicals.php?id = 19, for
additional information).
As a second example, consider the landmark Paris Climate Accord
signed by 196 nations agreeing to correct the devastating impact of cli-
mate change. In her New York Times article, Friedman (2017) provided a
link to the draft of a recent report on climate change by scientists from a
number of federal agencies. She explains that the report, “ … contradicts
claims by President Trump and members of his cabinet who say that the
human contribution to climate change is uncertain, and that the ability
to predict the effects is limited.” Friedman continues,

The authors note that thousands of studies, conducted by tens of thou-

sands of scientists, have documented climate changes on land and in the
air. Many lines of evidence demonstrate that human activities, especially
emissions of greenhouse (heat-trapping) gases, are primarily responsible
for recent observed climate change.

Yet President Trump has decided to pull the United States out of the
agreement. Why? Is our withdrawal really about a disagreement over
the science? Or is it perhaps an issue of personal wealth and corporate
profits at the expense of the welfare of humanity and wildlife? One
must ask, who stands to gain or profit from our refusal to adhere to
the agreement and continue polluting the environment. The fossil fuel
industry? The automotive industry? Then there are the powerful lobby-
ists, paid handsomely to influence congressional votes to help insure
the enrichment of the industries employing them. With the Paris Climate
Accord as a powerful example, we see our leaders, corporations, and
lobbyists evidencing the psychopathic traits of having no conscience,
no strong sense of morality, or empathy. Their endgame is their own
20 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

benefit and the benefit of their shareholders only. Even when it puts all
of humanity and wildlife at risk.

References
Press, Associated (2009, November 6). Neighbors: Serial killing suspect seemed
OK. Retrieved from, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33736578/ns/us_news-
crime_and_courts/t/neighbors-serial-killing-suspect-seemed-ok/#.WZHU-
a2ZOgQ
Babiak, P., Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. (2010). Corporate psychopathy: Talking
the walk. Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 28(2), 174–193.
Babiak, P., & O’Toole, M. E. (2012). The corporate psychopath. Retrieved from
The FBI Law Enforcement Bulliten. https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/november/the-
corporate-psychopath
Blair, J., Sellars, C., Strickland, I., Clark, F., Williams, A., Smith, M., … Jones, L.
(1996). Theory of mind in the psychopath. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry,
7(1), 15–25. doi:10.1080/09585189608409914
Boddy, C. R. P. (2010). Corporate psychopaths and organizational type. Journal
of Public Affairs, 10(4), 300–312. doi:10.1002/pa.365
Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (1964). Studies on hysteria. In J. Strachey (Ed., Trans.). The
standard edition of psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 2). London,
UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1893–1895).
Bromberg, P. M. (1998). Standing in the spaces. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Bromberg, P. M. (2006). Awakening the dreamer: Clinical journeys. New York,
NY: The Analytic Press.
Bromberg, P. M. (2011). The shadow of the tsunami. New York, NY: Routledge.
Bollas, C. (1995). Cracking up. New York, NY: Hill & Wang.
Cheliotis, L. K. (2010) (forthcoming,. ‘Narcissism, humanism and the revolution-
ary character in Erich Fromm’s work.’, In L. K. Cheliotis (ed.) Roots, rites and
sites of resistance: The banality of good. (pp. 36–58). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Cortina, M. (2015). The greatness and limitations of Erich
Fromm’s humanism. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 51(3), 388–422.
doi:10.1080/00107530.2015.999297
Craparo, G., Schimmenti, A., & Caretti, V. (2013). Traumatic experiences in child-
hood and psychopathy: A study on a sample of violent offenders from Italy.
European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 4, 1–6. doi:10.3402/ejpt.v4i0.21471
Dozier, M., Stovall-McClough, K. C., & Albus, K. E. (2008). Attachment and
psychopathology in adulthood. In J. Cassidy & P. R. Shaver (Eds). Hand-
book of attachment: Theory, research, and clinical applications, 2nd edition.
(pp. 718–744). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII.
(pp. 67–144), London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 21

Friedman, L. (2017, August 7). Scientists Fear Trump Will Dismiss Blunt Cli-
mate Report. The New York Times. Retrieved from, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/07/climate/climate-change-drastic-warming-trump.html?_r = 0
Fonagy, P., Moran, G. S., & Target, M. (1993). Aggression and the psychological
self. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 74(3), 471–485.
Fonagy, P. (1999). Male perpetrators of violence against women: An attachment
theory perspective. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 1(1) pp. 7–27.
doi:10.1023/A:1023074023087.
Fonagy, P. (2003). Towards a developmental understanding of violence. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 183(3), 190–192. doi:10.1192/bjp.183.3.190
Fromm, E. (1947). Man for himself: An inquiry into the psychology of ethics. New
York, NY: Henry Holt & Co.
Fromm, E. (1964). The heart of man: Its genius and evil. New York, NY: Harper
& Row.
Fromm, E. (1971). The anatomy of human destructiveness. New York, NY: Henry
Holt & Co.
Fromm, E. (1991). On being human. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Funk, R., & Shaw, M. (1982). Erich Fromm: The courage to be human. New York,
NY: Continuum.
Gates, G., Ewing, J., Russell, K., & Watkins, D. (2017, March 16). How Volk-
swagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked. The New York Times. Retrieved from,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-
emissions-scandal-explained.html?_r=0
Gergely, G., Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2002). Attachment, mentalization, and the
etiology of borderline personality disorder. Self Psychology, 7(1), 61–72.
Gilligan, J. (1997). Violence: Reflections on a national epidemic. New York, NY:
Vintage books.
Gilligan, J. (2009). Sex, gender, and violence: Estela Welldon’s contribution to
our understanding of the psychopathology of violence. British Journal of Psy-
chotherapy, 25(2), 239–256.
Greenacre, P. (1945). Conscience in the psychopath. American Journal of Or-
thopsychiatry, 15(3), 495–509. doi:10.1111/j.1939-0025.1945.tb04963.x
Hare, R. D. (1993). Without conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths
among us. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Henning, P. J. (2014). The Year in White-Collar Crime. The New York Times.
downloaded from http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/the-year-in-white-
collar-crime/?_r=0
Howell, E. F. (2002). Back to the “states”: Victim and abuser states in borderline
personality disorder. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 12(6), 921–957.
Howell, E. (2005). The dissociative mind. New York, NY: Routledge.
Howell, E. F. (2011). Understanding and treating dissociative personality disor-
der. New York, NY: Routledge.
22 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

Howell, E. F. (2014). Ferenczi’s concept of identification with the aggressor: Un-

derstanding dissociative structure with interacting victim and abuser self-states.
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74(1), 48–59.
Howell, E. F., & Itzkowitz, S. (Eds.). (2016). The dissociative mind in psychoanal-
ysis: Understanding and working with trauma. New York, NY: Routledge.
Itzkowitz, S. (2017). Erich Fromm: A psychoanalyst for all seasons. Psychoana-
lytic Perspectives, 14(1), 81–92. doi:10.1080/1551806X.2016.1209351
Kaufman, I. (1958). Panel reports—superego development and pathology in
childhood. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 6(3), 540–551.
doi:10.1177/000306515800600308.
Kernberg, O. F. (1970a). A psychoanalytic classification of character pathol-
ogy. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18(1), 51–85.
doi:10.1177/000306517001800103
Kernberg, O. F. (1970b). Factors in the psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic
personalities. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 18(1), 51–
85. doi:10.1177/000306517001800103
Kernberg, O. F. (1971). Prognostic considerations regarding borderline person-
ality organization. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19(4),
595–635. doi:10.1177/000306517101900401
Kernberg, O. F. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New
York, NY: Jason Aronson.
Kernberg, O. F. (1992). Psychopathic, paranoid and depressive transferences.
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 73(1), 13–28
Landis, B. (1975). Fromm’s theory of biophilia-necrophilia. Contemporary Psy-
choanalysis, 11(4), 418–434. doi:10.1080/00107530.1975.10745401
LeBreton, J. M., Binning, J. F., & Adorno, A. J. (2005). Subclinical psychopaths. In
J. C. Thomas & D. L. Segal (Eds.), Comprehensive handbook of personality and
psychopathology, personality and everyday functioning (Vol. 1, pp. 388–411).
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Levinson, A., & Fonagy, P. (2004). Offending and attachment: The relationship
between interpersonal awareness and offending in a prison population with
psychiatric disorder. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 12(2), 225.
Levy, T. M., & Orlans, M. (2000). Attachment disorder as an antecedent to vi-
olence and antisocial patterns in children. In T. M. Levy (Ed.), Handbook of
attachment interventions. (pp. 243–259). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Liotti, G. (2004). Trauma, dissociation, and disorganized attachment: Three
strands of a single braid. Psychotherapy: Theory, research, practice, training,
41(4), 472–486. doi:10.1037/0033-3204.41.4.472
Liotti, G. (2006). A model of dissociation based on attachment the-
ory and research. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 7(4), 55–73.
doi:10.1300/J229v07n04_04
PSYCHOPATHY AND HUMAN EVIL 23

Lorenzini, N., & Fonagy, P. (2013). Attachment and personality disorders: A short
review. FOCUS, 11(2), 155–166. doi:10.1176/appi.focus.11.2.155
Meloy, J. R. (1996). The psychopathic mind: Origins, dynamics & treatment.
Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Meloy, J. R., & Shiva, A. (2007). A psychoanalytic view of the psychopath.
In Alan R. Felthous & Henning Sass (Eds.). The International Handbook of
Psychopathic Disorders and the Law (Vol. 1, pp. 335–346), West Sessex, UK:
John Wiley & Sons: Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John
_Meloy/publication/228002741_A_Psychoanalytic_View_of_the_Psychopath/
links/0912f50a68d9331e49000000.pdf
Moskowitz, A. (2004). Dissociation and violence: A review of the literature.
Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 5(1), 21–46. doi:10.1177/1524838003259321
Schore, A. (2003). Early relational trauma, disorganized attachment, and the de-
velopment of a predisposition to violence. In M.F. Solomon & D.J. Siegel (Eds.),
Healing trauma: Attachment. mind body, and brain (pp. 107–167). New York,
NY: W.W. Norton.
Schimmenti, A. (2016). Dissociative experiences and dissociative minds: Explor-
ing a nomological network of dissociative functioning. Journal of Trauma &
Dissociation, 17(3), 338–361.
Shapiro, R. (1973). Neurotic styles. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Stein, A. (2001). Murder and memory. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 37(3), 443–
451.
Stein, A. (2007). Prologue to violence: Child abuse, dissociation, and crime. Mah-
wah, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Stein, A. (2016). A tale of two offenders: Why dissociation is under-diagnosed
in forensic populations. In, E. F. Howell & S. Itzkowitz (Eds.), The dis-
sociative mind in psychoanalysis: Understanding and working with trauma
(p. 231–240). New York, NY: Routledge.
Stern, D. (2003). Unformulated experience. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Stevens, G. W., Deuling, J. K., & Armenakis, A. A. (2012). Successful psy-
chopaths: Are they unethical decision-makers and why? Journal of Business
Ethics, 105(2), 139–149. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0963-1
Stone, M. (2009). The anatomy of evil. New York, NY: Prometheus Books.
Taubner, S., White, L. O., Zimmermann, J., Fonagy, P., & Nolte, T. (2012). Mental-
ization moderates and mediates the link between psychopathy and aggressive
behavior in male adolescents. Journal of The American Psychoanalytic Associ-
ation, 60(3), 605–612.
Wellons, S. (2012). The devil in the boardroom: Corporate psychopaths and
their impact on business. PURE Insights, 1 (Article 9), 42–45. Retrieved from
http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/pure/vol1/iss1/9
24 SHELDON ITZKOWITZ, Ph.D., ABPP

Yakeley, J., & Meloy, J. R. (2012). Understanding violence: Does psycho-

analytic thinking matter? Aggression and Violent Behavior, 17(3), 229–239.
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2012.02.006
Yamamoto, J. (2016, February 16). ‘Happy-go-lucky guy’: Residents in dis-
belief that neighbor accused of ‘grim sleeper’ murders. Retrieved from
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/grim-sleeper-franklin-trial-south-
los-angeles-serial-killer-neighbors-react-369048401.html

Sheldon Itzkowitz, Ph.D., ABPP is an adjunct clinical associate professor of psy-

chology and clinical consultant, the NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy
& Psychoanalysis; guest faculty, Eating Disorders, Compulsions, and Addictions
Program, the William Alanson White Institute; on the teaching and supervisory
faculty, the National Institute for the Psychotherapies program in psychoanalysis;
and the Trauma Studies Program, The Manhattan Institute for Psychoanalysis.
He is an associate editor of Psychoanalytic Perspectives and former president of
the Division of Psychoanalysis of the New York State Psychological Association.
Dr. Itzkowitz has presented his work with extremely dissociated individuals
both nationally and internationally. His most recent publications include, The
Dissociative Mind in Psychoanalysis: Understanding and Working with Trauma,
coedited with Elizabeth F. Howell. The book received the 2016 Media Award-
Written by the International Society for the Study of Trauma & Dissociation and
the Author Recognition Award from NIP and nominated for the 2017 Gradiva
Award for “A Dream as an Internal Enactment of Trauma: The Impact on the
Analyst’s Self.” He is in full-time private practice in New York City.