Republic of the Philippines application for Probation, the Court hereby denies said motion and considers the

Court hereby denies said motion and considers the case as closed and terminated.
SUPREME COURT (Rollo, p. 11)
Manila
On February 18, 1982, the petitioner flied a motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 1982 order.
FIRST DIVISION
On February 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion for reconsideration.
G.R. No. L-60151 June 24, 1983 The order stated:

SALVADOR L. BUDLONG, in his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal, City of Tagbilaran, petitioner,  A motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order dated 11 February 1982 having been filed by Asst. City Fiscal
vs. Salvador Budlong, the Court hereby denies said motion on the ground that under Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1257
HONORABLE AQUILES T. APALISOK, in his capacity as Acting City Judge, City Court, Branch II, City of Tagbilaran, amending P.D. No. 968, the Court after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon his
and CAMILIO PUYO Y GALAGAR, respondents. application for probation suspend (sic) the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation. The
prosecution should have asked leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant right before it rendered its
judgment not after for by doing so, would in effect nullify the Order of suspension of the sentence and would
Salvador Budlong for petitioner.
defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law. (Rollo, p. 16)

Alexander Lim for respondents.

The Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal decided to file this petition. On April 14, 1982, we issued a resolution which
reads:

G.R. no. 60151 [Formerly UDK-5358] (Salvador L. Budlong, etc. vs. Hon. Aquiles T. Apalisok, etc., et al.). - Let this
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: case be DOCKETED in this Court. After deliberating on the petition filed in this case; by the petitioner fiscal, the
Court Resolved: (a) to CONSIDER the People of the Philippines as impleaded in this case; and (b) without giving
This petition for certiorari asks for the setting aside of the orders dated February 11, 1982 and February 19, 1982 due course thereto to require the private respondent and the Solicitor General to COMMENT thereon (not to file
issued by the respondent City Court of Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case no. 1838. a motion to dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

In his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal of Tagbilaran, the petitioner filed an information before the The Solicitor General filed his comment as directed. The private respondent, however, decided not to file any
respondent court charging private respondent Camilo Puyon y Galagar with the crime of serious physical injuries comment. In a manifestation dated October 8, 1982, the counsel for accused Camilo Puyo y Galagar stated that
through reckless imprudence. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1838. the private respondent was submitting the matter to the sound discretion of this Court without any comments. In
the light of this manifestation, we have given due course to the petition.

During the scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
Immediately after the plea the respondent judge rendered judgment in open court and sentenced the accused to The petitioner contends:
suffer thirty (30) days of imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was imposed. At this same hearing, the
accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law, as a. THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE, GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EX-PARTE MOTION TO SET CASE FOR
amended. Acting on the manifestation, the respondent court gave the counsel of the accused five (5) days within HEARING WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING THAT THE ACCUSED HAS ALREADY FILED AN APPLICATION FOR
which to file the petition for probation. In the meantime, the accused by recognizance was entrusted to the custody PROBATION.
of a police officer of the Tagbilaran City Integrated National Police.
b. THAT, RESPONDENT JUDGE AGAIN GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE
On February 5, 1982, the petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Set Case for Hearing for the reception of evidence GROUND THAT UNDER SECTION I OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1257, AMENDING SECTION 4 OF PRESIDENTIAL
to prove the civil liability of the accused. (Rollo. Annex "C", Petition, p. 10) DECREE NO. 968, THE COURT AFTER IT SHALL HAVE CONVICTED AND SENTENCED A DEFENDANT AND UPON HIS
APPLICATION FOR PROBATION SUSPENDS THE EXECUTION OF SAID SENTENCE AND PLACE THE DEFENDANT ON
On February 11, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion. The order stated: PROBATION.

An ex-parte motion to set the above entitled case for hearing having been filed by Acting Asst. City Fiscal Salvador c. THAT, RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN IN THE SAME
Budlong, and the Court finding said motion to be filed out of time considering that the accused has already Med an ORDER (Annex 'F') DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION HE OPINED AND HELD THAT "THE
PROSECUTION SHOULD HAVE ASKED LEAVE TO PROVE THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT BEFORE IT
RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT NOT AFTER FOR BY DOING SO WOULD IN EFFECT NULLIFY THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION In Veloso v. Carmona (77 SCRA 450) we had a situation similar to the present case where the accused pleaded
OF THE SENTENCE AND WOULD DEFEAT THE VERY PURPOSE OF THE PROBATION LAW." guilty during the arraignment. The judge rendered a decision in open court and convicted the accused of slight
physical injuries, sentencing him to pay a fine of P25.00 and to suffer public censure but with no adjudication
regarding civil liability. We stated:
The petition is meritorious.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the February 11, 1982 order of the respondent court denying the
motion for hearing on the civil liability of the accused was improper.
It may further be observed that respondent Judge should have made a finding as to the civil liability of the
accused considering the allegation in the complaint that the offended party suffered "contusion with abrasions on
Probation is defined by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law as "a disposition under which a
the left cheek and left axillary fold, which injuries will require medical treatment from 7 to 9 days barring
defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the
complication."
supervision of a probation officer."

and warned and admonished the Judge to be more careful in the performance of his duties in the future.
The "conviction and sentence" clause of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case.
In Morta Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr. (101 SCRA 221) another judge was similarly admonished for the following error:
During the regional seminars on the Probation Law conducted for judges, fiscals, and leaders of the bar, one of the
lecturers stated: We hold that Judge Alvizo overlooked the elementary rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
... The court convicts and sentences the defendant but the execution of the sentence, whether it imposes a term of
reserves his right to institute it separately (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code and sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court).
imprisonment or a fine only, (Sec. 4, PD 968) is suspended (Sec. 4, PD 968) and the defendant is released on
probation. Probation implies that during a period of tune fixed by the court the defendant is provided with
individualized community-based treatment including conditions he is required by the court to fulfills for his After Magayones had pleaded guilty, Judge Alvizo should have set the case for hearing for the reception of the
correction and rehabilitation which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence, and for this offended party's evidence on the civil liability (Veloso vs. Carmona, Adm. Matter No. 502-MJ, June 30, 1977, 77
purpose is placed under the actual supervision and visitation of a probation officer. (Preamble, Secs. 2, 4, 10, 13 and SCRA 450).
14, PD 968) If the defendant violates any of the conditions of his probation, the court may revoke his probation and
order him to serve the sentence originally imposed. (Sec. 15, PD 968) Upon the other hand, if he fulfills the terms
It was alleged in the criminal complaint that the victim suffered injuries which would require medical attendance
and conditions of his probation, he shall be discharged by the court after the period of probation, whereupon the
for a period of seven to ten days and incapacitate him for performing his customary labor for the same period.
case against him shall be deemed terminated. His final discharge shag operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
According to Fidel Morta Sr., his son, the aggrieved party, had to be hospitalized for the treatment of his injuries.
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted. (Sec- 16, PD 968) However, he shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability
resulting from the crime committed by him. [Art. 113, Revised Penal Code]. (Cecilio C. Pe "Petition, Investigation, The civil liability may be claimed in the criminal action even if there is no specific allegation of damages in the
and Grant or Denial of Probation: Their Legal Effects" published in 5 Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complaint or information (Roa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; People
No. 5, pp. 372-376.) vs. Celorico, 67 Phil. 185; People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252)

The extinction and survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter Three, Title Five, Book One of the Revised Penal If under Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues notwithstanding
Code as follows: service of sentence or non-service due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or  any other reason we fail
to see what led the respondent judge to rule that an application for probation should have an opposite effect
insofar as determination of civil liability is concerned. It could not have been delay because the motion was filed
ART. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil Liability established in articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall
on the day after the judgment of conviction was rendered in open court right after the plea of guilty and the
be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
manifestation that the accused was applying for probation.

ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next
It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries the first is the social injury
preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or
the and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence,
compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this
or any other reason.
Court in U.S. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for
the crime committed. It is personal to the victim. Hence, extinguishing such civil liability in the manner followed by As regards the trial court's pronouncement that said motion, if granted, would defeat the very purpose of the
the respondent judge who summarily denied the motion and declared the case "closed and terminated" constitutes Probation Law, suffice it to state that this reasoning is both specious and devoid of merit. Nowhere in the
a violation of the victim's basic constitutional guaranty of due process. Probation Law may the respondent judge's conclusion find source. To be specific, Section 2 of PD 968 bears
restating,
The general rule is that "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the civil liability arising from the
offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or Sec. 2. Purpose. — This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
reserves his right to institute it separately." (Article 100, Revised Penal Code and Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court)
In the instant case, the civil action was more than impliedly instituted because the information specifically alleged
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment.
that there were physical injuries inflicted on the victim which would require medical attendance for a period of forty
(40) days and would incapacitate the victim from performing his customary labor for the same period of time to the
damage and prejudice of the latter and that the same would be "in the amount to be proved during the trial of the (b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to
case." (Information, Annex " A " to petition, Rollo, p. 8). serve a prison sentence; and

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1257 amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law of (c) prevent the commission of offenses.
1976, provides:
The admission of evidence on civil liability, in this case, will not certainly defeat the end and purpose of the
SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law of 1976, is hereby probation law. Its denial would on the other hand, violate the complainant's right to due process. (Rollo, pp. 42-
amended to read as follows: 43)

SEC. 4. Grant of probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted In his keynote, address during the 1977 Regional Seminars on Probation delivered at the Philippine International
and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the Convention Center, President Ferdinand E. Marcos stated:
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best. A year ago, on July 24, 1976, we restored human dignity to those who may have lost it by legal prescription, by
enacting the privilege of probation to adult offenders. This is the decree that we are now studying, 'The Probation
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for probation and he Law of 1976.' So by these steps, we placed ourselves on the side of the liberal thinkers in penology and in law, as
may submit his comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification. well as the humanists in their compassionate attitude not only to prisoners and offenders but to man at large.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary We broke away from the archaic institutional corrections system founded on the blind concepts of retribution
imprisonment in case of insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the and punishment. In their place, we introduced humanitarian concern for the first offender, to distinguish the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be crime from the offender, and to save him from the corrosive effects of imprisonment and the stigma of
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, incarceration.
however, if the application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shag
be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court. All of us subscribe to the philosophy of probation, of rehabilitation, and of compassion. We go along to a certain
extent with the philosophy which is embodied in all of these steps that the community to a certain extent is
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. responsible for crime and its causation, that individuals can change and deserve a second chance, and that it is for
the greater good of society that offenders not be summarily eliminated from productive life but brought back to
its fold in the quickest and least traumatic way possible."
The above provision of the Probation Law clearly provides only for the suspension of the sentence imposed on the
accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is no legal basis
for the respondent court's conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused under the At the same time, the President warned against the multiple probation system or the "revolving door process"
circumstances of the case, "... would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the whereby repeaters or recidivists and dangerous offenders manage to enter the probation system. The President
very purpose of the Probation Law." The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal added:
action. (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; People vs. Sendaydiego, 81
SCRA 120). ... Another weakness is the indiscriminate grant of probation whatever be the crime, whatever be the past
criminal record of the offender, and whatever be the penalty, short of life term and capital sentence. This non-
As for the respondent court's conclusion that the motion to set for hearing the civil liability of the accused, if selectivity of offense, penalty and disregard of prior record permit undue risks which we in the Philippines cannot
granted "... would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law," we agree with the Solicitor General's observation:
afford to take in favor of the rehabilitation of the offender without tilting the balance against the community at the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot with a .45 cal. pistol,
other end of the probation continuum. one CARLOS G. ORO, inflicting upon the latter, mortal gunshot wounds in different parts of his body which were
the cause of this death.2
xxx xxx xxx
After due trial on plea of not guilty, on May 17, 1994, the trial court rendered decision finding accused Police
Inspector Roque G. Galang guilty, as charged, rejecting his claim of self defense. The dispositive portion of the
... The common cause of misunderstanding and lack of coordination among the five pillars of the criminal justice
decision reads:
system in other countries is their failure to involve the judges, the prosecutors, and the practitioners in the
orientation seminars and conferences on probation as a law and as a system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused, Police Inspector Roque Galang, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and prescribed under ART. 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
The instant case provides another weakness continued incomprehension by some of its implementors.
and, with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, their attendance having been off-set by each other,
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of eight (8) years and
Probation has been with us for six (6) years but the statutory concept and objectives, the selection criteria, and its one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of  reclusion
many other aspects, and the prescription for its success appear to elude some judges charged with its temporal, as maximum; (People vs. Raquito Y. Tolentino, G.R. No. 90766, 13 August '90); to pay the heirs of the
implementation. victim, Carlo Oro, the sum of P30,000.00 as damages; plus costs.3

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The respondent court's orders dated February 11, 1982 and February In due time, accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. 4
19, 1982 respectively are hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent court is ordered to set hearings on the civil liability of
the accused.
On November 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification that of the trial
court, as set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
On March 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration. 5
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
Hence, this petition.6
FIRST DIVISION
The Court of Appeals found the following facts:
G.R. No. 128536           January 31, 2000
On November 26, 1992, the town of Alcantara in Romblon was in a festive mood since the provincial meet was
P/INSP. ROQUE G. GALANG, petitioner,  being held, in a cultural program hold "Sayawitan" was scheduled that night.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
That day also happened to be the birthday of Carlos Oro, and, ironically, the day of his demise. As it was his
birthday, Carlos celebrated by going on a drinking spree. At around 7:00 o'clock that evening, Carlos went home,
PARDO, J.: drunk. After a while, he left, never to return again. At around 8:00 o'clock, in front of the house of ex-Governor
Solidum, Carlos figured in an altercation with one Jojo Marcelo. Later on, he similarly had a run-in with one
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 finding petitioner guilty of homicide Dennis Lota, who happened to pass by.
and "appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of
duty as provided under paragraph 1, Article 13 in relation to paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code ", Reports of the altercation reached appellant who, together with policeman Adreo Galin and CAFGU members,
sentencing him to six (6) years of prision correcional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, proceeded to the place. Upon seeing Carlos, appellant drew his gun and pointed it at him, and said: "Carlos, buhe-
to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Oro in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and costs.1âwphi1.nêt i imong baril, ako si Inspector Galang" (Carlos, drop your gun, I am Inspector Galang). Carlos raised his hands,
saying: "Nong Roque, indi ako mag laban" (Nong Roque, I will not fight back). Thereafter, appellant grab the right
Police Inspector Roque G. Galang was originally charged with homicide by information filed with the Regional Trial arm of Carlos and forced him to kneel on the ground with his right hand behind his back still being held by the
Court, Romblon, Odiongan, Branch 82 which reads as follows: appellant. It was in this position when appellant pumped two (2) bullets into Carlos who slumped to the ground.
Appellant ordered his men to get a tricycle to bring Carlos to the hospital. He was pronounced dead upon arrival. 7

That on or about the 26th day of November, 1992, at around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Alcantara, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of homicide, not appreciating his claim of Petitioner was a police officer. Policemen are bound by their duty to protect life, liberty and property. As their
self-defense. position gives them a great deal of advantage in case they decide to turn to the other side of the law, we must be
more exacting and vigilant in order to curtail the wrongful use of force for the better protection of the public.
We deny the petition.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. We, however, set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 16954, promulgated on November 29, 1996. Instead, the Court hereby renders
The rule is well established that factual findings of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court when supported
judgment finding accused Police Inspector Roque G. Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined
by substantial evidence on record and carry more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 8
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
their attendance having been offset by each other, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing him
In this petition, petitioner imputes as errors the Court of Appeals' failure to appreciate his claim of self-defense and to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
its reliance on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Carlos Oro in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), and to pay the costs.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to prove his claim of self-defense. Generally, "the burden
lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused No costs in this instance.1âwphi1.nêt
that he was in fact innocent."9 However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, 10 the
burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence 11 that
SO ORDERED.
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. 12 To escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the
accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance. 13
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must prove the existence of all the following concurrent elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack; and (c) the person defending himself must not have provoked the victim into committing the act of
aggression.14
Footnotes

Petitioner claims that he fired upon Carlos Oro after the latter pointed a gun at him. The physical evidence does not 1 
In CA-G.R. CR No. 16954, promulgated on November 29, 1996, Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili,  ponente, Justices
support this claim. It was impossible for Carlos to be facing petitioner because the bullet's trajectory was
Jorge S. Imperial and Buenaventura J. Guerrero, concurring, Rollo, pp. 20-39.
downward.15 Carlos Oro was in kneeling position when petitioner mercilessly shot him from behind as he was
begging for his life.16
2 
Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-24, at p. 9.
Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was attendant at the initial stage, the same ceased to
3 
exist when Carlos Oro dropped his gun and was forced down on his knees. The threat to petitioner's life was no Rollo, pp. 28-39.
longer attendant. He had no justification for shooting Carlos Oro. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. 17 4 
Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16954.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There can be no self- 5 
Rollo, pp. 41-42.
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.18 In the absence of such element, petitioner's claim of self-defense must fail. 6 
Filed on April 17, 1997, Rollo, pp. 8-26.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in considering in favor of petitioner "the privileged mitigating circumstance of 7 
incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty as provided under paragraph 1, Article 13 in relation to Court of Appeals Decision promulgated on November 29, 1996, Rollo, pp. 28-39, at p. 29.
paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code." This circumstance can not be considered in view of the court's
own finding that the victim was disarmed and in kneeling position when petitioner mercilessly shot him from behind 8 
Valgoson's Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 449 [1998]; Polotan , Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA
as he was begging for his life. "A peace officer is never justified in using necessary force in effecting arrest or in 247 [1998]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 322 [1998]; Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 [1998];
treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be Lagandaon vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330 [1998]; Salao vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493 [1998].
effected otherwise."19
9 
People vs. Lati, 184 SCRA 336, 345 [1990].
10 
People vs. Magaro, 291 SCRA 681 [1998]; People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]. FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused ALBERTO ABREA y Arancon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of MURDER, defined and punishable under Article 248, pars. 1 (treachery) and 5 (evident
11  premeditation), with the special aggravating circumstance of QUASI-RECIDIVISM attendant to his commission of
People vs. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92 [1983]; People vs. Atienza, 116 SCRA 379 [1982]; People vs. Valencia, 133 SCRA
said offense and, conformably with law, the Court sentences said accused, ALBERTO ABREA y Arancon to suffer
82 [1984].
the extreme and maximum penalty of DEATH.
12 
People vs. Sarense, 214 SCRA 780 [1992].
In the brief filed by Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales, counsel de oficio of the accused, it is admitted that the facts are
correctly stated in the decision of the trial court. Copied below are the quoted portions of the decision in the brief
13 
People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 [1998]; People vs. Noay, 296 SCRA 292 [1998]. of the appellant, namely:

14 
People vs. Aguilar, supra; People vs. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384 [1998]. The amended information, signed and filed by Third Assistant City Fiscal Dalmacio M. Tubungbanua on September
2, 1980, alleged:
15 
Findings of Dr. Maximo Reyes (NBI medico legal officer).
xxx xxx xxx
16 
Ibid.
That in the afternoon of August 20, 1980, inside the Zamboanga Del Norte Provincial Jail compound at Sicayab
17 
People vs. Cawaling, supra; People vs. Bitoon, G.R. No. 112451, June 28, 1999, citing People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil Dipolog City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ALBERTO ABREA y
366 [1947]. ARANCON, an escape from the Davao Prison and Penal Farm and under temporary detention at said provincial jail
armed with a hunting knife and with intent to kill a person without justifiable cause, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
18 
People vs. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 [1998]. ANATALIO COCA, a detention prisoner, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wound on the left side of his back,
as a result of which, said ANATALIO COCA died almost instantaneously; that as a result of the death of the victim,
19 
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 edition, Vol. One, p. 205. his heirs suffered the following damages, viz:

1. Indemnity for death of victim ..................... P12,00000

Republic of the Philippines 2. Moral damages.............................................. 5,000.00

SUPREME COURT
Manila 3. Exemplary damages ...................................... 10,000.00

EN BANC 4. Loss of earning capacity ............................ 10,000.00

G.R. No. L-55309 February 22, 1982 CONTRARY TO LAW, with aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, the accused having been previously
convicted in Crim. Case No. 1916 of the crime of Robbery with Homicide in the Court of First Instance of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Zamboanga del Norte, Branch I, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua in a decision promulgated on June 28, 1978.
vs.
ALBERTO ABREA y ARANCON, defendant-appellant. When arraigned on September 2, 1980, duly assisted by Atty. Orlando 0. Barrera, his counsel de oficio, accused
Alberto Abrea y Arancon, entered the plea of GUILTY.

On September 4, 1980, the Court before receiving the evidence of the prosecution, invited the accused to the
ABAD SANTOS, J.: rostrum, asking him if he understands the meaning of his plea of guilt; whether he knows that, by such plea to the
amended information, he may suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. The Court informed accused Abrea that he
can still be allowed to withdraw his previous plea of GUILTY to one of NOT GUILTY if that be his desire. Accused
Automatic review of a death sentence imposed on ALBERTO ABREA y ARANCON by the Court of First Instance of respondent in saying that he is not changing his said plea of guilty, but hastened to ask the Court that he be
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. 2454. More specifically, the sentence reads: accorded leniency in the imposition of the penalty.
The prosecution presented Warlito Caibang, a detention prisoner at the provincial jail; Sofronio S. Peras, Officer-in- — Died at 6:00 P.M., August 20, 1980.
Charge of the Zamboanga del Norte provincial jail; Felizardo Acaylar clerk-in-charge of criminal case, CFI,
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III, and Dr. Luis P. Young, resident physician of the Zamboanga del Norte provincial
Defense witness Quintero's version was that, the victim (Anatalio Coca), and the assailant (Alberto Abrea) had
hospital as its witnesses.
two confrontations during that afternoon, the stabbing incident. The first, according to him, occurred at the jail's
mess hall when victim Coca berated assailant Abrea why the latter, even if already given cooked corn grits, also
Warlito Caibang declared he was in the office of the provincial warden on August 20, 1980 at 5:00 o'clock in the asks raw corn grits ration, to which Abrea retorted, "Who are you to question and felt aggrieved?" Quintero
afternoon, more or less; he actually saw accused Alberto Abrea stab detention prisoner Anatalio Coca from behind noticed Abrea moving out from the mess hall and went to his special cell. The next thing he (Quintero) noticed
while the latter was in the act of receiving his corn grits ration from another detention prisoner, Bertito Bacus at was victim Coca, then an inmate in prison cell No. 1, proceeding to the special cell where accused Abrea was and
said warden's office. Caibang said he was only one (1) fathom from where the victim Coca was, when stabbed by from the outside of the wooden bars of the door, brandished a kitchen knife against herein accused Abrea.
accused Abrea. Unable to enter the special cell victim Coca left Abrea in his cell and went to the direction of the jail's
administrative office. Same defense witness (Quintero) testified he saw accused Abrea following the path of
victim Coca towards the administrative office moments later. The next thing he noticed was the unusual
Sofronio S. Peras, OIC or acting provincial warden, testified he was invited to, and attended a conference at,
movements of the jail guards: It was the stabbing of Coca by Abrea.
television Channel 11, Dipolog City, at the time when accused Abrea stabbed detention prisoner Coca on August 20,
1980 at 5:10 o'clock in the afternoon. After the conference, he went to Pampangueña Restaurant. It was there that
a jail guard, in the person of Jesus Hamac informed him (Peras) of the incident. From the Pampangueña Restaurant, Accused Abrea declared that about two (2) weeks before he stabbed his victim Coca, the latter accosted him for
witness warden Peras said he went direct to the Zamboanga del Norte provincial hospital where the wounded Coca having indulged in a conversation with his (Coca's) woman, a jail inmate, by the name of Regina Penaso. Abrea
was brought for emergency treatment. Peras declared the injured Coca can no longer make responses to his explained he was never intending to disaffect the attention of Regina Penaso on Anatalio Coca. He asked
questions because said victim was already hovering between life and death. Same witness (Peras) declared forgiveness from the latter, promising not to converse anymore with the woman.
detention prisoner Anatalio Coca expired at 6:10 o'clock in the early evening of August 20, 1980, by reason of the
fatal stab on his back by accused Alberto Abrea.
Abrea corroborated the testimony of defense witness Quintero, in that he (Abrea) and victim Coca were having
an oral confrontation at the jail's mess hall in the afternoon of August 20, 1980 concerning Coca's disapproval of
Warden Peras said he conducted an investigation of the incident, after which he prepared and submitted a Spot Abrea's practice in asking cooked corn grits, as well as raw corn grits for a single meal ration. Abrea also
Report (Exhibit A), to the Provincial Governor. The other prosecution exhibits Identified by warden Peras: confirmed that Coca went to his special cell brandishing a kitchen knife. When the latter went to the direction of
the warden's office, he followed him there and stabbed Coca. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1-4.)
— Handwritten letter in two (2) pages (Exhibits B, B-1) of accused Alberto Abrea, dated August 22, 1980, addressed
to 'Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Ministry of Justice, Malacanang Palace, Metro Manila; Exhibit BB, the English translation The trial judge faithfully followed the prescribed procedure in capital cases where the accused pleaded guilty —
of said letter. which is to require the prosecution to present evidence so as to substantiate the allegations in the information
and thus guard against improvident admissions of guilt.
— Official letter of 1st Lieut. Lorenzo N. Presas, Commanding Officer, 463rd PC Company, Sicayab Dipolog City,
dated August 4, 1980 (Exhibit C), addressed to the Officer-in-Charge , Provincial Jail, Sicayab same city formally We have gone over the record of the case and the facts are indeed as stated by the court a quo and admitted by
turning over to the latter the living body of 'escapee Alberto Abrea, Prisoner No. 106304 who allegedly escaped the counsel for the appellant.
from Davao Prison and Penal Farm on July 4, 1980 ... re-arrested by elements of the Manukan Integrated National
Police on August 3, 1980 ... for safe keeping.
In the session of September 4, 1980, the following took place in respect of the plea of guilty made by the accused:

— Copy of a radiogram from the Superintendent, Davao Penal Colony (Exhibit D) that "Alfredo Abrea confirmed
COURT: —
escape this prison request turn over San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm Zamboanga City," addressed to the
Commanding Officer, 463rd PC Company, Dipolog City.
Let the accused come here.
Dr. Luis P. Young, a resident physician of the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital, Dipolog City, Identified the
Certificate of Death of prisoner-victim Anatalio Coca (Exhibit F), and living Report Case No. 0-00-88 (Exhibit COURT: —
I, Medical Certificate). The latter contains the following findings:
(to the accused)
— Vital sign — B.P. 0/0 Pulse rate 0 on arrival;
Q Last Tuesday, September 2, 1980, you were arraigned. Do you remember that?
— Stabbed wound 3 cm. in length penetrating located at the level of the left nipple ventral side 10 cm. lateral to the
spinal cord; A I remember that.
Q And do you remember also that, before the Court asked you whether you would plead guilty or not, you were A Yes, sir.
asked whether you understood the amended information which was read to you?
Q Where were you at that time?
A I remember that also.
A I was in the office of the Provincial Warden.
Q And then when you were asked what your plea would be your answer was "guilty"?
Q You remember what happened that afternoon, at about 5:00 o'clock, of August 20, 1980, within the compound
A Yes. of the Provincial Jail of Zamboanga del Norte?

Q And you still confirm that plea? A Yes, sir. Anatalio Coca was stabbed.

A I confirm that. Q Who stabbed Anatalio Coca?

Q The Court will still allow you to withdraw your plea of guilty if you have changed your mind. Your plea of guilty A Alberto Abrea.
made on September 2, 1980 might not have been understood by you as to its significance.
Q This Anatalio Coca, where is he now?
A I will not change that plea.
A He is already dead.
Q But the Court still will ask you again. Do you understand that your plea will mean the heaviest penalty to be
imposed upon you for committing the act?
Q And because he was stabbed by Alberto Abrea?

A I would like to request that the penalty to be imposed upon me be lighter.

A Yes, sir.

Q It is not the Judge that will impose your penalty. It is the law. And because of your plea, to give you the last
Q Have you seen when Abrea, Alberto Abrea, stabbed Anatalio Coca?
chance, you should understand that your said plea of guilty may mean imposition upon you of a death penalty.

A Yes, sir.
A I would just like to request that, if possible, the penalty to be imposed upon me would be lighter. That is my wish.

Q What was Anatalio Coca then doing at the time he was stabbed by Alberto Abrea?
Q But the Court tells you now that it is very possible that you will be given death penalty. You will still not enter the
plea of not guilty?
A He was receiving his corn grits ration.
A I still enter the plea of guilty.
Q Who was then giving the ration to Coca at that time?
COURT: —
A Bacus.
Alright You take him to his seat. Evidence for the prosecution in this case. (tsn, Hamoy, pp. 2- 3.)
Q That Bacus, is he a guard or another prisoner?
Warlito Caipang, 19 years old and a detention prisoner at the Provincial Jail of Zamboanga del Norte, was an
eyewitness to the killing. His testimony reads in part: A A prisoner.

Q You remember where you were on Wednesday, August 20, 1980, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon? Q You mean to say that it is the policy of the Provincial Jail to give rations to inmates in the jail?
A Yes, sir. Q In other words, Coca, when stabbed by Abrea, was not aware that Abrea was at his back?

Q You mean to say that Anatalio Coca was in the act of receiving ration when Alberto Abrea stabbed him? ATTY. BARRERA: —

A Yes, sir. We object, Your Honor. The witness would be incompetent to answer that.

Q How far were you at the time of the stabbing of Anatalio Coca? COURT: —

A More or less, one fathom. Reform it.

Q Where were you at the time when Coca was in the act of receiving ration? FISCAL TUBUNG BANUA: —

A I was near. (to the witness)

Q At the left side, right side, back or front of him, of Coca? Q Did Coca notice that Abrea was proceeding towards him?

A I was on the right side of Coca. A No, sir.

Q When Abrea stabbed Coca, was there an altercation before the stabbing or there was none? Q When he was stabbed at the back, what happened to Coca ?

A None. A He stood up.

Q Before Abrea hit Coca, did you see Abrea proceeding to the place where Coca was? Q When he stood up, what did he do?

A Yes, sir. A He walked and sat on a bench.

Q On what part of the body was Coca hit? Q Was he not able to fight back at Abrea ?

A On his back, left portion, A No, sir.

Q How many times did Abrea stab Coca ? Q After stabbing Coca, what did Abrea do?

A Only once. A He ran away.

Q That was the position of Coca while being stabbed by Abrea ? Q Did Coca run after Abrea when Abrea ran away?

A He was bending. A No, sir.

Q Was he facing Abrea at the time when he was stabbed at the left side of his back? Q After he stood up, what did Coca do then ?

A His back was facing Alberto Abrea. A He sat down.

Q After sitting down, what happened? A Yes, sir.

A A guard of the jail approached him. Q When he arrived what did Anatalio Coca do?

Q And he remained sitting all the time when the guard was approaching him? A He challenged me to a fight.

A Yes, sir. Q How did he challenge you?

Q How long had he been sitting ? A He told me he was not afraid of me. In fact he has nothing to fear because he has stayed at Muntinlupa for
fourteen years.
A For quite a period of time.
Q What did you tell him?
Q After sitting down, what did he do or what happened?
A I did not say anything.
A After that, he died.
Q You did not also do anything?
(tsn, Hamoy, pp. 4-6.)
A None.
The appellant testified that he was at the Provincial Jail of Zamboanga del Norte because he escaped from the
Davao Penal Colony on July 4, 1980; that he had known Anatalio Coca in the provincial jail and with whom he had Q And what else did Anatalio Coca do while he was facing you?
arguments because Coca accused him of grabbing Coca's common-law wife who was also an inmate at the
provincial jail and also because of their food rations; that Coca was well-built and a bully; and that because of their
A He pulled out his hunting knife and thrust it against the door and at the same time pulled the door, and one of
differences he decided to stab Coca with a hunting knife which he had buried near the jail's kitchen.
the stakes was broken.

The evidence on record is sufficiently convincing to show that the appellant is indeed guilty of murder qualified by
Q When he pulled the door Coca was intending to enter your cell ?
treachery. He stabbed his victim from behind and the attack was sudden and unexpected.

A Yes, sir.
Counsel de oficio asserts, however, in the lone assignment of error that "the lower court erred in imposing the
death penalty on the accused." He claims that there was no evident premeditation and he is right for there is
nothing in the record which We have examined to show when the plan to kill the victim was hatched. The following Q What was the mood of Coca at this time?
testimony of the appellant is revealing:
A He was mad at me. Maybe he wanted to kill me.
Q While you were in the special cell what happened?
Q And after striking the knife to the wooden bar of the special cell and forcibly pulling the door of that cell, what
A I closed the door of the special cell and Anatalio Coca arrived. else did Coca do?

Q How did you close the door of the special cell ? A No more because I told him that I'll not fight with him.

A There is a wire inside attached to the door which I have to tie with a nail. Q After that where did Coca go?

Q Have you finished closing the door when Anatalio Coca arrived ? A He went to the office.
Q What did you do? (tsn, Bantilan, pp. 71-73.)

A I opened the door of my cell. I went outside bringing with me my hunting knife inside my bag. The Solicitor General argues that when the appellant pleaded guilty he admitted the material allegations in the
information including the circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime and consequently he can not
now disclaim that he committed the crime without evident premeditation. We do not agree. The precise purpose
Q How were you able to carry that hunting knife in your bag to the provincial jail?
of the automatic review in capital cases is to open the entire record for scrutiny so that a human life will not be
lost thru a miscarriage of justice by misappreciation of the evidence.
A That was my old hunting knife. When I was first incarcerated in the provincial jail I buried that hunting knife near
the kitchen of the provincial jail.
But the absence of evident premeditation cannot alter the imposition of the death penalty. For the appellant is a
quasi-recidivist and Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code mandates the imposition of "the maximum period of
Q What was your purpose of bringing that hunting knife inside the provincial jail? the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." According to Article 248 of the same code, murder is
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Hence, notwithstanding the mitigating
A For my own self defense. circumstance of the plea of guilty in the appellant's favor, the correct penalty is still death. (People vs. Alicia, G.R.
No. L-38176, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 227; People vs. Majuri G. R. No. 38833, March 12, 1980, 96 SCRA 472.)

Q After that, when you followed Coca, were you able to overtake him?
Judge Simplicio M. Apalisok who imposed the death sentence on the appellant added the following:

A Yes, I was able to overtake him while he was trying to receive the uncooked rice.
From the facts and circumstances gathered during the trial and, from the documentary evidence presented by
both the prosecution and the defense, the following were brought to the attention of the Court:
COURT: —

— The letter complaint of accused Abrea addressed to Minister Enrile attributed lack of strict enforcement of
Q Rice or corn grits ? prison rules and regulations by provincial jail authorities. As a citizen, accused Abrea is entitled to express his
redress of grievances If he suffered any discrimination, it is not only his duty, but his right to ventilate his
A Corn grits. grievances to the authorities;

ATTY. BARRERA: — — Inmate/victim Anatalio Coca was a pain in the neck to the rest of the inmates in the Provincial Jail, behaving as
if he can dominate prison guards by violating prison rules and regulations by lodging in an outside cottage with a
lady detainee, Regina Penaso;
Q You want to tell this Honorable Court there was very little interval of time from the time Cora left your special cell
and you followed him?
— Inmate/victim Coca had previously been sentenced to five (5) death penalties in G.R. No. L- 30491, prom. Jan.
21, 1972; according to the latest criminal information against him (Criminal Case No. 1967, CFI, Branch III), he is
A Yes, sir. charged of the offense of Robbery with Rape and Less Serious Physical Injuries 'with aggravating circumstance of
three (3) recidivisms. (Information, Exhibit H, Criminal Case No. 1967, dated March 3, 1978).
Q You did not have any time to think before you followed Coca when he left?
TRUE IT IS, the inmate-victim Anatalio Coca's notoriety and propensity of committing bloody and rapacious
A No more. offenses clearly makes him a continuing terror to, and danger against, society. Incorregibly atrocious as he is, it is
not incumbent upon accused-inmate-assailant Alberto Abrea to snuff his life.
Q Why did you follow Coca ?
The penalty of DEATH now being willed by the Court against assailant Abrea comes to the fore, coincidentally
when modern penologists have different schools of thought regarding death penalties. The present-day
A I decided to stab him.
discussion of penologists and other learned men, pro and con on the imposition of death penalty, taken together
to the factual circumstance that inmate-victim Anatalio Coca was himself brutal, notoriously perverse and a clear
Q When did you decide to stab him? danger to society, this Court with bated breath, has to recommend, as it hereby RECOMMENDS to the Chief
Executive of the land, the granting of an executive clemency to herein accused ALBERTO ABREA y Arancon by the
A After that incident. commutation of the herein death conviction to LIFE IMPRISONMENT:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding the appellant guilty of murder is hereby affirmed but for lack In another Information, bearing the same date and signed also by Prosecutor Nazareno, appellant was charged
of the required number of votes the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; the judgment in respect of with frustrated murder as follows:
the civil indemnity and costs is likewise affirmed. No costs.
"That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
SO ORDERED. Mindanao, Municipality of Malabuyoc, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike and hit Severina Macion with the use of an iron
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-
bar, thereby hitting the victim on her hand and the back portion of her head, thus performing all the acts of
Herrera, Ericta, Plana and Escolin JJ., concur.
execution which would have produced the crime of [m]urder, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of a cause independent of his will, that is: by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to the victim which prevented her death."3

THIRD DIVISION Assisted by Atty. Gines Abellana, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned on October 10,
1995.4
G.R. No. 130941               August 3, 2000
The two cases were tried jointly. In view of the claim of self-defense, the parties agreed that the defense would,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  as it did, present its evidence ahead of the prosecution. After trial in due course, the court  a quo rendered its 26-
vs. page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PONCIANO AGLIPA, accused-appellant.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered convicting the accused
DECISION Ponciano Aglipa of the crimes of [m]urder and [f]rustrated [m]urder and accordingly, he is hereby punished to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the crime of [m]urder and the penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum in the crime of [f]rustrated [m]urder.
PANGANIBAN, J.: The accused is further directed to indemnify private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of
Solano Macion and the sum of P2,000.00 for the injuries private complainant Severina Macion sustained." 5
The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear and convincing evidence, must
establish all the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of Hence, this appeal.6
the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense. Upon failure to establish these requisites, conviction is inevitable because the accused, by setting up
self-defense, admits being the author of the killing. The Facts

The Case Prosecution’s Version

Ponciano Aglipa appeals the July 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18), finding him In its Brief,7 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise: 8
guilty of murder and frustrated murder.
"In the early afternoon of April 24, 1995, Severina Macion was at home in Barangay Mindanao, Malabuyoc, Cebu,
In an Information dated August 30, 1995, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Benedicto C. Nazareno charged appellant with when her son, Erick, informed her that their goats had eaten the corn plants of the Aglipas. Severina told Erick
murder allegedly committed as follows: that they would report the matter to the Barangay Captain as soon as his father would arrive (TSN, pp. 3-4, April
15, 1996).

"That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
Mindanao, Municipality of Malabuyoc, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable "Later, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Severina’s husband, Solano Macion, arrived. The couple went to
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then the house of the Barangay Captain, Nemesio Pielago. When they arrived there, they found that the Barangay
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike and hit Solano Macion with the use of an iron bar, Captain was not at home. They, however, decided to wait for him for a while. As they waited for the Barangay
thereby hitting the victim at the back of his head which caused his instantaneous death."2 Captain, appellant Ponciano Aglipa suddenly appeared and stood on the road in front of the Barangay Captain’s
house. Appellant shouted at Solano challenging him to a ‘buno’ (fight to the death). Solano answered saying he
was not afraid of him. Severina advised her husband not to mind appellant so as to avoid trouble. Solano ignored
appellant’s challenge. Appellant, however, kept on shouting at Solano and challenging him to a fight. Severina 3) Incision – 2 cm. Forehead.
confronted appellant asking him why he followed them, kept on challenging Solano to a fight, and looked for
trouble. Appellant was pacified by the wife of the Barangay Captain who admonished him to leave. To avert any
4) Laceration ( R ) thumb.
fight, Severina pulled Solano inside the house of the Barangay Captain. Appellant then went home (TSN, pp. 4-7,
April 15, 1996; TSN, p. 8, February 5, 1996).
5) Incision wound 1 cm. (L) hand.’
"Becoming impatient of waiting for the Barangay Captain, Severina told Solano that they better go home and come
back later. While walking home along the road, Solano and Severina dropped by the sari-sari store of Honorata "Dr. Elvira L. Grengia, Municipal Health Officer of Alegria, Cebu, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Solano
Cedeño and bought biscuits for their children. About 20 meters away, appellant shouted from his house challenging Macion (TSN, pp. 4-5, March 28, 1996). The Medico-Legal Certificate (Exh. ‘D’, p. 155, Record) she issued,
Solano to a fight. Appellant’s parents, Daniel Aglipa and Anecita Aglipa, and his brother, who were also in their indicated the following injuries sustained by him, to wit:
house, joined appellant in challenging and demanding from the Macion couple payment for the Aglipa’s damaged
corn plants. Anecita shouted at the Macions that they be paid their damaged corn plants immediately, while ‘FINDINGS:
appellant and his father challenged Solano to a ‘buno’ (fight to the death) (TSN, pp. 9-11, February 5, 1996; TSN, pp.
7-9, April 15, 1996).
1) Lacerated wound measuring 5 inches in length at the occipital area of the head.

"Sensing danger, Solano advised Severina to go ahead and take their children inside their house because he would
still urinate. As it was already dark, Severina got a kerosene lamp and went back to her husband, who stood [a] few 2) Lacerated wound 4 inches in length, at the right side of the forehead.
meters away from the door of Honorata’s house. While Solano was urinating, Severina stood behind him holding
the kerosene lamp. Momentarily, appellant, who came from nowhere, suddenly appeared passing behind 3) Lacerated wound, 4 inches in length, right eyebrow.
Honorata’s house. Without saying a word, appellant hit Solano with an iron bar at the back of his head. Solano
slumped with his face down. Daniel Aglipa and Anecita Aglipa, who were in their yard, shouted at their son and
urged him by saying: "Patya na! Patya na!’ (kill him, kill him). Appellant hit Solano repeatedly with a crowbar which 4) Lacerated wound, 1.5 cms. right upper eyelids.
caused Solano’s instantaneous death. Severina rushed to the aid of her husband but she too was hit by Ponciano at
the back of her head. Severina instinctively turned around to face appellant and attempted to wrest the crowbar 5) Fracture of the skull at the left parieto-occipital area, measuring about 6 inches in length, 4 inches in diameter
from him but appellant hit her on the hand holding the kerosene lamp. Bloodied and feeling dazed, Severina exposing the brain tissue.’
shouted at Honorata for help. When appellant was about to strike again at Severina, Honorata picked up a stone
and hurled it at appellant. Hit by the stone hurled by Honorata, appellant scampered away bringing with him the
"PO2 Mario Paler, a PNP member of Malabuyoc, Cebu was instructed by his Chief of Police to arrest one Ponciano
crowbar (TSN, pp. 11-20, February 5, 1996; TSN, pp. 9-15, April 15, 1996).
Aglipa, a suspect in a murder in Barangay Mindanao, Malabuyoc, Cebu. PO2 Paler was informed that the suspect
was about to board an ABC Bus Liner. PO2 Paler, accompanied by the Chief of Police, immediately proceeded to
"Because of the blows Severina sustained, she became unconscious. Honorata pulled Severina inside her the house of appellant’s friend in Barangay Montañeza to look for appellant there. They were, however, told that
(Honorata’s) house. When the Barangay Captain arrived, he accompanied Honorata and several barangay tanods in appellant had escaped. They proceeded towards the school building nearby. While they were resting there, an
taking Severina to the hospital. The cadaver of Solano Macion was left behind watched by other barangay tanods. ABC Liner bus passed by and stopped at a grassy portion of the road. Suspecting that appellant had boarded the
Severina was admitted at the Mariano Jesus Cuenco Memorial Hospital in Malabuyoc, Cebu. The Barangay Captain bus, they proceeded towards the bus. True enough, they found appellant on board the ABC Liner bus and
and the Barangay Tanods proceeded to the nearby Police Station to report the crimes (TSN, pp. 20-25, February 5, arrested him. They brought appellant to the police station for investigation (TSN, pp. 2-13, February 19, 1996)."
1996; TSN, pp. 15-16, April 15, 1996).
Defense’s Version
"Dr. Neal Anthony Singco, medical officer of the Mariano Jesus Cuenco Memorial Hospital, attended to Severina
Macion (TSN, pp. 24-27, March 28, 1996). Dr. Singco issued a Living Case Report (Exh. ‘F’, p. 193, Record) which
Invoking self-defense, appellant narrated the facts in this manner:9
showed that the following injuries were sustained by Severina:

"The accused and his parent testified that Solano Macion challenged them by shouting at the yard of the house of
‘FINDINGS:
Honorata Cedeño. Since Solano Macion called for the accused, the latter went down from their house and
approached them and when Solano Macion saw the accused, he pulled out his gun and fired but the accused
1) Laceration 2 cm. ( R ) parietal area. evaded by docking and in defense of himself he picked a coco lumber and without hesitation struck the hand of
Solano Macion that held the gun but it was at this moment that Macion crouched and his head was hit by the
2) Laceration 3 cm. occipital area. wooden lumber instead. He fell to the ground hitting his head on a stone with sharp edges.
"Then, the wife of Solano Macion, Severina, picked the gun which was released by Solano Macion. In anticipation In the present case, Appellant Aglipa claims that the victim Solano Marion had challenged him to a fight on
that she [would] use it against the accused, the latter also struck her hand with the same lumber. Since he was several occasions. The former alleges that while he was inside his house that fateful day, he heard the latter
standing and she was crouching in her attempt to pick-up the gun, the back of her head was also hit which [was] calling on him to come down from his house. When Aglipa did so, Solano suddenly fired his gun at him. The
injured. former then picked up a piece of wood and struck the latter’s right hand which was holding the gun. When the
victim attempted to pick up the weapon, appellant hit him again, this time at the back of the head. When Solano’s
wife, Severina, attempted to retrieve the firearm, Aglipa shifted his attention to her, hitting her also on the head.
"The barangay [captain] was presented by the accused only to prove that he knew that Solano Macion owned a
gun."
This version is not convincing. First, it is not supported by the postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Elvira
Grengia on the body of the victim. The Medico-Legal Report indicates that he sustained the following wounds:
Trial Court’s Ruling

"1.....Lacerated wound measuring 5 inches in length at the occipital area of the head.
Rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court ruled as follows:

2.....Lacerated wound 4 inches in length, at the right side of the forehead.

"It is evident from the record that victims Solano Macion and Severina Macion did not commit any act of aggression
against the accused. It was Ponciano Aglipa who was the aggressor for he challenged Solano Macion to a fight to
death (buno) at the house of Barangay Captain Nemesio Pialago where spouses Solano Macion and Severina Macion 3.....Lacerated wound, 4 inches in length, right eyebrow.
went to ascertain the extent of the damage caused by their goats on the corn plants of Daniel Aglipa, father of the
accused. It was Ponciano Aglipa who attacked and assaulted the victims while Solano Macion was urinating near the
4.....Lacerated wound, 1.5 cms. right upper eyelids.
house of Honorata Cedeño and Severina Macion holding a lamp. While their backs were towards the place where
Ponciano Aglipa came from, both victims were attacked and assaulted by Ponciano Aglipa. Honorata Cedeño belied
the claim of Ponciano Aglipa that at that time Solano Macion had carried a firearm in his hand." 10 5.....Fracture of the skull at the left parieto-occipital area, measuring about 6 inches in length, 4 inches in
diameter exposing the brain tissue."13
The Issues
Significantly, all the wounds were located on the head. No injury was found on the victim’s right hand, which
appellant had allegedly hit first. Moreover, contrary to Aglipa’s claim that he had hit Solano’s head only once, the
Appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:
autopsy report clearly indicated that five wounds had been inflicted on the victim.

"1.....The court below erred in finding x x x the accused guilty of the crime of murder in [the] killing of Solano
Second, in the testimony of appellant, there were lapses which indubitably cast suspicion on the veracity of his
Macion and of frustrated murder in [the] wounding of Severina Macion.
account. He lied when he narrated that the victim had challenged and provoked him several times before the
incident. This was clear from Aglipa’s testimony on cross-examination, pertinent portions of which are
"2.....The court below erred in not appreciating the x x x self-defense interposed by the accused." 11 reproduced hereunder:

In the main, the Court will resolve the following questions: (1) tenability of self-defense and (2) presence of "Court:
treachery. In addition, the Court will also discuss the proper penalty.
Q....So, what then is the truth?
The Court’s Ruling
A....The truth is, he only challenged [me] on April 24, 1995.
The appeal has no merit. The Decision, however, should be modified in respect to the penalty for frustrated murder.
x x x           x x x          x x x
First Issue: Self-Defense
Fiscal Dalawampu:
One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the
accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following
Q....So, your statements regarding the shouts of "buno" allegedly made by Solano Macion before April 24, 1995
requisites must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the
were not true?
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense.12
A.... [They were] not true, Ma’am. A....Their four (4) children

Q....Why did you tell a lie? x x x           x x x          x x x

Atty. Abellana: Q....Minutes after Severina Macion and her husband, Solano Macion, together with their children, passed by your
house towards the house of the barangay captain, what did you hear, if any?
....What is there to explain? I don’t think that is proper.
A....I heard Ponciano Aglipa shouting.
Fiscal Dalawampu:
Q....What were the shouts of Ponciano Aglipa?
....Why?
A....He want[ed] to finish them off. He challenged Solano Macion to go down because they would finish
(‘magtiwas’) [their quarrel].
Atty. Abellana:

x x x           x x x          x x x
....What is there to explain?

Q....How was the manner . . . [What] did you observe [in] Ponciano Aglipa [when he made] that challenge of
Court:
finishing their quarrel; was [he] in [a] sober mood, or [was he] very angry?

Q....Why did you say that there were many times x x x such challenge [had been made] prior to April 24, 1995?
A....He was angry.
Answer.

x x x           x x x          x x x
A....I cannot answer."14

Q....Okay. Now, at that time that Solano [--] Ponciano shouted that challenge, where was, at what particular place
The veracity of the entire claim of appellant was further weakened by his flip-flop regarding what he had done after
was Solano?
the incident. In his direct testimony, he claimed that he had surrendered at the police station around 3:00 a.m. the
following day.15 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had not actually surrendered. 16 In fact, the
second version was corroborated by PO2 Mario Paler, who testified that he and SPO4 Cesar Guerrero had arrested A....[At] the entrance of my house; right at the door of my house.
the appellant while the latter was inside a bus.
Q....Where was Severina?
Indeed, appellant’s version was contradicted by the prosecution witnesses, who testified that he was the aggressor.
A....Same place.
Honorata Cedeño, an eyewitness, testified that while Solano was urinating, Aglipa sneaked behind and hit him on
the head with a crowbar. While the victim was slumped on the ground, appellant struck him on the head two more
Q....Okay. Now, after … Where was Ponciano when he shouted the challenge?
times. Cedeño testified as follows:

A....Ponciano Aglipa, together with his father and his mother, were shouting together.
"Q....Now, [o]n the afternoon of April 24, 1995, at about 5:30, where were you?

Q....What did Daniel Aglipa shout?

A....I was in my house, I saw Solano Macion together with his wife going to the house of the barangay captain.

A....Daniel Aglipa shouted that he wanted killings (‘buno’).

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q....What did Anecita Aglipa shout?

Q....Aside from the wife of Solano Macion, who were his other companions, if any?
A....Anecita Aglipa was also shouting by saying that she did not want that payment of their corn eaten by the goats A....I was sitting on the stone at the front yard of my house facing the door of our house.
be made the following day, that she wanted immediate payment.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q....What did Solano Macion say, if any?
Q....If the crowbar is presented to you, can you tell this Honorable Court, can you identify that crowbar?
A....Solano Macion wanted to pay but the Aglipas were shout[ing] because they wanted payment immediately.
A....This is the one.
Q....Where was Daniel Aglipa at the time that he shouted ‘buno’, ‘patay’?
x x x           x x x          x x x
A....At their yard.
Q....Now, when Ponciano Aglipa passed by you while you were sitting on a stone fronting your door, what was the
Q....Where was Anecita Aglipa when she shouted that she did not want payment to be made the following day but position of Solano Macion?
she wanted the damage caused by the goats to be made immediately, that evening; where was she?
A....Solano Macion [--] his back was towards me because he was urinating and he was facing the house of the
A....Also at their house, lower portion of their house. Aglipas with his back towards me.

Q....Where was Ponciano at the time he also shouted ‘magtiwas’ ta’, let us finish; where was he? x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. ABELLANA: Q....How many times [did] Ponciano Aglipa [strike] Solano with the crowbar?

....Already answered, Your Honor: in his house. A....Three (3) times.

COURT: Q....Where was Solano Macion hit for the first time?

Q....Do you confirm defense counsel’s statement that Ponciano Aglipa was at his house at the time he made the INTERPRETER:
challenge about killings?
....Witness pointing to the back portion of her head, and his brain even came out. [sic]
A....He was initially in his house, but he went around not later than five (5) minutes, and because he was downstairs,
he even went around my house and he passed by me.
x x x           x x x          x x x

FISCAL DALAWAMPU:
Q....How about the second and the third striking[s], where did those strikings land?

Q....When you saw … How many times did Ponciano Aglipa make that challenge?
A....He was already slumped to the ground.

A....Two (2) times in their house, and he was [in front]. Later, I saw him passing [in front] of me carrying a crowbar.
COURT:

x x x           x x x          x x x
Q....In what portion of his body was [he] hit by the second and third striking[s] while he was already in that
position?
FISCAL DALAWAMPU:
A....The same: Solano Macion was hit on his head.
Q....Okay. You said that you saw Ponciano Aglipa [pass] by you. Where were you then at that time?
Q....So, the three (3) strikings landed on his head? also hit the victim’s equally defenseless wife on the head, almost killing her. Verily, he carried out his attack in a
swift manner with no risk to himself from any defense which the victims might put up. Clearly, there was
treachery.
A....Yes, Your Honor.

Hence, the trial court did not err in finding him guilty of murder for the death of Solano Macion and frustrated
x x x           x x x          x x x
murder for the wounding of Severina Macion.

Q....What did Severina Macion do, [while] standing by near your door?
Proper Penalty

A....Severina Macion attempted to hold the hand of her husband, Solano Macion, but she was also struck by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, provides that the penalty for murder is reclusion
Ponciano Aglipa on her head once and then followed by another striking on her hand. As a matter of fact, one of the
perpetua to death. Considering that no other aggravating circumstance was established in this case, the trial court
fingers of her right hand was [almost] severed but still hanging."
was correct in imposing on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the death of Solano Macion.

Significantly, the trial court rejected Aglipa’s claim and gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
The trial court erred, however, in imposing on appellant the penalty of six years of prision correccional as
witnesses. Time and again, this Court has pronounced that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
minimum to ten years of prision mayor as maximum for the frustrated murder of Severina Macion. This penalty,
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe them
according to the court a quo, was two degrees lower than that for consummated murder.22
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, the trial court’s assessment is accorded
respect, even finality.17 Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code states: "The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony." Moreover, Article 61 (2) of the
same Code provides that "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or
Appellant assails the testimony of Cedeño for being contrary to human experience. According to her, Aglipa
of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
surreptitiously approached the victim by using the path at the back of her house. He maintains, however, that this
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scales."
alleged path was impassable because it was planted with huge and thorny cactus plants which also served as a
fence. This argument is bereft of merit. Cedeño testified that those plants were still small and newly planted at the
time of the incident.18 As earlier stated, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, the penalty for frustrated murder,
which is one degree lower, is reclusion temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 23 the proper penalty for
the frustrated murder in this case should be ten years of prision mayor to seventeen years and four months
Verily, appellant failed to show sufficient reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s findings of facts. He did not
of reclusion temporal.
show any motive for Cedeño to testify falsely against him. Indeed, we find no reason to reject the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of this witness.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the penalty for the frustrated murder should be ten years of prision mayor to seventeen
Second Issue: Treachery
years and four months of reclusion temporal. Costs against appellant.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the accused deliberately adopts such means, methods and
SO ORDERED.
forms of execution that give the victim no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. 19 The essence of treachery is
swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim.20
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Appellant maintains that treachery was not sufficiently proven. He denies that he attacked the victim from behind,
claiming that "if the assailant is in front of the victim while striking any part of the back of the victim, especially
when it is the head, the back portion of the head will be wounded."21
Footnotes
The argument is unacceptable. Speculative at best, it is bereft of any evidentiary basis.1âwphi1 In any event, the
wounds of Solano were found not only at the back of his head, but also on the right upper eyebrow and the right 1 
Written by Judge Galicano C. Arriesgado.
upper eyelids.
2 
Records, p. 3.
Furthermore, Cedeño’s eyewitness account clearly showed that Aglipa had sneaked behind Solano, who was
urinating at the side of the road, and struck him on the head with a crowbar. Not content with doing that, appellant
3  18 
Records, p. 1. TSN, April 19, 1996, pp. 22-23.

4  19 
Records, p. 59. People v. de La Cruz, 291 SCRA 164, June 26, 1998; People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, July 28, 1998;
People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998.
5 
Decision, p. 26; rollo, p. 64.
20 
People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158, March 6, 1998; People v. Villamor, 284 SCRA 184, January 16, 1998;
6  People v. Andres, 296 SCRA 318, September 25, 1998; People v. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331, October 7, 1998.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 7, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the Appellee’s Brief.
The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none had been submitted within the reglementary period.
21 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 112.
7 
Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Raul J.
22 
Mandin. Decision, p. 26; rollo, p. 64.

8  23 
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4-8; rollo, pp. 167-171. Section 1 of the law provides that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
9  of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 104-105. The Brief was signed by Atty. Gines N. Abellana.
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense; x x x."
10 
Decision, p. 23; rollo. p. 61.
Republic of the Philippines
11 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 8; rollo, p. 110. SUPREME COURT
Manila
12 
Art. 11 (1), Revised Penal Code. See also People v. Janairo, 311 SCRA 58, July 22, 1999; People v. De la Cruz, 291
SCRA 164, 180, June 26, 1998; People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680, May 5, 1999; People v. Dorado, 303 SCRA 61, THIRD DIVISION
February 11, 1999; People v. Vermudez, 302 SCRA 276, January 28, 1999.
 
13 
Records, p. 155.
G.R. No. 116512 July 30, 1996
14 
TSN, January 8, 1996, pp. 30-32.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
15 
TSN, December 27, 1995, pp. 8-9. vs.
LEOPOLDO BACANG @ "POLDO," "Gerry Brako," and "Arnold," FRANCISCO PALACIOS, @ "Minggoy & Joe,"
16 
The TSN reveals the following: TATA DOE, WILLIAM CASIDO @ "Mario," and FRANKLIN ALCORIN y ALPARO @ "Arman," and REO
DOE, accused.

"Q So in effect, therefore, you did not actually surrender because you were confused on that day and you found
only on the following day that you were already x x x inside the jail? RESOLUTION

A That’s true." (TSN, January 26, 1996, p. 26.)  

17 
People v. Sumbillo, 271 SCRA 428, April 18, 1997; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495, March 13, 1997; DAVIDE, JR. J.:p
People v. Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221, January 18, 1995; People v. Jimenez, 302 SCRA 607, February 4, 1999;
People v. Angeles, 275 SCRA 19, July 1 1997; People v. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339, September 3, 1996; People v.Cura, 240 From the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 45 (Bais City), in Criminal Case No.
SCRA 234, January 18, 1995; and People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995. 397-B promulgated on 1 December 1993, finding them and co-accused Francisco Palacios guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay,
severally, P200,000.00 and P25,000.00 as actual damages and for funeral expenses, respectively, and
costs,1 accused WILLIAM CASIDO and FRANKLIN ALCORIN appealed to this court by filing a supplemental notice of Earlier, in our resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Sepada, 12 this Court signified in no uncertain terms the
appeal on 8 December 1993.2 necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended.

This court accepted the appeal on 7 December 1994.3 Having observed that the pronouncements in the aforementioned cases remain unheeded, either through
deliberate disregard or erroneous applications of the obiter dictum in Monsato vs. Factoran 13 or the ruling
in People vs.Crisola, 14 this Court, in its resolution of 4 December 1995 in People vs.
On 30 June 1995, counsel for accused-appellants filed the "Appellant's [sic] Brief."4
Salle, 15 explicitly declared:

On 28, September 1995, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the Brief for the Appellee 5 and asked for the
We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
affirmance in toto of the appealed decision.
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or
On 11 January 1996, this Court received an undated Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal 6 from the accused- the process towards its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin which, however, did not state any reason therefor. At the lower instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
portion thereof is a 1st Indorsement, dated 5 January 1996, of Venancio J. Tesoro, Superintendent IV of the Bureau from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by
of Corrections, referring the motion to this Court with a claim that "the legal effect . . . [thereof] has been the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
adequately explained to the accused-appellant/s and that the same is/are filed in his/their own free will." abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
On 28 February 1996, this Court required counsel for the accused-appellants to comment on the urgent motion to liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of
withdraw the appeal. the accused from confinement.

On 22 March 1996, this Court received a 1st Indorsement, dated 18 March 1996, 7 from Superintendent Venancio J. xxx xxx xxx
Tesoro informing this Court that accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on
Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996." This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee's appeal.
(emphasis supplied)
On 20 May 1996, this Court directed Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro to submit to this Court certified true copies
of the Conditional Pardon and the release or discharge order. It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant
On 29 April 1996, counsel for the accused-appellants filed the required comment 8 on the urgent motion to appeal.
withdraw the appeal and the counsel offered no objection thereto.
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants' Urgent Motion To Withdraw Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of
In a 1st Indorsement, dated 10 June 1996 but received on 14 June 1996, Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the support and assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest
submitted certified true copies of the conditional pardons separately granted to accused-appellants William Casido of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who shall then, forthwith, be reconfined at the New
and Franklin Alcorin9 both signed by the President on 19 January 1996 and of their certificates of discharge form Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, both within sixty (60) days from notice hereof, and to submit a
prison 10 showing that the said accused-appellants were released from confinement on 25 January 1996 in view of report thereon within the same period. In the meantime, further action on the appeal is suspended until the re-
the grant of conditional pardon. These certificates stated that the pardons were granted: arrest of the accused-appellants.

[b]y virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release,
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release and Pardon . . . and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, why they should not be held in contempt
of court for acting on and favorably recommending approval of the applications for the pardon of the accused-
appellants despite the pendency of their appeal.
It is then clear that the conditional pardons separately extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
Let copies of this Resolution be immediately furnished the Superintendent of the Bureau of Corrections and the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon.
In the resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs. Hinlo, 11 this Court categorically declared the "practice of
processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law."
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
MULLER BALDINO, accused-appellant.
Footnotes

DECISION
1 Rollo, 26-46.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
2 Id., 48.

The Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 15635-R convicting Muller
3 Id., 49.
Baldino of rape and imposing the death penalty is before this Court on automatic review.

4 Id., 59.
Muller Baldino was charged on May 4, 1998 under the following Information2 :

5 Rollo, 112.
"The undersigned accuses MULLER BALDINO of the crime of RAPE, at the instance, relation and written complaint
of ABRELINDA SILAM. Copies of her written complaint are hereto attached and made an integral part of this
6 Id., 134. information, committed as follows:

7 Id., 138. That on or about the 4th day of March, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
8 Id., 143-144 means of force or intimidation have carnal knowledge of the complainant ABRELINDA SILAM, a minor-13 years
old, against her will and consent.

9 Id., 146, 148

CONTRARY TO LAW."

10 Id., 147, 149.

The complainant Abrelinda Silam was thirteen years old when the incident happened. The accused is her brother-
in-law, being the husband of her elder sister Judith. Abrelinda was staying with another sister Marcelet Silam-
11 G.R. No. 110035. Danglosen at the latter's house in Irisan, Baguio City. The house of the accused also in Irisan was 50 to 60 meters
away.
12 G.R. No. L-47514.
The following narration of the rape incident by the trial court is not disputed:
13 170 SCRA 190 [1989].
"On March 4, 1998 at about 6:00 p.m., Abrelinda left the house of Marcelet and went to the house of accused
14 128 SCRA 1, 3 [1984], decided under the 1973 Constitution which authorized the exercise of executive clemency and Judith nearby. She was requested by her sister Judith to spend the night thereat to take care of the children
either before or after conviction. of Judith while the latter is in Buguias, Benguet.

15 G.R. No. 103567. At that time Judith and accused had 3 children; Jomar, 5 years old; Janice, 3 years old; and Muller Jr., 1 year old.
Judith testified that she brought along with her to Buguias Janice but left Jomar and Muller in Irisan with their
father, the accused.
EN BANC

At around 9:00 p.m., while Abrelinda was sleeping, the accused suddenly grabbed her hands by the wrists. He sat
G.R. No. 137269               October 13, 2000 on her legs. He removed her pants and panty. She struggled and pushed him and shouted for help to no avail. He
told her to keep still because there is nothing she could do. He spread her legs and mashed her breasts. She
continued struggling and resisting. But the accused, who was naked, was able to insert his penis in her vagina and
made pumping motions, consummating sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain.
After he satisfied his lust, he threatened her not to tell her sister what he did otherwise he will get angry. She cried Dr. Bandonill explained that the old-healed hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted more than three (3)
and pounded her right hand on accused but he just kept quiet. Then he moved away and slept. months previous to the examination on the person of Abrelinda on March 13, 1998. He added that once the
hymen is lacerated, it will not be lacerated again or there will be no new lacerations even if there is another
sexual contact. This is consistent with the declaration of Abrelinda that there were two incidents of rape; one in
Immediately Abrelinda left and returned to the house of Marcelet. Crying, she reported to Marcelet and the latter's
Buguias, Benguet sometime 1997 and the second on March 4, 1998 in Irisan, Baguio as the first incident
husband that the accused raped her or had sexual intercourse with her against her will. She told them she will sue
happened more than 3 months before examination.
the accused.

On the same day of March 13, 1998, Abrelinda gave her Sworn Statement (Exh. A) to the Baguio Police charging
It appears that this was the second time accused raped Abrelinda. The first happened sometime 1997 in their
the accused of Rape committed against her on March 4, 1998 in Baguio City. On the basis of her said complaint,
hometown in Buguias, Benguet. Apparently, she can no longer endure or take the repeated sexual assault on her by
an Information for Rape was filed by the Prosecutor's Office of Baguio against the accused which is now the case
accused, who is considered a member of the family being her brother-in-law. She thus went home to Buguias,
at bar.
Benguet to report to her father where she filed her complaint of rape against the accused on March 11, 1998
assisted by her father Teligo Silam on the first incident. (See statement of Abrelinda dated March 11, 1998 attached
to the Information for Rape filed in Benguet, Exh. C). In respect to the first incident of rape that happened sometime in 1997 in Buguias, Benguet, an Information for
Rape (Exh. C) was also filed by the Prosecutor's Office of Benguet against the accused with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 64, Buguias, Benguet.
Then she came back to Baguio to file her complaint on the incident that happened in Baguio.

Further, an Information (Exh. D) for Violation of Sec. 10 (b) of RA 7610, as Amended (Child Abuse Law), was
On March 13, 1998, Abrelinda went to the NBI, Baguio where she was examined by Dr. Ronald Bandonill who
likewise filed against the accused by the Prosecutor's Office of Baguio with Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio
submitted a report (Exh. B), the pertinent portion of which reads:
City with Edwina Silam as the complainant." 3

'GENITAL EXAMINATION:
The accused denied the charge and claims that the accusation was fabricated. He testified that on the day in
question, he slept together with his wife, who had returned from a visit to her parents in Buguias , Benguet, the
*PUBIC HAIR: Absent, LABIA MAJORA and day before. During the period from February 20 to March 3, 1998, when his wife was in Buguias, he personally
took care of the needs of the two children left with him, and brought the children to his place of work at Irisan,
MINORA: both slightly gaping. where he was assigned as security guard. He insisted that neither he nor his wife requested Abrelinda to take
care of the children while his wife was in Buguias and that while Abrelinda went to their house about four times
during his wife's absence, it was only for the purpose of getting rice and other things after which she immediately
*FOURCHETTE: moderately lax. VESTIBULAR left. He claimed that he did not sign the deed of "Amicable Settlement" dated July 6, 1998 because there was no
truth to the rape charged against him. Judith Baldino, wife of the accused and sister of the complainant
MUCOSA: pinkish. corroborated the statement of the accused, that on the alleged date of the crime, the accused was with her. 4

*HYMEN: originally annular, tall, thin with old-healed, complete lacerations at 6:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock The trial court found the accused liable as charged for the following reasons:
positions corresponding to the face of a watch, edges of which are rounded, retracted and non coaptible.
"First, the accused had carnal knowledge of Abrelinda.
HYMENAL ORIFICE: admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter with slight difficulty
The evidence shows that on the night of March 4, 1998 after the accused spread the legs of Abrelinda, he
*VAGINAL WALLS: tight. RUGOSITIES: prominent. inserted his penis in her vagina and made pumping motions consummating sexual intercourse with her. She felt
his penis inside her vagina. And she felt pain. There is therefore no doubt that there was carnal knowledge.
CONCLUSIONS:
Second, the carnal knowledge was consummated by means of force and against her will.
1) No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
While Abrelinda was sleeping, the accused pinned her on the bed by holding her hands by the wrists and sitting
down on her legs. He undressed her by removing her pants and panty. She resisted by pushing him. She struggled
2) Old-healed, complete hymenal lacerations noted.' (Exh. B) and shouted for help and kept moving. But he told her to keep still because there is nothing that she could do.
She continued struggling but the accused succeeded in penetrating her.
Abrelinda did not therefore freely and willingly submit to the carnal act. There was force used on her. Seventh, the claim of the accused that the charges against him were fabricated which is the reason why Abrelinda
was willing to have the instant case settled and even sought his forgiveness is incredible.
True, the accused was not armed at the time. He did not have to. For his size, weight and strength were enough for
him to attain his evil design. At a tender age of 13, innocent to the ways of the world, Abrelinda was no match to The accused cannot point to any dark or sinister motive that Abrelinda may have in filing the instant case. As
the size and strength of accused who is 20 years her senior and married. In addition to all these, the accused already discussed above, she was impelled by no other reason than to vindicate an offense committed against
enjoyed an ascendancy over Abrelinda being the husband of her oldest sister. her.

'It bears repeating that the force and violence required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be There is nothing on record to prove that Abrelinda sought the forgiveness of accused and wanted to have the
overpowering or irresistible. What is essential is that the force used is sufficient to consummate the purpose which instant case settled except his self-serving, gratuitous and preposterous assertion. More, it is the malefactor who
the offender had in mind, or to bring about the result. The force and violence necessary in rape is naturally a asks normally for forgiveness and a settlement, not the victim.
relative term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. All
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.' (People vs. Errojo, 229 SCRA 49)
The signature of Abrelinda in the Amicable Settlement (Exh. 1; E) was sufficiently explained by no other than
Judith, the wife of the accused himself, who admitted that Abrelinda signed the said document, although she did
Third, the fact that the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. B) shows that there were no extragenital physical injuries noted not understand its contents, after she was erroneously made to believe by Maria Delias, an auntie of Judith and
on the body of Abrelinda at the time she was examined does not negate her claim of rape. Neither does it mean lack accused, that if she does not sign, the instant case will not push through.
of resistance on her part.
Abrelinda's having signed the said document on the false belief that if she does not, the instant case will not push
The mere size, weight and strength of the 33 year old accused rendered the 13 year old Abrelinda virtually through only shows that she is very interested in pursuing this case. In fact, after the signing, she testified in Court
immobilized. about her harrowing experience in the hands of the accused. If she really knew or understood what she signed,
she would have desisted from testifying in Court against the accused.
Besides, it is unreasonable to expect the young Abrelinda to put up resistance with all her might considering her age
and her relationship to the much older accused who was her brother-in-law. And granting arguendo that Abrelinda signed the Amicable Settlement despite knowing its contents, this does not
detract from the fact that the accused raped her. Nowhere in the document does it state that the charge of rape
against the accused is not true. In fact the amicable settlement proceeds on a premise that the rape was true.
Fourth, after the sexual act, Abrelinda returned that same night to the house of her sister Marcelet crying and
disclosed to Marcelet and the latter's husband that the accused raped her and had sexual intercourse with her and
that she would sue him. If the sexual intercourse was with her consent, Abrelinda would have kept it to herself It is worth noting that the Amicable Settlement (Exh. 1; E) was prepared with the intercession of the uncle of
especially so that the accused is married to her older sister Judith. Judith as admitted by her and the Office of the Barangay Captain of Poblacion, Buguias, Benguet. The amicable
settlement prepared shows that Judith, the wife of accused, their relatives, common friends and Barangay
Officials, about 61 in all, tried to patch things up but failed. This is normal in the countryside or rural areas where
Fifth, it is unnatural and highly improbable that an artless and guileless 13 year old barrio lass like Abrelinda would
common relatives, friends and elders in the community try to intercede between the accused and victim.
fabricate matters about the bestial acts committed on her person by the accused knowing fully well the seriousness
and consequences of her charges. More so, that the accused is her brother-in-law. She would be the last person to
bring sorrow and pain on her elder sister Judith and the latter's children who would be deprived of the love, x x x           x x x          x x x
company and support of the accused by his incarceration or death. This can only mean Abrelinda had no choice but
to bare it all as the beastly acts were true and she can no longer endure them as accused repeated the despisable
Eighth, the Court believes the version of Abrelinda that on March 4, 1998, she was called by her sister Judith to
deed, one in Buguias and the other in Baguio.
take care of the latter's children as Judith is going to Buguias, Benguet. This was the reason why Abrelinda had to
go to the house of Judith and the accused which was just 60 meters away from the house of Marcelet in Irisan
Sixth, the Court was impressed with the total naivette and lack of sophistication of Abrelinda. She was candid, where she stays. And that was when the rape incident happened. These declarations of Abrelinda were
natural and straightforward in her answers without any intention to evade or concoct. Her answers were utterly corroborated by Marcelet who testified that Abrelinda slept in the house of the accused on the night of March 4,
simple and sincere and ring with truth as the record will show. They were not embellished. She could not have 1998 because she was called by Judith to take care of her children while Judith is in Buguias, but in the early dawn
possibly imputed and fabricated such a serious offense of rape if it were not true. She is yet a young girl and does of March 5, 1998, Abrelinda returned to Marcelet's house crying complaining that she was raped by the accused.
not have the designing mind of a scheming woman. The testimony of Marcelet on what Abrelinda reported could even be considered as part of the res gestae as
when Abrelinda made said spontaneous utterances while crying to her sister she was still under the influence of
the startling occurrence that happened to her just a few hours before.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Like Abrelinda, Marcelet would not testify on these facts if they were not true. Both sisters, Abrelinda and Marcelet, The absence however, of an allegation in the Information of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, precludes
knew that they will be causing great pain and sorrow to their elder sister Judith and the latter's children in doing so a conviction for qualified rape.
but they had no other choice but to tell the truth.
Republic Act No. 8353, insofar as pertinent, reads:
Ninth, it is hard to believe that accused can baby sit his children Jomar and Janice, ages 5 and 3 respectively while
doing his work at the same time. Accused could not possibly change their clothes, wash them, feed them, have
"ART. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
them defecate and urinate and take care of them while he was on duty for 24 hours as security guard. His claim
perpetua.
(that) he brought them to his work where electric transformers and installations are being guarded by him, a
dangerous place ordinarily is not plausible and credible. Hence the need for someone in his house to take care of his
very young children while his wife is away is more believable." 5 Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Muller Baldino Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Rep. Act 8353, as charged in the Information, with the
aggravating qualifying circumstance of the victim, Abrelinda Silam, being a 13 year old minor and the offender When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
Muller Baldino, being her brother-in-law and relative by affinity within the third civil degree (husband of her elder be reclusion perpetua to death.
sister Judith Silam-Baldino) and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death to be implemented in
accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party, Abrelinda Silam, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. The penalty shall be death.1âwphi1
and the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
6
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
SO ORDERED."

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
The Public Attorney's Office filed a brief for the accused-appellant raising a lone assignment of error, namely: guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim;
"THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN METING OUT ON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE APPLICABLE RULINGS IN THE CASES OF PEOPLE 2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal
VERSUS GARCIA (281 SCRA 463, 489) (1997) AND PEOPLE VERSUS RAMOS (G. R. No. 129439, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998). 7 institution;

Accused-appellant prays that the judgment of conviction be modified so as to reduce the penalty to reclusion 3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the
perpetua. third civil degree of consanguinity.

The Solicitor-General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee's Brief. He agrees that it was "palpable 4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be
error" on the part of the trial court to have imposed the death penalty, and takes exception to the award of "the such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;
measly amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnification."

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

The Public Attorney's Office filed a Manifestation in lieu of Reply Brief, reiterating that the proper imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to
The appeal has merit. the victim;

We find from our own examination of the evidence no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and 7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military units thereof or the
being in full agreement in its ratiocination, we affirm the findings of the trial court that the accused-appellant raped Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage
the private complainant Abrelinda. of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;
8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability; Footnotes

1 
9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime and; Penned by Judge Ruben C. Ayson.

2 
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended Records, p. 1.
party at the time of the commission of the crime. "
3 
Rollo, pp. 18-21.
x x x           x x x          x x x
4 
TSN, September 23, 1998, p. 7.
The above-quoted provision is a reenactment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as then amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, which introduced seven attendant qualifying circumstances that would justify imposition of 5 
Decision, p. 7-14.
the death penalty.
6 
Ibid., p. 16.
The seven attendant circumstances above-quoted, first introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of
the nature of "qualifying circumstances" which would increase the penalty by degree and make the crime
7 
punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death. It has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be Appellant's Brief, p. 1
properly pleaded in the indictment; if the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstance.8 Indeed it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges 8 
People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463; People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559.
against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the 9 
capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.9 People vs. Garcia, supra, at p. 489.

10 
It was established that the accused-appellant is the brother-in-law of the private complainant Abrelinda, being the Article 2230, Civil Code.
husband of the latter's older sister Judith, and consequently, a relative by affinity within the third civil degree. This
circumstance was never mentioned in the Information, which charges merely simple rape. The trial court therefore FIRST DIVISION
erred in convicting the accused-appellant of qualified rape. The crime committed under the circumstances is simple
rape attended by generic aggravating circumstance of relationship. The proper penalty imposable, as it is hereby
imposed is reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 awarded by the trial court is in order, as the G.R. No. 123298               November 27, 2003
conviction is not for qualified rape and since the proven relationship of the accused-appellant as the brother-in-law
of the victim, makes him a brother by affinity, the circumstance of relationship may be considered as an aggravating PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
circumstance which justifies the award of exemplary damages.10 vs.
FRANCISCO L. CALPITO alias "Francis," appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No.
15635-R against accused-appellant Muller Baldino is affirmed with the modification that the accused-appellant is DECISION
convicted of simple rape and is accordingly meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and the award for moral damages also for ₱50,000.00 are hereby affirmed and in addition
AZCUNA, J.:
thereto, an award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is granted.

On appeal is the decision dated July 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City 1 in Criminal Case No. 91-
SO ORDERED.
01-59 finding appellant Francisco Calpito alias "Francis" guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.2
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Appellant was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under an information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1990, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with intent [to] gain did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the person of FLORENTINA Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 12 arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of
VILLAS rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag containing cash in the amount of ₱15,000 and jewelries amounting Murder instead of Homicide, and in failing to apply the mitigating circumstance of minority.
to P30,000 belonging to Florentina Villas; that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof and for the
purpose of enabling him to take/rob and carry away the above-mentioned bag, taking advantage of superior
Acting on the motion, the court a quo ordered the reception of evidence to prove appellant’s minority. Appellant
strength with treachery and with intent to kill, said accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
presented the testimony13 of Paquito Ato, Civil Registrar of Butuan City who allegedly issued the former’s birth
attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas
certificate, the original of which was submitted as evidence. On this birth certificate, it was stated that appellant
which caused her death and [a] wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him for a
was born on May 31, 1974, thus indicating that he was only 16 on November 20, 1990 when the crime happened.
period of 5-7 days and [which] incapacitated him from performing his usual work for the same length of time.
Ato confirmed the authenticity of the aforesaid document, and its late registration, as indicated thereon. He
further declared that it was applied for by appellant’s mother, who supplied to him all the details on appellant’s
Contrary to law.3 birth. He, however, admitted that he was unable to verify the information given, as the hospital where appellant
was born no longer existed, and as the named attending physician no longer resided in Butuan City.
Initially, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. 4 Upon appellant’s motion, a reinvestigation of
the case was conducted.5 However, the prosecution resolved to maintain the original information. 6 On January 15, In its Order dated September 15, 1995, the court a quo denied the motion and affirmed appellant’s conviction for
1993, appellant was re-arraigned, and after being appraised of the consequences of the nature of his offense, he Murder. It further found the submitted birth certificate dubious and self-serving.14
changed his plea to one of guilty. 7 The court a quo thereafter received the prosecution’s evidence to prove the
nature and extent of appellant’s culpability as to the crime charged. 8
Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant questions his conviction on two grounds:

The prosecution presented its sole witness in the person of Israel Montilla, the grandson of the victim Florentina
I.
Villas. In his testimony,9 he narrated that at around 2:00 a.m. of November 21, 1990, he was sleeping in the sala of
the victim’s residence when he was awakened by the victim’s shout for help. He then rushed to the victim’s
bedroom which was just 2 ½ meters away from the sofa on which he slept. By the doorway, he met appellant who THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
was holding a fan knife in his right hand and the victim’s shoulder bag in his left. He grappled with appellant, who ANY QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.
suddenly stabbed him on his left upper arm. While Montilla searched for something with which he could defend
himself, appellant rushed out of the house through the kitchen door, the lock of which the latter had destroyed. II.
Montilla looked inside the bedroom and saw his grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of blood, with stab wounds
all over her body.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY
INTERPOSED BY THE DEFENSE.15
Montilla further declared that no other person was inside the bedroom when the incident happened. He was able
to recognize appellant because of the fluorescent light. He testified that he could not be mistaken regarding the
assailant’s identity, since he had long known appellant, who resided near the victim’s house. He also stated that Appellant disputes the court a quo’s finding of the attendance of qualifying circumstances in the commission of
appellant, in his haste, left a flashlight and a cap which had the latter’s name written on its inside portion. He added the crime. The information alleged the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.
that he had known appellant to be a drug user, and that at the time of the incident, the latter appeared to be under Although the assailed decision did not discuss which of these qualified the killing to murder, a perusal of the facts
the influence of drugs. of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has
ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there
is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
The Medico-legal Report10 submitted by Dr. Benjamin Ver disclosed that the victim suffered a total of 4 stab wounds notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the commission of
and 7 incise wounds on different parts of her body. These wounds caused the victim’s death, at the age of 74. the crime.16 In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor’s superior strength. 17 The circumstance must apply
The court a quo, finding the charge of Robbery with Homicide unsubstantiated by evidence, convicted appellant of with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of superior strength is evident from the notorious
the crime of Murder. Appellant was thus sentenced, as follows: disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young
man armed with a knife.
WHEREFORE, in view of the plea of guilty of accused Francisco Calpito alias "Francis" to the crime charged in the
information and considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution which sufficiently established the absolute With respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present case. This circumstance
culpability and degree of participation of the herein accused in the killing of the deceased, accused is hereby found cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but not the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, but of Murder, the prosecution having manner the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim’s death unfolded. 18 It must be noted
failed to prove with sufficient amplitude the existence of Robbery, [and] the Court hereby sentences accused to that in this case, the prosecution’s lone witness only accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he did
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000, and to pay the not see the actual attack on the victim.
costs.11
Given the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the court a quo therefore correctly convicted WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding appellant Francisco L. Calpito alias "Francis" guilty of Murder
appellant for Murder. is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years
of prision mayor medium as MINIMUM, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MAXIMUM and that, in
addition to the civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000, he is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
This Court, however, disagrees with the trial court in its conclusion on the mitigating circumstance of minority. In its
₱25,000 as exemplary damages and ₱25,000 as temperate damages. Costs de oficio.
order,19 the court a quo found appellant’s birth certificate doubtful because there appeared a slight discrepancy
between the name stated thereon and the name being used by appellant. It also took into consideration the fact
that the document was belatedly registered by appellant’s mother, who appeared to have supplied the necessary SO ORDERED.
information so that her son may avail of the aforesaid mitigating circumstance.1âwphi1
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority,
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. 20 In fact, in several cases,
this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. 21

Footnotes
This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely satisfactory, a careful review of the
records reveals other evidence of appellant’s minority. In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the
1 
trial court, appellant declared that he was 20 years old, 22 consequently indicating that on November 21, 1990, he Branch 9.
must have been only 16 years old. Also, as appearing in appellant’s sworn statement executed on November 21,
1991,23 he declared that he was 18 years old, hence evincing that he must have been only 17 at the time of the 2 
Rollo, p. 40.
incident. Notwithstanding the discrepancy, both declarations nonetheless show that he was below 18 when he
committed the crime. This Court has held that the claim of minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any 3 
proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the prosecution failed to present Records, pp. 1-2.
contradictory evidence thereto.24 In this case, the prosecution only questioned the submitted birth certificate, but
did not adduce any evidence to disprove appellant’s claim of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly, 4 
Certificate of Arraignment, Records, p. 59; Order, Records, p. 60.
the mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in favor of appellant,
especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has granted to minors involved in serious crimes. 25 5 
Records, p. 73.

Furthermore, this Court agrees with appellant’s claim that he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of 6 
voluntary plea of guilty to the offense charged. The requisites of this circumstance are: (1) that the offender Id., at 77-79.
spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the
7 
competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of Id., at 101.
evidence for the prosecution.26 In this case, upon re-arraignment, appellant, in the presence of his counsel, and in
open court, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged before the prosecution presented its evidence. 27 This 8 
Id., at 105.
mitigating circumstance should therefore be considered in computing the proper penalty.
9 
TSN, February 23, 1994, pp. 1-12.
On the matter of appellant’s civil liability, this Court finds it appropriate to impose additional damages in line with
prevailing jurisprudence: exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000 28 and temperate damages in the amount of
10 
₱25,000.29 The civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000 is sustained. Records, p. 7.

11 
Lastly, modifications on the imposable penalty are in order. As the crime was committed prior to the amendment of Rollo, p. 11.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act 7659, the appropriate penalty for Murder is  reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death.30 In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the 12 
Records, pp. 121-123.
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period, pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Code, which
is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium.31 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being
13 
an ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should TSN, December 19, 1994, pp. 2-8.
be taken from the minimum period of the imposable penalty, which is prision mayor in its maximum period, while
the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is anywhere within the range of prision 14 
Records, p. 134.
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
15 
Rollo, p. 30. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
16  JOEMARIE CHUA y BALDEVINO, JOEL BASCO y BALDEVINO, JOEFREY BASCO y PARRA, and AGOSTO O.
People v. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 (1994).
BROSAS, accused-appellants.
17 
People v. Appegu, 379 SCRA 703 (2002).
MENDOZA, J.:
18 
People v. Baniega, 377 SCRA 170 (2002); People v. Bulan, 374 SCRA 618 (2002).
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated January 8, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City,
finding accused-appellants Joemarie B. Chua, Joel B. Basco, Joefrey P. Basco, and Agosto O. Brosas guilty of two
19 
Records, supra, note 14. counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and sentencing them accordingly and ordering them to
pay damages.
20 
People v. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368 (1993) citing US v. Bergantino, 3 Phil 118 (1903).
The informations against accused-appellants alleged:
21 
People v. Barreta, 343 SCRA 199 (2000); People v. Regalario, supra, note 20, citing People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535
(1991). Crim. Case No. 43454:2

22 
TSN, December 19, 1994, p. 8. The Provincial Prosecutor through the undersigned accused JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO and JOEMARIE CHUA,
as principals by direct participation and AGOSTO BROSAS, as accomplice, of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER,
23 
Records, pp. 70-71. committed as follows:

24 
People v. Monteron, 378 SCRA 340 (2002) citing People v. Chua, 339 SCRA 426 (2000). That on or about the 20th day of January, 1994 in the Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO and
JOEMARIE CHUA, conspiring, confederating and helping one another armed with firearms of unknown caliber,
25 
People v. Regalario, supra, note 20. with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit ERLINDO MANA-AY, with said firearms,
26 
People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 (1988). causing multiple gunshot wounds on different parts of his body, thereby performing all the acts of execution that
could have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce the same by
27 
reason of some cause or accident independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely medical attendance
See note 7. administered on said ERLINDO MANA-AY which prevented his death; that the accused AGOSTO BROSAS, is being
charge in this case as an accomplice to the crime for having participated in its commission by previous and
28 
People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 137782, April 1, 2003; People v. Alcodia, G.R. No. 134121, March 6, 2003. simultaneous acts.

29 
People v. delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003. CONTRARY TO LAW.

30 
People v. Alfon, G.R. No. 126028, March 14, 2003. Iloilo City, Philippines, April 21, 1994.

31 
People v. Paredes, 264 SCRA 578 (1996). Crim. Case No. 43455:3

Republic of the Philippines The Provincial Prosecutor through the undersigned accuses JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO and JOEMARIE CHUA, as
SUPREME COURT principals by direct participation and AGOSTO BROSAS, as accomplice, of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER,
committed as follows:
SECOND DIVISION
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1994 in the Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO, and
G.R. No. 126255-56             August 31, 2000
JOEMARIE CHUA, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with firearms of unknown caliber,
with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and thereafter; that the accused AGOSTO BROSAS, is being charged in this case as an accomplice to the crime for
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit PERPETUA GRACE GAJETO, with said having participated in its commission by previous and simultaneous acts.
firearms, causing multiple gunshot wounds on her right foot and leg, thereby performing all acts of execution that
could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce the same by reason
CONTRARY TO LAW.
of some cause or accident independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely medical attendance
administered on said Perpetua Grace Gajeto which prevented her death; that the accused AGOSTO BROSAS, is being
charged in this case as an accomplice to the crime for having participated in its commission by previous and Iloilo City, Philippines, April 18, 1994.
simultaneous acts.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon joint trial of the four
CONTRARY TO LAW. cases was held.

Iloilo City, Philippines, April 21, 1994. As alleged in the informations, the incident took place at around 10 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 1994, at
Barangay Cabanbanan, Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo. Charlie Sinoy, Arsenio Gajeto, Erlindo Mana-ay,
Nathaniel Presno, and several other companions were having drinks at the side of a sari-sari store fronting the
Crim. Case No. 43456:4
national road going to the adjoining Municipality of Tigbauan. After some time had lapsed, a jeepney with the
name "Salamander" at the backboard, owned by accused-appellant Joemarie Chua and driven by accused-
The Provincial Prosecutor through the undersigned accuses JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO, JOEMARIE CHUA, as appellant Agosto Brosas, arrived. With them were accused-appellants Joel Basco and Joefrey Basco. A burst of
principal by direct participation, and AGOSTO BROSAS, as accomplice, of the crime of MURDER committed as gunfire was then heard. Sinoy and Arsenio Gajeto were killed, while Perpetua Grace Gajeto and Erlindo Mana-ay
follows: were seriously injured. Who fired at the group is the subject of the differing versions of the prosecution and the
defense.1âwphi1.nêt
That on or about the 20th of January, 1994, in the Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO and JOEMARIE CHUA, Five witnesses testified for the prosecution namely, Erlindo Mana-ay, 6 Nathaniel Presno,7 Jesus Cebu,8 Corazon
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with firearms of unknown caliber, with deliberate intent Gajeto,9 and Perpetua Grace Gajeto.10 Their testimonies are as follows:
and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit, CHARLE SINOY, with said firearms, causing upon the latter gunshot or
On the night in question, Erlindo Mana-ay, Charlie Sinoy, Arsenio Gajeto, Nathaniel Presno, Dwight Tacata,
pellet wounds on different parts of his body which caused his death thereafter; that the accused AGOSTO BROSAS,
Baltazar Tadea, Romeo Presno, Rolando Tullo, and Jesus Cebu were having drinks at the store of Lorna Geonigo.
is being charged in this case as an accomplice to the crime for having participated in its commission by previous and
Presno, Gajeto, Mana-ay, and Sinoy were seated on a bench on the left side of the store outside the fence. There
simultaneous acts.
were electric lights inside and outside the store, as well as on the electric post nearby. At a distance on the right
side of the store was a parked motorcycle.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
While the group was thus having drinks, a group of men arrived on board a jeepney. The jeepney stopped a short
Iloilo City, Philippines, April 18, 1994. distance away from the store. It was parked diagonally on the left side of the road with its headlights beamed on
the right side of the store. Three men, whom prosecution witnesses identified as Joel Basco and Joemarie Chua,
both of whom were armed with long firearms, and Joefrey Basco, who was armed with a short firearm, alighted
Crim. Case No. 43457:5
from the vehicle. The three went to the place where Presno, Gajeto, Mana-ay, and Sinoy were and then fired at
them. Afterwards, they boarded the jeepney and sped away. The jeepney was driven by accused-appellant
The Provincial Prosecutor through the undersigned counsel JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO, JOEMARIE CHUA, as Agosto Brosas.
principals by direct participation, and AGOSTO BROSAS, as accomplice, of the crime of MURDER committed as
follows:
The prosecution witnesses testified that they recognized the three who fired at the victims because they were all
residents of Barangay Botong. They knew the driver of the jeepney, Agosto Brosas, because they used to ride on
That on or about the 20th of January, 1994, in the Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jeepney with the word "Salamander" painted on its back.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused JOEL BASCO, JOEFREY BASCO and JOEMARIE CHUA,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with firearms of unknown caliber, with deliberate intent
As a result of the incident, Erlindo Mana-ay was hospitalized for injuries described in the medical certificate 11 
and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
issued by Dr. Dennis Superficial, dated January 24, 1994, as follows:
and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit ARSENIO GAJETO with said firearms, causing upon the latter gunshot
wound on the right scapular area and contusion and abrasions on other parts of his body, which caused his death
Injuries incurred were:
1) Apparent GSW thru and thru thenar aspect (R) hand On the other hand, a postmortem examination on the body of Charlie Sinoy was conducted by Dr. Tito Doromal at
the Flores Funeral Homes, Oton, Iloilo, at 3:10 in the afternoon of January 21, 1994. His report contained the
following findings:14
2) Apparent GSW of entrance #2 at the D/3rd dorsal aspect (R) forearm

GENERAL SURVEY
3) Apparent GSW thru and thru (R) arm mid 3rd.

The body was seen by the undersigned at the autopsy table of Flores Funeral Homes, Oton, Iloilo, lifeless, lying
4) Apparent GSW of entrance at the proximal 3rd medial aspect left thigh no exit wound
flat on his back, on the stage of rigor mortis with lividity on the posterior half with pellet wounds on the left and
right thighs. The height is 166 cms., and weighs about 64 kilos. The estimated time of death is fifteen (15) to
5) Apparent GSW of entrance at the anterior aspect mid 3rd (R) thigh with no exit. seventeen (17) hours before the autopsy.

X-ray revealed foreign bodies in the (R) and (L) proximal thigh and distal (R) arm, Fracture at (R) carpal and distal (R) The victim allegedly was declared DOA by Iloilo Doctor's Hospital authorities, Iloilo City at around 10:30 PM of
radius. January 20, 1994.

I & D with removal of foreign bodies (bullets) #2 pellets (R) forearm were done. Foreign bodies at the right thigh AUTOPSY FINDINGS
were not accessible to retrieval.
HEAD & NECK:
This certificate was issued for legal purposes.
Nothing of note.
Dr. Superficial testified that the first and second wounds on Erlindo Mana-ay were caused by a single bullet. He
recovered two pellets from wound no. 1 and foreign objects from wound no. 5. He also found a contusion collar in
THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
wound no. 2. He opined that without timely medical attendance, the patient would have died.12

Nothing of note.
Perpetua Grace Gajeto also suffered injuries. The medical certificate 13 dated January 24, 1994, issued by Dr. Marcelo
Jaen, stated:
EXTREMITIES:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Upper:
This is to certify that PERPETUA GRACE GAJETO, 27 years old female, single, was admitted and treated in this
hospital last January 21, 1994 at 1:05 A.M. because of: Nothing of note.

1) Multiple gunshot wound (R) foot and leg Lower:

2) Comminuted fracture distal 3rd (R) tibio fibula, 4th and 5th metatarsal (R) foot 1) PELLET WOUNDS, one central hole, 4.5 x 7.5 cm., in dia., anterior upper 3rd, left thigh, 77 cms., from the left
heel, penetrating muscle tissue, exiting on the skin at the antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd, left thigh, 75.5 cms.,
from the left heel, 6 in nos., ranging from 0.7 x 0.5 to 2.1 x 2.4 Cm., in diameter all stellate in shape. One carton
This certification is being issued for whatever purpose it may serve her.
wad was extracted on the muscle tissue near the exit wound, antero-medial aspect upper 3rd, left thigh.

Dr. Jaen testified that the wounds listed in the medical certificate were all entrance wounds. He did not recover any
The direction of the wound is left to right downward.
foreign object from, nor were there any contusion collars in, any of the wounds. On the basis of the location of the
wounds, he stated that Perpetua Grace was facing the assailant when she was shot at a distance of more than two
meters. He opined that without medical attention, the patient would have died. 2) PELLET WOUNDS, 7 in nos., ranging from 0.5 x 0.6 cm., in dia., to 0.7 x 0.9 cm., in dia., anteromedial aspect,
upper 3rd, right thigh, denter of which is 77 cms., from the right heel, 5.6 cms., from the mid-line, penetrating
muscle tissue, lacerating the femoral artery & vein, exiting on the skin at the lateral aspect, junction of upper &
middle 3rd, right thigh, with exit wounds 7 in nos., ranging from 0.7 x 0.6 to 1 x 1.3 cm., in dia., stellate in shape, About 2.5 liters of clotted and liquefied blood was extracted from the thoracic cavity.
center of which is 74 cms., from the right heel.
EXTREMITIES:
The direction of the wound is right to left, downward.
1) Abrasion, 3 x 4 cm., in dia., left anterior knee.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
CAUSE OF DEATH:
HEMORRHAGE, 2° to MULTIPLE PELLET WOUNDS.
HEMORRHAGE, 2° to GUNSHOT WOUND.
Dr. Doromal testified that wound no. 1, a through and through wound, was caused by a pellet fired from a .12 gauge
shotgun. He recovered a carton wad near the exit wound on the left thigh of the victim. Based on the location of the
Dr. Doromal testified that wound no. 2 was a through and through wound, the entrance of which was at the right
wound, he believed that the assailant was on the left of the victim with both of them in a standing position.15
lateral scapular area. Based on the location of the wound, he believed that the assailant was at the back of the
victim, slightly on the right side, when he fired upon him. Since he did not recover any foreign object from the
Dr. Doromal also performed the postmortem examination on the body of Arsenio Gajeto. His findings are contained wound, Dr. Doromal could not determine the type and caliber of the firearm used by the assailant. 17
in a report,16 the pertinent parts of which read:
On the other hand, the defense gave a different version as follows: 18 Joemarie Chua testified that about 8:30 in
GENERAL SURVEY the evening on January 20, 1994, he and his co-accused, Joel Basco and Joefrey Basco, as well as Romeo de la
Cruz and Michael Canto, arrived home in Barangay Botong, Oton, Iloilo on his jeepney which was driven by
Agosto Brosas. They had just come from Iloilo City when a certain Joemar Basco flagged down the jeepney and
The body was seen by the undersigned at the autopsy table of Flores Funeral homes, Oton, Iloilo, lifeless, lying flat
informed him that the motorcycle he borrowed from Joemarie Chua was taken from him. Accordingly, Joemarie
on his back, on the stage of rigor mortis with lividity on the posterior half with contused abrasion, on the right
ordered Joemar to board the jeepney and join him to go after the carnapper. Upon reaching Barangay
lateral eyebrow and gunshot wound on the right lateral scapular area. The height is 163 ½ cms., and weighs about
Cabanbanan, Joemarie saw his motorcycle parked on the left side of the national road. He and Joemar alighted
62 kilos. The estimated time of death is sixteen (16) to eighteen (18) hours before the autopsy.
from the vehicle and went to the sari-sari store. After greeting the persons drinking beer beside the sari-sari
store, he asked who drove his motorcycle to that place. One of the men resented Joemarie's question as it
The victim allegedly was declared DOA by Iloilo Doctor's Hospital authorities, Iloilo City at around 10:30 PM of insinuated that they had stolen the motorcycle.
January 20, 1994.
Joemarie then saw a person coming from the side of the store with a long firearm pointed at him. The man,
AUTOPSY FINDINGS whom Joemarie identified as Nathaniel Presno, squeezed the trigger, but the weapon did not fire. Joemarie
claimed he pushed the firearm from his head and, with his left hand holding the barrel and his right hand holding
HEAD & NECK: the hand of the person with the firearm, pointed the firearm downward. He and Presno grappled for possession
of the firearm. Presno was able to reload the firearm and fire it twice.

1) Contused-Abrasion, 2 X 0.8 cm., in dia., with central lacerated wound, 1.5 cm., long right lateral eyebrow.
Failing to wrest the firearm from Presno, Joemarie ran towards his jeepney, but the vehicle was already moving
away. He therefore took his motorcycle and drove away. He used a duplicate ignition key which he had with him.
THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

On January 8, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1) GUNSHOT WOUND, thru & thru, entrance, circular, 0.5 x 0.5 cm., in dia, with abrasion collar around, 1 x 1 cm., in
dia., right lateral scapular area, 14.5 cms., from the posterior median line, 127 cms., from the right heel,
penetrating, making a punch-in fracture of the 6th rib, along right mid-scapular line, thru & thru the middle lobe, WHEREFORE, the court finds:
right lung, cutting the bronchus, right pulmonary artery & vein, perforating the posterior pericardial sac, lacerating
the ascending aorta, perforating the anterior pericardial sac, penetrating the muscle tissue of the 2nd intercostal 1. In Criminal Case No. 43454, the accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino and Joefrey Basco
space, along left parasternal line, finally exiting on the skin at the said area with exit wound measuring 1.5 x 0.9 y Parra, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Frustrated Murder, as principal by direct participation
cms., in dia., stellate in shape, 5 cms., from the anterior median line, 127.5 cms., from the left heel. penalized under Article 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by No. 1, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Article 50 of the same Cote and hereby sentence Joemarie Chua y Baldevino and Joel Basco y
The direction of the wound is forward, slightly upward right to left. Baldevino, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum; for accused, Joefrey Basco y Parra, to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) Accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the same offense as an
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum. accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum.
Accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the same crime as an
accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) In addition, all four (4) accused shall pay the heirs of Arsenio Gajeto the sum of P29,503.60 as actual damages and
years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day as maximum. a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 by reason of his death.

In addition, all four (4) accused shall indemnify, Erlindo Mana-ay the sum of P17,759.83 as actual damages, jointly The accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino, Joefrey Basco y Parra, being detained, the whole
and solidarily; period of their detention shall be deducted in full from the period of their imprisonment, provided however, they
had agreed in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, they shall
be credited only to four-fifths (4/5) of the time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment.
2. In Criminal Case No. 43455, the accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino and Joefrey Basco y
Parra, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Frustrated Murder as principal by direct participation
penalized under Article 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by No. 1 Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 in relation With the finding of conviction of accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino and Joefrey Basco y
to Article 50 of the same code and hereby sentence Joemarie Chua y Baldevino and Joel Basco y Baldevino to suffer Parra in Criminal Cases Nos. 43456 and 43457, no bail is available to each of them and they shall remain under
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) detention pending the finality of this judgment.
years and one (1) day as maximum; for accused, Joefrey Basco y Parra, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
Since the penalty herein imposed is an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years,
one (1) day as maximum.
in so far as accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is concerned in herein four (4) cases, the prosecution is ordered to
manifest within two (2) days from promulgation whether it objects to the continued grant of bail to herein
Accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the same crime as an convicted accused stating specifically its grounds with annexes as proofs thereto, copy furnished by personal
accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) services to the defense who shall make a reply thereto, if it wish[es] to, with evidences as annexes, all within the
years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day as maximum. same period above stated counted from receipt, without extension. This shall guide the court on whether or not
the accused shall be granted bail should he opt to appeal, all pursuant to the new rules on bail. A hearing may be
conducted for such purpose, if necessary.
In addition, all four (4) accused shall indemnify Perpetua Grace Gajeto the sum of P27,906.80 as actual damages,
jointly and solidarily;
With herein conviction, the property bond of accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is automatically cancelled. His
bondsmen are ordered to appear before the court during promulgation of herein sentences of conviction and
3. In Criminal Case No. 43456, the accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino and Joefrey Basco y
manifest whether or not they shall continue with their property bond in favor of said accused during his period to
Parra, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder as principal by direct participation penalized under
appeal.
Article 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by No. 1, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 and hereby sentence each
of them to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Costs against the four accused, jointly and solidarily.
Accused, Agosto Brosas y Yange, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the same offense as an
accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) It is so ordered.19
years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum.
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants raised the following issues:
In addition, all four (4) accused shall pay the heirs of Charlie Sinoy the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity by
reason of his death;
I             WHETHER THE DEATHS OF CHARLIE SINOY AND PERPETUA GAJETO AS WELL AS INJURIES TO PERPETUA
GRACE GAJETO AND ERLINDO MANA-AY WERE MERELY ACCIDENTAL
4. In Criminal Case No. 43457, the accused, Joemarie Chua y Baldevino, Joel Basco y Baldevino and Joefrey Basco y
Parra, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder as principal by direct participation penalized under
II             WHETHER THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FIRED AT THE
Artide 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by No. 1, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 and hereby sentence each
VICTIMS IS SUPPORTED BY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
of them to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

III             WHETHER CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMSSSION OF THE CRIME

IV             WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN IGNORING THE UNDISPUTED FACT OF THE PRESENCE OF Indeed, if the gun was pointed to the ground, as accused-appellants say it was when it was fired, the trajectory of
THE MOTORCYCLE OF ACCUSED JOEMARIE CHUA IN THE VICINITY OF THE INCIDENT PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE the bullets would have been downward. But, as Dr. Doromal said, the trajectory was horizontal, indicating that
ACCUSED the bullets were fired by the assailant while standing to the left of the victim.

V             WHETHER JOEFREY BASCO IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY The same observation could be said regarding the wounds suffered by Arsenio Gajeto. According to the
postmortem report of Dr. Doromal, the direction of the bullet was forward, slightly upward, right to left. This
disproves the defense's claim that Joemarie Chua had the gun pointed to the ground when Presno fired it.
First. Accused-appellants' theory is that Nathaniel Presno was the one who tried to shoot Joemarie Chua. It is
claimed that, as Joemarie Chua tried to seize the gun from him, Presno fired it several times and hit Charlie Sinoy,
Arsenio Gajeto, Erlindo Mana-ay, and Perpetua Grace Gajeto. Furthermore, based on the nature of the wounds suffered by Perpetua Grace, it is improbable that she was
injured while trying to stop Presno from firing at Joemarie. Dr. Marcelo Jaen testified that she was far from the
assailant when she was hit.21 Dr. Jaen said:
There is nothing in the evidence to support this theory. As the trial court correctly ruled, this claim is belied by the
testimony of Dr. Doromal, the medicolegal officer who performed the postmortem examination on the bodies of
Charlie Sinoy and Arsenio Gajeto.20 Dr. Doromal told the court: Pros. Cabalum:

PROS. CABALUM Now, doctor, is it possible doctor that at that time the victim was shot she was standing and at the same time
facing the assailant or assailants?
Q             Now doctor considering the location of the wounds which you had found after you conducted autopsy on
the body of the victim, Charlie Sinoy, what could have been the probable position of the assailants in relation to the A             It is possible.
victim when they shot the victim?
Q             But the probability or precisely the victim was standing at the time when she was shot because she was
ATTY. GEROCHE hit on the right leg?

Objection, Your Honor, the question assumes that there are more than one assailant. A             Yes, it is probabl[e].

PROS. CABALUM Q             Basing again doctor from the wounds that the victim suffered, how far was the victim to the assailant or
assailants when she was shot?
Assailant or assailants.
A             I could not exactly tell how far but there were no contusions current. It means to say that the patient is
not within a very close range.
COURT

Q             Could it be two or three meters away?

Answer.

A             More than that.

A             The assailant is located on the left side of the victim.

Indeed, Perpetua Grace testified:22

Q             And what could have been the possible position of the victim here when he was shot?

Pros. P. Cabalum:
A             It is possible that the victim and the assailant were standing.

Now, Madam Witness, according to the accused, Agosto Brosas, witness, Joemar Basco, and Joel Basco, accused,
Q             Is it also possible that the victim was seated at that time when he was shot?
the two women were present in front of that store that evening together with the other victims in these cases
and their companions drinking beer and the two women were identified by accused, Joel Basco, as you and your
A             I don't think so. mother, Corazon Gajeto, what can you say to the statement of accused, Agosto Brosas and Joel Basco?
Witness: Q             And do you know who brought that motorcycle there?

Those are all lies because everytime I go home I stayed at home and how come that I was at the store when I do not A             Because I was not present when the motorcycle arrived and I only saw it.
go out and in the Sari-Sari Store are full of men drinking.
Q             Up to now you never asked how come that the motorcycle was there?
Q             How about your mother, according to the same accused and their witnesses your mother was outside the
store together with you. What do you say to the statement of accused, Agosto Brosas, Joel Basco, and witness,
A             Only later on I knew.
Joemar Basco?

Q             How did you know?

A             My mother was not at the Sari-Sari Store. She was inside our fence outside our house.

A             Only later on I knew that they were not in good terms with one of our barangay mate Nathaniel Presno.
Second. It is contended that accused-appellants were inquiring as to the whereabouts of the one who had taken the
motorcycle when they were suddenly fired at by Presno. Accused-appellants cite the following testimony of Erlindo
Mana-ay:23 Q             You are not answering the question. The question is: How did you know that this motorcycle belongs to
Chua.
Q             Have you seen a motorcycle that evening of January 20, 1994?
A             When it was impounded in the Municipal Hall.
A             I saw the motorcyde which was parked with a distance from the store near the canal.
Q             And up to now you did not know how come that motorcycle was there on January 20, 1994?
Q             At what time did you see the motorcycle there?
A             What I knew was that, they bought cigarettes from the store.
A             When I arrived in the store.
Q             Who bought cigarettes from the store?
Q             Was that motorcycle familiar to you?
A             I'm not sure because that was only told to us by the neighboring barangay that they bought cigarette
from the store.
A             I'm not familiar with the motorcyde because I have no interest on it.

Q             Were you not there when that person bought cigarette?

Q             You did not wonder whose motorcycle was that?

A             I was not there yet.

A             Only later on I knew that it belongs to Chua's group.

Q             How about your other companions, were they there already?

Q             How did you know?

A             Only Nathaniel Presno.

A             Only later on after they fired upon us.

This excerpt from the testimony of Mana-ay does not prove that Presno was the one who had stolen the
Q             You mean to say that the Chua's riding in a motorcycle when they arrived there?
motorcycle. What this testimony shows is that Joemarie had a prior misunderstanding with Presno. If at all, the
testimony proves that accused-appellant had a reason to commit the crimes charged against Presno and his
A             No, sir. group. Besides, if the motorcycle had been stolen at gunpoint from Joemar Basco, it was improbable that
accused-appellants would try to run after those who took their vehicle without arming themselves.
Q             I thought you said that the Chua is the owner of that motorcycle?
Third. Accused-appellants dispute the trial court's finding that Joemarie Chua, Joel Basco, and Joefrey Basco were
all armed and that they fired at the victims. They contend such finding is not supported by the evidence. They cite
A             Yes, they are the owners.
the post-mortem findings of Dr. Doromal and the testimony of policemen that they found only two spent bullets acts of an accomplice. Even assuming he was not initially aware of the plan of the three, once the three started
and one dud ammunition. They likewise cite the finding of the ballistics expert who testified that the two bullets shooting at their victims, Brosas could not have remained ignorant of their criminal design. His subsequent act
came from the same shotgun. Accused-appellants thus conclude that only one shotgun was used in the commission showed his concurrence to what his co-accused had done.
of the crime.
Fifth. Appellant Joefrey Basco claims he should have been credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of
This contention has no basis. First, the accounts of the prosecution witnesses that accused-appellants fired at the minority. We find this contention meritorious.
men having drinks near the store are consistent. The testimonies of Erlindo Mana-ay, Nathaniel Presno, Jesus Cebu,
Corazon Gajeto, and Perpetua Grace Gajeto establish the fact that Joemarie Chua, Joel Basco, and Joefrey Basco
Joefrey Basco testified that he was born on May 22, 1977. 31 His testimony was never disputed by the prosecution.
carried firearms. Second, the ballistics expert, Robert Page, Jr. of the PNP Crime Laboratory, found that, because of
Nonetheless, the trial court did not appreciate this as a mitigating circumstance in view of Joefrey's failure to
the similarity of the breech faces of the shells, 24 the two shells and one dud shell recovered from the scene were
present additional proof of his minority. This is error. In several cases, 32 we have upheld the claim of minority
fired from the same .12 gauge shotgun. This finding does not mean that there were no other shells at the scene of
even without any other proof to corroborate such testimony, especially when coupled with the fact that the
the crime. The crime was committed near the national road. It is reasonable to assume that considerable time had
prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence.
elapsed before responding policemen arrived at the scene of the crime. Hence, there was the probability that the
shells of other bullets had been taken in the meantime. Third, it is only with respect to the wounds suffered by
Charlie Sinoy that it was established that a .12 gauge shotgun was used. Even then, it could not be determined The trial court held that the killing of Charlie Sinoy and Arsenio Gajeto was committed with treachery. There is
whether it was the same gun which produced the marks on the breech face of the bullets found by the policemen treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in
since the gun used was never recovered. Dr. Doromal testified that, with regard to Arsenio Gajeto's wounds, he the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
could not determine with certainty the type and caliber of the firearm used by the assailant since he did not recover the defense which the offended party might make. 33 In this case, the victims were seated on a bench, relaxing
any foreign object from the wound.25 The same is true with regard to the wounds of the other victims. Accused- with beer, when accused Joemarie Chua, Joel Basco, and Joefrey Basco suddenly appeared and started firing at
appellants' bare denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that them. The attack was sudden and unexpected and the victims, all unarmed, were caught totally unprepared to
accused-appellants Joemarie Chua, Joel Basco, and Joefrey Basco were armed and that they fired at the victims. 26 defend themselves. Doubtless, the execution of the crime was done to ensure the accomplishment thereof. This
circumstance qualifies the crime committed to murder.
Fourth. Accused-appellants question the finding of the trial court that Joemarie Chua, Joel Basco, Joefrey Basco
conspired to commit the crimes imputed on them. They contend that there was neither time nor opportunity for Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and, in
the accused-appellants to agree to an unlawful object. Agosto Brosas also questions the ruling of the trial court determining which of the indivisible penalties prescribed by law should be imposed, the presence of mitigating or
finding him liable as an accomplice. aggravating circumstances should be considered.

Their contentions have no merit. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning As regards Joemarie Chua and Joel Basco, the defense clearly proved that the two voluntarily surrendered to the
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 27 Conspiracy may be established not only by proof of an local police of Oton on January 21, 1994, thus saving the government trouble and expense in searching for them.
express agreement among the accused to commit a crime but also by evidence showing concerted action aimed at In accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in
the same purpose. view of the presence of such mitigating circumstance and the absence of any aggravating circumstance.

In the case at bar, the trial court found that when Joemarie, Joel and Joefrey arrived, they alighted from the Considering the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Joefrey Basco and the fact that there
jeepney, went to the place near the store were the victims were, started firing at the latter and fled afterwards. was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the maximum of the penalty
Such concerted action cannot be interpreted otherwise than that they were acting according to a previous to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
agreement. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common Law, the minimum of the penalty should be prision mayor.
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.28
As for Agosto Brosas, who was an accomplice in the commission of murder against Charlie Sinoy and Arsenio
As for Agosto Brosas, the trial court was correct in finding him guilty as an accomplice. An accomplice is one who, Gajeto, the trial court correctly sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day,
not being a principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. 29 To be an as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as maximum, considering that there was
accomplice, it must be established (1) that the offender knew of the criminal design of the principal by direct neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.
participation and concurred therein or (2) that he cooperated in the execution of the offense by prior or
simultaneous acts by supplying material or moral aid. Finally, it must be shown that there is a relation between the The trial court also correctly ordered accused-appellants to pay P50,000.00 for the death of Charlie Sinoy. For the
acts done by the principal and those of the accomplice.30 death of Arsenio Gajeto, accused-appellants were ordered to pay P50,000.00 and an additional amount of
P29,503.00 as actual damages. The latter amount must be reduced as the evidence showed that only P13,003.60
Brosas was the driver of the jeepney used by the three accused-appellants to go to the scene of the crime. He had been incurred34 for funeral expenses.
waited for them and, after they had accomplished their mission, helped Joel and Joefrey get away. These are clear
 1 
For the injuries suffered by Erlindo Mana-ay and Perpetua Grace Gajeto, the trial court convicted the accused- Per Judge David A. Alfeche, Jr.
appellants of frustrated murder. This is correct because the unrebutted testimonies of Dr. Jaen and Dr. Superficial
showed that, without immediate and proper medical attention, the two would have died. 2 
Records (Crim. Case No. 43454), p. 4.

The penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the 3 
Records (Crim. Case No. 43455), p. 1.
principal in a frustrated felony. 35 The trial court correctly imposed on Joemarie Chua and Joel Basco the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12)
4 
years and one (1) day as maximum, such penalty corresponding to a minimum penalty of prision mayor and a Records (Crim. Case No. 43456), p. 1.
maximum penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. 5 
Records (Crim. Case No. 43457), p. 1.

Modification should, however, be made on the penalty to be imposed on Joefrey Basco. Considering the privileged 6 
TSN, pp. 1-64, Nov. 15, 1994.
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of reclusion temporal should be lowered to prision mayor. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within the range 7 
of prision correccional, and the maximum prision mayor medium considering the absence of mitigating and TSN, pp. 22-72, Nov. 24, 1994; TSN, pp. 4-19, Aug. 24, 1995.
aggravating circumstance.
8 
TSN, pp. 2-44, Nov. 9, 1994.
As accomplice, Agosto Brosas, was correctly sentenced to an indeterminate prison term ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and (1) day, of prision mayor, as 9 
TSN, pp. 19-59, Dec. 28, 1994; TSN, pp. 21-24, Aug. 24, 1995.
maximum.
10 
TSN, pp. 2-47, Feb. 15, 1995; TSN, pp. 18-30, Aug. 31, 1995.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City, is MODIFIED as follows:
11 
Exh. A (Crim. Case No. 43454); Records (Crim. Case No. 43454), p. 15.
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 43454 & 43455, accused-appellant Joefrey Basco is sentenced in each case to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision 12 
correccional and the maximum of which is eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium. TSN, pp. 2-21, Jan. 26, 1995; TSN, pp. 2-7, Feb. 3, 1995.

13 
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 43456 & 43457, accused-appellant Joefrey Basco is sentenced in each case to an Exh. A (Crim. Case No. 43455).
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is eight (8) years of prision mayor and the maximum of which is
14 
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. Exh. A (Crim. Case No. 43456); Records (Crim. Case No. 43456), p. 8.

15 
(3) Accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and solidarily, the heirs of Arsenio Gajeto a modified amount of TSN, pp. 6-10, Nov. 24, 1994.
P13,003.60 as actual damages.
16 
Exh. A (Criminal Case No. 43457)
In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
17 
TSN, pp. 15-16, Nov. 15, 1994.
SO ORDERED.
18 
TSN, pp. 5-32, April 5, 1995; TSN, p. 35, June 1, 1995; TSN, pp. 1-27, June 8, 1995.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
19 
Decision, pp. 25-28; Records, pp. 878-881.

20 
TSN, pp. 9-10, Nov. 24, 1994.
Footnotes:
21 
TSN, pp. 15-16, Feb. 8, 1995.
22 
TSN, pp. 20-21, Aug. 31, 1995. The case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur,
Branch 29, Bislig, finding accused George Cortes y Ortega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
23  sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.
TSN, pp. 52-54, Nov. 15, 1994.

24  On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur filed with the Regional Trial Court,
TSN, pp. 8-12, July 21, 1995.
Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes y Ortega, which reads
as follows:
25 
TSN, p. 19, Nov. 15, 1994.
"That on or about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at P. Lindo Street, Saint Paul
26 
People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31 (1996); People v. Abrenica, 252 SCRA 31 (1996); People v. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 District, Nangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
(1995); People v. Macario, 240 SCRA 531 (1995). above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a knife and with intent to kill did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assault and stabbed one Edlyn S. Gamboa, a 16 year
27 
REVISED PENAL CODE, ART. 8. old girl, thereby inflicting the latter multiple stab wounds on her body which caused her instantaneous death as
certified by the doctor, to the damage and prejudice of the victim's heirs.
28 
People v. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 (1996).
Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code."2
29 
REVISED PENAL CODE, ART. 8.
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her
house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn
30 
People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 (1922). Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuña. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by
accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn complied, accused
31 
TSN, p. 4, June 8, 1995. followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered
her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters
32 
away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help. At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was
People v. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 (1993); People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991); People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical
(1986); People v. Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 (1985). Clinic, where she expired.

33 
REVISED PENAL CODE, ART. 14, par. 16. Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had an
altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very drunk and
34 
Decision, p. 25; Exh. H to H-5 (Crim. Case No. 43456). the place was very dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning through
the radio vigilantes program.
35 
REVISED PENAL CODE, ART. 50.
On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused. 3 He entered a plea of guilty. 4 In virtue of his plea of
guilty, the trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of the plea by propounding questions to the
EN BANC
accused to find out if he understood his plea and the legal consequence thereof. Accused, assisted by counsel,
reiterated his plea of guilty and the extra judicial confession he executed before the police.
G.R. No. 137050            July 11, 2001
Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence of aggravating
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the mitigating circumstances that
vs. attended the commission of the crime.
GEORGE CORTES Y ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of
PARDO, J.: superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the commission of the crime. The accused,
on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty,
mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances attendant "The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of
found the existence of the aggravating circumstances and appreciated only the mitigating circumstance of plea of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating
guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the circumstance."10 Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.
appropriate penalty to be imposed on the accused. The trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and womanhood.11 In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the family of the victim
"Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances
in the amount of P60,000.00, and to pay damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and cost ."5
attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional,
Hence, this review.6 it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading in toxication to mitigate penalty must present
proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce
the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker
Accused raises the following errors imputed to the trial court:
and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime." 12

1. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior
Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information and
strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of the crime charged; and
considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is
not death but reclusion perpetua.
2. In imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only aggravating circumstance present was treachery
According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
and other circumstances attending the commission of the crime. intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759.
We agree with the accused that the prosecution did not prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. "The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a) the We also award P50,000.00 as moral damages in keeping with current jurisprudence. Moral damages is proper
time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to considering the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim on account of her untimely and gruesome
that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the death.13
accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act."7
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, in Criminal Case No. 2026
As to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the victim several times, the same convicting accused George Cortes y Ortega of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
could not be considered as cruelty because there was no showing that it was intended to prolong the suffering of imposed. In lieu of the death penalty, the accused George Cortes y Ortega is hereby sentenced to reclusion
the victim. "For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty
and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity, and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to
moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim the offender pay the costs of suit.
denotes sadism and consequently a marked degree of malice and perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various
successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the
SO ORDERED.
infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is
not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration." 8
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason that it was
Panganiban, J., abroad on official leave.
not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
(1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.
the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture." 9 In the case at bar, no evidence
suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
Footnotes subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of suit. 1 

1 An Information 2 for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was filed against Edgar Dawaton
 Original Record, Decision, pp. 35-37.
on 11 March 1999. When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, 3 but during the pre-trial on 7 May 1999, he
offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the prosecution, hence, the case
2
 Information, Rollo, pp. 6-7. proceeded to trial.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

3
 Original Record, Certificate of Arraignment, p. 31. The prosecution presented as witnesses the very persons who were with the accused and the victim during the
incident, namely, Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez. The prosecution also presented Generosa Tupaz, the
mother of the victim, to prove the civil liability of the accused.
4
 Ibid.
The evidence for the prosecution: On 20 September 1998 Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in his house
5
 Original Record, Decision, pp. 35-37, at p. 37. in Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares
dropped by at about 12:00 o’clock noon followed by Domingo Reyes shortly after. All three (3) guests of
6
Esmeraldo were residents of Sitio Garden. They started drinking soon after. At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon
 On July 20, 1999, we accepted the case. Rollo, p. 15. and after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they went to the house of Amado Dawaton, Edgar’s uncle,
located about twenty (20) meters away from Esmeraldo’s house. They stayed at the balcony of the house and
7
 People v. Torres, G. R. No. 138046, December 8, 2000. continued drinking. Amado Dawaton was not in.

8 Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden bench, lying down on his right side facing
 People v. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767, 775-776 [2000], citing People v. Dayug, 49 Phil. 423 [1926]; People v. Estorco, G.
Domingo and Edgar using his right hand for a pillow. Edgar, Domingo and Esmeraldo continued drinking until they
R. No. 111941, April 27, 2000.
finished another bottle of gin.
9
 People v. Gallego, G. R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000; People v. Bohol, G. R. No. 130587, July 12, 2000. At about 3:30 in the afternoon, twenty (20) minutes after Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up and left for
his house. When he returned he brought with him a stainless knife with a blade 2 to 3 inches long. Without a
10
 People v. Casturia, G. R. No. 128819, November 20, 2000, citing People v. Carillo, G. R. No. 129528, June 8, 2000. word, he approached Leonides who was sleeping and stabbed him near the base of his neck. 4 Awakened and
surprised, Leonides got up and blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?" 5 Instead of answering, Edgar again stabbed Leonides
on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on Leonides’ arm.
11
 Mari v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 127694, May 31, 2000.
Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar who was much bigger grabbed the collar of his shirt and thus effectively
12
 People v. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270 [1999]; People v. Tambis, 311 SCRA 430 [1999]. prevented him from running away. Edgar then repeatedly stabbed Leonides who, despite Edgar’s firm hold on
him, was still able to move about twenty (20) meters away from the house of Amado Dawaton before he fell to
13
the ground at the back of Esmeraldo’s house. But even then, Edgar still continued to stab him. Edgar only stopped
 People v. de la Cruz, G. R. No. 128362, January 16, 2001; People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, 717 [1997]. stabbing Leonides when the latter already expired. Edgar then ran away towards the house of his uncle Carlito
Baras situated behind the cockpit.
EN BANC
Domingo and Esmeraldo were positioned a few meters away from where Leonides was sleeping when he was
[G.R. No. 146247. September 17, 2002.] initially assaulted by Edgar. They were shocked by what happened but other than pleading for Edgar to stop they
were unable to help Leonides.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, v. EDGAR DAWATON, Accused.
Domingo left for his house soon after the stabbing started as he did not want to get involved. Nonetheless he felt
DECISION pity for Leonides so he returned a few minutes later.

By then, Leonides was already dead and people had already gathered at the site. The mayor who was in a nearby
BELLOSILLO, J.: cement factory arrived and instructed them not to go near the body. They pointed to the direction where Edgar
fled. Edgar was later arrested at the house of his uncle, Carlito Baras, at Sitio Aves, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan.

Accused-appellant Edgar Dawaton was the sole witness for the defense. He did not deny that he stabbed
EDGAR DAWATON was found by the trial court guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to death,
Leonides Lavares but insisted that he was provoked into stabbing him. Edgar claimed that the night prior to the
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 plus the accessory penalties provided by law, without
stabbing incident, or on 19 September 1998, his uncle Armando Ramirez went to his house to welcome his return
from Cavite where he worked as a carpenter. They started drinking gin at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening and
ended at 3:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day. He slept and woke up at 6:00 o’clock in the morning of 20 The conclusion that accused-appellant murdered Leonides Lavares was sufficiently proved by the testimonies of
September 1998. prosecution witnesses Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez who both witnessed the fatal stabbing. This was not
refuted by the accused himself who admitted that he stabbed the victim three (3) times before his mind went
Apparently, he did not have enough of the prior evening’s drinking orgy. He went to his uncle’s house early that blank and could no longer recall what he did after that.
morning and after his uncle bought two (2) bottles of gin they started drinking again. Domingo Reyes arrived at
around 7:30 in the morning and joined them. Esmeraldo Cortez joined them about 12:00 o’clock noon and bought Treachery clearly attended the killing. The accused attacked the victim while the latter was in deep slumber owing
two (2) more bottles of gin. Later, the group with the exception of Armando Ramirez transferred to the house of to the excessive amount of alcohol he imbibed. We are not persuaded by the version of the accused that the
Esmeraldo upon the latter’s invitation and drank two (2) more bottles of gin. victim threatened to harm him with a grenade and that it was only to prevent this from happening that he was
forced to stab Leonides. We defer instead to the judgment of the trial court which gave more credence to the
In Edgar’s version of the stabbing incident, a drunk and angry Leonides arrived at about 2:30 in the afternoon and version of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as it was in a better position to decide on the question of
demanded that they — he and Edgar — return candles (magbalikan [tayo] ng kandila). 6 Leonides was godfather of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during trial.
a son of Edgar. Leonides also cursed and threatened to hang a grenade on Edgar (P - t - ng ina mo. Hintayin mo ako.
Kukuha ako ng granada at sasabitan kita!). 7  According to the prosecution witnesses, the victim had no chance to defend himself as he was dead drunk and
fast asleep. He had no inkling at all of what was going to happen to him since there was no prior argument or
According to Edgar, he tried to calm down Leonides but the latter insisted on going home purportedly to get a untoward incident between him and the accused. From all indications they were on friendly terms; as in fact they
grenade. Alarmed because he knew Leonides had a grenade, Edgar went home to look for a bladed weapon. He were even kumpadres. No one knew nor expected that when the accused momentarily excused himself, it was
already had a knife with him but he thought it was short. Not finding another weapon, he returned to Esmeraldo’s for the purpose of looking for a knife, and without any warning, stabbing the victim who was sleeping.
house.
There is treachery when the attack is upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense
When he returned, Leonides was still in Esmeraldo’s house and had joined in the drinking. He sat opposite Leonides whatsoever, 14 or a person who was dead drunk and sleeping on a bench and had no chance to defend himself.
who resumed his tirades against him. 15 Clearly, the attack was not only sudden but also deliberately adopted by the accused to ensure its execution
without risk to himself.
Again Leonides started to leave for his house purportedly to get a grenade. Afraid that Leonides would make good
his threat, Edgar held on to him and stabbed him. He did not know where and exactly how many times he struck The accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of mitigating and
Leonides but he recalled doing it three (3) times before his mind went blank (nablangko). 8 Edgar also claimed that alternative circumstances in his favor. 16 He avers that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of
he was in this mental condition when he left Leonides and ran to the house of Carlito Baras. He did not know that he guilty. We disagree. While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he was charged
had already killed Leonides, only that he stabbed him thrice. He regained his senses only when he reached his uncle with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty. We have ruled that an offer to enter a plea of
Carlito’s house. guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of
The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. 17 
Edgar further said that he sought his uncle’s help so he could surrender but he was told to wait because his uncle
was then taking a bath. It was while waiting for his uncle when the policemen arrived to arrest him. He maintained Furthermore, Sec. 2, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the consent of the offended
that he voluntarily went with them. party and the prosecutor before an accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily
included in the offense charged. We note that the prosecution rejected the offer of the accused.
The medico-legal certificate dated 24 September 1998 issued by Dr. Ernesto C. del Rosario 9 showed that the victim
sustained a stab wound at the back and ten (10) stab wounds in front. He also had slash wounds on his left hand Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as he himself admitted that he
and his tongue was cut off. The immediate cause of death was determined to be "Hypovolemic Shock due to was arrested at his uncle’s residence. 18 The following elements must be present for voluntary surrender to be
hemorrhage, multiple stabbed (sic) wounds." 10  appreciated: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority, and, (c) the surrender must be voluntary. 19 
On 20 October 1999 the parties entered into several stipulations which were embodied in an Order. 11 Specifically,
they admitted the veracity of the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 21 September 1998 executed by SPO2 Ramil D. Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the
Gamboa and PO3 Gerry M. Fabros, 12 the police officers who arrested the accused; the genuineness and due policemen when they came for him. This attempt at semantics is futile and absurd. That he did not try to escape
execution of the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Ernesto C. del Rosario; and, the authenticity of the certificate or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender. A
of death 13 also issued by Dr. del Rosario. Thus, the presentation of the arresting officers and Dr. del Rosario as surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
witnesses was dispensed with. unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and capture. 20 It is also settled that voluntary
On 20 November 1999 the trial court convicted Edgar Dawaton of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him surrender cannot be appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came
to death. looking for the accused. 21 

We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant; we however modify the penalty imposed on him. Moreover, the evidence submitted by the prosecution belies the claim of the accused that he intended to submit
himself to the authorities. The joint affidavit of the arresting officers, the veracity of which was admitted by the SO ORDERED.
parties and evidenced by a 20 October 1999 Order of the trial court, revealed that they chanced upon the accused
trying to escape from the rear of the cockpit building when they came looking for him. 22  Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Similarly, there is no factual basis to credit the accused with the mitigating circumstance of outraged feeling
analogous or similar 23 to passion and obfuscation. 24 Other than his self-serving allegations, there was no evidence
Endnotes:
that the victim threatened him with a grenade. Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez testified that there was no
prior altercation or disagreement between Edgar and Leonides during the drinking spree, and they did not know of
any reason for Edgar’s hostility and violence. On the contrary, Esmeraldo Cortez even recalled seeing the two (2) in
a playful banter (lambingan) during the course of their drinking 25 indicating that the attack on the accused was
completely unexpected. 1. Decision penned by Judge Rebecca R. Mariano, RTC Br. — 96,
Baler, Aurora; Records, p. 129.
The accused would want us to reconsider the penalty imposed on him on account of his not being a recidivist. He
contends that an appreciation of this factor calls for a reduction of the penalty. 2. Records, p. 1.

We are not persuaded. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance the presence of which increases the penalty. The 3. Id., p. 19.
converse however, that is, non-recidivism, is not a mitigating circumstance which will necessarily reduce the
penalty. Nonetheless, we hold that the trial court erred in not appreciating the alternative circumstance of 4. TSN, 9 September 1999, p. 3; Esmeraldo Cortez testified that
intoxication in favor of the accused. Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be Leonides Levares was first stabbed on his upper left shoulder, TSN, 21
considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is October 1999, p. 3.
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. 5. TSN, 21 October 1999, p. 3.

The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the prosecution 6. TSN, 19 July 2000, p. 7.
witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo
Cortez, each one drinking at least a bottle. 26 It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin 7. Ibid.
at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents. 27 In addition, Esmeraldo
testified that when Edgar and Leonides arrived at his house that noon, they were already intoxicated. 28 There 8. TSN, 19 July 2000, p. 8.
being no indication that the accused was a habitual drunkard or that his alcoholic intake was intended to fortify his
resolve to commit the crime, the circumstance of intoxication should be credited in his favor. 9. Records, p. 8.

Consequently, we find that the trial court erroneously imposed the penalty of death. The accused was charged with 10. Ibid.
murder for which the law provides a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised
Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in 11. Records, p. 60.
this case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there 12. Id., p. 11.
existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua. 13. Id., p. 9.

The trial court correctly ordered the accused to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the 14. People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116524, 18 January 1996, 252 SCRA 31.
victim without need of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and
that the accused was responsible therefor. 29 The heirs are also entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2206 of 15. People v. de Guia, G.R. No. 123172, 2 October 1997, 280 SCRA
the New Civil Code on account of the mental anguish which they suffered, and the amount of P50,000.00 is 141.
considered reasonable according to existing jurisprudence. 30 
16. Appellant’s Brief, p. 5; Rollo, p. 45.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding the accused EDGAR DAWATON guilty of MURDER
qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion 17. People v. Noble, 77 Phil 93 (1946).
perpetua. The accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Leonides Lavares P50,000.00 in civil indemnity and P50,000.00
in moral damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary 18. TSN, 19 July 2000, p. 10.
 19. People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, 21 August 2001. That on or about April 2, 1997 in the municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
20. Ibid. premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and set on fire one Mary Jane Del Carmen with the use of gas or combustible liquid which caused
21. People v. Sumalpong, G.R. No. 124705, 20 January 20 1998, 284 her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Mary Jane Del Carmen.
SCRA 464, citing People v. Flores, G.R. Nos. 103801-02, 19 October
1994, 237 SCRA 653.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 (Underscoring supplied)
22. Par. 5 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the arresting officers states, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Arraigned on August 11, 1998,2 appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

"Na, inabutan namin siya (Dawaton) na papatakas na sa likod ng From the evidence for the prosecution, the following are established:
Sabungan ng Dingalan ng Sitio Aves, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora at
malapit na kami sa kanya (Dawaton) ay bigla siyang may ibinalibag na
patalim sa sukalan bago humarap sa amin."cralaw virtua1aw library At around 1:00 a.m. of April 2, 1997, Andres Cadavis, a co-tricycle driver-friend of appellant, while on board his
tricycle in front of and about 5 meters away 3 from the house shared by appellant and his common-law wife Mary
23. Art. 13(10), The Revised Penal Code. Jane (the victim) along Little Baguio, Wawa III, Rosario, Cavite, within the vicinity of the waiting area for
passengers,4 heard appellant shouting "Putang-ina mo."5 Out of curiosity,6 Cadavis stopped and "heard sighs as if
24. Art. 13 (6), id. the woman was crying."7 He also heard "noise . . . kalabugan"8 and perceived that the couple had a row.9

25. TSN, 21 October 1999, p. 3. Cadavis soon left the scene when a passenger "on a special service" boarded his tricycle whom he ferried to
Pandawan, barangay Sapa.10
26. TSN, 9 September 1999, p. 8.

27. TSN, 21 October 1999, p. 7. After Cadavis left, prosecution witness Alfredo Guinaja, Jr., also a co-tricycle driver of appellant and who was at
his house across the street and about six meters away 11 from the house of appellant repairing an airgun, 12 heard
28. Id., p. 6. some thuds coming from the house of appellant. 13 Peering through his window, Guinaja saw appellant carrying
his and Mary Jane’s child and jumping out of the about one meter high window of his "very bright[ly]" lighted
29. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 135666, 20 July 2001. house.14 Upon seeing him, appellant, in a "soft voice,"15 uttered "Pare, nasusunog kami" and asked for "tulong."16

30. People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, 19 July 2001. Guinaja shouted for help, got a bucket of water, proceeded to the house of appellant and Mary Jane and after
forcibly opening its closed door,17 he poured water on the "burning thing"18 partly slumped on a bamboo
chair.19When the flame was extinguished, the burning thing turned out to be the body of Mary Jane who lay
EN BANC unconscious.20In the meantime, appellant’s sister Erlinda Estillore Monton, whose house was about two meters
away from appellant’s house, went inside the couple’s house and covered the victim Mary Jane with a blanket.
Appellant remained outside the house and never made any attempt to return inside. 21
G.R. No. 140348            July 18, 2003
Eleazar Valencia, Jr., who was renting the house of appellant’s mother adjacent to that of appellant, responding
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  to Guinaja’s call, arrived and carried the victim to Guinaja’s tricycle 22 within the view of Cadavis who had in the
vs. meantime returned after he conducted his passenger to barangay Sapa.
GERRYMEL ESTILLORE Y POSTICO, appellant.
Guinaja, together with appellant, brought the victim to the Divine Grace Hospital in Rosario, Cavite where they
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: were followed by appellant’s sister Erlinda. At the hospital, Mary Jane begged Erlinda: "Ate tulungan mo
ako";23 she also begged Guinaja: "Jun tulungan mo ako."24 Guinaja soon left to inform appellant’s mother and the
On August 1, 1997, appellant Gerrymel Estillore y Postico was charged before the Cavite City Regional Trial Court victim’s mother about the incident.25
(RTC) with murder allegedly committed as follows:
Learning that the victim had suffered severe burns and was going to be brought to the Divine Grace Hospital in
Rosario, Cavite, Cadavis repaired thereto where he saw appellant, Erlinda, and the victim in the emergency
room26in the company of nurses. He there heard the victim stammer "Ate tulungan mo ako" and "Ate tulungan mo Also two days after the incident, Cadavis gave a sworn statement 31 before the local police stating the following,
ako dahil sinunog ako."27 among other things:

As the Divine Grace Hospital did not have the necessary apparatus to handle the burns as severe as those suffered 05. T:         Maaari mo bang isalaysay kung anong pangyayari itong iyong nasaksihan?
by Mary Jane, she was transferred to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila 28 where she expired of 3rd degree
burns in the afternoon of the same day.
   S:         Noon pong oras at araw na nabangit ay kasalukuyang namamasada po ako ng traysikel sa Wawa III noong
ako po ay matapat sa bahay nina Gerry Estillore ay narining ko na may nag-aaway at nadinig ko ang boses ni Gerry
A day after the incident, or on April 3, 1997, at about 10:00 a.m., Rosario, Cavite Police Officer (PO)2 Fernando na galit na galit at minumura ang kanyang asawa tumigil po ako at nakinig sa kanilang usapan nadinig ko po na
Garcia conducted an investigation at the 3 x 4 meter dwelling of the couple, which was "attached" to the house of nagmumura si Gerry ng "PUTANG INA MO" at nakadinig po ako ng kalabugan sa loob ng bahay.
appellant’s parents, where he found a gas lamp and a match near the door, 29 about one and a half meters away
from the bamboo chair where part of the body of the victim was found slumped.
06. T:         Ano ang ginawa mo ng madinig mo na minumura ni Gerry Estillore ang kanyang asawa at nakadinig ka
ng kalabugan sa loob ng bahay?
Two days after the incident, or on April 4, 1997, Guinaja gave a sworn statement 30 before the local police wherein
he stated the following, among other things:
   S:         Naagaw po ang pansin ko ng may sumakay po sa aking pasahero at pagkahatid ko po ay nagmamadali po
akong bumalik sa lugar ng bahay ni Gerry Estillore at nakita ko na itong sina Jun at Nuno na sakay sa traysikel at
04. T:         Maaari mo bang isalaysay kung anong klaseng pangyayari itong iyong nasaksihan? ako po ay tumuloy sa bahay nina Gerry Estillore at nalaman ko po na ang asawa ni Gerry Estillore ay nasunog don
sa bahay na pinag-awayan nina Gerry at ng kanyang asawa.
     S:         Noon pong ika-2 ng Abril 1997, humigit kumulang sa ika-1:00 ng umaga sa Bgy. Wawa III, Rosario, Cavite
nasa loob po ako ng bahay namin at kasalukuyang ginagawa ko ang isang Air Gun matapos ko pong gawin ang Air 07. T:         Ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
Gun nakadinig po ako ng kalabugan sa katapat kong bahay sa bahay nina Gerry Estillore at Mary Jane ang ginawa ko
po ay sumilip ako sa bintana at nakita ko po na nagliliyab ang loob ng bahay nina Gerry at ang ginawa ko po ay
   S:         Sumunod po ako sa hospital at nakita ko po si Maryjane Estillore y del Carmen na sunog at nadinig ko po
nagsisigaw po ako ng sunog sunog at ako po ay dali-daling kumuha ng tubig at nagpunta po ako sa bahay nina Gerry
ang sabi niya na "ATE TULUNGAN MO AKO SINUNOG AKO PAULIT-ULIT PO NIYA ITONG SINASABI AT NAKIKIUSAP
dala ang isang container na tubig at nakita ko itong si Gerry na nagpapagpag ng apoy sa katawan at ako po ay
SA DOKTOR NA GAMUTIN PO NINYO AKO PARANG AWA NA NINYO." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
pumasok sa loob ng bahay at nakita ko po ang isang bagay na nagliliyab at ito ay dali-dali kong binuhusan ng tubig at
natakot po ako ng mawala ang apoy ay tao pala ang binuhusan ko na nasusunog.
In connection with the death of the victim, her family incurred P28,000.00 for funeral expenses, P10,000.00 of
which had been reimbursed by the Social Security System (SSS), P3,000.00 for the autopsy of her body, and
05. T:         Noong maapula mo ang apoy ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari?
P500.00 for gasoline and food.

     S:         Pumasok sa loob ng bahay si Linda kapatid ni Gerry Estillore at ang ginawa po ay inuga-uga po si Mary Jane
Gathered from the post mortem examination conducted on the body of the victim on April 4, 1997 by
at ng mag-kamalay po si Jane ay sumigaw at ang sabi ay "ATE TULUNGAN MO AKO" at ako naman po ay dali-dali
prosecution witness Dr. Renato Bautista, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), are
kong inihanda ang traysikel ko at ang sabi ko ay DALI-DALI Gerry dalhin natin ito sa ospital at habang nasa traysikel
the following:
na sina Jane at Gerry ay wala po akong nadinig at noon pong nasa hospital na po ay nagsalita uli si Jane at ang sabi
ay "JUN TULUNGAN MO AKO ATE TULUNGAN MO AKO".
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS32
06. T:         Ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari?
Markedly cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
     S:         Pinuntahan ko po ang magulang ni Jerry at pagkatapos naman po ay ang magulang ni Jane at sinabi ko ang
nangyari. Body previously embalmed

07. T:         Mayroon pa bang ibang nangyari? Embalming wounds, sutured: Neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 4.0 cm. long, trocar, abdomen, right upper
quadrant, 4.0 cm. long.
     S:         Noon pong ika-3 ng Abril 1997, ay may dumating na mga reporter sa bahay nina Gerry at ng ako po a
kausap ng mga reporter ay sinenyasan po ako ni Linda na huwag daw po akong mag-bbigay ng salaysay. Burns, 3rd degree, face, 20.0 x 22.0, 5th to 6th degrees of comprising approximately 50-60% of the total body
(Underscoring supplied) surface invol[v]ing the anterior and posterior chest, abdomen and lumbar regions extending to the left gluteal
region, both upper and lower extreximities, anteriorly and posteriorly.
Wounds, incised: Upper extremities, postero-medial aspect, right, 20.0 cm. long, postero-lateral aspect, left, 19.0 Q         Is it possible for the victim to have splashed the flammable on herself, the face and on her body?
cm. long.
A         If the victim tried to burn herself, the face, the neck, the anterior chest together with the entire abdomen
Brain and other visceral organs, markedly congested. would have been affected and not on the posterior portion, the backside, your Honor.

Stomach, filled with partially digested rice and other food particles. Q         So there is a possibility that the assailant went at the back or moved to the side or moved towards the back
of the person and poured gasoline on her back?
CAUSE OF DEATH: Burns, severe.
A         Not necessarily, your Honor, to the point that if you are doused with accelerant, the tendency of the victim
is to turn away, to turn his back on the assailant to the point that in so doing, part of the accelerant will be
By Dr. Bautista’s opinion, an accelerant like gasoline, gas and lighter fluid 33 was splashed on the body of the victim,
poured at the back of the victim. Initially, if you are facing one another and somebody is trying to pour flammable
as shown by the spread and extent of the burns.34
material at you, your tendency is to turn backward and in so doing, time will come that part of the accelerant will
hit you at the back and when he or she sets you on fire, definitely that portion of the back will also get burned if
As to whether the victim could have uttered the statements attributed to her by the other prosecution witnesses, there is that accelerant on it.
Dr. Bautista averred that the victim was physically capable of speaking clearly, or at least in a mumbling manner,
after she was burned35 since there was no sign that her tongue was damaged. 36
Q         You finding is more consistent on the fact that an outside element is responsible for the burning of the
victim?
Dr. Bautista ruled out the possibility of suicide based on the location of the burns 37 and their spread on Mary Jane’s
body,38 and opined that his findings are consistent with a third party being responsible for the burns suffered by the
A         Yes, your Honor.
victim.39 Thus, he declared, quoted verbatim:

Q         Inconsistent with the fact that she herself could have doused flammable on her body and lighted the
COURT’S QUESTIONS:
same?

Q         Is it possible, doctor, that the victim herself poured flammable over her head and burned herself?
A         Yes, your Honor, inconsistent.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A         The possibility exists, your Honor, but since there was no burn located on top of the head, as I mentioned
The defense suggested that the victim Mary Jane committed suicide.41
earlier, the vertex, I don’t think that thing happened here because if she poured herself this accellerant and lighted
herself, this will be a very, very painful way to commit suicide which is not in our culture to the point that if one
would like to commit suicide specially among females, they can just take poison or slash the wrist. Appellant’s version goes: On arriving home at about 10:00 p.m. on April 1, 1997 after watching basketball on
television at a neighbor’s house,42 Mary Jane, who was unusually washing clothes at that particular time, asked
him if he wanted to eat and he answered in the negative. He then summoned her to sleep, but she paid him no
Q         So the fact that the hair of the victim was not completely burned rules out the possibility that she poured
heed;43hence, he helped her wash clothes, after which he went to bed while she just sat beside him. 44
flammable over her head?

He was later roused from sleep by the smell of gas. Upon opening his eyes, he saw the victim standing in front of
A         Yes, your Honor. I would like to call the attention, as far as the area of the burn is concerned, you will notice
the door inside their house45 with her clothes on her "right thigh from the middle portion of it upward" on
that the burns as far as the diagram is concerned are patches located on the face, on the different portions of the
fire,46prompting him to rush towards her and embrace her in an attempt to put out the fire 47 in the course of
anterior chest, at the back and abdomen together with the lower and upper extremities.
which he also got burned on the left side of his body and on his left arm.48

Q         Are you saying that an outside force probably splashed the gasoline on her face or on the body and then
He then shouted for help49 but he got confused as the fire spread on the victim’s body. Thinking that the entire
lighted the victim?
house was going to be burned down, he carried their child and jumped out of the window, and brought the child
to the adjacent house belonging to his mother which was being rented out. 50 On seeing Guinaja on the other side
A         That is what I am trying to impart, your Honor. It is possible that the victim received the splashes of that of the road, he asked him for help. Responding, Guinaja rushed towards their house and poured water on the
accelerant in a way that the accelerant was placed in a container and the assailant tried to splash her with the victim.51His sister Erlinda also helped by putting a blanket around the victim 52 who, as she was being brought to
accelerant several times and then lighted her up explaining the fact that the burns that resulted were the so-called the hospital, uttered "Papa, I love you."53
patterned burns.
Defense witness Erlinda, sister of appellant, corroborated appellant’s testimony regarding her extension of 1) As appellant and Mary Jane were quarrelling, thuds (kalabugan) were heard immediately before the latter was
assistance to the victim and the utterance by the victim of "Papa, I love you." burned;

Erlinda disputed prosecution witness Cadavis’ claim that he heard the victim utter repeatedly at the hospital "Ate 2) Only appellant, Mary Jane, and their child were inside the house at the time of the incident;
tulungan mo ako, sinunog ako," averring that the victim "would not ask any help from [her] if she was burned by
others."54
3) After appellant jumped out of the window, he remained outside and did not return to the house to give succor
or comfort to Mary Jane.
Finding for the prosecution and noting that the killing was attended "by the aggravating circumstance that the
accused employed means to weaken the defense by splashing an accelerant on the victim’s face, which mode of
4) While Mary Jane was being carried to the tricycle and while she and appellant were on the tricycle, the latter
attack was calculated to insure the commission of the crime without risk to the offender," the trial court convicted
did not talk to her or utter a word of comfort despite the claim of the defense that the victim was uttering "Papa,
appellant in the appealed Decision,55 the dispositive portion of which reads:
I love you."

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this court hereby finds the accused Gerrymel Estillore y
5) The victim pleaded for help from Guinaja whom she addressed as "Jun" and appellant’s sister Erlinda for help,
Postico guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the Information, accordingly hereby
but never from appellant.
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death; and he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
P50,000.00 as indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P21,500.00 as actual damages. (Emphasis supplied).
6) The police found a gas lamp and a match by the door of the couple’s house after the incident.
Hence, this automatic review, with appellant claiming in his Appellant’s Brief that:
7) The victim repeatedly uttered at the hospital "Ate tulungan mo ako, sinunog ako" and begged the doctor to
treat her "parang awa na ninyo."
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE
UNCORROBORATED THEORY, CONJECTURES, SUSPICION, SPECULATION AND SURMISES OF THE MEDICAL OFFICER
WHO CONDUCTED THE AUTOPSY ON THE CADAVER OF THE VICTIM. (Underscoring supplied) 56 8) The victim suffered 3rd degree burns on her "face, different portions of the anterior chest, at the back and
abdomen together with the lower and upper extremeties."
Appellant contends that the records of the case will show that there was no direct and positive evidence to prove
that it was he who burned the victim to death; nor was there any set of circumstantial evidence upon which his guilt If by appellant’s claim, he, on being awakened by the smell of gas, he saw the victim standing in front of the door
beyond reasonable doubt may be inferred. He thus concludes that the trial court erred in relying totally and with her "right thigh from the middle portion of it upward" burning, he could have put off the fire, or at least
completely on the theory, conjecture and surmises of Dr. Bautista. summoned for help, or open the nearby door of their 3 x 4 meter-house and push her out if he really thought that
the entire house would be burned. But he did not. Instead, he carried their child, left the victim burning, and
exited through the window, and it was only after Guinaja had come out of his house, after being attracted by the
Appellant’s contention is bereft of merit.
"brightness" of the fire, that he (appellant), in a "soft voice," asked for help. Such line of conduct does not speak
of his innocence. His explanation of how his left side of his body and his left arm got burned — while embracing
The trial court dwelt on Dr. Bautista’s findings only to "belie" the suggestion of the defense that the victim the victim in an attempt to put off the fire — does not convince for, as earlier stated, if by his claim, the victim’s
committed suicide. "right thigh from the middle portion of it upward" was burning, he could have easily extinguished the fire. Why he
got burned could possibly have been occasioned when, in light of the doctor’s opinion, "[t]he assailant tried to
splash [the victim] with the accelerant several times and then lighted her lamp."
In determining whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court considered the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution, which included the facts testified to by Cadavis and Guinaja whom it found
to be both friends of appellant and who have no motive to falsely testify against him. If, by the claim of the defense, the victim uttered "Papa, I love you" as she was being carried to, and while on
board the tricycle, to thereby suggest that appellant had nothing to do with her burning, why did not appellant
utter a word, as he himself admitted as did his sister? Would not an innocent "spouse," under the circumstances,
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
have uttered words and showed gestures of endearment, comfort and assurance that she would be alright?
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.57
If the victim had committed suicide as suggested by the defense, why would she beg the doctor at the Divine
Grace Hospital to help her, "parang awa na ninyo," just as she did seek help from Guinaja and Erlinda, but never
The testimonies of Cadavis and Guinaja proved the following material circumstances to be present immediately
from appellant.
before, during, and after the burning of the victim Mary Jane:
Appellant’s sister Erlinda’s denial that the victim had told her in the hospital that "sinunog ako," she (Erlinda) Costs de oficio.
averring that the victim "would not ask any help from [her] if she was burned by others," does not lie not only
because such justification defies comprehension but also because of the unassailed credibility of Cadavis who early
SO ORDERED.
on or two days after the incident stated in his sworn statement before the police that the victim had made such
utterance.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
It cannot then be gainsaid that a combination of all these enumerated circumstances, along with the unrefutted
Quisumbing, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
opinion of Dr. Bautista, that:

A x x x It is possible that the victim received the splashes of that accelerant in a way that the accelerant was placed
in a container and the assailant tried to splash her with the accelerant several times and then lighted her up
explaining the fact that the burns that resulted were the so-called patterned burns. (Underscoring supplied), Footnotes

1 
points to appellant as the one who set the victim on fire which caused her death. Information, Records at 1-2.

2
Appellant having failed to disprove the prosecution evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the  Id. at 23.
affirmance of his conviction for murder under Article 248, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is in order.
3
 TSN, October 12, 1998, at 28.
This brings us now to the imposable penalty. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance that
appellant employed means to weaken the defense and accordingly sentenced him to death. 4 
Id. at 24-25.

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, however, that every complaint or information should state not 5
 Id. at 8-9.
only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. 58 In the case at bar, the information did not specifically
allege that appellant employed means to weaken the defense nor show how the act which resulted in the death of 6 
the victim was committed. The said aggravating circumstance cannot thus be appreciated. Id. at 30.

7
The penalty for the crime of Murder for which appellant is liable is reclusion perpetua to death. As there is neither  Id. at 53.
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the case at bar, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
applied conformably with Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. 8
 Id. at 9.

As for damages, while the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages without need of proof in line with the 9
 Id. at 8.
policy of the Court to award the same in case of violent death, 59 consistent with current case law, the award by the
trial court of P100,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.60 10
 Id. at 39.

With respect to actual damages sustained by the heirs of the victim, the same may only be awarded if duly 11
supported by receipts.61 Since only the funeral expenses of P28,000.00, less the admitted reimbursement by the SSS  TSN, December 14, 1998 at 7.
of P10,000.00, and the autopsy expenses of P3,000.00 are duly supported by receipts, the award of P21,500.00
must be reduced to P21,000.00.62 12 
Id. at 10.

13 
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gerrymel Estillore y Id. at 11.
Postico is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with accompanying accessory penalty therefor. He is further ordered to 14
 Id. at 12, 23, 24.
pay the heirs of the victim, Mary Jane del Carmen, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the further sum of P21,000.00 as actual damages.
15 
Id. at 46.
16 37
 Id. at 12, 46.  Id. at 58.

17 38
 Id. at 13-14.  Id. at 59-60.

18 39
 Id. at 14.  Id. at 62.

19 40
 Id. at 15; TSN, October 13, 1998 at 17.  Id. at 58-62.

20 41
 TSN, December 14, 1998 at 26.  TSN, February 9, 1999 at 48.

21 42
 Id. at 53.  TSN, April 14, 1999 at 57.

22 43
 Id. at 15-16; TSN, February 9, 1999 at 50.  Id. at 25.

23 44
 TSN, December 14, 1998 at 35-36.  Id. at 26.

24 45
 Id. at 36.  Id. at 28.

25 46
 Id. at 31.  Id. at 27.

26 47
 TSN, October 12, 1998 at 42.  Id. at 29.

27 48
 Id. at 44; Records at 9.  Id. at 38.

28 49
 TSN, October 26, 1998 at 8.  Id. at 62.

29 50
 Id. at 9; Exhibit "D," photograph of gas lamp and match, Records at 76.  Id. at 31-32.

30 51
 Exhibit "I," Records at 79.  Id. at 34.

31 52
 Exhibit "B," Records at 9, 68.  Id.

32 53
 Exhibit "M," Records at 63.  Id. at 36.

33 54
 TSN, December 15, 1998 at 32-33.  TSN, February 9, 1999 at 36.

34 55
 Exhibits "L" and "L-1," photographs of the burned body of the victim, Records at 62.  Records at 118-130.

35 56
 TSN, Dec. 15, 1998 at 52, 57.  Rollo at 51-56.

36 57
 Id. at 55.  Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 4.
58
 Rule 110, Section 8 states in pertinent part: unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, being the stepfather of Maricel A. Hilboy, with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation have sexual intercourse with the said private complainant, a 13-
year old minor, against her will and without her consent as evidenced by a medical certificate marked as Annex
Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
"A" hereof, to the damage and prejudice of said Maricel A. Hilboy.
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statue
punishing it. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

See People v. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679, 695-696 (2001) (citation omitted). Naga City, for Calabanga, Camarines Sur, January 22, 1997.

59
 People v. Umayam, G.R. No. 134572, April 18, 2002, at 11-12 (citations omitted), citing People v. Caboquin, G.R. Crim. Case No. RTC’97-169:
No. 137613, November 14, 2001.
xxx
60
 People v. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679, 696 (2001) (citation omitted).
That on or about 12:00 o’clock midnight of December 14, 1996 at Zone 6, Barangay Tamban, Municipality of
61
 People v. Feliciano, 365 SCRA 613, 632-633 (2001) (citations omitted). Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, being the stepfather of Maricel A.
62 Hilboy, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation have sexual intercourse with the said private
 Exhibit "A" at 74 and Exhibit "B" at 87.
complainant, a 13 year old minor, against her will and without her consent as evidenced by a medical certificate
marked as "Annex A" hereof, to the damage and prejudice of said Maricel A. Hilboy.
EN BANC
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
G.R. No. 138720-21      March 19, 2002
Naga City, Philippines, January 22, 1997.1
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
On April 4, 1997, accused-appellant Marcelo Esuela, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty
MARCELO ESUELA, accused-appellant.
in both cases. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Testifying for the prosecution, Maricel A. Hilboy, then 14 years old, declared that she was born on January 5,
1983.2Accused-appellant Marcelo Esuela was her stepfather 3 being the common-law husband of her mother,
Before us for automatic review is the joint decision, dated 14 April 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Calabanga, Concepcion Abadesa.1âwphi1.nêt
Camarines Sur, Branch 63 in Criminal Cases No. RTC ‘97-168 and RTC ‘97-169, finding accused-appellant Marcelo
Esuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape committed against his stepdaughter Maricel A.
Maricel recalled that on December 14, 1996 at around 12:00 o’clock midnight, she was sleeping inside their house
Hilboy and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each count.
when she was awakened and found out that she was already naked. 4 Accused-appellant Esuela was already on
top of her, inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but she could not shout because Esuela’s hand was
These criminal cases stemmed from two separate informations filed against accused-appellant Marcelo Esuela for covering her mouth.5 Before dismounting, accused-appellant warned her not to tell her mother about what
the acts of rape committed sometime in 1995 and 1996 when Maricel A. Hilboy was 13 years old. The informations happened; otherwise, he would inflict physical injuries upon her. Thereafter, accused-appellant Esuela left her,
for both cases are as follows: and she just kept on crying.6 She also testified that her stepbrothers and stepsisters were sleeping near her but
they were not awakened while the rape was taking place. 7 Her mother was sleeping on the other part of the
Crim. Case No. RTC ‘97-168: house.8 She did not report the incident to her mother because of accused-appellant’s warning. 9

xxx Maricel also testified that the incident in 1996 was the second time that she was raped by accused-appellant. The
first incident happened in 1995. She could not remember all the details of the first rape incident that transpired in
1995 but she could remember that accused-appellant kept on kissing her and that he inserted his penis into her
That on or about 12:00 o’clock midnight sometime in the year 1995 at Barangay Tamban, Municipality of Tinambac, vagina.10 She reported the incident to her mother but she could not remember what the response of her mother
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, was.11 Eventually, she told her teacher, Gemma Olarve, of what transpired. 12
Dr. Goito Froyalde, the Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, testified that he conducted an internal 1. In Crim. Case No. RTC '97-168, he is hereby sentenced the penalty of death and to indemnify the private
and physical examination on Maricel A. Hilboy on December 17, 1996. 13 His examination revealed lacerations in complainant Maricel Hilboy the amount of P75,000.00;
Maricel’s vagina at 12:00 o’clock and 6:00 o’clock positions, which could be caused by penetration of a penis. 14 He
concluded that the patient was no longer a virgin.15
2. In Crim. Case No. RTC '97-169, he is hereby sentenced the penalty of death and to indemnify the private
complainant Maricel Hilboy the amount of P75,000.00. The indemnification of P50,000.00 has been increased by
Gemalil Buenaobra, a Social Worker from DSWD Center for Girls in Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, testified that the Supreme Court in People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127903; July 9, 1998 to P75,000.00;
Maricel was her client at DSWD. Maricel's problem was the alleged rape incident, as well as the maltreatment that
she suffered from the hands of her stepfather. Maricel told her that the perpetrator of the crime was accused-
3. He is further ordered to pay the cost.
appellant.16 In the course of the individual counseling sessions with Maricel, she also found out that it was very
difficult for the latter to relate her feelings. She asked Maricel to write a letter and draw in order to elicit some
information from the latter and she discovered that Maricel was frustrated because of her family and her hatred for SO ORDERED.30
her stepfather.17 The rape incident was a traumatic experience for Maricel and it affected her behavior, making it
difficult for her to get along with others.18 The decision is now before this court for its automatic review.

Concepcion Abadesa, mother of Maricel, testified that her daughter was born on January 5, 1983. 19 Maricel's father Accused-appellant raised this lone assignment of error before the Court:
was Vicente Hilboy but they separated. She and accused-appellant lived together in 1986 and they had four (4)
children, three of whom are alive. 20 It was Maricel's teacher, Gemma Olarve, who told her that Maricel was abused
by accused-appellant.21 She confronted her daughter and the latter admitted that she was raped by accused- THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
appellant. She quarreled with accused-appellant, after which she went to report the incident to their barangay PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE IN THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
captain, Socorro Cabral.22 COMMON-LAW SPOUSE OF THE VICTIM'S MOTHER.31

In the presence of Cabral, accused-appellant at first denied but eventually admitted that he raped Maricel. Accused- Clearly, accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court insofar as his guilt is concerned.
appellant promised that the incident would not be repeated. 23 Concepcion further testified that she consulted her Nevertheless, this Court still painstakingly reviewed the records of the cases to determine whether the guilt of
mother about the matter and at first, they thought of having the incident recorded in the police blotter. However, accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately for accused-appellant, the Court
they changed their minds because nobody would take care of the three (3) children since she was jobless and could not find any reason to reverse his conviction.
accused-appellant was the only breadwinner of the family. 24
It is apparent that the trial court arrived at its finding after a careful assessment of the evidence presented,
For the defense, Natividad Esuela, mother of accused-appellant, testified that her son and Concepcion lived foremost of which was the testimony of the victim in open court. As a rule, we do not disturb the findings by the
together as husband and wife but separated in 1994 because they quarreled. Accused-appellant started living with trial court on the credibility of witnesses since the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the credibility of
her in their house at Zone 6, Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was quite far from the house of witnesses. The trial judge was able to personally evaluate the witness's manner of testifying, and from there
Concepcion. .Her son was working as a porter and he would usually go out early in the morning and return home at reach a studied opinion as to her credibility.32
three o'clock in the afternoon.25
Maricel categorically testified:
Accused-appellant Marcelo Esuela denied the accusations against him. 26 He testified that at midnight of December
14, 1996, he was sleeping in the house of his parents at Zone 6, Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. With him were xxx
his mother, two (2) small sisters and brother Cris. 27 He further testified that he and Concepcion were live-in partners
but they parted ways in 1994 because of misunderstanding about money and the meddling of his in-laws in their
lives.28 He declared that Maricel was not living with them during his cohabitation with Concepcion but with his in- Q       You said that something happened to you. Now, I call your attention whether you recall where were you?
laws whose house was about 200 meters from their house.29 On December 14, 1996?

On 14 April 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which read: A       Yes, sir.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable Q       Where were you?
doubt in both cases, accused Marcelo Esuela, is found guilty of the offense of rape. Applying the above-quoted law,
the rape cases having been committed in the year 1995 and December 14, 1996, accused Marcelo Esuela is hereby A       I was inside the house sir.
sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
Q       What were you doing at around 12:00 midnight? Q       You said that somebody was on top of you, who was that person if you recognize him?

A       I was sleeping sir. ATTY. TAYER:

PROS. CU: I think that the question is not proper your Honor. The translation is not someone but he.

Q       Were you awakened? Witness:

ATTY. TAYER: A       Marcelo Esuela.

Objection your Honor. Leading. PROS. CU:

COURT: Kindly point at Marcelo Esuela if he is around?

Sustained. Reform. INTERPRETER:

PROS. CU: The witness is pointing at a person who when asked his named answered Marcelo Esuela.

Q       What happened if anything while you were sleeping? ATTY. TAYER:

A       Yes, sir. We would like to manifest your Honor that as I observe the witness cannot pinpoint straight or directly to the
accused. She cannot face the accused.
ATTY. TAYER:
COURT:
We would like to strike out the answer because it was not responsive to the question.
Proceed.
COURT:
PROS. CU:
Strike that out.
Q       So you recognized the person who was on top of you to be Marcelo Esuela the accused here. So what if
anything transpired after that?
(The question was repeated to the witness by the interpreter.)

A       He inserted his penis inside my vagina sir.

WITNESS:

Q       What if anything did you feel when he inserted his penis to your vagina?
A       I was awakened to find out that I was already naked without my panty and my dress.

A       It was painful sir.

Q       So when you were awakened noticing that your panty was already been undressed, what if anything
transpired next?
Q       Where if at all was his hands placed while he inserted his penis into your private organ?
A       He was already on top of me sir.
A       He was covering my mouth sir so that I could not shout.
Q       Maricel Hilboy, while Marcelo Esuela had already inserted his penis to your private organ, what if anything did Agreed on the translation of babadolan?
he do next?
ATTY. TAYER:
ATTY. TAYER:
May we request that the word "babadolan" be placed.
We would like to manifest your Honor that the witness can hardly answer the question.
PROS. CU:
COURT:
Q       So, what if anything did you feel when you were warned that when you report (sic) the incident you will be
Make it of record. harmed by Marcelo Esuela?

WITNESS: A       I got scared.

A       He was kissing my lips sir. Q       So what transpired after that when he warned you not to reveal the incident to anybody?

PROS. CU: WITNESS:

Q       So for how long do you think had he inserted his penis into your organ? A       After that sir he dismount (sic) on top of me and left me.

A       I could no longer remember sir. PROS. CU:

Q       So what transpired next when he was kissing you Maricel Hilboy? Q       Where did Marcelo Esuela go after he dismounted from on top of you?

ATTY. TAYER: A       He went to the place where he was sleeping.

Objection, your Honor. The witness already say (sic) that nothing already happen (sic). Q       So what happened to you after he went to the place where he resumed to sleep?

COURT: A       I kept on crying sir.

There was no testimony on that. She said she could not recall how long the penis of the alleged accused was inside Q       Did you report this incident to your mother?
her vagina, but not what happened next. There was no question on that. The witness may answer.
A       No, sir.
A       He was holding my hands sir so that I could not move.
Q       Why did you not report it to your mother?
Q       What transpired next after that?
A       Because sir of what he warned me. He threatened me that he is going to hurt me if I report the incident to
A       He warned me that I should not tell my mother because he will cause some physical injuries on me my mother.33
(babadolan).
xxx
COURT:
As regards the first rape incident, Maricel declared:
PROS. CU: The testimony of Maricel was candid and straightforward, interrupted only by her tears as she recalled her
unpleasant experience at the hands of accused-appellant. As such, it must be given full faith and credit by this
Court.
Q       Tell us about that incident Marcel Hilboy, that incident that happened in 1995.

On the matter of the victim’s age, this Court ruled that the testimony of the mother is admissible as she is in the
A       What happened to me in 1995 is the same of what happened in 1996.
best position to know when she delivered her child. 35 Further, the trial court observed that Maricel could not have
been more than 18 years old when she testified. 36 Hence, the age of Maricel at the time of the incident was
Q       That is right Maricel Hilboy, but we wish to know what exactly happened to you? sufficiently established.

ATTY. TAYER: As stated earlier, accused-appellant only assails the imposition of the death penalty on him. He alleged that in the
two (2) informations, he was considered as the stepfather of the victim but the records would show that he and
At this juncture, we would like to manifest. The witness had difficulty in answering the question. The question had Concepcion, mother of the victim, only lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Hence,
to be explained by the Honorable Court as well as the prosecutor. accused-appellant prays that decision of the trial court be reversed and set aside and that a new one be rendered
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.37

WITNESS:
Indeed, accused-appellant is correct in assailing the death penalty imposed upon him by the trial court and even
the Solicitor General subscribes to this view. 38 The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-88 '97-168 and RTC
A       I was raped sir in 1995 but I could no longer remember some of the incidents. '97-169 alleged that accused-appellant was the stepfather of Maricel. In People vs. Dimapilis, 39 this Court
declared:
PROS. CU:
The death penalty is imposed when the "victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is x x x the
Q       You said some of the incidents you have already forgotten. Which or what part of that incident which you have common law spouse of the parent of the victim. The victim is the daughter of appellants’ common-law spouse.
still a recollection? Ordinarily, the case would have thus meant the imposition of the mandatory death penalty. Quite fortunately for
appellant, however, he would be spared this extreme punishment. The relationship between appellant and his
victim - the victim is the daughter of appellant’s common-law spouse by the latter’s previous relationship with
ATTY. TAYER: another man - is a qualifying circumstance that has not been properly alleged in the information which
erroneously referred to the victim as being, instead, the "step-daughter" of appellant. A step-daughter is a
Since the witness is still thinking, I would like to manifest that the answer she had given a while ago it took time daughter of one’s spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage. This
before she can answer the question. Court has successively ruled that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of Republic
Act 7659 the attendance of any which mandates the single indivisible penalty of death, instead of the standard
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death prescribed in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are in the nature of
WITNESS:
qualifying circumstances. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a
qualifying aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information although it may be proved as a
A       I could remember sir that he kept on kissing me. generic aggravating circumstance if so included among those enumerated in the Code. Obviously, the technical
flaw committed by the prosecution in this instance is a matter that cannot be ignored, and it constrains the Court
PROS. CU: to reduce the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to that of reclusion perpetua.40

Q       What else did he do? What else do you remember aside from being kissed by Marcelo Esuela? Accordingly, accused-appellant must be sentenced to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

A       I also remember that he inserted his penis into my vagina. As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has ruled that if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity for the victim shall
be increased to the amount of P75,000.00. However, since the death penalty is not imposable due to the reasons
Q       Please identify the person who inserted his penis into your vagina and which you said he was repeatedly heretofore set forth, the victim is entitled only to P50,000.00 as indemnity for each count of rape. 41 In addition,
kissing you? the trial court should have ordered accused-appellant to pay the offended party moral damages. Moral damages
are awarded to victims of rape cases involving young girls between thirteen and nineteen years of age, taking into
A       Marcelo Esuela.34 account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful feminine psyche. 42 An additional award of P50,000.00
by way of moral damages is thus awarded in favor of the victim who suffers that injury.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of RTC 5th Judicial Region, Branch 63, Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case 13
 TSN, 13 August 1997, at. 3-4.
Nos. RTC '97-168 and RTC '97-169 finding accused Marcelo Esuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced in each case from Death to Reclusion Perpetua. 14
 Id., at 5, 8.
The civil indemnity of P150,000.00 awarded by the trial court for the two counts of rape is reduced to P100,000.00.
In addition, an amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages for the two counts of rape is hereby awarded to the
15
victim.  Id., at 7.

16
SO ORDERED.  TSN, 17 October 1997, at 6-7.

17
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno *, Vitug*, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De  Id., at 8-9.
Leon, Jr., Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
18
 Id., at 19.

19
 TSN, 22 October 1997, at 4.
Footnote
20
 Id., at 4.
*
 On official leave.
21
 Id., at 5.
1
 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
22
 Id., at 6.
2
 TSN, 17 September 1997, at 3.
23
 Id., at 7.
3
 Id., at 4.
24
 Id., at 9.
4
 Id., at 5-6.
25
 TSN, 17 April 1998, at 2-4.
5
 Id., at 6-7.
26
 TSN, 01 December 1998, at 3.
6
 Id., at 8-9.
27
 Id., at 2-4.
7
 TSN, 24 September 1997, at 13.
28
 Id., at 5.
8
 Id., at 5.
29
 Id., at 6.
9
 TSN, 17 September 1997, at 9.
30
 Rollo, p. 55.
10
 Id., at 14.
31
 Id., at 69.
11
 Id., at 16.
32
 People vs. Adajio, 343 SCRA 316 (2000).
12
 TSN, 24 September 1997, at 19.
33
 TSN, 17 September 1997, at. 5-9.
34
 Id., at 14. -       Avulsion, right, temporo-parietal area, about one inch below the first wound, about 5x3 inches

35
 People vs. Boras, 348 SCRA 638 (2000). -       Hacking wound, 5x3 inches, occipital area

36
 Rollo, p. 51. -       Hacking wound, 2 inches, submandibular area

37
 Rollo, p. 75. -       Hacking wound, right, elbow joint area, 4x2 inches

38
 Rollo, p. 119. which caused his instantaneous death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

39
 300 SCRA 279 (1998). CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."

40
 Id., at 308-309. During the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and hence, trial ensued. On
January 7, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
41
 People vs. Poñado, 311 SCRA 529 (1999).
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
42 Murder punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of
 People vs. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382 (1999).
Death. Likewise, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Fifty One
Thousand Pesos (P51,000.00) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages."
EN BANC
Accused-appellant Cesar Marcos (Cesar) and the victim Virgilio Marcos (Virgilio) are brothers and they live in the
G.R. No. 132392       January 18, 2001 same house at Bayambang, Infanta Pangasinan.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 19, 1996 at about 12:00 noon, Fernando Marcos, Jr.
vs. (Fernando) was resting under a mango tree a few meters away from the house of the Marcoses. After a while, his
CESAR MARCOS Y MON, accused-appellant. uncle Virgilio arrived and proceeded to the artesian well (jetmatic) located just at the back of the house. Virgilio
bent down to put on the ground the tools he was carrying. It was at this precise moment that Fernando saw his
PUNO, J.: uncle Cesar come out of the kitchen door with a bolo in hand and suddenly hacked the unsuspecting Virgilio from
behind. Virgilio was hit on the nape of the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Then Cesar hacked him
again and this time Virgilio was hit on the right side of the head. Fernando rushed to his uncle Cesar and asked
Before this Court on automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70, in why he did that, to which Cesar replied "You go away if you do not want to get involved." Out of fear, Fernando
Criminal Case No. B-055, dated January 7, 1998, finding accused-appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty beyond could only watch helplessly at Virgilio as the latter was asking him for help. Then Fernando heard Cesar tell
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.1âwphi1.nêt Virgilio "Your life is not enough to pay the money you squandered."

In an Information1 dated October 11, 1996, accused-appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon was charged with the crime of Fernando ran to the house of Kagawad Solomon del Fierro (Solomon) to ask for assistance. After learning of the
Murder, committed as follows: hacking incident, Solomon went with Fernando to go to the Marcoses' house. On the road, they met the Chief of
the Civilian Voluntary Organization, Catalino Custodio (Catalino), heading towards the same direction. When they
"That on or about August 19, 1996, at noon, in Brgy. Bayambang, Municipality of Infanta, Province of Pangasinan, reached the house, they saw Cesar seated inside the sala where a bloodied bolo lay on top of the table beside
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with Cesar.
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack Virgilio Marcos y
Mon, his elder brother with a bolo hitting on the right side of head, back of neck and other parts of his body, Solomon then asked Cesar where the victim was and he motioned towards the back of the house. When they saw
inflicting upon him injuries, to wit: the bloodied Virgilio sprawled on the ground near the artesian well, they shifted him to a more comfortable
position. Catalino was about to leave to look for a car that would bring Virgilio to the hospital when the
-       Hacking wound, right, temporo-parietal, 2 ½ inches policemen arrived and went inside the house. Cesar surrendered his bolo to SPO1 Oscar Lagasca and, without
uttering a word, allowed himself to be hauled into the police car together with the body of Virgilio. Solomon and
the son of Virgilio went with them. On the way to the police station, Solomon asked Cesar why he hacked his ensured the execution of his nefarious design upon the victim without risk to himself arising from any defense
brother, to which the latter answered "That's good for him," Solomon tried to explain to Cesar that he can be jailed which the offended party might have made. 5 The aggravating circumstance of treachery qualifies the crime to
for what he did but Cesar simply replied "Even if I will be jailed." Then Cesar turned to the son of Virgilio and said murder.
"Now you see what happened to your father." When they reached the police station, Virgilio was already dead.
Cesar was immediately detained.
It is not disputed that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, although alleged in the
information, was not duly proven by the prosecution and hence, it was properly not appreciated by the trial
Dr. Genaro Merino who conducted a post mortem examination on the body of Virgilio testified that the victim died court. However, the Solicitor General insists that since accused is a brother of the victim, the alternative
due to hemorrhage or loss of blood, secondary to multiple hacking wounds. He surmised that by the nature of the circumstance of relationship must be considered in determining the imposable penalty.
wounds sustained, the same could have been caused by a bolo. He claims that considering that majority of the
wounds inflicted were located on the right side of the victim, it is possible that the assailant was standing just
In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the imposition of the
behind the victim on his left side. He discounted the possibility that the assailant and the victim could have been
proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate,
facing each other because a person could not be hacked in front.
natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender. 6 In the case at
bar, prosecution eyewitness Fernando Marcos, Jr. testified that Cesar and Virgilio Marcos are brothers. 7 Accused
Accused-appellant gave a different version of what happened. According to him, in the afternoon of August 19, likewise declared that Virgilio is his brother.8 That the victim is the elder brother of Cesar is likewise alleged in the
1996 he was on his way out of the house when he was met by Virgilio near the artesian well who suddenly Information. The rule is that relationship is aggravating in crimes against persons as when the offender and the
unsheathed his bolo and tried to hack him. Cesar was able to get hold of Virgilio's arm and they grappled for the offended party are relatives of the same level such as killing a brother. 9 Thus, relationship was correctly
bolo. In the course of the struggle, Virgilio tripped and fell to the ground thereby hitting his head with the bolo. appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
When Cesar saw that Virgilio was already wounded, he went inside the house and sat on the bamboo bed near the
door where he stayed until the policemen arrived. According to Cesar, the police retrieved the bolo from Virgilio
It appears from the records that a Certification was issued by the Philippine National Police at Infanta, Pangasinan
who was then holding it. He likewise testified that he agreed to go to the police station because he was asked by the
dated 18 February 1997,which states that herein accused "voluntarily surrendered to this station with the
police to accompany his brother. However upon reaching the police station, he was immediately detained, and
weapon used."10 Nevertheless, the trial court did not take into consideration this mitigating circumstance of
several days thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against him. According to Cesar, Virgilio tried to hack him
voluntary surrender. Neither was it raised in the appellant's nor appellee's brief. Be that as it may, considering its
because he left Virgilio behind when he went out fishing the night before.
possible effect on the penalty that may be imposed in this case, it is well to ascertain if the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of herein accused.
Accused-appellant raises as his lone assignment of error the issue of whether or not the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of death. It is argued that although the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present: (a) that the offender had not
raised in the information, the prosecution failed to prove the same and hence, accused-appellant can only be
been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent;
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, citing in support thereof the rulings in the cases of People vs. Lucas (240 SCRA 68)
and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. The circumstances of the surrender must show that it was made
and People vs. Saliling (249 SCRA 185). In the latter case, the Court held that where the killing although qualified by
spontaneously and in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either
treachery was not attended by evident premeditation or any other aggravating circumstance, and neither was there
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will
any mitigating circumstance, the penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.11

The Solicitor General countered that the presence or absence of evident premeditation should not come to fore
In the case at bar, appellant testified that he did not resist when the police brought him to the police station but
simply because it was never appreciated by the trial court in its questioned decision nor was it considered in
instead voluntarily and unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the authorities. 12 The fact that appellant
determining the penalty to be imposed. It submits that appellant's blood relationship with the victim as an
voluntarily surrendered is further buttressed by the certification issued by the police to that effect. This was never
aggravating circumstance, in addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, warrants the imposition of the
refuted by the prosecution. In one case, it was held that where the accused testified that he voluntarily
death penalty.
surrendered to the police and the prosecution did not dispute such claim, then the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.13
The two conditions before treachery may be considered a qualifying circumstance are: (a) the employment of
means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63
on the part of the victim; and (b) the deliberate adoption by the offender of such means, methods, or manner of
thereof provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties, to wit:
execution.3 It is well-established that treachery, to be considered a qualifying circumstance, must be proven as
clearly and indubitably as the crime itself, and it may not be simply deduced from presumption. 4 In the case at bar,
prosecution witness Fernando Marcos gave an eyewitness account of how appellant attacked the victim. He "Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. – x x x.
testified that appellant, armed with a bolo, suddenly attacked the victim from behind and while the latter was in a
stooping position, thereby depriving the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim a chance to repel or offer any In all cases in which the law prescribes the penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall
defense of his person. And when the victim fell to the ground, accused hacked him again guaranteeing that the be observed in the application thereof:
victim would not survive the attack. This undoubtedly constitutes treachery for the means employed by the accused
 4 People vs. Jesse Torre and Juliver Chua, G.R. No. 130655, August 9, 2000.
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.
5 People vs. Rufino Teston and Rogelio Gaco, G.R. No. 134938, June 8, 2000.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. 6 People vs. Caballes, 274 SCRA 83 (1997).

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating 7 TSN, December 17, 1996, p. 2.
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.1âwphi1.nêt
8 TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 1.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
9 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 14th rev. ed., 1998, p. 462, citing People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil 362, 364.
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation."

10 Exhibit "B", Original Record, p. 107.

In the present case, while the trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it failed to
make a finding as to the presence of any aggravating circumstance which would justify the imposition of the death
penalty. There is here present the aggravating circumstance of relationship but this is offset by the mitigating 11 People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500 (1998).

circumstance of voluntary surrender. Perforce, pursuant to Article 63, the correct penalty to be imposed should only
be reclusion perpetua. 12 TSN, August 27, 1997, p. 14.

With regard to actual damages, the trial court likewise erred in awarding the sum of P51,000.00 to the heirs of the 13 People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996).
victim which must be reduced to P18,000.00 since it is only the latter amount which is supported by a receipt. 14 The
bare testimony of the victim's son as to the other expenses was not substantially corroborated by receipts to prove
the same. The court can only grant actual damages for such expenses if they are supported by receipts. 15 We affirm 14 Exhibit "D", Original Record, p. 152.

the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 should also be
awarded as civil indemnity without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.16 15 People vs. Wilfredo Riglos y Ramos, G.R. No. 134763, September 4 , 2000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70, in Criminal Case 16 People vs. Isabelo Ragundiaz, G.R. No. 124977, June 22, 2000.
No. B-055 dated January 7, 1998 finding appellant Cesar Marcos y Mon guilty for the crime of the murder is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua and that
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P18,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as THIRD DIVISION
moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
G.R. No. 133382             March 9, 2000
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, vs.
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur EFREN MENDOZA y SALVADOR, accused-appellant.

Footnotes: PANGANIBAN, J.:

1 Original Record, p. 1.
True, a father and husband has the duty and the right to defend himself, his family and his home. However, in
order to successfully invoke self-defense and defense of relative, he must prove, by clear and convincing
2 People by Executive Judge Angel L. Hernando, Jr.; Original Record, pp. 230-236. evidence, the concurrence of three elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, these defenses collapse and the accused must be convicted.
3 People vs. Pepe Lozada, G.R. No. 130589, June 29, 2000; People vs. Abdulajid Sabdani y Shumarhari, G.R. No. 134262, June 28, 2000.
The Case
Efren Mendoza y Salvador was charged with murder for the July 14, 1993 killing of Anchito A. Nano. Before the Brgy. Kagawad Pedro Saman, together with Ernesto Cribe and Trinidad delos Santos, arrived later at the scene of
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, an Information 1 was filed against him on September 9, 1993, alleging the crime. Kagawad Saman discovered Anchito in a kneeling position already dead. He also found (3) three hack
as follows: wounds on the nape and two (2) hack wounds at the back of Anchito's body (TSN, March 10, 1997, pp. 7 and 18).

That on or about 7:30 o' clock [o]n the evening of July 14, 1993, at Brgy. Manlucugan, [M]unicipality of Vinzons, At around 9:00 p.m. of that day, Trinidad delos Santos reported the hacking incident to the sub-station of Aguit-it,
[P]rovince of Camarines Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did Vinzons. SPO2 Silverio Rafael proceeded to the crime scene and saw Anchito's body still in a kneeling position
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident with hackwounds at the back of the neck and body (TSN, May 31,1994, p. 5).
premeditation, assault, attack and hack with a bolo one ANCHITO A. NANO, thereby inflicting upon the latter
multiple hacking wounds, which were the proximate cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
SPO4 Rafael asked the people present who was the perpetrator of the crime. The Barangay officials led by Kgwd.
of the heirs of the victim.
Saman and Kgwd. Cribe informed Rafael that the perpetrator was appellant Efren Mendoza. SPO4 Rafael later
observed that the appellant's house was in total disarray and he surmised that things might have been taken in a
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 hurry. He also noted that there was no weapon anywhere near the victim's body (Ibid., pp. 12-14 and 17).

During his arraignment on October 22, 1993, appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Leo Intia, entered a plea of not Later that night, appellant surrendered to Senior Police Officer Leonardo Almadrones who promptly turned him
guilty. 3 On November 6, 1997, after trial in due course, the court a quo rendered its assailed nine-page over to Chief Investigator Joel Guinto for the requisite investigation. During investigation, appellant claimed that
Decision, 4the dispositive portion of which reads: Anchito ransacked his house and hacked his seven (7) year old son Ernie Mendoza (TSN, July 1, 1994, p. 5).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Efren Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable Two days later, appellant's wife and son went to the Vinzon's police station to blotter Ernie Mendoza's wound.
doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The mitigating Investigator Guinto interviewed Ernie Mendoza and concluded that Ernie's wound was made by somebody other
circumstance of voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty imposed since it is offset by the aggravating than the victim since the said wound was not deep enough. Also, when he questioned the child about the wound,
circumstance of treachery. Wherefore, he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to the latter answered that when he woke up, he already had a wound. Investigator Guinto later filed the present
pay the heirs of the deceased the following: charge against appellant after the victim's common-law wife brought several witnesses who each executed their
corresponding sworn affidavits. (ibid., pp. 7 & 11). 8
a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and
The Version of the Defense
b) P30,000.00 as moral damages.
The defense presented six witnesses: Appellant Efren Mendoza, his wife Emily and his son Ernie; Bayani Aguilar;
Dr. Gaudencio Albano and Carmen Herico. In his Brief, 9 appellant summarized the defense witnesses' testimonies
The bond posted for the provisional liberty of said accused is hereby CANCELLED.
as follows:

SO ORDERED. 5
EMILY MENDOZA, wife, of appellant, testified that at around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, the victim Anchito Nano
and his companion Marianito Rafael arrived at their house and upon arrival, Anchito Nano destroyed the two (2)
6
Hence, this appeal.  windows of their house. She saw afterwards that her son, Ernie Mendoza, was hacked by Anchito Nano while the
former was peeping thru the destroyed window. She shouted for help and appellant, her husband, responded to
The Facts her call and saw Anchito Nano who was about to attack her husband, but was hacked first by the latter. Marianito
Rafael who was just watching subsequently fled from the place of the incident. She brought her son first to the
faith healer for immediate treatment and the following morning to the Provincial Hospital for medical treatment.
The Version of the Prosecution She learned later that her husband went to Vinzons Municipal Hall and surrendered voluntarily to the police
authority on the same day of July 14, 1993. (TSN, December 8, 1994, no. 3-11).
In the People's Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following statement of facts:
EFREN MENDOZA, accused-appellant, testified that on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in [the] evening, he was at
At around 7:00 p.m. of July 14, 1993, in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Anchito Nano and the comfort room 20 about meters away from their house when he heard his wife shouting for help. He ran
Marianito Rafael passed by appellant's house and asked for a drink from appellant's wife, Emily Mendoza. Anchito immediately towards the direction of their house and saw Anchito Nano destroying the lock of their window[;]
began talking with Emily and they were about four arms-length from Marianito when appellant suddenly appeared. hence he looked for a piece of wood but found a bolo instead. He later heard his son shout, "Ama, tinaga ako." He
Appellant hacked Anchito on the nape, which prompted Marianito to flee out of fear for his life. (TSN, March 9, approached Anchito Nano to prevent him from entering their house but the latter tried to hack him. He was able
1993, pp. 10-14).1âwphi1.nêt
to deliver a hacking blow ahead of the victim on the right side of the neck. Thereafter, he immediately went to the felony. But these circumstances surrounding the incident negates the allegations of the accused's self-defense. 
Municipal Hall of Vinzons and surrendered voluntarily to the police authority (TSN, March 27, 1995, pp. 3-8). First, there is an eyewitness on the part of the prosecution, that the accused suddenly attacked and hacked the
victim outside the house (tsn., March 9, 1994, pp. 12-13). Secondly, the physical evidence of the number,
location and severity of the [hack] and incised wounds found on the body of the victim affirmed by the medical
ERNIE MENDOZA, appellant's son, testified that on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, he noticed that
findings contained in the autopsy report that all the hack wounds [came] from the back of the victim's body (tsn.,
somebody was hacking their house, hence, he peeped through the window and saw Anchito Nano who hacked him
Feb. 4, 1994, p. 7), and the pictures presented in court (Exhibits "C" to "C-40") all indicate that the victim was
on the head, thereby resulting [in] los[s] of consciousness while his mother [kept] on shouting for help. He was
hacked from behind. Clearly, accused's act was no longer one of self-preservation, but a determined effort to kill
brought first to a quack doctor for immediate treatment and the following morning, to the provincial hospital where
his victim. 11
he was treated by Dr. Albano for the head injury he sustained.

Holding that appellant's claim was debunked by the prosecution witnesses' testimonies which were more
BAYANI AGUILAR, police chief of Vinzons PNP testified that he issued a certification on August 3, 1993 about the
credible, the trial court explained:
voluntary surrender of appellant Efren Mendoza and another certification regarding one in the report made by
Emily Mendoza relative to the hacking of his son by Anchito Nano which happened on July 14, 1993 at about 7:30 in
the evening at their house (TSN, November 7, 1995, pp. 2-4). Kagawad Pedro Saman was among the first persons who saw the vicinity of the incident. He noticed that the
victim was not carrying any weapon or knife or a piece of wood and the house was in good condition (tsn, March
10, 1994, p. 14). It was corroborated by SPO4 Silverio Rafael that there was indeed no weapon within the vicinity
DR. GAUDENCIO ALBANO, the attending doctor who treated appellant's son testified that he treated Ernie Mendoza
where the corpse of the victim was found (tsn, May 31, 1994, p. 17) The allegations of the accused that the victim
who suffered a wound laceration four (4) cm. long at the middle of the head which could have been caused by a
was the aggressor who hacked him first is contrary to human nature. There was no altercation, warning or even a
blunt object. (TSN, July 31, 1996, pp. 4-6).
challenge that [would] enable the victim to be aggressor. The aggression must be real, or at least, imminent and
not merely imaginary. The aggressor's intent must be ostensibly revealed by his hostile attitude and other
CARMEN HERICO testified that on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, she heard her daughter, Emily external acts constituting a real, material, unlawful aggression. A threat, even if made with a weapon or the belief
Mendoza shouting for help, hence she ran towards her daughter's house and they met halfway along the road. They that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by
proceeded back to her daughter's house and she saw the fallen window. She and her daughter, subsequently an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual, material, unlawful
proceeded to the house of Pedro Saman, a barangay kagawad and informed the latter about the incident. (TSN, aggression. This court finds that [since] the accused was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an
October 22, 1996, pp. 3, 5-6). 10 attempt to defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence,
the self-defense foisted by the accused is not well-founded, but an alibi to exonerate him from the offense he
committed. 12

Trial Court Ruling

The court a quo rejected appellant's plea of self-defense, ratiocinating as follows: The Alleged Errors

In his Brief, appellant assails (1) the trial court's rejection of his plea of defense of relative and (2) its
characterization of the crime committed. Thus, he submits:

To bolster his claim of self-defense, accused Efren Mendoza declared: when he heard the shouts for help of his wife,
immediately he ran towards their house and saw the victim destroying their house. There, he heard his son [shout],
"Ama, tinaga ako." He immediately approached the victim in order to prevent him from entering the house. He
delivered the first blow by hacking the victim, hitting the victim at the right side of the neck, alleging that the victim, I
when they were facing each other, hacked the accused first.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVE ESPOUSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME.

Indeed, a man's house is his castle. He has the right to protect it. He may repel force by force in defense of person, II
habitation or property against anyone who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a
 We find that the appellant was not able to prove the all-important first requisite — unlawful aggression on the
part of Anchito Nano. Mendoza contends that it was the latter who started the aggression by acting in a manner
that was threatening and dangerous to the former and his family, wreaking havoc on his house and in the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE process, injuring his seven-year-old son. Appellant likewise avers that Nano was about to strike him when the
OF QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS ALLEGED IN THE former, acting instinctively, delivered the fatal blows to the latter.
INFORMATION. 13

The Court's Ruling

Emily and Ernie Mendoza, appellant's wife and son, corroborated this assertion. They testified that the deceased
The appeal is partly meritorious. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in
had started the fracas and caused the wound on Ernie's head. To further prove this claim, the defense presented
appellant's favor.
Dr. Gaudencio Albano, Ernie's attending physician, who testified that the boy had suffered a laceration, four
centimeters long at the middle of the head, which could have been caused by a blunt object. 17
First Issue:
Despite this corroboration, however, several circumstances belie appellant's claim of self-defense and defense of
Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative a relative. First, investigators found the deceased in a kneeling position with five wounds — three on the nape,
and two at the back. Thus, the nature and the location of such wounds debunked appellant's claim that Nano was
The appellant admits to having hacked Anchito Nano, but vigorously insists that he did so to defend himself, his about to attack him.
family and his home.
Second, the bolo which Nano had allegedly used in his attack was not found within the vicinity of the crime scene
Mendoza recounts that on that fateful night, he was relieving himself in their comfort room situated about twenty and was not presented in court. This point was established by SPO4 Silverio Rafael's testimony  18 and the
meters outside their house, when he heard his wife's frantic pleas for help. He immediately rushed to their house photograph 19 depicting the actual crime scene.
and saw Nano destroying their windows. The former looked for something with which to arm himself and found a
bolo. He recalls that at this point, he heard his son shout, "Ama, tinaga ako!" Thereafter, he approached Nano to Third, granting that Ernie Mendoza was injured, the appellant and his witnesses were nor able to prove
prevent him from entering the house. The latter allegedly faced him and was about to strike him with a bolo, but adequately that such injury was caused by Nano, because there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in their
the former was able to parry the blow, quickly retaliate and hit him on the neck. 14 testimonies. Ernie claimed that he had lost consciousness after being struck with a bolo by Nano. 20 However,
appellant asserts that he heard his child cry, "Ama, tinaga ako!" while the former was about to subdue the
assailant. Moreover, appellant admits that he did not see Nano hit his son.

Likewise, the testimonies of Carmen Herico (Emily's mother) and Pedro Saman regarding the circumstances after
Requisites of Self-Defense and
the hacking incident negated Emily's claim that she had rushed her wounded son to the faith healer. Herico went
Defense of Relative
to her daughter's house after hearing the latter's cries for help, but the former did not see anything except a
fallen window. 21 Surely, she would have noticed if her grandchild was injured. Pedro Saman, the baranggay
kagawad summoned by Herico, also testified that appellant's children were in the house when he arrived at the
crime scene, 22 but he did not mention anything about an injured child.

Because the accused raises self-defense and defense of a relative, it is incumbent upon him to prove the presence
of the following requisites: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, lack of sufficient provocation on his part, In any event, the trial court disbelieved the testimonies of the defense witnesses. The well-settled rule is that the
and reasonable necessity of the means he used to repel the aggression.  15 It is settled that the accused who invokes trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect,
self-defense or defense of a relative must present clear and convincing evidence. Such person cannot rely on the in the absence of any clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
weakness of the prosecution, for even if it is weak, it cannot be disbelieved because the former has admitted the affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.  23 Appellant failed to present
killing. 16 any reason why this Court should reverse or modify the court a quo's ruling.

In all, the totality of the evidence presented by the appellant was not sufficient to prove that it was Nano who
had started the fracas, and that the former was just acting to defend himself, his family and his home.

Unlawful Aggression
Second Issue:
Not Proven
 Crime and Punishment Q What did [he] do upon arriving, if any, this Efren Mendoza?

We agree with the trial court that the killing of Anchito Nano was qualified by treachery, as alleged in the A He suddenly hacked.
Information. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked. 24 Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
Q Who?
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 25
A Anchito Nano.
In the present case, the victim's lack of awareness of the attack can be gleaned from the nature, the number and
the location of his wounds. Furthermore, the testimony of Marianito Rafael, against whom no ill motive was x x x           x x x          x x x
imputed by the appellant, likewise established this fact. The former testified:
Q How many times was Anchito Nano hacked by Efren Mendoza, if you know?
Q You mean to say that you were present when he was hacked?
A I only saw once, I ran away after seeing the first hack. 28
A Yes, sir.

Q In what place was he hacked?

x x x           x x x          x x x Voluntary Surrender

A Near the house of Efren Mendoza. Appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor,
because he immediately went to the Municipal Hall and surrendered to the police on the night of the incident.
Q Why were you there? . . .

A Because I asked for water from Emily Mendoza.

We agree, To establish this mitigating circumstance, the following three requisites must be shown: (a) the
Q And Anchito Nano was also there? offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's
agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary.  27 The defense must show intent to surrender unconditionally to the
x x x           x x x          x x x authorities, eitherbecause of an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble and the
expense concomitant to the search and the capture of the accused. 28

A We were together.
In this case, all these requisites were proven. Appellant's assertion that he surrendered was corroborated by Chief
Inspector Bayani Aguilar, Vinzons chief of police, who issued a Certification that "one Efren Mendoza . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x voluntarily surrendered [to] this station, including his bolo . . . which was used to hack 3 times a certain Yoyoy
Nano . . ." 29Contrary to the submission of the solicitor general, 30 the surrender of appellant was unconditional.
Q You mean to say that after you had a drink, Efren Mendoza came? He readily admitted that he had hacked the victim and subsequently put himself under police custody.

A He came out suddenly. Furthermore, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that voluntary surrender was "offset by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery." 31 The court a quo failed to appreciate the distinction between a generic aggravating
circumstance and a qualifying one.
Q . . . [W]here did he come from?

A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other
A He came from outside of the house.
hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty
 3 
in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a Records, pp. 10-11.
qualifying circumstance may not. 32
4 
Penned by Judge Sancho Dames II.
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. 1âwphi1 Its presence served to
characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance 5 
Rollo, p. 28.
to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender.
6 
The case was deemed submitted for decision upon receipt by this Court of the Appellee's Brief on May 31, 1999.
The Proper Penalty
The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.

When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal, in its maximum 7 
Signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Magdangal M. de Leon and
period, to death. 33 At the time, however, RA 7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not yet in effect. In any
Solicitor Ronaldo B. Martin.
event, the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender impels the imposition of the minimum
period of the applicable penalty, 34 reclusion temporal (maximum). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
8 
Law, 35appellant should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal also in its Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-5.
maximum period.
9 
Appellant's Brief was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Bartolome P. Reus and Rogel F. Quijano of the Public
Civil Indemnity Attorney's Office.

10 
Citing People v. Victor, 36 the solicitor general argues that the civil indemnity should be raised from P50,000 to Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-6; rollo, pp. 47-49.
P75,000. This is erroneous. In the said case, the Court held that "starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the 11 
RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 26-27.
present amended law, the Indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00."
Obviously, that ruling, which involved rape and imposed the death penalty, cannot apply to the present case. 12 
Hence, consistent with current jurisprudence, 37 we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. Ibid., p. 8; rollo, p. 27.

13 
Likewise, we affirm the award of moral damages in the sum of P30,000 for the anguish and the wounded feelings Appellant's Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 44.
suffered by the victim's heirs, which were duly proven.
14 
TSN, March 27, 1995, pp. 4-8.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor (maximum) to 17 years, 4 15 
Art. 11 (1 and 2), Revised Penal Code, which reads:
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (maximum). All other awards are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability.

SO ORDERED.
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following
circumstances concur:
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Footnotes
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
1 
The Information, dated September 6, 1993, was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Pascualita Duran-Cereno.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
2 
Rollo, p. 6; records, p. 1. descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by
 27 
affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, People v. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691, October 30, 1996.
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance
are present and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person 28 
People y. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, September 25, 1998; People v. Umadhay, 293 SCRA 545, August 3, 1998.
attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein.
29 
16  Records, p. 190.
People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, July 28, 1998; People v. Cayabyab, 274 SCRA 387, June 19, 1997; People v.
Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558, February 22, 1995; People v. Peñones, 200 SCRA 625, August 16, 1991; People v.
30 
Bausing, 199 SCRA 355, July 18, 1991. Brief for the Appellee, p. 10.

31 
17 
TSN, July 31, 1996, pp. 4-6. Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 28.

32 
18 
TSN, May 31, 1994, p. 17. Silverio Rafael testified: Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 12th ed., pp. 316-317.

33 
Q What did you observe immediately within the surrounding of the body of the victim? Under RA 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the penalty for murder is now  reclusion perpetuato
death.
A There was none. There was no sign of commotion or trouble whatsoever.
34 
Art. 64 (2), Revised Penal Code.
Q Did you also find any weapon within the vicinity where the corpse of the victim was found?
35 
Sec. 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that it does not apply "to persons convicted of
offensespunished with death penalty or life imprisonment; . . ." (emphasis supplied) Because the law used the
A There was none.
word "punished" instead of "punishable," what should be considered is the penalty actually imposed, not the
imposable penalty. (Reyes, supra, p. 778; see also People v. Moises, 66 SCRA 151, August 13, 1975.) Accordingly,
19 
Exhibits "C," "C-1," "C-2," "C-3" and "C-4," Records, pp. 88-A, B, C, D and E. the law should be applied in this case, because the maximum penalty actually imposed is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
20 
TSN, June 28, 1995, p. 5. Edwin Mendoza declared:
36 
GR No. 127903, pp. 15-16. July 9, 1998, per curiam.
Q And what happened to you after you were hacked by Anchito Nano?
37 
People v. Quitlong, GR No. 121562, July 10, 1998; People v. Lagarteja, GR No. 127095, June 22, 1998; People v.
Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24, 1997; and People v. Caballes, GR. No. 102723-24, June 19, 1997.
A I lost consciousness, sir.

21 
TSN, October 22, 1996, p. 6.

22 
TSN, March 10, 1994, p. 19.
EN BANC
23 
People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19, March 14, 1996; People v. Lua, 256 SCRA 539, April 26, 1996.
G.R. No. 126135               October 25, 2000
24 
People v. Rebamontan, 305 SCRA 609, April 13, 1999; People v. Camaling, 293 SCRA 267, July 28, 1998; People v.
Sol, 272 SCRA 392, May 7, 1997.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
25 
Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code. ALBERTO OCFEMIA y MAIMOT, accused-appellant.

26 
TSN, March 9, 1994, pp. 9-13. DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: entered a plea of not guilty. The accused-appellant thereafter testified in his defense stating, in the words of the
court, as follows:
On September 26, 1995, Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot was charged with the crime of murder, as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: "He testified that on September 22, 1995, in the morning, he was at his place of work as "cantero" at Hemady
Street, Quezon City, starting working (sic) thereat from 7:00 in the morning up to 6:00 in the evening. He left his
place of work at 7:00 in the evening because he waited for his salary. From his place of work at Hemady Street,
"That on or about the 22nd day of September 1995 in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, he boarded a vehicle for Cubao and from Cubao, he boarded another vehicle, going to Crossing,
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation
arriving at his home at around 11:00 in the evening because of heavy traffic. Upon reaching home, he met his
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed one Miriam Reyes with a knife on the different parts
wife Margie and maid Miriam Reyes. Upon arrival at his house, he sat on a bench. While sitting on a bench, his
of her body thereby inflicting mortal wounds upon the latter which directly caused her untimely death.
wife approached him, telling him that their maid, Miriam Reyes will be leaving the following day. He asked his
maid why she is leaving. After asking his maid why she is leaving, he went out of his house. He cannot tell in what
CONTRARY TO LAW."1 place he went, all that he noticed was he was far away from home and noticed that he was near the chapel of the
Mormons in Tambac, Taguig. He does not know how he got there. He cannot even tell whether he took a ride in
The accused-appellant was accused of stabbing his maid, Miriam Reyes, 16 years old, who was dead upon arrival at going to that place. All that he could recall was, the fare in going to that chapel and going back, was P1.50. When
the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, where she was brought after the stabbing incident on September 22, 1995. he realized that he was in front of Mormons Chapel, he went back home by boarding a jeepney. On his way
home, he passed by his brother Oscar’s house which is a block away from his house. In his brother’s house, his
brother asked him what his problem was. He did not answer because he was thinking why he was far from his
Upon arraignment on November 13, 1995, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, and after being informed of the house. His brother mentioned to him something like "Wala na patay na" and referred to him as the one who
consequences of his plea, pleaded guilty to the offense charged. On November 17, 1995, the Court issued an order, killed Miriam. At the time he was talking with his brother, he did not know who killed Miriam. At his brother’s
in accordance with Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, setting the case for hearing so as to conduct a house he was arrested by the police and brought to his house. At home, he noticed that his house was "magulo".
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea of guilty. The His wife was not at home. He pleaded guilty because at that time, his mind was confused." 3
prosecution was ordered to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant and his precise degree of culpability.

After his testimony, the accused-appellant through counsel prayed that he be subjected to psychiatric
The prosecution presented Margie Ocfemia, the live-in partner of the accused-appellant Alberto. examination. The court ordered counsel to file his motion in writing. The written motion filed on May 20, 1996,
states:
The testimony of Margie Ocfemia was summarized by the trial court as follows:
"01. THAT after herein accused terminated his direct and cross examinations, the undersigned counsel requested
"She testified that on November 22, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, in her house at No. 14 Herrera Street, Group 9, for the issuance of an order from the Honorable Court that the accused be subjected to a psychiatric
Zone 14, Pembo, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, their maid, Miriam Reyes, 16 years old, single, complained to her that examination; this was upon the manifestation of the undersigned counsel that they have envisioned to interpose
accused Alberto Ocfemia, touched her (Miriam Reyes) private part. She confronted accused Alberto Ocfemia. When INSANITY as their defense;
confronted, accused admitted touching the private part of Miriam Reyes. When night came, accused talked with
Miriam Reyes, asking Miriam Reyes not to tell of what he (accused Ocfemia) did to her, to her brother and the 0.2 THAT the Honorable Court called the attention of the undersigned counsel that this should have been known
brothers of Margie. Miriam Reyes refused, telling accused that she has to tell what he (accused) did to her, to her to the Court earlier in order that a reversed trial should have been undertaken; vis-a-vis the observation of the
"mga kapatid". Later that evening, accused Alberto Ocfemia, told the members of the household to go to sleep. Honorable Court, the defense admitted that it failed to do so, but sought refuge under the mantle of
They all complied. While Margie was lying, she noticed that accused Ocfemia was taking coffee, smoking and SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE; and the Honorable Court directed the filing of the instant motion;
roaming around the house. At 11:00 that evening, while Miriam Reyes, the maid, was lying on her side (nakagilid)
and asleep, accused stabbed Miriam several times. Miriam shouted asking for help. Margie brought Miriam Reyes to
the hospital, arriving in the hospital at 12:30 in the morning. The doctor who attended Miriam Reyes tried to save 0.3 THAT this motion finds justification on the fact that during the stabbing, he appeared to have acted without
her life, but at 12:45 in the morning, she passed away." 2 the least discernment and that he was unable to perceive and to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
commission of the act in issue.

The prosecution also presented Dr. Ferdinand Gonzalez of Rizal Medical Center, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, Medico-
Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who conducted medico-legal examination on the cadaver of the victim, 0.4 THAT it is respectfully requested that an order be issued directing the examination of the accused by the
and Lorna Reyes, the sister of Miriam, who testified on the expenses for the hospital, wake and the interment. NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH; and, pending the requested examination and the submission of the
report thereon, it is respectfully requested that the proceedings in this case be held in abeyance.

Before the reception of the evidence of the defense, accused-appellant through counsel filed a motion praying that
his plea of guilty be withdrawn as it was improvidently made. The motion was granted and the accused-appellant 0.5 THAT this is not intended to delay the administration of justice on this case, but only because of the foregoing
reason."4
The prosecution opposed the above-stated motion alleging inter alia, that: "WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of
the crime of murder as charged in the Information, qualified by treachery, attended by two generic aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and accused’s private relations with the victim, the latter being his maid
"x x x           x x x          x x x
and pursuant to Article 248, in relation to Article 62, part. 3 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R. A. 7659,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, and indemnify Lorna Reyes, the sum of ₱27,000.000; and
5) That there has been a complete absence of Evidence that there is a history of insanity on the part of the accused the heirs of Miriam Reyes, the sum of ₱50,000.00, plus costs.
prior to the commission of the offense;
SO ORDERED."
6) There has been no oral or documentary evidence to lay the predicate that the accused was previously insane;
The case is now before us on automatic review.
7) That a person is presumed to be of sound mind (sane);
In his appellant’s brief, the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
8) That the defense of insanity which the accused would now put up as his defense is completely opposite his earlier
defense of denial and alibi when he testified in Court last April 22, 1996;
"A

9) Consequently, the accused cannot interpose the defense of alibi and denial and at the same time claim that he is
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED TO BE EXAMINED BY THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR
insane because the defense of insanity admits the commission of the offense only that he committed it when he
MENTAL HEALTH TO ESTABLISH THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE ACCUSED DURING AND AFTER THE
was insane."5
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

The trial court denied the motion of the accused-appellant that he be examined by a psychiatrist, reasoning that:
B

"This Court does not find merit in the plea of the accused, thru his counsel, that he should be examined by a
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING FEIGNED INSANITY. 8
Psychiatrist to determine his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense, because:

which were jointly discussed being "closely entertwined".

1) When arraigned, accused assisted by counsel, voluntarily pleaded guilty;

Counsel for accused-appellant submits that there were indications of a mental dysfunction as personally observed
2) When arraigned his plea of guilt, this Court conducted a searching inquiry to determine voluntariness and full
and perceived by him, which prompted the accused-appellant to change the plea of guilty to a plea of non-guilty,
comprehension of the consequences of his plea, still accused insisted in pleading guilty;
and that because "the accused-appellant continuously showed signs of mental infirmity during his direct
examination", he was prompted to request the court that the accused-appellant be allowed to undergo a
3) At the time of arraignment accused appeared be of sound mental condition; understood the nature of the charge psychiatric examination. Before the trial court could declare that the accused-appellant was "feigning insanity", a
against him, and could intelligently enter a plea, otherwise, this Court will order the suspension of arraignment; psychiatric study, it is claimed, should be made on his alleged mental malady.

4) Accused already testified in his defense; and, during his testimony, this Court finds no justification to submit him The Solicitor General asks for an affirmance of the judgment of conviction. He claims that it is too late in the day
for psychiatric examination; for the accused-appellant to question the denial of his motion for psychiatric examination as he rested his case
after the denial of the motion and submitted the issue of his guilt or non-guilt for the resolution of the trial court.
5) Moreover, before his arraignment, and during the hearing, there was no slightest insinuation by accused and Moreover, there is no showing, "even in the slightest extent", that appellant was in any way insane or mentally
counsel that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense; and impaired prior to or on or about the time the offense was committed. Further, a psychiatric examination now
would not serve any useful purpose anymore considering that the stabbing incident took place almost three years
ago. With respect to the evidence to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant, the Solicitor General seeks an
6) It was only after accused testified that he would like to be mentally examined." 6 affirmance of the finding of the trial court on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the same.

The trial court handed down its judgment 7 dated September 4, 1996, finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder In his Reply Brief, the accused-appellant, now represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, stresses that the signs
as charged in the information, qualified by treachery, and aggravated by evident premeditation and the accused- of mental dysfunction, as personally observed by his private counsel, during the direct examination, indicate the
appellant’s private relations with the victim, who was his maid. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads: importance of the requested psychiatric examination to prove the exempting circumstance of insanity. The reply
brief prays for an acquittal.
In asking for a reversal of the judgment of conviction, accused-appellant assails the rejection by the trial court of his Miriam was killed. He testified that he did not know who killed her. On cross-examination, he stated that at the
request to be subjected to mental examination, thus: time he pleaded guilty upon arraignment, he was confused and did not know anything about the case. 13 The
invocation of denial and alibi as his defense indicates that he was in full control of his mental faculties. It has been
held that a shift in theory by the defense, from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after
"When the accused manifested signs of mental dysfunctions such as, his changeable dispositions during the
realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction. 14 Moreover,
proceedings as shown by his insistence to a plea of guilty, only for him to change this plea to that of not guilty; his
the eyewitness account of the accused-appellant’s common-law wife of five (5) years never mentioned any
demeanor and manifestations before the undersigned counsel showing his incoherence and flight of ideas during
indication that the accused-appellant could not have been in his right mind when he committed the crime, and
those times that counsel had the chance to interview the accused; his lack of knowledge where he was at the time
renders the theory of insanity doubtful. The eyewitness stated that prior to stabbing the victim, the accused-
of the incident as testified to by the accused himself during his direct examination; his lack of knowledge as to who
appellant told the members of the household to go to sleep while he walked around the room, smoking and
killed the victim when he was confronted by his brother Cesar on the night of the stabbing; and, has lack of concern
drinking coffee, that the accused-appellant also told Margie not to tell his brothers and the brother of Miriam
on what was happening during the proceedings, made and constrained his counsel to entertain the serious
that she touched the private parts of the victim. Such actuations are hardly the actuations of a man not in full
suspicion and observation that accused must be suffering from a certain degree of mental defect. And, such defect
possession of his mental faculties. Although the accused-appellant testified that he could not recall how he
must have impaired and affected his voluntariness in giving his plea of guilty. Further, such mental infirmity must
reached the Mormon chapel in Taguig, after leaving his house at around 11:00 o’clock p.m. on September 22,
have denied him that comprehension of a normal individual of the consequences of his plea of guilty." 9
1995, and could not recall at what time he reached the house of his brother, who informed him that Miriam was
stabbed, he failed to ask who was the killer and merely surrendered to the policemen. 15 We agree with appellee
and claims that the trial court’s declaration that he was "feigning insanity" was not proper where no psychiatric that his professed inability to recall events before and after the stabbing incident does not necessarily indicate an
study was made on his alleged mental malady. aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. We find no cogent reason to
disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the accused-appellant was feigning insanity to justify his application for
We are not convinced by the accused-appellant’s submission. There is no cogent justification to reverse the finding mental examination when he testified that when he left home in the evening of September 22, 1995, he was
of the trial court that accused-appellant was of sound mental condition at the time of his arraignment, and that confused and lost his direction.
during the hearing where the accused-appellant testified in his defense, there was "no slightest insinuation" by
accused-appellant and counsel that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The fact that the accused-appellant originally pleaded guilty and thereafter changed his plea to "not guilty" does
not support a claim that there were indications of "mental dysfunction". It is not uncommon for an accused to
Notably, accused-appellant did not question the denial of his motion for psychiatric examination and simply rested change his plea. In this case, upon his own motion, the court allowed the accused to withdraw his plea of guilt
his case. and enter a plea of not guilty. Hence, an examination as to the voluntariness of his plea of guilt is no longer in
order.

The belated perception that accused-appellant could be insane was based on the observation made by his own
counsel of his statements and demeanor at the witness stand during his direct testimony, specifically his As above-stated, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant of murder
"changeable dispositions" during the proceedings as shown by his insistence on a plea of guilty only for him to qualified by treachery. The eyewitness testified that Miriam was stabbed several times while she was lying down
change this plea to that of not guilty, his lack of knowledge of where he was at the time of the stabbing incident and on her side and asleep. The crime was committed employing means or method in the execution thereof which
as to who killed the victim. Counsel claims that the accused-appellant showed "incoherence and flight of ideas" tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which
during those times that he had the chance to interview the accused-appellant. the offended party might make.16

We are not impressed. However, we do not agree that the crime was committed with evident premeditation.1âwphi1 The rule is that the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is satisfactorily established only if it is proved that the
defendant had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and continuously followed it
Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an insane person is exempt for criminal liability unless he has notwithstanding that he had ample time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he
acted during a lucid interval. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every man is sane; anyone had so desired after meditation and reflection. This circumstance is not proven where there is no evidence, as in
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving that he was completely deprived of this case, as to the time when the defendant decided to kill the victim. Nowhere is there an indication in the
reason when he committed the crime charged. 10 Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude testimony of the lone eyewitness, as to when the accused-appellant decided to stab the victim, or as to the time
imputability.11 It is equally well-settled that proof of the accused-appellant’s insanity must relate to the time that lapsed after the accused-appellant planned to kill the deceased up to the time that the killing took place, that
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged; the mental illness that could would establish that there was sufficient or substantial period of time that lapsed after he conceived of the idea
diminish his ill power should relate to the time immediately preceding or during the commission of the crime. 12 of attacking the deceased and the actual perpetration of the crime. The element of sufficient time is necessary to
show that his decision is the result of the calculation, or reflection, or persistent attempt.17
We reject accused-appellant’s insistence that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his request to be
subjected to psychiatric examination. To begin with, the defense of insanity was not raised at the earliest Neither is there present an aggravating circumstance of "private relations of accused-appellant with the offended
opportunity; it was raised only after the accused-appellant had testified in his defense. He declared that he reached party" arising from the fact that the victim was the maid of the accused-appellant. The alternative circumstance
home from work at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of September 22, 1995 and was informed by his wife that of relationship shall be taken into consideration only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
 4 
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the Id., p. 169.
offender.18 Article 62 paragraph 3, cited by the trial court, is not in point. It states:
5 
Id., p. 170.
"Article 62. Effects of attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency . Mitigating
or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or 6 
Id., p. 171.
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
7 
Penned by Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
x x x           x x x          x x x
8 
Appellant’s Brief; Rollo, p. 52.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private
relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the
9 
liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant." Id., p. 53.

10 
It is clear that Article 62 merely states the rule for the application of penalties with respect to, among others, the People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325; People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275; People vs. Cruz, 109 SCRA 288; People vs.
aggravating circumstance of relationship, as this is defined in Article 15, by limiting the effect of the attendance of Madarang, G. R. No. 132319, prom. May 12, 2000.
such aggravating circumstance to the principal, accomplice or accessory to whom such circumstance is attendant.
Article 62 does not purport to define or establish an aggravating or mitigating circumstance arising from the 11 
People vs. Bañez, 301 SCRA citing People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.
offender’s private relations with the offended party such as the relationship of a master to a maid. It merely
specifies the effect of an attendant circumstance of relationship, as this is defined in Article 15. 12 
People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451; People vs. Villa, Jr., G. R. No. 129899 prom. April 27, 2000; People vs.
Madarang, G. R. No. 132319, prom. May 12, 2000.
Accordingly, the crime is murder with no aggravating circumstance which can be appreciated to increase the
penalty. The imposable penalty under Article 248 as amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. In the 13 
absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed is reclusion perpetua.19 TSN, May 13, 1996, at pp. 4-7.

14 
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of People vs. Balgos, G. R. No. 126115, January 26, 2000 citing People  vs. Trimor, 243 SCRA 129; People vs.
murder, qualified by treachery, is affirmed with the modification that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua. The Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638; People vs. Pambid, G. R. No. 124453 prom. March 15, 2000.
awards of ₱27,000.00 as actual damages and the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages are also affirmed.
15 
TSN, May 13, 1996, p. 17-24.
SO ORDERED.
16 
Article 14, Revised Penal Code.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concur. 17 
People vs. Sarmiento, 8 SCRA 263; People vs. Bautista, 79 Phil. 652.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
18 
Article 15, Revised Penal Code.

19 
Article 63, par. 2, Ibid.
Footnotes
THIRD DIVISION
1 
Records, p. 1.
G.R. Nos. 138472-73            August 9, 2001
2 
Id., p. 166.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
3 
Id., p. 168. vs.
PO3 NOEL PADILLA, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.: The defense placed the accused and nine others to the witness stand but, except for the accused, no one attested
to the events that had transpired on the night of the shooting. Padilla's own account was synthesized by the trial
court; viz:
PO3 Noel Padilla has appealed from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 2, in Criminal Cases
No. 5095 and No. 5096, convicting him of murder and frustrated murder.
"On November 18, 1991, he was with Lt. Nieves conducting a mobile patrol. On their way to the municipal
station, they received a radio call from the station. When they reached the station they were informed that there
The twin indictments against appellant for murder and frustrated murder, respectively, read:
was a stabbing incident at the PRPC. He was ordered by Lt. Nieves to look into the incident. He had then the
handgun which he kept in his possession even if he was not on duty. He charged to civilian clothes together with
"That on or about November 19, 1991, in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable members of the family of the victims of the stabbing incident proceeded to the PRPC hospital. At the hospital,
Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there Noel saw SPO4 Lagundino, the investigator, who told him that he saw PO3 Tongia at the Shakey's party at the
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon Apolinario Belmonte by then and mess hall of the PRPC. When he went to the party, he saw PO3 Tongia who was with some youngster whom he
there shooting him with a firearm on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds has not met before. Tongia, offered him a mug of beer. He left Shakey's at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more or
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said less. PO3 Tongia invited him together with the young boys to the picnic grove.
Apolinario Belmonte."2
"Upon arriving at the picnic grove, they went directly to the long table. Tongia ordered softdrinks for the young
"That on or about November 19, 1991, in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable boys and for Tongia and him two (2) bottles of beer. There were two tables near the store occupied by different
Court, the said accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, groups.
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon Jesus Casaul, Jr., by shooting him with a
firearm on the right cheek, thereby inflicting upon the said Jesus Casaul, Jr., physical injury which could have caused
"A betamax was playing very loud. But he was not interested in the show.
his death, thus the said accused performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of his will, that is, the
timely and able medical attendance rendered upon Jesus Casaul, Jr., which prevented his death, to the damage and "When they run out of cigarettes, he went to the store to buy. He was joking with the saleslady. Afterwards he
prejudice nevertheless of the said offended party." 3 introduced himself to a person who must have noticed his gun. This man introduced himself as Pines Simon. After
he returned to the long table, a group of four (4) males arrived, a group which he saw at Shakey's. One of them
occupied the seat near Tongia and two (2) occupied the seats near him. He was introduced to the three who were
Noel Padilla, a member of the Philippine National Police since 1985, pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases
homosexuals. After exchanging jokes, he left the picnic grove for the hospital after telling Tongia about it. Nothing
were jointly tried and heard, initially, by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig and, later, by Judge Lorenzo R. Silva, Jr.
unusual happened before he left for the hospital.

The facts found by the trial court that led to the conviction of the accused were largely sourced from the eyewitness
"xxx           xxx           xxx
account of Jesus Casaul, Jr., the victim in the frustrated murder charge.

"When he was at the hospital at the lobby when he saw Casaul and his cousin at around 1:00 or 2:00 o'clock
On 18 November 1991, around 11:30 p.m., Jesus Casaul, Jr., and his cousin Apolinario Belmonte, the victim in the
being transferred in an ambulance he heard their names from SPO2 Lagundino. He has not met the victims
murder charge, were partaking of beer and watching a video cassette recording on television inside the Mango
before.
Grove restaurant at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) in Morong, Bataan, when PO3 Noel Padilla
together with several companions, among them Nonong Navarette, arrived at the scene. Navarette approached
Casaul and Belmonte. An ensuing conversation turned into a heated argument. Navarette went back to his group "On cross-examination, Noel Padilla declared that he was assigned at the Regional Special Action Force in Camp
while Padilla, at first appearing to aim his gun at the television set, suddenly went behind Belmonte and shot him Olivas in December 1985 up to March 1987. He was the platoon sergeant of the company. They were assigned at
twice at the back of his head. Padilla next pointed his gun at Casaul who raised his hands pleading for dear life. The civil disturbance control and went to infiltrated areas. This is an elite force of the police.
accused, unmindful of the plea, shot Casaul twice, hitting him on the cheek and at the back of his ear.
"xxx           xxx           xxx
Belmonte and Casaul were rushed by the owner of the restaurant to the PRPC Hospital. Belmonte did not make it.
Dr. Roberto Luneta who conducted the post mortem examination attributed the death of Belmonte to the gunshot
"He confirmed that he arrived at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at the PRPC and after ten (10) or fifteen (15)
wound that had penetrated his skull. Casaul survived. Dr. Benjamin Dacula, the medical officer who attended to
minutes, he proceeded to Shakey's. . .
Casaul at the PRPC Hospital said that the gunshot wounds sustained by Casaul did not pose any threat to his life.
While he had to undergo an operation for the removal of the slugs embedded on his cheek and the right side of his
vertebrae, Dr. Antonio Rafael, the surgeon, stated there was, however, no vital tissue damaged and the wounds "xxx           xxx           xxx
suffered by the victim, without complications, would not have been enough to kill him.
"It was only after he had a few drinks of beer with Navarette and his companions and with Tongia that he decided to not in accord with the opinion of Dr. Rafael that while the wound on Casaul's cheek did not render the victim
proceed to the picnic grove and Shakey's was about to close. Only he, Tongia and three youngsters who were not unconscious, the wound, however, on his ear must have did.
homosexuals proceeded to the picnic grove. A few minutes later Nonong Navarette and his three companions
arrived. The three (3) went to their table while Nonong Navarette went to the store. This was the second time he
The defense argument has been convincingly refuted by the Solicitor General; he states:
met Navarette; the first time was at the police station.

"A careful examination of the record will show that Casaul's testimony is not inconsistent with the testimony of
"He was not irritated by the loud volume of the betamax; he did not draw his firearm and aimed it at the betamax.
Dr. Rafael. Casaul was telling the truth when he said that he saw the appellant shoot him. It must be noted that
He did not notice if Navarette went to the table occupied by Apolinario Belmonte and Jesus Casaul. He denied that
Casaul and his cousin Apolinario Belmonte were occupying a square table which were just beside the table being
Navarette complained to him about Apolinario Belmonte. From 10:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight he was at the picnic
occupied then by appellant and his friends (pp. 14-15, TSN May 19, 1994). For this reason, Casaul could clearly
grove drinking beer and conversing with Tongia. He does not know of any reason why Jesus Casaul should point to
observe and see the table where appellant was when the crimes were committed (p. 15, ibid.):
him as the one who fired and killed Apolinario Belmonte. He does not know of any reason why Jesus Casaul pointed
to him as having fired a gun at him except that he was the policeman present. He decided to transfer his gun to the
front of his pants because according to Navarette someone quarreled with them the night before. "Q         How about your cousin Apolinario Belmonte, what was his position when Noel Padilla was already behind
Apolinario Belmonte?
"On re-direct, Noel Padilla declared that he never met Jesus Casaul, Jr., and Apolinario Belmonte before the
incident."4 "A         His back is on Noel Padilla.

The trial court gave scant value to the testimony of the accused which it described to be "uncorroborated, negative "Q         And then what happened please demonstrate.
and evasive in character."5 The court held the shooting of Belmonte and Casaul to have been attended by treachery.
The trial court concluded thusly: "A         He fired two shots. (The witness is slightly in bending position with his two hands clutched).

"WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the murder of Apolinario Belmonte and the frustrated murder of Jesus "ATTY. CARIAN:
Casaul, Jr., having been proved beyond reasonable doubt the accused Noel Padilla is hereby sentenced as follows:

And the hand is less than one foot from the head of Apolinario Belmonte.
"In Crim. Case No. 5095 for the offense of frustrated murder against Jesus Casaul, Jr., the accused Noel Padilla is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days reclusion temporal as maximum with the "ATTY. BANZON:
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00 for moral
damages, plus the costs of suit. Showing the position of Noel Padilla holding a gun.

"In Crim. Case No. 5096 for the murder of Apolinario Belmonte, the accused Noel Padilla is sentenced to suffer the "Q         And then what happened?
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Apolinario Belmonte the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit." 6
"A         He fired two shots, 'Bang, Bang' (in a split second).

In this appeal, appellant raises the following issues:

"Q         What was the position of your cousin Apolinario Belmonte when hit?

"WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS CASAUL, JR., IS TRUSTWORTHY AND RELIABLE, and
"A         He fell on his right.

"WHETHER THE NON-PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES LISTED IN THE INFORMATIONS (SHOULD) BE CONSTRUED

AGAINST THE PROSECUTION."7 "ATTY. BANZON:

In its attempt to support the first argument, the defense pointed to what it considered to be contradictions in the The alleged position of accused in line with the witness is around 45º.
testimony of Casaul. Thus, Casaul declared on direct examination that he was facing the accused when the latter
shot him; however, Dr. Rafael said that based on the location of the wounds, the triggerman must have been at "COURT:
Casaul's right side. Casaul stated that he was still conscious when he was shot on the right cheek, a claim which was
Make of record that when the witness demonstrated the position of the accused he was not directly behind commit the crime and was positive on the latter's physical identification, 11 rather than in being able to identify
Apolinario Belmonte. him by his appellation or name.12

"ATTY. CARIAN: Appellant would impugn the credibility of Judge Silva in rendering the assailed decision on the ground that it was
not he, but Judge Baclig, who heard the testimony of Casaul. This kind of argument had been dismissed a good
number of times by the Court. The efficacy of a decision should not necessarily be impaired by the fact that its
Around 40º.
writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. 13 The fact that the judge who penned
the decision did not hear the case in its entirety would hardly be a compelling reason to thereby jettison his
"ATTY. BANZON: findings and conclusions as long as the entire record was made available to him for his perusal. 14

"Q         Was there any conversation that transpired before the shot was fired between Apolinario Belmonte and the Appellant contends he has had a clean record and no strong motive to commit the crimes imputed against him.
accused? The absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude a conviction for it is not unknown for persons
to be killed or assaulted even for no reason at all. 15 More importantly, when an accused is positively identified by
"A         There was none. the victim himself, lack of motive on the part of the transgressor becomes close to being inconsequential. 16

"Q         How about you granting that I am you, what was my position then? Appellant alleges that the failure of the prosecution to present three of the witnesses listed in the informations,
as well as two others mentioned by Casaul, gives rise to the presumption that if the testimony of these witnesses
were given before the court, their declaration would have been adverse to the prosecution. The settled rule is
"A         After he fired his gun to my cousin, he pointed his gun at me and I raised my hands to stop him, and I said: that the prosecution determines who among its witnesses are to testify in court, 17 and it is neither for the
'Huwag.' accused nor the court to override that prerogative. Corrolarily, the failure of the prosecution to present a
particular witness does not give rise to the presumption that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
(Witness demonstrating by turning his head towards his right towards the direction of the accused who went near produced" where that evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only object of presenting the
him and then fired at him on his face. He slumped down on the table ). (emphasis supplied) (pp. 15-16, TSN May 19, witness would be to provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.18
1994)
This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the decision of the trial court in finding the accused guilty of
"Clearly then, Casaul was not lying when he said that he saw the appellant shoot him and Apolinario Belmonte. He murder.
testified that when appellant approached the back of Apolinario and shot the latter, he turned his head to his right
where he saw appellant. Hence, Dr. Rafael corroborates the testimony of Casaul that appellant was on the right side Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of
of Casaul when Casaul was shot and hit on the right cheek. the Revised Penal Code.19 Treachery, aptly alleged in the information, is one of such qualifying circumstances. Its
elements are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
"Significantly, Dr. Rafael likewise confirms that Casaul could still identify appellant when he was shot by appellant. himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. 20 Here, treachery is
As stressed by Dr. Rafael, the first gunshot wound on Casaul's cheek could not render him unconscious. Therefore, evident when the accused suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at
Casaul could still see appellant shooting him (p. 10, TSN December 7, 1994). With this on record, it is immaterial him and, without any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots. There was no way the victim could have
whether or not the second gunshot wound inflicted by appellant at the back of the ear of Casaul could knock-out defended himself, taken flight, or avoided the assault.
the latter. The trial court found no inconsistencies between the findings of Dr. Rafael and the testimony of Casaul.
Both are consistent on material points. There is thus, no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court There is, however, reason to modify the lower court's ruling on the second crime of frustrated murder. A felony is
insofar as the prosecution witness credibility and appellant's guilt are concerned."8 frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
The testimony of a witness would only need to be congruent on important and relevant points concerning the perpetrator.21 For the crime of murder, the frustrated stage is reached only if the wound inflicted would have
principal occurrence;9 slight inconsistencies might even serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness and would been mortal.22 The examining physician has declared that the wounds suffered by the victim damaged no vital
tend to prove that his testimony has not been rehearsed.10 tissues and, without complications, would not have killed him. The penalty imposed upon appellant should
correspondingly be lowered to prision mayor in its medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance established. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term can be anywhere within
Appellant would make an issue over an entry in the medical record of Casaul from the Jose Reyes Medical Hospital the range of prision correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and the maximum within
which stated "unknown assailant" to the question of whether the victim knew the identity of his attacker. The the range of prision mayor in its medium period, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
matter was easily explained, however, by Casaul himself who said that he had known appellant only by face until
the case was filed. The weight of the eyewitness account should be on the fact that the witness saw the accused
 12 
The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased victim Apolinario Belmonte conforms with People vs. Agsunod, Jr., 306 SCRA 612.
prevailing jurisprudence. The grant of P20,000.00 moral damages to Jesus Casaul, Jr., found by the trial court has
not been disputed by the defense; the award will not be disturbed. 13 
People vs. Badon, 308 SCRA 175; People vs. Queliza, 279 SCRA 145; People vs. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 5096, finding 14 
People vs. Rabutin, 272 SCRA 197; People vs. Sorrel, 278 SCRA 368.
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, as well as sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim, Apolinario Belmonte,
15 
a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 5095, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED and People vs. Benito, 303 SCRA 468; People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611.
appellant is hereby found guilty only of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and nine (9) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years and one (1) day 16 
People vs. Bautista, 312 SCRA 214; People vs. Tan, 315 SCRA 375; People vs. Floro, 316 SCRA 304.
ofprision mayor as maximum; the imposition on him by the trial court of P20,000.00 moral damages is AFFIRMED.
17 
People vs. Ronato, 316 SCRA 433.
SO ORDERED.
18 
People vs. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567.
Melo, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave. 19 
Reyes, Revised Penal Code Book 2, 1998, p. 472.

20 
People vs. Nullan, 305 SCRA 679; People vs. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577; People vs. Realin, 301 SCRA 495.

Footnotes 21 
Article 6, Revised Penal Code.
1 
Rollo, p. 70. 22 
People vs. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715; People vs. Pilones, 84 SCRA 167; People vs. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153.
2 
Rollo, p. 70
EN BANC
3 
Rollo, p. 70.
G.R. Nos. 146235-36            May 29, 2002
4 
Rollo, pp. 73-75.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
5 
vs.
Rollo, p. 77. MELCHOR RAFAEL y LEGASPI, MARIO RAFAEL y LEGASPI, and MAXIMO RAFAEL y MACASIEB, accused.
MELCHOR RAFAEL y LEGASPI and MARIO RAFAEL y LEGASPI, accused-appellants.
6 
Rollo, p. 80.
MENDOZA, J.:
7 
Rollo, p. 100.
This is an appeal by way of automatic review from the decision, 1 dated December 8, 2000, of the Regional Trial
8 
Appellee's Brief, p. 5-8. Court, Branch 217, Quezon City, convicting accused-appellants, Melchor and Mario Rafael, of frustrated murder
and murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59453 and Q-94-59454, respectively. Accused-appellants were accused
9 
with their father Maximo Rafael under the following informations alleging –
People vs. Biñas, 320 SCRA 22; People vs. Sesbreño, 314 SCRA 87; People vs. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28.

10  In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 (Frustrated Murder),

People vs. Reyes, 309 SCRA 622.

11 
That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
People vs. Tejero, 308 SCRA 660.
confederating together, and mutually, helping one another with evident premeditation, treachery, and superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault, and employ Without any warning, Melchor attacked Alejandra with a bolo, severing her left hand. He then turned to Gloria
personal violence upon the person of ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL, by then and there hacking her with a bolo and struck her on the head with the bolo. Wounded, Gloria tried to run away, but she was pursued outside by
and hitting her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which Mario. Melchor for his part continued to attack Alejandra and stopped only because he thought she was already
ordinarily would cause the death of said ALEJANDRA MACARAEG-RAFAEL, thus performing all the acts of execution dead. Melchor then followed his brother outside. Before losing consciousness, Alejandra heard Maximo Rafael
which should have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason telling his two sons to kill the victims.7
of causes independent of their will, that is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said ALEJANDRA
MACARAEG-RAFAEL which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice.
Alejandra was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center. A medical certificate (Exh. A) 8 issued to her on August
13, 1998 described her injuries as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
-         TRAUMATIC AMPUTATION, (L) WRIST.
and in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 (Murder),
-         HACKING WOUNDS, (R) HAND; OPEN COMPLETE FRACTURE DISTAL PART 3RD PORTION 4TH PHALANX,
That on or about the 28th day of August 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, PROXIMAL PART 2ND PORTION 3RD PHALANX, (R) HAND.
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation, treachery and superior
strength, by then and there hacking her [GLORIA TUATIS-RAFAEL] with the use of a bolo and hitting her on the
Surgical Procedure:
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which was the direct and
immediate cause of her death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said GLORIA TUATIS-RAFAEL.
-        'EMERGENCY' DEBRIDEMENT, PINNING 3RD AND 4TH PHALANGES, TENORRHAPHY 3RD FLEXOR DIGITORUM.
3 - (8/29/94)
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Rogelio Rafael, Gloria's husband, testified that in the evening of August 28, 1994, he was asleep in his bedroom
Accused Maximo Rafael was tried ahead of accused-appellants as he was the only one in custody at the time. On
on the second floor of their house when he was awakened by noise outside. When he looked through the
October 30, 1995, he was found guilty as charged and sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 (frustrated
window, he saw his wife being pursued outside their house by accused-appellants Mario and Melchor Rafael,
murder) to the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
both of whom were armed with bolos. Accused-appellants caught up with Gloria near the pigpen and took turns
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to death in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 (for murder). On appeal, this Court
stabbing and hitting her with their bolos. Rogelio said he cursed accused-appellants, "Putang-ina ninyo!" ("You
found Maximo Rafael guilty not as a principal but only as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes and
sons of bitches!") as he rushed downstairs to help his wife. But, by the time he got out of the house, accused-
accordingly sentenced him to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision correccional, as
appellants had already run away.9
minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for frustrated murder,
and to eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for murder.4 Leonilo Hamoy, whose house adjoined that of the victims, witnessed the attack on Gloria in the evening of August
28, 1994. He was holding his child when he heard a commotion outside. When he looked out of the window, he
saw Gloria Rafael coming out of her house being pursued by accused-appellants. He said he saw Gloria stumble
In 1996, accused-appellants Melchor and Mario Rafael were finally arrested.5 On November 10, 1997, both were
and fall to the ground, after which she was struck by accused-appellants with their bolos. Leonilo testified that he
arraigned, each one entering a plea of not guilty.6 Trial on the merits then ensued.
gave a sworn statement (Exh. C)10 to the police although the prosecution did not call him to the witness stand at
the trial of Maximo Rafael. 11
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rogelio Rafael, who is the husband of Gloria and the son of
Alejandra Rafael, the victim Alejandra Rafael herself; Leonilo Hamoy, a neighbor of Rogelio Rafael; and Dr. Florante
Dr. Florante F. Baltazar identified the medico-legal certificate (Exh. D) 12 and the sketches of the head (Exh. E) 13and
F. Baltazar, chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National Capital Region Crime Laboratory. The gist of their
body injuries (Exh. F)14 of Gloria Rafael which he had executed.15 The medico-legal certificate (Medico-Legal
testimonies is as follows:
Report No. M-1402-94) issued by him stated:

At around 8 o'clock in the evening of August 28, 1994, Alejandra Rafael and her daughter-in-law Gloria were in the
Specimen Submitted:
kitchen on the ground floor of their residence on Rosal Street, Pingkian, Barangay Pasong Tamo, Quezon City.
Alejandra Rafael was setting the table, while Gloria was cooking their dinner. As Alejandra heard a commotion
outside, she opened the kitchen door to find out what it was about. Alejandra saw accused-appellant Melchor Cadaver of Gloria Rafael, about 29 years old, 147 cm. in height, and a resident of Pingkian Village, Quezon City.
Rafael standing outside with his brother, accused-appellant Mario Rafael, and his father Maximo Rafael, who was
slightly behind the latter. Alejandra knew the three very well since Maximo is the brother of her husband. Purpose of Laboratory Examination:

To determine the cause of death.

Findings: 14) Stab wound, posterior middle 3rd right arm, 4 cms. lateral to its posterior midline, measuring 2.3 x 1 cm.,
directed upwards, slightly anteriorwards, right to left, exiting at the anterior middle 3rd right arm, 6 cms. medial
to its anterior midline, entry - exit measuring 7 cms.
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent
portions of the body. Conjunctivae, lips and nailbeds were pale.
15) Abrasion, right elbow, measuring 1.4 x 1 cm., along its posterior midline.
External Injuries: Head, Trunk, And Extremities:
16) Stab wound, posterior proximal 3rd right forearm, 3.4 cms. lateral to its posterior midline, measuring 4 x 1
cm., directed slightly downwards, anteriorwards, towards midline, exiting at the anterior proximal 3rd right
1) Hacking wound, left occipital region, 5 cms. from the posterior midline, measuring 8 x 2 x 2 cms. depth, directed
forearm, measuring 2 x 0.5 cms., along its anterior midline, entry-exit measuring 6 cms.
downwards, anteriorwards, slightly towards midline, fracturing the left occipital bone.

17) Stab wound, anterior middle 3rd right forearm, measuring 3.5 x 1.5 cms., 5 cms. lateral to its anterior midline,
2) Hacking wound, right parieto-occipital region, 14 cms. from the mid-sagittal line, measuring 7 x 2 x 3.5 cms.
directed downwards, anteriorwards, towards midline, exiting at the anterior middle 3rd right forearm, measuring
depth, directed slightly downwards, posteriorwards and towards midline, fracturing the right parieto-occipital bone;
2.2 x 0.6 cms., 3 cms. lateral to its anterior midline, entry-exit measuring 3 cms.

3) Stab wound, anterior right upper thorax, 116.5 cms. from the heel, 8 cms. from the anterior midline, measuring
18) Multiple abrasions, left knee, measuring 4 x 2 cms., along its anterior midline.
1.7 x 0.7 x 20 cms. depth, directed downwards, posteriorwards, right to left, fracturing the sternum at the level of
2nd thoracic rib, piercing the pericardium, ascending aorta, lower lobe of the left lung, exiting at the 6th left
intercostal space. Internal Findings:

4) Stab wound, anterior right upper thorax, 118 cms. from the heel, 12 cms. from the anterior midline, measuring 3 1. There were subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.
x 1.5 x 19 cms. depth, directed slightly upwards, slightly posteriorwards, right to left thru the muscle tissue.
2. Recovered from the stomach about 2 glasses of partially digested food particles mostly of rice.
5) Stab wound, anterior right thorax, 111 cms. from the heel, passing thru the 4th right intercostal space, measuring
2 x 0.4 x 10 cms. depth, directed downwards, posteriorwards, towards midline, piercing the lower lobe of the right
Conclusion:
lung, right dome of the diaphragm and right lobe of the liver.

Cause of death is hacking and stab wounds, head, body, and extremity.16
6) Stab wound, anterior right lower thorax, 108 cms. from the heel, 14 cms. from the anterior midline, measuring
1.7 x 0.3 x 7 cms. depth, directed downwards, posteriorwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.
Accused-appellant Mario Rafael's defense was alibi. He testified that on August 14, 1994, he left for Isabela upon
learning from the mother of his common-law spouse Myrna that one of their children was sick. He said that for
7) Multiple abrasions, right knee, measuring 3.5 x 1.5 cms., along its anterior midline.
the next two years he never left Isabela. 17 His claim was corroborated by his common-law wife Myrna, who
testified that when these crimes were committed on August 28, 1994, accused-appellant was with her in Malanit,
8) Linear abrasion, posterior left lumbar region, measuring 21 x 0.2 cms., 3 cms. from the posterior midline. Isabela, which was more than 250 kilometers away from Quezon City. She claimed that Mario stayed on for two
years working as a cook at the "Mabuhay" restaurant, of which she was the manager, until he was arrested
sometime in September 1996.18
9) Linear abrasion, posterior right shoulder, measuring 10 x 0.3 cm., 17 cms. from the posterior midline.

On the other hand, accused-appellant Melchor Rafael admitted to the crimes but invoked the mitigating
10) Multiple abrasions, anterior right deltoid region, measuring 8 x 1 cm., 6.5 cms. lateral to its anterior midline.
circumstances of passion and obfuscation on his part and provocation on the part of the victims. He claimed that
in the afternoon of August 28, 1994, he was invited by Rogelio Rafael, whom he called "Kuya Robert," to a
11) Stab wound, posterior left deltoid region, 3 cms. medial to its posterior midline, measuring 1 x 0.4 cm., 2 cms. drinking session at the latter's house. He arrived there alone at around 7 o'clock in the evening and found Rogelio
depth, thru the muscle tissue. Rafael drinking with two companions. He joined them and consumed four bottles of beer. Melchor claimed that
Rogelio's wife, Gloria Rafael, arrived while they were drinking and that the couple had a quarrel shortly
12) Incised wound, posterior distal 3rd left arm, 4 cms. lateral to its posterior midline, measuring 6 x 2 cms. thereafter. The couple then went outside. Gloria eventually returned and told him,  "Punyeta nandito ka na
naman!" ("Son of a bitch, you're here again!") Then, she allegedly told him, "Putang ina, wala na ba kayong
magawa kundi ayain n[an]g ayain ang Kuya Robert mong uminom?" ("Son of a bitch, don't you have anything
13) Incised wound, posterior right deltoid region, measuring 5.5 x 3 cms., bisected by its posterior midline. better to do than to keep inviting your Kuya Robert to drink?")
Melchor said Alejandra Rafael arrived shortly, and she too had derogatory words for him, as she said, " Nandito na Q         You said that you [were] play[ing dead] and you were in fact in a squatting position, and you could not
naman ang patay-gutom." ("The good-for-nothing is here again.") At this, accused-appellant claimed he lost control even remember how many times you were hacked and because of that condition, you did not notice what
of himself ("nagdilim ang paningin ko") and got hold of "two sharp objects" and struck Alejandra Rafael with them. happened outside of the kitchen?
When he saw Gloria Rafael running towards the door, he pursued her outside the house. He said that when Gloria
tripped near the pigpen and fell on her back, he stabbed her "with the knife [he] was holding." He then went into
A         I only witnessed the hacking of Gloria inside the house. The incident that took place outside of the house, I
hiding. On cross-examination, Melchor denied he harbored a grudge against Gloria and Alejandra Rafael. 19
am not aware.22

On December 8, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
However, accused-appellants' conviction is based not only on the testimony of Alejandra Rafael but also on those
of Rogelio Rafael and Leonilo Hamoy, both of whom witnessed Gloria Rafael being assaulted outside her
WHEREFORE, finding accused Melchor Rafael and Mario Rafael guilty beyond reasonable doubt in each of the residence.
offenses charged, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
To be sure, a reading of Alejandra Rafael's testimony, particularly during her direct examination, shows that, due
In Criminal Case No. Q94-59454 (for Murder), accused are hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death and to either her nervousness or the manner of questioning by counsel or the harrowing subject of her testimony, she
both are ordered to pay the heirs of Gloria Rafael the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, had difficulty narrating the events in chronological fashion. This difficulty is apparently the basis of accused-
Ninety Four Thousand Pesos (P94,000.00) as actual damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, appellants' contention that Alejandra's testimony is inconsistent. They point out that Alejandra testified that she
and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. was not able to set the table because she saw all three accused standing outside the kitchen door, but she later
claimed that she heard a commotion outside and thus opened the door, implying it had been closed beforehand.
That would mean, according to accused-appellants, that she saw them through a closed door.
In Criminal Case No. Q94-59453 (for Frustrated Murder), accused are hereby sentenced each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as MINIMUM, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as MAXIMUM, and both are ordered to pay Alejandra Rafael the This is not so. What really happened was that Alejandra heard a commotion outside while she was setting the
sum of Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P36,550.00) as actual damages and Twenty Thousand Pesos table so she stopped what she was doing to open the door, and it was then that she saw accused-appellants.
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. Thus, Alejandra said on cross-examination:

SO ORDERED.20 Q:         But before you saw the three (3) accused, you first heard a commotion, is it not?

The trial court held that the crimes were qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength, although the latter A:         Yes, sir.
had been absorbed by the former. It also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling with respect to the
killing of Gloria Rafael.
Q:         And that is the reason why you proceeded to the kitchen door to verify the same, is it not?

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants make the following assignment of errors:

A:         Yes, sir.

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND
Q:         When you saw the three (3) accused, the kitchen door was already opened?
FRUSTRATED MURDER DESPITE THE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, IF NOT CONTRADICTORY TESTIMON[IES] OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
A:         When I heard the sound, I went to the door immediately and I opened it, I saw the three (3) of them, and
then, Melchor Rafael immediately hacked me.23
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND
FRUSTRATED MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.21 There is therefore no inconsistency on Alejandra's testimony, as accused-appellants claim.

First. Accused-appellants contend that Alejandra Rafael admitted in her testimony that she was at all times in the Turning now to the testimony of Leonilo Hamoy, accused-appellants find it "surprising" that he did not shout or
kitchen during the incident and, therefore, she could not have seen them help each other in attacking Gloria Rafael. "do anything except watch [accused-appellants take] turns in hacking and stabbing Gloria Rafael." The contention
Indeed, Alejandra Rafael testified as follows: has no merit. With his baby in his arms and the speed with which the events unfolded, Leonilo Hamoy could not
be expected to act with such speed and composure as to be able to come to the aid of Gloria Rafael. In any case,
as accused-appellants themselves concede, different people react differently in a given situation. 24
ATTY. [Maximo B.] Usita [Counsel for Accused-Appellants]:
Indeed, the foregoing boils down to a question of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. But, with respect to this only be appreciated only where there is an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind
issue, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it be shown that it has plainly overlooked and the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
certain facts of substance which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 25 This is because the trial court, considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 32 In this case,
having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial, is in a however, there is no evidence other than Melchor's self-serving testimony that he was provoked by being
better position to decide the question of credibility. berated by the victims.

The Court thus finds no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification by prosecution witnesses Alejandra Rafael Third. The attacks on Gloria and Alejandra Rafael were clearly qualified by treachery inasmuch as they were made
and Leonilo Hamoy of accused-appellants as the assailants of Gloria Rafael. Indeed, the same is supported by without warning and by armed men against defenseless women. The two conditions for treachery, i.e., (1) that at
Rogelio Rafael's account which, curiously, accused-appellants chose not to assail in this appeal. Against their the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously
positive identification of accused-appellants, Mario Rafael's defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail. 26 adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him, 33 have thus been met in this case. This
qualifying circumstance of treachery absorbs the abuse of superior strength alleged in the informations so the
latter need not be appreciated separately. 34 The crime committed as to Alejandra was clearly frustrated murder
Second. Accused-appellants also contend that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of conspiracy in this
considering that the number and severity of her wounds would have caused her death had she not been rushed
case. Corollary to this, it must be noted that accused-appellant Melchor Rafael owns sole responsibility for the
to the hospital and received timely medical attention.35
crimes, albeit invoking the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation on his part and of provocation on
the part of the victims.
The trial court correctly held that evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not
established in this case. There is no proof of (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b)
While in the appeal of Maximo Rafael (G.R. No. 123176), this Court found that there was no conspiracy between
an act of the accused manifestly indicating that the accused have clung to their determination; and (c) sufficient
him and his two sons, herein accused-appellants, the conspiracy between the latter having been sufficiently and
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their
convincingly established in these cases. Accused-appellants' contention that proof of a previous agreement to
act.36
commit a crime is necessary to establish conspiracy is without any basis in law. 27 For direct proof of conspiracy is
rarely found, as criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. 28 Certainly, conspiracy can be inferred
from the acts of the assailants before, during, and after the commission of the crime.29 On the other hand, the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling, although proven, cannot be appreciated. To
be sure, the two women were attacked inside their house. 37 Gloria Rafael was killed outside the house only
because she ran outside to avoid further attack. The aggression began in her house though it ended outside of
In these cases, the testimonies of Rogelio Rafael, his mother Alejandra Rafael, and their neighbor Leonilo Hamoy
it.38 However, as this Court held in People v. Gallego, 39 where, under R.A. No. 7659, the effect of a generic
clearly show that accused-appellants possessed a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
aggravating circumstance is to raise the penalty to death, such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
unlawful purpose. Accused-appellants were both armed when they went to Rogelio Rafael's residence. When Gloria
information, otherwise it cannot be appreciated:
Rafael, who had been seriously wounded by Melchor, tried to run away, Mario went in pursuit of her. When
accused-appellants caught up with Gloria, they took turns in stabbing and hacking her. Afterwards, accused-
appellants both fled and went into hiding. The accused must . . . be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that
would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in
reviewing the parties' evidence." This, the accused can do only if he is apprised of the aggravating circumstance
Melchor's claim as the sole assailant of the victim is apparently intended to shield his brother Mario from criminal
raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. . . The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the
liability, in the words of the trial court, "to offer himself as a sacrificial lamb." In contrast to Melchor, however, the
decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating
prosecution eyewitnesses do not appear to have any improper motive except to bring the perpetrators of the
circumstance will be appreciated against him.
crimes to justice. Their testimonies, therefore, are entitled to full faith and credence. 30

Now, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, a generic
Moreover, Melchor's version of the events does not ring true because of the following circumstances:
aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the information. Rule 110
provides in pertinent parts:
(1) When he said he lost control of himself ("nagdilim ang paningin ko") because of the alleged derogatory remarks
of the victims, he managed to grab not just one but "two sharp objects," which were conveniently on hand, to
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
enable him to immediately commence his attack on the victims. One cannot help suspecting that Melchor was really
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
armed and that the "two sharp objects" correspond to his weapon and that of his brother Mario.
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.
(2) He testified that he "lost control of himself" so that he "was not aware [he] was hacking Alejandra Rafael," yet he
claimed he noticed Gloria running towards the door so that he stopped hacking Alejandra and ran after
SEC. 9 Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
Gloria.31These do not appear to be the acts of a man who finds himself in the grip of passion and obfuscation but
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
rather of one deliberately set on committing mayhem. Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance can
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
Footnotes
These provisions have been given retroactive effect 40 on the well-settled principle that "statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their 1
 Per Judge Lydia Querubin Layosa.
passage."41
2
 Records, p. 1.
The penalty for frustrated murder under Art. 245, in relation to Arts. 50 and 61(2) of the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating circumstance and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling not
3
being considered in view of the failure of the prosecution to allege the same in the information, the maximum of  Id., p. 4
accused-appellants' sentence for frustrated murder would fall within the range of reclusion temporal medium, i.e.,
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the 4
 People v. Rafael, G.R. No. 123176, Oct. 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 97. Accused Maximo Rafael was likewise ordered to
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty is within the range of the penalty one degree lower pay Alejandra Rafael P36,500.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the heirs of Gloria
than reclusion temporal, i.e., prision mayor, which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The Tuatis-Rafael P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P94,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
sentence imposed by the trial court is within the foregoing range and should therefore be affirmed.
5
 See Accused-appellants' Motion to Set Cases for Arraignment and Trial, dated July 11, 1997; Records, pp. 23-24.
Although dwelling has not been alleged in the informations, it may nonetheless be considered for the purpose of
determining liability of accused-appellants for exemplary damages in view of Art. 2230 of the Civil Code which 6
provides that exemplary damages may be awarded as a part of the civil liability of the accused in criminal cases  Records, p. 41.
"when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."
7
 TSN (Alejandra Rafael), pp. 6-10, Sept. 9, 1998; Affidavit, dated Sept. 9, 1994, of Alejandra Rafael (Exh. B);
In line with current jurisprudence, therefore, accused-appellants are civilly liable for the following damages: (a) for Records, pp. 12-13.
the murder of Gloria Rafael - P50,000.00 moral damages and P50,000.00 civil indemnity42 and (b) for the frustrated
murder of Alejandra Rafael - P30,000.00 civil indemnity43 and P50,000.00 moral damages.44 In both cases, due to the 8
 Records, p. 155.
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, an award
of P25,000.00 in exemplary damages should also be awarded pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. 45 The award of 9
actual damages for funeral and medical expenses in both cases should, however, be deleted for lack of receipts or  TSN, pp. 8-12, April 20, 1998; TSN, pp. 5-8, June 22, 1998.
any documents evidencing the same, as required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. 46 However, nominal damages of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) may be awarded so that the victims' rights may be recognized or vindicated. 47 10
 Records, p. 156. Leonilo Hamoy's affidavit was dated Aug. 29, 1994.

11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City, finding accused-appellants Melchor  TSN, pp. 2-15, March 22, 1999; TSN, pp. 5-7, May 12, 1999.
and Mario Rafael guilty of the frustrated murder of Alejandra Rafael and the murder of Gloria Rafael, is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: 12
 Records, p. 157.

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59453 (frustrated murder), accused-appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally 13
 Id., p. 158.
the victim Alejandra Macaraeg-Rafael P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as nominal damages.
14
 Id., p. 159.
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59454 (murder), accused-appellants are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered
15
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Gloria Tuatis-Rafael P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as  TSN, pp. 2-7, Sept. 8, 1999.
moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as nominal damages.
16
 Records, p. 157.
SO ORDERED.
17
 TSN, pp. 1-5, May 10, 2000.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
18 38
 TSN, pp. 5-8, July 5, 2000.  See People v. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769 (1995).

19 39
 TSN, pp. 2-14, June 7, 2000.  338 SCRA 21 (2000).

20 40
 RTC Decision, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 209-210.  See People v. Gano, G.R. No. 134373, Feb. 28, 2001; Tangan v. People, 352 SCRA 599 (2001); People v.
Arrojado; 350 SCRA 679 (2001).
21
 Appellants' Brief, p. 9; Rollo, p. 53.
41
 Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 27 (1989); Alday v. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 (1983); People v. Sumulong,
22 77 Phil. 764 (1946).
 TSN, p. 9, Sept. 9, 1998.

42
23  E.g., People v. Punsalan, G.R. No. 145475, Nov. 22, 2001.
 Id., p. 7.

43
24  People v. Pacaña, 345 SCRA 72 (2000).
 Maandal v. People, G.R. No. 144113, June 28, 2001; People v. Naredo, 276 SCRA 489 (1997).

44
25  People v. Singh, et al., G.R. No. 129782, June 29, 2001.
 People v. Punsalan, G.R. No. 145475, Nov. 22, 2001; People v. Cañares, G.R. No. 137243, Nov. 22, 2001.

45
26  People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, Aug. 23, 2001.
 People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 138022, Aug. 23, 2001; People v. Miana, G.R. No. 134565, Aug. 9, 2001; People v.
Maandal, G.R. No. 144113, June 28, 2001.
46
 The receipts evidencing such damages apparently were only presented in the trial of Maximo Rafael.
27
 People v. Estepano, 307 SCRA 701 (1999).
47
 People v. Sanchez, et al., G.R. Nos. 121039-45, Oct. 18, 2001; People v. Candare, 333 SCRA 358 (2000).
28
 People v. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999).
SECOND DIVISION
29
 People v. Templa, G.R. No. 121897, Aug. 16, 2001; People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, July 19, 2001.
G.R. No. 129899             April 27, 2000
30
 People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26, 2001.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
31 vs.
 TSN, p. 7, June 7, 2000.
RODOLFO VILLA, JR. y DELGADO, accused-appellant.
32
 People v. Lobino, 317 SCRA 606 (1999).

33
 People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 137494-95, Oct. 25, 2001.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
34
 People v. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679 (2001).
RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO appeals from the Decision of the trial court convicting him of four (4) separate
crimes of Murder qualified by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each murder. He was also
35
 Revised Penal Code, Art. 14. ordered to indemnify the heirs of his four (4) victims in the amount of P50,000.00 for each group of heirs or a
total of P200,000.00. 1
36
 People v. Cabug, G.R. No. 123149, March 27, 2001; People v. De la Tongga, 336 SCRA 687 (2000).
The antecedents: In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New
37
 It appears that the house is also Alejandra Rafael's residence per her affidavit, dated September 9, 1994; Exh. B; Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito, suddenly
Records, pp. 12-13. came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle 2 and shot Dionito from behind killing him instantly. Ronald
Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their father's rescue after hearing the gunshot but
the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father, and mortally wounding Sheila on state as well as to prevent a relapse of his illness.  10 In its Order of 21 June 1995 the trial court granted the
the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense.
the accused but Samuel too was gunned down.
On 3 April 1997 the trial court disregarded the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the
After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr. surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino of S2 OMDC (Olongapo Metropolitan crimes charged. Thus —
District Command). 3 Rodolfo was accordingly charged with multiple murder. When arraigned on 3 October 1991 he
entered a plea of not guilty. Later however his counsel, Atty. Cipriano Dumpit, manifested in open court that the
The court is not convicted that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type before or during the
accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked self-defense insofar as Dionito
killing. The evaluation reports do not say so in unequivocal terms. Dr. Zalsos, during her direct testimony, did not
Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus; according to the accused, he was forced
testify to the effect. In her cross examination, she, however, mentioned in passing that the accused was suffering
to shoot Dionito with his rifle. 4 The trial court then proceeded to propound searching questions on the accused to
from schizophrenia during the commission of the offense. The court noted that she was ensure of her allegation.
determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of his change of plea, and upon being satisfied
The said reports and testimony of Dr. Zalsos simply revealed that the accused suffered from insanity can be
with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by counsel the court allowed the change of plea. 5
considered as an exempting circumstance, it must be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the
offense (People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851). Also, in order to exempt the accused from criminal liability it must be
Meanwhile, on 16 July 1992, the trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Romeo Alinea as counsel de oficio for shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the
the accused, as his counsel de parte Atty. Cipriano Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical will at the time of the commission of the crime (People v. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275). These the accused failed to
treatment. 6Before the defense could present its evidence, however, counsel de oficio Alinea manifested his inability prove.
to confer with the accused but moved that a psychiatric examination of the accused be made at the National Center
for Mental Health to determine his mental condition. The motion was granted and the accused was examined at the
In resolving this appeal we need not inquire into the killing of the victims as this was already admitted by accused-
Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain whether he was suffering from mental illness before, during and after
appellant, nor into his theory of self-defense which he did not pursue, much more prove, during the trial. The
the commission of the crimes. 7
only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would
exempt him from criminal liability.
Dr. Romeo Enriquez, the examining psychiatrist at the Olongapo City General Hospital, recommended that the
accused be confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Forensic Pavillion, where an evaluation process for
We affirm the judgment of conviction. Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while
the possibility of insanity could be made. 8 Thus, on 4 November 1994, the accused was confined and treated at the
committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
National Center for Mental Health, under the direct supervision of Dr. Celeste A. C. Peña, Medical Officer III, and Dr.
complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality
Isagani S. Gonzales, Medical Specialist II, Physician-in-charge Male Court Case Pavillion.
of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. 11

On 21 December 1994, after more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to the
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language
trial court a psychiatric evaluation report, 9 which stated in part —
and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts.
Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION RESULTS: evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with
his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries
of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a
Evaluation shows that the patient is suffering from Insanity or Psychosis classified as Schizophrenia. This is a mental
person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 12
illness characterized by deterioration in social and occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion,
thought disturbances and poor judgment. He is at present incompetent to stand trial.
Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time he perpetrated
the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence on
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering to the PC Detachment in Olongapo
City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental Hospital; 13 and, (c) He was able to give a
He is recommend for further confinement and treatment. Sworn Statement before the Prosecutor's Office in Olongapo City immediately after the commission of the crimes
narrating his version of the incident. 14 These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind. In  People
Six (6) months later, or on 5 June 1995, a follow-up report on the patient's psychiatric status was made, this time by v. Ambal 15 we held: "The fact that immediately after the incident (accused) thought of surrendering to the law-
Dr. Cheryl Zalsos, with remarks that the patient's status had improved enough for him to withstand the rigors of the enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was
trial. Thus, Adoracion Manuit, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Section, National Center for Mental Health, filed going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication
a Petition for Release praying that the accused be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition of his that he was conscious of his acts, he acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.
case, and further recommending that he be allowed to undergo periodic check-up to sustain his improved mental
What militates heavily against his plea of insanity is his signed statement before the Prosecutor's Office dated 11 Moreover, if we were to follow accused-appellant's narration of the incident in his Sworn Statement, it will
October 1991 which manifests on its face that he was mentally sound at the time of the killings. The Sworn appear that he slaughtered his victims in a fit of rage after Dionito Fernandez, his first victim, allegedly accused
Statement is quoted hereunder for better appreciation and ready reference — him of stealing chickens and cursed him saying, "p - t - g ina mo," and, "gago." These negate insanity. There is a
vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. A man sometimes does crazy things when
Na humigit kumulang ng ika-pito ng umaga, nagbihis pa ako ng uniform para mag-duty ng marinig ko si Mr. Dionito
enraged but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is insane.
Fernandez na nagsabi ng ninakaw ng gagong CAFGU ang mga manok ko kagabi. Pagkarinig ko noon, ako ay lumabas
para tanungin kung sinong CAFGU ang nagnanakaw ng kanyang manok, at sumagot siya ng "anong pakialam mo,"
tinanong ko siyang muli na bakit nakarinig ako CAFGU, sinong CAFGU iyon, ako lang naman ang CAFGU rito so atin The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary,
ah." Sumagot siya ng "Hoy putang ina mo, hindi ako natatakot sa baril mo, walang baril-baril sa akin gago," sabay and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who
dampot niya sa itak at paharap sa akin, nabigla ako at nag-alangan na baka ibato o itaga niya sa akin ang hawak pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. 16 Insanity is a defense by way of
niyang itak at nakalabit ko ang gatilyo ng aking baril at siya ay tinamaan; confession and avoidance, and as such the quantum of evidence required to prove that is clear and convincing
evidence.
Pagkatapos ay bigla akong nilusob ng kanyang anak na si Ronald at dinampot ang itak na nasa kamay ng kanyang
ama at tatagain ako, at sinabi pang, "mamamatay ka rin." Nagdilim na ang aking paningin at siya ay aking nabaril at The defense banks heavily on the findings of the psychiatrists at the National Center for Mental Health,
hindi ko napansin ang patakbong papalapit na si Sheila sa kanila at hindi ko sinasadyang natamaan; specifically the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Peña and Dr. Gonzales, 17 and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos, that
he was suffering from insanity or psychosis classified as schizophrenia. The doctors arrived at this conclusion after
a series of medical and psychological examinations on accused-appellant during his confinement at the center.
Nataranta na ako at naisip kong magpunta sa PC Detachment para sumuko, ngunit hinarang ako ni Mr. Samuel
Eclevia, na kanyang kumpadre na may dalang kutsara ng semento at kanyang akmang aagawin ang baril ko at
nakaumang rin sa akin ang kanyang hawak, sa nagdidilim ko pang isipan ay nabaril ko rin siya; However, we are still in a quandary as to whether accused-appellant was really insane when he committed the
crimes. Firstly, we fail to discern anything from the psychiatric evaluation report that accused-appellant's
judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant the conclusion that his mental condition in
Pagkatapos ay dumating ang aking ama na si Rodolfo Villa, Sr. at ako ay inaawat at parang natauhan ako ng
1991 when he killed his victims, and in 1994 when he was admitted for psychiatric treatment at the center, was
maulinigan ko ang kanyang boses, sinabi niya na "anak, tumigil ka na, akina ang baril mo at sasamahan kita sa
the same so that his guilt or mental competence at the time he committed the crimes may be reasonably
Detachment para sumuko." Natatandaan ko pa na nasabi ko na wala na akong kinabukasan itay, mabuti pang
doubted. Secondly, without the least intention of casting doubt on the knowledge and integrity of expert
mamatay na rin ako at itinutok ko pa ang baril sa leeg ko;
witnesses, we agree with the trial court that the results of the examinations conducted by the psychiatrists on
accused-appellant appear to be based on incomplete or insufficient facts. Records show that the psychiatrists
Narinig ko pa na sinabi niya na huwag anak, kapag ginawa mo iyan ay bibigyan mo kami ng pagdurusa ng inay mo. relied mainly on the data supplied by accused-appellant and his police escort, without conducting an independent
Bayaan mo, gagawin ko ang lahat para sa iyo, ibaba mo iyan at i-safety mo na; interview of any of accused-appellant's family members, relatives or persons who could provide information on
his state of mind before or during the commission of the offenses. If he really was insane at the time of the
Pagkatapos ay ibinaba ko ang baril ko at sasama na sana ako sa kanya papuntang Detachment, ngunit napakaraming murders, certainly such a condition could not have escaped the notice of other persons, friends and strangers
tao ang nakaharang sa daan at may nakita pa akong may mga hawak na itak, kaya't ako ay nag-warning shot para alike, including the immediate members of his family.
sila ay lumayo;
It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability,
Maya-maya ay dumating na ang kasama kong CAFGU na si Agripino Saromo, at sa kanya ako sumuko at sumama such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends
papunta sa P.C. Detachment at doon ko na lang nalaman na nadaplisan pala ng bala si Mr. Bernardo Briones sa and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses
kanyang braso, ng ako ay mag-warning shot sa mga tao na nakaharang sa daanan ko bago dumating si CAFGU and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt
Saromo; his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should
relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the
inquiry, 18 and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of
Wala pong katotohanan ang kanilang hinala na si tatay ko, Rodofo Villa, Sr. ay nakialam sa aking mga ginawa. Sarili determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the
ko po lamang ang pagkabaril sa mga nasabing tao. person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the exempting
circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the
We find it incredible for a supposedly deranged person to remember vividly and give such a lucid and detailed burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crimes freely, knowingly and intelligently.
account of the carnage, from the moment he shot his first victim up to the time he surrendered to the authorities.
Quite noticeable also, attempts to justify his criminal acts pervade the Sworn Statement which only a perfectly sane It has been repeatedly held that this Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court
and intelligent person, not a demented one, would be capable of making. because it is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying on the stand. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which
 9 
might alter the result of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded Id., pp. 152-153; Exh. "I."
finality by this Court. We find no compelling reason to depart from the rule.
10 
Records, p. 154.
Finally, on the penalties imposed by the trial court, we do not agree that the aggravating circumstance of "taking
advantage of his public position" as a CAFGU member should be considered against accused-appellant. The mere 11 
See People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860, 866.
fact that he was a member of the CAFGU and was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not sufficient to establish that he
misused his public position in the commission of the crimes. 19
12 
Id., p. 867.
On the other hand, the trial court properly credited in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of
13 
"plea of guilty."1âwphi1 Thus, following Art. 64, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code, there being one mitigating Decision of the trial court, p. 9; Rollo p. 265.
circumstance, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period for
each crime of murder, it being the minimum imposable penalty after appreciating one mitigating circumstance in his 14 
Annex "A."
favor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate sentence
within the range ofprision mayor maximum as minimum to reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.1âwphi1.nêt 15 
G.R. No. 52688, 17 October 1980, 100 SCRA 325.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO 16 
of four (4) separate counts of Murder is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION of the penalties imposed; See People v. So, G.R. No. 104664, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 708.
consequently, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years two (2) months and
ten (10) days of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days 17 
Decision of the RTC-Br. 75, Olongapo City, Exh. "1;" Records, pp. 152-153.
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, for each crime of murder. He is further ordered to INDEMNIFY the
heirs of his victims in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case or for a total of P200,000.00. Costs against accused- 18 
appellant. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, 27 June 1990, 186 SCRA 851.

19 
SO ORDERED. See People v. Pantoja, No. L-18793, 11 October 1968, 25 SCRA 468, 471-472.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140344. August 18, 2000.]

Footnotes
SOLOMON RABOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
1 
Decision penned by Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr., RTC-Br. 75, Olongapo City.
DECISION
2 
TSN, 2 June 1992, p. 3.
KAPUNAN, J.:
3 
Records, p. 14.

4 
TSN, 2 June 1992, pp. 1-4. Through this petition for review on certiorari, Solomon Rabor (petitioner) seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision, dated 11 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11542 which affirmed the judgment of
3  the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Davao City finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Order of Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr., dated 2 June 1992; Rollo, pp. 65-66.
of Frustrated Murder. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Resolution, dated 7 September 1999, of
the appellate court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
6 
Records, p. 72.
The Information filed against petitioner reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
7 
Order dated 6 April 1993, Records, p. 128.
That on or about August 17, 1981, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a bolo, with treachery and evident premeditation and with
8 
Records, pp. 140-141. intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and hacked with said weapon one Hikaru
Miyake, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary In his defense, petitioner interposed alibi. He claimed that on 17 August 1981, at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon,
he met Vicente Panes while he (petitioner) was buying a newspaper at the corner of Bolton and San Pedro Streets
INCISED WOUND, POSTERIOR TEMPORAL AREA (L) 1.5 CM. LONG, 2-3 MM. DEEP. in Davao City. Panes asked petitioner to accompany him to Sigaboy, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to get
coconut seedlings. Petitioner readily agreed and after obtaining permission from his wife, he went to Sigaboy
INCISED WOUND SUPRASCAPULAR AREA (L) 12 CM. LONG, 5-6 CM. DEEP. with Panes. They arrived in Sigaboy at around 9 o’clock in the evening. From there, they traveled another thirty
(30) kilometers on motorcycle to reach the place of Fernando Perez in Luzon, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental
INCISED WOUND, BACK OF THE NECK 10-11 CM. LONG, 4-5 MM. DEEP. where they were supposed to get the seedlings. When they arrived in Luzon, however, Perez was not around.
They decided to stay there and wait for Perez. They waited for a few days as Perez arrived in Luzon only on 30
INCISED WOUND (L) LUMBAR REGION 6 CM. LONG, 4-5 MM. DEEP. August 1981. Petitioner and Panes returned to Davao City on that same day at around 3 or 4 o’clock in the
afternoon. 3 
INCISED WOUND (R) LUMBAR AREA 8 CM. LONG, 3 MM. DEEP.
Vicente Panes testified for the defense. He substantially corroborated petitioner’s alibi, i.e., he (petitioner) was in
INCISED WOUND, POSTEROLATERAL ASPECT (L) ELBOW, 6 CM. LONG, 3-4 CM. DEEP WITH CHIP FRACTURE OF Sigaboy, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental from 17 August 1981 up to 30 August 1981. The two of them were
LATERAL EPICONDYLE OF THE HUMEROS (L). there together to get coconut seedlings from Panes’ brother-in-law. 4 Emma Rabor, wife of petitioner, also
claimed that petitioner was in Sigaboy, Governor Generoso; Davao Oriental at the time. 5 
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of cause independent of his will of said accused, that is because of the After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the crime of frustrated murder. The
timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Hikaru Miyake. dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Contrary to law. 1  WHEREFORE, the accused Solomon Rabor is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Frustrated Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence for four years, two months
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecution’s case, based chiefly on the and one day of prision correccional, as its minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor, as its maximum,
testimony of the victim, Hikaru Miyake, 2 is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library and to pay the victim Hikaru Miyake the total sum of P12,000.00 for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 17 August 1981, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national, residing with his Filipina
wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City was taking his usual "Japanese-style" bath in a drum behind his SO ORDERED. 6 
house. As he soaked his body inside the drum filled with warm water, he heard a sound which made him turn to the
direction where it came from. Miyake sensed that there was something wrong, so he hurriedly got out of the drum. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, upon review of the records,
He then saw petitioner about one and a half meters away rushing towards him with a bolo. Petitioner attacked affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:chanrob1es
Miyake who fought and grappled with the former for the possession of the bolo. The struggle lasted for about two virtual 1aw library
(2) minutes.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo, finding the accused guilty of the offense of frustrated murder is
Petitioner fled when he lost possession of the bolo. As a result of the attack, Miyake sustained injuries on the AFFIRMED. 7 
different parts of his body. Miyake’s security guard arrived to give assistance to his employer. The security guard
saw petitioner flee towards the direction of his house. Miyake was immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but the same was denied for lack of merit. 8 
where he was confined for ten (10) days.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Miyake further testified that petitioner and his wife used to perform services to his (Miyake’s) family. Petitioner was
hired to bring the Miyake children to their school while petitioner’s wife gave them piano lessons. This cordial A. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF
relationship between Miyake and petitioner, however, abruptly ended when their respective wives quarreled with FRUSTRATED MURDER IS CONTRARY TO LAW;
each other over a sum of money which Mrs. Miyake loaned to petitioner’s wife. Since then, petitioner became
hostile towards the Miyakes. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.

On one occasion, petitioner threw stones at the house of Miyake. In the afternoon of that same day, Miyake went C. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE APPLICATION OF EVIDENT
to his (petitioner’s) house, which was just about fifty (50) meters away, to try to patch things up with him. PREMEDITATION IN THE INSTANT CASE IS A FINDING GROUNDED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES, CONJECTURES,
Nonetheless, on account of the strained relations between them, Miyake terminated the services of petitioner and AND IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.
his wife. Thereafter, Petitioner, while riding on his motorcycle, would stop in front of the Miyake residence and
shout, "I want to fight and I will kill you." Miyake ignored these threats to avoid any trouble. Then came that fateful D. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IN DISREGARDING THE ALIBI OF THE PETITIONER HAS DECIDED
day of 17 August 1981.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT.
 emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation. 15 
E. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION IS GUILTY OF SUPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. 9 
Evident premeditation having been wrongly appreciated in this case and there being no other qualifying
The petition is partly meritorious. circumstance established during the trial, the Court now holds that the crime committed in this case is frustrated
homicide.
The first three issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated. They all pertain to petitioner’s contention
that he was wrongly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. Petitioner maintains that the wounds sustained by With respect to the fourth issue raised by petitioner, i.e., the appellate court erred in disregarding his defense of
the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was merely attempted not frustrated. Further, the qualifying alibi, suffice it to say, that this defense cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of petitioner as the
circumstance of evident premeditation was not allegedly sufficiently proven in this case. Petitioner thus is of the person who attacked him. 16 Miyake could not have been mistaken about petitioner’s identity as he is no
view that the crime should be homicide and not murder. stranger to the former. They knew each other quite well. Miyake identified petitioner in a categorical,
straightforward and consistent manner, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Contrary to petitioner’s insistence, some of the wounds inflicted on the victim were fatal. This was sufficiently
established by the testimony of Dr. Bernardo Adolfo who, together with Dr. Virgilio S. Durban, Jr., attended to the x       x       x
victim when he was confined at the Brokenshire Hospital after the hacking incident. As stated in the trial court’s
decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Alright, you said you smell something wrong so you went out from the gasoline drum and clean your body?
Dr. Adolfo testified that the first wound may not be fatal, it is at the back of the left ear; the second wound could be
fatal, it is at the back left side; the third wound may not be fatal, it is at the back of the neck; the fourth wound may A I felt something wrong I heard some sound so I turn over and at that time Mr. Rabor was almost 1-1/2 meters
not be fatal, it is at the left waist; the fifth wound may not be fatal, it is at the right back above the waist; and the from me and suddenly attacked me.
sixth wound at the "posterior left elbow 6 cm. long, 3-4 cm. deep with chip fracture of lateral epicondyle of the
Humerus (L)", is fatal. If no medical treatment were applied the victim could have died. 10  Q You said when he attacked you, you saw him to be Solomon Rabor?

Given the foregoing testimony that Miyake could have died if not for the timely medical treatment, the trial court A Very clear. 17 
correctly held that the stage of execution of the crime was frustrated. A felony is "frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do x       x       x
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." 11 

There is merit, however, to petitioner’s assertion that the trial court and the CA erroneously appreciated evident Q Were you investigated by any police officer in connection with this case?
premeditation in the commission of the offense. In holding that petitioner committed the offense with evident
premeditation, the trial court considered his act prior to the hacking incident of shouting at Miyake, "I want to fight A Yes, sir. I think August 19 in the morning I was investigated by two policemen.
and I will kill you." According to the trial court, this showed that petitioner had long planned to kill Miyake.
Q And what did you tell these police officers?
On the other hand, the CA merely made a cursory statement that "in qualifying the crime as frustrated murder the
trial court considered the circumstance of evident premeditation and not treachery" 12 without elaborating on the A I explained to the police officers about the hacking incident.
bases for the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
Q If the accused Solomon Rabor alias Boy is in Court can you identify him?
In order that evident premeditation may be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty, the following
requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act A Yes sir.
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 13  Q Will you kindly look around the courtroom if he is around?

None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts of this case. For one, the records do not show the time when A He is Mr. Rabor. (The witness pointing to Mr. Solomon Rabor and when the accused was asked he answered
petitioner resolved to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the offender determined to that he is Solomon Rabor).
commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from
date and time. 14 Absent this first requisite, evident premeditation was thus incorrectly appreciated in this case. Q You said you told the police officer of what happened to you did you tell them who hacked you?

Further, the second requisite is wanting. The fact that petitioner was heard to have shouted at Miyake, "I want to A Yes sir, because I clearly saw the face so I informed the policeman that I was hacked by Solomon Rabor. 18 
fight and I will kill you" does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without showing that petitioner
performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination. Petitioner’s threat, unsupported by other Finally, petitioner impugns the alleged non-presentation of Sammy Babael and one Mr. Tan by the prosecution.
evidence which would disclose his true criminal state of mind, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally Babael and Tan were named by Miyake as the persons who brought him to the hospital. Petitioner is of the view
that the prosecution should have presented them as witnesses as their testimonies are vital to the case. This 9. Id., at 12-13.
proposition is untenable. The non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense
and the matter of whom to present as witnesses lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case. 19 10. Note 6, at 8; Records, p. 164. Emphasis ours.
Besides, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, assuming that the testimonies
of these persons were material and relevant, nothing could have prevented petitioner from presenting them as his 11. Article 6, Revised Penal Code.
witnesses in order to discredit the testimonies of those who testified for the prosecution. 20 The presumption of
suppressed evidence does not apply when the same is equally accessible or available to the defense. 21  12. Note 7, at 43.

In fine, the guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated homicide had been sufficiently established beyond 13. People v. Espina, G.R No. 123102, 29 February 2000, p. 11; People
reasonable doubt. The penalty imposed on him shall be modified accordingly. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 644 (1999); People v. Realin, 301
provides the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, SCRA 495, 513 (1999).
the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Frustrated homicide is thus
punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be meted out on 14. REYES, REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE 385 (13th ed., 1993).
petitioner should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional, and the maximum should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor (Article 64, par. 1 of the 15. People v. Fuentesuela, 73 Phil. 553, 554 (1942).
Revised Penal Code) the range of which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Considering that no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide, petitioner 16. People v. Bermudez, 309 SCRA 124, 135 (1999); People v.
shall be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637 (1996); People v. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. (1996).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision, dated 11 March 1997, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is 17. Note 2, at 19.
found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. 18. Id., at 23.

SO ORDERED. 19. People v. De los Santos, 295 SCRA 583, 604 (1998); People v.
Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574 (1996).
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
20. Note 7, at 79.
Endnotes:
21. People v. Martinez, 205 SCRA 666, 674-675 (1992); People v.
Araja, 105 SCRA 133 (1992).

1. Records, p. 1. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
2. TSN, Testimony of Hikaru Miyake, 12 July 1983, pp. 15-23. Manila

3. TSN, Testimony of Solomon Rabor, 20 February 1986, pp. 2-5.

FIRST DIVISION
4. TSN, Testimony of Vicente Panes, 16 June 1986, pp. 2-5.
 
5. TSN, Testimony of Emma Rabor, 6 December 1986, pp. 2-3.

6. Decision, Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Davao City, Criminal Case G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
No. 7022, p. 16; Records, p. 172.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
7. Rollo, p 45.
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and
8. Id., at 48.
MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners, 
vs. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents. convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one.10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee
has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see
to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.: Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or
We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons,1 Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential
Warden of Bohol3 and Torres v. Gonzales,4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty
need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11
determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach
thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed
scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now. against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years
in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray
for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the
in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the conditional authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified
pardon and was consequently released from confinement.6 ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.
convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly to costs.
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of
the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales  8. There we ruled that:
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have
Footnotes
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised 1 68 Phil. 154.
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.9
2 87 Phil. 495.

Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is no
3 108 Phil. 353.
adequate basis for us to oblige him.
4 152 SCRA 272.

5 Conditional Pardon, Rollo, p. 12.

6 Certificate of Discharge from Prison, Rollo, p. 13.

7 Rollo, p. 14.

8 See Note 4.

9 Ibid.

10 Alvarez v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 50.

11 Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154.