Aranas vs. Aranas

G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987

Facts:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19,
1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to
probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated
that as a reward to his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services he is
allowed to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's
death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to
anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will
have the power to select one among themselves.

Issue:
Whether or not the institution of Vicente Aranas is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Vicente Aranas was intended as a usufructuary by the Testator and has the right
to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal
enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente
to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a
limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these
properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art.
870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the
naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to
Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of
course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as
usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to
reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator
was seriously ill or bed-ridden.

Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the Estate

G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009
Facts:
 On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues in
Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate by virtue of the
order of the CFI Manila and said court approved the project of partition presented by the
executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will. As provided in her will Doña Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.After almost
40 years later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion
Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the
trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty
years, in violation of the the law.

Issue: Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by DOÑA
MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ can be dissolved .

Ruling:
Yes. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified
beneficiaries. The trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned should be
upheld however after 20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct in moving
for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period,but they are not necessarily
declared as intestate heirs of the decedent. The last will and testament of the decedent did not
institute heirs to inherit the properties under the void clause.Hence the case is remanded to
the lower court for the determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the decedent
where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their
status.

Morente vs. Dela Santa

G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

Facts:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not
marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any
portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining
thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located,
which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death
of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding
relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in CFI in which she alleged
the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-
mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, that
the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and
that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-
third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the
court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the
husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any
children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. 

Issue:

Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will?

Ruling:

No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in
certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not
leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain
building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these
orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy
given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave
the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he
shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if
he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does
happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be
changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to
Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.

There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second
marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will.

Henry Litam vs. Espiritu

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of RIzal. On April 24, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam filed a
petition stating that the petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam and the deceased was survived by 8
children by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, that after the death of Rafael Litam,
petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had contracted in the Philippines
another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, that the decedent left as his property among others 1/2
share in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera and that the decedent
left neither will nor debt. Petitioner prayed that after appropriate proceedings, letters of
administration be issued to administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera.

Marcosa Rivera. Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition substantially denying the alleged marriage
of the decedent to Sia Khin as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition,
asserting that the properties described are her paraphernal properties and praying that her nephew,
Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate
the intestate estate of the deceased. estate of the deceased.

The Court granted Marcosa Rivera’s petition and Arminio assumed as administrator of the estate. He
submitted an inventory of estate. He submitted an inventory of the alleged es the alleged estate of
Rafael Litam and said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition of Gregorio
Dy Tam in April 1952. Gregorio, on November 1952, filed a motion for the removal of Arminio Rivera
as administrator of the aforementioned estate. Meanwhile, Remedios Espiritu was appointed as
guardian of Marcosa who was declared incompetent. Gregorio Dy Tam filed Civil Case No. 2071 of
the same court against Espirity and Arminio Rivera. He reproduced substatially the allegations made
in his petition in April 1952 s tating that the properties in dispute are tating that the properties in
dispute are conjugal and are more than those specified in the inventory. The trial court dismissed
CivilCase No. 2071. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the
properties in question o ties in question or do the same constitute a common r do the same
constitute a common property of her a property of her and the decedent?
Ruling:

SC said the appellants failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by marriage
with Sia Khin. It appears from the evidence presented by the defendants that there was no such
marriage between Rafael Litam and Sia marriage between Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that Khin
and that the plaintiffs named are not children the plaintiffs named are not children of the deceased.
The various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that
he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no
child.

In and that he had no child. In the marraige certific the marraige certificate, it was clearly stated tha
ate, it was clearly stated that he was single was single when he married Marcosa Rivera. In the sworn
application for alien certificate or registration, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that
he had no child. Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and
Sia Khin, which in the opinion of the Court is the competent and vest evidence of the alleged
marriage between them.

No explanation has been given for the non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there
been any showing of nor has there been any showing of its loss. its loss. It is therefore the finding of
this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only
heir being his surviving wife. Appellants maintain that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of Bigamy,
that he had willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents and that although
appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera, the decedent had succeeded for
30 years in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations with the
other. T

he Court said the same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the
strongest possible kind, not only because it entails the commission by Rafael Lita of g the
commission by Rafael Lita of g rave criminal rave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his
honor, but also beecause death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of
defense. The proof for the appellants herein does not satisfy the ot satisfy the requirement.
requirement. It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by
Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. Great importance should be given to the
documentary evidence. Rafael declared under oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the
properties were her exclusive and separate money.

It was also acknowledge by Rafael that he had not t was also acknowledge by Rafael that he had not
given any money to his wife, ven any money to his wife, and that they and that they have actually
adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not having any interest or participation
whatsoe icipation whatsoever in the property of the the property of the other. These declarations
and admission of the fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs
and successors in interests and third persons as well.