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AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH
TO QUANTUM MECHANICS

Gil Sanders

Abstract: Ever since the scientific revolution and the enlightenment, Aristotelian
metaphysics has been abandoned in favor of a mechanistic conception of matter that
is now scientifically expressed exclusively in mathematical language. This has led to
ontological questions as to what features of reality these abstract algorithms are sup-
posed to represent. The measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics has made this
question particularly prominent. It is the contention of this paper that an Aristotelian
perspective should be taken seriously again because it provides the most plausible
ontological interpretation of the quantum algorithm. Once we understand that possi-
bilities are actually potentials and that potentials are real features of the world, we
can see that both absolute determinism and absolute indeterminism can be avoided
and a sensible view of the world is restored.



Quantum mechanics (QM) has raised some very difficult metaphysical questions about

what kind of world the quantum algorithm describes. This algorithm has rigorously predicted,

without fail, all of the baffling behaviors of particles and yet it seems impossible that it should

describe something about what the physical world’s ontology is actually like. The idea of super-

position, for example, states that a particle that can have either a spin-y or spin-x state is simulta-

neously (prior to measurement) not in both, not in neither, and not in either state. In other words,

physicists have no idea what a superposition is; they can describe it mathematically but it seems

to defy our understanding. According to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen), once mea-

surement occurs, the particle indeterministically collapses into either state. Without measure-

ment, the particle operates deterministically without a definite state and/or position. The idea that

prior to measurement something is in a superposition seems to be metaphysically impossible be-

cause it defies every logical category that we can conceive and it directly conflicts with our expe-
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rience of material objects as continuously having definite properties. We have never directly ob-

served superpositions, nor do we have a clue as to what it would even mean to observe such a

state of affairs.

This has led to the notorious measurement problem. What exactly constitutes a measure-

ment in the first place? Does collapse actually occur, and if so, how does this work? Various an-

swers have been to these questions by philosophers and physicists. The oldest and standard re-

sponse is the Copenhagen interpretation, but others like the Many-Worlds interpretation and

Bohm’s interpretation give answers that make different trade-offs. For every interpretation, there

is some metaphysically undesirable position one must accept as a consequence of that interpreta-

tion. For example, as Bell’s theorem deduced, any interpretation of QM must either affirm de-

terminism or local causation, but not both. A great deal of the data found in QM seems to chal-

lenge typical and deeply held metaphysical intuitions. This has created a situation where some

interpreters of QM prize an intuition or feature over another. Some interpret QM in a way that

restores a deterministic and mechanistic picture of physical reality, but this comes at the cost of

local causation, which makes spooky action at a distance possible. Others preserve local causa-

tion and as such, they embrace indeterminism, which makes causation unintelligible.


This paper contends that an Aristotelian interpretation of QM manages to avoids much of

these counter-intuitive implications because it preserves local causation, rejects absolute inde-

terminism in favor of final causality, offers qualitative insights about what superposition is, ad-

dresses the aspects of the measurement problem, explains why the micro world does not operate

like the macro world, and provides a plausible ontological interpretation of the wave function.

Section l will explain in more detail what the measure problem is from a scientific and metaphys-
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ical perspective. Section ll provides a brief critical overview of the three major interpretations of

QM (Copenhagen, Bohm, and Everett’s Many-Worlds) and finds them either insufficient or

metaphysically undesirable. Section lll accounts for the multitude of interpretations and meta-

physical problems in QM as significantly attributable to the modern’s rejection of Aristotle’s

metaphysic in favor of mechanism, thereby showing that we should reconsider Aristotle’s long

forgotten views. Lastly, section lV will introduce and defend crucial Aristotelian concepts like

act and potency against reductionism and competing explanations, while showing how it best

accounts for various counter-intuitive problems in QM.

l. The Measurement Problem

The measurement problem in QM has been expressed in different ways, but at its core,

the problem centers around two fundamental dynamics that appear to be inconsistent with one

another. A dynamic refers to the state of a physical system at some initial time that changes to a

different state some later time in accordance to a particular law or mathematical algorithm. The

first dynamic in QM is called Schrodinger Evolution. It is a fully deterministic algorithm that

describes how physical systems in general evolve from one state to another state when those

physical systems are not being measured. The second dynamic is called the Collapse Postulate. It

is a nondeterministic algorithm (known as the wave function collapse) that describes a superposi-

tion of possible quantum states that probabilistically collapses into one of those quantum states

when measured. Under the standard interpretation of QM, this probability is not epistemic but is

essential to the basic ontology of the world. So even if we had access to every detail about the

physical universe, it would be impossible to predict quantum outcomes with certainty because

reality itself is indeterminate, unlike the first dynamic. These dynamics describe two fundamen-
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tal laws about how quantum states evolve, and yet both cannot simultaneously hold. Whenever

experiments have been done to see how these processes work, the empirical results conflict with

each other. This conflict resulted in physicists seeking to determine what measurement is and

when it occurs in hopes of resolving the conflict. The word “measured” was used earlier to avoid

an explicit contradiction when describing both dynamics, but it is extremely implausible to sug-

gest that these dynamics only occur during human measurement. Instead, scientists claim that it

is a measurement-like process that causes collapse, but this in turn requires a precise definition of

what constitutes measurement in this broad sense.

It turns out that precisely defining measurement is remarkably difficult – which is what is

known as the measurement problem. Wigner suggests that the collapse occurs precisely at the

level of consciousness. The conscious mind fixes its attentive eye to the entire state of affairs that

it seeks to observe, thus causing the entire system (including the brain, measuring devices and

particles) to collapse. Once it closes its attentive eye to this state of affairs, the system operates

under Schrödinger. The problem with this definition of measurement is that not only is providing

a definition of consciousness difficult or controversial, but it gives us no causal account of how

consciousness is doing this and it seems wildly implausible to suggest that the quantum world

depends on consciousness for its operation. Another proposal is that a state collapses when a mi-

croscopic system comes in contact with some macroscopic system, but this still requires us to

precisely define what constitutes a macroscopic system. Perhaps the best way to define mea-

surement is via some empirical event: the moment at which collapse occurs. This requires us to

perform experiments on the physical states both prior and after the collapse. Unfortunately, it

turns out that empirically we cannot differentiate between two competing theories of when col-
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lapse occurs because measurement always impacts the environment. While a mathematical oper-

ator was discovered that shows it is theoretically possible to determine the moment of collapse, it

is practically impossible because it (a) requires trillions of particles to stay in place without mov-

ing, and (b) requires an incredibly sensitive measurement device that would require vast amounts

of energy – energy that surpasses what is present in our universe – to operate. 


A more technical way to describe the measurement problem is in terms of the wave func-

tion. A wave function is a complete mathematical description of the properties of particles (rep-

resented as state vectors) in a physical system. By itself the wave function is a superposition of

all possible state vectors. With Schrödinger evolution, the wave function evolves as a linear su-

perposition of different states. It is deterministic in that the current vector state will physically

determine the resulting vector state. If we could know all the prior conditions, we could predict

with certainty what the resulting state vector would be. The wave function generally evolves in

accord to Schrödinger, but once some form of measurement is performed, the wave function col-

lapses in the sense that it no longer operates in accord to Schrödinger’s equation but in accord to

the collapse postulate. Through a linear combination of these state vectors, the once indefinite

superposition of state vectors nondeterministically produces some definite state vector. In other

words, the collapse postulate tells us that once a particle is measured, it is no longer in a superpo-

sition of different states but collapses into a particle with definite properties and a definite posi-

tion in a nondeterministic manner. The mathematical formalism of QM cannot tell us when the

wave function stops evolving deterministically. If observers or measuring devices can be de-

scribed deterministically, then why can’t we predict the resulting state vectors with certainty as

opposed to probabilistically? This seems logically contradictory.

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Metaphysically, there are some serious problems here: how could the wave function pos-

sibly represent some real entity? It seems difficult, if not impossible to conceive that there could

be particles without definite properties. The standard interpretation treats the wave function as a

mathematical object only, but if we reify the wave function as some interpretations do, then it

would entail that unmeasured particles normally exist as several mathematical possibilities in a

state of superposition and not as a concrete object unless measured. Or should we say that ab-

stract mathematical objects really exist as physical objects? That seems absurd. And yet if we

deny that it represents a real entity, it seems to question the thesis that science studies real enti-

ties, not fictional entities. Something without definite properties does not seem capable of being

measured in the first place. What would it phenomenologically mean for a human to observe a a

particle that is in a superposition of being in spin-x or spin-y? The whole notion appears incoher-

ent not only because human consciousness experiences only singular definite states but because

it seems to violate the laws of logic if taken literally. Is physics now in the business of doing

speculative / incoherent metaphysics? In reality, we just do not understand what a superposition

is enough to claim that it violates the laws of logic. A second metaphysical problem is that if the

microscopic world is indefinite, then it should entail that the macroscopic world is indefinite as

well since QM is meant to be an exhaustive description of all physical reality. That directly con-

tradicts our experience of the world being definite. Lastly, if we define measurement as contact

of macroscopic systems with microscopic systems, we have an epistemological problem. How

can macroscopic measuring instruments give us information about microscopic objects? The

macroworld is still explicable via classical physics, the microworld is not. Both appear funda-

mentally different. Any plausible interpretation of QM must be able to address these metaphysi-
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cal problems. We shall look at what the current interpretations say, and then we will introduce an

Aristotelian approach as offering a more plausible ontology of quantum states.

ll. Analysis of Current Interpretations

Without a doubt the measurement problem raises some serious questions, but most be-

lieve they are surmountable. Any interpretation that seeks to address this problem must explain

why at the point of measurement we do not detect superposition but a definite position. There are

two features that every interpretation must explain: quantum algorithm and phenomenology. The

former considers what the wave function represents ontologically, if anything, and the latter con-

siders how humans could experience the natural world as definite if it is fundamentally indefi-

nite. Every interpretation must carry with it metaphysical costs that are counter-intuitive to some

degree. For example, Bell’s theorem showed that no interpretation can have both locality and de-

terminism as classically conceived. If locality is abandoned, as it is in Bohm’s interpretation,

then particles can causally affect another particle at a distance without any intermediary contact

between particles (aka spooky action at a distance). But if we reject determinism for locality, like

the GRW interpretation, then the world is indeterministic and it defies a full scientific explana-

tion because random causality has no order or predicability. Both options have the undesirable

consequence of removing a rather plausible metaphysical intuition about the world. Another pos-

sible consequence is that quantum physics can never know the world as it really is because

whenever we observe something, our mental structure imposes its subjectivity upon reality. Def-

inite properties are simply the product of a mind, as the physicist Bohr affirmed. Other interpre-

tations take a radically different approach. Bohm’s theory is deterministic and posits the wave

function as a strangely real physical entity that exists out there, whereas collapse theories affirm
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that indeterminism is a real feature of the world but deny that the wave function is a real entity.

Determining which theory is true is rather difficult because the experimental data thus far is not

sufficient to make a determination that one theory or interpretation is superior to any other. We

must instead assess each interpretation to see what kind of trade-offs or ontologies seem more

plausible to us.

The standard and oldest interpretation of QM is the Copenhagen interpretation. Both

Bohr and Heisenberg are its founders, although they did not agree on every issue. Under this

view, physical systems objectively do not have definite properties prior to measurement. Inde-

terminism is a real feature of the world that is not reducible to our epistemic limitations – i.e., it

denies that there are hidden variables. This is supported by a law of QM known as Born’s rule,

which states that the probability of obtaining some measurement outcome is equal to the square

of the corresponding amplitude in a wave function. All of our experimental data confirms Born’s

Rule. Ontologically, this view holds that the wave function does not point to some really existing

material entity but it does represent the state of the system. This interpretation is largely epis-

temic in that it focuses on explaining quantum phenomena rather than positing what it ontologi-

cally represents. Whatever this wave function represents, it becomes definite when a system is

measured. So measurement really does make a system definite, and this measurement is often

described as mechanical rather than consciousness-driven by modern supporters of the Copen-

hagen interpretation. The problem with this interpretation is that measurement is vague or unde-

fined. Wigner’s interpretation of measurement is commonly associated with Copenhagen, which

states that consciousness causes collapse, but how a mind could affect a physical system is wide-

ly disputed. Others like Einstein objected to the probabilistic nature of this theory with the fa-
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mous statement, “God does not throw dice,” to which Bohr replied, “Einstein, don't tell God

what to do.” Another problem is that metaphysically it still seems dubious to say that no object

with determinate properties exists before measurement. As Einstein asked, is the moon some in-

definite object until something measures it and gives it definite moon-like properties?

Bohm’s interpretation, by contrast, provides a completely deterministic view that pre-

serves the ontology of classical mechanics. This view postulates that every particle in the world

has a definite position, and that from knowledge of its current position and wave function we can

deduce with certainty what its position and wave function will be at any other time. Most surpris-

ingly, it treats the wave function not as representing some physical state but as really existing out

there as a physical thing. The wave function guides particles with definite trajectories. To appre-

ciate how strange this is, it is essentially saying that several mathematical possible properties re-

ally exist out there as one single entity that is spread out throughout all of space, rather than con-

fined to one location. This makes the theory non-local in that it allows for instantaneous interac-

tion between particles over long distances, thereby making the behavior of particles quite unlike

classical physics. Because it is non-local, it makes it explicitly at odds with special relativity.

Bohm’s theory avoids the measurement problem because he denies that an actual collapse of the

wave function ever occurs. All particles are in some definite position both prior to and after mea-

surement. He reinterprets the appearance of collapse in terms of decoherence. For this view,

properties are not intrinsic to the particles but are contextual in that they depend on the circum-

stances at the time of its measurement.

The last view we shall cover here is the Everett’s Many-Worlds interpretation. It also re-

jects an indeterminate collapse of the wave function; instead the wave function is interpreted to
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be a universe, which continuously evolves and splits into distinct universes. In other words,

whenever something is in a superposition, every possible measurement outcome actually occurs

but as a distinct universe/s. For example, if a particle is in a superposition of being in either state

spin-x or spin-y, we normally interpret this to to mean that the particle then collapses into a defi-

nite state at measurement. But for Everett, the universe splits into two kinds of parallel worlds

(spin-x worlds and spin-y worlds) at measurement. Exactly how many worlds of each kind are

created at measurement is unknown. Once this split occurs, the two kinds of worlds can never

interact with each other, and this branching off happens endlessly whenever something is in a

state of superposition and measured. There are perhaps an infinite number of worlds with alter-

nate histories and different futures. One of the serious problems with this view is that it fails to

explain the probabilities given by the Born Rule. How can there be probabilities in a theory that

is wholly deterministic? The second problem is that to talk about probability requires a preferred

basis that identifies the range of measurement outcomes. This preferred basis can only be deter-

mined by a decoherence process, but decoherence is itself probabilistic. Some respond to this by

reference to decision theory, but whether this response succeeds is a matter of controversy.

lll. Why We Need Aristotle

That there are ever-increasing multitudes of interpretations in QM should not be surpris-

ing given physics’ heavy reliance on mathematical formalism. As Russell points out, “All that

physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it

is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent” (My Philosophical

Development, p. 13). The methodology of physics is such that it must use the exceedingly ab-

stract tools of mathematics in order to perform its inquiry. Mathematics is inherently quantitative
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and structural by nature, thus it is in principle incapable of capturing qualitative aspects of nature

in the same way that a metal detector is in principle incapable of detecting plastic. Whatever does

not fit this quantifiable method, like immanent teleology and causal powers, must be ignored;

only mathematically definable properties are discoverable. The wave function, for example, is a

mere abstract equation that is standardly interpreted to be a representation of something concrete,

but as to what that is we do not know. At best physics can only give us a partial description of

reality (unless abstract structure is all that exists), it fails to tell us what is the inner qualitative

nature of the thing that exhibits this mathematical structure. After all, there must be some con-

crete physical object with qualities that this mathematical structure represents, otherwise we need

to deny scientific realism or treat mathematic objects as if they were physical objects. It is no

surprise then that physicists radically differ as to what the wave function represents, of which

there is no consensus in sight, because it is beyond the scope of physics and enters the realm of

metaphysics. The quantum data alone is simply insufficient to single out any particular interpre-

tation and it will always be insufficient because empirical data, as Thomas Kuhn point out, is al-

ways subject to interpretation (or paradigm shifts) and it is “particularly in periods of acknowl-

edged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the

riddles of their field” (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions). This is especially true for physics,

as it is the most abstract of all scientific fields, and so it inevitably ventures into metaphysical

territory. As Einstein recognized, it “turns out that one can, after all, not get along without meta-

physics” (Ideas and Opinions).

Metaphysics is inescapable, it is now a question of whether we will do it correctly. As the

physicist Heisenberg noted, “good science is being unconsciously discarded because of bad phi-
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losophy” (Die Naturwis-senschaften, 1976). Ever since Galileo and Newton, a mechanistic con-

ception of matter was assumed by modern science. It viewed matter as geometric extension (or

pure form), with the principle attributes of extension being size, shape, position, and motion. The

power to cause in us an experience of these attributes were taken to be the primary qualities of a

thing, in contrast to secondary qualities, which are powers that cause in us the sensations of col-

ors, tastes, sounds, and smells – or the way something “feels like” to an observer (also known as

qualia). These sensations do not exist apart from the mind that perceives them, whereas the at-

tributes of extension do. Instead, sensations like hot or cold were redefined as particles that have

the power to produce in us certain sensations, but the sensations do not resemble the object as it

is in itself. For example, there is no sensation of pain that resembles what exists in the object it-

self. Only primary qualities that could be quantified were said to resemble the object as it is in

itself. As Thomas Nagel pointed out, the moderns insisted that “physical science should provide

a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality” (Mind & Cosmos). The

moderns wanted a world that was precise, controllable, and predictable, which is exactly what a

quantifiable ontology of the physical world provided. In fact, the mechanical approach was so

successful in Newtonian physics that Aristotelianism was perceived as unnecessary. They reject-

ed Aristotle’s notion of substantial forms and replaced it with the idea that all physical objects are

reducible to particles. Every “kind” of object was just a different arrangement of particles; there

was no substance that existed above these particles. They also rejected final causes (which is a

thing’s inherent tendency toward a certain effect as its end goal) and instead favored the view

that a particle has no inherent purpose unless God imposes purpose upon it in the way a watch-

maker externally imposes a time-telling purpose on mechanical parts. Aristotle by contrast

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thought that purpose was not imposed but intrinsic to the very nature of things. For example, the

built in purpose of acorns is to become an oak tree and it will naturally do so if not impeded.

However, it turns out that excluding qualities from the world is fraught with problems. If

matter is essentially quantitative and devoid of the qualitative features that exist in the mind, then

it is in principle impossible (i.e. it cannot be resolved by some future scientific discovery) to re-

duce a mind that is essentially qualitative to something that is essentially non-qualitative. The

sensations of the mind are qualia that resembles only what the observer experiences. At best

something quantitative can be correlated with some qualia insofar as it has a power to produce

that qualia (secondary qualities are powers that do this), but this power is not itself a qualia so it

can only produce qualia in a mind that is already essentially receptive to qualitative experiences.

If matter is devoid of qualitative features resembling things like qualia, then it cannot be the en-

tire cause of the mind. This is infamously known as the mind-body problem. As even

Schrödinger recognized, “the mind itself remains a stranger in this picture, it has no place in it, it

can nowhere be found in it” (Mind and Matter, 1956). Furthermore, a rejection of Aristotelian

metaphysics led to Hume’s attack against causation and his problem of induction, which posed a

serious problem for scientific realism. Hume viewed causes and effects as “loose and separate,” a

notion Aristotle would reject because causes and effects are strongly connected by their final

cause. Even the laws of nature are difficult to understand under this mechanical view. It does not

suffice to explain the regularities of nature by making them into a law because that is circular. A

law just is a regularity, but the question is why is there regularity in the first place. Aristotle

would account for regularities by appeal to a thing’s final cause, but without that, the mechanist

can only say that regularities occur because efficient causes cause their effect with regularity –
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which is not an explanation at all. It became readily apparent that this mechanistic project was

doomed to fail. But instead of returning to an Aristotelian conception, the moderns insisted on

rejecting its notion of formal and final causes while creating a diverse set of dubious material

ontologies. Ever since the arrival of QM, it has become even more apparent that this conception

of matter is woefully inadequate. According to the world renowned physicist, Heisenberg, the

wave function “was a quantitative version of the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian philos-

ophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual

event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality” (1958,

41). Physicists who work within this mechanistic framework are already utilizing some Aris-

totelian ideas, so we should give Aristotelian metaphysics a chance to see what it can do.

lV. An Aristotelian Approach to QM

To explain what Heisenberg means by potentia, it is necessary to introduce and defend

some Aristotelian concepts. A potentia is simply a thing’s potential to have its accidents or sub-

stance changed. For example, a piece of glass has the potential to shatter or it has the potential to

melt into a fluid. The shattering of glass is a change of accidents, whereas melting into fluid is a

change in substance – which is technically not a substantial change (change to a different kind of

thing) but we will treat it as such for purposes of simplicity. This stands in contrast to actus,

which refers to the way a thing actually is here and now. The piece of glass is actually clear,

sharp, and of a particular shape here and now, but it nevertheless could shatter or it could melt

into fluid at some later time. When it does in fact melt into fluid, we say that this potential was

actualized. Aristotle used this act-potency distinction to show where Parmenides went wrong in

his argument against the reality of change. For Parmenides, there are only two possible cate-
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gories for change: being and non-being. For change to occur requires being coming from non-

being, or something from nothing, which is impossible. In other words, the piece of glass has be-

ing whereas the “glass fluid” is non-being here and now. In order for glass fluid to become a be-

ing, it must either get its being from the piece of glass or from non-being. It cannot get its being

from the piece of glass because it is not fluid, so it must come into being from non-being. But it

is impossible for something to come from nothing, so change must likewise be impossible. Par-

menides mistakenly thought that only actuality counts as being (or real), but as Aristotle ex-

plained, being should be divided into two parts: act and potency. Glass’s potential to break, for

example, is a real aspect of its being and is not non-being even if that potential to break never

gets actualized. A potentiality should not be confused with mere possibility. It is possible for a

unicorn to exist, but it is not possible for a piece of glass to become a unicorn because it lacks

that potential whereas it does have the potential to break. A piece of glass’s actuality limits the

potential range of things that can be actualized. Something rubber has the potential to bounce but

glass lacks this potential because their actuality is different.

If we are to preserve the reality of change, we must accept Aristotle’s act-potency distinc-

tion, as it provides the best response to Parmenides. It is both common sensical and obvious to

the senses that change exists, and it is obvious that things do in fact have the potential to break.

But just incase there is someone whose common sense reasoning is shot dead by “woke meta-

physics,” let us assume that it is not obvious or common sensical. Let us start by denying that

potency is real. To account for change, we can either say the glass fluid was transported to re-

place the piece of glass or the glass fluid comes into being from nothing at the very instant we

think “change” occurs. If it is only transported, then while you may avoid melting the piece of
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glass, you have still not avoided potency because that piece of glass must have the potential to be

located somewhere else if it is to be transported. But if one proposes it came from nothing, then

this is metaphysically impossible. Nothing cannot possibly produce anything since to be able to

“possibly create x” is to possess that property, but nothingness by definition has no properties. To

claim that “something can com from nothing” is as nonsensical as saying “the number one caus-

es smelly feet.” It is therefore very clear that potency is necessary if change is to be preserved.

Suppose instead that we deny the reality of change. Real change requires the belief that only the

present is real (presentism), but an eternalist (or B-theorist) would deny presentism. Instead, like

Parmenides, they would argue that we only have appearances of change because objects exist in

equally existing time slices with different properties. No object or property of an object truly

goes out of existence because the past, present, and future are equally real. At best all that could

be said is that at t1 an object with property x exists and at t2 a very similar object that lacks prop-

erty x exists such that it appears that the same object has changed. However, this argument can-

not possibly succeed for it is a necessary feature of conscious experience that it undergo real

change. Even granting that all times in the world are equally real, it is not equally real to our

conscious experience. We only ever experience one moment and then we immediately experi-

ence the next moment; we never simultaneously experience moments in which an identical cat is

alive at t1 but dead at t2. So at the very least, real change exists at the conscious level. But if real

change exists at that level, then we have no reason to deny its existence in the external world.

After all, our senses present us with a changing world and unless we have a strong defeater, we

should take it at face value. Lastly, rejecting real change threatens scientific realism insofar as

the scientific method observes and describe real changes of physical entities. Thus without di-
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rectly appealing to any intuitions, we have briefly shown that change must exist and that it is best

accounted for by the Aristotelian act-potency distinction.

As it turns out, modern physics makes the same mistake as Parmenides. It restricts the

“real” to actuality because their view of matter is still mechanistic, where material objects are

mere quantitative forms. By contrast, the Aristotelian conception of matter is hylomorphic,

which holds that all material substances are composed of form and matter. Form (the structure

that makes a thing what it is) corresponds to actuality, whereas matter (the stuff out of which

something is made) corresponds to the potency that persists through change. This matter is the

substrate of a material substance that is receptive to different kinds of forms, whereas the form

gives definite structure to the matter. Another way of putting this is that matter is an indetermi-

nate receptacle that individuates form and form is that which transforms matter into a determi-

nate kind of thing. No material object can exist without both form and matter. Matter by itself is

just prime matter, which is pure potency, but pure potency cannot exist without actuality because

a potential is a potential of some actual thing, not a potential of nothingness. Form by itself is

just abstract structure, it cannot be a concrete thing without some matter to inform. Both matter

and form are thus irreducible components of material objects. Since matter and form are just

more specific instances of potency and actuality, we already know that this analysis is plausible

given the above argument for Aristotle’s act-potency distinction. But another argument from

change should be made in favor of hylomorphism. Suppose again that a piece of glass is changed

into glass fluid. What makes it the case that it is the piece of glass itself that got changed into

glass fluid? There must be some underlying substrate that persists through the changes – other-

wise you simply have things popping into being. This substrate must be matter, and what
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changes is the form that it possesses. Another argument is that the identical form of “humanness”

can exist in multiple beings so there must be something that individuates one from another. What

individuates or particularizes this form is the particular bit of matter that it informs. In other

words, both Socrates and Plato share the same substantial form of being a human and it is this bit

of matter over here as opposed to that bit of matter over there that differentiates one from the

other, along with their particular accidental properties.

A crucial consequence of hylomorphism is that it denies that everything in the macro

world is fully reducible to particles. The particles in a substance do not exist as actual particles in

a macro level substance but rather exist virtually as parts of a macro substance – i.e. the particles

do not exist as individual substances arranged as some pattern (contra reductionism) but exist

only as parts of a substance that confer and derive their actuality to and from the substantial form

as a whole. A substance is the “essence of a thing… what it is said to be in respect of

itself” (Metaphysics Z.4. 1029b14). Something exists virtually insofar as it has the potential to

exist as an individual substance but actually exists not as an individual substance but as a part of

another substance by both giving its actuality to this substance and having its actuality through

the substance. A good example is H2O. The hydrogen and the oxygen do not exist as individual

substances, but rather exist as virtual parts of the water substance. The water thereby acquires

powers that neither hydrogen nor oxygen have in themselves, but nor could these powers be ac-

quired without either of their particular actualities (as opposed to some other actual chemical)

being so conjoined to become a new substance. Thus in some sense, hydrogen and oxygen stop

existing as actual things. This view of “natural kinds” is readily defended today [Ellis, 2001;

Cartwight, 1999; Oderberg, 2007]. Hylormophism provides an explanatorily powerful account of

 !19

reality that reductionism lacks because it grounds a thing’s unique powers in its irreducible sub-

stance. It is difficult to account for why magnets have the power to attract metals in a way that

water cannot if all substances are just different arrangements of particles like marbles scattered

across the floor. The powers of every particle are identical, so arranging them differently such

that they produce different powers is rather magical if reductionism is true. A reductionist could

push back by positing different kinds of powers for different particles instead, but the Aris-

totelian would point out that this concedes that there are hylomorphic substances at the micro

level of reality. The reductionist thus begs the question by privileging the micro level as more

“real” than the substances at the macro level.

Additionally, hylomorphism entails a gradual spectrum of material beings with greater

degrees of potentiality to greater degrees of actuality. Something has greater actuality if it has

more determinate form (or qualities) and something has higher potency if it is more indetermi-

nate with respect to being more receptive to various forms. For example, a piece of clay has

higher potency insofar as it is more malleable than a rock and thus more receptive to various

forms. A rock can likewise be modified to receive various forms, but it requires a physical entity

with greater actuality or power to do so because it has a more determinate form as a solid object.

A human hand has sufficient actuality (or power) to mold a form onto the clay, but it does not

have sufficient actuality to mold a rock. Of course something need not always have greater actu-

ality than another thing in every respect in order to produce a change in that being. For example,

animals have more actuality than a spider insofar as they are capable of sensory experience.

However, despite animals having more actuality than spiders, a spider can kill some animals with

its poison because some animals lack greater actuality with respect to their immune system or
 !20

lack the hardness needed to protect against poison. More fundamentally, all material things are

comprised of matter. The closer you are to prime matter, the less actuality that a thing possesses

and the more potential it has to take on a variety of forms. As Aristotle noted, matter is “universal

and indefinite” (Metaphysics), so when you destroy a substance to break it down to its smaller

parts, hylormophism predicts that you will find higher levels of potency because you are getting

closer to prime matter. This is precisely what we find in QM. The macroscopic world has more

actuality, which is why we experience it as more definite or determinate, whereas the microscop-

ic world has far less actuality, thereby creating far less determinate behavioral patterns.

That the world is hylomorphic and is a gradual spectrum of actuality and potentiality

gives us a principled means of accounting for what superposition is against competing interpreta-

tions. Taking Aristotle’s ideas seriously dissolves quantum mysteries because it provides us with

a richer ontology of what is real. The mechanistic conception of matter, by contrast, does not

admit of degrees of actuality: material entities are either actual or not. In a paper entitled, Taking

Heisenberg's Potentia Seriously (2017), Ruth Kastner and her colleagues argue that Aristotle

“accounts naturally for the counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics such as nonlocality,

entanglement, and instantaneous collapse.” Let us start with the wave function, which if you re-

call, initially describes several mathematical possibilities (aka superposition) prior to collapse.

QM forces forces us to reify the wave function in some way because by itself it would suggest

that the quantum world only exists when we are measuring it, which is rather absurd. However,

according to Heisenberg the wave function should not be treated as being actual in the way that

Bohm or Everett propose. The Many-Worlds interpretation is quite frankly rather fanciful and

needlessly multiplies universes. It may have formidable explanatory power in areas, but as it
 !21

stands now, it has serious difficulties explaining probability (c.f. The Probability Problem in

Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists, Foad). The Bohm interpretation over-reifies the wave

function by interpreting all mathematical possibilities as actually existing in some entity that

stretches across spacetime, but fails to specify what kind of entity this would be. Rather honestly,

one cannot help but get the impression that there is something rather ad hoc or excessive about

these interpretations. This is because these interpretations implicitly assume an anti-Aristotelian

metaphysic so like Parmenides, they must believe that the wave function exists as an actual enti-

ty of some sort or deny that it actually exists. But this is a false dilemma because potency is also

a real feature of the world despite not being actual. It is far more plausible to interpret the wave

function as real insofar as it describes a range of potential outcomes for particles that are low in

act but great in potency.

Aristotle's view reinterprets superpositions as being the potentials of a thing or state, not

as actual states in which all possibilities are realized. To say then that a particle is “not in both,

not in neither, and not in either state” with respect to being either in a spin-y or spin-x state is to

say that prior to measurement, it is not actually in both, neither, or either state. In actuality a par-

ticle can only be in either state, but potentially, it can have a contrariety of states. Superpositions

seem contradictory only because contrary potentials (like the potential to live or die in the next

moment) can exist in the same object. A skeptic could object that this does not explain what su-

perpositions are physically like, but an Aristotelian would reject this demand for a physical de-

scription. If superpositions are the potentials of a thing, then it is absurd to ask for a physical de-

scription because that is the same as demanding a purely actual description of what a potential is

when neither of them are reducible to the other. Anything physical is actual by definition, where-
 !22

as a potential state cannot be observed in principle because it is not actually there to be observed

yet. But once it does become actualized, it can no longer be observed as a potential. You can ob-

serve the contrary effects of potentiality, but you can never observe potentiality itself. This is ex-

actly how physicists came to believe in superposition in the first place. No physicist directly ob-

serves superposition but observed the contrary effects in the data which compelled them to assert

it as some mode of being that we know not what. Aristotle provides a very promising account of

what it is. Unlike its rivals, Aristotelianism does not conveniently posit new entities to solve a

very specific empirical problem. The act-potency distinction is something that permeates

throughout all levels of reality already, it is not something conveniently used to fit into the quan-

tum data, but is necessary to account for any empirical fact. So when Aristotelians appeal to po-

tencies to account for QM, it is not ad hoc or excessive but natural, thus giving it an explanatory

advantage over competing interpretations.

There are three fundamental problems that QM raises: (1) defining measurement, (2) de-

termining when the wave function collapses, and (3) quantum entanglement. Aristotelianism

sheds some insight into all three problems, but given its metaphysical nature, it encourages

physicists to fill in the details. A somewhat quick and dirty definition of measurement is to define

it as physical contact with the macroscopic and the microscopic – where the macroscopic is

whatever is fully captured by classical physics and the microscopic is whatever else is

captured by quantum physics that classical physics could not capture. Using Aristotelian termi-

nology, perceptible objects have higher actualities whereas the non-perceptible objects have

higher potencies. Something is perceptible if it is capable of being perceived by our senses via

some sensory-enhancing instrument, whereas something is non-perceptible if we cannot observe

 !23

the object itself with our senses via some sensory-enhancing instrument but must infer its exis-

tence from its effects. So a measurement device is just any perceptible object that comes into

contact with something that is non-perceptible. The next problem to address is explaining when

the wave function collapses. It is clear that it occurs somewhere around the moment of measure-

ment, but Aristotelian mechanics is not going to be able to give a precise quantitative answer in

terms of time, it can only provide a qualitative answer. Collapse occurs when a “quantum mea-

surement event entails the actualization of one of the potential outcomes inherent in a pure

state” (Kastner, 2017). Thus collapse occurs when there is contact between a perceptible object

and a non-perceptible particle whereby contact with the perceptible object actualizes a particular

potential (spin-y as opposed to spin-x) of the particle into a definite state. The actualization of

certain outcomes at measurement has the result of affecting the range of potential outcomes of

some other particle: “actual events can instantaneously and acausally affect what is next possi-

ble” (Kastner, 2017). A particularly mystifying problem in QM is known as the entanglement

problem. Whenever a particle is measured to be in spin-y or spin-x state, you can know with cer-

tainty that another particle will be in an opposite state no matter how far away the particle is.

This is particularly mysterious because these particles cannot possibly be sending each other sig-

nals. Einstein was troubled by this because it seemed to imply that there is “spooky action at a

distance.” In other words, things can act upon each other from a distance without physical inter-

action of objects in between. This problem is resolved if you’re an Aristotelian. Suppose you in-

tended to visit Los Angeles but unbeknownst to you an earthquake sank that traffic-ridden city

into the ocean. This actualized event changed the range of potential places that I (or anyone else)

could visit without acting upon other persons. In other words, actuality cannot directly alter a
 !24

distant actuality without interaction but it can instantaneously and acausally change a distant

range of potentials. Kastner and her colleagues use potency to further address the two-slit exper-

iment and null measurement.

Aristotelianism also provides a plausible reply to the metaphysical issues that the mea-

surement problem raised. Why is it that the act of measurement causes a particle to collapse from

an indefinite state of superposition to a definite state? Recall the metaphysical problem: if the

microscopic world is indefinite, as QM affirms, then it should entail that the macroscopic world

is indefinite as well, but this is not what we in fact find. There are no cats in a superposition of

being dead and alive. Schrödinger was so puzzled by the standard interpretation of QM that he

used the cat thought experiment to demonstrate just how absurd that interpretation was. This is of

course all rather mysterious for a mechanical conception of matter because all macroscopic de-

vices are reducible to their microscopic particles. If all microscopic particles are equally actual,

then either all physical things are definite or all things are indefinite. Those who believe the for-

mer will come up with metaphysically excessive theories about many worlds, while those like

Wigner who believe the latter will claim that an immaterial mind is what confers definite proper-

ties to an otherwise indefinite world. Such a view, however, is subject to Descartes’s infamous

interaction problem and does nothing to explain how an immaterial substance would make a ma-

terial substance definite. This is just not a problem for Aristotelians. As Aquinas argues, “potency

cannot raise itself to act; it must be raised to act by something that is in act” (SCG I.16.3). In

other words, only something that is actual can actualize a potential; a potential cannot actualize

itself. If it could actualize itself, it becomes inexplicable why a potency does not actualize itself

now as opposed to another time. It cannot be a coincidence that when intense heat comes in con-
 !25

tact with a piece of glass, it actualizes this piece of glass’s potential to become glass fluid. The

same applies at the quantum level. Since measurement of particles at the quantum level have

such high potency, physical objects at the macroscopic level (i.e. the measurement devices) actu-

alize this particle’s potential state into something definite because of their higher actuality.

For Aristotelians this does not require consciousness because non-conscious things actu-

alize potentials all of the time. This high potency is described by the wave function as represent-

ing a state of superposition in which there are several mathematical possibilities, but instead of

possibilities we are interpreting them as potentialities. Macroscopic objects have higher actuality

because the particles lose their low actuality when they become a part of an irreducible substance

that absorbs their actuality to create something with a higher actuality. Hylormophism can there-

fore easily explain why the macroscopic world is not indeterminate like the microscopic world

because it rejects reductionism in the first place. As a closing note, it is absolutely fascinating

that Aristotle described something like superposition over a millennium ago: “The contradictory

states proceed from one and the same capacity, the matter of the thing being the cause equally of

its existence and of its non-existence. Hence contradictories would be present together in actuali-

ty “ (Metaphysics). He even says the potential is for “both alike, or neither.” This is very similar

to how we defined superposition at the beginning of this paper and sounds quite similar to

Schrödinger’s cat experiment. For Schrödinger it appeared to be absolute nonsense because he

mistakenly thought there is only actuality and non-actuality, but for Aristotle it is perfectly sensi-

ble since potentiality must be part of the ontology of the world. Measurement causing collapse is

therefore just a very special case of something actualizing the potency of another thing, an occur-

rence that happens in the world all of the time.

 !26

A return to Aristotelian metaphysics eliminates that false dilemma and restores a common

sensical view of reality that was thought to be impossible. There is neither absolute determinism

nor absolute indeterminism under this view. As Feser notes, “for a cause to be sufficient to ex-

plain its effect it is not necessary that it cause it. It need only make the effect

intelligible” (Scholastic Metaphysics, p. 135). Something need not determine an effect in order

to be intelligible as a cause; it need only provide conditions that would make it likely. As

Heisenberg pointed out about the probabilistic nature of the atom, “One might perhaps call it an

objective tendency or possibility, a “potentia” in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy.” If we

bring back final causality, we bring back a tendency toward a certain outcome, which would suf-

ficiently account for an effect despite not being deterministic. While a physical object can cer-

tainly be deterministic, especially if it is more determinate in its actuality, it can also fail to be

deterministic for various reasons that will not be explained here. This is very unlikely to per-

suade the skeptic, but it will hopefully show that Aristotelianism offers an eminently plausible

account of QM that should be thoughtfully considered rather than outrightly dismissed as “out-

dated” or “irrelevant”. It is more relevant today than it ever was and, if allowed to, it can revolu-

tionize our understanding of modern science.

 !27

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––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Special thanks to David Pitt, Mark Balaguer,

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, and Katelyn Rogers
for their critical feedback of this paper.