Bacalso, Uzziel G.

Labor Law 2

CASE DIGESTS

1. Sameer Overseas v Cabiles

G.R. 170139, 5 August 2014

Material Facts

Joy Cabiles was contracted by Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc.

(“Sameer”), with whom she signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 15,360.00. She also alleged that she was
required to pay a placement fee of P70,000 upon signing.  
She started to work for Taiwan Wacoal (“Wacoal”) on June 26, 1997.
Whereas she alleged that she agreed to work as quality control for one year, she
was instead asked to work as a cutter. 
  July 14, 1997, or barely a month into her work, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal, without prior notice, terminated her contract. She was asked to immediately
report to their office to gather her salary and passport, and to prepare for immediate
repatriation.  
From June 26, 1997 to July 14, 1997, Cabiles alleged that she received only
NT$9,000 and that Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.  
On October 15, 1997, Cabiles filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with the
National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”) against Sameer and Wacoal. She
asked for (a) the return of her placement fee [P70,000], (b) the amount withheld for
her plane ticket [NT$3,000], (c) payment for her salary for 23 months, and (d) moral
and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer’s foreign principal. 
 For its part, Sameer contended that Cabiles was terminated due to her (a)
inefficiency, (b) negligence in her duties, and (c) failure to comply with the work
requirements of Wacoal. Sameer also denied asking for a placement fee by showing
an Official Receipt dated June 10,1997 bearing the amount P20,360. 
In addition, Sameer claimed that Wacoal’s accreditation with it (Sameer) was
already transferred to Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (“Pacific”);
thus, as Sameer claimed, it has already been substituted by Pacific.  
Pacific moved for the dismissal of Cabiles’s complaint against it, alleging the
absence of an employer employee relationship between them, thereby making the
claims outside the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.
Labor Arbiter dismissed Cabiles’ complaint and ruled that her complaint was
based on mere allegations and that there was no excess payment of placement
fees. 
 Then, Cabiles appealed to the NLRC and it reversed and ruled that Cabiles
was illegally dismissed, reiterating the rule that the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was based on a just or valid cause rests on the employer. 
The NLRC found that there was no sufficient proof that Cabiles was inefficient
or non-compliant with company requirements. In addition, the NLRC found that
Sameer violated procedural due process in terminating Cabiles. 
The NLRC awarded Cabiles (a) 3 months worth of salary or NT$46,080, (b) the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000, and (c) attorney’s fees of NT$300. NLRC
denied Sameer’s Motion for Reconsideration, prompting the latter to petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.  
CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision with respect to the (a) finding of illegal
dismissal, (b) award of 3 months’ worth of salary or NT$46,080, (c) reimbursement of
the NT$3,000 repatriation expense, and (d) attorney’s fees of NT$300. Still, the CA
remanded the case to the NLRC for the sole purpose of addressing the validity of
Sameer’s third-party complaint against Pacific. Nevertheless, Sameer filed a petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether or not Cabiles is entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to
illegal dismissal.

Ruling:

Yes, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were
terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started
working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is
entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would
be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal
that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s
security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”
Furthermore, the court reiterated in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting
wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three
months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This

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provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be
a condition precedent for its approval.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency is ordered to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her
salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this judgment and to reimburse respondent the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest
of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment and Section 7 of RA 10022
amending section 10 of of the said act is null and void.

2.
Malvar v Kraft Foods
GR No.

Materials Facts
Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. hired Malvar as its Corporate Planning Manager
until she became the Vice President for Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of
Kraft Foods International (KFI), KFPI's mother company in 1996.
. Respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista, as Chairman of the Board of KFPI and
concurrently the Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of KFI, sent
Malvar a memo asking her to explain why no administrative sanctions should be
imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of
company rules and regulations.
After her written explanation, an investigating body was formed. Malvar was
placed under preventive suspension with pay. Malvar filed a complaint for illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the NLRC.
Malvar and respondents entered into a compromise agreement, whereby
she was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her.
Issue:
1.) Whether Malvar’s motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the
execution of the compromise agreement was proper;
2.) Whether the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can
prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.
Ruling
1.) No. A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties
undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced. The client may enter into a compromise agreement with the adverse
party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered. 
If the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in order.
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention
of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over
the subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if acting in good faith, settle
and adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even without the
attorney’s intervention. It is important for the client to show, however, that the

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compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons who are not parties
to the agreement.
Yes, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship
at any time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because
good faith is required in terminating the relationship and the limitation is based on
Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that “[e]very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The right is also subject to
the right of the attorney to be compensated.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing
and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the
case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall
have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client.
2.) Yes. The Court disapproves of the tendencies of clients compromising
their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees.
 Thus, the Court grants the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated
professional fees that would be denied under the compromise agreement. The Court
does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering
professional services on contingent fee basis.
Claims on attorney’s fees does not void or nullify the compromise agreement
between Malvar and the respondents. There being no obstacles to its approval, the
Court approves the compromise agreement. But the Intervenor’s should be allowed
to be paid.
In the event of a dispute between the attorney and the client as to the amount
of fees, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that
there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the
services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof the history of
the Intervenor’s legal representation of Malvar can provide a helpful predicate for
resolving the dispute between her and the Intervenor.
Although there was no written agreement with the lawyer, a client cannot
deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason.
Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the Intervenor’s legal service to her
but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by offering
excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell
short of being justifiable.
The respondents are liable to pay also because of the following reasons:
(1) the unusual timing of Malvar’s letter terminating the Intervenor’s legal
representation of her, of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the execution

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of compromise agreement manifested her desire to evade her legal obligation to pay
to the Intervenor its attorney’s fees for the legal services rendered.
(2)the respondents suddenly turned around from their strong stance of
berating her demand as offensive to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a
form of unjust enrichment for her to a surprisingly generous surrender to her
demand, allowing to her through their compromise agreement the additional amount
of P40,000,000.00 on top of the P14,252,192.12 already received by her in August
2008.
(3) the compromise agreement was silent on the Intervenor’s contingent fee,
indicating that the objective of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge
discount from its liability towards Malvar.

3.
Radio Mindanao Network v Amurao III

Material Facts:
Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) hired respondent Michael Maximo
Amurao III (Michael) as a radio broadcaster for its DWKC FM station and production
manager for its metropolitan radio operations at a monthly salary of P28,400.00.
Later on RMN decided to reformat and restructure the programming of its
DWKC-FM station to meet the demands of the broadcasting industry.
Then the president of RMN had a meeting with Michael and other personnel
of the station . The management decide that reformatting and restructuring of the
programs will really affect their employees but rest assured, they will be given their
separation benefits, service incentive leave pay, proportionate13th month pay and
salary for the month of May 16 to June 15, 2002.
Amurao first refused to sign the quitclaim but later on, he agreed to it.
Amurao accepted the offer of RMN and executed an affidavit ofrelease/quitcla
im containing declarations that he has no more claims, right or action of whatever
nature against RMN, that the latter is released and discharged from any and all
claims and demands that maybe due to him and that he read and understood the
terms of his release and quitclaim and consented to such. After 5 months from the
execution of the quitclaim
Amurao filed a complaint against RMN for illegal dismissal with money claims
before the NLRC. Both the Labor Arbiter and NLR Cheld that the quitclaim is void for
it was not voluntarily executed. The Court of Appeals affirmed their decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim executed by Michael was
valid and binding

Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition found that the CA's ruling unfounded
when it ruled that Michael has been coerced into the quitclaim. A quitclaim is invalid
or contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was

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wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on their face. In instances of invalid quitclaims, the
law steps in to annul the questionable waiver.
Certainly, there are legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and
reasonable settlements of laborers' claims that should be respected by the Court as
the law between the parties.
When the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a full understanding of
its terms as well as its consequences, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking, and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly
understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition. As a
radiobroadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly responsible position
in the company. It would be implausible to hold, therefore, that he could be easily
duped into simply signing away his rights. Besides, the language and content of the
quitclaim were clear and uncomplicated such that he could not claim that he did not
understand what he was signing.
Additionally, P311,922.00 was credible and reasonable considering that
Michael did not even complain about the said amount.
. Lastly, he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release of
the settlement pay did not prove that its execution was coerced. He signed the
quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide for the needs of his family and the
education of his children and did not immediately indicate that he had been forced to
sign the same.
“Dire necessity should not necessarily be an acceptable ground for annulling
the quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been forced to
execute it.”

4.
J-PHIL MARINE, INC. v. NLRC
G.R. No. 175366; August 11, 2008

Material Facts:

Dumalaog whi ]served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas, filed on

March 4, 2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma
complaint against petitioners — manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its then
president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services — for
unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent's total claim against petitioners was P864,343.30 and
P117,557.60 representing interest and P195,928.66 representing attorney's fees

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 By Decision of August 29, 2003, Labor Arbiter Fe Superiaso-Cellan dismissed
respondent's complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision of September 27, 2004, reversed the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
During the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, respondent,
against the advice of his counsel, entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners. He thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to
before the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:
Whether the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement
without the assistance of a counsel is proper

Ruling
Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a
lawyer is proper.
The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many
respects one of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The
acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the
scope of his authority. The circumstances of this case indicate that respondent's
counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise
agreement.
Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such
compromise is entered into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly
due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees.

5.
Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa v Bureau of Labor Relations
G.R.No.211145, October 14, 2015

Material Facts:
Samahan, through its authorized representative filed an application for
registration of its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with
the DOLE. The application stated that the association had a total of 120 members.
DOLE-Pampanga, issued the corresponding certificate of registration in favor of
Samahan.
Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines filed a
petition with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of
Samahan's association on the ground that its members did not fall under any of the
types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249) and it
posits that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and
those without definite employers may form a workers' association and (1/3) of the

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members had definite employers. Furthermore, the existence and registration of the
association would prejudice the company's goodwill.
March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental petition alleging that Samahan
committed a misrepresentation in connection with the list of members and/or voters
who took part in the ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its application for
registration making it look like all its members are qualified to become members of
the workers' association.
DOLE-Pampanga called for a conference, wherein Samahan requested for a
10-day period to file a responsive pleading but none was submitted and the
Samahan filed a motion to dismiss instead.
DOLE Regional Director ruled in favor of Hanjin.
Feeling aggrieved of the decision, the Samahan appealed to the BLR and the latter
granted the appeal.
Hanjin filed its motion for reconsideration BLR affirmed their Decision, but
directed Samahan to remove the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name.
Not satisfied with the decision, Samahan filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA. The Court of Appeals ruled that the registration of Samahan
as a legitimate workers' association was contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of
the Labor Code.  It stressed that only 57 out of the 120 members were actually
working in Hanjin while the phrase in the preamble of Samahan's Constitution and
By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" created an impression
that all its members were employees of HHIC.
That manifestation which was used in its application for registration, was a
clear proof of misrepresentation which warranted the cancellation of Samahan's
registration. It also stated that the members of Samahan could not register it as a
legitimate worker's association because the place where Hanjin's industry was
located was not a rural area and there was no evidence to show that the members of
the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant workers.
The CA also said that dropping the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the
association name would not prejudice or impair its right to self-organization because
it could adopt other appropriate names.

Issue:
Whether the court CA seriously erred in ruling that Samahan cannot form a
workers' association of employees in Hanjin and should have formed a union instead
and their registration as a workers' association should be cancelled.
Whether the deletion of Hanjin Shipyard in the name of the samahan would
tantamount to violation of the right to self-organization.

Ruling

The Supreme Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a ground for the

cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done maliciously and
deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the application or attachments must

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be grave or refer to significant matters. The details as to how the alleged fraud was
committed must also be indubitably shown. The records of this case reveal no
deliberate or malicious intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan.
The use of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the
preamble of the constitution and by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as
to warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of registration.
Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and grave
misrepresentationand there was no evidence to support that the alleged
misrepresentation was serious in character.
Misrepresentation is a serious charge that cannot simply be entertained by
mere allegations. Even granting that Samahan's members misrepresented
themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin, said misrepresentation does not
relate to the adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to the election of
its officers.
However, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be
removed in the name of the association.
A legitimate workers' association refers to an association of workers
organized for mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective bargaining registered with the DOLE. Having been granted a
certificate of registration, Samahan's association is now recognized by law as a
legitimate workers' association.
Since there is no provision under our labor laws which speaks of the use of
name by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code, which
governs the names of juridical persons. The policy underlying the prohibition in
Section 18 against the registration of a corporate name which is "identical or
deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of any existing corporation or which is
"patently deceptive" or "patently confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the
avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with the entity
concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of
difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.
Wherefore, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use
"Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give the wrong impression that all of its
members are employed by Hanjin.

6.
Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas, et al.
G.R.No.179146, JULY 23, 2013

Benjamin Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union and

Elizalde Rope Factory Inc.

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 GRN L-25246, September 12, 1974
Materials Facts :
Benjamin Victoriano (appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the
“Iglesia ni Cristo”, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
(Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.”
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the employer
was not precluded “from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees.”
However, on June 18, 1961 RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as follows: “but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization”. Being a member of a religious sect
that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano
presented his resignation to appellant Union.
Then, the union wrote a formal letter to the company asking the latter to
dismiss Victoriano because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
company in turn notified the appellee and his counsel that unless the former could
get a satisfactory arrangement with the union, they would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service.
Thus, the appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and
the Union from dismissing Appellee with the RTC. The Union invoked the “union
security clause” of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and
contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions but the RTC ruled in favor of Victoriano.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court on purely questions of law from the
decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.
2. Whether RA 3350 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Constitution freedom of association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the
Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide
that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the “right” to

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form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely:
first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.
It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should
join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time. The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is
withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
Prior to the enactment of enactment of RA 3350, there was a closed shop
agreement that if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be
employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the collective
bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is
curtailed and withdrawn. But, the Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure
from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which affiliation of their members with any labor
organization.
What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or
not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so.
If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do
so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights.
In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former. The purpose of RA 3350 is to
serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
(2) No. The constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of
any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of
utmost amplitude.

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 RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect neither
does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its member from
joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union
RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affiliation from the required to do
a positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. Victoriano is
exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may
have entered into.
Therefore, RA 3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.

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