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The document provides a 3 sentence summary of a 1961 National Security Estimate regarding unidentified flying objects and the potential nuclear threat they pose. It finds that while UFOs present a remote possibility of causing misidentification of aircraft or missiles, leading to a nuclear attack alert, the likelihood is estimated at 20%. It also finds that 6 cases involved retrieval of nuclear materials from UFOs, which could generate panic or suspicions triggering retaliation, but communication between nations makes global nuclear war unlikely. Current detection systems are deemed adequate to avoid nuclear war by mutual desire between the US, allies and USSR.

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215 views4 pages

Kt. C.i: Restricted

The document provides a 3 sentence summary of a 1961 National Security Estimate regarding unidentified flying objects and the potential nuclear threat they pose. It finds that while UFOs present a remote possibility of causing misidentification of aircraft or missiles, leading to a nuclear attack alert, the likelihood is estimated at 20%. It also finds that 6 cases involved retrieval of nuclear materials from UFOs, which could generate panic or suspicions triggering retaliation, but communication between nations makes global nuclear war unlikely. Current detection systems are deemed adequate to avoid nuclear war by mutual desire between the US, allies and USSR.

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SuoTan
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© © All Rights Reserved
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HANDLE AS COMINT ON
"NEEI}-TO-KNOW" BASIS
RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

u.S. INTELU GENCE CO MM UN ITY


AND
MITWELVE OPERATIONS
A SPECIAL NATIO NAL I"ITELLEGE"ICE ESTIMATE

Prepared
By

NSA Scientific Advisory Board


Joint Atomic Energy In telligence
Comm iuee
The Guided i\'lissile and Astronautics
Intell igence Committee
The Scientific Intelligence Com mince

For

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

No. 1-61-E

Critical Aspects of Unide ntified Flyi ng Objects and the Nuclear Threat to the Defense
of the United States and Allies

Completed
On

5 November 1961

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its t'OILf(,1l1S in any m,t1Ull'r [0 iLll I1lw. lllhon7.<"l1
1Jl'1'S01I b proldbileo.l b~' law.
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In pursuant to Presidential National Security Action Memorandum No.
70 and a separate action item levied against the OeI for the production of a
SNiE regarding what information concerning unidentified flying objects
has been coUected and evaluated in the co ntext of nuclear war possibilities.
OCIO 5/ 1 was authori:ed by the USIB and subsequent action was taken bv
the Office of National Estimates. OCIO 5/ 1 also identified guidance fr om
NSC Staff for opinions and reco mm endatio ns of CtA. ~tJT\VEL''''E
consultants o n a wide variety of iss ues. Specific TRs were issued to
NSASAB. JAElC, GMAIC, and SIC by appropriate agencies of th e USAF
to eliminate ambiguity and confusion in the preparation of this SNlE.
Based o n information collected by authorized co ntactS within appropriate
componentS of DO/ a, 0 / 0, FBlS, and lNR, minimal threat warnings arc
considered classified. and as such. were taken at face value.

Contributio ns

Summary reports fro m USAF UFO project files and ('Stimatcs fro m OS I
were provided as a basis fo r evaluating tcchnical challen ges and COMINT
sorting of relevant data . ~QT\VELVE advisory gro u p coo perated in
summari zing th e over all situatio n as it no w stands and assisted in the
preparatio n o f histo rical data. \Vhat foreign intelligence was available [0
LA.Cs were submitted for weapons sy'Stem analysis and useful intce,· ratio n
data was supplied by J NEIC and JROB specialists.

TOP SECRET
UMBRA

EXE)IPr FHO)I AlJTO)l>\TIC RI:Ai 1t:\.DL\"G


DIl n ;')2()(). 10
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
the Defense of t he United States and Allies

In the current political and military situation in which the United States
finds itself in the Cold War effort against the USSR. there is the remote
possibility \\ithin current understanding of the verifiable UFO phenomena
that early warning defense systems could err in the identification of
unidentified aircraft and missiles. This probability is estimated to fall
within a 20% margin for error and could pose possible early attack warnings
(Q be issued \"ithin the JO minute decision window before a OEFCON 2

alert goes into affect. \Ve concur that 2 per cent of UFO cases studied
have caused electrical interference with airborne early detection eq uipm ent
and have caused a confusion and identification factor which could be
attributed to enemy ECM. \Ve believe Soviec capabilities in this area are
of such sophistication that it is possible that simulated UFO detection cou ld
be regarded as an actual attack. \Ve also believe the Soviets have calculated
that U.S. ECM. capabilities are on a level similar to theirs and arc at parody.

There are only SLX cases in which nuclear materials were involved in the
retrieval of unidentified space vehicles of which U.S. intelligence can vouch
for that could present foreseeable problems. The most serious are
contamination. exposure. and coUateral damage inflicted on unsuspecting
elements of the population. The less serio us involve panic and false rumors
of a Soviet sneak anack. It is almost certain that a crashed nuclear
powered UFO on Soviet territory could generate misguided suspicions and
trigger a retaliatory attack on the United States or its allies \\ithin JO
minut es of detection. It is do ubtful that China has a nuclear arrack
capability at the present time and is not seen as a problem area. Nuclear

TOP SECRET
UMBRA
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EXE.\ll']' mO~1 AllfmL'TlC IW..oHADlKG


Dol) ;1200. 10
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
l\~~:~::~,t~ m~jor
centers.
lili~~ data, a full
measure of rocket and deliver enough megaton
weapons to kill 20-50 million Americans in the initial attack and post-strike
fallout could kill anomer 20 million '''ithin 90 days. Added chaos would
result in more deaths straining emergency management resources to their
limit. Our retaliatory capability is estimated to be twice as effective
resulting in 100 million Soviet dead. Fallout projections indicate that
radioactive clo uds could circle the earth ""irhi n nine m onths causing
nuclear sickness in other co untries. Projections calculate hali the earth's
population could die within 18 months. These projections are based on
CIA and DoD postmortem studies and estimated Soviet ground tests
detected in 1958 .

lnrciligence provided by MJTWELVE leads us to believe that such a


scenario is doubdul but remain cautious due to power plant studies n ow
being cond ucted at l.A1'Jl.. which indicate past incidents in the U.S. were
detected through air sampling and ground m onimring stations. \Ve
cannot judge \\;th any degree of predictability what future actions we can
expect from these devices and can only guess as to what p urpose such future
incidents may hold . We remain confident that current detection systems
arc adequate enough and that communications between us. ou r allies and
the Kremlin will function due mutual desire to avoid n uclear war.

TOP SECRET
UMBRA
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EXE~lPl' FRO:\I All fOMATI C H.EGrt-\..J)lXG


I:kJ 0 5200. IO
RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

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