G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, 
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the

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 determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of
the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. ( Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice
of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they
are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

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 MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE.  Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d]
as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can
be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one
such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way
in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The

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 recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does.
For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation.
Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's
work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary

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 skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state
is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to
understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-
on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly

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 diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or
makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with
an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring

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 contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs
of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3
and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law,
or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

7|Page
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that
he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise
clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2387 September 10, 1998

CLETO DOCENA, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of
malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.

It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyer on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the
appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-

8|Page
appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.

To raise the required amount complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch
of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of
P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn,
Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter
dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:

I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.

Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance and the Honorable
Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said amount.

I wish to inform you also that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.

We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the appealed case in favor of the
Docena spouses.

After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00, but he thereupon
discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.

When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such undertaking despite repeated
demands from the Docena spouses.

In his answer to the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the Docena
spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from
the Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision
of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the
money was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.

After due investigation and hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing
more) within 1 month from notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.

The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small, but the nature of the transgression
calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Canon 1. xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16. xxx xxx xxx

Canon 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in character that exclusive and
honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana , 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).

It has been said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State
Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to
them. (Agpalo, id.) By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law
profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law
and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his
depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.

9|Page
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to
strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of
the money entrusted to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 4749           January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who,
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br.
224, QC.

Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
(not 257), Parañaque, MM.

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both
with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court
but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 (in SCRA).

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred
to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

10 | P a g e
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid
or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case
was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged:5

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of
the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled
to practice law.

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316
RPC, concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a
limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4
of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an
IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment,
not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in
a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on
the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier
that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in
the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.

xxx     xxx     xxx

11 | P a g e
 The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the
practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter
that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes:  provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members
of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that,
as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that
the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification
from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of
an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the
United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as
that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to
prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the
passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before
the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill , a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so

13 | P a g e
 far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile
Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors,
and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in
patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but
practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent
Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines
before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one
year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual
inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29,
the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents
in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent
was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a
commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's
refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the
Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All
these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve
questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides
that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain
a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final
order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not
the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-
judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any
person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent,
and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a  judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . .
(60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of
said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business
before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions
of said Rules of Practice:

14 | P a g e
 Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on
which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx     xxx     xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and
prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good
moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in
the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized
by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office,
and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other
persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are  possessed of the necessary
qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to
advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution  of their applications or other business
before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude,
either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then
he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While
the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point.
Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications
of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions
of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office,
then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in

15 | P a g e
the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs
duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them
or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in
good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial,
so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.

ADM. CASE NO. 5737             October 25, 2004

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his
neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors;
during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge
Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:

You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.

Thereafter, the respondent said:

Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!

To this the complainant remarked:

"Your Honor, I’m not xxx xxx."

Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer
or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having
appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent
was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered
were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

16 | P a g e
Complainant claims that respondent’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his
duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that
lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said
administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.

In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as
counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
complainant’s illegal practice of law; complainant’s complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able
to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalogthus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
order stating "[i]n today’s hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of which, respondent stated: "Your honor I would like to
manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer," to which complainant
replied: "The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer
was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge
that he is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of
complainant’s temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint
for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: "It is a settled principle in this
jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 540);" in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before
Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for
himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:

In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz’s motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having
satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.

Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated
in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable
Court’s Third Division which stated among others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration
and in reaction to complainant’s actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing
the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant." Respondent
prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent’s averment that the
utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not
relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court.

Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for
his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively,
pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.

Likewise respondent did not refute complainant’s allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice
law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979
docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice
which was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only
abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.

Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainant’s
appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of
Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the
sensitivities of the other party as in this case.

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:

17 | P a g e
 SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision
of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it
is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigator’s report. (Emphasis supplied)

In Teodosio vs. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:

For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the
findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance
that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.2

In this case, the Board of Governors’ resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or
law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless,
where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of
the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. 3 This case
falls within the exception.

We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a
lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002,
noted that complainant is a lawyer.4 Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s
suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It
has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin
at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.5

Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct
litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.

In Maderada vs. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly
as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
[referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a
lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.7

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly.8 Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of judicial forum.9

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his
duties as an officer of the court.

18 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga,  and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."chanrobles virtual law library

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.chanrobles virtual law library

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

19 | P a g e
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly 
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-
a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports,
local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that
the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it
is alright to advertise one's legal services).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and
that it renders legal services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent -
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as
the term medical clinic connotes doctors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of
justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services.
In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal
services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in

20 | P a g e
the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or
not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of
the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know
that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side"
of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains
a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage,"
if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for
a marriage license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from
the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed 
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that
it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

21 | P a g e
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in
the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in
the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on
which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinsonto be handling the fields of law belies
its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation
of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor
can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal rightlimited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical
law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:chanrobles virtual law library

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

22 | P a g e
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P.  Women Lawyers' Circle:chanrobles virtual law library

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While
it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do
not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising,
it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name - The
Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there
are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:chanrobles virtual law library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral
in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the
public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the

23 | P a g e
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for
a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent
is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law - accurate or inaccurate - moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the
law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into
the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved
to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may

24 | P a g e
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-
of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to
the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his
men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:chanrobles virtual law library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:chanrobles virtual law library

Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the
Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A"
and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action
to take.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to
the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation - in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having
any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75
or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might

25 | P a g e
arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that
if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11chanrobles virtual law library

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of
the term, some of which we now take into account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12chanrobles virtual law library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13chanrobles virtual law library

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual law library

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18chanrobles virtual law library

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether
certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:chanrobles virtual law library

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v.  Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

26 | P a g e
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197
A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent,
as advertised, constitute "practice of law."chanrobles virtual law library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20chanrobles virtual law library

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals,
it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations
of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building
along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

27 | P a g e
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also.
They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on.
That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this
were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21chanrobles virtual law library

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual
law library

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23chanrobles virtual law
library

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.  24chanrobles
virtual law library

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of
the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to
practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts
as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26The justification for excluding
from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27chanrobles virtual law library

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals"
or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations
of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants,
Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29chanrobles virtual law library

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30chanrobles virtual law library

28 | P a g e
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33He is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36chanrobles virtual law library

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of
law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to
those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39was held to constitute improper advertising or
solicitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services
or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . .
. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40chanrobles virtual law library

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41chanrobles
virtual law library

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42chanrobles virtual law library

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43chanrobles virtual law library

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44chanrobles virtual law library

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the

29 | P a g e
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said
case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged
for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with
more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our
law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just
like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can
institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

30 | P a g e
A.C. No. 6296 November 22, 2005

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty.
Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a)
Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract
they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled "Sumbong",1 to
Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation
proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos,
appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainant’s objection to respondent’s appearance elicited the
response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to
complainant’s retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-
fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of
the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzo’s counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This
is what complainant said in her complaint: 2

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place
because Lorencito Inos said that [complainant’s brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon …. Afterwards Atty.
Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex "A"

31 | P a g e
6. That on January 12, 2003, … Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the
minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only
her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on
record. She also signed as "saksi" in the minutes ….

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong") sent to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing
herself as "Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family", a copy of the letter is attached as Annex "C" . . . . (Words in bracket added.)

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit,
within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.3

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondent’s
answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.4

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa,  and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a
conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer
appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was
not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003, 5 Commissioner Maala stated that the "charge of complainant has been established by clear
preponderance of evidence" and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession
for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with
the inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,6 a lighter penalty, to
wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in the
Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 19917, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay  proceedings, the parties must appear in person
without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of
kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan pambarangayconciliation
proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable
the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,8 the exception being in cases where minors or
incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate
and confuse issues.9 Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge
tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent.
Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the
barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to
state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she
addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.10

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)11the LGC of 1991
clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either
before the lupon  chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the
prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified.
Doubtless, respondent’s conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan  pambarangay system. What
compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant’s protestation against her continued appearance in the
barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for willful violation
of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

32 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203               June 10, 2003

NELIA A. ZIGA, Complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Nelia A. Ziga against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Daet, Camarines
Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land registration case without permission from the Supreme Court and asking for attorney’s
fees for his legal services.

Nelia Arejola-Ziga and Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue of inheritance, they and eight others
became owners in fee simple of a 19,664 sq. m. land in Calauag, Naga City owned by Fabiana. On January 23, 1995, while
respondent was employed as an attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-heirs, an
application for registration of title of the lot, docketed as Land Registration Case No. 95-142.1

In its decision dated October 25, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City, granted the petition and ordered the
imperfect title of the heirs to the property confirmed and registered in the name of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, flee from liens and
encumbrances of any kind whatsoever.2 Subsequently, a substantial portion of the lot, or 17,894 sq. m., has been agreed to be sold
in favor of the City of Naga, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale.3 The remaining portion of 1,770 sq. m. is subject of a
dispute between the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and Josefina Vda. De Segarra.4

On June 9, 1997, respondent was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. He took his oath on August 1, 1997.

33 | P a g e
Despite his appointment, respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case. On October 31, 1997, he was
requested by the court hearing the land registration case to submit his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as
counsel in the said case.5 This order was reiterated on June 15, 1998.6

On April 6, 1998, respondent Judge wrote the City Mayor of Naga City, insisting (1) that the amounts due under the contract of sale
of the property of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola should be paid by individual checks drawn out in equal proportionate amounts in
favor of each heir, and (2) that his claim for contingent attorney’s fees and agent’s fees be segregated and paid to him in an
amount equivalent to 30% of the gross selling price before any payment is made to the heirs. He further added that unless his
demands are met, no contract for the absolute sale of the property would be finalized.7

In the present complaint, Nelia Arejola Ziga alleges that respondent should be disciplined for appearing before a court as counsel
without securing the permission of the Supreme Court and for asking contingent attorney’s fees and agent’s commission amounting
to 30% of the gross selling price of the property subject of the land registration case.

In his Comment dated August 24, 1998, respondent argues: He does not need to ask permission from the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) or from the Supreme Court since he has every right to appear before the lower court as co-heir. According to him, he has
been appearing in the land registration case as representative of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and not as counsel. Respondent
explained that being one of the heirs of the late Fabiana Arejola, he is a party-litigant and therefore a party-in-interest in the land
registration case. He filed the application for the confirmation of land title in his own behalf and in representation of his co-heirs.
Hence, he had every right to appear and prosecute the case. The permission of the PAO was not required. Respondent further
explains that since he alone actively participated in the case, he has every right to demand contribution from the other heirs who
benefited from his work, to be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the property. He believes that this case was filed to harass
him because of the misspelled name of the complainant in the RTC decision on the registration of land title.8He further claims that
complainant is shown to have a disturbed mind and to be suffering from manic depression.9

Pursuant to the Court’s Resolution on June 30, 1999, the complainant and respondent manifested their willingness to submit the
case for resolution based on the pleadings.10

On October 2, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On August 13, 2001, Executive Judge Jose G. Dy submitted his report recommending that respondent be warned for using
intemperate and unkind language towards complainant. Anent the alleged unauthorized practice of law, Executive Judge Dy opines
that the same is without any basis. He finds that since the complainant did not question the act before the Department of Justice
where PAO is a line agency, and considering that the RTC trying the case did not insist on the inhibition of respondent, the actions
of the latter in appearing on his own behalf and that of his co-heirs in the land registration case is not malicious.

After the investigation report of Executive Judge Dy was noted, the Court, in a Resolution dated May 29, 2002, referred the case to
the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Memorandum dated August 20, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) disagreed with the findings of the Executive
Judge and recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly be
suspended for a period of three months without pay.

The report of OCA reads:

We do not agree with the findings and recommendation of the investigating judge. It must be pointed out that Judge Dy arrived at
his findings and recommendation on the basis only of the records at hand. He did not conduct any investigation but merely
evaluated the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties.

Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically provides that: "No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients." Further, Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: "A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law."

....

Contrary to the findings of the investigating judge, the facts of this case clearly show that respondent Judge Arejola violated the
foregoing rules prohibiting judges from engaging in private law practice.

Records disclose that respondent was appointed to the Judiciary on 9 June 1997. He assumed office on 1 August 1997. Yet, he
still submitted, on 9 June 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration dated 5  June 1998 of an Order of the court in subject land registration
case. Again, on 28 July 1998, Judge Arejola filed a "Manifestation" dated 24 July 1998 in the aforesaid case. Further, he appeared
as counsel in the hearing conducted on 12 August 1998. All this he did without the required permit from the Supreme Court and
despite having been required, in at least two (2) occasions, by then Judge Ernesto A. Miguel, RTC, Br. 23, Naga City, before whom
the case was pending, to secure the necessary permission to appear as counsel.

No less than respondent himself admitted in his comment that he indeed appeared as counsel in the land registration case but
sought to justify his act by alleging that he did so to protect his rights as one of the heirs to the disputed land. He went as far as

34 | P a g e
saying that as such, he need not request permission from the Supreme Court and that it was incorrect for Judge Miguel to require
him to secure a permit to appear as counsel.

Time and again, the Court has imposed sanctions on judges who engage in the practice of law without first securing a permit
therefor. In the case of Judge Arejola, his offense is aggravated by the fact that he stubbornly continued to appear as counsel in the
land registration case despite having been twice required by the court to first apply for permission to do so.

Under Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the offense of engaging in the private practice of a civil
servant’s profession without the necessary authorization is punishable by suspension for six (6) months to one (1) year, for the first
offense.

Also, under Sec. 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious offenses which, under
Sec. 10 of the said Rule, are punishable by, among others, suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary and benefits.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned most respectfully recommends that Judge Ramon A. Arejola, MTC, Daet, Camarines
Norte, be FOUND GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months
without pay.

The findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator are on the main well taken except for the recommended
penalty.

First. As the OCA correctly observed, no hearing was conducted by the Executive Judge when the instant case was referred to him
for investigation, report and recommendation. However, we find that the requirements of due process have been met. Due process
does not mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. A trial-type hearing is not always de rigueur  in
administrative proceedings.11 One may be heard not solely through oral presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings, 12 for as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. 13 In this
case, respondent was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.

Based on the records of this case, he filed his comment to the complaint filed against him and he filed a manifestation stating that
he is willing to submit the instant case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In his comment, he justified his claim for
payment from his co-heirs for his fruitful work. That what he was asking is attorney’s fees can be clearly gleaned from the Notice of
Attorney’s Lien,14 dated March 31, 1997, which he filed before the court hearing the land registration case, wherein he admitted to
being "the attorney of the applicants and their lawful representative." 15 Although the notice was filed before he was appointed
municipal trial judge, he continued his practice of law after his appointment without prior permission from this Court. In his letter,
dated April 6, 1998, respondent Judge insisted on his claim for "attorney’s fees."16

Also, respondent failed to refute the documents submitted by complainant stating that he signed as counsel for the heirs.17 Against
these documentary evidence, the defense of respondent, that he merely participated in the land registration case as a party-litigant
and a co-heir, fails.

Second. The term "practice of law" is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also
includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving advice to clients or persons needing the same, 18 the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions
and special proceedings.19

Based on the records of the instant case, the practice of law exercised by the respondent from the time he was appointed MTC
Judge on June 9, 1997 and took his oath on August 1, 1997 can be enumerated thus:

1. October 21, 1997 - Respondent signed an answer to the petition for relief from judgment filed by Josefina De Segarra.20

2. October 31, 1997 - Respondent appeared for the applicants in the land registration case. He was ordered by RTC
Judge Ernesto Miguel to file his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case.21

3. April 6, 1998 - Respondent wrote a letter to Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, asking for the issuance of individual
checks to the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, and insisting on his claim for attorney’s fees.22

4.June 5, 1998 - Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the order of the RTC directing the suspension of the registration
of the certificate of title in view of the filing by an oppositor of a petition for relief from judgment.23

5.June 15, 1998 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, filing the motion for reconsideration.24

6. July 1, 1998 Respondent requested permission from the Supreme Court, through the Court Administrator, to appear as
counsel in the Land Registration Case No. 95-142 in connection with the Petition for Relief from judgment filed by an
oppositor in said case.25

7. August 12, 1998 - Respondent appeared in the land registration case hearing on the petition for relief from judgment
and on his motion for reconsideration.26

35 | P a g e
 8. January 25, 1999 Respondent wrote Naga City Mayor Sulpicio Roco, requesting that he be paid partial advance
payment of the balance on the sale of the lot. He also admitted in his letter that he is the counsel of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola in the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Petition for Relief from Judgment filed by Josefina Segarra.27

9. February 8, 1999 Respondent signed as authorized representative and as counsel of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola in a
partial compromise agreement with the oppositor, Josefina Cedo Vda. De Segarra, and the City of Naga.28

10. May 20, 1999 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, agreeing to submit pre-trial brief in support of the
motion to treat the petition for relief from judgment as an ordinary action for reconveyance. He was ordered by the court,
through RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla, to submit his permit to appear as counsel in the case.29

11. July 27, 1999 - He signed a pre-trial brief for the heirs of Fabiana Arejola.30

12.October 19, 1999 - RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla ordered respondent disqualified from appearing in the land registration
case in view of the latter’s failure to submit to the court a permit to appear as counsel. All pleadings submitted by him were
not acted upon by the said court by reason of such disqualification.31

His rationalization that he represented the heirs as a co-heir and not as counsel is hair-splitting. The respondent’s act of writing
pleadings and defending the rights of his co-heirs amounts to private practice of law. The tenor of the letters and pleadings, taken
with his acts of appearing, representing and defending the rights of the heirs over the property, show that respondent, as
representative of the heirs, was defending the latter’s rights over the disputed property, and these constituted private practice of
law.

It should be clarified that prohibited "private practice" of a profession is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer.32 It is evident that the instances when respondent appeared and represented his co-heirs are not isolated, thus, constituting
the "private practice" of the law profession as contemplated by law.

Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law or
giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated in Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins members of the
bench to regulate their extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the Code in
particular states:

A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the
practice of any other profession provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of
an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors
to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.33

Third. Respondent failed to obtain a written permission to appear as counsel in the land registration case from the head of the
Department, which is this Court, as required by Rule XVIII, Section 12 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,34 thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided,  That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,  That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case
of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (Emphasis ours)

As a Civil Service employee, he cannot engage in private practice without the written permission from this Court. The public
expects him to devote full time to his judicial work. As a general rule, the appointment or election of an attorney to a government
office disqualifies him from engaging in the private practice of law. The reason for the disqualification is that a public office is a
public trust, and a public officer or employee is obliged not only to perform his duties with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency but also with exclusive fidelity. The disqualification is intended to preserve the public trust in a public
office, avoid conflict of interests or a possibility thereof, assure the people of impartiality in the performance of public functions and
thereby promote the public welfare.35

Also, Section 7 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) prohibits a public
officer from undertaking certain business transactions or doing certain acts which may compromise his position as a public official.
This provision applies to judges. The said section reads in part:

36 | P a g e
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.  - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

(a). . . .

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.  - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:

....

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or by law, Provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;. . .

There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the complaint in behalf of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, he was not yet a
member of the judiciary. He was a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Naga City. He claimed that he was authorized to
engage in practice in behalf of his relatives but presented no documentary authority. The Court takes judicial notice of PAO
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1998, amending Sec. 5, Art. II of the Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1997. It states
thus:

Sec. 5-A. Other Persons Qualified for Assistance. -Immediate members of the family and relatives within the 4th civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of PAO lawyers may avail of his services regardless of qualification under the indigency test, with the
approval of the Regional Director, if the case is within his region or the Chief Public Attorney, if the case is outside of his region and
provided further that the lawyer files a leave of absence on the day of the hearing.

Hence, while PAO lawyers may represent their family and relatives, they are required to get the approval of either the Regional
Director or the Chief Public Attorney. However, considering that respondent filed the application for registration of title in behalf of
his co-heirs in 1995 before he was appointed to the Bench, said circular does not apply to him. Despite this, respondent is not
exculpated from liability.

While respondent insists that he performed the alleged acts of private practice before he joined the judiciary, he failed to mention
that even after he assumed office as a municipal judge on August 1, 1997, he continued to act as counsel for the heirs.

Respondent was twice required by the RTC judge presiding over the land registration case 36 to submit his written authority from the
Supreme Court to appear as counsel, to which he did not comply.

On July 1, 1998, respondent requested the Court Administrator for authority to appear as counsel of his co-heirs, in LRC Case No.
95-142.37 On July 15, 1998, he was required by then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo to furnish the Court with copy of the
pleadings he filed, and to state the date of filing of each, the stage of the proceedings and the background of the
case.38 Unfortunately, however, he did not comply.

The fact that respondent made a request for authority to appear as counsel in the said case is an admission not only that he was
appearing as counsel but also that he was aware that he needed the permission of this Court to do so.

The Court always emphasizes the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and
confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply
the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence,
in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in
both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.39

Under Section 9 (3) of the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which took effect on October 1, 2001, an unauthorized practice
of law of a judge constitutes a less serious charge. Under Section 11, if a judge is guilty of a less serious charge, he may be
imposed either (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

The OCA recommended that respondent should be suspended for a period of 3 months without pay.1âwphi1 Considering that Rule
140 as amended took effect only in 2001 and this is respondent’s first offense40 , in lieu of suspension, we find the imposition of fine
amounting to P10,000.00, just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte LIABLE for illegal
practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Revised Rules of Court, the Revised Civil Service Rules, and Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts or omissions will be dealt with more severely.

37 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents.

Reyes, Lozada and Sabado for petitioner.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession while employed
in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local
Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and
of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

38 | P a g e
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago
City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from
the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and
Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil
cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which
provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCD REGIONAL

DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN SESSIONS, PER

DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel
Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to amend said Memorandum
Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of Circular No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter alia  that "members of
local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep regular office hours."
"They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or the city or municipal council" and that
provincial board members are not even required "to have an office in the provincial building." Consequently, they
are not therefore to required to report daily as other regular government employees do, except when they are
delegated to perform certain administrative functions in the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as
the case may be. For this reason, they may, therefore, be allowed to practice their professions provided that in so
doing an authority . . . first be secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58,
provided, however, that no government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the
practice of their professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as
possible attend regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they were
elected as members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon to
save a life. For this purpose it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions, regular or
special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of lawyers and Sanggunian
sessions can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always be subject to the
restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any profession should be
favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or
municipal mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30, Rollo.)

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and
the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated
in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:

1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated September 10, 1990,
requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein stated, with this information that, as
represented and consistent with law, we interpose no objection thereto, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions.

LUI
S T.
SAN
TOS
Secr
etar
y.

(p. 60, Rollo.)

39 | P a g e
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice
of professions by local elective officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors and All
Concerned.

SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees),
states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials  . . . during their incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept
employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4, 1986, the authority to
grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and to exercise profession, to any
government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry (Department) or agency in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides,  in part, that:

No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without a written

permission from the head of the Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in
the case of those officers . . . whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office should be fixed
by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer
or employee . . . subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems
necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant of permission to the
practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment of local elective officials, to wit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the government in conformity with Sections 141, 171
and 203 of the Local Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to engage in the practice of
their profession and to accept private employment during their incumbency:

3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or engage in private
employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local Government, subject
to existing laws and to the following conditions:

a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
local chief executive concerned to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the officials concerned;

b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in

the pursuit of one's profession or private employment;

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or

engagement in private employment and the official duties of the concerned
official shall arise thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to impose on

each particular case, in the interest of public service. (Emphasis supplied,
pp. 31-32, Rollo.)

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.

40 | P a g e
In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which
provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. (Emphasis
ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed this petition
for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code
(RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:

(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and  quasi-judicial  bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members
who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers,
opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]).

In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a Reply. After deliberating on the
pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and
regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166
SCRA 657). With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are
necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City
Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining
employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice
of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

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Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public
duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some
prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to
relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Resolution             March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;  
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly
known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which
the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of

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only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three
bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to
all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and
II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946     (August) 206 121 18

1946     (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953   2,555     968     284
               TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to
the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

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(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however,
their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions.
Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied,
while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they
could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of
justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions
for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply
argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E.
Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the
U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos
A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member
in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its
author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to
create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the
question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily
consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve,
or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not
find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of
Day (In re  Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original
bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately
declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

44 | P a g e
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of
the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that
State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of
law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office
except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any
power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of
this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and
this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner
in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of
the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it
draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by
the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the
constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we
cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object
of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation,
and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only
subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before
being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination,
together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was
essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object,
and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx     xxx     xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to
the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

45 | P a g e
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the
practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of
this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than
six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our
judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this
matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the
following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far
as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained.
Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial
department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality
of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily
bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the
courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of
determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be
difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and
made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law.
There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with

46 | P a g e
 respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which
the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which
the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19
How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as
this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear
that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine
the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE
725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People
ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon
its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise
of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It
has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such
by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding
their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors,
and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and
are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of
it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise
of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court,
"are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature;
and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

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 Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. — 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law
according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to
grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal,
concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this
Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to
exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority
and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the
need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law
and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to
the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have
existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may
and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good
and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in
the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the
establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the

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practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a
remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have
held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts
of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed
examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of
these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to
the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory
proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier
statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in
that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and
articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word
"may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining
or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in
the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to
the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to
entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the

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 duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain
him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule,
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee
of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re  Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant
license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to
amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28,
1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re  Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall
grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly
organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is
that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the
aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists
at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and
invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons
or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes
the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to
the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession
cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor,
65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of
the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time
are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness
of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one
who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,

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 and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma
is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought,
and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-
648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to
the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and
definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can
not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L.
Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here
all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot
be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our
system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the
application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs.
Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer
of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to
practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That
fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it
would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and
received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten
per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly
violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of
citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to
which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of
all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural
cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only,
and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of
69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and
none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included
because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and
that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the

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Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and
in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by
the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per
cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed
law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the
order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law
attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its
place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other
words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to
apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that
it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have
temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary
to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and
without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits,
are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No.
972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the
Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that
end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of
article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

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Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested
law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting,
we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of
said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval
of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of
the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are
denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of
the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty.
Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
members.
Number of candidates 206      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12      
          73'S 6
          72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85      
Number of candidates who failed 121      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18      
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72      
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who
was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19      
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249      
Number of candidates who failed 228      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43      
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72      
         (By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners:  Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty.

53 | P a g e
 Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon.
Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43      
         70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
         69 per cent 40
         68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409      
Number of candidates who failed 340      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972      
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69      
         (by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the
bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario
Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
Members.
Number of candidates 899      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64      
         71's 29
         70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490      
Number of candidates who failed 409      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11      
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70      
         (by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon.
Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico
Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon,
Members.
Number of candidates 1,218      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55      
Number of candidates who passed 686      
Number of candidates who failed 532      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164      
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74      
         (by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners:  Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio
Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno,
Members.
Number of candidates 1,316      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38      

54 | P a g e
 (The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432      
Number of candidates who failed 894      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26      
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75      
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert,
Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112      
Number of candidates who passed 1,189      
Number of candidates who failed 879      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196      
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75      
August, 1952
Board of Examiners:  Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon.
Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata,
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates 2,738      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163      
Number of candidates who passed 1,705      
Number of candidates who failed 1,033      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426      
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75      
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz,
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates 2,555      
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100      
Number of candidates who passed 1,570      
Number of candidates who failed 986      
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284      
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75      

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar
examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere
motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
. . Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85

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 1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15

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 53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3

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 MRD-102. Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.                  
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85

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 152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45

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 1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
MRP-243. Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3

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 253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65

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 304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75

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 MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95

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 MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8

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 456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP-494. Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing
the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions
for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

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 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.                  
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.                  
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.                  
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo                  
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.                  
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.                  
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.                  
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.                  
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.                  
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.                  
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro                  
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.                  
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.                  
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.                  
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75

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 1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.                  
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino                  
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.                  
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.                  
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration of their
grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions
for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol Crim. Rem. Leg Gen. Av.
. . .
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1

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 25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc Int. Pol Crim. Rem. Leg Gen. Av.
. . .

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6

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 15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not
presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of august
and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since
1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of
the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters,
but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the
average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International
Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per
cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their
general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average
of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has
been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects
which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have
therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed
with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal
before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took
no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70
per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his
next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate
because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time
that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers
only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is
nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only

69 | P a g e
 condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments; but
there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the
object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so
admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who
may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the
last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general
average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around,
and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who
has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office.
In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed
to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such
reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the
discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a
certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the
Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in
order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready,
competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that
a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and
unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat,
that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed
in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically
one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the
law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the
passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally
obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as
prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

70 | P a g e
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71
per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar;  Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations;
and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme
Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of
passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general
averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not
obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such
as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be
under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the
administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a
special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not,
in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in
1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or
could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already
accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following
American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier,
199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws.
Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike.
Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution
does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last
analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain
abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as in
this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

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 (Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of
this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to
Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by
Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law
on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were
candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

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G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times  published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of
the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith,
Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966
Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served

73 | P a g e
on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied
both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on
August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to
the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it
hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113,
printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed
a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is
contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on
grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring
the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon
the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962,
one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal.
Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that
is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to
turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said
reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said
case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November
17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge,"
he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in

74 | P a g e
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in
oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen
unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how
can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou
wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular
case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will
bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word,
DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and
prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to
inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now
that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID
YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it
is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a
marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this
Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we
waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on
your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and
his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

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 The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is
impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We
have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement.
We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us
examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed against this
Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law,
and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought
never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out
effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it
would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al.,  vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for

76 | P a g e
 review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain
the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of
appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the
Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of
this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines
etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a
motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon
the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not).
This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served
upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case
the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963;
citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if
he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may
file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating
rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a
lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by
the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent
danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.

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Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice,
his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence
of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points
out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by
Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for
observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be 
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in
the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits
of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into
the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
— assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the

78 | P a g e
 judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which
brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In  In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN
OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair
trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that
Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to
bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published
a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money."
Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication
by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex
parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice
be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press
the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies,
and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:

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 ... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest
and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are
officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in
their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the
write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying
that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members
it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's
right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him
of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of
this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible
for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and
integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice
and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of
this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in
whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show
a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered
the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them 
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of
the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the
courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts,
who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or
less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too
much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make
out a  prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who
is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the
motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...

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 The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system
and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of
the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly
misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is
the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution
— not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in
respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case
of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the
decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper.
One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It
seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant
that the widow got no undue 
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement
of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice
the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other
justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him
and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor
was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to
his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or
written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does
not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending
by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize,
but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge
in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of
judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained
by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a
cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge
because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel
the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or

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 else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the
latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of
New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the
state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the
attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not
be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and
thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar.
The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to
the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49
Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In  In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a
judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious
attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as
a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation
utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not,
which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to
subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct
which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless
illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

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found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights
of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to
be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted
said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his
belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put
an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to
liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not
merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration
by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court
and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices
of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon,
and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to
the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty
of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this
Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating
the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the
tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import
of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one
which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of
the members — and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a
tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed
in detail.

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Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no
moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the
prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the
rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been
resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is
sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself
and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration
were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if
it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and
actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of
the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In
this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved
himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent
to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit
attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its
officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to
the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his
own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

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The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it
may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his
petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing
his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not
only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused
the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language
used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never
serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice.
Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and
gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is
such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge
is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions.
As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the
imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the
Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it

85 | P a g e
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never
fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it
is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension,
which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is
best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and
ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer
to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade
of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released
this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to
believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior
to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates
concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that
some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades
in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated
by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the
1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5)
bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

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In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated
March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were
also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of,
his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came
on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the
correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission
(pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the
grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of
Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal
Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under
the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-
respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be
gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them
to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian,
examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

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 3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files
I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used
in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its
owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between
Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to
the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting

the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar
Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made
the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law,
confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at
least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and,
after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook
because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in
remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.

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 Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer,
and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar
Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him
even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as
the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was
apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew
the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered
661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of
the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951
Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in

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 Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent
and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%then he would make the general
passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that
he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each
and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in
some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall
that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be
faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request
made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been
apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the
position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed,
herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

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 xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I
was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular
Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade
of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook
of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement
made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one
subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which
I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook
No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have
never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set
of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language
and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we
are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would
copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or
requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which
we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of
the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar
confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners'
decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that
he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought

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 the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la
Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved
failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted
to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not
re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way
back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have
always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object
and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of
P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is
attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-
Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would
contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all
the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything
I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27"
(or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-
Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List
as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970
Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list
as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a)
On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on,
I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from
the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of
the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since
then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at
the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the
notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it
aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the
clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh.
1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later
on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

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 3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I
brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
(47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110,
identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as
Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade
below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left
in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law
under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook
was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law
in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so,
notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in
grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed
of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco
post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent
and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone
to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise:
First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have
been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit
for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences

93 | P a g e
 are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an
unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that
the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the
stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually
the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in
behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and
there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees
and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme
Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian
did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the
said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook
and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might
yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in
five subjects.

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Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in
all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the
mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this
is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was
increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his
failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
— Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing
the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark
and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while
his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for
this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing
average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook
in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before
the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61,
rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark
in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee
for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where
an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected
to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41,
72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the
particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and
passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper  (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the
last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent
Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged
to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

95 | P a g e
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL
FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the
five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from
66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle
the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no
authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects
and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..."
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is
not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of
the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive
cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise
from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to
be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which
under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline
of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

96 | P a g e
 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the
circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted
points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees.
He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz.
But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and
Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the
grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee
in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the
basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation
should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the
Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the
Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying
to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a
man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time
only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47%
TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW
TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political
Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

97 | P a g e
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to
the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination
Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned
for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-
39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which
was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to
him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol.
VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of
respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22,
29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was
officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It
appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover
of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50
bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p.
4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee,
who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it
was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the
borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred
to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the
case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly
re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He
is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in
Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-
Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said
examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

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(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification
grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it
is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a
necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise
of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts
as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to
the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct
of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

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The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already
clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass
the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion
with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And
whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral  
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old
Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the
Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending
— becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the
year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also
of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But
as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the
applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the
Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form
provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that
nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending
in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court
his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971,
he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations
seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious
a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license
issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the
exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the
character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

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Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted
it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity
and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in
this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of
the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of
Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing
of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and
Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question
upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they
did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar
examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive
before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination
Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent
Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent
Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of
Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased
the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the
words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he
would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure . ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61,
rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "...
he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate
this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe
I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with
me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I

101 | P a g e
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-
45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned,
were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own
words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see
also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo;
allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the
said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a
higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to
be given the passing grade of 
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall 
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's
memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that
their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case
and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.

102 | P a g e
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner
Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with
vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971
Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed
away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this
out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during
the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and
possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be
misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act
of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that
examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the
1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the
release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the
official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the
integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence  that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations
in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5,
1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down
payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him
through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he  filed on January
17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00.
In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of
P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement  was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets
and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at
the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In
fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of
her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion,
therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable
under the foregoing circumstances.

103 | P a g e
 On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972  — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed
by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March
2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of
GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the
monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to
pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in
the amount of P64,200.00  (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities  is a 1956 VW  car valued at P5,200.00. That
he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that
no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was
P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and
lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car  worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of
his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the
1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his
property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented
or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board
from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
— 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is
the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator,

104 | P a g e
Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his
educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether
beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and
imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several
benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the
course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p.
49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still
confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of
respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal
Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first
lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal
dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

105 | P a g e
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case
involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

106 | P a g e
 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The
oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to
file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen."
The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of
Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the
Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at
p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing  Op. Nos.
355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official
documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La
Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was

107 | P a g e
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior
to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs.  Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship
under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances,
as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944.
His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he
was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare  is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present
case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly
pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino,
he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse,
29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May
12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where
we held:

108 | P a g e
 We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

109 | P a g e
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, 

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired
his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of
the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that
he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

110 | P a g e
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and
a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is
in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship
pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh
the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as
an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

111 | P a g e
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he
be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September
15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington,
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were
several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay
(Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and
eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the
Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for
the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines
must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to
submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

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1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of
Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were
satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the
Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to
resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

VILLA vs. AMA

EN BANC

Sirs/Mesdames:

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Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 14 2005.

Bar Matter No. 674 (ROMULO M. VILLA vs. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, MICHAEL FREDERICK MUSNGI and CRISANTO SARUCA,
JR., Successful Bar Examinees.)

Before this Court is a Petition filed on April 13, 2005 by Junel Anthony D. Ama, a successful 1992 Bar Examinee, praying that he
be admitted to the Philippine Bar, be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The petitioner, along with other members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity of the Ateneo de Manila School of Law, was implicated and
criminally charged for the death of Jose Leonardo "Lenny" Villa. An Amended Information for serious physical injuries was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 53, against the petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 155211.
Another criminal Information for Homicide, in relation to the death of Villa, was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-38340.

On April 16, 1993, Romulo Villa, the victim's father, filed a petition with the Court praying that the petitioner be disallowed from
taking the Lawyer's Oath and from signing the Roll of Attorneys pending final judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.

Eventually, on February 28, 1996, the MTC rendered its decision and acquitted the petitioner. On the other hand, the RTC, in its
Decision dated November 27, 1993, found the petitioner guilty of homicide through conspiracy.

The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15520. On January 10, 2002 the appellate
court rendered its decision, setting aside the lower court's finding of conspiracy and considered the individual actuation of the
accused. As for herein petitioner, the appellate court found him guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced him to twenty (20) days of arresto menor. He, along with the other accused, was likewise ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity.

Instead of serving the twenty (20) day imprisonment, the petitioner applied for probation [1]cralaw which the RTC of Caloocan City,
Branch 130 granted on October 11, 2002.[2]cralaw

After six (6) months, or on April 10, 2003, the RTC issued its Order[3]cralaw discharging the petitioner on probation, and declared
the case terminated.

Appended to the present petition are various certifications[4]cralaw attesting to the petitioner's moral character.

On May 6, 2005, the petitioner manifested that he made a manifestation in the case entitled People vs. Court of Appeals, et
al,  docketed as G.R. No. 154954, that he is willing to deposit his share of P7,500.00 in the civil indemnity provided in the CA
Decision.

In her Report dated May 10, 2005, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa recommended that
petitioner be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, citing the cases of In Re: Al Argosino[5]cralaw and In
Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.,[6]cralaw both involving bar passers who were convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, but after serving their respective sentences, were nevertheless allowed by the Court to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was also pointed out that in Bar Matter No. 832, the Court allowed Antonio M. Tuliao, convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide (which arose out of the same incident as that of Argosino and Cuevas, Jr.,) to take the Lawyer's
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court agrees with the foregoing recommendation. The crime for which the petitioner was convicted - slight physical injuries - is
after all, a light offense, and cannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of
cruelty, hostility, or revenge; certainly not a crime involving moral turpitude.[7]cralaw

The Court thus resolves to GRANT the petition of Junel Anthony D. Ama. He is hereby allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys upon a showing of proof of having deposited his share in the civil indemnity stated in the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, and upon payment of the required fees.

Tinga, J., no part.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

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A.C. No. 3405

JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a "Petition for Readmission" to the practice of law filed by Dominador M. Narag (Respondent).

On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein
respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) – a
17-year old first year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already abandoned her and their children to
live with Gina. The respondent denied the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were mere
fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her concoct stories against him.

On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the
respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out
that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the legal profession.

A Motion for the Re-opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by
the respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as
he was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no
substantial arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the motion with finality in the Resolution
dated September 22, 1998.

On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has
expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and
their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an
undated affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim.

The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that he has been punished enough. He alleged that
he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating osteo-arthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his
arthritis and his right knee injury.

He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent
likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his petition for readmission.4

"Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice
will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The
Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement."5

The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on account of his having committed a grossly immoral conduct,
i.e., abandoning his wife and children to live with his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more reprehensible than
betraying one’s own family in order to satisfy an irrational and insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent’s act
was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of the noble legal profession.

More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now professes that he had already repented and expressed remorse over
the perfidy that he had brought upon his wife and their children. That such repentance and remorse, the respondent asserts,
together with the long years that he had endured his penalty, is now sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law.

The respondent's pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any substance. The Court, in deciding whether the
respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had
already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the
respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour - the woman for whose sake he abandoned his
family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings.

That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent's
plea.1âwphi1 It is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the forgiveness
bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had

115 | P a g e
likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the
fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.

Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is
quite immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent
from later on executing another last will and testament of a different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession.

In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had already
changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal, profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine
Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at
the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor.  In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.

116 | P a g e
 On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May
2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel
for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance
on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends
that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared
as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted.
Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for
Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14
May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal
counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering
his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao
as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without
being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in

117 | P a g e
matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires
the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private
client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless
had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and
NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista,
Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal
wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos;
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two
children are legitimate, while in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections,
respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared

118 | P a g e
his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts
constituting falsification of public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds
for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally
procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence;
respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent
never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia;
and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected
him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and
were subjected to cross-examination by respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting
openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation, they
produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza.
Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was married to
Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela
Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between
respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally
married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondents
Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to
all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of
Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and
the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong
to warring political parties. It was not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case.
Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not
immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against
him that he decided to file an administrative case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against the open relationship between
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are
both still legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth certificates
of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness
Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just
gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding
respondents immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondents
counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing
Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the
celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent dated March 9, 1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998, [9]Certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela
Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10]and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was stated that
respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his
arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary
evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not
his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted
Resolution was based, read as follows:

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FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence
consisting of their Exhibits A to H.

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted not to
present his evidence anymore because according to him there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the private
complainants. Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the
comment and memorandum submitted, respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated since complainants
are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1 which were offered to show that respondent sired
the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his
cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and
B] particularly in paragraph 2 that Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing
themselves to be husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that respondent has
even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical statements made under oath by
complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As
shown by Exhibit H, a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of
said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings.
The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates
Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine
but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits D
and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said children by respondent
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and
corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de
la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not been
denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility,
hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince
us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will support
the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious
allegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the Commission. As
between the documents and positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so give
weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo
that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent
Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would respondent admit that to
complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la
Fuente who is not respondents wife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, are enough to
convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in
the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181
SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact
even so stated in Exhibit F that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further explanation from
respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a
member to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts
should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through unjust
and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on
the evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character
necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage
in the practice of law.

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 We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and,
hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction.
[12]

Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by
the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and stating therein that
respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. [13] It should be noted that said
publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded
that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they are
motivated by revenge for respondents filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are
so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary
evidence which speak for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an
entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and
are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993,
which provides as follows:

Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.

(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued
except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official proceedings
to determine the identity of the childs parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an
amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it
is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. [15] In People vs. Hipol,
[16]
 we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only
tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department
of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged warrantless
search made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was
married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that
he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:

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. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct
way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a
woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in
mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof
that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and entered in his record as
attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information
and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1370             May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y.
Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986
until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing
dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the
IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of

122 | P a g e
the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment
of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of
the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in
inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by
the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

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As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State,
and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the
amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5161             April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando
S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.

The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T.
Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents
died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:

a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or
less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;

b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and
covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;

c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and
covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

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According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession
to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She
attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima
and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986,
wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting,
knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer
of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for
P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at
that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or
falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated
by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s
sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting
and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the
express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for
P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending
the reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom
when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that
the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even
used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.

In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his
profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.

Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely
profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting
sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was
done in good faith.

The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of
TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente
Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel
Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the
property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order
of reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of
Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.

Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this
administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a
criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.

In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by
their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the
properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four
of the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to
the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was
not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.

On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision.3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.4

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In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San
Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has
sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal
profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH

I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of
law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. 6 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

...

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

...

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member
of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are
the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. 7 There
was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is
the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he declared that the
complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. 8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of
Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law
Miriam.

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted 9 regarding the falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial
Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the
property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that document. 11 Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s
signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of
a public document.12

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Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented 13 such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. 14 He himself, therefore, may
also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs. 15 Notably, he
also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the
first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and
obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon
that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.17 For a
lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.18 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 19 He should not, therefore,
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20 He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any
such unbecoming act or conduct.21

Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No.
5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following
circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who
were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she
has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:

ATTY. TORRES:

Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?

WITNESS:

A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.

Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?

A None, sir.23

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony24 in court, and he never corrected the same despite
full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. 25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony,
he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.26

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had
no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was
executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement
in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title29 and would not, therefore,
know that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of
the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk
of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month. 30 Respondent’s
information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the
letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

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In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of
disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 While the assessment of
what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic,
nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard
the purity and independence of the bar.33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34 Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this
case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore
adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the
respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

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