Internal Ranking Moot Court Competition, 2020

INTERNAL RANKING MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
TEAM CODE; 04
IN THE MATTER OF
UNION OF INDIA......................................................APPELLANT
V.
WOMEN FREEDOM UNION (WFU).........................RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
1
TABLE OF CONTENT
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS...............................................................................................................
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................................................
 CASES CITED
 BOOKS REFERRED
 STATUTES
 ARTICLES AND LEGAL JOURNALS
 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
 LEGAL DATABASE
FACT OF THE CASE………………………………………………………………………..
STATEMENT JURISDICTION……………………………………………………………..
ISSUE OF THE CASE………………………………………………………………………
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………
ARGUMENT ADVANCED…………………………………………………………………
PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………..
2
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
AIR All India Reporter
All. Allahabad High Court
Art. Article
Bom. Bombay High Court
Anr. Another
CAL Calcutta High Court
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Cri. L. J. / Cr. L. J. Criminal Law Journal
DLR Delhi Law Review
Ed. Edition
HON’BLE Honorable
i.e. That Is
I.P.C. Indian Penal Code
ibid. Ibidem
id. Idem
ILR Indian Law Reports
Ors. Others
RAJ Rajasthan
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCJ Supreme Court Journal
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
SUPP. Supplementary
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UOI Union of India
3
V. Versus
Vol. Volume
4
I NDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
18. Hinds v. R, (1976) 1 All ER 355.
42. Nar Singh Pal v. UOI, (2000) 3 SCC 589,594: AIR 2000 SC 1401.
58. R.M.D.C. v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628.
68. Sow Chandra Kanta v. Sk. Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674, 1975 SCC (Cri) 305, (1975) 3 SCR
933).
1. Abdul Rehman v. Pinto, AIR 1951 Hyd. 11.
2. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663.
3. Ashok Kumar Sahu v. UOI, (2006) 6 SCC 704.
4. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34: AIR 2002 SC 1533.
5. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 2041.
6. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615: AIR 1987 SC 748.
7. CBI and Ors. v. Keshub Mahindra, (1996) 6 SCC 129.
8. Chandra Kanta v. Sheik Habib, AIR 1975 SC 1500: (1975) 1 SCC 674.
9. Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others, (2015) 1 SCC 192.
10. Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 41.
11. Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v.Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2041.
12. Common Cause, a Registerd Society v. UOI, AIR 1999 SC 2979.
13. Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 AIR 1378: 1975 SCR (3) 946.
5
14. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 2746: 1950 SCR 88.
15. Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 109.
16. Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 10 SCC.
17. Harakchand v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 1453: (1969) 2 SCC 166.

19. Hardie Trading Ltd & Anr. v Addison Paint & Chemical Ltd 2003 (27) PTC 241 (SC)
20. Hiral P Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 : AIR 2016 SC 4774 :
2016 (9) SCJ 204.
21. Hoystead v. Commr. of taxation, (1925) AC 155, (1925) All ER 56, (1926) 42 TLR 207, 67 ER
313.
22. Indira Sawhney v. UOI, (1992) SUPP. 3 SCC 217.
23. J Srinivas Raju v. State of Orissa, 113 (2012) Cut LT 13 (22) (Ori).
24. Jagjit Singh v. State, AIR 1954 Hyd. 28.
25. James Sibongo v. Lister Lutombi Chaka and Another, CASE NO: SA 77/2014.
26. John Vallamattom v. UOI, Writ Petition (Civil) 242 of 1997.
27. Joseph Shine v.UOI, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 194 of 2017.
28. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
29. Kameshwar Pd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166: 1962 SUPP (3) SCR 369.
30. Kesav Nanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
31. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 1963 AIR 1295: 1964 SCR (1) 332.
32. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. And Another v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3
SCC 114.
33. Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 412: 1992 SUPP. (2) SCC 651.
34. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873, 891: (1981) 2 SCC 600.
35. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650.
36. M. G. Badappanabar v. State of Karnataka, (2000) SUPP. 5 SCR 302.
6
37. M. Nagaraj v. UOI, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
38. M/S Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167.
39. Malak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 760: (1981) 1 SCC 420.
40. Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur,
(1976) 4 SCC 124.
41. Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India & Others, (1996) 2 SCC 749.
42. Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1984 SC 121.
43. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1234.
44. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
45. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, W. P.
(Crl.) No. 76 of 2016 D. No. 14961/201.
46. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, [WP (CRL.) No. 76/2016].
47. Neera Mathur v. L.I.C, 1992 AIR 392: 1991 SCR Supp. (2) 146.
48. Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674: (1980) 2 SCC 167.
49. Nupur Talwar v. C.B.I., AIR 2012 SC 1921.
50. Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 7 SCC 780.
51. Payal Sharma v. Supdt, Nari Niketan kalindri vihar, agra, AIR 2001 All 254.
52. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.
53. Pn Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, AIR 1980 SC 808. 54. R v. R., (1991)
4 All ER 481.
55. R. K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138: (1981) 4 SCC 675.
56. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., 1995 AIR 265: (1994) SCC 6 632.
57. R.D. Sugar v. V. Nagary, AIR 1976 SC 2183.
59. Rajasthan State Board Transport Corporation v. BalMukund Bairwa, (2) (2009) 4 SCC
229: (2009) 2 JT 423.
7
60. Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development Authority, (1989) SUPP 1 SCC 116: AIR 1989 SC
307.
61. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388.
62. Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Govt. of A. P, (2003) 10 SCC 78.
63. Sewpujanrai v. Customs Collector, AIR 1958 SC 845: 1959 SCR 821.
64. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K. M. & Ors, 2018 SCC: 2018 SC 343.
65. Shaukat Hussain Guru v. State, (2008) 6 SCC: AIR 2008 SC 2419.
66. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 SCC 963.
67. Sidram S. Patil and others v. Gurunath Shivappa Patil and others, (2005) 2 SCC 358.
69. State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde, AIR 1968 SC 1053: (1968) 3 SCR 489.
70. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681.
71. State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5.
72. Sumer v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2005) Cri. LJ 540.
73. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494.
74. Sunil Kumar v. State of J & K and Another, 14 Dec., 2018.
75. Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100.
76. Textile Labour Association v. Official Liquidator, AIR 2004 SC 3272.
77. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
78. Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 273: 1989 SCC.
79. Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By L.R.S., (1989) 2 SCC 754.
80. Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416
81. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A. P., (1993) 1 SCC 645, 66.
82. UOI v. International Trading Corporation, AIR 2003 SC 3983.
83. V. M. Elangovan v. Inspector, (2014) 5 SCC 859.

8
84. Varinder Singh@ RAJA v. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR 2014 SC 1892.
85. W. Kalyani v. State Thro’ Inspector of Police and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 358.
86. Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470.
87. Zahira v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCALE 397.

BOOKS REFERRED
1. Batuk Lal, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Law Agency, 2017).
2. Dr. J.N. Pandey, Dr. Surendra Sahai Srivastava (ed.), Constitutional Law of India (Central Law
Agency, 54th Edition, 2016).
3. Dr. Narendra Kumar, Constitutional Law of India (Allahabad Law Agency, 9th Edition, Re.
2016).
4. K.D. Gaur, Textbook on I.P.C. (Universal Law Publications, 6 th Edition, 2016).
5. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis, 8th Edition, 2018).
6. Mulla, the Code of Civil Procedure (Lexis Nexis, 19th Edition, 2017).
7. P.S.A. Pillai, Dr. K. I. Vibhute, Criminal Law (Lexis Nexis, 12th Edition, Re. 2016).
8. Paras Diwan & P. Diwan, Modern Hindu law, (Allahabad law agency, 23rd edition, Re. 2018).
9. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, I.P.C. ( L e x i s N e x i s , Nagpur, 30 th Ed., 2008).
10. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis, 22nd Edition, 2017).
11. S.N. Mishra, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Law Publications, 20 th
Edition, 2016).
12. Surya Narayan Mishra, Shriniwas Gupta (ed.), I.P.C. (Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 20th Edi,
2016).
 STATUTES AND RULES
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The Constitution of India, 1950.
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3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
5. The Supreme Court Rules, Order XLVIII, Rule 6 (1966).
ARTICLES AND LEGAL JOURNALS
1. “Decriminalization of Adultery and Defenses”, available at: http://Endvawnow.Org.
2. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1.
3. Crowford on Statutory Construction, 2018-19.
4. Dhruv Tiwari & Anand Vardhan Narayan, “Recolouring the colored walls of constitution: a
futile judicial exercise of creating the curative petition”, IJLPP 2.2E.
5. Government of India, Report: Committee on reforms of criminal justice system, (Ministry of
Home Affairs, 2003).
6. Law commission of India, 42nd Report on ‘The I.P.C.’, (Government of India, 1972).
7. Macaulay, Mac’leod, Anderson and Millett, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law
Commissioners, Pelham Richardson, 1838.
8. Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India,
Sage Publications.
9. Statement by the United Nations Working Group on “Discrimination against Women in
Law and in Practice.”
10. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, “Interpretation of Statutes”, II.
11. UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: “A Global Study on
the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution”.
12. Constitutional Court Of Guatemala, Expediente 936-95, (07.03.1996)
13. Constitutional Court Of South Korea, 2009 Hun-Ba 17, (26.02.2015)
 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

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1. European Convention of Human Rights, 1950.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, 1966.
3. The International Covenant on Civil Rights, 1966.
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
 LEGAL DATABASES
 Manupatra.
 SCC Online.
11
S TATEMENT OF FACTS
1. There is a moral notion in Indonian society regarding ideal marriages. The past speaks
that women were mistreated in various spheres of life across religions, regions and communities.
Except for a few revolutionary activities, the situation hanged about more or less the same in the
ancient, medieval, and early modern times. Crime against women like female foeticide,
discrimination against women, rape, etc. is common. Regardless of existing stringent laws and
safeguards to women, the Status of women has not elevated. The unfortunate part of gender
inequality in our society is that the women too, through, continued socio-cultural conditioning,
have accepted their subordinate position to men and they are also part and parcel of same
patriarchal system.
2. Women Freedom Union (WFU), Non-Governmental Organization, raised its concern

about discrimination against the women in so far as Sec. 497 of Indonian Penal Code confers
upon the husband only the right to prosecute the adultery and not women, filed the Writ Petition
before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indonia challenging constitutional validity of Sec. 497 of the
Indonian Penal Code and Sec. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being in violation of
Article 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution of Indonia.
3. On 23.02.2018, Hon'ble Supreme Court passed its judgment dismissing the Writ Petition
held that although right to be heard is a fundamental right but, law can’t be held unconstitutional
on such ground owing to express provision under law.
4. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, WFU filed review
Petition on the ground that said judgment experiences errors apparent on the face of the record as
liberty envisaged under the Indonian Constitution will be in peril. The said review petition was
allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court held that Sec. 497 of the Indonian Penal Code
and Sec. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are unconstitutional.
5. The Court further decriminalized the adultery observing that “Treating adultery an
offence, we are disposed to think, would tantamount to the State entering into a real private
realm. Under the existing provision, the husband is treated as an aggrieved person and the wife
12
is ignored as a victim. ”
6. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a review
petition, the Union of Indonia has preferred Curative Petition. The some of the grounds raised by
the Union of Indonia are as follows:
7. That Sec. 497 is valid on the ground of affirmative action.
8. All discriminations in favor of women are saved by Article 15 (3), and hence were
exempted from punishment.
9. That Sec. 497 does not account for instances where the husband has sexual relations outside
his marriage would not render it unconstitutional.
10. The sanctity of family life and the right to marriage are fundamental rights comprehended in
the right to life under Article 21. An outsider who violates and injures these rights must be
deterred and punished in accordance with criminal law.
11. It was finally suggested that if this Court finds any part of this Sec. violative of the
Constitutional provisions, the Court should read down that part, in so far as it is violative of the
Constitution but retain the provision.
12. The main purpose of enacting Sec. 497, I.P.C. is to curb crime by way of deterrence, but
declaring Sec. 497 as unconstitutional by Apex Court of the country, will not only promote
deceitful and immoral activity between man and woman but will also create chaos in society.
13
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant in the present case has approached the hon’ble Supreme Court of India to initiate
the present appeal under article 137 of the Constitution of India. The Respondent most humbly
and respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of the hon’ble Supreme Court in the present matter.
14
S TATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE?
3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

SECTION 497, I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION?
4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2) Cr.P.C. IS
CONSTITUTIONAL?
15
INTERNAL RANKING MOOT COURT COMPITITION, 2020,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the appeal filed by the appellant under
Article 137 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. The curative petition evolved in
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,1 was made to be filed only subject to fulfillment of grounds
specifically stated. Whereas, the filed petition does not fulfill the grounds for the same as the
discerning judgement of the court striking down the provision was rational and embody no error
on any part of law or fact. The curative petition observes strict procedural precaution because the
matter relates to re-examination of a final decision of this court which is not to be lightly settled
as it violates the principle of finality of judgment of the court. Thus, permitting the parties to
reopen the concluded judgments of this court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is
clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the
administration of justice.
ISSUE 2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

MARRIAGE?
It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the said provision does not protect the
sanctity of marriage but treats women as property of husband and undermines the status of
women in marriage. It treats women as property of her husband by making a third party liable for
encroachment into marriage leaving the fact that it is a consensual sexual act between the man
and women, which further implies lack of women’s right and capability of taking her own
decisions. The said provision in no way protects the sanctity of marriage as the sanctity of
marriage is not offended only by sexual acts of wife outside marriage but also by man doing the
same act with an unmarried women or widow. Section 497, I.P.C. puts women in a state of
marital subordination to man entitled to control over her body as consent of husband to the
sexual act of women would not render it as a crime, which further badly destroys women’s
dignity.
16
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

SECTION 497, I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT GUARANTEED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the said provision of Section 497, I.P.C. is
violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The exemption
granted to women is based on the notion of women being the ‘victim’ and men the ‘seducer’
which is no longer relevant or applicable in the contemporary societal aspect. Also, the provision
by completely exempting women from punishment under adultery as an abettor discriminates
against men as it puts both men and women under similar circumstances and fault on different
pedestals. The Section is in no way protected under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution of India
which does not provides for exemption of women from criminal liability on the baseless
presumption of weak status.
ISSUE 4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2) Cr.P.C. IS
CONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Section 497, I.P.C. along with Section
198 (2), Cr.P.C. shall be held unconstitutional as they are in violation of Article 14, 15 and 21 of
the Constitution of India. The Section is manifestly arbitrary as it treats women as property of
husband and creates unreasonable categorization between genders. The law intrudes in the
privacy of the individual and hurts the dignity of women by allowing her husband to control her
sexual activities. Also, there can’t be any segregation of valid provision from given provisions as
it would then lead to a residue having no practical application. Hence, it needs to be annulled as
a whole owing to doctrine of severability, which in this case is that if law be made gender neutral
it would no longer have any efficacy.
17
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly pleaded that the Hon’ble court should not entertain the curative petition filed by the
State of Indonia concerning the Judgment which struck down Section 497 IPC and section
198(2) CrPC by this Hon’ble Court pursuant to a review petition filed by Women Freedom
Union (WFU) who is the respondent in this case.
1.1 THE CURATIVE PETITION CAN BE FILED IN ONLY EXCEPTIONAL CASES

The respondent humbly submits that before everything else the Hon’ble Court must first
consider whether the State has a locus standi in this court i.e. whether it can file a curative
petition in this case. The concept of a curative petition arose from the aforementioned case of
Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. 1 In this case the court used the Latin maxim
“actus curiae neminem gravabit”, which means that an act of the court shall prejudice no one.
The maxim becomes applicable when the court is under an obligation to undo a wrong done to a
party by the act of court itself i.e. whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against the
final judgment/order of the Supreme Court, after the dismissal of a review petition.
So it must be first established that the State is an aggrieved party and it is aggrieved by the
judgment/ order of the Supreme Court in this case,2 for the curative petition to be entertained.
The Black’s Law dictionary defines an aggrieved party as, “The party that is injured or suffered
damages.” In criminal procedure in general, everyone whose legal interests have been directly
infringed (or threatened) by a crime is entitled to have the status of an aggrieved party. 3 The
respondent would also like to draw the attention of the court towards the Intellectual Property
Rights facet to define who an aggrieved person is.
1
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388
2
Ibid
3
AGGRIEVED PARTY, (2015), http://karne.pl/en/aggrieved-party.html (last visited Oct 21, 2020).
18
In the case of Hardie Trading Ltd & Anr. v Addison Paint & Chemical Ltd 4, wherein it was held,
“in order to be aggrieved a person must show that in some possible way he may be damaged or
injured if the trademark was allowed to stay in the register, 'possible' means possible in some
practical sense and not in a fantastic view.” The respondent humbly asserts that the State of
Indonia is in no way being affected by or being aggrieved by the Judgment of this Hon’ble that
has struck down Section 497 and section 198(2) in any possible way. Decriminalising adultery is
in no way affecting the State of Indonia, neither it’s interests. However, it is with a heavy heart
that the respondent submits that it should have been the State who should have initiated a case in
the court to rescind such a barbaric provision that finds its place among the statutes which is, as
the Lordships had stated in the judgment passed for the review petition, based on the fact that a
woman is considered a mere property of the husband. More light will be shed in the coming
sections.
Having shed light on the aggrievement involved in the current case, it is further humbly
submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the curative petition is not maintainable on one more
yardstick. This is the yardstick laid down by the Hon’ble court in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra
Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr.5 The Hon’ble Court had laid down certain specific conditions for the
court to entertain such a curative petition under its inherent power to prevent floodgates of
unnecessary petitions seeking their second review 6. The conditions that concern this case and the
Hon’ble Court must by all means bear in mind are:
(i) In the case of a gross miscarriage of justice.
(ii) In the case of a genuine violation of principles of natural justice
Keeping the first condition in mind, the respondent submits that If there is any gross miscarriage
of justice, it occurred when the IPC, 1860 was born and these barbaric provisions were put into
place. His Lordships while striking down Section 497 IPC and 198 (2) CrPC have undone a 160
year old injustice. Injustice in the form of discrimination. Injustice in the form of unfair
treatment. Injustice in the form of a sheer erosion of the dignity or self worth of a particular
gender.
4
Hardie Trading Ltd & Anr. v Addison Paint & Chemical Ltd 2003 (27) PTC 241 (SC)
5
Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1771
6
J. N. Pandey, The Union Judiciary- The Supreme Court, Constitutional Law Of India , 585
19
The statute was in contravention of Article 15 of the Constitution of India 7 which prohibits
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Section 497 of the IPC
states that
“Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to
believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such
sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five
years, or with fine, or with both. In such a case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.” 8
If we read it carefully, the language of the provision implies that it does not allow the wife to be
the aggrieved party even though it clearly implies that she is to be deemed as the victim. Only
the husband will be the aggrieved party, since his permission/ consent was not solicited by the
man who slept with his wife. Moreover in the same breath, owing to the fact that the woman
cannot prosecute the offence of adultery against her husband, he is free to sleep with a single
woman. This is an outright breach of Article 15, where the wife is discriminated against and not
given the right to prosecute the offence of adultery whereas the man is.
Section 198 (2) further reinforces this discrimination which states that “For the purposes of sub-
section (1), no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by
any offence punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code: Provided that in the
absence of the husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when
such offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.” 9
And striking down these provisions, His Lordships have put an end to this discriminatory
provision that was breeding a gross miscarriage of justice.
Moreover the statutory provisions in question also facilitate a serious breach in Article 14 10 too
which provides every person equality before the law. Equality before the law means that every
person including a married man and a married woman should be viewed as equals under the law.
But S. 497 IPC and S. 198(2) place a married man and married woman differently with only the
married man having the right to prosecute adultery but not the wife breaching Article 14.
7
The Constitution of India
8
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860
9
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973
10
The Constitution of India
20
These provisions in conjunction as well as severally are also violative of Article 21. Article 21
grants women the right to sexual autonomy i.e. someone's prerogative to determine when, with
whom, and under what circumstances they engage in sexual activity; to only engage in sexual
activity to which they consent.11 This means that if a has consented to something, she has
complete knowledge of what she is doing and the consequences of the same. S.497 IPC and
S.198(2) denigrate this consent as it is deemed of no value and a married woman’s consent holds
no value as the husband’s consent takes the main seat.
A married woman does not have the liberty to sleep with another man without the husband’s
consent, which totally relegates the value of a woman’s consent and eliminates her liberty to
engage in any sexual activity to which she consents. Finally Article 21 also guarantees the right
to a dignified life and the statutory provisions in question take this away as it is evident from
their language and in harmony with what His Lordships said, the wife is deemed as her
husband’s chattel or personal possession. It treats her as the property of man and totally
subservient to the will of the master. 12 This removes her very sense of self worth and dignity of
being an independent individual who is her own master and her sense of personal liberty. Hence
there is no possible miscarriage of justice in the light of the above arguments and the respondent
humbly submits that this petition fails to fulfill the first condition.
The respondent would now like to draw the court’s attention to the second condition laid down
by this Hon’ble to entertain a curative petition which is that there should be a violation of the
principles of natural justice.
The respondent humbly submits that In India, the principles of natural justice are firmly
grounded in Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution. With the introduction of the concept of
substantive and procedural due process in Article 21, all that fairness which is included in the
principles of natural justice can be read into Art. 21.13
11
Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Against Sexual Autonomy: Why Sex Law's Lodestar Should Be Self-Possession (2020),
https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/against-sexual-autonomy-why-sex-laws-lodestar-should-be-self-possession
(last visited Oct 26, 2020).
12
Joseph Shine Archives, SCC Blog (2019), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/joseph-shine/ (last visited Oct
26, 2020).
13
Shivraj, Principles of Natural Justice In Indian Constitution,
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1519/Principles-of-Natural-Justice-In-Indian-Constitution.html
21
In the famous Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court extracted the
speech of Lord Morris in the House of Lords, “That the conception of natural justice should at
all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an
essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But
there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and
described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their
inspiration than any precision of definition nor precision as to application. We do not search for
prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done.
The principle and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of
circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only “fair play in
action”15 Hence in harmony with the words of Lord Morris, the respondent humbly submits that,
there has been no deviation from fairness in the Hon’ble decision in the review petition. It aims
to put an end to an unfair and inequitable provision in the statutes concerning a particular gender.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel16, the Supreme Court analysed
in depth the principles of natural justice. It was stated, “the principles of natural justice are not
the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that Article 14 is not their begetter but
their Constitutional Guardian.” The Hon’ble Court here enunciates that for natural justice to be
upheld, a decision must pass the touchstone of equality. The judgment in our case in no way
breaches equality. By eliminating inequality of an arbitrary nature, it is in perfect harmony with
the principles of natural justice.
In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India17, SC opined that “Art 14 is an authority for the
proposition that the principles of natural justice are an integral part of the guarantee of equality
assured by Art. 14. An order depriving a person of his civil right passed without affording him
an opportunity of being heard suffers from the vice of violation of natural justice.” This further
substantiates the Court’s position that if there is a breach in equality, then there is a violation of
principles of natural justice. In our case the State was felicitously afforded the right to lay down
its grievances i.e. the right to a fair hearing. This rules out the last condition to entertain a
14
AIR 1978 SC 597
15
National Informatics Centre, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE, Lecture delivered by Justice
T.S.Sivagnanam at Tamil Nadu State Judicial Academy, http://www.tnsja.tn.gov.in/?_event_transid=605486418.
16
Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416.
17
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
22
curative petition. Hence it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Court shall not
entertain the curative petition being filed by the State since it fails to qualify the specific
conditions laid down by the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr..18
1.2 THE DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGEMENT MUST BE RESPECTED
“Interest republicae ut sit finis litium” elucidates that it is for the public good that there must be
an end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeal. Certainty and continuity are essential
ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in the law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious
setback if the highest court of the land readily overrule the views expressed by it in earlier cases
even though those views had held the field for a number of years.19
A departure from the principle of finality can only be justified in circumstances of a substantial
and compelling character makes it necessary to do so. A judgment is not reconsidered except
“where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in the earlier
decision.”20
In Manganese Ore India Ltd v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, 21
and this court held that the doctrine of stare decisis is a very valuable principle of precedent
which cannot be departed from unless there are extraordinary or special reasons to do so.
A three-Judge Bench of this court in M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of
Delhi,22 held that a party is not entitled to seek a review of this court's judgment merely for the
purpose of rehearing and for a fresh decision of the case. Departure from the normal principle
18
Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr AIR 2002 SC 1771
19
Dhruv Tiwari & Anand Vardhan Narayan, “Recolouring the Colored Walls of Constitution: A Futile Judicial
Exercise of Creating the Curative Petition “, IJLPP2.2E; Hoystead v. Commr.of taxation, [1926] AC 155, [1925]
All ER 56, (1926) 42 TLR 207, 67 ER 313.
20
Chandra Kanta v. Sheikh Habib, AIR 1975 SC 1500: (1975) 1 SCC 674; PN Eswara Iyer v. Registrar,
Supreme Court Of India, AIR 1980 SC 808; Avtar Singh Sekhon v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 2041: 1980 Supp SCC
562, Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674: (1980) 2 SCC 167; Sow Chandra
Kanta v. Sk. Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674, 1975 SCC (Cri) 305, (1975) 3 SCR 933); R.D. Sugar v. V.Nagary, AIR
1976 SC 2183.
21
Manganese Ore (India) Ltd v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, (1976) 4 SCC 124.
22
M/S Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167; Green View Tea &
Industries v. Collector, Golaghat and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 109.
23
that the court's judgment is final would be justified only when compelling our substantial
circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such circumstances may be that a material statutory
provision was not drawn to the court's attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has
been done.
In Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead), 23 this Court held that the plea for
reconsideration is not to be entertained merely because the petitioner chooses to reagitate the
points concluded by the earlier decision in Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability.
In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Another v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, 24the
Court held the reconsideration of the final decision of the Supreme Court after review petition is
dismissed by way of writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution cannot be sustained.
Thus, permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this court by filing repeated
interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching
adverse impact on the administration of justice.
ISSUE2 WHETHER SECTION 497 I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

MARRIAGE?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the said provision does not protect the
sanctity of marriage and instead treats women as property of husband and undermines the status
of women in marriage.
2.1 SEC. 497 I.P.C. GRANTS THE PROPRIETARY INTEREST TO HUSBAND OVER
HIS WIFE
It is submitted that the provision treats the married woman as the property of the man. This
provision was written by Macaulay based on the mistaken notion that women are the property of
men and that the husband has one right over his wife's body. This is evidenced by the fact that if
23
Union of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By L.Rs., (1989) 2 SCC 754
24
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Anr. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3 SCC 114; Mohd Aslam
v. Union of India & Others, (1996) 2 SCC 749.
24
adultery is committed according to the woman's husband at the time, such an act ceases to be a
crime. Thus, the idea was not to violate an extramarital affair but rather to impose a ban on any
infidelity of the wife without the consent of her "owner".
Moreover, it uses the same analogy that is used for the offence of trespass. There is no doubt
then that this Section treats a woman like a man’s chattel 25. The way a person is not expected to
enter on the property of the other without his consent, another man is not expected to have sexual
intercourse with someone’s wife without his consent. Adultery therefore is not an offence against
the matrimonial home but against the husband himself.
In addition, the view that Sec. 497, I.P.C. it was intended to maintain fidelity between partners is
not true as the provision does not concern a man who has sex outside of marriage with an
unmarried woman. The concern for this arrangement was to have sex with another man's wife,
which is why the arrangement focused on the 'injury' felt by another man. All of this is about
protecting a man’s interest in “full access to his wife’s sexuality”.26.
It is important to note that Sec. 497, I.P.C. does not bring within its purview an extra marital
relationship with an unmarried woman or a widow, the law treats it with unconcern. Thus, a
married man may engage in sexual relations outside marriage with a single woman without any
repercussion in criminal law.
It is clear, therefore, that this archaic law has long outlived its purpose and does not square with
today‘s constitutional morality, in that the very object with which it was made has since become
manifestly arbitrary, having lost its rationale long ago and having become in today‘s day and
age, utterly irrational.
2.2 NOTION OF MARITAL SUBORDINATION DENYING SEXUAL AGENCY OF

WIFE IS NOT RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
25
R. v. R., (1991) 4 ALL ER 481; at p.484.
26
Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India, Sage
Publications (1996), at Page 120.
25
From the historical perspective marriage had been considered a sacrament however, in the
modern perspective, the marriage is held to be a contract as it now, can be dissolved and requires
consent of parties27. In the eyes of law, as marriage is a civil contract, the consensual sexual
relation of one spouse outside marriage should at best be a violation of that contract that is, it can
be a civil offence but not a criminal offence.
Sec. 497 disregards the sexual autonomy which every woman possesses as a necessary condition
of her existence. Implicit in seeking to privilege the fidelity of women in a marriage is the
assumption that a woman contracts away her sexual agency when entering a marriage.
Far from being an equal partner in an equal relationship, she is subjugated entirely to the will of
her spouse. Sec. 497 is based on the understanding that marriage submerges the identity of the
woman, based on a notion of marital subordination28.
As it is contended that the adultery laws are needed to protect the divine and pure institution of
marriage. In this regard, it is essential for the judiciary to recognize that a “divinely sanctioned”
contract which needs unending legislation to keep one partner from abusing the other, is perhaps
not all that divine.
In Payal Sharma v. Supdt, Nari Niketan Kalindri Vihar, Agra29, the court had observed:
“A woman who is a major has a right to go anywhere and live with anyone she likes without
getting married. This may be regarded immoral by society but it is not illegal. There is a
difference between law and morality.
27
Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law; Aqil Ahmad, Prof. Iqbal Ali Khan (ed.), Text Book of Mohammedan Law
(Central law Agency, 15th Edition, 1992).
28
UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, Pp. 83-84, (New York, 2015).
29
Payal Sharma v. Supdt, Nari Niketan kalindri vihar, agra, AIR 2001 All 254.
26
”The effect of Sec. 497 is to allow the sexual agency of a married woman to be wholly
dependent on the consent or connivance of her husband. Sexual autonomy constitutes an
inviolable core of the dignity of every individual. Sexuality cannot be dis-associated from the
human personality. For, to be human involves the ability to fulfill sexual desires in the pursuit of
happiness. Autonomy in matters of sexuality is thus intrinsic to a dignified human existence.
Human dignity both recognizes and protects the autonomy of the individual in making sexual
choices.
Thus, a woman's 'purity' and a man's married 'entitlement' to her exclusive sexual possession is
also reflective of the archaic social and sexual mores of the nineteenth century, however is not
relevant to the up to date perspective wherever men and girls in wedding square measure
presented equal rights and liabilities. Sec. 497 is therefore based on the notion that a girl by
coming into upon wedding loses, therefore to talk, her voice, autonomy and agency. Manifest
whimsy is obvious on the supply. Such a notion has no place within the constitutional order.
2.3 PENALIZING ADULTERY DOES NOT FUNCTION AS A DETERRENCE

It is submitted that Adultery is not the cause but the consequence of a pre-existing disruption of
the marital tie. All too often, spouses who have drifted apart irrevocably may be compelled for
reasons personal to them to continue with the veneer of a marriage which has ended for all
intents and purposes. In such a situation, Penalizing adultery doesn’t serve as deterrence but a
final nail in the coffin.
In James Sibongo v. Lister Lutombi Chaka and Anr30 ,The Supreme Court of Namibia, in an
instructive judgment decriminalising adultery, went into whether the criminal offence of adultery
would protect marriages and reduce the incidence of adultery. It said:
“But does the action protect marriages from adultery? The question becomes more focused when
the spotlight is directed at the following considerations:
(a) First of all, as was known by the German Bundesgericht within the passage from the judgment
(JZ 1973, 668) from that I even have quoted earlier, though wedding is — ‘a human
30
James Sibongo v. Lister Lutombi Chaka and Another, (Case No. SA77-14) (19.08.2016) [Supreme Court of
Namibia] cited in Joseph Shine v. UOI, 2018 SCC SC 1676.
27
establishment that is regulated by law and guarded by the Constitution and that, in turn, creates
real legal duties. Its essence . . . consists in readiness, based in morals, of the parties to the
wedding to make and to take care of it.’If the parties to the wedding have lost that ethical
commitment, the wedding can fail, and social control dispensed to a 3rd party is unlikely to alter
that.
(b) Grave doubts are expressed by many about the deterrent effect of the action. In most other
countries it was concluded that the action (no longer) has any deterrent effect and I have no
reason to think that the position in our society is all that different. Perhaps one reason is that
adultery occurs in different circumstances. Every so often it happens without any premeditation,
when deterrence hardly plays a role. At the other end of the scale, the adultery is sometimes
carefully planned and the participants are confident that it will not be discovered. Moreover,
romantic involvement between one of the spouses and a third party can be as devastating to
the marital relationship as (or even more so than) sexual intercourse.
(c) If deterrence is that the main purpose, one would have thought that this might higher be achieved
by holding the imposition of criminal sanctions or by the grant of associate interdict in favour of
the innocent relative against each the guilty relative and also the third party to stop future acts of
adultery…firstly, that associate interdict against the guilty relative isn't attainable as a result of
he or she commits no delict. Secondly, that as against a 3rd party — ‘it interferes with, and
restricts the rights and freedom that the third party commonly has of victimisation and
removing his body as he chooses; . . . it conjointly affects the connection of the third party
with the claimant's relative, WHO is and can't be a celebration to the interdict, and thus
indirectly interferes with, and restricts her rights and freedom of, victimisation and
removing her body as she chooses‘.
(d) In addition the deterrence argument appears to depart from the idea that criminal conversation is
that the reason behind the breakdown of a wedding, whereas it's currently widely recognised that
causes for the breakdown in marriages are much more complicated. Quite often criminal
conversation is found to be the result of Associate in Nursing not the reason behind a sad
28
matrimony. Conversely explicit , a wedding within which the spouses reside harmonic is
hardly probably to be broken by a 3rd party.”
Moreover, the Sec. conjointly criminalizes accordant sexual act between wife and third person,
even in cases wherever the spouses have taken fiat and square measure about to take divorce
wherever there will be no scope for defense of wedding. As adultery is marked as associate
offence against wedding, therein perspective too it's in no manner protective because the holiness
of marriage will be completely destroyed by a married person having sexual activity with
associate adult female or a widow that isn't enclosed within the provision underneath Sec. 497,
I.P.C. As so much as holiness of wedding thinks about, it's still a ground for divorce in Asian
nation that is equal for each men girls|and ladies|and girls} then there's no logic in golf stroke
women in exempted class in criminal offence.
Furthermore, adultery is an addition of a social and civil offense and depicts an additional
impulsive and unfaithfulness of trust not solely the spousal equivalent however the entire family.
Adultery could be a consequence of the collapse of religion and conscience in a very relationship
and needs corrective action instead of punishment. The sanctions obligatory by the laws will
bring relief to the victim for a brief time, however destroys the holiness of wedding and family
life within the long run ruins.
ISSUE3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

SECTION 497, I.P.C. VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the exemption granted to married
women from prosecution under Sec. 497, I.P.C. is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the constitution of India and is not protected by Art. 15 (3) of the constitution of India.
3.1 ARTICLE 15 (3) DOES NOT PROTECT A STATUTORY PROVISION THAT

ENTRENCHES PATRIARCHAL NOTIONS IN THE GARB OF PROTECTING
WOMEN
29
It is humbly submitted that this exemption is contrary to the remedy which Art. 15 (3) sought to
embody. Sec. 497 exempts a woman from being punished as an abettor. The exemption seeks to
be justified on the ground of being a provision that is beneficial to women and protected under
Art. 15 (3) of the Constitution.
The invocation of Art. 15 (3) as a carte blanche to uphold laws that impose differential benefits
and burden upon men and women, ostensibly to the advantage of women, is unjustified. The
constitutional guarantee in Art. 15 (3) cannot be employed in a manner that entrenches
paternalistic notions of ‘protection’. This view of protection only serves to place women in a
cage. Discrimination which is grounded in paternalistic and patriarchal notions cannot claim the
protection of Art. 15 (3).
In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay,31 The Bombay High Court, relied upon the carte
blanche approach to Art. 15 (3): In this case, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the adultery provision in the I.P.C., which is asymmetrical in that women cannot be
prosecuted for adultery. The Court upheld the law by a simple invocation of Art. 15 (3), ignoring
the fact that the basis of the adultery provision was precisely the kind of stereotypical gender-
based assumptions that the Constitution intended to do away with: i.e., that women are passive
partners, lacking in sexual autonomy. This inattention to how Art. 15 (3) ought not to end up
becoming a shield to perpetuate sexual and gender-role based stereotypes has plagued the
Court’s jurisprudence ever since.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, 32 the Court held: “Dignity of a woman is a part of her
nonperishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There
cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honor which matters the most.
It is sacrosanct”.
Moreover, Art. 15 (3) is not a stand-alone constitutional provision, but nestled within the Articles
14-15-16 equality scheme. The use of the phrase “nothing in this Art.”, as a precursor to Art.
31
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470
32
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681; Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and
others, (2015) 1 SCC 192; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438
30
15(3) suggests that where a legislative classification might otherwise have fallen foul of the non-
discrimination guarantee of Art. 15 (1), Art. 15 (3) would save it. However, given that Art. 15 (3)
is itself a part of Art. 15 suggests that the goal of such classification must also fit within the
concept of equality. Art. 15 (3) does not exist in isolation. Articles 14 to 18, being constituents of
a single code on equality, supplement each other and incorporate a non-discrimination principle.
Consequently, laws making “special provisions” for women (and children) ought to be judicially
reviewed for whether or not they bear some connection with remedying the historical and
structural subordination of women. However, this form of reasoning has been entirely absent
from Indian sex discrimination jurisprudence.
The same was endorsed by the Fifth Law Commission which recommended that the wife, who
has sexual intercourse with a person other than her husband, should be punished for committing
adultery as the reasons that prompted authors of the Penal Code in the nineteenth century for
exempting her from punishment are ‘not valid’ and there is ‘hardly any Justification for not
treating the guilty pair alike’.33 Again In 2003, the Justice Malimath Committee also suggested
that suitable amendments to Sec. 497, I.P.C., should be made to bring adulterous woman within
Hence, Art. 15 (3) does not protect a statutory provision that entrenches patriarchal notions in the
garb of protecting women. It is vehemently argued that special provisions can be made for
women as under Art. 15 (3) of the Constitution, but same cannot be used to give them a license
to commit and abet crimes. Any provision which prohibits punishment is tantamount to a license
to commit the offence of which punishment has been prohibited.34
As also in Roop chand adlakha35 : “To overdo classification is to undo equality”. Further, there
also exists a disparity of the right even under S.198 (2) of the Cr.P.C. which denies a wife the
right to prosecute her adulterous husband, reserving this power only for the husband of the
woman involved in the relationship. So, only the husband of the woman involved enjoys the
right to prosecute while the wife of the involved man has no resort to take any action.
33
Law Commission of India ’42nd Report: The Indian Penal Code’, Government of India, 1972, Para 20.18.
34
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 194 of 2017.
35
Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development Authority, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116: AIR 1989 SC307.
31
Furthermore, the judgment in Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay,36 applies a constitutional
provision which is obviously inapplicable as Article 15 (3), which states that, “nothing in this
article shall prevent the State from making a special provision for women”, would refer to the
“State” as either Parliament or the State Legislatures or the Executive Government of the Centre
or the States, set up under the Constitution after it has come into force. Section 497 is, in
constitutional language, an existing law which continues, by virtue of Article 372 (1), to apply,
and could not, therefore, be said to be a law made by the State.37
Thus, only such provisions can be made in favor of women under Art. 15 (3) as are reasonable
and which do not altogether obliterate or render illusory the constitutional guarantee mentioned
under Art. 16 (2).38
3.2 THE NOTION THAT MARRIED WOMAN IS A “VICTIM”, AND THE MALE
OFFENDER IS THE “SEDUCER” IS NO LONGER RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY
Underlying this exemption is the notion that a woman is the victim of being seduced into a
sexual relationship with a person who is not her husband. Given the presumed lack of sexual
agency, criminal exemption is then granted to the woman in order to ‘protect’ her. The
‘protection’ afforded to women under Sec. 497 highlights the lack of sexual agency that the Sec.
imputes to a woman. It exempts women as an abettor in the offence however, the exemption to
women is prima facie granted on the perusal of Sec. 497, I.P.C. by treating her as a victim. This
sort of differential treatment implying that women is always a victim and not capable of making
independent choices and always needs protection in all respects even for the results of her own
consensual acts clearly seems to be affecting women’s dignity and equal status in society. It
hurts the individual dignity of women and works on the unreal presumption that woman is
always a victim even in consensual sexual relationships.
36
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 Bom. 470.
37
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 194 of 2017
38
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis, 8th Edition, 2018).
32
In Pawan kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh,39 the court observed:“A woman has her own
space as a man has. She enjoys as much equality under Article 14 of the Constitution as a man
does.”
Recently, In Sunil kumar v. State of J&K and anr, 40“When a woman is major and educated, she
is supposed to be fully aware of the consequences of having sexual intercourse with a man
before marriage.” It has been held that perpetrators cannot be restricted to “adult male person”
but also include a female member and non-adults, as it fails the test of reasonable classification
in section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.41
In Joseph Shine v. Union of India,42 Indu Malhotra J. observed: “Section 497 of the I.P.C. was
framed in the historical context that the infidelity of the wife should not be punished because of
the plight of women in this country during the 1860s. Women were married while they were still
children, and often neglected while still young, sharing the attention of a husband with several
rivals. This situation is not true
155 years after the provision was framed. With the passage of time, education, development in
civil-political rights and socio-economic conditions, the situation has undergone a sea change.
The historical background, in which Section 497 was framed, is no longer relevant in
contemporary society. It would be unrealistic to proceed on the basis that even in a consensual
sexual relationship, a married woman, who knowingly and voluntarily enters into a sexual
relationship with another married man, is a ‘victim’, and the male offender is the ‘seducer’.”
Thus, Ancient notions of the man being the seducer and the woman being the victim permeate
the judgment, which is no longer the case today. 43 Also, the Constitution is an organic living
document. Its outlook and expression as perceived and expressed by the interpreters of the
Constitution must be dynamic and keep pace with the changing times.44
39
Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 7 SCC 780.
40
Sunil Kumar v. State of J&K and Anr, 14 Dec., 2018.
41
Hiral P Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 : AIR 2016 SC 4774 : 2016 (9) SCJ 204.
42
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC SC 1676
43
Nariman J. in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC SC 1676
44
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5, (lexis nexis, 8th Edition, 2018).
33
ISSUE4. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2) Cr.P.C.
ISCONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this honorable Court that Sec. 497, I.P.C. read with Sec. 198 (2)
Cr.P.C. is unconstitutional.
4.1 SECTION 497 VIOLATES OF ARTICLE 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE INDIAN

CONSTITUTION
On both administrative and legislative, Art. 14 strikes at arbitrary state action. There has been a
shift towards equating unreasonableness or arbitrary as the yardstick by which administrative as
well as legislative actions are to be judged.45 All persons in similar circumstances shall be treated
alike both in privileges and liabilities imposed.46
The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of rule of law which pervades the
Indian Constitution.47 The right to equality has been declared by the Supreme Court as the basic
feature of the constitution.48 This means that neither the parliament nor any state legislature can
transgress the principle of equality.49 Art. 26 of ICCPR,50 and Art. 7 of the UDHR,51 1948,
declares that all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the laws.
The Constitution Bench in Shayara Bano v Union of India,52 held the practice of Triple
Talaq to be unconstitutional. Justice Rohinton Nariman, in his concurring opinion, applied the
45
Union of India v. International Trading Corporation, AIR 2003 SC 3983; Sunil Batra v. Delhi
Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494.
46
John Vallamattom v.UOI, (Writ Petition (Civil) 242 Of 1997).
47
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34: AIR 2002 SC 1533; National Human Rights Commission
v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1234.
48
M. Nagaraj v. UOI, (2006) 8 SCC 212; M. G. Badappanabar v. State of Karnataka, (2000) Supp 5
SCR. 302; R. K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138: (1981) 4 SCC 675; Jagjit Singh v. State,
AIR 1954 Hyd. 28
49
Kesav Nanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Sawhney v.UOI, (1992) Supp 3 SCC 217
50
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf;
51
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.
52
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 SCC SC 963; Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Govt. of A .P, (2003) 10 SCC
78; Chiranjit Lal v. Union Of India AIR 1981 SC 41; Abdul Rehman v. Pinto, AIR 1951Hyd. 11.
34
test of manifest arbitrariness to hold that the practice does not pass constitutional muster: “The
thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights chapter. What is manifestly
arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of law, would violate Article
14.”
Under Section 497, it is only the male-paramour who is punishable for the offence of adultery.
The woman, who is pari delicto with the adulterous male, is not punishable, even as an “abettor”,
even though the relationship is consensual. The adulterous woman is excluded solely on the basis
of gender, and cannot be prosecuted for adultery. Thus, it is discriminatory against men as it
violates their fundamental right of equality before law.53 Art.15 also stands violated as such penal
provision not only creates a categorization among the two sexes but in fact metes out unequal
treatment amongst the males as well. A married man who has an affair with an unmarried
woman is not prosecutable under the existing adultery law while the same man if indulges in
such activity with a married woman would be at the risk of facing a prosecution. There exists an
inequality in the treatment being mete out depending upon the marital status of the woman.
In Navtej Singh Johar,54 Justice Chandrachud had held that a provision of law which perpetuates
gender stereotypes will be bad for discrimination on grounds of sex, and hence will fall foul of
Article 15 (1). Same approach was extended here; upon identification of patriarchal and
paternalistic undertones of the provision. Section 497 has a significant social impact on the
sexual agency of women. It builds on existing gender stereotypes and bias and further
perpetuates them.
It also violates Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Right to Privacy has been recognized as
a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution.55
53
W. Kalyani v. State Thro’Inspector of Police and another, (2012) 1 SCC 358
54
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, [WP (Crl.) No. 76/2016]; J Srinivas Raju v. State of Orissa, 113 (2012) Cut
LT 13 (22) (Ori).
55
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 AIR 1378: 1975 SCR (3) 946; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 1963 AIR
1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332; R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., 1995 AIR 265; 1994 SCC (6) 632; People’s Union For Civil
Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008)13 SCC 5.
35
In K M Puttaswamy v. Union of India,56a nine-judge Constitution Bench declared that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right under Art. 21, stating: “Sexual privacy is an integral part of right
to privacy.” The Apex court unreservedly held that privacy safeguards individual autonomy and
recognizes the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. While
acknowledging decisional privacy, it upholds the cognitive decisions of every individual
including the ability to make intimate decisions primarily consists one’s sexual or procreative
nature and decisions in respect of intimate relations.
To "shackle" sexual freedom of a woman and allow criminalization of consensual
relationships was a denial of right of sexual privacy and considering a citizen as a property of
other was an "anathema" to ideal of dignity.57
In Nar Singh Pal v. UOI,58 The Supreme Court has asserted: “Fundamental rights under the
constitution cannot be bartered away. They cannot be compromised nor can there be any
estoppel against the exercise of fundamental rights available under the constitution. ”
In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India59, this Court held that personal autonomy includes
both the negative right of not to be subject to interference by others and the positive right of
individuals to make decisions about their life, to express themselves and to choose which
activities to take part in.
In Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K .M. & Ors.,60 this Court observed that each individual is guaranteed
the freedom in determining the choice of one’s partner, and any interference by the State in these
matters, would have a serious chilling effect on the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Both, Art. 8 of European Convention of Human Rights, 61 and Art. 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, 1966,62 provide for protection from arbitrary or
unlawful interference neither with his privacy, family, home and correspondence nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.
56
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Neera Mathur v. LIC, 1992 AIR 392: 1991 SCR
Supl. (2) 146: 1992 SCC (1) 286; Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615: AIR 1987 SC 748; Unni
Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A. P., (1993) 1 SCC 645, 66.
36
Secrecy is an essential adjunct to the private life. The exercise of secrecy in relation to facts that
bear a highly personal character is the very essence of personal autonomy. Such view renders the
provision criminalizing sexual intercourse between two consenting and willing adults as being
illegal and unconstitutional. The mutual decision of two agreeable adults to participate in sexual
activity goes to the very core of the privacy jurisprudence and calls for removal of any
restrictions on a person’s decision to participate or not participate in a sexual activity.63
International trends worldwide also indicate that very few nations continue to treat adultery as a
crime, though most nations retain adultery for the purposes of divorce laws. In South Korea 64
and Guatemala,65 provisions similar to Sec. 497 have been struck down by the constitutional
courts of those nations. UN Women has called for the decriminalization of adultery.66
A Joint Statement by the United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in
law and in practice in 2012, stated:67“The United Nations Working Group on discrimination
against women in law and in practice is deeply concerned at the criminalization and
penalization of adultery whose enforcement leads to discrimination and violence against
women.”
Thus, this provision which treats similarly situated persons unequally and discriminates between
persons on the basis of sex alone, is liable to be struck down as being violative of Articles 14 and
57
Chandrachud J. in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC: SC 1676.
58
Nar Singh Pal v. UOI, (2000) 3 SCC 589,594: AIR 2000 SC 1401.
59
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663; Malak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 760:
(1981) 1 SCC 420; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1980 SC 1675: (1980) 3 SCC 488.
60
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K. M. & Ors, 2018 SCC SC 343.
61
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
62
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
63
Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
64
Constitutional Court of South Korea: 2009 Hun-Ba 17(26.02.2015).
65
Expediente 936-95, (07.03.1996), República De Guatemala Corte De Constitucionalidad
[Constitutional Court Of Guatemala].
66
"Decriminalization of Adultery and defenses" http://Endvawnow.Org.
67
"Statement by the United Nations working group on discrimination against women in law and in practice"
37
15, 21 of the Constitution, which form the pillars against the vice of arbitrariness and
discrimination.
Furthermore, Sec. 198 (2) Cr.P.C. which provides that no person other than the husband of the
woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved party and woman are denied right to prosecute for the
sexual act committed by her husband. Hence, the right to prosecute the adulterer is restricted to
the husband of the adulteress but has not been extended to the wife of the adulterer. Thus, it
violates the principle of natural justice. 68 Sec. 198 (2) Cr.P.C. operates as a fetter on the wife in
prosecuting her adulterous husband. The procedural law which has been enacted in Sec. 198 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 re-enforces the stereotypes implicit in Sec. 497. 69
Therefore, when the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same
path.
Hence, the provisions of Sec. 497, I.P.C. are held to offend the fundamental rights, the
procedure engrafted in Sec. 198 (2) will cease to have any practical relevance. Hence, the
relevant provision is unconstitutional on the ground of obnoxious discrimination.
SECTION 497, I.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 198 (2), Cr.P.C. HAS BEEN RIGHTLY
STRUCK DOWN AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN ITS’ ENTIRETY
It is submitted that Sec. 497, I.P.C. read with Sec. 198 (2) Cr.P.C. is unconstitutional in its
entirety and has been rightly struck down by this court. Art. 13 Clause (1) and (2) of the Indian
Constitution declare that laws inconsistent with or in contravention of the fundamental rights
shall be void to the extent of inconsistency or contravention, as the case may be. If, however, it is
not possible to separate the valid from the invalid portion, then the whole of the statue will have
to go.70
Further, In Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and
Justice,71 has held that there is no presumption of constitutionality attaches to a pre-constitutional
statute like Indian Penal Code.
68
Rajasthan State Board Transport Corporation v. Bal Bukund Bairwa, (2) (2009) 4 SCC 229: (2009) 2 JT 423.
69
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC SC 1676.
70
Kameshwar Pd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166: 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369; State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde,
AIR 1968 SC 1053: (1968)3 SCR 489.
71
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, W. P.
(Crl.) No. 76 of 2016 D. No. 14961/201.
38
The Supreme Court laid down the following propositions as regards the doctrine of severability
in R.M.D.C. v. Union of India.72 The whole provision being unconstitutional being violative of
Art. 14, 15 and 21 of the constitution of India, the question of striking down the unconstitutional
part or severability does not arise.
Furthermore, the contention of the appellant that if this Court finds any part of this
section violative of the Constitutional provisions, the Court should read down that part, in so far
as it is violative of the Constitution but retain the provision,73 is not tenable as the power under
Art. 142 being curative in nature, cannot be used to supplant the substantive law, or to fill lacuna
in a statue or by-pass the provision thereof.74 The apex court has even went on to say that it may
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 142, although it would be lawful to do so.75
In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,76 the apex court has observed in this regard:“This power
could not be used to supplant substantive law applicable to the case or cause under
consideration. Even, with the width of its amplitude, Article 142 could not be used to build a new
edifice where none existed earlier. By ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a
subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly, which could not be achieved directly.”
Consequently, Section 497, I.P.C. read with Section 198 (2) Cr.P.C. has been rightly
struck down by this court in its entirety.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

AND AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY REQUESTED THAT THIS HON‟BLE
COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE:
72
R.M.D.C. v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, at 633; These Propositions Have Been Reiterated With Approval by the
Supreme Court in Motor General Traders v. State of A. P., AIR 1984 SC 121; Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950
SC 27,4 6: 1950 SCR 88.; Kihota Hollohon, Supra, Chapter II Section F(A); Hinds v. R, (1976) 1 All ER 355; Laxmi
Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873, 891 : (1981) 2 SCC 600; Sewpujanrai v. Customs Collector, AIR 1958
SC 845: 1959 SCR 821; Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu & ors, AIR 1993 SC 412: 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651;
Harakchand v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 1453: (1969) 2 SCC 166.
73
Page no. 3 of Moot Proposition.
74
Textile Labour Association v. Official liquidator, AIR 2004 SC 3272.
75
Ashok Kumar Sahu v.UOI, (2006) 6 SCC 704
76
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, JT (2002) 3 SC 609: (2002) 4 SCC 388; Common cause, a Registered Society
v. UOI, AIR 1999 SC 2979.
39
 That the present Curative Petition filed by the Appellant is not maintainable.
 To uphold the decree of this Court in W.F.U. v. U.O.I.
AND MAY PASS ANY SUCH ORDER, OTHER ORDER THAT IT DEEMS FIT IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
AND FOR THIS, RESPONDENT AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL HUMBLY PRAY.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
40
41
42
43
44
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WOMEN FREEDOM UNION (WFU).........................RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 ARTICLES AND LEGAL JOURNALS

 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

FACT OF THE CASE………………………………………………………………………..

ISSUE OF THE CASE………………………………………………………………………

18. Hinds v. R, (1976) 1 All ER 355.

58. R.M.D.C. v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628.

1. Abdul Rehman v. Pinto, AIR 1951 Hyd. 11.

2. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, AIR 2008 SC 663.

3. Ashok Kumar Sahu v. UOI, (2006) 6 SCC 704.

5. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 2041.

7. CBI and Ors. v. Keshub Mahindra, (1996) 6 SCC 129.

10. Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 41.

12. Common Cause, a Registerd Society v. UOI, AIR 1999 SC 2979.

16. Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 10 SCC.

17. Harakchand v. UOI, AIR 1970 SC 1453: (1969) 2 SCC 166.

24. Jagjit Singh v. State, AIR 1954 Hyd. 28.

26. John Vallamattom v. UOI, Writ Petition (Civil) 242 of 1997.

28. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

30. Kesav Nanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

35. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650.

36. M. G. Badappanabar v. State of Karnataka, (2000) SUPP. 5 SCR 302.

37. M. Nagaraj v. UOI, (2006) 8 SCC 212.

42. Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1984 SC 121.

49. Nupur Talwar v. C.B.I., AIR 2012 SC 1921.

50. Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 7 SCC 780.

57. R.D. Sugar v. V. Nagary, AIR 1976 SC 2183.

62. Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Govt. of A. P, (2003) 10 SCC 78.

66. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 SCC 963.

70. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681.

71. State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5.

72. Sumer v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2005) Cri. LJ 540.

73. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494.

74. Sunil Kumar v. State of J & K and Another, 14 Dec., 2018.

75. Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100.

76. Textile Labour Association v. Official Liquidator, AIR 2004 SC 3272.

80. Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416

82. UOI v. International Trading Corporation, AIR 2003 SC 3983.

83. V. M. Elangovan v. Inspector, (2014) 5 SCC 859.

87. Zahira v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCALE 397.

9. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, I.P.C. ( L e x i s N e x i s , Nagpur, 30 th Ed., 2008).

 STATUTES AND RULES

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2. The Constitution of India, 1950.

3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.

5. The Supreme Court Rules, Order XLVIII, Rule 6 (1966).

ARTICLES AND LEGAL JOURNALS

1. “Decriminalization of Adultery and Defenses”, available at: http://Endvawnow.Org.

2. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1.

3. Crowford on Statutory Construction, 2018-19.

13. Constitutional Court Of South Korea, 2009 Hun-Ba 17, (26.02.2015)

 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1. European Convention of Human Rights, 1950.

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, 1966.

3. The International Covenant on Civil Rights, 1966.

4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

2. Women Freedom Union (WFU), Non-Governmental Organization, raised its concern

1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE?

3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

ISSUE 2. WHETHER SECTION 497, I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE CURATIVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

1.1 THE CURATIVE PETITION CAN BE FILED IN ONLY EXCEPTIONAL CASES

(i) In the case of a gross miscarriage of justice.

(ii) In the case of a genuine violation of principles of natural justice

1.2 THE DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGEMENT MUST BE RESPECTED

ISSUE2 WHETHER SECTION 497 I.P.C. PROTECTS THE SANCTITY OF

2.2 NOTION OF MARITAL SUBORDINATION DENYING SEXUAL AGENCY OF

2.3 PENALIZING ADULTERY DOES NOT FUNCTION AS A DETERRENCE

ISSUE3. WHETHER THE EXEMPTION GRANTED TO MARRIED WOMEN UNDER