a. People vs. Ducosin, G.R. No.

38332, 14 December 1933 (positivist theory)

We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty,
namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration
of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI,
August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and,
second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost limitless filed of investigation
and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far
as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of
protecting the social order.

Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered
are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general
health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his
previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his
previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for
usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his attitude with
regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime
was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103
excepts certain grave crimes — this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum
penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his
dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization
against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual
for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not
heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.
 a. Intestate Estate of Carungcong vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010 (pro-reo)
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That
is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or
commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the
subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views.
There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children
or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view
supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living
issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the
rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v.
Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the
marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity
was continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch.
331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and
coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to
the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of
one spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved
because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. 29 Under this view,
the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a
result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes
have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people
and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the
second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation
of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory
cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree
covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line"
is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the
spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a
son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) 32 can be drawn from
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
 Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to
strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national
policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. 34 In this connection, the spirit of
Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 35 The view that relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is
more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This
is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed
innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the
court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an
absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt
an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation
is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised
Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed
against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship
in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

a. People vs. Gabo, G.R. No. 161083, 03 August 2010 (equipoise rule)

Petitioner’s main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC’s use of the equipoise rule in
dismissing the case which was affirmed by the CA. Specifically, petitioner contends that the
equipoise rule cannot be used by the RTC merely after the filing of the information, thus:
Since there must be a proper determination of the presence or absence of evidence sufficient to
support a conviction, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, the equipoise rule shall properly come into
play when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence. It is only
at this stage, not at any prior time and certainly not merely after the filing of the information, can the
trial court assess and weigh the evidence of the parties and thereafter determine which party has the
preponderance of evidence. If both parties fail to adduce evidence in support of their respective
cases, an adverse decision would be rendered against the party which has the burden of proof. 38
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise
rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction. 39
To this Court’s mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is misplaced as a review of
previous Court decisions would show that the position of petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise
rule has been generally applied when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their
respective evidence as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v. People, 40 Tin v.
People41 and People v. Leano.42
While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances of the case at bar, the
same, however, does not equate to an abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most,
merely an error of judgment. More importantly, this Court finds that the RTC had in fact complied
with the requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence and that the assailed Order was arrived at after due consideration of the merits
thereto
a. People vs. Ragay, G.R. No. 230867, 04 March 2019 (equipoise rule)

Magno vs. CA, G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992 (utilitarian theory)

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or
favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and
circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also
as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich"
scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of
society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could
be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the
offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs.
Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be
clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be falling prey to
such a vicious transaction. (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, p. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded
upon that moral disapprobation x x x of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are
detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. This disapprobation is inevitable to the extent that morality is
generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. x x x
That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation: the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment." (Ibid.,
p. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904. Note also Justice Pablo's
view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's
four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt
of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner
should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the
aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could
be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

a. Vergara vs. People, G.R. No. 160328, 04 February 2005 (utilitarian theory)

In Magno v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It was not intended to shelter or favor nor
encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through the manipulation and
circumvention of the noble purpose and objectives of the law. Under
the utilitarian theory, the “protective theory” in criminal law affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protection of the society against actual and potential
wrong doers.

In the case at bar, petitioner could hardly be classified as a menace against whom the
society should be protected. The records show that from December 1988 when
petitioner was informed of the dishonor, to the filing of the information on April 1,
1991, she paid P423,354.00 to LIVECOR.[28] Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the
loan, it cannot be denied that the previous payments fully covered the value of the
dishonored check. It would be unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check
which has been satisfied 2 years prior to the filing of the criminal charge against her.

a. Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 223705, 14 August 2019 (constitutional limitations)

Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the same against the
intermediate test, viz.: ( 1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) such
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of the free expression; and (4) the
incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than what is
essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. [38]

Our point of inquiry focuses on the fourth criterion in the said test, i.e., that the
regulation should be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest.

The failure to meet the fourth criterion is fatal to the regulation's validity as even if it is
within the Constitutional power of the government agency or instrumentality concerned
and it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest which is unrelated to
the suppression of speech, the regulation shall still be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than what is necessary to achieve the invoked
governmental purpose.[39]

In the judicial review of laws or statutes, especially those that impose a restriction on
the exercise of protected expression, it is important that we look not only at the
legislative intent pr motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at the effects of such
restriction when implemented. The restriction must not be broad and should only be
narrowly-tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow
alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.[40]

As stated, the prohibition is aimed at ensuring the conduct of honest and orderly
elections to uphold the credibility of the ballots. Indeed, these are necessary and
commendable goals of any democratic society. However, no matter how noble these
aims may be, they cannot be attained by sacrificing the fundamental right of expression
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by not encroaching on protected speech
merely because of the apprehension that such speech creates the danger of the evils
sought to be prevented.[41]
In this case, the challenged provision's sweeping and absolute prohibition against all
forms of expression considered as partisan political activities without any qualification is
more than what is essential to the furtherance of the contemplated governmental
interest. On its face, the challenged law provides for an absolute and substantial
suppression of speech as it leaves no ample alternative means for one to freely exercise
his or her fundamental right to participate in partisan political activities. Consider:
The use of the unqualified term "abroad" would bring any intelligible reader to the
conclusion that the prohibition was intended to also be extraterritorial in
application. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia.[42] General words are
understood in a general sense. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the
word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is
manifest from the law itself.[43] Thus, since the Congress did not qualify the word
"abroad" to any particular location, it should then be understood to include any and all
location abroad. Regardless, therefore, of whether the exercise of the protected
expression is undertaken within or without our jurisdiction, it is made punishable under
the challenged provision couched in pervasive terms.

To reiterate, the perceived danger sought to be prevented by the restraint is the

purported risk of compromising the integrity and order of our elections. Sensibly, such
risk may occur only within premises where voting is conducted, i.e., in embassies,
consulates, and other foreign service establishments. There is, therefore, no rhyme or
reason to impose a limitation on the protected right to participate in partisan political
activities exercised beyond said places.

While it may be argued that the Congress could not be presumed to have enacted a
ridiculous rule that transgresses the elementary principle of territoriality in penalizing
offenses, however, the general language of the law itself contradicts such argument.

For the same reason, we cannot accept the OSG's argument that the prohibition was
intended to apply to candidates only, whose exercise of the right to campaign may be
regulated as to time, place, and manner, citing the case of The Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC.[44] Again, the overbroad language of the questioned provision, i.e., "any
person" is prohibited to engage in any partisan political activity within the voting period
abroad, betrays such argument. The general term "any person" should be understood to
mean "any person" in its general sense as it was not clearly intended to be restricted to
mean "candidates only."

a. Del Socorro vs. Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014 (generality and
territoriality)

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation
to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that:“[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.”  On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City.  As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.