Republic Act No.

9244             February 19 2004

AN ACT ELIMINATING THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY AS A MODE OF INSTITUTING RECALL OF

ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 70 AND 71, CHAPTER
5, TITLE ONE, BOOK I OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
OF 1991", AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 70, Chapter 5, Title One, Book I of Republic Acts No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

a. The Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be commenced by a
petition of a registered voter in the local government unit concerned and supported by the registered
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected subject to the following percentage requirements:

1. At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of local government units with a voting
population of not more than twenty thousand (20,000);

2. At least twenty percent (20%) in the case of local government units with a voting population of
at least twenty thousand (20,000) but not more than seventy-five thousand (75,000): Provided,
That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than five thousand (5,000);

3. At least fifteen percent (15%) in the case of local government nits with a voting population of at
least seventy-five thousand (75,000) but not more than three hundred thousand (300,000):
Provided, however, That in no case shall the required number of petitioners be less than fifteen
thousand (15,000); and

4. At least ten percent (10%) in the case of local government units with a voting population of
over three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That in no case shall the required
petitioners be less than forty-five thousand (45,000).

b. The process of recall shall be effected in accordance with the following procedure:

1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the petitioners before the
election registrar or his representative, shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the
local government unit concerned.

2. The petition to recall shall contain the following:

a. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and their
signatures;

b. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which
the petitioners belong;

c. The name of the official sought to be recalled; and

d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore.

1. The Comelec shall, within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition, certify
to the sufficiency of the required number of signatures. Failure to obtain the
required number of signatures automatically nullifies the petition;
 2. If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the Comelec or its duly
authorized representative shall, within three (3) days form the issuance of the
certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition, cause
its publication a national newspaper of general circulation and a newspaper of
general circulation in the locality, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at
the expense of the petitioners and at the same time post copies thereof in public
and conspicuous places for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than
twenty (20) days, for the purpose of allowing interested parties to examine and
verify the validity of the petition and the authenticity of the signatures contained
therein.

3. The Comelec or its duly authorized representatives shall, upon issuance of

certification, proceed independently with the verification and authentication of the
signatures of the petitioners and registered voters contained therein.
Representatives of the petitioners and the official sought to be recalled shall be
duly notified and shall have the right to participate therein as mere observers.
The filing of any challenge or protest shall be allowed within the period provided
in the immediately preceding paragraph and shall be ruled upon with finality
within fifteen (15) days from the date of filing of such protest or challenge;

4. Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the positive and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the
official sought to be recalled."

SEC. 2. Section 71. Chapter 5, Title One, Book I of the Republic Act No. 7160, "Local Government Code of 1991", is
hereby amended to read as follows:

(1) "SEC. 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of
the Comelec, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election or recall, which
shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the completion of the procedure outlined in the preceding article, in the
case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The
officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon."

SEC. 3. All pending petitions for recall initiated through the Preparatory Recall Assembly shall be considered dismissed
upon the effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 4. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, issuances, and rules and regulations, and parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two 92) national
newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA PAYUMO, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmeña, Crisostomo Banzon and Horacio Apostol for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people's might is not a myth. The 1987 Constitution then
included people power as an article of faith and Congress was mandated to p ass laws for its effective exercise. The Local
Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2) modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective
officials who appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a
preparatory recall assembly. In the case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The
challenge cannot succeed.

We shall first unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. In the early
evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M of
the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar,
de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and
Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was
recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss of
confidence."1 The motion was "unanimously seconded."2 The resolution states:

RESOLUTION NO. 1

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the Province of Bataan have
voluntarily constituted themselves for the purpose of the recall of the incumbent provincial governor of the
province of Bataan, Honorable Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the provisions of Section 70, paragraphs (a), (b) and
(c) of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991;

Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in the province of Bataan is
One Hundred and Forty- Six (146) composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of all the 12 towns of the province of Bataan;

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, after a serious and careful
deliberation have decided to adopt this resolution for the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Garcia for
loss of confidence;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved that having lost confidence on the incumbent governor of
Bataan, Enrique T. Garcia, recall proceedings be immediately initiated against him;

Resolved further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the Honorable Commission on Elections, Manila and
the Provincial Election Supervisor, Balanga, Bataan.

One hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80) carried the signatures of the
members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures, only seventy-four (74) were found genuine.3 The PRAC of the
province had a membership of one hundred forty-four (144)4 and its majority was seventy-three (73).

On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution No. 1.
Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section
70 of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In a per curiam Resolution promulgated
August 31, 1993, the respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of
Governor of Bataan on October 11 , 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that
section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have
the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local
public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed
by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate
failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. On September 7, 1993, We required the
respondents to file their Comments within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days.5 On September 16, 1993, We set
petition for hearing on September 21, 1993 at 11 A.M. After the hearing, We granted the petition on ground that the
sending of selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally
flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged constitutional infirmity of sec. 70 of R.A. No. 7160 for
its resolution is not unavoidable to decide the merits of the petition. The petition can be decided on the equally
fundamental issues of: (1) whether or not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its
meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice, whether or not it would vitiate the proceedings of the assembly including
its Resolution No. 1.

The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the members known to be political allies of
petitioner Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to
agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They justified these
selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice.

We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an
element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its
silence. The need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent
the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the
assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall
should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely
determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of
their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is indispensable in determining the collective
wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the
resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan.

The petition raises other issues that are not only  prima impressionis but also of transcendental importance to the
rightful exercise of the sovereign right of the people to recall their elected officials. The Court shall discuss these
issues in a more extended decision.

In accord with this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the Honorable Mayor of Dinalupihan, Oscar de los
Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of the PRAC to "convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the
town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 6 From news reports, the PRAC convened in session and
eighty-seven (87) of its members once more passed a resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia. 7 On September
27, 1993, petitioners filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion for a resolution of
their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is unconstitutional.

We find the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar
as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of local elective officials as bereft of merit.

Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by whom the law is
approved,8 For upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the duty of the legislative
and executive.9 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the
fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.10 The annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable
implication. The universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law. 11
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative
to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power
is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs. 12 Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy. 13

Recall is a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973 Constitution. 14 It was
mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:

Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended
except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government
structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983." Section 54 of its Chapter
3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned, viz:

Sec. 54. By Whom Exercised; Requisites. — (1) The power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of
the unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(2) Recall shall be validly initiated only upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned based on the election in which the local official sought to
be recalled was elected.

Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was exercised by our
people.

In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to revolution and they
booted of office the highest elective officials of the land.

The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm
institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People's
Organizations, viz:

Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means.

People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public
interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which "shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. . .," viz :

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsible and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In this Code, Congress provided for a second mode of initiating the recall
process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors
and sanggunian  members of the municipalities and component cities. We quote the pertinent provisions of R.A. 7160, viz:

CHAPTER 5 — RECALL

Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the
registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be
composed of the following:

(1) Provincial Level. — all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component
cities;

(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all
elective municipal officials in the district; in cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by
district , all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and
initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of
provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the
members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be validly initiated upon petition of at
least twenty-five (25) percent of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned
during the election which in the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

Sec. 71. Election Recall — Upon the filing of a valid resolution petition for with the appropriate local office of the
Comelec, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which
shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition recall in the case of the barangay,
city, or municipal officials, forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be
recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. — The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the
election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him
is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.

Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. — The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to
resign while the recall process is in progress.

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding regular election.
A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials originated from the House of Representatives A reading
of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the recall from office of local elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the
Senate. 15 The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the
recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of
the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. 16 Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism
initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this
lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process
by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. 17 Consequently,
our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They
brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined
ease.

We have belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the unillumined interstices of the law. In
resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs. Prescinding from this proposition, We
shall now resolve the contention of petitioners that the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional.

It is first postulated by the petitioners that "the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to
reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative
necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not." 18

We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will sustain this submission. To
be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode,
of initiating recall elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The
mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly
given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select
which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate.
Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply
required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the
Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even
then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 20

Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate
the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alone. To
quote the exact language of the petitioners: "The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the
term of the incumbent local officials. Precisely, in the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC
on 11 October 1993 to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of office which should
have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a mere candidate for the same position of governor (by
operation of law) he has, therefore, been effectively recalled." 21 In their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory
Manifestation, 22 petitioners put the proposition more bluntly stating that a "PRA resolution of recall is the re call itself."

Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory
process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people.
This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing
less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either
to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a
lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of
the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be seriously
doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process.
This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not
recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the
purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear
before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render
their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question.
This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local official  shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes cast during the election on recall."

We shall next settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioners asseverate:

5.01.2. It denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials constituting the majority party can
constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a duly elected provincial official belonging to the minority party
thus rendering ineffectual his election by popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly could, to the prejudice of the
minority (or even partyless) incumbent official, effectively declare a local elective position vacant (and demand the
holding of a special election) for purely partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of the electorate. In the
case at bar, 64 of the 74 signatories to the recall resolution have been political opponents of petitioner Garcia, not
only did they not vote for him but they even campaigned against him in the 1992 elections.

Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC while exercising
their right to initiate recall proceedings. More specifically, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject
political color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially
those belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give an
asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be considered is the politically
neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code provides:

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the
registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be
composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. — All mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component
cities;

(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District Level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all
elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by
district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.

Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made
members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties.
No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground
to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not
in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence
cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party
system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly
then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.

The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate
the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike
down the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the
reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of
power to an individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government
powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no democratic government that can operate on the
basis of fear and distrust of its officials, especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws
assume that officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will perform the duties of their office. Such
presumption follows the solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.

Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly
will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. As explained above, the diverse and distinct composition of the
membership of a preparatory recall assembly guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. It is
for this reason that in Our Resolution of September 21, 1993, We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that the recall
resolution by the said majority must be adopted during its session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry
distinct legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the members of a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise,
there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

Furthermore, it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted
strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the respondent COMELEC nor this Court made a judicial inquiry as to the
reasons that led the members of the said recall assembly to cast a vote of lack of confidence against petitioner Garcia.
That inquiry was not undertaken for to do so would require crossing the forbidden borders of the political thicket. Former
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local Government Code of 1991: The
Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why the substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is
beyond any inquiry, thus:

There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. This means that the
people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials without
specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of
abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.

In the case of Evardone vs.  Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472 (1991), the Court ruled that
"loss of confidence" as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the Court, "whether or not the
electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question.

Any assertion therefore that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted due to their political aversion to
petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise.

Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of the
electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia with a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention
proceeds from the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that
the resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The
proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is
premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan
may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the
proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate does not
re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will
write  finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people
is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly their direct right to initiate
and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be a return to the
previous system of recall elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall
proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to
the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. The power
to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section 70 of
R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall process are dismissed for lack of merit.
This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126576 March 5, 1997

MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, and ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 1 dated October 15, 1996
issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which (1) approved the Petition for Recall filed and
signed by only one registered voter — herein private respondent Ma. Aurora Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner —
incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of
Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of
registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.

On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 2 enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.

The facts of this case are not disputed.

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. He
garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections.

Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a
Petition for Recall3 against petitioner. On September 12, 1996, petitioner received a copy of this petition. Subsequently
said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in
Manila, for approval.

Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the COMELEC En Banc, a
Memorandum4 dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the petition for recall filed by private respondent and its
signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the COMELEC en banc issued
the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid, on two main
grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of
the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall; and (2) that the
resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

In at least three (3) urgent motions, private respondent has sought the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued
last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that the issue of the one-year bar on recall elections has been resolved in
the case of Paras v. COMELEC5, promulgated on November 4, 1996; and (2) that the procedure prescribed by Resolution
No. 96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation of even just one person, is no different from that provided for in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which was upheld as constitutional in the 1991 cases of Sanchez, et
al. v. COMELEC6 and Evardone v. COMELEC7.

Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v. COMELEC8, the recall election
scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
In construing the meaning of the term, "regular local election" in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year . . . immediately preceding a regular local election," we ruled
that for the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be
recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being
invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no application of
the one year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.
We, however, find petitioner's second ground to be impressed with merit.

Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall of public officials voted for in popular elections, was
governed by Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983.
Pursuant to Section 59 thereof, which states that "the Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process
of and election on recall . . . and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations," the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2272 Sections 4 and 5 of which provide as follows:

Sec. 4. How instituted. — The recall of an elective provincial, city or municipal official shall be
commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall containing the address and precinct number of
the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official sought to be recalled, his position, and the
ground(s) for the recall. Each notice shall refer to only one official.

The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election Registrar if the recall involves a city or
municipal official, or with the Provincial Election Supervisor if it involves a provincial official, one copy of
which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.

If the recall involves a provincial official, two additional copies of the notice shall also be furnished by the
voter filing the notice to the Election Registrar of each city and municipality in the province, one copy of
which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.

In every case, the voter filing the notice of recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the official sought to be
recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election Records and Statistics Department of
the Commission.

Sec. 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. — The Election Registrar shall submit to the
Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from filing of the notice of recall, the schedule of the
signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding . . .9

In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC 10, petitioners therein contended that the aforegoing "Resolution No. 2272 is
unconstitutional there being no legislative enactment yet on [the] mechanism of recall as mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of
the Constitution". 11 It is true, as private respondent asseverates, that we upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No.
2272, but not because we found nothing constitutionally infirm about the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall petition
to be filed by only one person. The issue in Sanchez was not this questioned procedure but the legal basis for the
exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the alleged absence of a grant of such power by an enabling
statute on recall. Thus we ruled:

While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a local government
code providing among others for an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said provision could be
inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local government code existing prior to the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution merely provides that the local government code to be
enacted by Congress shall be "more responsive" than the one existing at present. Until such time that a
more responsive and effective local government code is enacted, the present code shall remain in full
force and effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, (a)ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Considering that the present local government code (BP 337) is still in effect, respondent COMELEC's
promulgation of Resolution No. 2272 is therefore valid and constitutional, the same having been issued
pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:

Sec. 59. Supervision by the Commission on Elections. — The Commission on Elections shall conduct and
supervise the process of and election on recall . . . and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations. 12

We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case of Evardone v. COMELEC 13 in this wise:

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No.
 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991,
specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local
Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case.

xxx xxx xxx

Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective
officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the
process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations. . . . Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.

We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for
recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. 14

In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC-prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the recall petition to be filed by at least
one person or by less than 25% of the total number of registered voters and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on
a date set for that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux of the present constitutional challenge, the proper
time has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling on the matter.

Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a mode of removing a public
officer by direct action of the people, essayed in the case of Garcia v. COMELEC 15:

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The
people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence
of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held
to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.

Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in section 2 of Article
XI entitled Local Government, viz.:

Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of
recall . . .

The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, "The Local Government Code of 1983. Section
54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local election officials, i.e.,
by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned . . . .

Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was
exercised by our people.

In February, 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to
revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of the land. The successful use of
people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm
institutionalization of the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of
People's Organizations . . . .

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code
which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum . . . . In
response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992." 16
Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective . . . municipal . . .
official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected". The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, "petition of at
least twenty-five percent (25%)" and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25%
of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must
be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. This is understandable, since
the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be undertaken "before the election registrar or his representative, and in
the presence of a representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the . . . municipality . . . "  17.
Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose
behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing 25%
statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably
violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that this is the
requirement under a majority of the constitutions and recall statutes in various American states to the same extent that
they were aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an
official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best
of his ability and as his conscience dictates 18 it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their
leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by
one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct
remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would
destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.

A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum voter requirement in
American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse of the power of recall. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of In Re Bower 19 that:

[t]he only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a
recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before
having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his political policies and decisions. We view the
statutory provision requiring the number of petition signers to equal at least 45% of the total votes case in the
last general election for mayor as a further attempt to insure that an official will not have to defend his policies
against frivolous attacks launched by a small percentage of disenchanted electors. 20

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen, v. City of Boulder 21 that:

[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of all votes cast in the last
election for all candidates for the position which the person sought to be recalled occupies, assured that a recall
election will not be held in response to the wishes of a small and unrepresentative minority. However, once at
least 25% of the electorate have expressed their dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power to the
will of the electorate. 22

And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp 23, the Supreme Court of Michigan echoed the foregoing posturings in this wise:

Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated by the Constitution
has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate . . . . A much cited Nebraska case pertaining to a Nebraska
recall statute provides some answers which are equally applicable to the Michigan constitutional right of recall:

. . . Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the petition before the
council [is] compelled to act was designed to avoid such a contingency. The Legislature
apparently assumed that nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail upon the taxpayers
the cost of an election unless the charges made approved themselves to their understanding and
they were seriously dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent of the office. 24
In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the applicable law and no
less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local
Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered
voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as
the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost
confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini
who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private
respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims
responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner's continuance in office. But the same cannot be said of all the other
people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the people are vested with the power to
recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the
consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be
recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of
allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which
amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the
performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go
around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit
25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No.
96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.

The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140560 May 4, 2000

JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and
RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.

G.R. No. 140714 May 4, 2000

PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD
ADVINCULA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City (PRA) in the
Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF
PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the resolution, 1 dated
October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor
of Pasay City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its Chair,
Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to
the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the
possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of
barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc
committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and
petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated chair.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan
chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO
O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as
chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to
witness the formal submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.

As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the
Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards
of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and
at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity
of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the
COMELEC.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles,
alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually
meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties
concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the
one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, 2 filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the
proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against
petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA,
considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang
kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.

In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against
it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073
members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its
records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is
required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the
verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA
sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not and that
petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for
recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the
negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on
July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was
filed on time.

Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after which the Court, by
the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, 3 resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the
COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Court unanimously dismissed the petition in
G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised therein had become moot and academic.

We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.

In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in Pasay City on April
15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the
recall elections in Pasay City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with only petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and
prohibition.

The bone of contention in this case is §74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) 4 which provides:

Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:

WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . . .

A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period for that
regular election or simply the date of such election.

(1)

On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local Government Code Includes the
Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution.

Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in §74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in
§74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May
19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for
the purpose of adopting a resolution "to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence,"
the process of recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was
illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null
and void.

The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and
ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the one-year
prohibited period.

Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in §74 refers to a process. They
disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in paragraph (b) of §74.

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall assembly or the gathering
of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall
election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. 5 However, as used in paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers
to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his
replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion.

First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, §69
provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings 6 but
the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings.
In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and
the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the
COMELEC — there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely
preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of
recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this — and not merely the preliminary steps required to be taken to
initiate a recall — which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year
from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC 7 where two objections were raised against the legality of
PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be
delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten
the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a
PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to
initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall
resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned
remains in office . . . ."

If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned
continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall,
except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the
limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official.
In the Bower case 8 cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, 9 it was held that "The only logical reason which we can
ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on
their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his
policies and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal
Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has
actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an
elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has been in office for one-
year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the
adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the
electorate in the election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing
the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of
assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of
their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first
limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to
unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will
always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to
provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any
impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a
period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject
to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated
and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense
and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan
politics may have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the
limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the
performance of an elected local official.

In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the
people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall
Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.

Two points may be made against this argument.

One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose recall is sought is
actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which the
question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can
say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan
City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor
failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for
the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.

Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit cannot be more representative
of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the entire electorate in the local
government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as
are those composing PRAs.

The other point regarding Justice Puno's claim is that the question here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of the
voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the
PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people, as
the petition filed by 25% of the registered voters is claimed to be?

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate
recall —

1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year
period provided in paragraph (b);
 2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor
of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

(2)

On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local
Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such
Election.

Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of
prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the
day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at
least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000,
no recall election may be held.

This contention is untenable.

The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the
Omnibus Election Code, 10 it could have expressly said so.

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually,
because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about
the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the
second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government
units "more responsive and accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, 11 unless
otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and
ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph
(a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second,
paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third,
paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As
succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, 12 "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

(3)

On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified.

Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a
recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74
members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-
104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word
"Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before
the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that
some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a
prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the
COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue
now being raised by petitioner.

Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was
crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate
document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their
attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence
in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part.

The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty.
Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the
first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is DISMISSED for
having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.