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22.

TRANSPO FULL CASE (INTERNET)

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989

KAPALARAN BUS LINE, petitioner,

vs.
ANGEL CORONADO, LOPE GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents,

Leopoldo M. Consunto for petitioner.

Danilo S. Cruz for intervenor-appellee.

Conrado Manicad for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Kapalaran Bus Line ("Kapalaran") seeks the reversal or modification of

the Court of Appeals' decision in CA G.R. CV No. 12476 and the absolution of
petitioner from all liability arising from the collision between one of petitioner's
buses and a jeepney owned by respondent Coronado, driven by respondent
Grajera and in which jeepney respondent Shinyo was a passenger.

The facts of this case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are summarized in the trial court's decision and quoted in the Court of
Appeals' own judgment in the following terms:

The accident happened on the National Highway at 10:30 A.M. on August 2, 1982.
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then corning from Pila, Laguna on its way
towards the direction of Sta. Cruz, traversing the old highway. As it reached the
intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated
the intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way
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from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way
towards Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper
of Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with
passengers and can no longer accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL
bus neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they
could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he
decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio
Llamoso admitted that there was another motor vehicle ahead of him.

The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way
as against a feeder road. Another general rule is that the vehicle coming from the
right has the right-of-way over the vehicle coming from the left. The general rules
on right-of-way may be invoked only if both vehicles approach the intersection at
almost the same time. In the case at bar, both roads are national roads. Also, the
KBL bus was still far from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As
testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming
from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he
stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. Behind
Manicad were two vehicles, a car of his client and another car. A Laguna Transit
bus had just entered the town of Pila ahead of Atty. Manicad.

The sketch marked Exhibit 'E' indicates very clearly that the jeepney had already
traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that
the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane
properly belonging to the jeepney. As testified to by Lope Grajera, the KBL bus
ignored the stopped vehicles of Atty. Manicad and the other vehicles behind Atty.
Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection, therefore, causing the
accident.

Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit
'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the
intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which
had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty.
Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about
this time, the KBL bus was approaching the intersection and its driver was
engaged in determining from his conductor if they would still pass through the
town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were already full, he turned his
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attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the
jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus had no more room within
which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of
Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way,
unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was
about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL
bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that the
KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not
stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric
post (pp. 3-4, Decision; pp. 166167, Record). 1

On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense

was offense, filed a complaint for damage to property and physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and Lope
Grajera in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Respondents
answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for damages. A third-party
complaint and/or a complaint for intervention was also filed in the same case
against Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo.

On 15 October 1986, after trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of
private respondents and ordering Kapalaran

(a) to pay Angel Coronado the sum of P40,000.00 as compensation for the totally
wrecked jeepney, plus the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, and

(b) to Dionisio Shinyo the sum of P35,000.00 representing the expenses incurred
by said intervenor for his treatment including his car-hire, the further sum of
P30,000.00 representing the expenses said defendant will incur for his second
operation to remove the intramedulary nail from his femur, the additional sum of
P50,000.00 to serve as moral damages for the pain and suffering inflicted on said
defendant, plus the sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff, may be minded to induce
accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement, and the sum of
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
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From the above judgment, Kapalaran appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing
the trial court's findings on the issue of fault and the award of damages. The
Court of Appeals, on 28 June 1988, affirmed the decision of the trial court but
modified the award of damages by setting aside the grant of exemplary damages
as well as the award of attomey's fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio
Shinyo. 2

This decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us on a Petition for Review, a
motion for reconsideration by Kapalaran having been denied by that court on 13
October 1988.

Kapalaran assails the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court
of Appeals, and insists before this Court that respondent Grajera, driver of the
jeepney, was at fault and not the driver of Kapalaran's bus. It must be
remembered that it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh
evidence presented by the parties all over again and that our jurisdiction is in
principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals. Kapalaran has made no compelling showing of any
misapprehension of facts on the part of the Court of Appeals that would require
us to review and overturn the factual findings of that court. On the contrary,
examination of the record shows that not only are the conclusions of fact of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court on who — the bus driver or the jeepney driver
— had acted negligently and was at fault in the collision of their vehicles, amply
supported by the evidence of record, but also that Kapalaran's bus driver was
grossly negligent and had acted wantonly and in obvious disregard of the
applicable rules on safety on the highway.

Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and
travelling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously
to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the
intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and
proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be
able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had
stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such
preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the
jeepney within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver
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was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a
highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less
than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the
highway, and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall
drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life,
limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to
bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. _1 (a) The driver of a vehicle shall
not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing
another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly
visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding
in the same direction, at any railway grade crossing, or at any intersection of
highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or
unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway
having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the
driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing, upon the
right, another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent 3 a presumption
Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.
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Petitioner's contention that the jeepney should have stopped before entering the
"Y-intersection" because of the possibility that another vehicle behind the cars
which had stopped might not similarly stop and might swerve to the left to
proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious than substantial. It
also offers illustration of the familiar litigation tactic of shifting blame from one's
own shoulders to those of the other party. But the jeepney driver, seeing the cars
closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a stop to
give way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further away and
behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a stop and not seek illegally to
overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into the intersection at an
unsafe speed. 4 Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection
when the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided head on into the jeepney
because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity immediately
before and at the time of overtaking the stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney
within the intersection. It was also the responsibility of the bus driver to see to it,
when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead which had stopped at the intersection,
that the left lane of the road within the intersection and beyond was clear. The
point of impact was on the left side of the intersection (the light lane so far as
concerns the jeepney coming from the opposite side), which was precisely the
lane or side on which the jeepney had a right to be.

Petitioner Kapalaran also assails the award of moral damages against itself, upon
the ground that its own bus driver, third-party defendant, was apparently not
held liable by the trial court . 5 Hence, Kapalaran argues that there was no
justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering that such
liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner "as
mere employer" was not guilty of such negligence or imprudence. 6 This
contention in thoroughly unpersuasive. The patent and gross negligence on the
part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that
Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the
supervision of its bus driver, 7 Where the employer is held liable for damages, it
has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner
Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or
reimbursement from its own driver, 8 it should have appealled from that portion
of the trial court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not "merely
subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his
liability" nor are private respondents compelled frist to proceed against the bus
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driver. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. 9 So far as the
record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of
negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest consideirng Dionisio
Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not
directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

The Court of Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages which the trial
court had granted in order "to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff
[Kapalaran], may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a
sworn statement." The Court of Appeals held that htere was no basis for this
award of exemplary damages, stating that it was not "such a reprehensible act to
try to gather witnesses for one's cause" and that there was no evidence of use of
"presure or influence" to induce the accident victims to perjure themselves While
that might have been so, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlook
another and far more compelling basis for the award of exemplary damages
against petitioner Kapalaran in this case. There is no question that petitioner's bus
driver was grossly and very probably criminally negligent in his reckless disregard
of the rights of other vehicles and their pasangers and of pedestrian as well The
Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the gross negligence and the appalling
disregard of the physical safety and property of others so commonly exhibited
today by the drivers of passanger bussses and similar vehicles on our highways.
The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence
incarrying and transporting their passanger safely "as far as human care and
foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all circumstances." 10 In requiring the highest possible degree of
diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against
them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. 11 While
the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of
course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are
not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully
observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of of their
own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the
owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and
convenient use of our roads and highways. 12 The law seeks to stop and prevent
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the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the
destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the
very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary
damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."
Thus we believe that the award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite
proper, although granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored
but augmented in the present case. The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo
did not file a separate petition for review to set aside that portion of the Court of
Appeals'decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary
damages. It is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved if substantial
justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and should be considered and
decided by this Court even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the
party affected. 13 In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial
justice but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted above, which
impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of exemplary damages was
erroneously deleted and must be restored and brought more nearly to the level
which public policy and substantial justice require.

In much the same vein, we believe that the award by the trial court of P15,000.00
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, deleted by the Court of Appeals, should
similarly be restored, being both authorized by law 14 and demanded by
substantial justice in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, except (1) that the
award of exemplary damages to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased
from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be
restored. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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Footnotes

1 Record, pp. 63-65.

2 Rollo, p. 34.

3 Article 2185, Civil Code.

4 Section 42 (a) of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:

"Sec. 42. Right of way. — 4a) When two vehicles approach or enter an
intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left
shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise
hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at any unlawful speed
shall forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have hereunder."
(Emphasis supplied)

5 The other grounds adduced by Kapalaran in its petition for review of the Court
of Appeals' decision are clearly insubstantial and require no discussion.

6 Petition for Review, p. 15; Rollo, p. 16.

7 Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate court, 148 SCRA 370

(1987); Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979); Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263
(1976).

8 Article 2181, Civil Code.

9 Bienvenido Galisan v. Benito Alday, 154 SCRA 388 (1987); Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. intermediate Appellate Court, 1555 SCRA 713 (1987); Malipol v.
Tan, 55 SCRA 214 (1974).

10 Article 1255, Civil Code.

11 Nucom v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 30 SCAR 69 (1969).

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12 Under Executive Order No. 202, dated 19 June 1987 (83 Official Gazette No. 27,
p. 3122-B [6 July 19871), the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board is authorized, among other things:

"k. To formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce rules and

regulations on land transportation, public utilities, standards of measurements
and/or design and rules and regulations requiring operators of any public land
transportation service to equip, install and provide in their utilities and in their
stations such devices, equipment, facilities and operating procedures and
techniques as may promote safety, protection, comfort and convenience to
persons and property in their charges as well as safety of persons and property
within their areas of operations;

x x x x x x x x x"

(Emphasis supplied)

13 Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 897 (1983); Miguel v.
Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760 (1969); Saura Import and Export Co., Inc. v.
Philippine International Surety Go., Inc., 8 SCRA 148 (1963).

14 Article 2208 (1), (2) and (5), Civil Code.