G.R. No. 154598.

 August 16, 2004.* CORONA, J.:

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD  
BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent. resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The
Habeas Corpus; Jurisdiction; Nothing in RA 8369 that revoked the jurisdiction of the Court dispositive portion2 read:
of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors .—The Court of Appeals
should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction “WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a)
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not
sufficient in substance.”
Same; Same; Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from  
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the
family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.— Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She
sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word “exclusive” wanted to return to her old job as a “guest relations officer” in a nightclub, with the freedom to go
apparently cannot be construed any other way. We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree
are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but
the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner
then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he
did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
Same; Same; RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors .—The primordial
 
consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
involving the custody of minors.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
Same; Same; Family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. —The jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
minors is at issue.
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Urbano, Palamos & Fabros for petitioner.

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court.— The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
x x x      x x x      x x x
 b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter. Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to “protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children.” The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing
three major issues regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater
jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word “exclusive” than guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.
to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the  
Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore
exclusive but concurrent—and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over
of RA 8369. habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus situations that the legislature
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ 556
has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
554 seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being;
In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by
the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot
 
exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word “exclusive” as not foreclosing
resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court—or any
Mining Corporation ,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit
court for that matter—to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive
in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s
domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be
Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
sought form the courts but only from the legislature.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
 
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar, it supports petitioner’s
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
submission that the word “exclusive” in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its
Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The petition is granted.
 
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines , and may
be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word “exclusive” be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
apparently cannot be construed any other way. or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which  
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal In ruling that the Commissioner’s “exclusive” jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying
passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General: andgiving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law: members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines . The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
“Idolatrous reverence” for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, “the letter of the law killeth; its (Emphasis Ours)
spirit giveth life.”
 
x x x      x x x      x x x From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as involved.
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law- One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for
legislation aforementioned. dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10

  That the serving officer will have to “search for the child all over the country” does not
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy “to protect the rights and promote the welfare of  
children”8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R. SP
This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
the provisions of RA 8369. SO ORDERED.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,  every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied re-

peal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.”9
 
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where
the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.— A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

x x x      x x x      x x x
 G.R. No. 159374. July 12, 2007.* under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to
the custody case pending before the family court. The
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, respondent.
writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions,
Parent and Child; Custody; Habeas Corpus; Courts; Jurisdictions; Family Courts Act of 1997 interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability. The rule therefore is: when by law
(R.A. No. 8369); RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors—the provisions of RA 8369 necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires
must be read in harmony with RA No. 7029 and BP 129, i.e., family courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where including related incidents and ancillary matters.
the custody of minors is at issue. —In Thornton v. Thornton, 436 SCRA 550 (2004), this Court
resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions: The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs      Real, Brotarlo and Real Law Offices for petitioner.
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. x x x x x x x x x We rule therefore
that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their CORONA, J.:
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. x x x x x x x x x
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heartrending affair.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are charged.
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (22 April 2004) in Re: sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. —The to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. too proved futile.
No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in 490
Relation to Custody of Minors: In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Madriñan vs. Madriñan
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the
that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus .—A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. x x x x x x x x x The petition may
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and
likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and,
to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially
made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner,
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. From the
however, had a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.
foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late
involved.
at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and
neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A careful reading of
respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa,
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases—writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules
(otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997”) family courts have exclusive original
of Court.—A careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
driven out by petitioner.
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s “In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of
alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.4 Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus .—A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court x x x      x x x      x x x
in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied.
Hence, this recourse. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,Court of Appeals, or with
petition for habeas corpus  and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369: Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within
“Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts.—The Family Courts shall have exclusive original the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: on the merits.
x x x      x x x      x x x

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
b)Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.”9 (emphases supplied)

x x x      x x x      x x x We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
Petitioner is wrong. transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to the Thornton  interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA “[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus  cases, the
8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions: lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result
“The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking
of minors. for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
x x x      x x x      x x x transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner
in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].”10
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
minors. original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
x x x      x x x      x x x the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the instability.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.”8 (emphases Costs against petitioner.
supplied) SO ORDERED.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus  in Relation to Custody of Minors:
 G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.* claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in 354
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed 354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
GARCIA, respondents.
Garcia vs. Drilon
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. No. therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
8369); It must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of
and children.—At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. —That the proceedings in
key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law. which does not need to be supported by evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is due to
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the time until final judgment is rendered. —To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” —Inspite of its designation as a family court, the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if
the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the
resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the general definition needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed
of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It bears
but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior the law against Violence Against Women and Children. —As the rules stand, a review of the case
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment
granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with more
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule
on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the 355
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. —Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10- VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 355
11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
Garcia vs. Drilon
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. Thus:
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined.
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not
Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes,
include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but
either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be
any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of
the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is
action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. —We
not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective of
third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted  ex parte so as to protect women and
a defending party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 357
purpose of the law against VAWC.
Garcia vs. Drilon
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of powers, it is the succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. —It is
settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on Women
Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between
No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.” —According to the Philippine
its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s
erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case. take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities expression of controlling women to retain power.
im-
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about
356 by biases and prejudices against women.—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
Garcia vs. Drilon discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.
posed.—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,”
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union , 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “ to modify the social and
instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. ” Justice Puno
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding a private affair to a public offense will require the development
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection 358
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation 358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Garcia vs. Drilon
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law
is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means Declaration of Policy.—The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing its Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the
State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. — Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
357 was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. —The application of R.A. 9262 is not
limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
its wordings or detailed in its provisions.—There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.” The
and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is
are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to
conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. Yet, issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of
petitioner insists that the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to
protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence,
359 which is about to recur.
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 359
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
Garcia vs. Drilon hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant
phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence Against Women and
“solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing Children may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
mental or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. —
However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be pre-
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual 361
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 361
Revised Penal Code (RPC).—VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word Garcia vs. Drilon
“person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even vented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go- immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file
physically. an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection order is an
order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that petitions for charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; “To be heard” does not
protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. —It is clear from
responsibility, criminal or the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of
360 petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere product
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
Garcia vs. Drilon opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To
civil, for every allegation therein. —A protection order is an order issued to prevent further be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
 Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the  Punong
violated.—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
case from the residence of the Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in
the barangay.” We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
362 the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers.”
Garcia vs. Drilon
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to the Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule, however, breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must
does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC. 11. Reliefs be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. —Before a
available to the offended party .—The protection order shall include any, some or all of the statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with
following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence; x x x x Indubitably,
petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s residence, regardless of 364
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion
may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private 364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest? Garcia vs. Drilon
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001),
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator. —Under Section powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Concurring Opinion:
the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from
ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that the Regional Trial
a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved
process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must
at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on appeal. —I agree with
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide
the protection order has been sought. issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be
resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order issued by constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on
the Punong Barangay or, in his unavail- appeal. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides: Sec.
20. Opposition to Petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
363 himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 363 why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not
include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause
Garcia vs. Drilon of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
ability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the alleged
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. —The alleged
to “maintain public order in the barangay.” —Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion raised it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.365
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 365
their due observance.” As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by Garcia vs. Drilon
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the constitutionality of technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue. —Notwithstanding my position that
the law cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not technically the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of petitioner’s failure
feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur
can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the Temporary that the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, should still pass upon the said issue in the
Protection Order against the petitioner. —For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the petitioner, but the private respondent as
filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was ultimately directed against the well, pray that the Court resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and paramount
issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is importance. Indeed, when public interest
a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed
separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will 367
be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that can be the subject of such VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 367
separate action if it were not for the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the
controversy, subject of a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would Garcia vs. Drilon
still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another case in the RTC. requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with this Court’s
duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have
Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the
earliest opportunity.—The challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.
earliest opportunity. In Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation , 565 SCRA 624
(2008), we said: A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent Philippine jurisprudence
so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of
must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a classifications.—Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.) This standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco
Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, v. Camacho, 585 SCRA 36 (2009), this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a
such that “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then “the rational basis test was
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” The decision upon the constitutional properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal
question is necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such protection challenge.”
question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative defense in the
Opposition filed with the RTC handling the protection order proceedings, which was the competent Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the
court to pass upon the constitutional issue.366 fundamental equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to test
whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is
the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review. —Since statutory remedies
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
accorded to women are not made available to men, when the reality is that there are men,
Garcia vs. Drilon regardless of their number, who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational basis test
may be too wide and liberal to justify the statutory classification which in effect allows different
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing of a separate action treatment of men who are similarly situated. In the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure
before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act the fundamental equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to
No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality and test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause,
propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. —The filing is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive
of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of intermediate review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the governmental objectives, and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those
issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are objectives.
inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial court, cannot
resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the petition for the Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure
issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will that human rights and fundamental
result in an unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the
proceedings for the protection order is not suspended, it does create the danger of having 368
inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two separate courts, whether of the same or
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
different levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject of
separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions for review before Garcia vs. Drilon
this Court – the exact scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. —By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is
held, “the law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions.” committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest requires the resolution (UDHR), which was a mere two years after it gained independence from the United States of
of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty of determining America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties
whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained within the limits such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International
of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among under the law, and that one person was the husband,” a concept that evidently found its way in
others. some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.370

Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the 370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and
human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or Garcia vs. Drilon
physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father
of the victim.—The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that although
said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals
of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the attention because it occurs in situations or places where women and children should feel most
victim. The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure safe and secure but are actually not. —Preventing violence against women and children through
gender equality, which is quoted as follows: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in their availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental objectives of protecting the
nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting
gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists other laws on violence against
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the
Republic Act No. 9262; View that Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations
Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The
against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which
directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a
against women in all forms both in law and in practice. —It has been acknowledged that “gender- person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a
based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” Republic not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and
children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the
369 other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal
protection from violence perpetuated by women.
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 369
Garcia vs. Drilon Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits the issuance of protection
Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing; Despite the
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all to be availed of by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only
appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued. —The
practice. Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. It brings the women into urgency of the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical,
the focus of human rights concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Hence, the law permits the
men and women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of issuance of
extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of
the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity. 371
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 371
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-Based Violence; As one of the
country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with Garcia vs. Drilon
the unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as “gender- protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a
based violence.”—As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is hearing. The law has granted authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is the offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC may likewise grant an application for a
otherwise known as “gender-based violence.” Violent acts towards women has been the subject of temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the
an examination on a historic world-wide perspective. The exhaustive study of a foreign history application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of
professor noted that “[f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without violating the offender’s right to
violence, were facts of life,” as three great bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent protection
ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code, which have influenced western order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More
society’s views and treatment of women, all “assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male importantly, they serve the objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate
domination stemming from the view of male superiority.” It cited 18th century legal expert William protection from the violence they perceive as threats to their personal safety and security. This
Blackstone, who explained that the common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the victims
assumption that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus “they were ‘one person’ instant relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of
dignity and equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order.
 Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); View that in of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human
furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence life, commonly designated as the police power.
against women and children under this Act has been classified as a public offense,  making its
prosecution independent of the victim’s initial participation. —In furtherance of the governmental Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View that a Barangay Protection
objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against women and children under Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the
this Act has been classified as a public offense, making its prosecution independent of the victim’s Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence against
initial participation. Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is the family or household members particularly women and their children. —A Barangay  Protection
substantially related to the important governmental objectives of valuing every Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence
person’s dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence
children, promoting gender equality, and empowering women. against the family or household members particularly women and their children. The authority of
barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262: SEC.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal protection clause in our 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How .—Barangay Protection Orders
Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. —The equal (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of
justified to put them on filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
372 available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Garcia vs. Drilon Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct
of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences any barangay official to effect is personal service. The parties may be accompanied by a non-
between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere provisional remedy
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for instant
law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to protection; Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a Barangay
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier Protection Order or the pendency of an application for a Barangay Protection Order shall not
judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a Temporary Protection Order or
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution. Permanent Protection Order.—While judicial power rests exclusively

Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection Order; View that a protection 374
order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child. —A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the 374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances Garcia vs. Drilon
surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards
must have immediate and uncomplicated access to the same. or bodies, or even particular government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to
the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to
a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. In the case of a BPO, it is
police power.—The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural a mere provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of
due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of appropriate judicial
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to the
competent tribunal. However, it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those the pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the
involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were enacted and court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by any court,
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also require that
health, and general welfare and comfort within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the barangay official shall assist the
victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with the nearest court in the victim’s place of
373 residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan Trial Court.
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 373
BRION, J., Concurring Opinion:
Garcia vs. Drilon
 Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View that Congress found that scrutinized and constitutionally upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law. Under a
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify reasonableness test, there is a presumption of constitutionality and that the laws enacted by
and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s Congress are presumed to fall within its constitutional powers.
total development.—From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress enacted R.A. No. 9262
as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms of Same; Same; View that there is no indication that Congress actually intended to classify
violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties, women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a
thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s total development. clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to harmonize family
Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are more susceptible to domestic and relations and protect the family as a basic social institution. —I do not really see any indication that
other forms of violence due to, among Congress actually intended to classify women and children as a group against men, under the
terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification, the  overriding intent of the
375 law is indisputably to harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 375 social institution. After sifting through the comprehensive information gathered, Congress found
that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children impedes the harmony of
Garcia vs. Drilon the family and the personal growth and development of family members. In the process, Congress
others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within found that these types of violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly
the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found experienced by women and children due to the unequal power relations of men and women in our
it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one society; Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that block the
hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which men are important component
first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also members.
recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of
the family. Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of
Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the reasonableness test has been the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and the
consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be
germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development of the 377
family.—My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal protection clause and in applying
a strict scrutiny standard is, among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need these VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 377
measures when we can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s constitutionality using the reasonableness Garcia vs. Drilon
test. The family is a unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on an uneven standard impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification. —In my view, a suspect
where measures beyond what is necessary are extended to women and children as against the classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the
man—the head of the family and the family provider. The use of an expanded equal protection case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed
clause only stresses the concept of an uneven equality that cannot long stand in a unit living at protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification. A suspect
close quarters in a situation of mutual dependency on one another. The reasonableness test, on classification label cannot solely and automatically be triggered by the circumstance that women
the other hand, has been consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as and children are accorded special protection by the Constitution. In fact, there is no place for a
the action is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has recognized the need for special protection;
development of the family. If we are to deviate from or to modify this established where such recognition has been made, congressional action should carry the presumption of
standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully and for strong justifiable reasons . validity.

Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and Phrases; View that a Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not immediately brought on by
suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in
classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children. —A suspect
alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. —When the classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard cannot be solely based on the
court uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from circumstance that the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the
the premise that the law established a “suspect classi- classification in the law was not immediately brought on by considerations of gender
or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a
376 marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children. An obvious reason, of
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED course, why the classification did not solely depend on gender is because the law also covers
children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Garcia vs. Drilon
fication.” A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the  most Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men members of the
race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their own
orientation. With a suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is rights and interests.—With the objective of promoting solidarity and the development of the
applied: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the government carries the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal redress for domestic violence that particularly affects
burden of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This approach is unlike the lowest level of women and their children. Significantly, the law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and
scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the past where the classification is
human rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social prejudice”; and 2) promo[ting a Philippine]
members of the family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings.
protection of their own rights and interests.  Consequently, the resulting classification under
R.A. No. Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of the Law; View that Republic Act
No. 9262 is gender-specific as only they may file the prescribed actions against offenders,
378 whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in lesbian relationships. —What
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED remedies does R.A. 9262 especially provide women and children? The law is gender-specific as
only they may file the prescribed actions against offenders, whether men or women, with whom
Garcia vs. Drilon the victims are or were in lesbian relationships. The definition includes past or present marital,
9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an injustice by removing remedies that are live-in, sexual or dating relationships. This law also provides for the remedy of a protection order
available to men in violence committed against them. The law furthermore does not target men in a civil action or in a criminal action, aside from the criminal action for its violation. It makes the
against women and children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional objective, process of securing a restraining order against perpetrators easier and more immediate by
and it does not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification that can be labeled “suspect” in providing for the legal remedy of protection orders from both the courts and barangay
the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the circumstances, the use and application officials.380
of strict scrutiny review, or even the use of an expanded equal protection perspective, strike me
as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
ABAD, J., Separate Concurring Opinion: 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Drilon
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that men and women are supposed to
be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to (CEDAW); View that in the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by
the latter.—This separate concurring opinion will address the issue of equal protection since it the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as
presents the more serious challenge to the constitutionality of the law. Men and women are equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an
supposed to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and enabling environment to achieve equality of results. —In the context of women’s rights,
harsh consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not substantive equality has been defined by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
available to the latter. The law, Garcia says, violates his right to equal protection because it is Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women be given an equal
gender-specific, favoring only women when men could also be victims of domestic violence. start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is
not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as
Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken
guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. —Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be
right to equal protection casts another shadow when the issue raised under it involves persons required in order to address such differences.
protected by the social justice provision of the Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The
equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been
substantive equality. “It ought to be construed,” said the Chief Justice, “in consonance with social victims of domestic violence.—Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For one
justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a transformative covenant in which thing, Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in preventing and addressing the serious
the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and problem of violence against women in the context of intimate relationships — recognized all over
build a genuinely egalitarian democracy.” This means that the weak, including women the world as one of the most insidious forms of gender discrimination. For another, R.A. 9262 is
based on the experiences of women who have been victims of domestic violence. The list of acts
379 regarded as forms of violence come from true-to-life stories of women who have suffered abuses
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 379 from their male partners. Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks women’s full participation in society. Hence, the
law grants them needed relief to ensure equality, protection, and personal safety, enabling them
Garcia vs. Drilon to enjoy their civil, political, social, and economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for
in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak. instance, precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in
the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently
Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; View that the expanded equal protection regain control over her life.”
clause should be understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
good.”—Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the
human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; View that Locus standi is
the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful position defined as “a right of appearance
as a person with equal moral status.” Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should be
understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
381
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.” Borrowing the
language of Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his own thoughts, the Chief VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 381
Justice said: The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and enhance the Garcia vs. Drilon
right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation “of disadvantage,
 in a court of justice on a given question.” —Legal standing in cases that raise constitutional Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women’s groups,
issues is essential. Locus standi  is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
given question.” The fundamental question is “whether a party alleges such personal stake in the Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
questions. women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband;
former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be said that violence in the context woman has a common child .5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
issue.—In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are not workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of
gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer from double victimization first VAWC or requests for assistance.
by their abusers and second by the judicial system. Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
entrenches some level of heteronormativity. It is blind to the possibility that, whatever moral violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
positions are taken by those who are dominant, in reality intimate relationships can also happen power to barangay officials.
between men. The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf
Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
never been passed.—We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
as though it had never been passed.” However, the seemingly all-inclusive statement of absolute the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
retroactive invalidity may not always be justified. One established exception is the doctrine of support.7
operative fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as Private respondent’s claims
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who
and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia,
by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old .8
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid Law. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around
her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
382 controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
Garcia vs. Drilon and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
  Roland G. Ravina for petitioner. Robinson’s Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
  Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon  for private respondents. household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
  Mae Niña Reyes-Gallos for private respondents. Petitioner’s infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
  Claire Angeline P. Luczon co-counsel for private respondents. arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos — or
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the
mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
are aware of private respondent’s sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair.
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, “female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women’s
by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.”3
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12 house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson’s Bank that she intends to f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
manager’s job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
good. He even told private respondent’s mother, who lives with them in the family home, that President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13 the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would of Indirect Contempt of Court.
take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14 considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
the President of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque,
together with the bills for utilities.15 the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of sureties.
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17 Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder: reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby: P100,000.00.Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family allow him visitation rights to his children.
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
(Republic Act No. 9262 states “regardless of ownership”), this is to allow the Petitioner Rosalie and her
(private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of
Respondent. the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the of Court;
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home. house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her c) Ordering the Chief of the Women’s Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit. remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after
and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove
where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing. things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture,
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future. of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and contempt of Court;
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent’s firearm licenses. He should also be Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
 f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23 Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes “I,” “I-1,” and “I-2,” including
private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the 9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25 signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties
to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the “Special Protection of Children why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner’s
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent’s motion to
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner’s lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner
at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
get her and her children’s belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid’s (Sheryl hereunder:
Jamola) bag in the maids’ room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola.27 x x x x
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows: x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby: Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each
acts of violence against the offended party; expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise court.
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly; After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or required comment to private respondent’s motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia’s three only be an “exercise in futility.”33
brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, Proceedings before the CA
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner’s other During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the
children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 35 (TRO)
the TPO will be rendered nugatory; against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for
to the Court; failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00; issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
and Php25,000.00; Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that—
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a The Issues
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J I.
Bros Tading;393
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 393 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
Garcia vs. Drilon ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT,
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those
in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts
III. in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. x x x
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
IV. Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION. instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

V. x x x x

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order
THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38 before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
The Ruling of the Court review of this Court.
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner. and not an answer.49 Thus:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40 (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
“inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.” 41  
We disagree. We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-
Family Courts have authority claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
constitutionality of a statute. money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as party.50 A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. 52 As pointed out by Justice
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz.: prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
SEC. 7. Venue.—The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have exclusio alterius.
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case  a quo because
under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain,
was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied) direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.That the
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of
statute,45 “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the among others, viz.:
fundamental law.”46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. —In case the court determines the need for
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said (a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
 (b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved; A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262,
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
presented; Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a “synthesized measure” 62 — an amalgamation
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of two measures, namely, the “Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “AntiAbuse of Women in
of affidavits; and Intimate Relationships Act”63 — providing protection to “all family members, leaving no one in
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one isolation” but at the same time giving special attention to women as the “usual victims” of violence
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied) measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection Wednesday, December 10, 2003
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women’s groups
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household,
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address
rules on summary procedure. domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives,
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record.
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves “WIIR”
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course those related with the family. 65
in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.     x x x x
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a Wednesday, January 14, 2004
time,56 should not be enjoined.The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or
invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris,
x x x x
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community
women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that
is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
correctly, Madam sponsor.
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo  until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte  so As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such period.
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC. I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women’s rights especially in the
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in domestic environment.
view of private respondent’s plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should put the As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall. opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262. partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
 I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I x x x x
am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would x x x x
always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman. Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
x x x x The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say? The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso,
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this
women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure particular measure.
focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be So, if I may propose an amendment—
victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
that there may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly Senator Sotto.—more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact,
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have
addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
orders for one are not available in said law. breaks my heart to find out about these things.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
407 women.409
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 407 VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 409
Garcia vs. Drilon Garcia vs. Drilon

behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot
just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints. Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in
the bill but not the children.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
particularly children. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members amendment, as amended, is approved. 66
as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President. statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
Senator Sotto. Mr. President. children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators. may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized. determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
be removing the “men and children” in this particular bill and focus specifically on women R.A. 9262 does not violate the
alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale guaranty of equal protection
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa “Loi” Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure of the laws.
now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the
this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union69 is instructive:
Mr. President.408
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
Garcia vs. Drilon
 order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the his control. I quote the early studies:
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy—the
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave,
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification society.
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives.
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal more importance than preventing violence to women.
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection. The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one’s wife with a stick, to pull her
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”70 hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
A. Unequal power relationship indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to
between men and women the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.414
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as Garcia vs. Drilon
“gender-based violence”. Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, As time marched on, the women’s advocacy movement became more organized. The
men’s companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women to retain power. 71 saloons, bars and their husbands’ other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement’s agenda. They
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, fought for women’s right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
1993 stating that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power movement was on the roll.
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No
subordinate positions, compared with men.”72 less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based noted:
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are
portions of which are quoted hereunder: the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women
reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as “marked
underestimates,” because the nature of these incidents discourages women from
 reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing
not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, “researchers on family violence 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year.” and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families were committed by the women’s intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
where wife beat- partners.73
415 Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 415 against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
Garcia vs. Drilon 2004,74 thus:
ing takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women,
most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and 2004 - 2011*
economic isolation of women, is also common. Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200 201 201
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,04 832
income... Returning to one’s abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of 2
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
Incestuous 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners. Rape
Attempted 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act. Rape
Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
In the International front, the women’s struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality Lasci-
of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention viousness
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN
Physical 3,5 2,3 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,4 2,01 1,58
General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Injuries 53 35 92 05 07 98 8 8
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
the Status of Women. Harassmen
t
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — steps of all these
women’s movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates RA 9262 218 924 1,2 2,3 3,5 5,2 9,97 9,02
the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental 69 87 99 85 4 1
equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
the Convention on the Rights of
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
416 Concubina 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ge
Garcia vs. Drilon RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act Abduction 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
/
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes.”
(Citations omitted) Kidnapping
  Unjust 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
B. Women are the “usual” and “most likely” victims of violence.
Vexation
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that — Total 6,2 5,3 4,8 5,7 6,9 9,4 15,1 12,9
71 74 81 29 05 85 04 48
*2011 report covers only from January to August Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC) focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner’s contention,83 therefore, that
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take
many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women all appropriate measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic on stereotyped roles for men and women .”84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he
violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public
to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their prosecution and the judges.”85
spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical II. The classification is germane to the purpose of         the law.
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
or emotional abuse.76 address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in as follows:
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid. SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children,
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited
to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
but similarly pass through the same streets. women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non- Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
vehicle-drawing animals Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention
that also traverse the city roads, “but their number must be negligible and their on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to Philippines is a party.
constitute a menace to the health of the community.”77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78 Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
C.  Gender bias and prejudices women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of
United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. protocols.
Congress’ authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally
the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims to all members
of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to “double victimization”—first at the hands of Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
the offender and then of the legal system.79 promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
“(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, thereof defines VAWC as:
the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence.” 80 wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women. relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as “only a live-in such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
partner” and presenting her as an “opportunist” and a “mistress” in an “illegitimate relationship.” includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
Judge Amila even called her a “prostitute,” and accused her of being motivated by “insatiable
greed” and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila’s A. “Physical Violence”  refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity. B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
 a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser; her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due
or coercion; process clause of the Constitution.
c) Prostituting the woman or child. Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
C. “Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: “On the basis of
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or seconds, without an inkling of what happened.”95
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
D. “Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96“The scope of
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following: reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard
legitimate profes- the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
424 household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
Garcia vs. Drilon abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.” 97
sion, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 petitioner98 thereby under-taking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
of the Family Code; Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” 99 the court is
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common; property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
3. destroying household property; necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
4. controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the such violence, which is about to recur.100
conjugal money or properties. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. 101
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous. because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection of women and children
like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing mental It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order
or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five
However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93 service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom likewise be indicated on the notice.105
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
“person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected
 The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
order should not be issued.106 Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating
happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order
be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107 There is no undue delegation of
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent  Ex- judicial power to barangay officials.
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him the Constitution, is placed upon the “Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave established by law” and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an “exercise in SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. —Barangay
futility,” conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong
period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and
can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
complain that he was denied due process of law. protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for
from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO
check” issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108 is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance
suggest that this is so. It states: of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party .—The protection order shall include any, (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte  BPO, the Punong
some or all of the following reliefs: Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
x x x x The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before
the Punong Barangay.
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,  
regardless of owner- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
ship of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power “is generally
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” 113
gathered his things and escort him from the residence; As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or,
in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
x x x x from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s residence,
laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”114
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated . How then can the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case Garcia vs. Drilon
to a mediator is justified. private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.” 115
Petitioner argues that “by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to “protect proceeding “whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.” 109 and the accused is probably guilty thereof,” the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of
acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence
and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration
of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno’s observation that “the history of the women’s movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the
violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment.” 118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 157802. October 13, 2010.* subordinate officers or agents.—The Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the
power to create a corporate office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation
MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, RICHARD K. SPENCER, CATHERINE Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to
SPENCER, AND ALEX MANCILLA, petitioners, vs.  RICARDO R. COROS, respondent. elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the Board
of Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice
President for Finance and Administration created by Matling’s President pursuant to By-Law No. V
Labor Law; Labor Arbiters; Illegal Dismissals; As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or
was an ordinary, not a corporate, office.
other employee of a private employer is properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (LA).—As a rule,
the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private employer is properly cognizable by
the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as amended. Same; Same; Same; The statement in Tabang, to the effect that offices not expressly
mentioned in the By-Laws but were created pursuant to a By-Law enabling provision were also
considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum .—The petitioners’ reliance on Tabang,
Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer,
supra, is misplaced. The statement in Tabang, to the effect that offices not expressly mentioned in
however, the controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
the By-Laws but were created pursuant to a By-Law enabling provision were also considered
(SEC).—Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate offi-
corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due to the position subject of the controversy being
mentioned in the By-Laws. Thus, the Court held therein that the position was a corporate office,
cer, however, the controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
and that the determination of the rights and liabilities arising from the ouster from the position
Commission (SEC), because the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
was an intra-corporate controversy within the SEC’s jurisdiction.
between and among stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates,
Same; Same; Same; Elements in order to determine whether a dispute constitutes an intra-
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as
corporate controversy or not.—True it is that the Court pronounced in Tabang as follows: “Also,
the controversy concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the
an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation.
controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such
There is no distinction, qualification or any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and
corporation, partnership, or association. Such controversy, among others, is known as an intra-
covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.” However,
corporate dispute.
the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too sweeping and does not accord with
reason, justice, and fair play. In order to determine whether a dispute constitutes an intra-
Same; Same; Same; Upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The
corporate contro-
Securities Regulation Code, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s)  jurisdiction over all
intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). —Effective on August 8,
15
2000, upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation
Code, the SEC’s jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the RTC, pursuant VOL. 633, OCTOBER 13, 2010 15
to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799, to wit: “5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the versy or not, the Court considers two elements instead, namely: ( a) the status or
Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the relationship of the parties; and ( b) the nature of the question that is the subject of their
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches controversy.
that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed   Reyes & Reyes Law Offices  for petitioners.
as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.”
  Antonio R. Bacalso II for respondent.
Same; Corporation Code; Corporate Officers; The creation of an office pursuant to or under
a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office .—Conformably BERSAMIN, J.:
with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered This case reprises the jurisdictional conundrum of whether a complaint for illegal dismissal is
as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (LA) or by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The determination of
provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office. Guerrea v. Lezama, 103 whether the dismissed officer was a regular employee or a corporate officer unravels the
conundrum. In the case of the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction; otherwise, the RTC
14 exercises the legal authority to adjudicate.
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners challenge the decision dated
Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros September 13, 20021 and the resolution dated April 2, 2003, 2 both promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No.
Phil. 553 (1958), the first ruling on the matter, held that the only officers of a corporation 65714 entitled Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation, et al. v. Ricardo R. Coros and
were those given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-Laws; the rest of the National Labor Relations Commission , whereby by the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the ruling
corporate officers could be considered only as employees or subordinate officials. of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to the effect that the LA had jurisdiction
because the respondent was not a corporate officer of petitioner Matling Industrial and
Commercial Corporation (Matling).
Same; Same; Same; The power to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power
that the law exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to
_______________ On March 13, 2001, the NLRC set aside the dismissal, concluding that the
respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal was properly cognizable by the LA, not by the SEC,
because he was not a corporate officer by virtue of his position in Matling, albeit high ranking and
1 Rollo, pp. 53-61; penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired), with Associate managerial, not being among the positions listed in Matling’s Constitution and By-Laws. 8 The NLRC
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring. disposed thuswise:

“WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is SET ASIDE. A new one is entered declaring and
2 Id., at pp. 63-67. holding that the case at bench does not involve any intracorporate matter. Hence, jurisdiction to
hear and act on said case is vested with the Labor Arbiter, not the SEC, considering that the
16 position of Vice-President for Finance and Administration being held by complainant-appellant is
not listed as among respondent’s corporate officers.
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros

Antecedents Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Arbitration Branch of origin in
order that the Labor Arbiter below could act on the case at bench, hear both parties, receive their
After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, the respective evidence and position papers fully observing the requirements of due process, and
respondent filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against resolve the same with reasonable dispatch.
Matling and some of its corporate officers (petitioners) in the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration
Branch XII, Iligan City.3 SO ORDERED.”
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint,4 raising the ground, among others, that the
complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) due to
The petitioners sought reconsideration, 9 reiterating that the respondent, being a member of
the controversy being intra-corporate inasmuch as the respondent was a member of Matling’s
the Board of Directors, was a corporate officer whose removal was not within the LA’s jurisdiction.
Board of Directors aside from being its Vice President for Finance and Administration prior to his
The petitioners later submitted to the NLRC in support of the motion for reconsideration the
termination.
certified machine copies of Matling’s Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws to prove that
The respondent opposed the petitioners’ motion to dismiss,5 insisting that his status as a
the President of Matling was thereby granted “full power to create new offices and appoint the
member of Matling’s Board of Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not been formally
officers thereto, and the minutes of special meeting held on June 7, 1999 by Matling’s Board of
elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling, considering that he had
Directors to prove that the respondent was, indeed, a Member of the Board of Directors. 10
been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the certificate of stock he had been given
Nonetheless, on April 30, 2001, the NLRC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.11
in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retained the certificate of stock in its custody; and that
even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as the Vice President
Ruling of the CA
for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the notice of his termination dated
April 10, 2000 showed.
On October 16, 2000, the LA granted the petitioners’ motion to dismiss,6 ruling that the The petitioners elevated the issue to the CA by petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
respondent was a corporate officer because he was occupying the position of Vice President for SP 65714, contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
Finance and Administration and at the same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of jurisdiction in reversing the correct decision of the LA.
Matling; and that, consequently, his removal was a corporate act of Matling and the controversy In its assailed decision promulgated on September 13, 2002, 12 the CA dismissed the petition
resulting from such removal was under the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant to Section 5, for certiorari, explaining:
paragraph (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902.
 “For a position to be considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for one to be
Ruling of the NLRC considered as a corporate officer, the position must, if not listed in the by-laws, have been created
by the corporation’s board of directors, and the occupant thereof appointed or elected by the
same board of directors or stockholders. This is the implication of the ruling in Tabang v. National
The respondent appealed to the NLRC,7 urging that:
Labor Relations Commission, which reads:
I.
“The president, vice president, secretary and treasurer are commonly regarded as the
principal or executive officers of a corporation, and modern corporation statutes usually
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION GRANTING
designate them as the officers of the corporation. However, other offices are sometimes
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT GIVING THE APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE
created by the charter or by-laws of a corporation, or the board of directors may be
HIS OPPOSITION THERETO THEREBY VIOLATING THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF DUE PROCESS.
empowered under the by-laws of a corporation to create additional offices as may be
necessary.
II
It has been held that an ‘office’ is created by the charter of the corporation and the
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED AN ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an ‘employee’ usually
OF JURISDICTION. occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders
 but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be 1. Unfair labor practice cases;
paid to such employee.”
2. Termination disputes;
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Ongkingco v. National Labor Relations
Commission and De Rossi v. National Labor Relations Commission. 3.  If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
The position of vice-president for administration and finance, which Coros used to hold in the
corporation, was not created by the corporation’s board of directors but only by its president or 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
executive vice-president pursuant to the by-laws of the corporation. Moreover, Coros’ appointment the employer-employee relations;
to said position was not made through any act of the board of directors or stockholders of the
corporation. Consequently, the position to which Coros was appointed and later on removed from, 5.  Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving
is not a corporate office despite its nomenclature, but an ordinary office in the corporation. the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

Coros’ alleged illegal dismissal therefrom is, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the labor 6.  Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
arbiter. benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.20 regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros
(c)  Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
SO ORDERED.” agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on April 2, 2003.13 and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As amended by Section 9,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).”
Issue
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the
Thus, the petitioners are now before the Court for a review on certiorari, positing that the controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), because
respondent was a stockholder/member of the Matling’s Board of Directors as well as its Vice the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among
President for Finance and Administration; and that the CA consequently erred in holding that the stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the corporation,
LA had jurisdiction. partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
The decisive issue is whether the respondent was a corporate officer of Matling or not. The and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as
resolution of the issue determines whether the LA or the RTC had jurisdiction over 22
his complaint for illegal dismissal.
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ruling Mating Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs. Coros
the controversy concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the
The appeal fails. controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such
corporation, partnership, or association. 14 Such controversy, among others, is known as an intra-
I corporate dispute.
Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, 15 otherwise known
as The Securities Regulation Code, the SEC’s jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was
The Law on Jurisdiction in Dismissal Cases
transferred to the RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799, to wit:
As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private employer is properly
cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
provides as follows: “5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
“Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. —(a) Except as
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000
non-agricultural:
until finally disposed.”
 Considering that the respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal was commenced on August Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. Any two (2) or
10, 2000, it might come under the coverage of Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799, supra, should it turn more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act as
out that the respondent was a corporate, not a regular, officer of Matling. president and secretary or as president and treasurer at the same time.

II The directors or trustees and officers to be elected shall perform the duties enjoined on them
by law and the by-laws of the corporation. Unless the articles of incorporation or the by-laws
Was the Respondent’s Position of Vice President provide for a greater majority, a majority of the number of directors or trustees as fixed in the
for Administration and Finance a Corporate Office? articles of incorporation shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of corporate business, and
We must first resolve whether or not the respondent’s position as Vice President for Finance every decision of at least a majority of the directors or trustees present at a meeting at which
and Administration was a corporate office. If it was, his dismissal by the Board of Directors there is a quorum shall be valid as a corporate act, except for the election of officers which shall
rendered the matter an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the RTC pursuant to RA No. 8799. require the vote of a majority of all the members of the board.
The petitioners contend that the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration was
a corporate office, having been created by Matling’s President pursuant to By-Law No. V, as Directors or trustees cannot attend or vote by proxy at board meetings.”
amended,16 to wit:
Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order
BY-LAW NO. V to be considered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-
Officers Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office. Guerrea v.
Lezama,19 the first ruling on the matter, held that the only officers of a corporation were those
“The President shall be the executive head of the corporation; shall preside over the given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-Laws; the rest of the corporate
meetings of the stockholders and directors; shall countersign all certificates, contracts and other officers could be considered only as employees or subordinate officials. Thus, it was held
instruments of the corporation as authorized by the Board of Directors; shall have full power to in Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. v. King:20
hire and discharge any or all employees of the corporation; shall have full power to create
new offices and to appoint the officers thereto as he may deem proper and necessary  “An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the
in the operations of the corporation and as the progress of the business and welfare of directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies no office and generally is
the corporation may demand; shall make reports to the directors and stockholders and employed not by the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the
perform all such other duties and functions as are incident to his office or are properly required of corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
him by the Board of Directors. In case of the absence or disability of the President, the Executive
Vice President shall have the power to exercise his functions.” In this case, respondent was appointed vice president for nationwide expansion by Malonzo,
petitioner’’s general manager, not by the board of directors of petitioner. It was also Malonzo who
The petitioners argue that the power to create corporate offices and to appoint the individuals determined the compensation package of respondent. Thus, respondent was an employee, not a
to assume the offices was delegated by Matling’s Board of Directors to its President through By- “corporate officer.”  The CA was therefore correct in ruling that jurisdiction over the case was
Law No. V, as amended; and that any office the President created, like the position of the properly with the NLRC, not the SEC (now the RTC).”
respondent, was as valid and effective a creation as that made by the Board of Directors, making
the office a corporate office. In justification, they cite Tabang v. National Labor Relations This interpretation is the correct application of Section 25 of the Corporation Code, which
Commission,17 which held that “other offices are sometimes created by the charter or by-laws of a plainly states that the corporate officers are the President, Secretary, Treasurer and such other
corporation, or the board of directors may be empowered under the by-laws of a corporation to officers as may be provided for in the By-Laws. Accordingly, the corporate officers in the context
create additional officers as may be necessary.” of PD No. 902-A are exclusively those who are given that character either by the Corporation
The respondent counters that Matling’s By-Laws did not list his position as Vice President for Code or by the corporation’s By-Laws.
Finance and Administration as one of the corporate offices; that Matling’s By-Law No. III listed A different interpretation can easily leave the way open for the Board of Directors to
only four corporate officers, namely: President, Executive Vice President, Secretary, and circumvent the constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure of the employee by the expedient
Treasurer; 18 that the inclusion in the By-Laws of an enabling clause on the creation of just any corporate officer
corporate offices contemplated in the phrase “ and such other officers as may be provided for in position.
the by-laws” found in Section 25 of the Corporation Code should be clearly and expressly stated in It is relevant to state in this connection that the SEC, the primary agency administering
the By-Laws; that the fact that Matling’s By-Law No. III dealt with Directors & Officers while its the Corporation Code, adopted a similar interpretation of Section 25 of the Corporation Code in its
By-Law No. V dealt with Officers proved that there was a differentiation between the officers Opinion dated November 25, 1993,21 to wit:
mentioned in the two provisions, with those classified under By-Law No. V being ordinary or non-
corporate officers; and that the officer, to be considered as a corporate officer, must be elected by “Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation Code), whoever are
the Board of Directors or the stockholders, for the President could only appoint an employee to a the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive Officers of the
position pursuant to By-Law No. V. corporation and the Board has no power to create other Offices without amending first
We agree with respondent. the corporate By-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than
Section 25 of the Corporation Code provides: the positions of corporate Officers, but the persons occupying such positions are not
considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Corporation
“Section 25. Corporate officers, quorum.—Immediately after their election, the directors of a Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate Officers,
corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who shall be a director, a except those functions lawfully delegated to them. Their functions and duties are to be
treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of the determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.”
 Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create status or relationship of the parties; and (b) the nature of the question that is the subject of their
a corporate office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation Code requiring the controversy. This was our thrust in Viray v. Court of Appeals:27
Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to elect
the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the Board of “The establishment of any of the relationships mentioned above will not necessarily always
Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents. 22 The office of Vice confer jurisdiction over the dispute on the SEC to the exclusion of regular courts. The statement
President for Financeand Administration created by Matling’s President pursuant to By-Law No. V made in one case that the rule admits of no exceptions or distinctions is not that absolute. The
was an ordinary, not a corporate, office. better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not only
To emphasize, the power to create new offices and the power to appoint the officers to the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of
occupy them vested by By-Law No. V merely allowed Matling’s President to create non-corporate their controversy.
offices to be occupied by ordinary employees of Matling. Such powers were incidental to the
President’s duties as the executive head of Matling to assist him in the daily operations of the Not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves corporate matters that
business. only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. If, for
The petitioners’ reliance on Tabang, supra, is misplaced. The statement in Tabang, to the example, a person leases an apartment owned by a corporation of which he is a stockholder,
effect that offices not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws but were created pursuant to a By-Law there should be no question that a complaint for his ejectment for non-payment of rentals would
enabling provision were also considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due to the still come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not of the SEC. By the same token, if
position subject of the controversy being mentioned in the By-Laws. Thus, the Court held therein one person injures another in a vehicular accident, the complaint for damages filed by the victim
that the position was a corporate office, and that the determination of the rights and liabilities will not come under the jurisdiction of the SEC simply because of the happenstance that both
arising from the ouster from the position was an intra-corporate controversy within the SEC’s parties are stockholders of the same corporation. A contrary interpretation would dissipate the
jurisdiction. powers of the regular courts and distort the meaning and intent of PD No. 902-A.”
In Nacpil v. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation ,23  which  may be the more appropriate
ruling, the position subject of the controversy was not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws, but In another case, Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla ,28 the Court reiterated these
was created pursuant to a By-Law enabling provision authorizing the Board of Directors to create determinants thuswise:
other offices that the Board of Directors might see fit to create. The Court held there that the
position was a corporate office, relying on the obiter dictum  in Tabang. “In order that the SEC (now the regular courts) can take cognizance of a case, the controversy
Considering that the observations earlier made herein show that the soundness of their dicta is must pertain to any of the following relationships:
not unassailable, Tabang  and Nacpil  should no longer be controlling.
a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
III b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers;
Did Respondent’s Status as Director and c)  between the corporation, partnership or association and the State as far as its franchise,
Stockholder Automatically Convert his Dismissal permit or license to operate is concerned; and
into an Intra-Corporate Dispute? d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.
Yet, the petitioners insist that because the respondent was a Director/stockholder of Matling,
and relying on Paguio v. National Labor Relations Commission 24 and Ongkingko v. National Labor The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties
Relations Commission,25 the NLRC had no jurisdiction over his complaint, considering that any case involved are the stockholders and the corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the
for illegal dismissal brought by a stockholder/officer against the corporation was an intra-corporate ambit of the jurisdiction of SEC. The better policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a
matter that must fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC conformably with the context of PD No. case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or
902-A. the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. In the absence of any one of
The petitioners’ insistence is bereft of basis. these factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that
To begin with, the reliance on Paguio  and Ongkingko  is misplaced. In both rulings, the every conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would involve such corporate matters
complainants were undeniably corporate officers due to their positions being expressly mentioned as only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” 29
in the By-Laws, aside from the fact that both of them had been duly elected by the respective
Boards of Directors. But the herein respondent’s position of Vice President for Finance and
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from office at
Administration was not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws; neither was the position of Vice
will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for just cause,
President for Finance and Administration created by Matling’s Board of Directors. Lastly, the
on the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of
President, not the Board of Directors, appointed him.
creation of the office. In the respondent’s case, he was supposedly at once an employee, a
True it is that the Court pronounced in Tabang as follows:
stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office
must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate
“Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the controversy or a labor termination dispute. We must also consider whether his status as Director
corporation. There is no distinction, qualification or any exemption whatsoever. The provision is and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice
broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.” 26 President for Finance and Administration.
Obviously enough, the respondent was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and
However, the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too sweeping and does Administration because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working
not accord with reason, justice, and fair play. In order to determine whether a dispute constitutes for Matling on September 8, 1966, and had been employed continuously for 33 years until his
an intra-corporate controversy or not, the Court considers two elements instead, namely: ( a) the termination on April 17, 2000, first as a bookkeeper, and his climb in 1987 to his last position as
Vice President for Finance and Administration had been gradual but steady, as the following
sequence indicates:
1966—Bookkeeper
1968—Senior Accountant
1969—Chief Accountant
1972—Office Supervisor
1973—Assistant Treasurer
1978—Special Assistant for Finance
1980—Assistant Comptroller
1983—Finance and Administrative Manager
1985—Asst. Vice President for Finance and Administration
1987 to April 17, 2000—Vice President for Finance and Administration
Even though he might have become a stockholder of Matling in 1992, his promotion to the
position of Vice President for Finance and Administration in 1987 was by virtue of the length of
quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the
status of Director/stockholder had no relation to his promotion. Besides, his status of
Director/stockholder was unaffected by his dismissal from employment as Vice President for
Finance and Administration.33

In Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, 30 a case involving a lady bank manager who
had risen from the ranks but was dismissed, the Court held that her complaint for illegal dismissal
was correctly brought to the NLRC, because she was deemed a regular employee of the bank. The
Court observed thus:

“It appears that private respondent was appointed Accounting Clerk by the Bank on July 14,
1963. From that position she rose to become supervisor. Then in 1982, she was appointed
Assistant Vice-President which she occupied until her illegal dismissal on July 19, 1991. The
bank’s contention that she merely holds an elective position and that in effect she is
not a regular employee is belied by the nature of her work and her length of service
with the Bank. As earlier stated, she rose from the ranks and has been employed with the Bank
since 1963 until the termination of her employment in 1991. As Assistant Vice President of the
Foreign Department of the Bank, she is tasked, among others, to collect checks drawn against
overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the collection of foreign bills or checks
purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same. It has been stated that
“the primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. Additionally, “an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of
service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.” As Assistant Vice-President
of the Foreign Department of the Bank she performs tasks integral to the operations of the bank
and her length of service with the bank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a
regular employee of the bank. In fine, as a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure;
that is, her services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. This being in truth a
case of illegal dismissal, it is no wonder then that the Bank endeavored to the very end to
establish loss of trust and confidence and serious misconduct on the part of private respondent
but, as will be discussed later, to no avail.” 

_______________
 G.R. No. 185567. October 20, 2010.* attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
ARSENIO Z. LOCSIN, petitioner, vs. NISSAN LEASE PHILS., INC. and LUIS BANSON, respondents. and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Labor Law; Appeals; Motions to Dismiss; The denial of a motion to dismiss by the Labor Same; Corporation Law; Jurisdiction; Termination of Employment; It is the Regional Trial
Arbiter is unappealable—as a general rule, an aggrieved party’s proper recourse is to file his Court (RTC), not the Labor Arbiter or the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which has
position paper, interpose the grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss before the labor jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of a corporate officer. —Given Locsin’s status as
arbiter, and actively participate in the proceedings. —Prefatorily, we agree with Locsin’s submission a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality
that the NCLPI incorrectly elevated the Labor Arbiter’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss to the CA. of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. As we also held in Okol,  a corporate officer’s
Locsin is correct in positing that the denial of a motion to dismiss is unappealable. As a general dismissal from service is an intra-corporate dispute: In a number of cases [ Estrada v. National
rule, an aggrieved party’s proper recourse to the denial is to file his position paper, interpose the Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106722, 4 October 1996, 262 SCRA 709; Lozon v. National
grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss before the labor arbiter, and actively participate in Labor Relations Commission, 310 Phil. 1 (1995); Espino v. National Labor Relations Commission ,
the proceedings. Thereafter, the labor arbiter’s decision can be appealed to the NLRC, not to the 310 Phil. 61 (1995); Fortune Cement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R.
CA. No. 79762, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA 258], we have held that a corporate officer’s dismissal
is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a
stockholder and a corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While, as a rule, the Court strictly
adheres to the rules of procedure, it may take exception to such general rule when a strict
implementation of the rules would cause substantial injustice to the parties. —As a rule, we strictly Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Under the circumstances of the
adhere to the rules of procedure and do everything we can, to the point of penalizing violators, to case, the Court gives precedence to the merits of the case, and primacy to the element of
encourage respect for these rules. We take exception to this general rule, however, when a strict jurisdiction—in the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over
implementation of these rules would cause substantial injustice to the parties. We see it the termination dispute the corporate officer brought, and should not be allowed to continue to
appropriate to apply the exception to this case for the reasons discussed below; hence, we are act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and
compelled to go beyond procedure and rule on the merits of the case. In the context of this case, the law.—Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the
we see sufficient justification to rule on the employer-employee relationship issue raised by NCLPI, case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and
even though the Labor Arbiter’s interlocutory order was incorrectly  brought to the CA under Rule rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial
65. officer can act. In the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have
jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to
continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the labor law setting, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
is still open to the aggrieved party when a labor arbiter denies a motion to dismiss; The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is clothed with sufficient authority to correct any claimed 395
“erroneous assumption of jurisdiction” by labor arbiters. —In the labor law setting, a plain, speedy VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 395
and adequate remedy is still open to the aggrieved party when a labor arbiter denies a motion to Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils., Inc.
dismiss. This is Article 223 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended ( Labor Code), which has become obvious, based on the records and the law. In more practical terms, a
states: ART. 223. APPEAL  Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate
only on any of the following grounds: (a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter; x x x Pursuant to this Article, we held in  Metro PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Drug (citing Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. Court of Appeals , 293 SCRA 101 (1998), that the    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NLRC is clothed with sufficient authority to correct any claimed “erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction” by labor arbiters.   Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles  for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Determination of Exceptionally Meritorious   Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose  for respondents.
Circumstances.—Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious  circumstance  can be tested
under the guidelines we established in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 540 (2003), as
BRION,**  J.:
follows: Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1  petitioner Arsenio Z. Locsin ( Locsin) seeks the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 28, 2008,3 in “Arsenio Z.
appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other ele-
Locsin v. Nissan Car Lease Phils., Inc. and Luis Banson,”  docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103720 and
the Resolution dated December 9, 2008, 4 denying Locsin’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
394 assailed ruling of the CA reversed and set aside the Decision 5 of the Hon. Labor Arbiter Thelma
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Concepcion (Labor Arbiter Concepcion) which denied Nissan Lease Phils.
Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils., Inc. Inc.’s (NCLPI) and Luis T. Banson’s (Banson) Motion to Dismiss.
ments that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely The Factual Antecedents
 On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer and subsequent re-elections from 1992 until 2005. Further, he performed only those functions that
(EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and responsibilities included: (1) the were “specifically set forth in the By-Laws or required of him by the Board of Directors.” 17
management of the finances of the company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President With respect to the suit Locsin filed with the Labor Arbiter, the CA held that:
and/or the Board of Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of “Private respondent, in belatedly filing this suit before the Labor Arbiter, questioned the legality of
financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition of NCLPI. 6 Locsin his “dismissal” but in essence, he raises the issue of whether or not the Board of
held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected every year since 1992, until January 21, Directors had the authority to remove him from the corporate office to which he was
2005, when he was nominated and elected Chairman of NCLPI’s Board of Directors. 7 elected pursuant to the By-Laws of the petitioner corporation. Indeed, had private
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the Board, respondent been an ordinary employee, an election conducted by the Board of Directors would not
the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda have been necessary to remove him as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer. However, in an
was the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman obvious attempt to preclude the application of settled jurisprudence that corporate officers whose
nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.8 position is provided in the by-laws, their election, removal or dismissal is subject to Section 5 of
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for P.D. No. 902-A (now R.A. No. 8799), private respondent would even claim in his Position Paper,
reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter that since his responsibilities were akin to that of the company’s Executive Vice-
against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI.9 President/Treasurer, he was “hired under the pretext that he was being ‘elected’ into said
The Compulsory Arbitration post.”18 [Emphasis supplied.]
Proceedings before the Labor As a consequence, the CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with the Labor
Arbiter. Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether elected or appointed, is an
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC has no jurisdiction. 19 Instead, according to the
Dismiss,10 on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the CA, Locsin’s complaint for “illegal dismissal” should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court
issue of Locsin’s removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute. (RTC), pursuant to Rule 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to dismiss, maintaining his Controversies.20
position that he is an employee of NCLPI.     Finally, the CA addressed Locsin’s invocation of Article 4 of the Labor Code. Dismissing the
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, application of the provision, the CA cited Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo School of Law, as
holding that her office acquired “jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the instant complaint follows:
finding extant in the case an employer-employee relationship.” 11 “x x x the non-coverage of corporate officers from the security of tenure clause under
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for  Certiorari  under the Constitution is now well-established principle by numerous decisions upholding such
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.12 NCLPI raised the issue on whether the Labor Arbiter committed doctrine under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution in the face of contemporary decisions of the
grave abuse of discretion by denying the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had same Supreme Court likewise confirming that security of tenure covers all employees or workers
jurisdiction over the dispute. including managerial employees.”21
The CA Decision—Locsin was a
corporate officer; the issue of his The Petitioner’s Arguments
removal as EVP/Treasurer is an
intra-corporate dispute under the Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the present petition on
RTC’s jurisdiction. January 28, 2009, raising the following procedural and substantive issues:
On August 28, 2008,13 the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Order denying the (1) Whether the CA has original jurisdiction to review decision of the Labor Arbiter under
Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer. Rule 65?
Citing PD 902-A, the CA defined “corporate officers as those officers of a corporation who are (2) Whether he is a regular employee of NCLPI under the definition of Article 280 of the
given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations’ by-laws.” In this Labor Code? and
regard, the CA held: (3) Whether Locsin’s position as Executive Vice-President/
“Scrutinizing the records, We hold that petitioners successfully discharged their onus  of Treasurer makes him a corporate officer thereby excluding him from the coverage of the Labor
establishing that private respondent was a corporate officer who held the position of Executive Code?
Vice-President/Treasurer as provided in the by-laws of petitioner corporation and that he held Procedurally,  Locsin essentially submits that NCLPI wrongfully filed a petition
such position by virtue of election by the Board of Directors. for certiorari  before the CA, as the latter’s remedy is to proceed with the arbitration, and to appeal
That private respondent is a corporate officer cannot be disputed. The position of Executive Vice- to the NLRC after the Labor Arbiter shall have ruled on the merits of the case. Locsin cites, in this
President/Treasurer is specifically included in the roster of officers provided for by the (Amended) regard, Rule V, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission ( NLRC
By-Laws of petitioner corporation, his duties and responsibilities, as well as compensation as such Rules), which provides that a denial of a motion to dismiss by the Labor Arbiter is not subject to
officer are likewise set forth therein.”14 an appeal. Locsin also argues that even if the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in
Article 280 of the Labor Code, the receipt of salaries by Locsin, SSS deductions on that salary, denying the NCLPI motion, a special civil action for certiorari,  filed with the CA was not the
and the element of control in the performance of work duties—indicia used by the Labor Arbiter to appropriate remedy, since this was a breach of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
conclude that Locsin was a regular employee—were held inapplicable by the CA. 15 The CA noted remedies.
the Labor Arbiter’s failure to address the fact that the position of EVP/Treasurer is specifically Substantively, Locsin submits that he is a regular employee of NCLPI since—as he argued
enumerated as an “office” in the corporation’s by-laws. 16 before the Labor Arbiter and the CA—his relationship with the company meets the “four-fold test.”
Further, the CA pointed out Locsin’s failure to “state any circumstance by which NCLPI First,  Locsin contends that NCLPI had the power to engage his services as
engaged his services as a corporate officer that would make him an employee.” The CA found, in EVP/Treasurer. Second,  he received regular wages from NCLPI, from which his SSS and Philhealth
this regard, that Locsin’s assumption and retention as EVP/Treasurer was based on his election contributions, as well as his withholding taxes were deducted. Third,  NCLPI had the power to
terminate his employment. 22 Lastly,  Nissan had control over the manner of the performance of his We similarly ruled in Texon Manufacturing v. Millena,29  in Sime Darby Employees Association
functions as EVP/Treasurer, as shown by the 13 years of faithful execution of his job, which he v. National Labor Relations Commission 30 and in Westmont Pharmaceuticals v. Sama-
carried out in accordance with the standards and expectations set by NCLPI. 23 Further, Locsin niego.31 In Texon,  we specifically said:
maintains that even after his election as Chairman, he essentially performed the functions of “The Order of the Labor Arbiter denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is interlocutory. It is well-
EVP/Treasurer—handling the financial and administrative operations of the Corporation—thus settled that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and
making him a regular employee. 24 hence, can-
Under these claimed facts, Locsin concludes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC—not the RTC not be appealed, until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.” [Emphasis
(as NCLPI posits)—has jurisdiction to decide the controversy. Parenthetically, Locsin clarifies that supplied.]32
he does not dispute the validity of his election as Chairman of the Board on January 1, 2005. and indicated the appropriate recourse in Metro Drug, as follows:33
Instead, he theorizes that he never lost his position as EVP/Treasurer having continuously “x x x The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss is similar to the
performed the functions appurtenant thereto. 25 Thus, he questions his “unceremonious removal” general rule observed in civil procedure that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory
as EVP/Treasurer during the August 5, 2005 special Board meeting. and, hence, not appealable until final judgment or order is rendered [1 Feria and Noche,  Civil
Procedure Annotated 453 (2001 ed.)]. The remedy of the aggrieved party in case of denial of the
The Respondent’s Arguments motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as a defense or defenses, the ground
or grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and, in case of
It its April 17, 2009 Comment,26 Nissan prays for the denial of the petition for lack of merit. adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course [Mendoza v. Court
Nissan submits that the CA correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909, September 5, 1991, 201 SCRA 343]. In order to avail of the
Locsin’s complaint for illegal dismissal. In support, Nissan maintains that Locsin is a corporate extraordinary writ of certiorari,  it is incumbent upon petitioner to establish that the denial of the
officer and not an employee. In addressing the procedural defect Locsin raised, Nissan brushes motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. [ Macawiwili Gold Mining and
the issue aside, stating that (1) this issue was belatedly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration, Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602]”
and that (2) in any case, Rule VI, Section 2(1) of the NLRC does not apply since In so citing Feria  and Noche, the Court was referring to Sec. 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of
only appealable decisions, resolutions and orders are covered under the rule. Court, which specifically enumerates interlocutory orders as one of the court actions that
cannot be appealed. In the same rule, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, the aggrieved party is
The Court’s Ruling allowed to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The latter rule, however, also
contains limitations for its application, clearly outlined in its Section 1 which provides:
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit. “Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
At the outset, we stress that there are two (2) important considerations in the final When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
determination of this case. On the one hand, Locsin raises a procedural issue that, if proven or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
correct, will require the Court to dismiss the instant petition for using an improper remedy. On the of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
other hand, there is the substantive issue that will be disregarded if a strict implementation of the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
rules of procedure is upheld. court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
Prefatorily, we agree with Locsin’s submission that the NCLPI incorrectly elevated the Labor modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
Arbiter’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss to the CA. Locsin is correct in positing that the denial of a law and justice may require.”
motion to dismiss is unappealable. As a general rule, an aggrieved party’s proper recourse to the  
denial is to file his position paper, interpose the grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss In the labor law setting, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy is still open to the aggrieved
before the labor arbiter, and actively participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the labor arbiter’s party when a labor arbiter denies a motion to dismiss. This is Article 223 of Presidential Decree
decision can be appealed to the NLRC, not to the CA. No. 442, as amended (Labor Code), 34 which states:
As a rule, we strictly adhere to the rules of procedure and do everything we can, to the point
of penalizing violators, to encourage respect for these rules. We take exception to this general “ART. 223. APPEAL
rule, however, when a strict implementation of these rules would cause substantial injustice to the
parties. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to
We see it appropriate to apply the exception to this case for the reasons discussed below; the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
hence, we are compelled to go beyond procedure and rule on the merits of the case. In the such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
context of this case, we see sufficient justification to rule on the employer-employee relationship following grounds:
issue raised by NCLPI, even though the Labor Arbiter’s interlocutory order was incorrectly  brought
to the CA under Rule 65. (a)If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
The NLRC Rules are clear: the x x x” [Emphasis supplied.]
denial by the labor arbiter of the
motion to dismiss is not appealable Pursuant to this Article, we held in Metro Drug (citing Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. Court
because the denial is merely an of Appeals35) that the NLRC is clothed with sufficient authority to correct any claimed “erroneous
interlocutory order. assumption of jurisdiction” by labor arbiters:
In Metro Drug v. Metro Drug Employees ,27  we definitively stated that the denial of a motion to “In Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. The Court of Appeals, et al., a case where the jurisdiction of
dismiss by a labor arbiter is not immediately appealable. 28 the labor arbiter was put in issue and was assailed through a petition for certiorari,  prohibition and
annulment of judgment before a regional trial court, this Court had the opportunity to expound on
the nature of appeal as embodied in Article 223 of the Labor Code, thus:
 x x x Also, while the title of the Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.” [Emphasis
appeal as that term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office supplied.]
of certiorari, nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as An exception to this rule is our ruling in Lazaro v. Court of Appeals 37 where we held that the
understood by the petitioners x x x. strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally meritorious cases:
“x x x Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
of review thereof to the NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
meaning of appeal as that term is used in the Code. For this reason, petitioners cannot when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
argue now that the NLRC is devoid of any corrective power to rectify a supposed the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. The
erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter x x x. [Air Services Court reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain
Cooperative, et al. v. The Court of Appeals, et al ., G.R. No. 118693, 23 July 1998, 293 acts must be done, “have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
SCRA 101] delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x x The reason for rules of this
nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays
Since the legislature had clothed the NLRC with the appellate authority to correct a claimed would result, without rules governing practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to the
“erroneous assumption of jurisdiction” on the part of the labor arbiter—a case of grave abuse of proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.” Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the
discretion—the remedy availed of by petitioner in this case is patently erroneous as Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.”
recourse in this case is lodged, under the law, with the NLRC.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious  circumstance  can be tested under the
In Metro Drug, as in the present case, the defect imputed through the NLCPI Motion to guidelines we established in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,38 as follows:
Dismiss is the labor arbiter’s lack of jurisdiction since Locsin is alleged to be a corporate officer, “Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of
not an employee. Parallelisms between the two cases is undeniable, as they are similar on the the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court
following points: of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the
(1) in Metro Drug,  as in this case, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
by one of the parties;(2) the basis of the Motion to Dismiss is also the alleged lack of jurisdiction case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
by the Labor Arbiter to settle the dispute; and (3) dissatisfied with the Order of the Labor Arbiter, favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review
the aggrieved party likewise elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65. sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
The similarities end there, however. Unlike in the present case, the CA denied the petition prejudiced thereby.” [Emphasis supplied.]
for certiorari and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration in Metro Drug; the CA correctly found
that the proper appellate mechanism was an appeal to the NLRC and not a petition Under these standards, we hold that exceptional circumstances exist in the present case to
for certiorari under merit the relaxation of the applicable rules of procedure.
407 Due to existing exceptional
circumstances, the ruling on the
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 407
merits that Locsin is an officer
Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils., Inc. and not an employee of Nissan must take
Rule 65. In the present case, the CA took a different position despite our clear ruling in  Metro precedence over procedural
Drug, and allowed, not only the use of Rule 65, but also ruled on the merits. considerations.
From this perspective, the CA clearly erred in the application of the procedural rules by We arrived at the conclusion that we should go beyond the procedural rules and immediately
disregarding the relevant provisions of the NLRC Rules, as well as the requirements for a petition take a look at the intrinsic merits of the case based on several considerations.
for certiorari under the Rules of Court. To reiterate, the proper action of an aggrieved party faced First,  the parties have sufficiently ventilated their positions on the disputed employer-
with the labor arbiter’s denial of his motion to dismiss is to submit his position paper and raise employee relationship and have, in fact, submitted the matter for the CA’s consideration.
therein the supposed lack of jurisdiction. The aggrieved party cannot immediately appeal the Second, the CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists between Locsin
denial since it is an interlocutory order; the appropriate remedial recourse is the procedure and Nissan.
outlined in Article 223 of the Labor Code, not a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the
A strict implementation of the NLRC Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws. 39 As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The
Rules and the Rules of Court would CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on Presidential Decree 902-A,
cause injustice to the parties because which defines corporate officers as “those officers of a corporation who are given that character
the Labor Arbiter clearly has no either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.” Likewise, Section 25 of Batas
jurisdiction over the present intra- Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines ( Corporation Code) provides that
corporate dispute. corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be
Our ruling in Mejillano v. Lucillo36 stands for the proposition that we should strictly apply the provided for in the by-laws.
rules of procedure. We said: Third.  Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a corporate officer
“Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the because the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissan’s By-Laws.
litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this position, as follows:
construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules were established primarily
 ARTICLE IV 258], we have held that a corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act, or
Officers an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a
corporation.”43 [Emphasis supplied.]
“Section 1. Election and Appointment.—The Board of Directors at their first meeting, annually so that the RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on the following legal reasoning:
thereafter, shall elect as officers of the Corporation a Chairman of the Board, a President, an
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, a Vice-President/General Manager and a Corporate “Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (PD 902-A) provided
Secretary. The other Senior Operating Officers of the Corporation shall be appointed by the Board that intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
upon the recommendation of the President. (SEC):

xxxx Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations
Section 4. Executive Vice-President/Treasurer.—The Executive Vice-President/Treasurer shall registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
have such powers and perform such duties as are prescribed by these By-Laws, and as may be original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
required of him by the Board of Directors. As the concurrent Treasurer of the Corporation, he shall
have the charge of the funds, securities, receipts, and disbursements of the Corporation. He shall xxxx
deposit, or cause to be deposited, the credit of the Corporation in such banks or trust companies,
or with such banks of other depositories, as the Board of Directors may from time to time c)  Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
designate. He shall tender to the President or to the Board of Directors whenever required an managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
account of the financial condition of the corporation and of all his transactions as Treasurer. As
soon as practicable after the close of each fiscal year, he shall make and submit to the Board of Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on 8 August 2000,
Directors a like report of such fiscal year. He shall keep correct books of account of all the transferred to regional trial courts the SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases listed in Section 5 of PD
business and transactions of the Corporation. 902-A:
In Okol v. Slimmers World International,40 citing Tabang v. National Labor Relations
Commission,41 we held that — 5.2.  The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
“x x x an “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general juris-diction or
the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee” usually occupies no office the appropriate Regional Trial Court.” [Emphasis supplied.]
and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by
the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such b. Precedence of Substantive Merits;
employee.” [Emphasis supplied.]       Primacy of Element of Jurisdiction
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the Amended By- Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to remand the case to
Laws of the corporation. The following factual determination by the CA is elucidating: the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to dismiss the petition outright due to the
“More important, private respondent failed to state any such “circumstance” by which the wrongful use of Rule 65.44 We cannot close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality,
petitioner corporation “engaged his services” as corporate officer that would make him an established by evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose termination of
employee. In the first place, the Vice-President/Treasurer was elected  on an annual basis as relationship is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule upon.
provided in the By-Laws, and no duties and responsibilities were stated by private respondent Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the case, and
which he discharged while occupying said position other than those specifically set forth in the By- primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a
Laws or required of him by the Board of Directors.  The unrebutted fact remains that private case and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer can
respondent held the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer of petitioner corporation, a act. In the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction
position provided for in the latter’s by-laws, by virtue of election by the Board of Directors, and over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to
has functioned as such Executive Vice-President/Treasurer pursuant to the provisions of the said act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the
By-Laws. Private respondent knew very well that he was simply not re-elected to the said position records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay
during the August 5, 2005 board meeting, but he had objected to the election of a new set of and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This
officers held at the time upon the advice of his lawyer that he cannot be “terminated” or replaced conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and is without
as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer as he had attained tenurial security.” 42 prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
We fully agree with this factual determination which we find to be sufficiently supported by WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
evidence. We likewise rule, based on law and established jurisprudence, that Locsin, at the time Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 103720, promulgated on August 28, 2008, as
of his severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s corporate officer. well as its Resolution of December 9, 2008, which reversed and set aside the March 10, 2008
a. The Question of Jurisdiction Order of Labor Arbiter Concepcion in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-06165-07. This Decision is
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has without prejudice to petitioner Locsin’s available recourse for relief through the appropriate
jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. As remedy in the proper forum.
we also held in Okol,  a corporate officer’s dismissal from service is an intra-corporate dispute: No pronouncement as to costs.
“In a number of cases [Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R. No. 106722, 4 SO ORDERED.
October 1996, 262 SCRA 709; Lozon v. National Labor Relations Commission , 310 Phil. 1
(1995); Espino v. National Labor Relations Commission , 310 Phil. 61 (1995); Fortune Cement
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R. No. 79762, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA
 G.R. No. 147874. July 17, 2006.* Same; The courts in ejectment cases may determine questions of ownership whenever
necessary to decide the question of possession. —In Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco
DOLORES GAYOSO, DANNY GAYOSO, ELIZABETH G. DONDRIANO, VICTORIANO GAYOSO, Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank , 392 SCRA 506 (2002), this Court ruled: All ejectment cases
CHRISTOPHER GAYOSO, REMEDIOS GAYOSO and THE HEIRS OF VICTORIANO GAYOSO, are covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and are within the jurisdiction of the inferior
petitioners, vs. TWENTY-TWO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. courts regardless of whether they involve questions of ownership. The courts in ejectment cases
may determine questions of ownership whenever necessary to decide the question of possession.

Jurisdictions; Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is provided by law; Section 33 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22, as amended, provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
forcible entry and unlawful detainer.—It is basic that a court’s jurisdiction is provided by law. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides in part: SEC. 33.  Jurisdiction of      Benjamin M. Tongol and Joselito E. Cabote for petitioners.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. —      Jose F. Justiniano and Antonio Eugenio S. Ungson for respondent.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x
x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:  Provided, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001.
issue of possession; (Emphasis supplied) This case stemmed from a Complaint for Ejectment filed by Twenty-Two Realty Development
Corporation (TTRDC), respondent, on December 12, 1996 with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City against the above-named petitioners. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 15340, alleges that on October 11, 1954, Victoriano Gayoso (now
deceased) sold to Prospero Almeda a lot located on Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets,
Ejectment; The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall
Mandaluyong City. After the sale, Almeda allowed Gayoso and his children, herein petitioners, to
be conclusive with respect to the possession only, nonetheless, inferior courts are competent to
stay on the property as lessees, paying P20.00 a month. Later, Almeda’s heirs sold the lot to
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of
respondent TTRDC. Thus, on February 19, 1996, the title to the property was transferred in the
ownership.—Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states that:
name of respondent corporation.
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive in actions involving title or
However, petitioners have stopped paying rentals. Respondent then sent letters dated
ownership.—The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
September 12 and October 17, 1996 to petitioners demanding that they vacate the premises, but
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect
they refused to do so. This prompted respondent to file with the MeTC a complaint for illegal
the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
detainer against them.
parties respecting title to the land or building. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to
In their answer, petitioners denied specifically TTRDC’s allegations in its complaint. They
the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record
claimed that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case since in their answer they are raising an
of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
issue of ownership. They alleged that their father, the late Victoriano Gayoso, sold the lot (a
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. In Barba vs. Court of Appeals,
conjugal property) to Almeda without the consent of their mother. The sale, being void, Almeda
this Court held: The Court has repeatedly emphasized that municipal
could not have transferred ownership of the lot to respondent corporation.
On July 21, 1997, the MeTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

_______________ . A.Ordering the defendants

trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts now retain jurisdiction . 1.and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises located at
over ejectment cases if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets, Mandaluyong City, and to surrender the possession
issue of ownership. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the of the same to the plaintiff;
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to . 2.to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,000.00 representing their unpaid rentals
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of beginning February 1981 to December 1996 and the amount of P20.00 per month every
possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or month thereafter until the premises shall have been vacated;
building, neither shall it bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon
. 3.to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
a different cause of action involving possession.
. 4.to pay the costs of suit.

. B.Dismissing the counterclaim.

 SO ORDERED. “The Court has repeatedly emphasized that municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, and
municipal circuit trial courts now retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases if the question of
The MeTC ruled that since petitioners failed to pay rentals for more than three months, then possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. In forcible entry and
respondent has the right to evict them from the premises. unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City, affirmed the MeTC and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
Decision, holding that the refusal of petitioners to vacate the property and pay the rents make out inferior courts, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of
a clear case of unlawful detainer over which the MeTC has jurisdiction. ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however,
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building, neither shall it bar an action
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor be held conclusive of the
In its Decision dated April 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision, facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
thus: possession.”
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court Likewise, in Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank ,3 this
affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Court ruled:
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. “All ejectment cases are covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and are within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts regardless of whether they involve questions of ownership. The
SO ORDERED.” courts in ejectment cases may determine questions of ownership whenever necessary to decide
the question of possession.”
Hence, the instant petition. Verily, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
Petitioners contend that since the issue of ownership of the property in dispute is inextricably has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 15340, notwithstanding the issue of ownership
linked with the issue of possession, the MeTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 15340. raised by petitioners in their answer.
For its part, respondent maintains that the real issue is who between the parties is entitled to WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 2001
possession. Hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
We find for the respondent. SO ORDERED.
It is basic that a court’s jurisdiction is provided by law. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended, provides in part:
299
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 299
Gayoso vs. Twenty-Two Realty Development Corporation
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:

xxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession; (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states that:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership.—The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court.

In Barba vs. Court of Appeals,2 this Court held:

 G.R. No. 151821. April 14, 2004.* Same; Same; The award of actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness
without any tangible document, such as receipts or other documentary proofs to support such
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI Investment Corporation, claim.—The award of actual
petitioner, vs. ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondent.
566
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); Jurisdiction
of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. —Pursuant to 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions of the HSRC were transferred to Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. ALS Management & Development
the HLURB. As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is encompassing. Hence,
we said in Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Sarte : “x x x. While PD 957 was Corp.
designed to meet the need basically to protect lot buyers, from the fraudulent manipulations of damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness without any tangible document,
unscrupulous subdivision owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the such as receipts or other documentary proofs to support such claim. In determining actual,
NHA is broad and general—‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’ in accordance with the damages, courts cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must
provisions of said law.” Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of loss.
Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a
complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
lot; for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not; and for determining
whether there is a perfected contract of sale. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Emmanuel Ruben T. Malto, Jr. for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; The National Housing Authority (NHA) had the competence to award      Vicente B. Chuidian for respondent.
damages as part of the exclusive power conferred upon it.—In Solid Homes v. Payawal, we      George H. Yarte, Jr. and Martin collaborating counsel for respondent.
declared that the NHA had the competence to award damages as part of the exclusive power
conferred upon it—the power to hear and decide “claims involving refund and any other PANGANIBAN, J.:
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.” Factual findings of the lower courts, are entitled to great respect, but may be reviewed if they do
not conform to law and to the evidence on record. In the case at bar, a meticulous review of the
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; An exception to the rule that any decision rendered without facts compels us to modify the award granted by the Court of Appeals.
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time even on appeal before the Court The Case
is where a party is barred by estoppel. —The general rule is that any decision rendered without Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this November 24, 2000 Decision2 and the January 9, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Court. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that such action in CA-G.R. CV No. 25781. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
would not result in the mockery of the tenets of fair play. As an exception to the rule, the issue “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the
may not be raised if the party is barred by estoppel. instant appeal DISMISSED.”4
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s The Facts
case for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of The facts of the case are narrated by the appellate court as follows:
jurisdiction if it is not.—The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case “On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of Money
for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of against ALS Management and Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on July 22, 1983,
jurisdiction if it is not. [petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila a Deed of Sale for one (1)
unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage Apartment Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A comprising of 271 squares
barred the party from questioning it later.—In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, we declared that the failure [sic] meters more or less, together with parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63. The
to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage barred the party from questioning it later. Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was
issued after the execution of the said Deed of Sale. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of
Civil Law; Damages; To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be P26,300.45 for the expenses in causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium
capable of proof, but also be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. —To recover actual Certificate of Title. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated that the
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but also be proven with a VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed
reasonable degree of certainty. The lone evidence for this award was the self-serving testimony of of Sale and such other documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the corresponding
respondent’s witness that a lease contract had indeed been intended to commence in January Condominium Certificate of Title. After the [petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said
1982, instead of the actual implementation on June 18, 1982. Without any other evidence, we fail Deed of Sale, [respondent], notwithstanding demands made by [petitioner], failed and refused to
to see how the amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. pay [petitioner] its legitimate advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid, legal
or justifiable reason.
 “In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, [respondent] averred among others that it has . ‘5.The varifold divider, including the bar and counter top cabinet were not installed;
just and valid reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal claims. In clear and direct
contravention of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee except . ‘6.The toilets had no tiles;
those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected
for the issuance of such title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the amount of its alleged . ‘7.No closed circuit TV was installed;
advances for the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title in the name of
the [respondent], by including therein charges which should not be collected from buyers of . ‘8.Rainwater leaks inside or into the condominium unit.’ ”5
condominium units. [Petitioner] made and disseminated brochures and other sales propaganda in
and before May 1980, which made warranties as to the facilities, improvements, infrastructures or Respondent’s Answer prayed that “judgment be rendered ordering [petitioner] to correct such
other forms of development of the condominium units (known as The Twin Towers’) it was defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit,”6 and that the following reliefs be granted:
offering for sale to the public, which included the following:

‘The Twin Towers is destined to reflect condominium living at its very best.’ . “1.The sum of P40,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from the date of extrajudicial
demand, representing the amount spent by the defendant for the completion works it
had undertaken on the premises.
. “2.The sum of U.S.$6,678.65 (or its equivalent in the Philippine currency) representing
‘While the twin tower design and its unusual height will make the project the only one of its
the unearned rental of the premises which the defendant did not realize by reason of
kind in the Philippines, the human scale and proportion [are] carefully maintained.’
the late delivery to him of the condominium unit;
. “3.Twenty-four percent (24%) interest per annum on the agreed one (1) year advance
rental and one (1) month deposit (totaling U.S.$15,785.00) corresponding to the period
568 January 1, 1982 to June 17, 1982, which [petitioner] would have earned had he
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED deposited the said amount in a bank;
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. ALS Management & Development . “4.The sum of U.S.$1,214.30 per month, commencing from May 1, 1985, which the
[respondent] no longer earns as rental on the premises because the lessee vacated the
Corp. same by reason of defects and/or deficiencies;
‘To be sure, modern conveniences are available as in the installation of an intercom system and a . “5.The sum of P50,000.00 plus appearance fees of P300.00 per court hearing, as
closed-circuit TV monitor through which residents from their apartments can see their guests attorney’s fees;
down at the lobby call station.’ . “6.Litigation expenses and costs of suit.”7

On February 6, 1990, the trial court issued this judgment:

‘Some of the features of each typical apartment unit are: x x x A bar x x x Three toilets with
baths x x x.’
. “1.Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of P26,300.45, with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof, representing the
‘The penthouse units are privileged with the provision of an all-around balcony. x x x’ amount spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit in [respondent’s]
name;
. “2.Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at [petitioner’s] exclusive
“[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented to the [respondent] that the expense/cost or appoint a licensed qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf, the
condominium unit will be delivered completed and ready for occupancy not later than December following defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the [respondent]:
31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the descriptions and warranties contained in the
aforementioned brochures and other sales propaganda materials when [respondent] agreed to . a)KITCHEN
buy Unit E-4A of the Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00 considering that the Twin
Towers was then yet to be built. In contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and of good
. i)The sides of the kitchen sink covered with sealants as well as miscut marble installed
engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by [respondent] suffered from the
as filler at the right side of the sink;
following defects and/or deficiencies:
. ii)Miscut marble installed on both sides of the side wall above the gas range;
. ‘1.The clearance in the walkway at the balcony is not sufficient for passage;
. b)FOYERS
. ‘2.The anodized aluminum used in the door and windows were damaged;      Water marks at the parquet flooring, near the main water supply room;

. ‘3.The kitchen counter tops/splashboard suffered from cracks and were mis-cut and . c)MAIDS ROOM
misaligned;      Ceiling cut off about one (1) square foot in size and left unfinished
. d)DINING ROOM
. ‘4.The partition between living and master’s bedroom was unpainted and it had no
access for maintenance due to aluminum fixed glass cover;
 . i)Water damaged parquet up to about one (1) meter from the wall underneath the open vacate the premises and condominium unit remained vacant, all with legal interest from
shelves and directly behind the plant box; the filing of the counterclaim until the same are fully paid.”8
. ii)Plant box directly behind the dining room;
. iii)The water damaged parquet flooring near the door of the dining room to the passage
way Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, after “a thorough review and examination of the evidence on record,”9 the CA found
“no basis for disbelieving what the trial court found and arrived at.”10
. e)MASTER’S BEDROOM The appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that “while [petitioner] succeeded in
proving its claim against the [respondent] for expenses incurred in the registration of [the latter’s]
. i)Falling off paint layers at the bathroom wall behind the bathtub/faucet along the title to the condominium unit purchased, x x x for its part [respondent] in turn succeeded in
passageway of the master’s bedroom; establishing an even bigger claim under its counterclaim.”11
. ii)Falling off water-damaged plywood ceiling in the master’s bedroom bathroom; Hence, this Petition.12
. iii)Grinders mark damage at the bathtub; The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
. f)BALCONY WALKWAY
. “I.Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the trial
. i)PVC pipes installed two (2) inches above floor level causing water to accumulate; court had no jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaims.
. ii)Cracks on level of wash out flooring; . “II.Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
. iii)14-inches passageway going to the open terrace not sufficient as passageway; facts and/or manifestly mistaken warranting a review by this Honorable Court of the
. iv)PVC pipe installed on the plant box water drained directly on the balcony floor; factual findings therein.
. “III.Whether or not the award of damages by the Honorable Court of Appeals is
conjectural warranting a review by this Honorable Court of the factual findings
. g)BALCONY (OPEN) TERRACE therein.”13

. i)Two (2) concrete cement measuring about 6 x 4 inches with protruding live wires,
The Court’s Ruling
purportedly lamp posts which were not installed;
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
. h)BOYS BEDROOM
Jurisdiction
Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)—not the RTC—that
. i)Water mark on the parquet flooring due to water seepage; had jurisdiction over respondent’s counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the award of the trial
. ii)Asphalt plastered at the exterior wall/floor joints to prevent water seepage; court.
Promulgated on July 12, 1976, PD No. 957—otherwise known as “The Subdivision and
571 Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”—provides that the National Housing Authority (NHA)
shall have “exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.”14 Promulgated
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004 571
later on April 2, 1978, was PD No. 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. ALS Management & Development Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957.”
Corp. It expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA as follows:
“SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presi-
. i)ANALOC FINISH of the aluminum frames of doors and windows all around the, dential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction, to hear
condominium were painted with dark gray paint to cover dents and scratches; and decide cases of the following nature:
. j)LIVING ROOM Intercom equipment installed without the TV monitor;
. k)STORAGE FACILITIES at the ground floor
. A.Unsound real estate business practices;

. “3.Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following: . B.Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
. a)The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for expenses incurred for the
materials/labor in installing walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar counter cabinet. . C.Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
. b)The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned income for the five-month period buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, broker or
that the defendant had to suspend a lease contract over the premises. salesman.” (Italics ours.)
. c)The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one (21) months (from May
1985 to January 1987), representing unearned income when defendant’s lessee had to
On February 7, 1981, by virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of the NHA “Laches, in general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Section 8 thereof time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
provides: negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
“SECTION 8. Transfer of Functions.—The regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby
transferred to the Commission (Human Settlements Regulatory Commission), x x x. Among these “The doctrine of laches or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public policy which
regulatory functions are: 1) Regulation of the real estate trade and business; x x x 11) Hear and requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific performance.” of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.”28
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions of the HSRC were
transferred to the HLURB. Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant therein failed to raise
As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is encompassing. Hence, we said the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after an adverse decision had been rendered.
in Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Sarte:15 We further declared that if we, were to sanction the said appellant’s conduct, “we would in
“x x x. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot buyers, from the effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive x x x and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA is broad and general—‘to regulate the real estate trade and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.”29
business’ in accordance with the provisions of said law.” Applicable herein is our ruling in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,30 in which we said:
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344 “Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who
is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter
performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot; 16 for claims of disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying that, in this
refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;17 and for determining whether there is case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial
a perfected contract of sale.18 court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court.
In Solid Homes v. Payawal, 19 we declared that the NHA had the competence to award It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.”31
damages as part of the exclusive power conferred upon it—the power to hear and decide “claims
Second and Third Issues:
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.”20 Appreciation of Facts
Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim—being one for specific performance (correction of It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising issues of fact that have been ruled upon by the RTC
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages—falls’ under the jurisdiction of the and sustained by the CA. The factual findings of lower courts are generally binding upon this Court
HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No. 1344. and will not be disturbed on appeal, especially when both sets of findings are the
same.32 Nevertheless, this rule has certain exceptions,33 as when those findings are not
The Applicability of Estoppel
supported by the evidence on record.
The general rule is that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found reason to modify the award to
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.21 Indeed, the question of jurisdiction
conform to law and the evidence. We thus address the arguments of petitioner seriatim.
may
be raised at any time, provided that such action would not result in the mockery of the tenets of Warranties and Representations
fair play.22 As an exception to the rule, the issue may not be raised if the party is barred by in the Brochure
estoppel.23 The brochure that was disseminated indicated features that would be provided each condominium
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a judgment unfavorable unit; and that, under Section 19 of PD No. 957, would form part of the sales warranties of
to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, petitioner.34 Respondent relied on the brochure in its decision to purchase a unit.35 Since the
for estoppel bars it from doing so. This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures former failed to deliver certain items
petitioner has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it has voluntarily stated therein, then there was a clear violation of its warranties and representations.
submit-ted.24 The brochure says that “[t]he particulars stated x x x as well as the details and visuals shown
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and x x x are intended to give a general idea of the project to be undertaken, and as such, are not to
then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if it is not.25 be relied [upon] as statements or representations of fact.”36 This general disclaimer should apply
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the question of only to the general concept of the project that petitioner aptly characterizes thus:
jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the “ ‘x x x [D]estined to reflect condominium living at its very best’ and ‘its design x x x will make the
former could have raised such issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its project the only one of its kind in the Philippines.’ ”37
appellant’s brief26 with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction for This disclaimer, however, should not apply to the features and the amenities that the brochure
the first time. promised to provide each condominium unit. Petitioner was thus in breach when it failed to deliver
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,27 we declared that the failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at a “closed-circuit TV monitor through which residents from their apartments can see their guests x
an earlier stage barred the party from questioning it later. Applying the rule on estoppel by laches, x x.”38
we explained as follows: Storage Facilities
“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different The trial court erred, though, in requiring petitioner to provide storage facilities on the ground
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppe[l] by deed or by record, and of estoppel floor, as the non-delivery had not been alleged in respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim.39
by laches. It is elementary, that a judgment must conform to and be supported by both the pleadings
and the evidence, and that it be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the
pleadings were framed and the case was tried.40 Indeed, issues in each case are limited to those A Normally, it is variable.
presented in the pleadings.41
We are aware that issues not alleged in the pleadings may still be decided upon, if tried with Q What do you mean by variable?
the parties’ express or implied con- A It depends on the actual measurement of the building construction.
sent.42 Trial courts are not precluded from granting reliefs not specifically claimed in the Q Could you please tell the Court, what x x x the purpose of the said
pleadings—notwithstanding the absence of their amendment—upon the condition that evidence
portion of the condominium unit [is]?
has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support
their respective contentions and to refute each other’s evidence.43 This exception is not present in A It is used for watering the plants and the servicing of some area[s].
the case at bar. Q How much measurement is made to affix the portion of watering the
Moreover, a cursory reading of the brochure shows that there is no promise to provide
plants?
individual storage facilities on the ground floor for each condominium unit. The brochure reads:
“Storage facilities in the apartment units and the ground floor.”44 Apparent from the letter of A Approximately .50 [m].”62
petitioner dated June 18, 1982,45 was its compliance with its promise of storage facilities on the Respondent maintains that this portion should have been .80 meters (or 80 centimeters), similar
ground floor. In that letter, respondent was also informed that it may course a reservation of to another area in the building plan that it offered as Exhibit “2-A.”63 But an analysis of this plan
those facilities through the building superintendent. reveals that the latter area has a different width from that of the former.
It is readily apparent from the foregoing facts that the portion in controversy was not intended
Damages for Delay in Delivery
to be a walkway. Thus, there was no deviation from the building plan. Because it has not been
It is undisputed that petitioner sent respondent a “Contract to Sell”46 declaring that the
shown that this section was insufficient to serve the purpose for which it was intended, the lower
construction would be finished on or before December 31, 1981.47 The former delivered the
courts erred in considering it as defective.
condominium unit only in June 1982;48 thus, the latter claims that there was a delay in the
delivery. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. ALS Management & Development
Because of this delay, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages of P136,608.75 Corp.
representing unearned income for the period that respondent had to suspend a lease contract. We Reimbursement of P40,000
find a dearth of evidence to support such award.
To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but also be for Completion Work
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.49 The lone evidence for this award was the self- The lower courts did not err in ordering petitioner to correct the defects in the condominium unit,
serving testimony of respondent’s witness that a lease contract had indeed been intended to but in requiring it to reimburse respondent in the amount of P40,000 for completion work done.
commence in January 1982, instead of the actual implementation on June 18, 1982.50 Without Petitioner argues that the trial court’s Decision encompassed the areas beyond those alleged
any other evidence, we fail to see how the amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of in respondent’s Answer.64 This contention is not convincing, because the allegations in the latter
certainty. were broad enough to cover all the defects in the condominium unit. In fact, respondent prayed
that “judgment be rendered ordering [petitioner] to correct such defects x x x in the condominium
Condominium Defects unit as may be prove[d] during the trial.”65
The rule is that a party’s case must be established through a “preponderance of evidence.”51 By Petitioner further challenges the award of P40,000 as reimbursement for completion work
such term of evidence is meant simply evidence that is of greater weight, or is more convincing done by respondent, on the ground that this claim was not proven” during the trial. The latter’s
than that which is offered in opposition to it.52 Respondent was able to establish through its evidence partook of a witness’ testimony66 and of a demand letter67 sent to petitioner requesting
witness’ testimony that the condominium unit suffered from defects.53 This testimony was reimbursement for completion work done. Petitioner argues that respondent should have
confirmed by an inspection report54 noted and signed by petitioner’s representative, as well as by presented receipts to support the expenses.68
a commissioner’s report55 prepared after an ocular inspection by the clerk of court acting as a We agree with petitioner. While respondent may have suffered pecuniary losses for completion
commissioner. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the circumstances that occurred work done, it failed to establish with reasonable certainty the actual amount spent. The award of
during the lease period, as evidenced by the complaint and the update letters56 of respondent’s actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness without any tangible document,
lessee. such as receipts or other documentary proofs to support such claim.69 In determining actual,
Petitioner’s contention that the claim arising from the alleged defects has already prescribed damages, courts cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must
must fail for being raised for the first time only on appeal.57 Well-settled is the rule that issues not depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of loss.70
raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts.58
We agree, however, that the lower, courts erred in finding that there was a defect in a portion Unearned Lease Income
of the balcony, which respondent alleges to be a “walkway x x x [that] is not sufficient for Respondent entered into a lease contract with Advanced Micro Device on May 18, 1982, for the
passage.”59 Petitioner was able to prove, however, that the specifications thereof conformed to period June 18, 1982 to June 17, 1983, with option to renew.71 The lease—which was for an
the building plan. agreed monthly rental of P17,000—was renewed for a period ending May 1, 1985, when Advanced
Respondent contends that this portion should have been 65 to 80 centimeters wide, so that it Micro Device vacated the unit.72 On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to
would be sufficient as a passageway.60 The building plan61 had not specified the width, however. pay damages by way of unrealized income for twenty-one months or from May 1, 1985, until
Architect Leo Ramos of W.V. Coscolluela & Associates, the architectural firm that prepared the January 1987—when respondent decided to move into the condominium unit, which was
building plan, testified thus: unoccupied by then.
Despite the defects of the condominium unit, a lessee stayed there for almost three
“ I am directing your attention x x x to a certain portion in this years.73 The damages claimed by respondent is based on the rent that it might have earned, had
Q condominium unit x x x it appears x x x [that] there is no Advanced Micro Device chosen to stay and renew the lease. Such claim is highly speculative,
measurement indicated therein, do you know why the measurement considering that respondent failed to adduce evidence that the unit had been offered for lease to
others, but that there were no takers because of the defects therein. Speculative damages are too
of said portion was not indicated in the building plan?
remote to be included in an accurate estimate thereof.74 Absent any credible proof of the amount
of actual damage sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations as to its existence and
amount.75
We recognize, however, that respondent suffered damages when its lessee vacated the
condominium unit on May 1, 1985, because of the defects therein. Respondents are thus entitled
to temperate damages.76 Under the circumstances, the amount equivalent to three monthly
rentals of P17,000—or a total of P51,000—would be reasonable.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:
Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver storage facilities on
the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned income for the five-month period that the
lease contract was allegedly suspended; (3) correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4)
pay P40,000.00 as reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5) pay P27,321.75
per month for a period of twenty-one months for the alleged unearned income during the period
when the condominium unit remained vacant. Petitioner, however, is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as
temperate damages for the termination of the lease contract because of the defects in the
condominium unit. All other awards are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-PE, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether
PASTORIN, respondent. the time honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Actions; Jurisdictions; Waivers; Estoppel; The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction 322

may be waived by estoppel on the party invoking the same most prominently emerged in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).—The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be 322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
waived by estoppel on the party invoking the same most prominently emerged in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the Marquez case relied upon by the CA is in turn grounded on Tijam, Metromedia Times Corporation vs. Pastorin
where We held that: . . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or Same; Same; Same; Same; If the lower court had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal from
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct by consent of the parties or by estoppel,’ but if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy. the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. —The rulings in Lozon v.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Tijam stands as an exception rather than a general rule. — NLRC addresses the issue at hand. This Court came up with a clear rule as to when jurisdiction by
Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only estoppel applies and when it does not: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is
after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
Court of Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes that Tijam stands as an exception, rather than a matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be
general rule. The CA perhaps though felt comfortable citing Marquez owing to the pronouncement interposed at any time, during appeal ( Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final
therein that the Court would not hesitate to apply Tijam even absent the extraordinary judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al. , 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this
circumstances therein: “. . . where the entertainment of the jurisdictional issue at a belated stage kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
of the proceedings will result in a failure of justice and render nugatory the constitutional themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this
imperative of protection to labor.” In this case, jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was questioned as Court, on the issue of estoppel, held: “The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question
early as during appeal before the NLRC, whereas in Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If
raised for the first time only before this Court. The viability of Marquez as controlling doctrine in it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
this case is diminished owing to the radically different circumstances in these two cases. A similar jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
observation can be made as to the Bayoca and Jimenez cases. the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel’ (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,
Same; Same; Same; Same; The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.”
waiver or by estoppel. —Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that the instant case falls squarely
within the purview of this Court’s ruling in the case of Dy. Admittedly, a different factual milieu Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction. —
was present insofar as the questioned jurisdiction was alleged to have been properly lodged in the In line with the cases cited above and applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer
SEC instead of NLRC. Yet the rationale employed by the Court therein warrants serious jurisdiction,
consideration. The aforementioned case was ruled in this wise: . . . .More importantly, estoppel
cannot be invoked to prevent this Court from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has 323
been apparent on the face of the pleadings since the start of litigation before the Labor Arbiter. It
is well settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005 323
void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held: “A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the Metromedia Times Corporation vs. Pastorin
subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC
of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, on appeal. Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioner’s claim of lack of jurisdiction
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed on the part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRC’s correct observation that jurisdiction over
therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.
a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. its Decision11 dated 16 March 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the
     Juanitas, Perez, Bolos and Associates for petitioner. latter had no jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the
     Pastor A.P. Morales for respondent. voluntary arbitrator. The decretal portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision under review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered,
TINGA, J.: DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

At issue in this Petition for Review1 on certiorari under Rule 45 is whether or not lack of SO ORDERED.”12
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, heard and decided by the labor arbiter, may be
raised for the first time before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by a litigant who The motion for reconsideration having been denied on 18 May 2001, respondent elevated the case
had actively participated in the proceedings, which it belatedly questioned. before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari13 under Rule 65.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows: The CA Fifteenth Division reversed the Decision of NLRC, and reinstated the earlier ruling of
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation (Petitioner) on the Labor Arbiter. Adopt-ing the doctrines by this Court in the cases of Alfredo Marquez v. Sec. of
10 December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector. His task entailed the periodic collection of Labor14 and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
receivables from dealers of petitioner’s newspapers. Prior to the subject incident, respondent Corporation,15 the CA ruled that the active participation of the party against whom the action was
claimed to have received a termination letter dated 7 May 1998 from management terminating his brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body
services for tardiness effective 16 June 1988. Respondent, member of Metro Media Times where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to
Employees Union, was not dismissed due to the intervention of the labor union, the collective abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
bargaining agent in the company. body’s jurisdiction. The appellate court then disposed the case in this wise:
In May 1998, he obtained a loan from one of the dealers whom he dealt with, Gloria A. De “WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition having merit, in fact and in law, is
Manuel (De Manuel), amounting to Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00). After paying One Thousand hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the challenged resolution/decision and orders of public
One Hundred Twenty-five Pesos (P1,125.00), respondent reneged on the balance of his loan. De respondent NLRC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter
Manuel wrote a letter dated 6 July 1998 to petitioner, and seeking assistance for collection on the dated May 28, 1999 REINSTATED with a slight modification, that the 13th month pay be in the
remainder of the loan. She claimed that when respondent became remissed on his personal amount of P7,430.50. No costs.
obligation, he stopped collecting periodically the outstanding dues of De Manuel.2
On 9 July 1998, petitioner sent a letter addressed to respondent, requiring an explanation for SO ORDERED.”16
the transaction with De Manuel, as well as for his failure to pay back the loan according to the
conditions agreed upon. In his reply letter3 dated 13 July 1998, respondent admitted having Petitioner sought reconsideration17 of the above Decision18 but the CA denied the motion in the
incurred the loan, but offered no definitive explanation for his failure to repay the same. assailed Resolution19 dated 27 June 2002. Hence, its recourse to this Court, elevating the
Petitioner, through a Memorandum4 dated 24 August 1998, imposed the penalty of following issues:
suspension on respondent for 4 days, from 27 August to 1 September 1998, for violating Company
Policy No. 2.175 and ordered his transfer to the Administration Department. I.
On 2 September 1998, respondent wrote a letter6 to petitioner, stating that he wanted to sign
a transfer memo before assuming his new position. WHETHER OR NOT METROMEDIA IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF
On September 7, 1998, he was handed the Payroll Change Advice7 (PCA), indicating his new THE LABOR ARBITER OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE FOR THE FIRST TIME ONLY IN
assignment to the Traffic and Order Department of Metromedia. Nonetheless, respondent stopped THEIR APPEAL BEFORE THE NLRC.
reporting for work. On 16 September 1998, he sent a letter8 to petitioner communicating his
refusal to accept the transfer.
II.
Respondent duly filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and
other money claims with the labor arbiter, a copy of which petitioner received on 28 September
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF 13TH MONTH PAY BY THE LABOR ARBITER MAY BE
1998. The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. In a Decision9 dated 28 May 1999,
MODIFIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER ASSIGNED AS AN ERROR.
Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion concluded that respondent did not commit insubordination or
disobedience so as to warrant his transfer, and that petitioner was not aggrieved by respondent’s
failure to settle his obligation with De Manuel. The dispositive portion read: Anent the first assignment of error, there are divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching on this
“WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to his former issue. On the one hand are the cases of Martinez v. Merced,20 Marquez v. Secretary of
position, with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until he is actually reinstated. Labor,21 Ducat v. Court of Appeals,22 Bayoca v. No-
As of this date, the complainant’s backwages has reached the sum of P97,324.17. The gales,23 Jimenez v. Patricia,24 Centeno v. Centeno,25 and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union
respondents are further directed to pay the complainant his 13th month pay for 1998 in the sum Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation ,26 all adhering to the doctrine that a party’s active
of P3,611.89. The claims for allowance and unpaid commission are dismissed for lack of sufficient participation in the actual proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop him from
basis to make an award. assailing such lack of jurisdiction. Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal jurisprudence.
On the other hand, the cases of Dy v. NLRC,27 La Naval Drug v. CA,28 De Rossi vs.
CA 29 and Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC 30 buttress the position of petitioner that jurisdiction
SO ORDERED.”10
is conferred by law and lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal.
The Court of Appeals adopted the principles in the cases of Martinez, Marquez and ABS-CBN in
Petitioner lodged an appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor
resolving the jurisdictional issue presented for its resolution, to wit:
arbiter over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the
“Indeed, we agree with petitioner that private respondent was estopped from raising the question
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. In
of jurisdiction before public respondent NLRC and the latter gravely abused its discretion in
addressing said question in private respondents’ favor. As early as Martinez vs. De la Merced, 174 As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the
SCRA 182, the Supreme Court has clearly ruled thus: “ For it has been consistently held by this question of lack of preliminary conference first, when private respondents filed a motion for
Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in extension of time to file their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their
the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack position paper in which they sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial Court; and third,
of jurisdiction.” when they filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
expunging from the records the position paper of private respondents, in which motion private
.... respondents even urged the court to sustain their position paper. And yet, in none of these
instances was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by private
The same principle was adopted by the Highest Tribunal in the case of  Alfredo Marquez vs. respondents. In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings.
Sec. of Labor, 171 SCRA 337 and quoted in the latter case of ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees For it has been consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation , 304 SCRA 497, where it was ruled that: stage, a party’s active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop
“The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.37
failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, The case of Ducat was categorical in saying that if the parties acquiesced in submitting an issue
is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction .”31 same court to pass upon the issue. But this should be taken in the context of the “agreement” of
the parties. We quote from said case:
We rule differently. A cursory glance at these cases will lead one to the conclusion that a party Petitioner’s filing of a Manifestion and Urgent Motion to Set Parameters of Computation is
who does not raise the jurisdictional question at the outset will be estopped to raise it on appeal. indicative of its conformity with the questioned order of the trial court referring the matter of
However, a more circumspect analysis would reveal that the cases cited by respondent do not fall computation of the excess to SGV and simultaneously thereafter, the issuance of a writ of
squarely within the issue and factual circumstances of the instant case. We proceed to possession. If petitioner thought that subject order was wrong, it could have taken recourse to the
demonstrate. Court of Appeals but petitioner did not. Instead he manifested his acquiescence in the said order
The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel on the party by seeking parameters before the trial court. It is now too late for petitioner to question subject
invoking the same most prominently emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.32 Indeed, order of the trial court. Petitioner cannot be allowed to make a mockery of judicial processes, by
the Marquez case relied upon by the CA is in turn grounded on Tijam, where We held that: changing his position from one of the agreement to disagreement, to suit his needs. If the parties
. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his acquiesced in submitting an issue for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same questioning the jurisdiction of the same court to pass upon the issue. Petitioner is consequently
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of estopped from questioning subject order of the trial court.38
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either Centeno involved the question of jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not because the Board (DARAB). The Court did rule therein that “participation by certain parties in the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional
such a practice can not be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy. infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.”39 Still, the Court did recognize
therein that the movants questioning jurisdiction had actually sought and litigated for affirmative
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering reliefs before the DARAB in support of a submitted counter-claim. No similar circumstance obtains
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power in this case concerning the petitioner.
of the court . . . And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a Evidently, none of these cited precedents squarely operates as stare decisis on this case,
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an involving as they did different circumstances. The question now lies as to whether the precedents
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.33 cited by petitioner are more apropos to this case.
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that the instant case falls squarely within the purview of
this Court’s ruling in the case of Dy. Admittedly, a different factual milieu was present insofar as
However, Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did
the questioned jurisdiction was alleged to have been properly lodged in the SEC instead of NLRC.
so only after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to
Yet the rationale employed by the Court therein warrants serious consideration. The
the Court of Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes that Tijam stands as an exception, rather than a
aforementioned case was ruled in this wise:
general rule.34 The CA perhaps though felt comfortable citing Marquez owing to the
. . . .More importantly, estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this Court from taking up the
pronouncement therein that the Court would not hesitate to apply Tijam even absent the
question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of the pleadings since the start of
extraordinary circumstances therein:
litigation before the Labor Arbiter. It is well settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with
“. . . where the entertainment of the jurisdictional issue at a belated stage of the proceedings will
appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held:
result in a failure of justice and render nugatory the constitutional imperative of protection to
“A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
labor.”35
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and
In this case, jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was questioned as early as during appeal before the
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
NLRC, whereas in Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was raised for the first time only before
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
this Court. The viability of Marquez as controlling doctrine in this case is diminished owing to the
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
radically different circumstances in these two cases. A similar observation can be made as to
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
the Bayoca and Jimenez cases.36
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved
Neither do the other like-minded cases squarely settle the issue in favor of the respondent. In the
in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of
case of Martinez, the issue is not jurisdiction by estoppel but waiver of preliminary conference. In
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
that case, we said:
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction.44
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The rulings in Lozon v. NLRC 45 addresses the issue at hand. This Court came up with a clear rule
as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears
.... that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2,
Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal ( Roxas vs.
Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment ( Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al. , 101
“It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within
taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs.
circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be
asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with “The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
matter (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to barred, on appeal, from assailing
secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at Metromedia Times Corporation vs. Pastorin
once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the
334 lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position
Metromedia Times Corporation vs. Pastorin —that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
the result of an honest mistake or of divergent interpretation of doubtful legal provisions. If any jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing
fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed thereon.”46 (Emphasis supplied)
on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they Verily, Lozon, Union Motors, Dy and De Rossi aptly resolve the jurisdictional issue obtaining in this
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss case. Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction when he should not.
an action ‘whenever it appears that court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.’ (Section 2, In fact, the NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter’s decision and ratiocinated:
Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment What appears at first blush to be an issue which pertains to the propriety of complainant’s
may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid.), within ten (10) reassignment to another job on account of his having contracted a private loan, is one which may
years from the finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code).”40 be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless,
The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was assailed in the cases of De Rossi v. NLRC 41 and Union since the complainant is a union member, he should be bound by the covenants provided for in
Motors Corporation v. NLRC 42 during appeal to the NLRC. Since the same circumstance obtains in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.47
this case, the rulings therein, favorable as they are to the petitioner, are germane.
In De Rossi, this Court elucidated:
....
Petitioner maintains that MICC can not question now the issue of jurisdiction of the NLRC,
considering that MICC did not raise this matter until after the case had been brought on appeal to
Based on the foregoing considerations, it appears that the issue of validity of complainant’s
the NLRC. However, it has long been established as a rule, that jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency,
reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a management prerogative which is a matter apt for
or office, is conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on
resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties having opted to consider such as a grievable
appeal. In La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals , 236 SCRA 78, 90, this Court said:
issue. Further, a review of the records would show that the matter of reassignment is one not
directly related to the charge of complainant’s having committed an act which is inimical to
“Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
respondents’ interest, since the latter had already been addressed to by complainant’s service of a
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed.
suspension order. The transfer, in effect, is one which properly falls under Section 1, Article IV of
This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, as such, questions as to the enforcement thereof is one
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
which falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.”48
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
In line with the cases cited above and applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer
conveniently set aside.”43
jurisdiction, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the
We held in the Union Motors Case:
NLRC on appeal.
The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law. [ Ilaw at
Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioner’s claim of lack of jurisdiction on the
Buklod ng Manggaggawa v. NLRC , 219 SCRA 536 (1993); Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc.
part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the
v. Sarmiento Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153 (1990); Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 30
Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our
(1968)]. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRC’s correct observation that jurisdiction over
action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be
grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.
Since jurisdiction does not lie with the Labor Arbiter, it is futile to discuss about the
computation of the 13th month pay.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the NLRC in dismissing the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167702               March 20, 2009 On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended complaint by (i) impleading Manuel Carmona (or
"Carmona") and Rene Cristobal (or "Cristobal"), UVAI’s newly-elected president and chairman of
the board and newly-designated construction committee chairman, respectively, as additional
LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner,
defendants and (ii) increasing her claim for moral damages against each petitioner from
vs.
₱500,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00.
COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.

On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for production and inspection of documents, which
DECISION
UVAI, Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed. The motion sought to compel
[UVAI and its officers] to produce the documents used by UVAI as basis for the imposition of the
NACHURA, J.: ₱400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well as letters and documents showing that UVAI had
informed the other homeowners of their violations of the CRR.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 dismissing Civil Case No. 99-297 before On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which pertinently reads:
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for lack of merit, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Denied, and
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple. plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default and for contempt are also Denied."

[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or "village"), The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not assail its jurisdiction "after
Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On the other hand, they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by
[respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former president and agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting (Eristingcol’s) workers from entering the
chairman of the board of governors (or "board"), construction committee chairman and village village." In so ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an association of
homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating her earlier motion for production and
inspection of documents.
[Eristingcol’s] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] is founded on the allegations that
in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAI’s approval of her building plans and
On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] moved for partial reconsideration of the
acceptance of the construction bond and architect’s fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house
order dated May 26, 1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.
on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway"; that for alleged
violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the
canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of ₱400,000.00 and barred her workers and On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order granting Eristingcol’s motion for production and
contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on inspection of documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order denying [UVAI’s, Limjoco’s,
"Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive. Tan’s and Vilvestre’s] motion for partial reconsideration.

On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] elevated the dispute before [the CA] via [a]
settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed petition for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction in issuing the orders of May
Eristingcol’s workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26, 2001.3
normal security regulations of UVAI.
The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order 4 and dismissing Eristingcol’s
On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC")2 which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes
Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:
involving homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended
by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.
Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcol’s complaint.
Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre did
not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the [RTC] after they voluntarily Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only Limjoco as private
appeared therein "and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking." respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by Eristingcol before the RTC, who then collectively
filed the petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s Order, were, curiously, not
included as private respondents in this particular petition.
Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the instant petition as her Suffice it to state that there is nothing in the same By-laws which deals
discussions with UVAI and the other defendants revealed their lack of participation in the work- explicitly with canopies or marquees which extend outward from the main
stoppage order which was supposedly single-handedly thought of and implemented by Limjoco. building.

The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants should have been 4. [Eristingcol] has been a resident of Urdaneta Village for eleven (11) years.
impleaded as respondents in this petition considering that the complaint before the RTC, where In February 1997, she purchased a parcel of land in the Village, located at the
the petition before the CA and the instant petition originated, has yet to be amended. corner of Urdaneta Avenue and Cerrada Street. x x x.
Furthermore, the present petition maintains that it was serious error for the CA to have ruled that
the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction
5. In considering the design for the house (the "Cerrada property") which she
Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the rest of the defendants should have been impleaded herein as
intended to construct on Cerrada Street, [Eristingcol] referred to the National
respondents.
Building Code of the Philippines. After assuring herself that the said law does
not expressly provide any restrictions in respect thereof, and after noting that
Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall "state the full name of other houses owned by prominent families had similar structures without
the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the being cited by the Village’s Construction Committee, [Eristingcol] decided that
lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." As the losing party in the Cerrada property would have a concrete canopy directly above the main
defendants’ petition for certiorari before the CA, Eristingcol should have impleaded all petitioners, door and driveway.
the winning and adverse parties therein.
6. In compliance with [UVAI’s] rules, [Eristingcol] submitted to [UVAI] copies
On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed outright. 5 However, to settle of her building plans in respect of the Cerrada property and the building plans
the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of this case on the merits. were duly approved by [UVAI]. x x x.

Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June Vilvestre (Vilvestre) from this suit, 7. [Eristingcol] submitted and/or paid the "cash bond/construction bond
Eristingcol insists that her complaint against UVAI and the defendants was properly filed before deposit and architect’s inspection fee" of ₱200,000.00 and the architect’s
the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules and asks that inspection fee of ₱500.00 as required under Construction Rules x x x.
damages be paid by Limjoco and the other UVAI officers who had inflicted injury upon her.
Eristingcol asseverates that since the case before the RTC is one for declaration of nullity, the
8. In the latter part of 1997, and while the construction of the Cerrada
nature of the question that is the subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the
property was ongoing, [Eristingcol] received a notice from [UVAI], charging
parties, should determine which body has jurisdiction. In any event, Eristingcol submits that the
her with alleged violations of the Construction Rules, i.e., those on the height
RTC’s jurisdiction over the case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its officers, including
restriction of eleven (11.0) meters, and the canopy extension into the
Limjoco, for affirmative relief from that court.
easement. On 22nd January 1998, [Eristingcol] (through her representatives)
met with, among others, defendant Limjoco. In said meeting, and after
Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a deliberation on the definition of the phrase "original ground elevation" as a
case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of reference point, [Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to revise the building
the question that is the subject of their controversy. 6 To determine the nature of an action and plan by removing what was intended to be a parapet or roof railing, and
which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and thereby reduce the height of the structure by 40 centimeters, which proposal
the essence of the relief prayed for.7 Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in Eristingcol’s was accepted by the Board through defendant Limjoco, Gov. Catalino
complaint, specifically her amended complaint, to wit: Macaraig Jr. ([UVAI’s] Construction Committee chairman), and the Village’s
Architect. However, the issue of the alleged violation in respect of the
canopy/extension remained unresolved.
Allegations Common to All Causes of Action

xxxx
3. In 1958 and upon its incorporation, [UVAI] adopted a set of By-laws and
Rules and Regulations, x x x. Item 5 of [UVAI’s] Construction Rules
pertinently provides: 9. In compliance with the agreement reached at the 22nd January 1998
meeting, [Eristingcol] caused the revision of her building plans such that, as it
now stands, the Cerrada property has a vertical height of 10.96 meters and,
"Set back line: All Buildings, including garage servants’ quarters, or parts
thus, was within the Village’s allowed maximum height of 11 meters.
thereof (covered terraces, portes cocheres) must be constructed at a distance
of not less than three (3) meters from the boundary fronting a street and not
less than four (4) meters fronting the drainage creek or underground culvert 10. Sometime in June 1998, [Eristingcol] was surprised to receive another
and two (2) meters from other boundaries of a lot. Distance will be measured letter from [UVAI], this time from the Construction Committee chairman
from the vertical projection of the roof nearest the property line. Completely (defendant Tan), again calling her attention to alleged violations of the
open and unroofed terraces are not included in these restrictions." Construction Rules. On 15th June 1998, [UVAI] barred [Eristingcol’s]
construction workers from entering the Village. Thus, [Eristingcol’s]
Construction Manager (Mr. Jaime M. Hidalgo) wrote defendant Tan to explain homeowners found by the Board to have violated the Village’s "set back"
her position, and attached photographs of similar "violations" by other provision.
property owners which have not merited the same scrutiny and sanction from
[UVAI].
15. On 22nd December 1998, defendant Vilvestre sent [Eristingcol] a letter
dated 18th December 1998 formally imposing a penalty of ₱400,000.00 for
xxxx the "canopy easement violation." x x x.

11. On 26th October 1998, and for reasons known only to him, defendant 16. On 29th December 1998, x x x, Vilvestre sent a letter to [Eristingcol],
Vilvestre sent a letter to Mr. Geronimo delos Reyes, demanding for an "idea of stating that "as far as [his] administration is concerned, there has been no
how [Mr. delos Reyes] can demonstrate in concrete terms [his] good faith as past penalties executed by [UVAI], similar to the one we are presently
a quid pro quo for compromise to" [UVAI’s] continued insistence that demanding on your on going construction. x x x
[Eristingcol] had violated [UVAI’s] Construction Rules. x x x.
17. On 4th January 1999, [Eristingcol’s] representative sent a letter to the
xxxx Board, asking for a reconsideration of the imposition of the ₱400,000.00
penalty on the ground that the same is unwarranted and excessive. On 6th
January 1999, [Eristingcol] herself sent a letter to the Board, expounding on
12. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo sent a letter dated 24th November 1998
the reasons for opposing the Board’s action. On 18th January 1999,
to defendant Tan, copies of which were furnished defendants Limjoco,
[Eristingcol] sent another letter in compliance with defendants’ request for a
Vilvestre and the Board, reiterating that, among others: (i) the alleged height
breakdown of her expenditures in respect of her donations relative to the
restriction violation is untrue, since the Cerrada property now has a height
Village park.
within the limits imposed by [UVAI]; and (ii) the demand to reduce the
canopy by ninety (90) centimeters is without basis, in light of the existence of
thirty-five (35) similar "violations" of the same nature by other homeowners. 18. On 3rd February 1999, [Eristingcol] through her lawyers sent defendants a
[Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo further mentioned that she had done letter, requesting that her letters of 4th and 6th January 1999 be acted upon.
nothing to deserve the crude and coercive Village letters and the Board’s
threats of work stoppage, and she cited instances when she dealt with [UVAI]
19. On 4th February 1999, x x x, defendant Limjoco gave a verbal order to
and her fellow homeowners in good faith and goodwill such as in 1997, when
[UVAI’s] guards to bar the entry of workers working on the Cerrada property.
she very discreetly spent substantial amounts to landscape the entire Village
Park, concrete the Park track oval which was being used as a jogging path,
and donate to the Association molave benches used as Park benches. 20. In the morning of 5th February 1999, defendants physically barred
[Eristingcol’s] workers and contractors from entering the Village and working
at the Cerrada property.8
xxxx

Eristingcol then lists the following causes of action:

13. On the same date (24th November 1998), defendant Vilvestre sent
another letter addressed to [Eristingcol’s] construction manager Hidalgo,
again threatening to enjoin all construction activity on the Cerrada property as 1. Item 5 of UVAI’s Construction Rules constitutes an illegal and unwarranted intrusion upon
well as ban entry of all workers and construction deliveries effective 1st Eristingcol’s proprietary rights as it imposes a set-back or horizontal easement of 3.0 meters from
December 1998 unless Mr. delos Reyes met with defendants. x x x. the property line greater than the specification in Section 1005(b) of the Building Code that "the
horizontal clearance between the outermost edge of the marquee and the curb line shall be not
less than 300 millimeters." As such, Eristingcol prays for the declaration of nullity of this provision
xxxx
in UVAI’s Construction Rules insofar as she is concerned.

14. On 2nd December 1998, [Eristingcol’s] representatives met with

2. UVAI’s imposition of a ₱400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol has no factual basis, is arbitrary,
defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre. During that meeting, defendants
whimsical and capricious as rampant violations of the set-back rule by other homeowners in the
were shown copies of the architectural plans for the Cerrada property.
Village were not penalized by UVAI. Eristingcol prays to put a stop to defendants’ arbitrary
[Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to allow [UVAI’s] Construction
exercise of power pursuant to UVAI’s by-laws.
Committee’s architect to validate the measurements given. However, on the
issue of the canopy extension, the defendants informed [Eristingcol’s]
representatives that the Board would impose a penalty of Four Hundred 3. Absent any factual or legal bases for the imposition of a ₱400,000.00 penalty, defendants and
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) for violation of [UVAI’s] "set back" or all persons working under their control should be permanently barred or restrained from imposing
easement rule. Defendants cited the Board’s imposition of similar fines to and/or enforcing any penalty upon Eristingcol for an alleged violation of UVAI’s Construction
previous homeowners who had violated the same rule, and they undertook to Rules, specifically the provision on set-back.
furnish [Eristingcol] with a list of past penalties imposed and paid by
4. Defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code, By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of VGCCI and,
demonstrated bias against Eristingcol by zeroing in on her alone and her supposed violation, while therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an intra-
other homeowners, who had likewise violated UVAI’s Construction Rules, were not cited or corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder under Sec. 5(b) of P.D. 902-A.
penalized therefor. Defendants’ actuations were in clear violation of their duty to give all
homeowners, including Eristingcol, their due.
An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the subject share anchored mainly
5. Defendants’ actuations have seriously affected Eristingcol’s mental disposition and have caused on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been posted as
her to suffer sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety. Eristingcol’s reputation has delinquent, the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the Club…" It is
likewise been besmirched by UVAI’s and defendants’ arbitrary charge that she had violated UVAI’s pursuant to this provision that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public auction, of which it was
Construction Rules. In this regard, individual defendants should each pay Eristingcol moral the highest bidder. VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its corporate by-laws should prevail.
damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation and application of VGCCI’s aforequoted
by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the special competence of the SEC.
6. Lastly, defendants should pay Eristingcol ₱1,000.000.00 for litigation expenses she incurred in
instituting this suit and for attorney’s fees. We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. De la Cruz:

At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute and is, in fact, 6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. Nonetheless, Eristingcol is adamant that the subject commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed before a corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the
specialized body or commission. Industrial Court’s intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause
strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in
the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
Eristingcol’s contention is wrong.
jurisdiction … the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one occasion, held that the caption administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.9 ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the xxxx
question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s
Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of
In this case, the need for the SEC’s technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized involving as it
UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties
does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a corporation’s by-laws as well as the
arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application
applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of VGCCI’s claims.
of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does
The SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant case.11
not assail the height restriction of UVAI’s Construction Rules, as she has readily complied
therewith.
Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association v. Sps.
Gaston,12 although it ultimately held that the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the
Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,  which upheld the jurisdiction of the
10
complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution issued by
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and recognized its special competence to
Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts. In Sta. Clara, the
interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.’s (VGCCI’s) by-laws. We ruled, thus:
main issue raised by SCHA reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the
[RTC], ‘to declare as null and void the resolution of the Board of SCHA, decreeing that only
Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has jurisdiction we members [in] good standing of the said association were to be issued stickers for use in their
have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of VGCCI and whether or vehicles.’" In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over respondent-spouses Gaston’s
not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation is intra- complaint for declaration of nullity, we stressed the absence of relationship and the consequent
corporate. lack of privity of contract between the parties, thus:

As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject share or membership Are [Respondent-Spouses Gaston] SCHA Members?
certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the issuance to it of the corresponding Certificate of
Sale) transferred ownership of the same to the latter and thus entitled petitioner to have the said
In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve
share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. x x x.
preliminarily—on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint—whether [respondent-spouses
Gaston] are members of the SCHA.
[SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate relations between the no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract
SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has jurisdiction over the dispute. To support their arising from the title certificate exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston].
contention that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the association, [SCHA] cite[s] the
SCHA’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara
Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private respondents
Subdivision are automatically members of the SCHA.
intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid
Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the association were
We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles. This fact has not been disputed by
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very [SCHA]. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not
foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one.
Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint
More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to become members of the
SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
without their express or implied consent. x x x. In the present case, however, other than the said
complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that [respondent-spouses Gaston] have
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
agreed to be SCHA members.
upon the whims of the defendant.

xxxx
The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA. In
point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. 13
No privity of Contract
In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is well-established. Given
Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston]. As a this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite
general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons. The Civil Code upholds the the latter’s deft phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAI’s
spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to exist, provided the essential requisites are Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcol’s complaint is UVAI’s supposed arbitrary
present. x x x. From the moment there is a meeting of minds between the parties, it is perfected. implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof.

As already adverted to, there are cases in which a party who enters into a contract of sale is also Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the
bound by a lien annotated on the certificate of title. We recognized this in Bel Air Village controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an intra-
Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, in which we ruled: corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535, 14 which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating
the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners’
associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides in pertinent part:
There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land
issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner
becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such 2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation,
rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and shall have among others, the following additional powers:
the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic
membership was expressly annotated on the petitioner’s Transfer Certificate of Title and on the
(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the
title of his predecessor-in-interest.
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association, the provision of
Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;
The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such annotation.
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners association
Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states: registered in accordance therewith.

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership
faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate x x x. relations.15 Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
(Italics supplied) responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’ associations, were transferred to
the HLURB.
The above ruling, however, does not apply to the case at bar. When [respondent-spouses Gaston]
purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T- As regards the defendants’ supposed embrace of the RTC’s jurisdiction by appearing thereat and
127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcol’s workers from entering the village, suffice it to
state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. 16 is quite a long
stretch.

The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As found by the
CA, defendants’ appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena
issued by that court in connection with Eristingcol’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO). On defendants’ supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcol’s
workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot
be equated with full acceptance of the RTC’s authority, as what actually transpired in
Tijam.1avvphi1.zw+

The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to
the court’s jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of
jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. 17 In that case, the
Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time—fifteen years after the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a
final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFI’s lack
of jurisdiction.

To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a
day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement
reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a Motion
to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as
laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction.

In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.