578 Phil.

588

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 145842, June 27, 2008 ]

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B.

COLAYCO, RUFINO L. SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, AND
KUOK KHOON TSEN, PETITIONERS, VS. BF CORPORATION
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 145873

CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. BF

CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 to
nullify certain issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la
Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok
Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen assail the Decision[1] dated November 12,
1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming the Decision[2] dated
September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in Pasig City
in Civil Case No. 63435 that ordered them to pay jointly and severally
respondent BF Corporation (BF) a sum of money with interests and damages.
They also assail the CA Resolution dated October 25, 2000 which, apart from
setting aside an earlier Resolution[3] of August 13, 1999 granting ESHRI's
application for restitution and damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid
September 23, 1996 RTC Decision.

In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-
del Castillo also assails the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999
insofar at it adjudged her jointly and severally liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay
the monetary award decreed in the RTC Decision.
Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement
for the Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project[4] that
ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel
starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the
payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as
described in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall
submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the
work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's
progress billing.[5]

In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the progress
billing to ESHRI's Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of
the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying
Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn
San Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the
period from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the
required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress billings, including an
evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Manager's Instructions
(PMIs) and the detailed valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders
(WVOs) for final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the
WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the section "Change
Orders."[6]

From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings
following the procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13,
ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.[7]

According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-
measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let
alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed
having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which
gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being
processed.

After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26,
1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.

In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to
13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to
refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and
turning up with inferior work accomplishment.

The RTC found for BF

On September 23, 1996, the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo,
is entitled to the payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
and to the retention money corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with
interest in both instances, rendered judgment for BF. The fallo of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, defendants [EHSRI], Ru[f]o B. Colayco, Rufino L.

Samaniego, Cynthia del Castillo, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon
Tsen, are jointly and severally hereby ordered to:

1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P24,780,490.00 representing unpaid

construction work accomplishments under plaintiff's Progress
Billings Nos. 14-19;

2. Return to plaintiff the retention sum of P5,810,000.00;

3. Pay legal interest on the amount of P24,780,490.80 representing

the construction work accomplishments under Progress Billings
Nos. 14-19 and on the amount of P5,810,000.00 representing
the retention sum from date of demand until their full Payment;

4. Pay plaintiff P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P1,000,000.00 as

exemplary damages, P1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees, and cost
of the suit.[8]

According to the RTC, ESHRI's refusal to pay BF's valid claims constituted
evident bad faith entitling BF to moral damages and attorney's fees.

ESHRI subsequently moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by
the RTC, prompting ESHRI to appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399.

Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the following events and/or
incidents transpired:

(1) The trial court, by Order dated January 21, 1997, granted BF's motion for
execution pending appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the CA via a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.[9] Meanwhile, the branch
sheriff garnished from ESHRI's bank account in the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) the amount of PhP 35 million.

(2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of

preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21,
1997 Order upon ESHRI's posting of a PhP 1 million bond. In a supplemental
resolution issued on the same day, the CA issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge and/or his branch sheriff
acting under him (a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the
enjoined order of execution pending appeal; (b) to immediately return the
garnished deposits to PNB instead of delivering the same to ESHRI; and (c) if
the garnished deposits have been delivered to BF, the latter shall return the
same to ESHRI's deposit account.

(3) By a Decision dated June 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA set
aside the trial court's January 21, 1997 Order. The CA would later deny BF's
motion for reconsideration.

(4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA Decision,
docketed as G.R. No. 132655.[10] On August 11, 1998, the Court affirmed the
assailed decision of the CA with the modification that the recovery of ESHRI's
garnished deposits shall be against BF's bond.[11]

We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.

(5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999
granted, an application for restitution or damages against BF's bond.
Consequently, BF and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the bonding company, filed
separate motions for reconsideration.

On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA rendered a Decision

resolving (1) the aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2) herein
petitioners' appeal from the trial court's Decision dated September 23, 1996.
This November 12, 1999 Decision, finding for BF and now assailed in these
separate recourses, dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is

AFFIRMED in toto. This Court's Resolution dated 13 August 1999 is
reconsidered and set aside, and defendants-appellants' application for
restitution is denied for lack of merit.
 SO ORDERED.[12]

The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the
issues the parties raised in their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual
and evidentiary. Thus, there is no reason to disturb the case disposition of the
RTC, inclusive of its award of damages and attorney's fees and the reasons
underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently established its case by
preponderance of evidence. Part of what it had sufficiently proven relates to
ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to re-measure BF's later work
accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed to
prove the basis of its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the
defective work accomplished by BF.

Apropos ESHRI's entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising

from the execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such
remedy may peremptorily be allowed only if the executed judgment is reversed,
a situation not obtaining in this case.

Following the denial by the CA, per its Resolution[13] dated October 25, 2000, of
their motion for reconsideration, petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner
del Castillo opting, however, to file a separate recourse.

G.R. No. 145842

In G.R. No. 145842, petitioners ESHRI, et al. raise the following issues for our
consideration:

I. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in

disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their appeal
[particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress
Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].

II. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in

not holding respondent guilty of delay in the performance of its
obligations and, hence, liable for liquidated damages [in view
that respondent is guilty of delay and that its works were
defective].

III. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in

finding petitioners guilty of malice and evidence bad faith, and in
awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to
respondent.
 IV. Whether or not the [CA] erred in setting aside its Resolution
dated August 13, 2000.[14]

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered relate
to the correctness of the CA's factual determinations, specifically on whether or
not BF was in delay and had come up with defective works, and whether or not
petitioners were guilty of malice and bad faith. It is basic that in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be presented by the parties
and reviewed by the Court.[15] Just as basic is the rule that factual findings of
the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on the
Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of
reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties; and (7) the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant evidence and undisputed facts, that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[16]

In our review of this case, we find that none of the above exceptions obtains.
Accordingly, the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that
there was delay on the part of ESHRI, that there was no proof that BF's work
was defective, and that petitioners were guilty of malice and bad faith, ought to
be affirmed.

Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and

WVOs

Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the
admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and
the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before
being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have
laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.

Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-
basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into
evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it
could not present the original of the documents since they were in the
possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests.

We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is
the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced[17] and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except
where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
enunciates the best evidence rule:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of

the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or

control. - If the document is in the custody or under control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers

to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself.[18] A party
may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations
must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.

In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied
documents in question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to
lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed. The stenographic notes of
the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF
and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:

ATTY. ANDRES:

During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the
witness testified that certain exhibits namely, the Progress Payment
Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these documents
were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of
ESHRI since these are internal documents and I am referring
specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your
Honor, that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present
secondary original, that opposing counsel first be given
opportunity to present the originals which are in their
possession. May we know if they have brought the originals and
whether they will present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis
added.)

ATTY. AUTEA:

We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor,
that it has been claimed by plaintiff that some of the originals are in
their possession and our client assured that, they will try to check.
Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit:
(1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2)
a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was
afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under
Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original
document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.[19] While perhaps
not on all fours because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v.
People, is very much apt, thus:

x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the

original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party,
Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
 reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in
court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.

xxxx

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient
time to produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.[20]
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the Restitution of the Garnished Funds

We now come to the propriety of the restitution of the garnished funds. As

petitioners maintain, the CA effectively, but erroneously, prevented restitution of
ESHRI's improperly garnished funds when it nullified its own August 13, 1999
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187. In this regard, petitioners invite attention
to the fact that the restitution of the funds was in accordance with this Court's
final and already executory decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying that ESHRI
should be restored to its own funds without awaiting the final outcome of the
main case. For ease of reference, we reproduce what the appellate court
pertinently wrote in its Resolution of August 13, 1999:

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Application (for

Restitution/Damages against Bond for Execution Pending Appeal)
dated May 12, 1999 filed by [ESHRI] is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
surety of [BF], STRONGHOLD Insurance Co., Inc., is ORDERED to
PAY the sum of [PhP 35 million] to [ESHRI] under its SICI Bond. x x x
In the event that the bond shall turn out to be insufficient or the
surety (STRONGHOLD) cannot be made liable under its bond, [BF],
being jointly and severally liable under the bond is ORDERED to
RETURN the amount of [PhP 35 million] representing the garnished
deposits of the bank account maintained by [ESHRI] with the [PNB]
Shangri-la Plaza Branch, Mandaluyong City. Otherwise, this Court shall
cause the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated April 24,
 1998 issued in Civil Case No. 63435 against both [BF], and/or its
surety, STRONGHOLD, in case they should fail to comply with these
directives.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Petitioners' contention on the restitution angle has no merit, for, as may be

recalled, the CA, simultaneously with the nullification and setting aside of its
August 13, 1999 Resolution, affirmed, via its assailed November 12, 1999
Decision, the RTC Decision of September 23, 1996, the execution pending appeal
of which spawned another dispute between the parties. And as may be recalled
further, the appellate court nullified its August 13, 1999 Resolution on the basis
of Sec. 5, Rule 39, which provides:

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. - Where the executed

judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may
warrant under the circumstances.

On the strength of the aforequoted provision, the appellate court correctly

dismissed ESHRI's claim for restitution of its garnished deposits, the executed
appealed RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435 having in fact been upheld in
toto.

It is true that the Court's Decision of August 11, 1998 in G.R. No. 132655
recognized the validity of the issuance of the desired restitution order. It bears to
emphasize, however, that the CA had since then decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399,
the main case, on the merits when it affirmed the underlying RTC Decision in
Civil Case No. 63435. This CA Decision on the original and main case effectively
rendered our decision on the incidental procedural matter on restitution moot
and academic. Allowing restitution at this point would not serve any purpose,
but only prolong an already protracted litigation.

G.R. No. 145873

Petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, in her separate petition, excepts from the CA

Decision affirming, in its entirety, the RTC Decision holding her, with the other
individual petitioners in G.R. No. 145842, who were members of the Board of
Directors of ESHRI, jointly and severally liable with ESHRI for the judgment
award. She presently contends:

I. The [CA] erred in not declaring that the decision of the trial court
 adjudging petitioner personally liable to respondent void for not
stating the factual and legal basis for such award.

II. The [CA] erred in not ruling that as former Director, Petitioner
cannot be held personally liable for any alleged breach of a
contract entered into by the corporation.

III. The [cA] erred in not ruling that respondent is not entitled to an
award of moral damages.

IV. The [CA] erred in holding petitioner personally liable to

respondent for exemplary damages.

V. The [CA] erred in not ruling that respondent is not entitled to

any award of attorney's fees.[22]

First off, Roxas-del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in question violated the
requirements of due process and of Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution that
states, "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."

Roxas-del Castillo's threshold posture is correct. Indeed, the RTC decision in

question, as couched, does not provide the factual or legal basis for holding her
personally liable under the premises. In fact, only in the dispositive portion of
the decision did her solidary liability crop up. And save for her inclusion as party
defendant in the underlying complaint, no reference is made in other pleadings
thus filed as to her liability.

The Court notes that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively
recognized the applicability of the doctrine on piercing the veil of the separate
corporate identity. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot allow such
application. A corporation, upon coming to existence, is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it.
Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital
stock of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of
separate corporate personality.[23] Thus, obligations incurred by corporate
officers, acting as corporate agents, are not theirs but direct accountabilities of
the corporation they represent. Solidary liability on the part of corporate officers
may at times attach, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as when
they act with malice or in bad faith.[24] Also, in appropriate cases, the veil of
corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the separate juridical personality of a
corporation is abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a social injustice,
or used as a vehicle to evade obligations.[25] In this case, no act of malice or
like dishonest purpose is ascribed on petitioner Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant
the lifting of the corporate veil.

The above conclusion would still hold even if petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the
time ESHRI defaulted in paying BF's monthly progress bill, was still a director,
for, before she could be held personally liable as corporate director, it must be
shown that she acted in a manner and under the circumstances contemplated in
Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads:

Section 31. Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote

for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or
acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons. (Emphasis ours.)

We do not find anything in the testimony of one Crispin Balingit to indicate that
Roxas-del Castillo made any misrepresentation respecting the payment of the
bills in question. Balingit, in fact, testified that the submitted but unpaid billings
were still being evaluated. Further, in the said testimony, in no instance was bad
faith imputed on Roxas-del Castillo.

Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the controversy
between the principal parties started in July 1992 when Roxas-del Castillo no
longer sat in the ESHRI Board, a reality BF does not appear to dispute. In fine,
she no longer had any participation in ESHRI's corporate affairs when what
basically is the ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is the rule
that contracts are binding only among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311 of the
Civil Code is clear on this point:

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law.

In the instant case, Roxas-del Castillo could not plausibly be held liable for
breaches of contract committed by ESHRI nor for the alleged wrongdoings of its
governing board or corporate officers occurring after she severed official ties
with the hotel management.

Given the foregoing perspective, the other issues raised by Roxas-del Castillo as
to her liability for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are now
moot and academic.

And her other arguments insofar they indirectly impact on the liability of ESHRI
need not detain us any longer for we have sufficiently passed upon those
concerns in our review of G.R. No. 145842.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 145842 is DISMISSED, while the

petition in G.R. No. 145873 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision
dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the petitioner in G.R. No. 145873, Cynthia Roxas-del
Castillo, is absolved from any liability decreed in the RTC Decision dated
September 23, 1996 in Civil Case No. 63435, as affirmed by the CA.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, (Acting Chairperson), Tinga, Reyes, and Brion, JJ., concur.

* Additional member as per April 16, 2008 Zero Backlog Raffle.

[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 145842), pp. 96-122. Penned by Associate Justice Omar U.

Amin and concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Jose L.

Sabio, Jr.

[2] Id. at 163-192.

[3] Id. at 450-454.

[4] Id. at 143-148.

[5] Id. at 97-98.

[6] Id. at 98-99.

[7] Id. at 100.

[8] Supra note 2, at 192.

[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 145842), p. 101.

[10] Id. at 102.

[11] Id. at 377-386; BF Corporation v. ESHRI, G.R. No. 132655, August 11,

1998, 294 SCRA 109.

[12] Supra note 1, at 121.

[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 145842), p. 124.

[14] Id. at 24-25.

[15] Allied Banking Corporation v. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 154126,

October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 303, 316; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v.
Santamaria, G.R. No. 139885, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA 84, 92.

[16] Dungaran v. Koschnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 676,

685; Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 484.

[17] Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor

Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117, 131; citing
McCormick, Handbook of the Law on Evidence 409 (1954).

[18] R.J. Francisco, Basic Evidence 283 (1991).

[19] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 5.

[20] G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 677, 684-685.

[21] Supra note 3, at 453.

[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 145873), p. 16.

[23] Union Bank of the Philippines v. Ong, G.R. No. 152347, June 21, 2006, 491

SCRA 581, 602.

[24] Petron Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

154532, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 596, 613-614.

[25] Enriquez Security Services, Inc. v. Cabotaje, G.R. No. 147993, July 21,
2006, 496 SCRA 169, 175.

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