1. DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS.

CASTILLO

61 SCRA 709

FACTS:

Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land, which it doesn’t own.
Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease agreement, all buildings and
improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not include machineries and
accessories. In connection to this, petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment
wherein some were bolted in foundations of cement.

HELD:

The machinery must be classified as personal property.

The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor
on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal

property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery was levied upon
by the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being
registered.

Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property
or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

2. B.H. BERKENKOTTER vs. CU UNJIENG E HIJOS

Posted on July 1, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

G.R. No. L-41643 July 31, 1935

FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff, B. H. Berkenkotter, from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing said plaintiff’s complaint against Cu Unjieng e Hijos et al

Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from
the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and
land “with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus,
utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots.”

Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the
capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that instead of milling
150 tons daily, it could produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment
was approximately P100,000. B.A. Green, president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H.
Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment,
promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the mortgagees, the
herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Berkenkotter agreed to the said proposition and delivered to him
a total sum of P25,750. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against said corporation for unpaid salary.
With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of P22,000, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., purchased the
additional machinery and equipment now in litigation.

B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional
loan of P75,000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A. Green
and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, together with
whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.

Appellants contention: the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar
central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in character inasmuch as B. A. Green,
in proposing to him to advance the money for the purchase thereof, that in case B. A. Green should fail
to obtain an additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said machinery and equipment
would become security therefor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment,
as improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of
the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.

HELD: No error was committed by trial court. The additional machinery and equipment are included in
the first mortgage.

Article 334, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to “machinery, liquid
containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in
connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet
the requirements of such trade or industry.”

If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co.,
Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar industry, converted them into real
property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not
permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them
the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
established. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment
installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessary be
permanent.

Furthermore, the fact that B. A. Green bound himself to the plaintiff B. H. Berkenkotter to hold said
machinery and equipment as security, as nothing could prevent B. A. Green from giving them as security
at least under a second mortgage.

As to the alleged sale of said machinery and equipment to the plaintiff and appellant after they had been
permanently incorporated with the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., and while the
mortgage constituted on said sugar central to Cu Unjieng e Hijos remained in force, only the right of
redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in he sugar central with which said machinery and
equipment had been incorporated, was transferred thereby, subject to the right of the defendants Cu
Unjieng e Hijos under the first mortgage.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the installation of a
machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the
purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a
permanent improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the
mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877, Civil Code); (2) that the fact that the purchaser of the new
machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold
them as security for the payment of the latter’s credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and
equipment with the central; and (3) that the sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the
purchaser who was supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar
central, does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply with the
right of redemption.

3. MINDANAO BUS COMPANY v. THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of
Cagayan de Oro City

G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962

FACTS:

Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. It
owns a land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair shop;
blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with machineries placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body
constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU land transportation
business it operates.
The machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to produce finished
products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general public
indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes.

Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner’s above-mentioned
equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground
that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, so
petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment.

The CTA held the petitioner liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance and repair
equipment mentioned above. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Should the tools and equipment in the petitioner company’s repair shop be considered immovable
taxable real properties?

DOCTRINE:

NO. Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be “essential and
principal elements” of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be “unable to
function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.” The tools and equipment are
not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers and
cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for
expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. The transportation business could be carried on
without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop
belonging to another.

4. STANDARD OIL COMPANY V JARAMILLO

The Power of the Registry of Deeds is Ministerial, and The absolute criterion to determine between real
and personal property is NOT supplied by the civil code. Parties may agree what to treat as personal
property and what to treat as real property.

FACTS
On November 27, 1922, Gervasia de la Rosa was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in the City of
Manila and owner of the house of really tough materials built thereon. She executed that fine day a
document in the form of a chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to Standard Oil Company of New York
(by way of mortgage) both the leasehold interest in said lot and the building.

After said document had been duly acknowledged and delivered, Standard Oil presented it to Joaquin
Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the
book of record of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, Jaramillo opined that it was
not chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal
property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this ground
only.

Later this confusion was brought to the Supreme Court upon demurrer by Joaquin Jaramillo, register of
deeds of the City of Manila, to an original petition of the Standard Oil Company of New York, demanding
a mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the proper register a document purporting to be a
chattel mortgage executed in the City of Manila by Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, in favor of the
Standard Oil Company of New York.

The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer, and ordered that unless Jaramillo interposes a sufficient
answer to the petition for mandamus by Standard Oil within 5 days of notification, the writ would be
issued as prayed, but without costs.

ISSUE:

w/n the Registry of Deeds can determine the nature of property to be registered.

w/n the Registry of Deeds has powers beyond Ministerial discretion.

RESOLUTION:
1.Jaramillo, register of deeds, does not have judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine nature of
document registered as chattel mortgage Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section
15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not confer upon the register
of deeds any authority whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of
chattel mortgages. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the act
of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the
existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument
itself in relation with the fact of notice.

2.Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code does not supply absolute criterion on distinction between real
and personal property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law Article 334 and 335 of
the Civil Code supply no absolute criterion for discriminating between real property and personal
property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Those articles state rules which,
considered as a general doctrine, are law in this jurisdiction; but it must not be forgotten that under
given conditions property may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is
undeniable that the parties to a contract may be agreement treat as personal property that which by
nature would be real property; and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property. Other situations
are constantly arising, and from time to time are presented to the Supreme Court, in which the proper
classification of one thing or another as real or personal property may be said to be doubtful.]

5. Evangelista v. Alto Surety

Evangelista v. Alto Surety

Facts:

In 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted Civil Case No. 8235 of the CFI Manila (Santos Evangelista vs.
Ricardo Rivera) for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was
levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said
writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. In
due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held
in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case on 8 October 1951. The corresponding
definite deed of sale was issued to him on 22 October 1952, upon expiration of the period of
redemption. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it,
upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the
latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on 10 May 1952, a definite deed of sale of
the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, on 29
September 1950, in compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case 6268 of the same court (Alto
Surety & Insurance vs. Maximo Quiambao, Rosario Guevara and Ricardo Rivera)" in which judgment for
the sum of money, had been rendered in favor of Alto Surety. Hence, on 13 June 1953, Evangelista
instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over
said house, and securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI
Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in
question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October 1952, until
said delivery. The decision was however reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved Alto Surety
from the complaint on account that although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been
filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Alto Surety, Evangelista did not
acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in question were
immovable property.

Issue:

Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with,
for purpose of attachment, as immovable property?

Held:

The court ruled that the house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal
property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As held in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 OG
5374), "a true building is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or
by a usufructuary or lessee.” The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached, as
"personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it
declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as
the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable. Parties to
a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said
contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based,
partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to
said contract. The rules on execution do not allow, and should not be interpreted as to allow, the special
consideration that parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate as personal property,
when they are not ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation
governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for
each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the character which the parties have given to it or
desire to give it. The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties, may have
privately given to the property levied upon. The court therefore affirms the decision of the CA with cost
against Alto Surety.

by Aianna Bianca Birao

 6. MANILA LODGE NO. 761 v. CA, GR No. L-41001, 1976-09-30

Facts:

On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila
to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act
provided that the reclaimed area "shall be the property of the City of

Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred
feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of... the Governor General, to a
responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed ninety-nine years."

Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360,
so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.

On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909, conveyed 5,543.07
square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) on the basis of which TCT No.

2195[2] was issued to the latter

Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to
which was issued TCT No. 67488.[4] The registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by
court order to "Manila Lodge No. 761,... Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."

In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation
of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property. This petition was granted on February 15,
1963.

On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the
improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short)
Issues:

What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is it of public... ownership (dominion) or of
private ownership?

Ruling:

The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a "public"
nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision.

We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.

Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could,
by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so
from the lawmaking body.

Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not
dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body.

Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb "authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by
means of this statute or... section." Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360,
the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the
whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its...
patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be
patrimonial property, for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto
would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the... terms provided by the statute.

Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila."

It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of
the Revised Ordinances of... the City of Manila.[42] Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a
public park or plaza and for public use.
Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of
the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and
shores are parts of the national domain open to public use.

These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil
Code of Spain.

Principles:

7. LAUREL VS GARCIA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Laurel vs Garcia

GR 92013 July 25, 1990.

Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in
Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by
the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As
such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the
property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public
dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule
is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable
of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine
who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

i. SPOUSES TIRONA vs. ALEJO, G.R. NO. 129313, OCTOBER 10, 2001
ii. MONTANEZ vs. MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 144116, NOV. 22, 2002
iii. SPOUSES LACAP vs. LEE, G.R. NO. 142131, DECEMBER 11, 2002

Perez vs Mendoza
8. Perez vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts:

In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her
aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a

piece of land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and

the municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the

other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost

one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter

Margarita when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita

and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.

When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the

deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and

witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to

know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the

signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private

document, Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for

insufficiency of evidence.

On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against

respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land

in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in

1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land

in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners;

that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the

lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to

file an unlawful detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

court in toto.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

Held:

NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review

with costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the

land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and

continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners

thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive

prescription. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes
the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the

Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a

disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process

for the recovery of the property."

Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the

cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the

present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in

possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title;

and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit

pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings

vi. PALATAO vs. CO, G.R. NO. 131726, MAY 7, 2002

BRUTAS vs. RADONA, SR., G.R. NO. 123213, NOV. 15, 2001
by Multi Athlete

9. SPS. WARLITO BUSTOS AND HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS v. CA, GR Nos. 120784-85, 2001-
01-24

Facts:

Fajardo died intestate

He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.

the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition[5] of the estate of Paulino Fajardo.

Manuela sold her share to

Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale

At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral... the cadastre was conducted, and the property involved
in the partition case were specified

The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses,... includes Lot... of the Masantol Cadastre... was
subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law
Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.

Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one fourth
(¼) share of Manuela which was sold to him.
During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died.

the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.

Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot... to spouses Venancio Viray and

Cecilia Nunga-Viray.

the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of Moses G.
Mendoza,... Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia Reyes-Bustos.

, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray,... filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court... an
action for unlawful detainer... against... spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in
actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad,... The municipal circuit trial court decided the
case in favor of spouses Viray.

he trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with
the Regional Trial Court,... the regional trial court rendered a decision,... to pay the private
respondents... the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases,... Moses Mendoza is
declared as owner of the ¼ undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court... is... affirmed but MODIFIED

Issues:

The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer
case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that
the decision has become final and executory. This means that the... petitioners may be evicted. In the
accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject
land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of
the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs.
Development Bank of Rizal,[20] the Supreme

Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature
where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to... direct the suspension of its execution
(Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v.
Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final
which could render the... execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners
of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from
the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice.

Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the
spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the
decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property.[21] One of the essential attributes of
ownership is possession. It follows that as... owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of
ownership--the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or
alienate, to... recover or vindicate and to the fruits--is a crippled owner."

Principles:

Copioso vs Copioso, 391 SCRA 325; GR No. 149243, October 28, 2002

Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011

(Civil Procedures – Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation)
````````````````

Facts: Respondents filed with the RTC an action for specific performance of reconveyance of two parcels
of land having an assessed value of P3,770.00.

Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother were co-owners of the subject
property having inherited the same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination the
deceased had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Doria who subsequently sold the
same to third parties. Thus, they are praying for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their
being co-owners thereof.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground that it was the MTC and not the RTC that had
jurisdiction considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00 (Section 33
[3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691). Petitioners argue that the complaint for
reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of “title, possession and
interests” of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land.

Respondents claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of action
which include the annulment of sale and other instruments of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary
estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC ( Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended).

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was
beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction.

Issue: WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.

Held: Yes. Although the assessed value of the two parcels of land involved is P3,770.00, which is within
the jurisdiction of the MTC, the action filed by the respondents is for specific performance of
reconveyance, annulment of contracts and claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the action affects the title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and jurisdiction is
determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

KIONISALA v. HEIRS OF HONORIO DACUT, GR No. 147379, 2002-02-27

Facts:

On 19 December 1995 private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
reconveyance and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-312 Of the Regional Trial
Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. This complaint involved two (2) parcels of... land

In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity of titles and reconveyance, private
respondents claimed absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title. They further alleged in their... complaint

The complaint was accompanied by a verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which affirmed
under oath

On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to the complaint and asserted the following
affirmative defenses

Petitioners set for hearing their affirmative defenses. After the hearing, or on 3 December 1996 the trial
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action of private respondents was truly
for reversion so that only the Director of Lands could have filed the... complaint, and that the certificate
of non-forum shopping accompanying the complaint did not comply with the standard form for such
undertaking.[1] On 23 December 1996 private respondents moved for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal but on 3 June
1997 the motion was denied by the trial court.

On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals. On 15
February 2000 the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision reversing the order of dismissal.

On 7 March 2000 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. On 22 January 2001 the
appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit, hence this petition for review.

Issues:

a disseisin and its continuance by the defendant

Plaintiff was not required and did not allege the source and kind of title under which it claimed, and
under the complaint, it was at liberty to introduce proof of any legal title which it possessed.

petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the
Court of any petition which might be filed,

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 15 February 2000 reversing the Order dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-312
entitled Heirs of Honorio Dacut, namely, Visaminda Orevillo,... Violeta Dacut, Josephine Dacut and
Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, namely, Ana, Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all
surnamed Kionisala, and Isabel Kionisala is AFFIRMED with the understanding that private respondents
Heirs of Honorio Dacut as... plaintiffs therein may proceed on the basis of their causes of action of
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of titles and/or reconveyance based on an implied
trust, with claim for damages. The proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith within...
thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this Decision without unnecessary delay.

SO ORDERED

Principles:
 i. LUBOS vs. GALUPO, G.R. NO. 139136, JAN. 16, 2002
ii. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF ANGELES, G.R. NO. 141296, OCT. 7, 2002

AUGUST 7, 2019 ATTY. ALDRIN JOSE M. CANA, CPA SASA

Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow of Salvador Santos, a brother of private respondents
Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, all surnamed Santos and Rosa Santos-Carreon. Spouses Jesus and Rosalia
Santos owned a parcel of land registered under TCT No. 27571 with an area of 154 square meters,
located at Sta. Cruz Manila. On it was a four-door apartment administered by Rosalia who rented them
out. The spouses had five children, Salvador, Calixto, Alberto, Antonio and Rosa. Jesus and Rosalia
executed a deed of sale of the properties in favor of their children Salvador and Rosa. Rosa then sold her
share to Salvador which resulted in the issuance of a new TCT No. 113221.

Despite the transfer of the property to Salvador, Rosalia continued to lease and receive rentals from the
apartment units. Jesus, Salvador and Rosalia died. Petitioner Zenaida, claiming to be Salvador’s heir,
demanded the rent from Antonio Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia. The latter refused to pay, thus
Zenaida filed an ejectment suit against him with the MTC of Manila. The trial court ruled in favor of
Zenaida. Private respondents instituted an action for reconveyance of property with preliminary
injunction against petitioner in the RTC of Manila, where they alleged that the two deeds of sale
executed on were simulated for lack of consideration and that they were executed to accommodate
Salvador in generating funds for his business ventures and providing him with greater business
flexibility. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can invoke the “Dead Man’s Statute”?

Held: No. Petitioner in her memorandum seeks to expunge the testimony of Rosa Santos-Carreon before
the trial court in view of Sec. 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the “Dead
Man’s Statute.” It is too late for petitioner, however, to invoke said rule. The trial court in its order dated
February 5, 1990, denied petitioner’s motion to disqualify respondent Rosa as a witness. Petitioner did
not appeal therefrom. Trial ensued and Rosa testified as a witness for respondents and was cross-
examined by petitioner’s counsel. By her failure to appeal from the order allowing Rosa to testify, she
waived her right to invoke the dean man’s statute. Further, her counsel cross-examined Rosa on matters
that occurred during Salvadors’ lifetime.

ADVERTISEMENT

REPORT THIS AD
In Goñi vs. CA, 144 SCRA 222, 231 (1986) we held that protection under the dead man’s statute is
effectively waived when a counsel for a petitioner cross-examines a private respondent on matters
occurring during the deceased’s lifetime. The Court of appeals cannot be faulted in ignoring petitioner
on Rosa’s disqualification. Petition is DENIED.

xvi. GO, JR. vs. PEREZ, G.R. NO. 142276, AUGUST 14, 2001

i. HEIRS OF INGJUG vs. SPOUSES CASALS, G.R. NO. 134718, AUGUST 20,
2001

Bachrach v. Seifert [G.R. No. L-2659. October 12, 1950.]

Posted by LADY ESQUIRE on JULY 4, 2012

Facts:

The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his
last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate of
E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received
from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June
10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower
court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach,
to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is
fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa
Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in
question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but
to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock
dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.

Issue:

Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.

Held:

The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in
usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be
sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be
held to be income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should
go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be
declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a
serious violation of the law.

Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the
remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The
Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.

Bernardo v. Bataclan G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938

Posted by LADY ESQUIRE on JULY 4, 2012

Facts:

By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about
90 hectares. To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929,
instituted a civil case. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this
Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he
found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former owners,
as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in
the civil case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him a civil case. In this case, plaintiff was
declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled for reimbursement
in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made.

The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is
entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance
with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No.
37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The
said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession
thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When
he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.

Issue:

Whether or not there is good faith.

Held:
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made
in favor of the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects,
the same is affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered

i. IGNACIO VS. HILARIO, G.R. NO. L-175, APRIL 30, 1946

FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29,
1959]BARRERA, J.:

Posted by LADY ESQUIRE on JULY 4, 2012

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May 10, 1957 (a)
declaring the Sheriff’s certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction null and void
unless within 15 days from notice of said order the successful bidders, defendants-appellants spouses
Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang, shall pay to, appellee Maria Gervacio Blas directly or
through the Sheriff of Manila the sum of P5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at
the Sheriff’s sale; (b) declaring the other appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934
undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in the
auction sale is situated; and(c) ordering the sale in public auction of the said undivided interest of
theFilipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in
favor of appellee Blas and against Filipinas Colleges, Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of
P5,750.00mentioned in (a) above. The order appealed from is the result of three motions filed in the
court a quo in the course of the execution of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2
cases appealed to it in which the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blas
were the parties. The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each and all of this motion. In
assailing the order of the court a quo directing the appellants to pay appellee Blas the amount of their
bid (P5,750.00) made atthe public auction, appellants’ counsel has presented a novel, albeit ingenious,
argument. They contend that since the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after
the owners thereof exercised theiroption under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his
right andthe appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto.

ISSUE/S:
1.Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not, what are the remedies left to the
owner of the land if the builder fails to pay?

2.Whether or not the appellants, as owner of the land, may seek recovery of the value of their land by a
writ of execution; levy the house of the builder and sell it in public auction.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS.

There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion
of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded
by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
Although it is true, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land
after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder’s right of retention provided in Article
546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely
all rights over his own building. The remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails
to pay the value of the land, though the Code is silent on this Court, a builder in good faith not be
required to pay rentals. He has right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is
reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.

Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate
the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the builder is
unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the
relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to
the court to fix that amount.

This was ruled in the case of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al ., 97 Phil.,801. A further remedy is indicated in
the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra , where this Court approved the sale of the land and the
improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the
land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof.

The second contention was without merit.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the
payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. With respect to the order of
the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of
its personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the Timbang, this Court likewise finds the same
as justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of
the Timbang spouses to pay to the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order of execution shall issue in favor of Maria
Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses not exempt from execution for
the satisfaction of the said amount.

i. EVADEL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. SPOUSES SORIANO, G.R. NO. 144291, APRIL
20, 2001

VIAJAR v. CA

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream or river.

FACTS:

Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan Iloilo.
Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te. Viajar had lot 7340 relocated
and found out that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She demanded the return but the
latter refused. She instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages. She also impleaded
Te as defedant for the reason that if Ladrido is going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and
plaintiff must be reimbursed. During the trial it was proven that during the cadastral survey in 1926, the
two lots were separated by the Suague River and that a part of the land of Lot 7340 and the old river
bed were in the possession of the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical
possession.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a mention in the case that the
issue from which the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA so the affirmation made by
the CA should be void.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden
2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in relation to the dimunition of the
area of their land because the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be interpreted as applicable
only to unregistered lands)

RULING:

It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its banks yearly
and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of
the river.

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream or river. Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect
of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares.
This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25,
1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto
stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to
be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the courta quoand granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on
Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held:

The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates
are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a
river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to
Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a
sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority."Only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for
the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as
qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

REYNANTE v. CA

FACTS:

More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took
care of the nipa palms which they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was located between the fishpond and
Liputan River. Reynante’s family sold the nipa palms, and appropriated the fruits as his own, without
interference or complaint from Don Carlos.
Upon Don Carlos’ death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a
caretaker of the fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he had built, and he still
took care of the nipa palms, which he continued to sell.

This lead the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against Reynante in
the MTC. The MTC found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where the decision was
reversed. The CA merely affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered land just because the adjoining lot is
registered in the Torrens System?

HELD:

While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does
not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not registered this with
the proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which was what occurred in
this case.

Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than 50 years,
the SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:

Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and issued
an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not
be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The District
Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding that the
subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the
title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land
within the 5-year period?

2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD

1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a
term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and
mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public
Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court
annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became
foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that
said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land
in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

i. PINGOL vs. CA, 226 SCRA 118

GALLAR v. HUSAIN

If the action is brought by the one who is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible;
otherwise, it could prescribe.

FACTS:
Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro Husain sold the land under dispute for 30
pesos to Serapio Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to
his sister, Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to Elias Gallar for
a cattle. Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro
Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who since then has been in possession of the
land. A couple of years after, Gallar filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to
compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of
conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. The
Husains countered by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price thus their father had
already reacquired ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of Elias has already
PRESCRIBED.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not ownership was transferred to Gallar?

2) Whether or not the action has already prescribed?

RULING:

1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of repurchase may be exercised only by the
vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been
transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right,
subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to
dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with Gallar.

2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet
title, to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the
sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in
possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must
be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.

RECAÑA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123850. January 5, 2001

Facts: Lot 6 of Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land of the Land Tenure Administration was sold to
Macario Arboleda, petitioner-spouses’ predecessor in interest. The land was covered by an original
certificate in the name of Arboleda. The city treasurer of Manila auctioned the lot at a public auction
sale due to tax delinquency. Spouses Cirilo and Miguela Montejo sold the property to petitioner-spouses
who refunded the amount equivalent to the delinquent taxes and other expenses entailed. Private
respondents, the other children and heirs of Macarion Arboleda filed for declaration of co-ownership
and partition against petitioner. They asserted that the repurchase by the petitioner of the lot
redounded to their benefit as co-heirs and now as co-owners. Petitioners contended that Section 4 of
R.A. 1597, the law governing the subdivision of the Tondo Foreshore Lands from which the subject
property emanated does not apply to the attendant facts in this case. Instead they instead that it was
Section 78 of P.D. 464 which was applicable.

Issue: Which of the two laws, Section 4 of R.A. 1597 or Section 78 of P.D. 464, should apply in so far as
the redemption period of the subject property is concerned?

Held: A special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law. Repeal of laws should be made clear and express. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless there is an irreconcilable or
repugnancy between Section 4 of R.A. 1597 and Section 78 of P.D. 464. The former law is of special and
exclusive application to lots acquired from the Tondo Foreshore Land only. The latter is a law or decree
of general application. Petitioner’s repurchase of the subject lot within the five-year redemption period
of Section 4 of R.A. 1597 is within the purview of redemption by a co-owner which inures to the benefit
of all the other co-owners of the property.

YU BUN GUAN vs ONG

GR No. 144735, Oct 18, 2001

Panganiban, J.:

FACTS:
Paraphernal property refers to a property over which the wife has complete control.

Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and her children were
abandoned by him in 1992 because of his incurable promiscuity, volcanic temper and other vicious vices.

In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal property) from Aurora Seneris.
Also during their marriage, they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds.

Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale on the Rizal property
on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a commercial building for the benefit of their
children. He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved
for any liability. The consideration for the sale was the execution of an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from the Allied Bank.

However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan, he did not pay the
consideration of 200k, supposedly the “ostensible” valuable consideration.

Because of this, the new title issued in his name was not delivered by Ong. Yu Bun Guan then filed a
petition for Replacement of the TCT , with an affidavit of Loss attached. Ong, on the other hand
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked that the Sale be declared null and void.

The RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since she purchased it with her
personal funds. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lot in question is a paraphernal property and not a part of the absolute community
property?

HELD:

Yes. The property was a paraphernal property because:

1) the title has been issued under her name

2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the title was under her name

3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale
which states that Ong was the “absolute and registered owner”

4) that Ong was the one who paid the real taxes and proved that she has means to do so.

5) a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid is considered null and void.

VELEZ, SR. vs. DEMETRIO, G.R. NO. 128576, AUGUST 13, 2002

OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ v. SPS. CARLOS AND NARCISA TARUN, GR No. 143868, 2002-11-14

Facts:

An 8,209-square meter fishpond... is disputed by [Respondents] Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno, and
[Petitioners] Corazon Cabal vda. de Fernandez and her children Oscar, Gil and Armando, all surnamed
Fernandez.

The brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel Fernandez, together with their uncle Armando, co-
owned this... property to the extent of 1/6 thereof.

It was subsequently increased to 1/5 on account of the 1/6 share of Armando, who died single and
without issue, which accrued in favor of the five remaining co-owners.

Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27 square meters to [the Spouses] Tarun (Exh. I).[5] On
June 18, 1967, Demetria Fernandez, also sold her share on the same fishpond consisting of 547.27
square meters to
[respondents].[6] Thus, the total area sold to [respondents] is 1094.54 square meters, more or less.

co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels of registered land with exchange of shares. Among the parties to
the deed are Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and

Angel, all surnamed Fernandez.

"It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale of a portion of Lot 2991
consisting of 1094.54 square meters previously sold by Antonio and Demetria Fernandez in favor of
[respondents]. This portion was excluded in the partition.

When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the partition of the property and their
share of its income. Angel Fernandez refused to heed their demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez,
[respondents] wrote [petitioners] of their desire for partition but... this was rejected by [petitioners].
Hence, this suit for partition and damages."

Issues:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption.

Ruling:

"Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

We disagree with petitioners.

True, the right to redeem is granted not only to the original co-owners, but also to all those who
subsequently acquire their respective shares while the community subsists.
However, it must be stressed that this right... of redemption is available only when part of the co-owned
property is sold to a third person. Otherwise put, the right to redeem referred to in Article 1620 applies
only when a portion is sold to a non-co-owner.

In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners' co-owners.

By the time petitioners entered into the co-ownership,... respondents were no longer "third persons,"
but had already become co-owners of the whole property. A third person, within the meaning of Article
1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.[

In Basa v. Aguilar,... this Court has unequivocally ruled that the right of redemption may be availed of by
a co-owner, only when the shares of the other owners are sold to a third person. " Legal redemption is
in the nature of a privilege created by... law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit
and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an]
inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It is intended to
minimize... co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when
the shares of the other owners are sold to a 'third person."'

There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere lease

Principles:

It is a long-established doctrine that the law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish
or disastrous agreement they entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of
what they were doing. Courts have no... power to relieve them from obligations they voluntarily
assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.

GAPACAN V. OMIPET, 387 SCRA 383

Issues of property rights can be determined in an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels
of riceland and another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation purposes. He had two
children Maria and Antonio. Antonio left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria
remained, took care of their father and eventually took over the cultivation of the land.

Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that the
property had been transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet (Omipet) making him in effect
the legal owner of the property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacan’s family (Gapacans) had been
occupying and cultivating the property.

Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and cultivate portions of the disputed property.
Gapacans prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to vacate the land and restore
possession to plaintiffs.

Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful owner. RTC
adjudged that Gapacans have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA, declared that the land is
common property of both Omipet and Gapacans and ordered its partition.

Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot declare that the land is common property since
it deviates from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipet’s appeal is mostly factual.

ISSUE: Whether or not property rights can be decided in an action to quiet title?

HELD: Yes.

Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud
on the title to a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v. Exconde, we held that the
property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper
determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper
place, that is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful
enjoyment of the property not only of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the view
of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It goes without saying therefore that the appellate
court in resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to adjudicate on the respective
rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare the same as
common property.

As to Omipet’s appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the trial court that she did not present
sufficient evidence to overcome Gapacan’s better right to possession. SC ultimately ruled that CA was
correct in its determination that the land in dispute is common property and should be partitioned.

CORINTHIAN REALTY, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

394 SCRA 260 (2002)

A co-owner who sells the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners does
not render the sale null and void. The sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale.

A parcel of land situated in Las Pinas is co-owned by Emilio Martin and Matilde Martin (Martins)
together with private respondent Delfin Guinto (Delfin), Teofilo Guinto, Prudencio Guinto and Margarita
Guinto (Guintos) and the heirs of Spouses Tomas de Leon and Francisca Medina (Heirs of de Leon). The
Martins and Guintos entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with Corinthian Realty Inc. (Corinthian).
However, Delfin and the Heirs of de Leon did not affix their signature in the said instrument although
their names appeared therein. Before the execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale, Corinthian paid
several amounts to Martins and Guintos. Corinthian however failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price within ninety (90) days, as stipulated.

The action for specific performance was filed by Corinthian against the Martins and Guintos for not
executing a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) dismissed the complaint
concluding that it was Corinthian who violated the deed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Deed of Conditional Sale was entered
into with the co-owners individually

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the payment of the purchase price is a
suspensive condition to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, hence Petitioner Corinthian cannot
file an action for specific performance

HELD:

First Issue: Deed of Conditional Sale was entered into Individually

A co-owner has the right to sell his undivided share. If he sells the entire property without obtaining the
consent of the other co-owners, the sale is not null and void. Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The transferee gets only what his
transferor would have been entitled to after partition. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. This is because under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common.

This Court does not find any mistake on the part of the appellate court. Indeed, only the pro-indiviso
shares in the property of the co-owners – signatories Martins and Guintos to the deed were affected by
the deed. That Petitioner Corinthian paid specific amounts of money to the co-owners-private
respondents-signatories Martins and Guintos to the deed and even had said -deed notarized inspite of
the absence of the signatures of private respondent Delfin and Heirs bars the claim of petitioner
Corinthian that it dealt with the co-owners of the property collectively.

Second Issue: Payment of the Purchase Price as a Suspensive Condition

Corinthian‘s contention that its obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price within 90 days was
not a condition precedent to the execution by private respondent Martins and Guintos of the Deed of
Absolute Sale is bereft of merit. The deed could not be any clearer on the matter – Petitioner
Corinthian‘s compliance with its obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price was a condition
precedent to the execution by private respondent Martins and Guintos of an absolute sale. Since it
failed to comply with such obligation, the obligation of private respondent Martins and Guintos to
execute a deed of absolute sale had not arisen. Furthermore, where one of the parties to a contract
does not perform the undertaking which he is bound by its terms, he is not entitled to insist upon the
performance of the other party.

HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA and SPOUSES ABALOS

FACTS:

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land was
originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the
Spouses David and Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting as
caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he
owned was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited was sold to the Spouses
ABALOS, here. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not completely (only ¾ of
the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos. The
courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of
the land and so filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in possession of the land
claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof?

RULING/RATIO:

No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include possession. This is
especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an
agricultural tenant. The court says “allegedly” due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the
DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of
the subject land has been laid to rest by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be
resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of
rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of
an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending litigation in the
DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court unless Soriano’s
occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.

b. MAGSINO vs. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 136291, OCT. 17, 2001

c. SPOUSES SABIO vs. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC., G.R. NO. 132709,
SEPT. 4, 2001

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL $ANK V COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 1#5!1 %&'(&r) 1*, !""!

Facts:

Due to S%ouses 8onsods failure to %ay their loan o.ligation in the a*ountof 19!,!!!)!!, P7 
e;traudicially foreclosed the *ortgage at the auction sale of the su. ect real %ro%erty, P7  was
declared the highest .idder) n Dece*.er 91, 1'<1, a certificate of sale was issued in fa or of P7 , and
was registered on=uly 11, 1'<) n =une 93, 1''9, P7  filed an &;-Parte Petition for the ssuanceof
Writ of Possession with the 4/+ of 8a0ati) P7 s re%resentati e testified thatthe foreclosed %ro%erty
is occu%ied .y one &rnesto ustria) ccording to P7 ,8r) ustria was in ited .y the .an0 to a
conference to discuss the ownershi% of the foreclosed lot .ut the latter denied) n ugust 9<, 1''9, the
trial courtgranted P7s %etition and a writ of %ossession was issued on cto.er 9#, 1''9 ) n Dece*.er
11, 1''9, res%ondents &rnesto and Loreto >uintana ustriafiled a 8otion for nter ention and to
4ecall and?or Sto% the &nforce*ent of theWrit of Possession) /he ustrias alleged that they are the
actual occu%ants of thesu.ect lot, which they %ur%ortedly .ought fro* the 8onsods as early as
1'")/hey clai*ed that the foreclosed %ro%erty was enclosed within a concrete fenceand for*ed %art
of their fa*ily co*%ound, and P7 allegedly 0new of this facte en .efore it granted the loan) Due to
the ustrias refusal to acate the%re*ises, the sheriff failed to enforce thechallenged writ)

ssue: /he .asic issue to .e resoled in this case is whether or not an

ex-parte

writ of %ossession issued %ursuant to ct 7o) 3135, as a*ended, can .eenforced against a third %erson
who is in actual %ossession of the foreclosed%ro%erty and who is not in %ri ity with the de.tor?
*ortgagor

6eld:4es%ondents assert that the trial court correctly held that the writ of %ossession can only .e i*
%le*ented against the de.tor?*ortgagor and hissuccessors-in- interest) Since res%ondents ac(uired their
rights as owners of the%ro%erty .y irtue of a sale *ade to the* .y the 8onsods %rior to the
.an0s*ortgage lien, res%ondents can not .e dis%ossessed therefro* without duenotice and hearing,
through the si*%le e;%edient of an

ex-parte

%ossessory writ)/he court agrees with res%ondents) @nder a%%lica.le laws and uris%rudence,they
cannot .e eected fro* the %ro%erty .y *eans of an

ex-parte
writ of %ossession)n the case at .ar, %etitioner P7  ad*itted that as early as 1''!, it wasaware that the
su.ect lot was occu%ied .y the ustrias) $et, instead of .ringingan action in court for the e ect*ent
of res%ondents, it chose to si*%ly file an

ex- parte

%etition for a writ of %ossession %ursuant to its alleged right as %urchaser inthe e;tra- udicial
foreclosure sale) We cannot sanction this %rocedural shortcut)/o enforce the writ against an unwitting
third %arty %ossessor, who too0 no %art inthe foreclosure %roceedings, would .e tanta*ount to the
ta0ing of real %ro%ertywithout the .enefit of %ro%er udicial inter ention) +onse(uently, it was not
a*inisterial duty of the trial court under ct 7o) 3135 to issue a writ of %ossessionfor the ouster of res
%ondents fro* the lot su.ect of this instant case)

Lunod et al vs. Meneses

Torres,

J.

G.R. No. 4223 | August 19, 1908

FACTS

Plaintiifs (Appellees) Nicolas Lunod and 7 others are owners of farmlands on the upper estates near a
lake(Calalaran).

Defendant-Appellant Higno Meneses is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land in Paraanan
adjoiningsaid lake on one side and a river on the other. Paraan is the only outlet of water to the river
from the landsof Lunod et al during rainy season.

In 1901 Meneses converted the land in Paraan to a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo
netprevented the free passage of water through Paraan causing flood and damage of plantations in the
upperestates.

Lunod et al filed a complaint alleging that there exists in favor of their rice fields a statutory easement
formore than 20 years before 1901 and praying that Meneses be ordered to remove the obstructions
thatimpede the passage of water through Paraanan.

TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE

WON Meneses can be permitted to obstruct the flow of waters through his lands.

HELDNO.

But Lunod et al cannot prevent the defendant from building works to prevent his lands against influx of
waters.
RATIO

Where a statutory easement exists between adjoining estates, the owner of the lower lands must
notconstruct any work that may impair or obstruct an easement which consists in receiving the waters
whichnaturally, and without the intervention of man, descend from more elevated lands; neither shall
the ownerof the latter construct any work that may increase the easement.

The Civil Code allows that every owner may enclose his property by means of walls, dikes, fences, or
anyother device, but his right is limited by the easement with which his estate is charged.

Since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt
water;but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands
to the riverduring the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are
flooded, therebyimpairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates; the court advised that it is
perhaps useful andadvantageous to all parties that Meneses be made to build a another dike in addition
to the old dikebetween the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, for the purpose of
preventing the salt watersof the river flooding (at high tide) not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also
the higher ones of Calalaranand its lake.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop
their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the
land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s
Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the
issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in
actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property.
The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by
trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC
denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied
thus this appeal
ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

RULING:

YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the
actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although
the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible
entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to
justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual
or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are
threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the
owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the
property from another person who possesses the land.

EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS

Possession of movable property acquired in GF is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a

receipt.

FACTS:

EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which
was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered to him with the
corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and was then showed
the invoice for the books.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the
police capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.

RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount to
unlawful deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract of sale so the proper remedy is
specific performance)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD: No.

Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she was
showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure
of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when
EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful
taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.
DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession.
Where the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead
pawned it without authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:

Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered
into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring and issued a
receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the latter refused to
comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt
of the pledge and she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by
Melia Sison, the niece of Clarita’s husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador
Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return of
the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the pendency
of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO

It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states
that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current
possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to
inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The
principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps because
of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to
complain if the right of the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:

Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.

> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be
bound.

> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.

Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost or Stolen Goods

(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover the same from
the possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it and it has been obtained by the
latter in good faith at a public sale wherein the former needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.

:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
FACTS:

Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamond-solitaire, and 4
brills. Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house. Luckily, on October 1953 (barely
a year after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena, on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo
De Garcia.

Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it. When the ring
was handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around, she brought her husband
and Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring from, to verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida
examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it
was the very ring that he had sold to the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the
ring, but De Garcia did not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica likewise
refused to deliver the ring.

According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another Miss who in turn
got it from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was nowhere to be found. She
boarded three months at the first buyer’s house but left a week after her landlady bought the ring. The
first buyer did not even know Aling Petring’s last name nor her forwarding address.

De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is equivalent to title.

[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased and at the time
it was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamond-solitaire with a heavier stone.]

The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner, Guevara. Hence,
the present petition.

ISSUE: Who has a better right?

RULING: Guevara (owner)

Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to the general
rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived
thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it
without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a
public sale.

There is no merit in the contention that De Garcia’s possession is in good faith, equivalent to title,
sufficed to defeat the owner’s claim. Possession in good faith does not really amount to title for the
reason that there is a period for acquisitive prescription for movable through “uninterrupted
possession” of 4 years.

FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO,CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO

v.VICTORIA P. CABRAL AND CAG.R. No. L-36789, 25 July 1983

FACTS:

Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of Felipa Cordero andfather of the other petitiones, died on May 17,
1958, andleft several properties. Petitioners took possession of theproperties left by him, among
others is a riceland.However, they found out that a portion of the same waspossessed by Victoria P.
Cabral, Alejandro Berboso andDalmacio Montaos. Petitioners filed a civil case allegingthat Victoria P.
Cabral continued claiming to be the ownerof the land while her co-defendants
continuedrecognizing her as the owner thereof instead of theplaintiffs despite demands to
vacate the property. Theyalso claim that due to respondents' occupancy of
theaforementioned portion of land, petitioners failed torealize a yearly harvest of at least
ten (10) cavanes ofpalay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to
the present. RTC dismissed thecomplaint. On appeal, even though the CA found that thedisputed
piece of land is registered in the name of thepetitioners but because of the supposed oral sale of
thesame to the predecessors of the defendants mentionedby the petitioners on appeal, it affirmed the
judgment ofthe trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery ofthe land.

ISSUES:1. Are the heirs of the registered owner entitled to theland?2. May the respondents
be held liable for reimbursementof fruits received?

RULING:1. YES. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that thedisputed portion of the land is
admittedly part of the landoriginally registered in the name of petitioners’predecessor in
interest. There should be no question thatthat title had become imprescriptible and the
originalregistrant as well as his successors had the right tovindicate their ownership against
anybody else.2. YES. The respondents, by their own admission, are inpossession of the disputed
land. There is no evidencethat they were possessors in bad faith. However, theirgood faith
ceased when they were served with summonsto answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith
fromthe service of the summons they "shall reimburse thefruits received and those which the
legitimate possessorcould have received”.

HEMEDES vs CA Case Digest

HEMEDES vs CA

316 SCRA 347

FACTS: Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions”
conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa
Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or remarriage, the title to the
property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the
DONEE.

Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.

Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.

R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan
even. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new title was
subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was
maintained in the new title.

Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes,
pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband
Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property, when the assessed
value of the property was raised. Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the
time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him. In the cadastral survey, the property was assigned in
the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the
records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.

Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium).
Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who made
constructions therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R & B Insurance sent it a letter
informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference was held between R & B Insurance
and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful owner
of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of R&B.

Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT issued in
favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property alleging that
Dominion was the absolute owner of the land.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.

ISSUE: W/N the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the
subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier
transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition
stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D.
Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer,
having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique D.
Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-
interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present
any certificate of title upon which it relied.

The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his being
designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and in the
records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a certificate of title,
which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and tax receipts, this Court
has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove title to land.

GABOYA V. CUI- Usufruct

FACTS

Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his children became co-owners of the
property. Don Mariano executed a deed authorizing the children to apply for a loan w/ mortgage with a
stipulation reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The children then constructed a building on the
land and collected rent from the lessee thereof. Much later, when Don Mariano died, his estate was
claiming the fruits of the building.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?

RULING: NO.

The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He only owned the rent for the
portion of land occupied by the building; thus, the estate could only claim the rent on that piece of land
and not on the entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the building. (A usufruct on
the land may be separate from the building.

There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent due and owing to the Don
Mariano’s estate is still unliquidated and undetermined. The trial court has the discretion to grant the
debtor (children) a period within which to pay the rental income from the portion of land owned by the
building because the same has not yet been determined. Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the right
to rescind but subject to the period that the court will grant.

VDA DE ALBAR v. CARANDANG, 106 PHIL 855- Usufruct

FACTS:

Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building and
improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised the naked
ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for
life.

During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of Manila, the
building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements that were not
destroyed by the fire.
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time
agreeing to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary
sign the agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to cede
the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on the
other hand the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was extinguished when the building
was destroyed, the right of the usufructory being limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and
the materials, in order that the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary
compromise whereby the naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly rental of
P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was likewise
stipulated in the agreement that the title to the building to be constructed would accrue to the land
upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly
reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the termination of the contract of lease to
determine which of said claims was legally correct.

By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to and
received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due on the
property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or naked
owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real
estate taxes?

HELD:

The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that when the
deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets,
she meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed
the building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable
part of the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in
the Spanish language, the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well.
(Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the
usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land as well, then the usufruct is not deemed
extinguished by the destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is extinguished only by the
total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).

FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to the
wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the
administrator of the property. This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil.,
536, which was litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the
will has been the subject of interpretation.

The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate
taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years previous to the present
litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself
to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties
and the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was
approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real
estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of
the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said agreement, respondent paid all the
taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.

: BACHRACH VS. SIEFERT, G.R. NO. L-2659. OCTOBER 12, 1950

Facts:

The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonaldBachrach, in his
last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed theremainder of his estate. The estate
of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stockof the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received
from the latter 54,000 shares representing50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On
June 10, 1948, Mary McDonaldBachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the
lower court toauthorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E.
M.Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing anddelivering to her
the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, althoughpaid out in the form of stock,
is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her asusufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa
Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased,opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in
question was not income butformed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary
but to theremainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend thata
stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.

Issue:Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.

Held:The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of
theproperty in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The54,000
shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They representprofits, and the delivery
of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to thepayment of said profits. Said shares
may be sold independently of the original shares, justas the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother. If thedividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be
held to be income. Adividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should
go tothe usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividendcan be
declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of thecapital it would be a
serious violation of the law.Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the
capital and belongsto the remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a
corporation, whendeclared as dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the
usufructuary,belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws
thanthe Massachusetts rule.

Bernardo v. Bataclan G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938

Posted by LADY ESQUIRE on JULY 4, 2012

Facts:

By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about
90 hectares. To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929,
instituted a civil case. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this
Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he
found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former owners,
as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in
the civil case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him a civil case. In this case, plaintiff was
declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled for reimbursement
in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made.

The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is
entitled has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance
with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No.
37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. The
said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and continued in possession
thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When
he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.

Issue:

Whether or not there is good faith.

Held:

The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made
in favor of the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects,
the same is affirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered

The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the
purchase price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture of
the situation thus created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to
recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212.

Digest: Damian Ignacio, et. al. vs Elias Hilario, et. al. , G.R. No. L-175 [76 Phil 605] April 30, 1946

Civil Law – Property – Accession Industrial – Builder in Good Faith; Owner in Good Faith

Facts: This is a civil suit between Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres, and Damian, Francisco and Luis,
surnamed Ignacio concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential.
Hilario was the owner of a parcel of land. He later discovered that Ignacio built some buildings therein (a
granary and a house) at the residential portion of the lot. Hon. Alfonso Felix (Lower courts) presided
over and rendered the a judgment holding Hilario as the legal owners of the whole property (owner in
good faith) and conceded to Ignacio the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the
residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith (builder in good faith), in accordance with
article 361 of the Civil Code.

Ruling of Court of First Instance of Pangasinan

(1) Ignacio are the owners of the whole property (transfer certificate of title No. 12872) issued in their
name, and entitled to the possession of the same;

(2) Hilario are entitled to hold the position of the residential lot until after they are paid the actual
market value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless Ignacio prefer to sell them said
residential lot, in which case Hilario shall pay the Ignacio the proportionate value of said residential lot
taking as a basis the price paid for the whole land

(3) That upon Hilario’s failure to purchase the residential lot in question, said defendants shall remove
their houses and granaries after this decision becomes final and within the period of 60 days from the
date that the court is informed in writing of the attitude of the parties in this respect.

No pronouncement is made as to damages and costs.

Parties prayed for order of execution. The current presiding judge is now Hon. Felipe Natividad. Hilario
chose neither to pay Ignacio for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said Ignacio should
be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of
said lot, which was granted by the Court.

Issue: W/N owner in good faith, may eject a builder in good faith without choosing either to appropriate
the building for himself after payment of its value or to sell his land to the builder in good faith.

Ruling: No. The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot dispense the options under the law
and then eject the builder in good faith. This is because both are in good faith.

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity
stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and
the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.

Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land,
upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to
the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building
and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same.

The writ of execution fails to determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they
are erected, as well as the period of time within which Hilario may exercise their option either to pay for
the buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the Ignacio
may pay for the land, these particulars having been left for determination apparently after the judgment
has become final. This is erroneous. The writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad is hereby set aside
and the lower court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case to determine the said particulars.

FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29,
1959]BARRERA, J.:

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Maniladated May 10, 1957 (a)
declaring the Sheriff's certificate of sale covering aschool building sold at public auction null and void
unless within 15 daysfrom notice of said order the successful bidders, defendants-
appellantsspouses Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang, shall pay to, appelleeMaria Gervacio
Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum ofP5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang
had bid for the building at the Sheriff'ssale; (b) declaring the other appellee Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. owner of24,500/3,285,934 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate oftile No 45970,
on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated; and(c) ordering the sale in public auction of the
said undivided interest of theFilipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy the
unpaidportion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against FilipinasColleges, Inc.
in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00mentioned in (a) above. The
order appealed from is the result of threemotions filed in the court a quo in the course of the
execution of a finaljudgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to it in whichthe
spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blaswere the parties. The Timbang
spouses presented their opposition to eachand all of this motion. In assailing the order of the court a
quo directing theappellants to pay appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made atthe public
auction, appellants' counsel has presented a novel, albeitingenious, argument. They contend
that since the builder in good faith hasfailed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof
exercised theiroption under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his right andthe appellants
as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipsofacto.

ISSUE/S:1.Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not, whatare the remedies left to
the owner of the land if the builder fails topay?2.Whether or not the appellants, as owner of
the land, may seekrecovery of the value of their land by a writ of execution; levy thehouse of the
builder and sell it in public auction.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS.

There is nothingin the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify theconclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the valueof the land, when such is demanded by
the land-owner, the latter becomesautomatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
Although it istrue, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to

pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, thebuilder's right of
retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless therewas nothing said that as a consequence
thereof, the builder loses entirely allrights over his own building. The remedy left to the
parties in sucheventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land, though theCode is
silent on this Court, a builder in good faith not be required to payrentals. He has right to retain
the land on which he has built in good faithuntil he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly
he might bemade to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not toappropriate the
improvement and requires the builder in good faithto pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or
unable to paythe land, and then they decide to leave things as they are andassume the
relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagreeas to the amount of rental then they can go to the
court to fix thatamount. This was ruled in the case of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil.,801. A
further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan,supra, where this Court
approved the sale of the land and the improvementin a public auction applying the proceeds thereof
first to the payment of thevalue of the land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of
thehouse in payment thereof. The second contention was without merit. Inthe instant case, the Court of
Appeals has already adjudged that appelleeBlas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price ofthe school building. With respect to the order of the court declaring appelleeFilipinas
Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of itspersonal properties sold at public
auction in favor of the Timbang, this Courtlikewise finds the same as justified, for such amount
represents, in effect, apartial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses topay to
the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 withinfifteen (15) days from notice of the
final judgment, an order of executionshall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all
proper.
VILLA SI VS. GARCIA G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014

Facts: Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-
storey condominium building located Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract
price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an
answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause
of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but
the latter accomplished only 28% of the project.To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a
Motion for Execution. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located Kalayaan Avenue,
Quezon City. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in
which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Garcia. The Spouses Garcia argued
that the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI
and that it could not be levied upon not being owned by the judgment debtor.

Issue: Whether the general rule on accession can be applied in the case at bar

Ruling: While it is a horn-book doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of
the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception. In
cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are
not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual
ownership shall be upheld.

When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it
stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot,
as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

ii. CALDITO vs. OBANDO, G.R. NO. 181596, JAN. 30, 2017

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares.
This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25,
1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto
stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to
be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the courta quoand granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on
Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held:

The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates
are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a
river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to
Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a
sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority."Only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for
the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to
show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as
qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

[DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. C.A]

Facts:

Sometimes in 1979, PR Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stoodfrom
one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, PR
allegedlystopped paying rentals. As a result, petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of CDO.
Adecision was rendered against PR, which decision was affirmed by the RTC of Misamis Oriental,
beforehe died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the Survey plan with a
view ofperfecting his title over the accretion are being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan
could bereleased to the applicant, however it was protested by PR before the Bureau of Land.Upon
investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was recommended that Survey Plan in thename of Antonio
Nazareno who denied the motion, Respondent Director of Land then ordered him tovacate the portion
adjudicated to private respondent be placed in possession thereof.Upon the denial of the late Antonio
Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitionersDesamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia
Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation
by respondent Gillera, report andrecommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario,
order by respondent Ignacioaffirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by
respondent Palad. The RTCdismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which
resulted in the finalityof the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands, On Appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC dismissing the complain.

Issue: W/N the subject land is public land.

Ruling:Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titledproperty,
applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides: To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river
belong the accretion which theygradually receive from the effect of the current of the water.In the case
of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring propertyunder Art. 457 of the
Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites.a. That the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible;b. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea). c. That
the land where takes place is adjacent to the bank of river (or the sea cost).These are called the rules on
alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owner of lands adjoiningthe bank of rivers or stream any
accretion gradually received from the effect of the current ofwaters. Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands,
classified the subject land as an accretion are which wasformed by deposits of sawdust in Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with th…

by Clayde Von Jape Pogado

OCHOA v. MAURO APETA, GR No. 146259, 2007-09-13

Facts:

petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying Lot No. 1580
The lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40624 of the Registry of Deeds of... that
province. They built their houses and apartment building thereon.

Mauro Apeta and Apolonia Almazan, respondents, found that they are the true owners of Lot No. 1580
being occupied by petitioners.

respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)... a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against petitioners

Respondents alleged in the main that they are the lawful owners... of Lot No. 1580 covered by
Certificate of Title No. RT-599 (10731) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.

petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that they are the owners of
Lot No. 1580 as shown by TCT No. T-40624 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.

During the proceedings before the RTC, upon agreement of the parties, the trial judge commissioned
Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a resurvey of the disputed
property.

The result of the resurvey... shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners, was registered in the
name of Margarita Almada, respondents' predecessor-in-interest;... and that the lot covered by TCT No.
T-40624 is not Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioners'...
predecessor-in-interest.

This lot has been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.

the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents

On appeal, the Court of Appeals,... affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

Issues:
Lot No. 1580 belongs to them and that respondents' action is barred by prescription... respondents'
action has been barred by prescription,... considering that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
have built their houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580, should respondents be allowed to take
possession of those improvements?... whether petitioners were builders in good faith.

Ruling:

Petitioners' contention lacks merit.

no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.

Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary successors of the registered owner, because
they step into the shoes of the decedent and are merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in-interest.

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality

It implies... honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry.

The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior
claim and absence of intention... to overreach another.

Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

we are convinced that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were in good faith when they built
their houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580 since they were convinced it was covered by their
TCT No. T-40624.

The following provisions of the Civil Code are relevant:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548,... or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he... shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have... acquired by reason thereof.

Article 548. Expense for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good
faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers
no injury thereby, and if his successors in the possession do not... prefer to refund the amount
expended.

Under the foregoing provisions, the landowner can make a choice - either by appropriating the building
by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle... of accession that
the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. He must choose only one.

Following the above provisions, respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between
appropriating as their own the houses and apartment building constructed thereon by petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest by paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging... petitioners to pay
the price of Lot No. 1580 which is not more than that of the improvements.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

BPI vs. SANCHEZ, G.R. NO. 179518, NOV. 19, 2014

ROBLES v. CA- Action for quieting of title | Free patent

FACTS

Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and
Silvino, their grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvino’s death in 1942, said petitioners
inherited the property and started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-
brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962,
Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering the property and its transfer to
Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax declaration
thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged the property to private
respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said bank acquired by public
bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the
mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as parties-defendant the
Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free patent in favour of spouses
Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs of Silvino
absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer had title to
the property.

ISSUES

(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant
issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is valid

(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid

(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid

HELD

(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as
owners of the subject property.

In this case, the cloud on petitioners’ title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent issued
and the tax declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading to the transfer
of the property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative
insofar as it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have prejudiced the rights
of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate. He must have first repudiated the ownership clearly and
evidently. CA failed to consider the irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No
instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show any transaction between petitioners and
Ballane or even Hilario.
(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilario’s undivided interest is concerned there being co-
ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on
part of bank by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such was
unregistered.

Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land by
virtue of the adverse possession in the concept of owners since.

by Arrah Camillia Quistadio

VILMA QUINTOS v. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, GR No. 210252, 2014-06-25

Facts:

Petitioners Vilma Quintos... and respondents Pelagia Nicolas... are siblings

Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the... owners of the subject property... parcel of
land

Tarlac

By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10) children
ownership over the subject property.

in 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners... the trial court
dismissed the case

For failure of the parties... counsels, to appear despite due notice... respondent siblings instead resorted
to executing a Deed of Adjudication[6] on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the
ten (10) siblings... respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their
co-respondents... the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario
TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios,
covering the 7/10 portion... petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
respondents

They also deny any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated
September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.

petitioners' cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners
offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings.

They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the... property is not entirely
theirs

During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having... filed an action for partition,...
dismissed petitioners' complaint.

subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld by the
trial court... court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and the
defendants-spouses Candelarios.

partition should no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res... judicata, respondent siblings
having already filed a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted by respondents
themselves during pre-trial.

appellate court upheld the finding that petitioners and respondent spouses Candelario co-own the
property, 30-70 in favor of the respondent spouses.

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED PARTITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUBDIVISION
PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69
OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;

Whether or not the respondents' counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata;
and

Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of
the property.

Ruling:

petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim.

Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied
by the fact... that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending
Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.

the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on
the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order...
of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.

However... dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of
a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of
shares yet.

However, d

We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that
even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice,... it
shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can
still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the
respective shares of the co-owners have been... determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no longer
exists.

We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a compromise agreement that
was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners have already been ascertained.

We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a compromise agreement that
was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners have already been ascertained...
with the case at bar wherein the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70
in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein
respondents from praying... for the partition of the property through counterclaim.

Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in
accordance with the Rules of

Court.

Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot
serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the
agreement was a falsity and that petitioners... never took part in preparing the same.

The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of... this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to
divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices.

Principles:

We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a compromise agreement that
was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners have already been ascertained.

i. MAGSANO vs. PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, G.R. NO. 215038, OCT. 17, 2016
Torres v. Lapinid

Facts:

The petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of the sale of real property by respondent in
favor of Lapinid; the recovery of possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of
damages. The petitioners were co-owners, with Jesus, who filed an action for partition of the parcels
of land against petitioners. The judgment was that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly
authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the
co-owners which was later amended to exclude Jesus co-owner but during inspection, it was found
out that Lapinid was occupying a portion the lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus. The
petitioners prayed that the deed of sale to be null and void. Further, the complainants prayed for
payment of rental fees. Jesus said that there was a partition case between him and the petitioners
filed in 1993 involving several parcels of land. Then, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was
entered into between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land. However, he insisted on the
validity of sale since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of the lot.
He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters
conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners. It was ruled that the buyers, including
Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to them by Jesus before
buying the property. A partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but it was
denied. Moreover, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that the compromise
agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid.

Issue:

Whether or not Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of
another person.

Held:

A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he
is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Jesus can validly alienate his co-
owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid validly
obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale.

REY CATEDRILLA v MARIO LAURON696 SCRA 341 GR No 179011 April 15, 2013
Facts:

Petitioner, as a co-owner of a lot, filed with the MTC a Complaint for ejectment against sps Lauron
who occupied a certain lot by mere tolerance of the former and his co-heirs. That despite several
demands for respondents to vacate, the latter still refused to do so and thus continued to unlawfully
withhold such possession. The MTC ruled in favour of plaintiff alleging that the latter is a party who
may bring the suit and as co-owner, petitioneris allowed to bring the action for ejectment under
Sec1 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA,
however, reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled thatthe other heirs should have been
impleaded as co-plaintiffs citing Sec 1, Rule 7 and Sec 7, rule 3 of the Rules of Court;.

Issue: Is the CA correct in ruling that petitioner’s co-heirs should be impleaded as co-plaintiffs?

Ruling: No, a co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Art 487 of
the NCC explicitly provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.Note:
Although the amicable settlement between petitioner’s father and respondent Margie before the
barangay regarding the sale of the lot had the force and effect of final judgment of a court,
respondent’s failure to respond to the change in purchase price constituted non-compliance with
the terms which may be construed as repudiation