Thutmose III

Thutmose III
Other books by Richard A. Gabriel

Scipio Africanus: Rome’s Greatest General (2008)
The Battle Atlas of Ancient Military History (2008)
The Warrior’s Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics (2008)
Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General (2007)
Soldiers’ Lives Through History (2006)
Jesus the Egyptian: The Origins of Christianity and the Psychology of Christ (2005)
Empires at War: A Chronological Encyclopedia, 3 volumes (2005)
Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General (2004)
Lion of the Sun: A Chronicle of the Wars, Battles and Great Deeds of Pharaoh
Thutmose III, Great Lion of Egypt, as Told to Thaneni the Scribe (2003)
The Military History of Ancient Israel (2003)
The Great Armies of Antiquity (2002)
Sebastian’s Cross (2002)
Gods of Our Fathers: The Memory of Egypt in Judaism and Christianity (2001)
Warrior Pharaoh: A Chronicle of the Life and Deeds of Thutmose III, Great Lion
of Egypt, Told in His Own Words to Thaneni the Scribe (2001)
Great Captains of Antiquity (2000)
The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development (1990)
The Painful Field: Psychiatric Dimensions of Modern War (1988)
No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in War (1987)
Military Incompetence: Why the U.S. Military Doesn’t Win (1985)
To Serve With Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier (1982)
With Donald W. Boose, Jr.

Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide to Great Battles
That Shaped the Development of War
With Karen S. Metz

A Short History of War: The Evolution of Warfare and Weapons
History of Military Medicine, Vol. 1, From Ancient Times to the Middle Ages
History of Military Medicine, Vol. 2, From the Renaissance Through Modern Times
From Sumer to Rome: The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies
Thutmose III
The Military Biography of
Egypt’s Greatest Warrior King
Richard A. Gabriel
Potomac Books, Inc.

Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 2009 Potomac Books, Inc.
Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this
book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the
publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gabriel, Richard A.
Thutmose III : the military biography of Egypt’s greatest warrior king / Richard A.
Gabriel. — 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-59797-373-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Thutmose III, King of Egypt. 2. Thutmose III, King of Egypt—Military leadership.
3. Pharaohs—Biography. 4. Egypt—Kings and rulers—Biography. 5. Egypt—History,
Military. 6. Egypt—History—Eighteenth dynasty, ca. 1570–1320 B.C. I. Title. II. Title:
Thutmose the Third.
DT87.2.G33 2009
932’.014092--dc22
[B]
2009015468
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American
National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard.
Potomac Books, Inc.

22841 Quicksilver Drive
Dulles, Virginia 20166
First Edition
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Suzi
who is the sunrise
and the warmth
In Memoriam
Timmy Mahoney
Bill Dorris and Donna Dorris
Frank Hamilton
“Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem

mortalia tangunt”
(These are the tears of things and
our mortality cuts to the heart)
— Aeneas
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
List of Illustrations ix
1 Warrior Pharaoh 1
The Man 1
Early Years 9
The Rise to Power 14
Strategist 17
The Egyptian Alexander 21
Succession 24
2 Strategic Setting 27
Egypt 27
The Land of Canaan 35
The Mitanni 39
Nubia 43
3 The Antagonists 49
Pharaoh’s Army 49
The Mitannian Army 65
The Armies of the Canaanites 73
Nubian Armies 79
4 The Battle of Megiddo 81

Thutmose’s Army 83
The Advance to Yehem 87
The March to Megiddo 97
The Battle 106
The Siege 112
vii
viii h Contents
5 The Campaign in Canaan 117

The Second, Third, and Fourth Expeditions 124
The Fifth Campaign 126
6 The Campaign for the Lebanon Coast 135

The Sixth Campaign 135
The Egyptian Navy 138
Thutmose’s Invasion Force 143
Invasion 148
The Seventh Campaign 155
7 The Euphrates Campaign 159

The March to the Euphrates 163
The Battle 171
The Attack on Kadesh 175
8 The Counterinsurgency Campaign 187

The Strategy 189
Revolt and Suppression 194
9 Epilogue 199
Final Years 200
Legacy 204
Notes 205
Bibliography 227
Index 233
About the Author 241
Illustrations
2.1. The Ancient Near East 29

2.2. Geopolitical Situation in Egypt during the Hyksos Period 33
2.3. Canaan: Strategic Passes, Roads, and Fortifications 38
2.4. Egypt and Nubia 45
3.1. Egyptian Chariot 60
3.2. Three Types of Egyptian Infantry 61
3.3. Organization of an Egyptian Division in the Eighteenth Dynasty 63
3.4. Mitannian Chariot 69
3.5. Mitannian Chariot Archer 72
3.6. Canaanite Chariot 75
3.7. Three Types of Canaanite Infantry 77
4.1. Thutmose’s Route to Megiddo 88
4.2. Three Roads to Megiddo 95
4.3. Megiddo and Its Environs 101
4.4. Thutmose’s Route to the Kina Valley 103
4.5. Tactical Disposition of Forces at Megiddo 110
5.1. Zone of Egyptian Operations in Syria 119
5.2. Location and Distances in the Canaanite-Syrian Zone of
Egyptian Military Operations 128
6.1. Sailing Distances between Ports on the Canaanite-Lebanon Coasts 144
7.1. Thutmose’s Route of March to the Euphrates River 167
7.2. Thutmose’s Return Route from Carchemish to Egypt 177
7.3. Chronology of Thutmose’s Euphrates Campaign 184
ix
1
Warrior Pharaoh
The Man
The room is not very large, about the size of a small chapel, and dimly lit
as if the shadows cast by the soft lights are concealing some ancient
secret. The air is chilly, a welcome relief from Cairo’s summer heat. Only
the background hum of the air conditioner disturbs the reverent silence.
This sacred place—a small room set apart in the Museum of Egyptian
Antiquities—is the final resting place of the great kings of imperial Egypt,
the warrior pharaohs.
Here lies Sekenenre, the great Theban prince who first rose against
the Hyksos invaders. His skull is gashed by a penetrating axe, apparently
having suffered hideous wounds. There is Ahmose, the founder of the
magnificent Eighteenth Dynasty and the hero who drove the despised
Hyksos out of Egypt. Thutmose I is here too. This great warrior brought
Nubia to heel and “raged like a panther” against his Asiatic enemies, with
his armies reaching as far east as the Euphrates River. Next to him rests his
son, Thutmose II, who put down the Nubians’ revolt with great slaughter
and taught the Sand People the meaning of fear.
Off to one side in a casket-like glass case half covered with a cloth
of royal purple rests a shrunken corpse, its skin parchment brown and
swathed completely in linen wrappings except for those pulled back to
reveal his face. The face is oval with full lips, smooth cheekbones, and
a prominent brow stretched tightly against the darkened skin. Through
the blackened decay one can recognize the set of the jaw and the nose

h Thutmose III
that bears a strong resemblance to that of his father and grandfather. One
cannot look upon this face without feeling a sense of awe. Here rests
Thutmose III, the greatest warrior pharaoh of the ancient world.
When the king’s mummy was discovered in 1881, Egyptologists were
horrified to learn that grave robbers in antiquity had almost destroyed the
corpse. They had torn all four limbs from the body, and the arms were
separated at the elbows. The feet were missing, most of the nose was gone,
and the head had been severed at the neck. The sight of this great man
desecrated in this manner was so disturbing that the Egyptian government
declared a moratorium on future examinations of royal mummies. The
ban lasted for five years.1
Famed Egyptologist and physician G. Elliot Smith performed the
autopsy of Thutmose’s corpse. Smith measured the body and declared
Thutmose to have been five feet three inches tall. The combination of
Thutmose’s well-known military prowess and his short stature led Egyp-
tologists to call Thutmose III the Napoleon of Egypt, a description that
may have originated with James Henry Breasted, the famous American
Egyptologist.2 It seems, however, that Smith did not account for the corpse’s
missing feet when taking his measurements. A more recent examination
revealed that the king’s height was 1.71 meters, or approximately five feet
six and one-half inches,3 which was taller than the average Egyptian of his
day and taller than all of the pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty except
Amenhotep I.4 It is fitting that Breasted’s description of the great king as
an ancient Napoleon Bonaparte should be abandoned, for in his military
achievements Thutmose III was, to borrow a line from the British historian
B. H. Liddell Hart, “greater than Napoleon.” Indeed, Thutmose III was
ancient Egypt’s Alexander the Great.
He was quite a remarkable fellow, this warrior prince of Thebes and
the greatest of all generals in Egyptian history. Unlike many generals before
and after him, he did not permit his military training and experience in war
to narrow his intellect. He was no military mechanic or a mere technician
of war; instead, he was an integral man who retained his interest in things
botanical, biological, religious, literary, aesthetic, and architectural to the
end of his life. His broad understanding of his world sharpened his already
literate, well-read mind, and his early education and training prepared
Warrior Pharaoh h
him to reason clearly. He was a brilliant strategic thinker. To him Egypt

owes the conception and implementation of a new strategic vision that
permitted this once defeated and insular society to become a great nation
of imperial dimensions that ruled all the world that an Egyptian would
have considered worth knowing for more than five hundred years.
Thutmose III was one of the great captains of the ancient world. His
record of military activity is remarkable. He fought more battles over a
longer period and won more victories than any other general did in the
ancient world. In the 60 years prior to Thutmose’s reign, the great warrior
kings of Egypt from Ahmose to Thutmose II fought one foreign campaign
every 4.6 years. In the 70 years following Thutmose, from Amenhotep
II to Amenhotep III, the kings conducted one foreign campaign every
10.5 years. In the 19 years between regnal years 23 and 42 of Thutmose’s
32-year reign, he fought seventeen campaigns in Canaan and Syria, or
an average of one military campaign every 1.2 years.5 In addition, he
conducted a major foray into Nubia during his last decade of life. In the
6 years between assuming command of the army and ascending the
throne in his own right, Thutmose fought a major campaign in Nubia and
perhaps another, for which there is only tentative evidence, and led the
army that liberated Gaza from the rebels.6 By the time Thutmose ruled
Egypt in his own right, sometime in his twenty-second year, he was
already an experienced combat commander. In this first major campaign
against the combined Canaanite-Syrian armies at Megiddo in his twenty-
third year, Thutmose revealed himself to be a first-rate strategist, tactician,
and logistician, qualities he gained through extensive experience in the
field prior to ascending the throne.
It is not surprising that this great warrior chose as one of the “five
great names,” which all pharaohs assumed, a name that is associated with
military prowess. Thutmose took as his Horus name Strong Bull Arising
in Thebes, a name associated with Montu, the Theban god of war. The
famous Blue War Crown also made its appearance during Thutmose’s
reign. Shaped like a helmet and fashioned of leather, the crown was
colored blue and studded with golden sequins. This war crown seems
to have been a completely new crown that came into prominence at this
time, perhaps reflecting the warrior lineage and military achievements of
Thutmose’s reign.
h Thutmose III
At this time also a new symbol of pharaonic authority was intro-

duced. From earliest times the symbol of Egyptian royal power had been
the mace. Pharaohs were often portrayed wielding the weapon as the
“smasher of foreheads.” Under Thutmose, the mace was replaced by the
sickle-sword, or kopesh. Although the Hyksos had introduced the sickle-
sword to Egypt and thus the Egyptian army had probably used it prior to
Thutmose’s reign, it was probably Thutmose who equipped the army with
this weapon on a large scale. It would have been possible only after Egypt
had established a strong presence in the Levant from which it could obtain
tin to manufacture these bronze weapons in large numbers. In symbol
and in fact, therefore, Thutmose transformed Egypt into a military state.
With Egypt’s great resources at his command, he set events in motion that
shaped Egypt and the Levant for the next four hundred years.7
More than a hundred portraits of Thutmose III, at least two-thirds
of which are life size or larger, have survived.8 Pharaohs devoted con-
siderable attention to the detail and style of their portraits. While there
is a sense that they portrayed themselves in idealistic poses and themes,
there is no reason to suspect that there was any great distortion in their
physical attributes.9 Thutmose’s portraits reveal a man with the body of a
soldier, as befits a person who spent his adolescence and most of his adult
life in military service and on campaign. It is not surprising, then, that his
physical traits are more in evidence in his portraits than other pharaohs’
portraits reveal. The warrior king is portrayed with a broad, thick chest
and shoulders; a short torso; and a narrow waist. The legs and calves are
muscular and well developed, and even the hands and feet are broad. Art
curator Arielle P. Kozloff points out, “These features, together with the
physical evidence of Thutmose’s mummy indicating that he was fairly
tall, at least in ancient terms, add up to quite an imposing figure.”10
One element of his physique, however, does not appear on his por-
traits: Thutmose may have suffered from a congenital skin disease. His
mummy and those of his father, Thutmose II, and his son, Amenhotep II,
show signs of the same disease. The skin on the shoulders, arms, thorax,
and buttocks of all three mummies are covered with hundreds of scabrous
eruptions similar to those associated with smallpox. Whether these out-
breaks represent a congenital condition or some irritant caused by the
Warrior Pharaoh h
mummification process is not known.11 Interestingly, a mummy that was

discovered in 2008 and believed to be that of Hatshepsut, the daughter of
Thutmose I and the mother of Thutmose II, has the same lesions.
Thutmose’s portraits reveal a man with a broad face, steeply sloped
forehead, strong jaw, intelligent eyes, and an aquiline nose that is eagle-
like in shape and size. The same large beaked nose is evident on his
father’s and grandfather’s mummies and may have been a family trait,
as, perhaps, was the steeply sloped forehead. But in ancient Egypt, where
the major god Horus was portrayed as a falcon, Thutmose III’s subjects
would have appreciated the association of Horus’s beak with the facial
features of their warrior king. Another striking feature in many of Thut-
mose’s portraits is the king’s expression of serenity and calm. Even when
portrayed at war, the king often seems to be smiling and content, an ex-
pression, perhaps, of a man confident in his own abilities and satisfied
with his own achievements.
Thutmose is often portrayed as a devout and respectful servant of
the gods, and, no doubt, he was. As a young man he trained as a priest
of Amun before being sent to the army as a teenager. As Amun’s servant,
Thutmose later justified his military campaigns as doing the god’s will.
He gave much of his victories’ spoils to the Amun priests of Thebes and
other cities. He built the great Festival Hall at Karnak and enhanced the
shrine of Montu, the Theban god of war. Thutmose constructed public
works, temples, and fortifications throughout the empire, from Buhen in
Nubia to the Lebanon Mountains. But always this great warrior humbled
himself before the gods of his forefathers.
Despite his great military achievements, Thutmose seems to have
retained a strong streak of humility. While the Annals carved on the temple
walls of Amun at Karnak tell the stories of his battles in detail, they do
so in a detached, accurate, and almost reportorial manner. Egyptologists
have easily been able to verify these campaigns’ details from the Annals’
descriptions of the terrain, the soldiers’ equipment, and the locations of
the battles themselves. Absent are the outrageous claims of personal valor
and great deeds that have marked so many monuments of antiquity before
and since. Even the numbers of enemy slain and the strengths of the armies
Thutmose faced, usually the most common source of exaggeration, are
believable. Thutmose certainly took care to ensure that those who came
h Thutmose III
after him would know of his achievements, but he did so in a manner that
makes him appear very self-effacing indeed.
The man’s humility is also reflected in his tomb. Thutmose’s tomb
is small and sparsely decorated. Compared to other tombs in the Valley
of the Kings, Thutmose is buried in the funereal equivalent of the simple
military coffin. There are no descriptions of his great military victories
inside his burial chamber. It is as if he wished the gods to remember and
judge him for other things. Still, no other general in antiquity could claim
such a remarkably successful military record as could Thutmose III of
Egypt.
Despite his ferocity on the battlefield, the great general seems to
have been a compassionate man. In all his campaigns, there are no reports
of massacres or atrocities. He often showed mercy to the inhabitants of
captured towns. He shared the spoils of war generously with his officers
and soldiers and seems to have taken great delight in rewarding his men
with decorations for valor in battle. Along with the traditional gold of
honor, the king seems to have introduced a number of other military
decorations for his troops. Thutmose always remained close to his troops,
and they had great trust in him as their commander. One story tells of
common soldiers threatening to report their unit scribe, or commissary
officer, to the pharaoh if they were not provided with adequate food. Only
soldiers who believed their commander to be a fair and just man would
dare make such a threat.
That Thutmose cared for his officers and men is clear from the fact
that his friends and trusted officials were men with whom he had served
in battle and whom he later appointed to administrative positions in the
government. As he approached the time when he would be king in his own
right, Thutmose began to surround himself with his fellow veterans. Many
of these men were of low social origins, but they had proved their mettle
in war. Thutmose gave many of them estates from which to draw a living,
and others rose to high office in the military and civil administrations.12
Thutmose also made sure to pass the lesson of caring for one’s troops and
comrades to his son Amenhotep II. Like his father, Amenhotep was sent to
the army as a young man to endure the hardships and learn the skills of
military life. Once, after he had become pharaoh, Amenhotep recognized
one of the rowers on the royal barge. The rower was Amenemhab, an old
Warrior Pharaoh h
veteran of many battles who had fought under Thutmose in Canaan and
Syria and had fallen on hard times. Amenhotep had the old man brought
before him and said, “I know thy character; I was abiding in the nest [i.e.,
when I was a child] while thou wert in the following of my father [i.e.,
serving with him on campaign].” With that acknowledgment, he also gave
Amenemhab a royal commission and pension.
Thutmose also possessed an inquiring mind, and his intellectual
interests ranged beyond military matters and affairs of state to include
history, religion, architecture, pottery, and even jewelry design. His reign
witnessed a period of prodigious art production of all forms, and he was
one of history’s greatest patrons of the arts.13 He had an abiding interest in
botany and while on campaign took along special scribes whose task was
to find and record any strange flowers and plants they might encounter.
One is reminded of Alexander and Napoleon, for they both took historians,
scientists, and secretaries with them on campaign to record the wondrous
new things they found in the foreign countries. Indeed, one of Napoleon’s
secretaries discovered the Rosetta stone during Napoleon’s Egyptian cam-
paign. Thutmose saw to it that samples of the strange plants were taken
to Egypt and planted there. We know of Thutmose’s interest in botany
because he had portrayals of these plants inscribed on the walls of the
Festival Hall in what has come to be called his Botanical Garden. Animals,
too, interested him. He seems to have been particularly enchanted by
the story of his father having encountered a white rhinoceros in Nubia.
Returning from one of his campaigns, Thutmose spent several days in the
vicinity of the marshes of Niya in Syria, studying and hunting elephants.
Thutmose was one of Egypt’s great builders. With the possible
exception of Ramses II, who enjoyed the longest reign in Egyptian history
(sixty-seven years), Thutmose constructed more temples, shrines, votive
buildings, pylons, and fortresses than any of his predecessors and all of his
successors.14 The Hyksos invaders had pillaged or destroyed much of the
monumental architecture in Middle Egypt, and it was probably not until
Thutmose’s time that events and resources made an attempt at large-scale
rebuilding of the ruined buildings possible. Thutmose also administered
an empire that required the construction of new military garrisons and
fortifications in Canaan and Nubia.15 He had an interest in monumental
architecture as well and paid great attention to his building program. It
h Thutmose III
was Thutmose who introduced the basilica as an architectural form to

Egypt.16 It is interesting that many of his construction projects took place
during the third and fourth decades of his reign, coinciding with the peak
of his military activity in Syria and Canaan.17 To secure his conquests in
Asia, Thutmose sometimes transported captured populations to Egypt to
serve as laborers. Thus, one of the results of his victories in Canaan-Syria
was a large supply of corvée labor that could be set to work on public
works projects.
Thutmose’s building program speaks volumes about his adminis-
trative ability. Egyptian bureaucracy was labyrinthine from ancient times,
and at the center of it was the king. The king owned the entire country,
and its bureaucracy grew as a means of collecting and redistributing
Egypt’s produce on behalf of the king.18 Under Thutmose, the size of
the bureaucracy greatly increased. One indication of its expansion is the
number of tombs constructed for new government officials: during the
New Kingdom the number of these tombs was four times greater than
those for any preceding dynasty. Many of the bureaucracy’s new officials
were the king’s military comrades, who appear to have regularly occupied
numerous administrative bureaus. This said, its appears that the highest
government offices—vizier, overseer of the seal, high priest of Amun,
and overseer of the granaries—remained in the hands of the professional
bureaucracy, which the powerful traditional elites of the country still
staffed.19
Thutmose’s administrative responsibilities were different and con-
siderably more difficult than those of his predecessors. The wars against
the Hyksos and the need to reestablish control over Nubia had led to a
gradual centralization of administrative authority in the hands of the
pharaoh, but much power remained decentralized until Thutmose III’s
reign. The need to conscript, train, and equip a large army and a new naval
arm and keep both in the field required centralized planning and control
over all national resources. While the trend toward centralization was
already evident under earlier kings, Thutmose’s large-scale and almost
constant wars accelerated and increased the trend toward centralization,
turning Egypt administratively into a military state. Although Nubia
had come under Egyptian administration by the reign of Thutmose I,
under Thutmose III Nubia still had to be governed, its goods extracted,
Warrior Pharaoh h
its garrisons staffed and repaired, and its occasional revolts suppressed.
Further, the great expansion of the Amun priesthood and the remarkable
building program, with all that entailed regarding extracting resources and
conscripting labor, required constant attention. Thutmose also needed to
administer the Egyptian military and economic presence in Canaan while
at the same time attending to the threats from Syria and the Mitanni. Unlike
any of his predecessors, Thutmose had to govern an imperial realm, and
he proved an excellent administrator equal to the task.
The centralization of pharaonic authority permitted a revolution in
agriculture, no small achievement in a country where seven million people
had to be fed and the army in the field or in garrison supplied.20 Key to
increased agricultural production was a device called the shadouf, a long
beam supported by two stakes that is weighted at one end and has a bucket
at the other. After dipping the bucket into a water source, the weighted
beam is used to raise the bucket and empty it into an irrigation channel
higher than the water source. Although the Hyksos first introduced
the shadouf, it does not seem to have come into widespread use until
Thutmose’s reign. At the same time, the old wooden plough made of two
bent handles that were fastened to the horns of oxen was replaced by a
lighter plough with more upright handles that a team of men could draw.
These two innovations resulted in more efficient and extensive agricultural
production during the New Kingdom.
Early Years
The son of Pharaoh Thutmose II by a concubine named Isis, Thutmose
III was probably born in 1504 BCE. Pharaoh’s great wife and half-sister,
Hatshepsut, produced only a daughter, Neferure.21 It is probable that
Thutmose, while still very young, was married to his half-sister, Neferure.
Marriages to sisters and half-sisters were common among the royalty of
Egypt since the bloodline of succession was held to follow the female line.
Marriage to these royal blue-blooded females was sometimes a means of
legitimizing the rule of a nonroyal who had been appointed to succeed a
pharaoh who had died without a male heir. The difficulty was, however,
that it also permitted powerful male cousins outside the normal line of
succession to raise claims to the throne by arranging a royal marriage.
Thutmose I had become pharaoh in exactly this manner by marrying the
10 h Thutmose III
sister of his predecessor, Amenhotep I, who had left no surviving male

heir. So, too, did Thutmose II, who was born of a nonroyal mother but
married Hatshepsut, the daughter of Thutmose I and his royal wife
Ahmose. Thutmose II died while his son, Thutmose III, was still an infant.
Although his son was recognized as pharaoh from this early time, real
power passed to Queen Hatshepsut, who governed as regent.
In the normal course of things, Thutmose III would have remained in
the care of his mother until he was five or six years old and been permitted
to scurry about the palace compound stark naked, as was the Egyptian
practice with all young children, including the children of the nobility
and high government officials. Early on, his head was shaved except for a
thickly braided side lock, the Horus lock, that symbolized his youth and
adolescence. When a boy turned five or six years old, responsibility for his
education passed to the father, who saw to it that the child attended the
private academies or was instructed by private tutors. Although his sire
was dead and his stepmother-aunt held the throne, Thutmose received the
usual education for a child of his age and rank.
We are lacking the details of his early adolescence, but it seems
reasonable that the boy-king was sent to one of the temples, a House
of Life, or perhaps the scriptorium of the temple at Karnak, where he
would have been taught to read and write, first in the common hieratic
script and then in the more complex system of hieroglyphics.22 Egyptians
valued literacy highly. They believed that writing, or what they called
the divine words, was an invention of the god Toth, who taught it to
the Egyptians as a divine gift. Egyptians learned much more than basic
literacy in the temples’ instruction houses, however; Thutmose would
have also been exposed to the books of the temple library, including the
historical accounts of his predecessors’ accomplishments.23 When stu-
dents of the upper classes reached age twelve, they were required to
choose a profession and received additional instruction in literary works,
poetry, essay writing, medicine, law, science, architecture, astronomy, and
mathematics. Egypt was one of the most populous and complex societies
of the ancient world and required skilled managers and professionals to
make it run smoothly.
It was probably around this age that Thutmose was apprenticed to
the priesthood at the temple of Amun at Karnak. The young man would
Warrior Pharaoh h 11
have been placed in the care of the priests to oversee his further education.
Thus, it would not have been unreasonable that the priests should have
encouraged Thutmose to become one of them. Such encouragement may,
perhaps, even have come at the instigation of the queen and her advisers,
who might have reckoned that the priesthood was an ideal place to
imprison her rival for the throne. So much the better if the boy were to truly
follow the religious life. For a few years after his circumcision, Thutmose
served as a priest of Amun at Karnak. The experience made him deeply
devout for the rest of his life.
An Egyptian boy became a man at age twelve or thirteen, a time of
great importance marked by the ceremonies of shaving the Horus lock
and of undergoing circumcision. The origins of the Egyptian practice of
circumcision are quite obscure and very old, perhaps reaching back to the
earliest days of man’s original settlement in Egypt. There seems to have
been no particularly religious significance to the practice, only a strong
social one to mark those men of the nobility as superior to and apart from
the other social classes. Among the lower classes, however, circumcision
may have been part of the military ritual of induction. The ceremony might
have marked the soldier-recruit’s commitment to serve the pharaoh, or
the warrior god.24
One can imagine Egypt’s greatest soldier enduring the rite of cir-
cumcision as a young man. For the usual nobility, Egyptian physicians
operated with the traditional flint knife. But given Thutmose’s royal
blood, the court physician would have used the star knife, a special scalpel
fashioned from nickel steel extracted from meteorites that had fallen to
earth. Portrayals of the procedure show the physician kneeling in front
of the young man, who is standing. Sometimes others grip the boy and
support him should he be rendered unconscious by the pain. One portrait
shows what might have been the manner in which Thutmose, a future
king, dealt with the pain: we see a young man standing rigidly straight
with one hand placed on the physician’s head and the other on his own
hip in a gesture of calm as he endures the pain without complaint. The
ceremony was performed before a gathering of relatives and friends, so
a young man’s performance on that special day might well mark him as
strong and brave or as a weakling for life.
12 h Thutmose III
We do not know exactly when Thutmose completed his temple

education and went to the army for military training. It may have been
a year or so before he reached his age of majority of sixteen years when
Queen Hatshepsut appointed him commander of the army.25 There are no
records that tell us about Thutmose’s training as an officer in the imperial
army at the Stable for Military Education. But whatever his experience,
he valued it as most important to forming his character and made certain
that his son Amenhotep II was sent to the army at an early age to harden
his character. Thutmose was so pleased by his son’s performance that he
directed a number of stelae to be made detailing the achievements of his
son’s military training and early career. From these records we are able to
obtain some idea of what Thutmose’s own military training might have
been like.
The training of an Egyptian officer was rigorous and physically de-
manding. It required familiarization with all combat arms of the fighting
force. Amenhotep’s stelae tell of his experiences with the infantry, chariot
corps, and what seems to have been his favorite arm, the archers. He
endured poor food—march rations comprised sour milk, fish with salt,
hard bread, and a canteen of water—and forced marches and had to row
boats. The Egyptian army held regular field exercises in which young
officers participated, and during jousts, mock combats, and weapons
competitions, they could demonstrate their skills to their superiors.
Thutmose’s introduction to military life likely first involved learning
the skills of the infantry, the largest combat arm of the army and its true
arm of decision. The roughest and most disciplined of the infantry were
the nakhtu-aa, or the “strong-arm boys.” These tough, disciplined shock
troops were armed with the bull hide shield; the dja, or short spear; the
kopesh, literally the “goat’s leg” or sickle-sword; the cast bronze penet-
rating socket ax; and the ta-agsu, or dagger. Life in the infantry has never
been pleasant, and it was no less so in the Egyptian army of Thutmose’s
time. One surviving document offers a soldier’s view of life in the Egyptian
infantry:
Come, let me tell you how he goes to Syria, and how he marches
over the mountains. His bread and water are borne upon his
shoulders like the load of an ass; they make his neck that of an
ass, and the joints of his back are bowed. When he reaches the
enemy he is like a trapped bird, he has no strength in his limbs. If
he comes home to Egypt he is like wood that is worm-eaten and
becomes bedridden.
If Thutmose’s experience was anything like that of his son, the young
pharaoh trained and became familiar with a range of infantry weapons,
just as ground officers must do today. Perhaps he spent some time training
with the kenyt-nesu, or the King’s Braves. These fellows were the Egyptian
equivalent of the U.S. Rangers, elite special operations units of heavy
infantry used especially for rushing head-on against difficult positions.
Like modern special operations units, the Braves were made up of soldiers
who had distinguished themselves in battle. Hardened veterans all, their
entry was by merit only.
Service with the light infantry would have gained the young prince
an appreciation for the archers—the megau, or “shooters”—and how to
coordinate their employment with infantry and chariots. Experience
with the archers would have also taught the young officer how to use the
composite bow to good effect. Egyptian archers and charioteers carried the
same bow, an instrument of Hyksos design constructed of a central wood
core with thin strips of horn and leather laminated around the belly. The
bow was 1.3 meters long, and when drawn to the ear, it could send a reed
shaft fletched arrow with a bronze arrowhead through an ingot of copper
three fingers thick. Powered by a string of twisted gut, this composite bow
was a formidable weapon in a trained soldier’s hands. For protection,
both archers and spearmen wore textile armor and helmets. The elite
infantry and the charioteers wore body armor fashioned of 2-millimeter-
thin bronze plates sewn in overlapping patterns on a leather jerkin. One
can imagine how uncomfortable and hot the young pharaoh must have
found this equipment. But then again, military life was a long way from
the comforts of the priests’ temple at Karnak or the royal palace.
The chariot corps seems to have been Thutmose’s favorite arm of
battle, and he used it to good effect when he became commander in chief.
But he was still a long way from that day, and before it came he had to
learn to master the chariot and use his weapons while racing over the
ground at combat speed. Chariot training began with learning to drive
14 h Thutmose III
a small cart with thick wooden wheels pulled by a single horse, usually
some retired warhorse that had survived many battles and had a mind of
its own when it came to working with young officers. The cart was very
difficult to steer, and attempting to hit anything with the bow even at low
speed was a challenge. Once having mastered the heavy cart, the trainee
moved to a lighter vehicle and, finally, on to the combat version of this
remarkable fighting machine. Thutmose would have been given his own
chariot and driver, and then, when proficient, he may have moved on to
his first command as a kedjen-tepy, or “first charioteer,” in charge of a troop
of ten machines. Just as his son did after him, Thutmose loved military
life and was a natural born leader of men in war. To the end of his life, his
most trusted confidants and closest friends remained those he made in
military service.
The Rise to Power

Meanwhile, Thutmose’s stepmother-aunt, Queen Hatshepsut, governed
Egypt as its true “king.” Although Thutmose had been very young,
perhaps only a nursling, when his father died, he was still recognized as
the legitimate king and dated his regnal years from his time as an infant.
The effective day-to-day governance of Egypt was then left in the hands
of the dead king’s great wife, Hatshepsut, who assumed the role of regent
for the young Thutmose. There were several historical precedents for an
Egyptian queen to assume the role of regent. Hatshepsut’s own mother,
Ahmose, had been regent for the young Thutmose II for several years.
Before that Ahhotep, the mother of Ahmose I, the hero of the Hyksos wars,
had played a similar role.26 But Hatshepsut did something no other female
regent had ever done. When Thutmose was seven years old, Hatshepsut
declared herself king, assumed the entire titulary of a pharaoh, and even
began to dress in male attire, complete with the false beard of Egyptian
royalty.27 The two kings, one male and one female, ruled side by side for
some fifteen years, but Hatshepsut wielded the real authority of office.
No king of Egypt before or since is known to have undergone Thutmose’s
experience in which a female regent actually became king and ruled in her
own right. It was this unique experience that influenced the first twenty-
two years of the young king’s life.28
The question of Hatshepsut’s motives has puzzled scholars for

centuries. It has been argued that Hatshepsut’s assumption of the Egyptian
throne was part of a plot to secure the position until she could pass it on to
her young daughter. None of the Thutmosid kings were blood descendants
of the royal line of Tao, the great king and founder of the Seventeenth
Dynasty. But all the females, including Hatshepsut, were Tao descendants
and had been used to legitimize the line of the Thutmosids through
royal marriage. If preserving the royal line was her goal, it failed when
Hatshepsut’s daughter died while Thutmose was still a young boy. There
were, however, plenty of royal cousins and ambitious men who might yet
mount a claim to the throne based on bloodlines. Hatshepsut may have
been trying to protect young Thutmose from rival claimants by assuming
the throne outright. Her own claim to royal lineage was unassailable, and
as long as she remained alive, no others could raise a credible claim to the
throne.29
Two facts support this interpretation of Hatshepsut’s motives. First,
if she really intended to seize power for her own sake, why did she not
have the young Thutmose killed? Hatshepsut had her own coterie of
court supporters who might have feared their loss of influence and wealth
under a regime led by a new king. Surely an accident could have been
arranged to befall the young prince. Second, why did she send Thutmose
off to the army as a young boy and when he reached his majority at age
sixteen then appoint him commander of the army, a position from which
he could easily have threatened her? She even trusted him to command
her armies on campaigns in Nubia and Gaza. It would have been a foolish
sovereign indeed to place the instrument of her own destruction in her
rival’s hands.30
If Hatshepsut was protecting Thutmose, why then did she not step
down as king when he reached his majority or, if she still had any doubts
about his ability, after he had proved himself as a competent general on
the battlefields of Nubia and Gaza? There is, of course, no way to know.
Perhaps it was part of the queen’s grand design all along that she would
continue to look after Egypt’s internal affairs while Thutmose led the
military campaigns against Egypt’s enemies.31 And this may have been
what happened. From the time of his majority at age sixteen until he
16 h Thutmose III
became king in his own right at age twenty-two, there is no evidence that
Thutmose asserted his claim to the throne with any vigor, if at all.
Hatshepsut ruled Egypt with Thutmose for twenty-two years (1504–
1482 BCE), all but seven of which as a king in her own right. Her reign
is noted for constructing a substantial number of public works buildings
and monuments, including her great mortuary temple in the Valley of the
Kings, and for sponsoring the famous trade expedition to the land of Punt
(Somalia), the record of which is preserved on her temple’s walls. She also
contributed to the expansion of the great religious complex at Karnak.
Under her reign, Egypt was well governed and without civil turbulence,
and the general impression from the surviving records is it was a time of
general prosperity and peace.
Early in her reign, however, Hatshepsut ordered a military foray
into southern Canaan either to put down a small revolt or to deal with the
banditry of the Apiru. Later, but still early in her reign, she seems to have
personally led a major military expedition into Nubia. One surviving text
describes the queen herself as present on the battlefield and supervising
the collection of booty.32 These events suggest that Hatshepsut was an
active pharaoh in both the domestic and foreign arenas and that she was
clearly aware of and concerned with events and developments beyond
Egypt’s borders.
While we still ponder Hatshepsut’s motives for serving as king,
the circumstances surrounding Thutmose’s accession to full kingship in
1482 or 1481 BCE remain unclear. It has been suggested that Hatshepsut
had been unwilling to resist the encroachments upon Egyptian influence
fostered by the Canaanite states. This show of weakness only encouraged
additional attempts, including the powerful Mitannian kings’ use of
proxies to weaken Egypt’s hold on the strategic land bridge. Over some
time, these encroachments had forced Egypt to withdraw most of its gar-
risons to the southern fringe of Canaan itself.33 This move placed Egypt’s
strategic position and commerce at risk, and it might have raised the fears
of the powerful Amun priesthood that the royal revenues and gifts that
were the mainstay of its wealth might be diminished.34 Sometime late
in Hatshepsut’s reign, she sent Thutmose in command of an army to
regain Gaza, long the lynchpin to Egypt’s strategic position in Canaan.
Shortly thereafter, Hatshepsut was forced to send another army under
Thutmose’s command to put down a revolt in Nubia. This campaign took

two campaign seasons to accomplish, indicating that the situation was
serious.35 Egyptian foreign policy and its strategic position were under
assault, and a strong hand was needed to guide the country.
We do not know the circumstances under which Thutmose assumed
his rightful position as sole king of Egypt sometime in 1482 or 1481 BCE
or what happened to Hatshepsut, who then would have been older than
fifty years of age. It is not unimaginable by year 22 of Hatshepsut’s reign
that Thutmose, commander of the army and the rightful male king, found
it appropriate to press his claim to the throne with the support of the
army and court elites and removed his aunt.36 That many of the important
personages of Hatshepsut’s court were permitted to continue in office
under the new regime suggests as much. It may also be that Hatshepsut
had fulfilled her mission to protect the throne for Thutmose, and she
handed over the reigns of power to her nephew as she had planned to
do all along. It is likely that she continued to live for years while retired
from governmental responsibilities.37 There is no good reason to suspect
that she was killed in a palace coup, as some have suggested. Hatshepsut
may have simply reached the end of her life and died. Within six months
of coming to the throne of Egypt, Thutmose III saw Canaan explode in
revolt. Egypt was threatened with another foreign invasion.
Strategist
Thutmose III’s great achievements on the battlefield inevitably lead one
to think of him mostly in military terms, that is, as a great general who
excelled in the art of war. It is certainly true that few generals of the ancient
world can claim a record of battlefield achievement equal to that of the
great pharaoh. Still, there is more to greatness, even military greatness,
than winning battles. Often an appreciation for the political dimension
of war and the personal dimension of leadership give victories on the
battlefield any meaning beyond the body count and the movement of
boundaries. Thutmose knew and appreciated these dimensions of military
performance and demonstrated them often.
Perhaps the most important and far-reaching of Thutmose’s achieve-
ments was how he changed the psychology of Egyptian national character.
In the same manner that Alexander did for the Greeks, he set forth a new
18 h Thutmose III
paradigm that altered the way Egyptians thought about themselves and
their world. For more than two millennia Egypt had been an isolated
society, almost hermetically sealed by its vast desert borderlands from the
great cultural changes that were occurring in the rest of the Levant. Thus,
Egyptians rarely thought about the world beyond these borders. Strange
and little-known lands were of no concern to the land of the gods, the
land that gave the world the concept of resurrection.38 Throughout their
recorded history, Egyptians had lived as if there were no other lands at
all. In all this time one is hard pressed to find any significant examples
of cultural or technological change within Egypt that occurred as a
consequence of contacts with lands and people beyond its borders.
The Hyksos invasion (circa 1650 BCE) and their subsequent 108 years
of occupation provided a shocking awakening to this peaceful view of
things. But even then, the Egyptian leaders’ goal was simply to rid Kemit,
or the “Black Land,” of the invaders and return to their former ways. It
was Thutmose III who first realized that there was no going back. The
strange lands of the Asiatics could no longer be safely ignored. To return
to the past would achieve nothing and only place Egypt at risk once more.
Thus, Thutmose led a closed society into a new era of awareness and
interaction with other cultures. Those of us who remember the uncertainty
that accompanied the end of the era of American isolation after World War
II and the difficulties the United States confronted in adjusting to its new
international role can only marvel at Thutmose’s achievement. It was one
thing for the barely two-hundred-year-old United States to make such a
significant change in its psychological perception of the world. How much
more traumatic it must have been for the Egyptians to abandon their
two-thousand-year-old history and worldview! Thutmose succeeded in
providing Egypt with a new vision of itself and its place in the world, and
that vision remained unchanged in its essentials for the next five hundred
years.
The new Egypt required a new national security strategy to guide
its policy in the changing and hostile environment in which it was forced
to live. Thutmose developed a strategic vision of Egyptian security that
guided Egyptian diplomatic, commercial, and military policy for half a
millennium. In this view, Egypt had no safe borders. Instead, the nation’s
security lay in Egypt’s ability to control the political and military dev-
elopments in Canaan, Lebanon, and Syria. The goal of Egyptian policy

was to prevent any major power or coalition of Asiatic city-states from
assembling an alliance powerful enough to threaten Egypt. This policy
required Egypt’s full involvement in the politics, economics, and military
affairs of the states on the land bridge. Egyptian policy was dynamic
and proactive, requiring preventive and reactive military interventions
in support of political objectives. After the battle of Megiddo, Thutmose
intervened with military force in the area no fewer than sixteen times. His
son, Amenhotep II, was kept busy with one campaign after another in a
similar fashion, as were most of the succeeding pharaohs for the next five
hundred years.
New empires and great powers rose and fell during this time, and
most challenged Egyptian hegemony on the Canaanite land bridge at one
time or another. Two centuries after Thutmose had defeated the Mitanni,
Ramses II fought the Hittite forces to a draw at Kadesh. A century and
a half later, Ramses III defeated the Sea People in a great land and sea
battle at the mouth of the Nile, saving Egypt from the devastation that had
overwhelmed and destroyed every major city from Syria to Canaan. And
so it went, on and on, with Egyptian policy guided by the same national
security goals and strategic vision that Thutmose had forged for Egypt so
many centuries before. It was “a sustained military and administrative
effort unequaled in Egyptian history.”39
Thutmose’s success on the battlefield provides a case study of
those personality traits that make a general great. First and foremost is a
penchant for clear thinking unclouded by ideology or religious precepts.
The battlefield is the most empirical and, thus, most unforgiving place of
a soldier’s existence. Thutmose was a deeply religious man who believed
in and attended to the gods. Yet, when it came to war, he appears to have
assessed situations with a cold, calculating eye. As far as we know, he
fought no wars for ideological purposes. He rarely destroyed the temples
of other people’s gods and then only to make a political point. Second,
Thutmose was a commander who was open to new ideas, and his
inquisitive mind permitted him to find them everywhere. Whether it was
adopting new weapons, using the four-wheeled wagon for the first time in
Egypt’s history, dragging rafts over mountains, or recognizing the value of
naval power to ground warfare, Thutmose was an innovative commander
who carefully considered things large and small. The willingness to accept
20 h Thutmose III
innovation is the mark of a stable, self-confident personality, one who

trusts his own experiences and intellect to make sense of his world. It is,
unfortunately, a rare trait among military men.
The strength of Thutmose’s personality is revealed, too, in his wil-
lingness to challenge the unknown. He moved armies eight hundred miles
from Egypt into foreign territory about which Egyptians knew little. Time
and again he forged ahead into unknown land, trusting in his ability to
learn and adapt to its very strangeness. In the twenty-first century, with so
much of the world known and mapped, it is difficult for us to appreciate
the apprehension such journeys could generate in the ancient mind. These
ventures would cause great trepidation, one suspects, especially for the
Egyptians with their millennia-long history of isolation. To challenge the
unknown requires a strong and confident personality, and Thutmose’s
strength of will was prodigious. It was revealed, for instance, when he
overruled his senior officers’ objections to his plan of advance at Megiddo
and imposed his own tactical vision upon the battle plan. One can only
imagine how many more times the young and adventurous pharaoh
overruled his more conservative military advisers. The risks and scale
of the Euphrates campaign against the Mitanni must have shocked his
generals. It is a maxim of military leadership that an army is an instrument
of a commander’s will. If so, then it is a good idea to have as its leader a
commander who possesses a will of iron, as Thutmose did.
Brilliance, clearheadedness, a sense of risk, and a strong character
are the qualities of a good general, but other qualities must augment them
if soldiers are to willingly follow a commander into battle and risk their
own deaths. No soldier dies for grand strategy or for the glory of his king
or country. Men cannot be managed to their deaths; they must be led.
Thutmose possessed the traits of a good combat commander, including
the all-important willingness to share the risks his soldiers faced, as Thut-
mose did at Megiddo when he personally led his army down a dangerous
narrow track. The lesson was clear: if he made a mistake and the enemy
ambushed the column, he would have been the first into the fight and
the first to die. During the battle itself, Thutmose led the chariot attack
in the center of the line, a place of great danger but also of high visibility.
As every combat officer knows, officers must be seen by their men when
it comes time to fight and die. In every one of his campaigns for which
we have records, Thutmose is portrayed as always participating fully in

the battles.
A great combat commander must also be responsible for his men.
Thutmose seems to have taken great care to be close to his troops and
ensured that they were well fed and well trained. He rewarded bravery in
battle often, and many stories indicate he bestowed gold and other awards
upon brave men. He seems to have taken a special pleasure in presenting
common soldiers with the Fly of Valor, a solid gold housefly on a chain
that was the highest Egyptian decoration for bravery in battle and one
that Thutmose himself introduced. He was one of those great captains of
antiquity who shaped his world in ways that most men of his time could
not have imagined.
The Egyptian Alexander

Thutmose III set in motion a series of events that shaped and influenced
the Levant and Egypt for the next five hundred years, and his reign can be
considered a watershed in the military and imperial history of the entire
eastern Mediterranean.40 In this regard he may rightly be compared with
Alexander the Great, whose achievements served as a turning point for
Greece a thousand years later; however, in numerous instances Thutmose
was even greater than Alexander. For example, Alexander’s father, Philip
of Macedon, built the military establishment and force structure that
Alexander later used as an instrument of his conquest. It was Philip’s
genius, not Alexander’s, that saw the need to abandon traditional Greek
infantry tactics and replace them with cavalry. In Philip’s new tactical
doctrine, infantry was relegated to a platform of maneuver with cavalry
becoming the battle arm of decision.41 Thutmose, meanwhile, had in-
herited only a rudimentary military establishment that was gravely
inadequate to the task of fostering his imperial ambitions. It was Thutmose
who forged the new model army of the New Kingdom, introducing major
reforms in logistics, conscription, weapons, chariotry, and a new naval
arm capable of supporting ground operations far from Egypt itself.42 Had
he not done so, Egypt’s conquest and administration of the eastern Levant
would have been impossible.
The army that Thutmose brought into being lasted almost four cen-
turies without major changes, remaining a reliable instrument of force
22 h Thutmose III
projection in the hands of his immediate successors throughout the rest

of the Eighteenth Dynasty and during most of the Nineteenth. After
Alexander’s death, however, his army proved largely ineffective in
the hands of his successors, whose meager reforms included the use of
lesser-quality infantry and the introduction of the elephant. Alexander’s
successors seem not to have continued his one tactical innovation, the use
of catapults as covering artillery.43
On the one hand, the strategic vision that made Alexander’s vic-
tories possible was not Alexander’s creation. It was Philip’s. It was
Philip who conceived the idea of an attack on Persia and forged the new
military instrument to attempt it. Both men, however, were not motivated
by any calculations of national security or national economic interest,
something that would have required a genuine sense of Greek nationhood
that transcended city-state, clan, and regional rivalries and did not yet
exist. Instead, Alexander was motivated by the traditional Greek ideal
of military glory, with the conquest of Persia being merely the arena in
which personal glory and fame might well be sought. The very nature
of the Greek city-states, with their small populations, paucity of wealth
and resources, and part-time militia armies, made it almost impossible for
long-term strategic goals to be achieved by Greek arms.
Thutmose, on the other hand, created a new strategic vision for
Egypt based solidly in calculations of national self-interest. Unlike Greece,
Egypt already possessed a sense of national identity. Achieving Thutmose
III’s long-term strategic goals made it possible for his heirs to keep Egypt
safe for generations. Thutmose was certainly aware of the millennia-old
Egyptian ideal of the warrior king who protected Egypt from its enemies
and triumphed gloriously on the battlefield. But the search for glory in
Egyptian terms had to be sought in the protection of the nation and its
security interests and not in the performance of a king seeking glory (arete)
for himself alone.
In twelve years Alexander demonstrated his brilliance as a tacti-
cian while fighting four major battles (Granicus, Issus, Arbela, and the
Hydaspes River), four short sieges (Miletus, Halicarnassus, Tyre, and
Gaza), and a number of running bloody battles and sieges with tribal
armies in what is now Afghanistan and India. All the other potential
adversaries—the city-states of the Phoenician coast, Egypt, and key
satrapies of the Persian Empire—surrendered to Alexander without a

fight. Thutmose, by contrast, took part in twenty campaigns in two
distant theaters of operations—Canaan-Syria and Nubia—and ruled for
thirty-two years. Alexander neither governed the empire that he brought
into being nor concerned himself with public works, improvements
in the army, creating a new naval force, foreign policy, diplomacy, and
rebellions. Thutmose had to attend to all these things as well as oversee
the governance of an empire that stretched from Asia to Nubia.
Alexander’s victories were achieved against mostly second-rate
armies and third-rate generals. Persia itself was rotten to the core well be-
fore Alexander attacked it. Indeed, the political assessment that Persia
was corrupt prompted Philip to conclude that only a slight push was need-
ed to make the empire collapse. The Persian army that faced Alexander,
though very large, was ill led, ill equipped, incapable of maneuver or
controlled retreat, and had officers who were selected more for their
political reliability than for their military competence. When Alexander
struck, the Persian army collapsed just as Philip had predicted. Only in
India did Alexander confront competent professional armies, and with the
exception of his battle with King Porus at the Hydaspes River, Alexander
refused to engage them.
The Canaanite armies that Thutmose faced in Canaan-Syria were
professional armies, led by competent commanders who were members
of a professional military aristocracy, and were equipped with the most
modern military equipment of the day: the sickle-sword, body armor, com-
posite bow, penetrating ax, and chariots. Most of Thutmose’s adversaries
in that theater of operations also had the advantages of interior lines along
which to logistically support their field forces and of strongly fortified
cities upon which to fall back and from which to carry on the war even
when defeated on the battlefield. Only in Nubia did the Egyptians face
adversaries who were weaker than they were. Egypt’s ability to prevent
Nubia from obtaining adequate supplies of tin to manufacture bronze
reduced its armies to using bows, arrows, and spears.44 If the greatness of
a field commander is judged by the ability of the enemy he faces—both
the opposing commander and the armies he commands—then compared
to Alexander, Thutmose must rank as the greater field commander for his
success in defeating stronger adversaries.
24 h Thutmose III
Alexander’s victories permitted Greek rule to be imposed on what

was the Persian Empire and resulted in Greek cultural and military
influences replacing the Persian in most of the Levant. This change
ushered in the Hellenistic Age, a period in which Eastern influences in all
areas flooded into the West at a level not seen before, and permitted the
diffusion of new ideas and technologies throughout the Mediterranean
basin. But Alexander’s empire existed in name only, for upon his death
it was divided among his successors into three competing imperial states
that frequently warred against one another. Once this internecine warfare
commenced, Alexander’s imperium came to an end in a practical sense.
Within a generation, the Ptolemies of Egypt, Alexander’s successors,
had become thoroughly Egyptianized to the point of calling themselves
pharaohs. Even the traditional Greek gods were expressed in Egyptian
terms.45 By the battle of Raphia (217 BCE), Egyptian troops outnumbered
Greeks in the Ptolemies’ armies. The rulers of mainland Greece witnessed
the beginning of their empire’s end at the hands of Rome after the battle
of Cynoscephalae (197 BCE) and suffered the coup de grâce at the battle
of Pydna thirty years later. The Syrian branch of Alexander’s empire
fell to the Romans at the battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE. By the time of
Carthage’s destruction in 147 BCE, for all practical purposes the empire
of Alexander’s successors had ceased to exist. By contrast, the empire
Thutmose III created in Canaan, Syria, and Nubia remained the dominant
cultural and military force in the Levant for more than five hundred
years.46 Seen in context, then, Thutmose III was at least Alexander’s equal
as a military commander and a force of history, and in many respects this
Egyptian warrior king was even greater than the Macedonian.
Succession
At the beginning of his third decade of rule, or regnal year 42, Thutmose
was still actively campaigning in Syria, this time against the cities of Kadesh
and Tunip. His program of domestic public works was in full swing, and
the great shipyard at Perunefer north of Memphis was producing the
new seagoing ships to transport Egyptian troops and supplies to Asiatic
battlefields. At the height of his power Thutmose began to think about
the problem of succession. None of the Thutmosids were of Tao blood,
and each had legitimized his rule by marrying a woman of the royal line.
Now Thutmose faced the same problem. As a young boy Thutmose was
probably married to Hatshepsut’s daughter, Neferure, but she died soon
after the union. He then married Queen Satiah, probably of royal blood.
She bore him a son, Amenenhet, who would have been a legitimate heir
had the boy not died around age eight. Thutmose then took another wife,
Meryetre-Hatshepsut, who was a commoner. She bore him four girls—
Nefertari, Isis, Baket, and Meryetamun—and a son, Amenhotep II, who
eventually became heir to the throne.
But just as all Thutmosids before him, because Amenhotep II’s
mother was not of royal blood, the legitimacy of his succession was in
question and raised the ambitions of royal cousins and others who had
married royal women. To forestall any challenge to that succession, in
year 42 Thutmose embarked on a systematic campaign to erase the
official memory of Hatshepsut in all Egyptian texts and monuments. He
attempted to rewrite the account of his reign by carrying out history’s first
great political purge of the official record and deleting Hatshepsut.
Thutmose ordered artisans to remove all representations of Hat-
shepsut in reliefs, texts, cartouches, and wherever else they appeared and
to recut the resulting blank spaces with other images, usually those of
offering tables. Where possible, these spaces were replaced with the names
of the first two Thutmosids and in some instances even with Thutmose’s
name itself. All of the freestanding portraits, sphinxes, and statues of
Hatshepsut were smashed and the pieces buried. Thutmose even ordered
Hatshepsut’s tomb opened and had the body of her father, Thutmose
I, which she had moved to a sarcophagus in her tomb, reinterred in his
original tomb in the Valley of the Kings.47 Thutmose I was the first king
to have been buried there and to have his tomb located apart from his
mortuary temple.
At this time Thutmose’s portraiture took on a new form. Many of
his portraits prior to Hatshepsut’s proscription show him with a round,
soft, almost feminine face fashioned in the image of the ruling queen. Now
Thutmose’s portraits took on a more masculine character and began to
reflect his physical features more realistically. The new portraits stressed
the physical features that the king shared with his father and grandfather
as if to say they, and he, were the legitimate heirs to Egypt and not the
women of the Tao bloodline.48 The idea seems to have been to present
26 h Thutmose III
himself and his male forebears as the true royal line and thus remove any
rationale for a challenge to his son’s claim to the throne.
When he was forty-two years old, Thutmose mounted his last
campaign in Syria-Lebanon. In the last years of the king’s life Amenhotep
II was sent at the head of an army to put down a rebellion in Syria. This
time the population was slaughtered, and the rebellious princes hanged
head down over the prow of Amenhotep’s barge as he sailed up the Nile
to present his father with a great victory. Unlike his father, Amenhotep did
not shrink from slaughter.
Thutmose III spent his last years building temples and indulging his
intellectual interests. Two years before his death, to further strengthen his
boy’s claim to the throne, Thutmose made Amenhotep co-regent, probably
when the boy reached his majority at age sixteen and after having seen
to his military education and giving him experience in war.49 Perhaps
Thutmose remembered his own youthful inexperience and wanted
Egypt’s next pharaoh to be more prepared to deal with the dangerous
world of war and international politics. And then one day the greatest of
the warrior pharaohs was gone, dead from natural causes.
Lo, the king completed his lifetime of many years, splendid in

valor, in might, and in triumph; from year 1 to year 54, third
month of the second season, the last day of the month under the
majesty of King Menkheperre [Thutmose III], triumphant. He
mounted to heaven, he joined the sun; the divine limbs mingling
with him who begat him.
He had lived fifty-three years, ten months, and twenty-six days, and in
his time had changed Egypt forever. For his having lived, the world was
never the same again.
2
Strategic Setting
Egypt
In order to understand Egyptian national defense strategy on the eve
of Thutmose III’s ascension to power, it is necessary to understand the
evolution of Egyptian foreign policy that preceded it. Egypt is one of the
oldest continuous national entities on the planet. Egyptian society of
4000 BCE was formed around province-like entities that the Greeks later
called nomi and that were ruled by individual nomarchs, or chiefs. Over
time, these nomarchs assembled in loose feudal arrangements into two
clusters of kingdoms, Upper and Lower Egypt. Sometime around 3200
BCE the king of Upper Egypt, known variously to history as Narmer or
Menes, united the two kingdoms by force into a single Egyptian state.1 His
successor, Hor-Aha, established the first national irrigation control system
and founded the national capital at Memphis. Thus began the reign of
the pharaohs of the Early Dynastic Period, which lasted for almost five
hundred years.
The social order that evolved was similar to the feudal orders of the
early European Middle Ages. Egypt’s national authority, in the person of
the pharaoh, was constantly at odds with rival local barons (nomarchs)
who provided military forces to the national sovereign in exchange for
local privileges and land. Over time, these rival barons represented a
considerable threat to the national state’s integrity, and Egypt’s early
history was punctuated by periods when coalitions of local barons
virtually controlled the national authority.
27
28 h Thutmose III
The kings from 3100 to 2686 BCE expanded the Egyptian state.
Successful campaigns were launched against Nubia to the south and the
Libyans to the west. Expeditions were also undertaken in the Sinai, and
trade was established with the principalities in Canaan, Lebanon, and
the Jordan Valley. During this period a state bureaucracy was developed,
writing was introduced as a tool of centralized administration, and
political institutions transformed Egypt from an assembly of chiefdoms
into a theocratic state ruled by a pharaoh, who was regarded as divine and
was supported by religious and administrative castes.
Over the centuries, however, the pharaohs of the Old Kingdom Period
(2575–2150 BCE) were able to create a national identity, conscript armies,
fight wars on Egypt’s borders, and develop a national defense policy that
kept Egypt free from foreign invasion and occupation. That geography
isolated Egypt from genuine security threats made this task somewhat
easier. To the west was the vast Libyan desert populated by wandering
nomadic tribes whose occasional forays represented more of a nuisance
than a threat to Egyptian security. To the east were the Sand People of the
Sinai and the Canaanite land bridge whose level of societal organization
and military sophistication were generally low, rendering them incapable
of mounting military operations of sufficient size and strength to challenge
Egyptian security. To the south, the Nubians, or “vile Kush” as they were
known in Egyptian documents for millennia, represented only a limited
military threat. But even here, the cataracts of the Nile helped provide
good defensive terrain from which to resist military incursions. Frequent
conflicts were fought between Egypt and Nubia for thousands of years,
but the Nubian armies’ limited sophistication could not really threaten
Egypt’s existence. To the north the Mediterranean Sea, known to the
Egyptians as the Great Green, presented a strategic barrier to invasion, for
shipbuilding had not yet evolved to build ships that could transport large
numbers of troops across the open sea with any degree of safety. For more
than a thousand years Egypt was under no significant military threat from
outside its borders.
The Egyptian social order was larger, more sophisticated, and more
organized in form and content than almost any other in the region except
the Sumerian civilization of southern Mesopotamia. By 3000 BCE Egypt’s
population was almost 1 million people,2 and its agriculture could support
Strategic Setting h 29
2.1. The Ancient Near East
450 people per square mile.3 Egypt’s destruction would have required a
degree of shock far beyond its traditional enemies’ ability to deliver. Safe
behind its natural borders, mesmerized by its unique theology,4 and well
administered by a highly structured governmental system, Egypt was
almost hermetically sealed off from the larger military and technological
developments occurring in the rest of the Near East, most particularly in
Mesopotamia, where military technology and warfare had reached levels
far more advanced than those in Egypt.
During the Old Kingdom, Egypt pursued a national defense policy
of preclusive security. Egypt focused its efforts on the frontiers to the
south and east, the sources of the two most troublesome threats. A series
of fortresses called the Wall of Princes was constructed along the Isthmus
of Suez and permanently garrisoned. These fortifications were the first
30 h Thutmose III
and last line of defense against the hit-and-run raids of the Canaanites.
To the south, along the First Cataract of the Nile, a series of forts were
also constructed to meet the threat of Nubian incursions. Thus, Egyptian
national security policy was both strategically and tactically defensive.
None of this discussion about Egypt’s defensive posturing is meant
to imply that the Egyptians were unaware of the larger world in which
they lived or that Egypt did not, from time to time, conduct military
expeditions beyond its defensive perimeter. Egyptian governmental
functionaries, mostly trade consulates, were stationed in Canaan, Syria,
and Lebanon, where they conducted trade, gathered intelligence, and
carried out diplomatic activities. It was also Egyptian practice to conduct
punitive military raids beyond their line of forts in both directions to
punish any transgressions of its borders. These operations were never
major campaigns or of long duration, however, and they did not result
in the establishment of permanent garrisons in territory beyond Egypt’s
borders. By the end of the Old Kingdom, the traditional defensive strategy
had worked successfully for almost half a millennium to keep Egypt safe
from foreign invaders.
The problem of national authority versus local barons had occa-
sionally resulted in periods of domestic unrest and instability, and civil
wars precipitated the demise of the Old Kingdom. Events were contained,
however, and at the dawn of the second millennium BCE, Egypt entered
the Middle Kingdom Period (1975–1640 BCE). As national authorities
gained more power over local barons, it was possible to raise larger armies
and conduct a more active and aggressive national defense policy. The
Middle Kingdom saw the development of a new national defense strategy
premised on the creation of buffer zones beyond the walls and forts to the
south and east. This strategy also saw more frequent and larger military
operations into hostile areas. No longer did Egypt merely react to military
threats; now it attempted to preempt them.
Along the eastern border Egyptian armies pressed the security
zone farther out from the Wall of Princes and established a major military
garrison in southern Canaan. From this forward base, the Egyptians
conducted search-and-destroy operations into Canaan proper, on one
occasion reaching as far north as Samaria in north-central Canaan to
reduce the garrisons of the Asiatics. They made no attempts, however, to

permanently occupy strong points in the area of military operations.
In Nubia, Egypt expanded its area of military control almost to
the Second Cataract of the Nile, constructing no fewer than twenty-one
permanent fortresses in the area of operations. This effort was classic
defense in depth, but again the Egyptians did not make any attempt to
colonize the new area. Instead, it was turned into a military defense zone
designed to make it expensive for the enemy to penetrate the Egyptian
homeland. Still reflecting the old policy of strategic defense, the military
used offensive tactics to preempt and protect the buffer zone from enemy
encroachments. The idea was not to take the war to the enemy, however,
but to prevent a large-scale war by preempting his military preparations
and punishing him whenever the need arose.
This national defense strategy worked well for almost three centuries.
Egypt then entered another period of domestic turmoil in which civil war
broke out between local and national authorities. While the Nubian threat
remained unchanged, events in Canaan took a more ominous turn. For
reasons still unclear, the people of the area, known collectively to the
Egyptians as the Heqau Khasut or, as rendered later in Greek, the Hyksos,5
had obtained the superior military technology of the Mesopotamians.
While the Hyksos armies had chariots, horses, helmets, body armor, the
composite bow, and the penetrating ax—all of which the Mesopotamians
introduced to warfare almost five hundred years earlier—the Egyptian
armies possessed none of these combat technologies. The result was a
greatly increased military threat to the Egyptian eastern border as the
Hyksos awaited the opportunity to take advantage of Egyptian domestic
instability. Sometime around 1650 BCE, the Hyksos armies struck.6 With
sudden and devastating military force, they invaded Egypt, pressed
the national army as far south as Thebes, and occupied the fertile delta
region.7 Establishing their capital at Avaris (modern Tanis), they remained
on Egyptian soil for 108 years.8
Egyptian power was driven south to Thebes. Sometime during this
period, the Nubians overran the southern defenses and established them-
selves above the First Cataract. Foreigners then occupied Egypt in the
north and south while Egyptian national authorities occupied only slightly
32 h Thutmose III
more than a third of the country. This period saw great national humiliation
for the proud Egyptians and was one they never forgot. The Hyksos
invasion and occupation had an enormous impact on the Egyptian
national psyche.9 Egypt had gone from a period of security to invasion,
occupation, and national peril in a few short years. Ejecting the Hyksos
and the Nubians from the country and reestablishing Egyptian national
identity became the primary national security goals of the Theban princes.
Even after achieving these goals, though, the fear of invasion remained
permanently embedded in the Egyptians’ national psyche. The result was
a new national security policy built around the aggressive use of military
force to protect the state.
The struggle against the Hyksos required several generations to
succeed, and it began in earnest sometime in the 1550s BCE as the first
great warrior pharaoh, Kamose, conducted a series of wars against the
Hyksos enemy. The Egyptians’ anger against the occupiers was captured
in Kamose’s words to his council, which opposed hostilities. Kamose
understood the role of power in a statesman when he rebuked his
councilors:
Let me understand what this strength of mine is for! One prince

is in Avaris, another is in Ethiopia, and here I sit associated with
an Asiatic and a Negro! . . . No man can settle down, despoiled
by the imposts of the Asiatics. I will grapple with him, that I may
cut open his belly! My wish is to save Egypt and to smite the
Asiatics.10
Having assembled the Egyptian armies under his command at his capital
in the city of Thebes, Kamose began his war of liberation.
Kamose gained some initial success, defeating the Hyksos in a
series of battles, capturing some of the northern towns, and expanding
his control of the Theban ascendancy. He was killed in battle and did
not live to see his dream of expelling the hated Asiatics from Egypt. He
was succeeded by his brother, Ahmose I (1539–1514 BCE), who ruled for
twenty-five years and waged unrelenting war against the occupiers.11
Ahmose succeeded in driving the Hyksos from Egypt and pressed them
back to their strongholds on the Canaanite border. He achieved his goal by
2.2. Geopolitical Situation in Egypt during the Hyksos Period
redesigning the army and reducing once and for all the power of the local
barons. The new Egyptian army became a national instrument with which
to pursue national objectives.
During the war with the Hyksos, Ahmose also conducted holding
and spoiling operations against the Nubians in the south. With the pri-
mary front secured, he turned his armies southward, driving the Nubians
34 h Thutmose III
back behind the First Cataract. At the end of his life, Ahmose had
restored the territorial integrity of Egypt from the Sinai to the Nubian
border, established Thebes as the new capital, redesigned the army into
an instrument of national military power, and passed his achievements
on to his son, Amenhotep I (1514–1493 BCE). Ahmose also founded
the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egyptian kings. Over the next two centuries
this dynasty produced fifteen kings, eight of which were great warrior
pharaohs. Throughout all of Egyptian history, before or since, there has
never been such a long line of talented rulers to oversee Egypt’s security.
Under the Eighteenth Dynasty, Egyptian power extended beyond the
Sinai into Canaan and Syria. The rulers abandoned the old geographically
based defensive strategy and replaced it with a new national defense
policy wherein Egypt attempted to influence events in Canaan through
diplomacy, treaties, and alliances with various small client states. Egypt
developed a sophisticated strategy in which diplomacy, intelligence, and
trade were used to influence the Canaanite states’ behavior and prevent
the emergence of any rival coalition with sufficient strength to threaten
Egypt itself. Behind the diplomacy and commercial inducements was
Egypt’s new modern army, a powerful and mobile instrument of force
that could be used to coerce rival states, go to their aid to protect them,
and, if need be, to attack any rival coalition of forces that diplomacy failed
to prevent. Although military garrisons and strong points were sometimes
constructed within the client states as a guarantee of the Egyptians’
commitment, for the most part there was less reliance on fortifications and
more on the army’s ability to move and strike quickly with overwhelming
force. Using political, economic, and military assets in the service of clear
national policy goals aimed at preventing the rise of a rival military power
was a masterpiece of policy integration. Later, Thutmose III gave full
expression to this new national defense policy, with the result that he set
in place an Egyptian Empire supported by military power that lasted for
more than five hundred years.
Egypt’s new security strategy was partially dictated by a change in
the nature of the threat the empire faced. The Sand People of the Canaanite
land bridge, whom the Egyptians continued to view as the descendants
of the hated Hyksos, had matured to the point where they constructed
sophisticated and powerful military establishments and fortifications.
These circumstances, when taken together, meant that the armies of

the small states of the area, especially in coalition, were dangerous and
powerful instruments that had to be dealt with if Egypt was to be secure.
At the same time, new and more powerful kingdoms were emerging.
The most proximate threats came from the Mitanni, who occupied the land
beyond the Great Bend of the Euphrates in northeast Syria and whose
client states extended south and west to the Litani River into southern
Syria and modern Lebanon. To the northwest the powerful and danger-
ous Hittites were also beginning to appear as major players on the inter-
national scene. Both states eventually became competitors with Egypt
for hegemony in Syria. The key to the dominance of Canaan, and thus
to protecting the Nile, was the ability of Egypt to control events in Syria.
The larger city-states of the area, particularly Kadesh, Qatna, and Tunip
on the Orontes River, could affect Egyptian influence considerably. It is
testimony to the sophistication of the Egyptians’ strategic thinking that
they realized that the defense of the Nile began far away in the mountains
of Syria.
As noted earlier, the waning of Egyptian influence among the client
states of Canaan marked Queen Hatshepsut’s reign. The unclear line of
royal authority also created domestic difficulties in Egypt. During this
uncertain time, the king of Kadesh led a coalition of states and attempted
to take advantage of Egypt’s domestic political difficulties while the
states of northern Canaan also began to maneuver for political advantage.
The king of Kadesh saw an opportunity to increase his influence in the
key Syrian zone and to weaken Egyptian influence in northern Canaan.
These maneuverings did not go unnoticed by the Egyptian diplomatic
and intelligence services. Once Thutmose’s grip on power was secure,
he moved immediately to restore Egyptian power in the critical strategic
platform of central Canaan. The result was war.
The Land of Canaan

From 1800 to 1550 BCE climatic conditions improved on the Canaan
land bridge and cultural development flourished, permitting the people
of Canaan to rebuild their old cities into powerful, new, fortified urban
centers. During this time both the first written documents in Canaanite
appear and Canaan as a recognizable entity with its own culture can
be said to have come into being.12 Egyptian documents from the time
36 h Thutmose III
of Senusret II (1897–1878 BCE) tell of a previous era when a number of

independent Canaanite kingdoms ruled by warrior princes from fortified
towns grew into city-states that challenged Egypt’s power in the area. Of
these early Canaanite fortified towns two of the more famous were Sodom
and Gomorrah. We can deduce from the famous Egyptian story of Sinuwe
and his travels in Canaan and Syria that during this time Canaanite society
was based on tribes, and each was ruled by a warrior chieftain (melik) who
held his position by virtue of being the tribe’s fiercest warrior. These chiefs
maintained household guards (henkhu) as part of their personal retinues,
which constituted their main combat elements in tribal wars.
The name Canaan is very old and in antiquity denoted that territory
between Gaza in the south and the upper reaches of Lebanon north
to Ugarit. To the east the land of Canaan ran to the base of the central
mountain massif of later Judah and Samaria and then north through the
Jezreel Valley to include the Beqqa Valley up to Kadesh. Later Canaan was
subject to the passage of a group of warrior tribes, originating somewhere
in northern Syria, that moved over the land bridge until they entered
Egypt itself. They settled in the Nile Delta near Avaris and defeated the
Egyptians by force of arms. These people were the Hyksos. While their
origin remains uncertain, undoubtedly these militarily sophisticated
people introduced their military technology to Canaan, where the rival
princes of the Canaanite city-states adopted it.13 The origin of the Hyksos’
sophisticated equipment is uncertain as well, but it might have come from
the technology of the Mitanni-Hurrians of the Upper Euphrates.
The military influence of the Hyksos, and later the Mitanni, brought
a number of new weapons to Canaan that revolutionized warfare on the
land bridge. From the Hyksos the Canaanites acquired the horse-drawn
chariot as a new weapon of war. The composite bow, socket ax, and the
sickle-sword also made their appearance in Canaan at this time.14 The coat
of mail used as body armor also came into use at approximately the same
time, but at first it was probably worn only by the armed charioteer. Later,
we find Canaanite infantry wearing body armor as well.
The Canaanites’ new military sophistication during this period
was reflected in another development when the Canaanite cities changed
the nature of their military fortifications. Canaanite princes began
constructing their cities atop a new kind of massive rampart, a slanted
bank of packed earth called a glacis. The glacis joined an exterior ditch,
or fosse, that obstructed the most likely avenues of approach. During this
time Canaan had extensive contacts with the Mitanni-Hurrians, and likely
they became the predominant influence on the Canaanites’ method of
war. The Mitannian influence on the new architecture, for example, is also
seen in two powerful cities in northern Syria, Carchemish and Ebla, which
used the same fortifications.15
The influence of the Mitanni-Hurrian culture during this period
was strongly reflected in the transformation of Canaanite society itself
into one derived from the Mitannian model. In Canaan a feudal warrior
noble caste based on heredity and land possession came into existence.
As in the land of the Mitanni, these warriors were called maryanna, and
like their Mitannian cousins, they were an elite group of chariot warriors.
This elite ruled over a half-free, Semitic-speaking class of peasants and
farmers (khupshu) without a middle or merchant class in between.16
There is some evidence that the feudal barons were of non-Semitic stock,
another similarity with the Mitannian social order. The transformation of
Canaanite military technology and social organization produced a society
able and willing to fight wars, especially in resistance to the aspirations of
the great powers to the south (the Egyptians) and to the north (the Hittites
and the Mitanni).
The presence of foreign influence did not prohibit the Canaanite
princes from fortifying their important cities and towns. The entire
country was heavily fortified even though an independent king or chief
ruled each city-state. Although there was no Canaanite high king to direct
it, the countrywide Canaanite fortification design was so well integrated
as to suggest at least some degree of cooperation among the princes. The
purpose of these fortifications was to protect the lucrative trade routes
that crisscrossed the country, linking it to Syria and Egypt, and to protect
Canaan from the predations of migrating nomadic tribes. Taken together,
the system of fortifications was designed to permit the Canaanite princes
to mount a mobile defense in depth, using mounted chariot warriors.
Only as a last resort did Canaanites permit themselves to be besieged in
their cities.
Illustration 2.3 portrays the Canaanite strategic defense system. Each
of the major fortified cities served as a base for chariot units to disrupt
38 h Thutmose III
2.3. Canaan: Strategic Passes, Roads, and Fortifications

and neutralize an enemy threat. Hazor, the largest of Canaanite cities

whose kings ruled over all of northern Canaan, sat astride a key road
junction that controlled the route leading to Damascus and the Lebanon
ports. Megiddo controlled the access to the Jezreel Valley from the coastal
road—known as the Way of Horus to the Egyptians and the Via Maris
to the Romans—leading east to the Transjordan. Beth Shean was located
at the far eastern exit of the Jezreel Valley and controlled the entrance to
the Jordan plain, blocking the logical route of the migrating desert tribes.
Shechem, in the middle of the country, controlled the crossroads of the
lateral routes across the land bridge. Closer to the coast sat Gezer, which
presided over the southern junction of two ancient trade routes—the Way of
Horus connecting Egypt and the main road leading inland up to Jerusalem
and the gateway to the central mountains. And Jerusalem itself, situated
on the northern central ridge, controlled the north-south route running
along the spine of the mountains. It also sat astride the continuation of
the road leading from the Mediterranean Sea east into Jordan.17 Operating
either independently or in concert, depending on the size and nature of
the threat, the Canaanite princes were able to mount a fierce defense of
their territories from these strategically located urban fortifications. From
a military point of view, the city-states of Canaan represented a formidable
defensive array against Egyptian encroachment.
The Mitanni
The people known as the Mitanni appeared on history’s stage for only a
short time, perhaps less than two centuries, before disappearing forever. In
that period the Mitanni built a powerful nation around which swirled the
great power conflicts of the armies of the Near East from the fourteenth to
the twelfth centuries BCE. The Egyptians, Assyrians, and Hittites were all at
one time or another allies or enemies of the Mitanni. The latter’s geographic
position astride the main trade, transportation, and communication routes
of Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt forced it to play the role of balancer
among the great powers in order to preserve its own security. The Mitanni
occupied the area of the northern Euphrates plain, or the steppe between
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The Assyrians called this area Hanigalbat,
a term that became synonymous with the Mitanni. It encompassed the
area of what is today southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, and northern
40 h Thutmose III
Iraq, or approximately the area corresponding to Kurdistan. Its capital,

Washukkanni (Ushshukana), probably lay at the head of the Khabur River
Valley. From here the power of the Mitanni spread eastward over the
east Tigris region and Assyria, where it reduced the country to vassalage.
All the Assyrian kings between 1500 and 1360 BCE were vassals of the
Mitanni,18 and there is evidence of Mitannian military units stationed in
Assyria at this time.
To the north, Mitannian power held sway in the ancient land of the
Urartu, or modern Armenia.19 In the northwest the borders of Mitannian
influence touched on Anatolia, the land of the powerful Hittites, and
for more than a century tension and frequent wars marked the relations
between the two nations. Northern Syria to the west marked the point
where Mitannian power rubbed against the northern frontiers of the
Egyptian empire and where, at one point, Mitannian influence ran to
the Litani River and the city of Megiddo.20 For more than two centuries
northern Syria was the hub of great power politics and the place where the
influence of three powerful states—that of the Hittites, the Egyptians, and
the Mitanni—collided and rubbed each other raw.
With few natural boundaries protecting their homeland, their routes
to sources of strategic metals and materials terminating in hostile territory,
and hostile powers surrounding them, it is not surprising that the Mitanni
became skillful warriors as their Hittite and Egyptian adversaries did. For
two centuries the Mitanni kept Assyria under its heel, stationing troops
throughout the country to secure its loyalty. Early in the seventeenth
century BCE, the Mitanni invaded the land of the Hittites and inflicted a
major defeat. From that time forward, the Mitanni consistently intervened
in Hittite domestic politics, provoking civil wars among Hittite vassals
and aiding foreign tribal people in their conflicts with Hittite rulers.
The Mitanni forged alliances with powerful vassals along the Hittite
homeland’s borders to form a ring of buffer states that would keep Hittite
power contained beyond the Taurus Mountains and the Cilician Gates. In
Syria, Mitannian diplomacy aimed at establishing alliances with powerful
city-states such as Kadesh, Tunip, and Aleppo, whose rulers saw these
alliances as a counterweight to Egyptian influence there. It was just such
a Mitanni-inspired coalition that sought to test the mettle of the new
Egyptian king at Megiddo.
Thutmose III’s policy of expanding Egyptian power to the Orontes

River succeeded in pushing the Mitanni back across the Litani River. Over
the next century, however, a rough parity between Egyptian and Mitannian
influence in Syria developed so that during the reigns of Amenhotep II
and Thutmose IV (1479–1400) the two nations signed a mutual assistance
treaty directed at containing Hittite ambitions in northern Syria.21 With
the ascent of the religious fanatic Akhenaten to the Egyptian throne (1353–
1336), Egypt turned its attention elsewhere and proved to be a weak reed
in upholding its military obligations under the treaty. With Egypt on the
sidelines, the Hittites saw their chance to drive the Mitanni from Syria.
The origins of the Mitanni are uncertain but seem closely related
to the history of the Hurrians, about whom we know only slightly more.
The Hurrians are first mentioned in the Amarna letters (diplomatic
correspondence) and again in the Bible (Genesis 36:20–30), where they are
called Horites. The Hurrian language is neither Semitic nor Indo-European
but seems vaguely related to the Asiatic group whose nearest relative is
the language of the Urartu. It is likely then that the highlands of Armenia
are the original homeland of the Hurrians.22 The Hurrians appear to have
been a people given to migration or clan travel, and there is evidence that
colonies of Hurrians had been extant in various parts of Mesopotamia
for millennia. For example, evidence shows a Hurrian element in ancient
Sumer before 2000 BCE, and during the Akkadian period that followed a
Hurrian community appears to have been in the area of the Upper Tigris
from which it migrated into the Fertile Crescent proper.23 By 1800 BCE, the
Hurrians were a majority in the Syrian town of Alalakh, situated between
Aleppo and Antioch, and a century or so later they were a majority in
northern Iraq itself. During this time they occupied the city of Gasur,
changed its name to Nuzi, and adopted the language and customs of the
former Semitic community there.24 After 1600 BCE, the Hurrian element
became dominant in northern Syria.
Hittite texts dating from the middle of the seventeenth century BCE
record a major attack on the Hittite homeland by a people called the Hurri,
but the texts suggest that they were not yet a unified people established
in a single homeland but instead a confederation of people organized
along clan lines. Probably around this time a warrior caste of Aryan
(Indo-Iranian) dynasts imposed themselves upon the Hurrian people and
42 h Thutmose III
became a new aristocracy in command of war and the government.25 By

1550 BCE, Hittite texts report a major Hurrian-based kingdom, then known
as the Mitanni, had been established east of the Euphrates River while
other smaller Hurrian states were also extant in northern Syria at the same
time. During this period the Mitanni established their dominance over
Assyria and became a major competitor to Hittite and Egyptian influence
in Syria. While the Assyrians called this powerful kingdom of the Mitanni
Hanigalbat, the Egyptians called it nhrn (Akkadian for “river”), which
was rendered as Naharin.
Just when and how the Hurrians were eclipsed or subsumed under
the people who called themselves Mitanni are uncertain. One widely
accepted idea is that the Indo-Aryan Mitanni were equipped with the
horse chariot, and that weapon permitted them to rapidly conquer the
area. Another view is that the Mitanni were an Indo-European people of
the Russian steppe.26 That the Mitanni were of Indo-Aryan origin seems
probable, however, in that their gods and several of their famous kings,
including Tushrata and Mattiwaza, have names that are linguistically of
Indo-Aryan origin. Wherever the Mitanni came from, there is no dispute
that by 1500 BCE or so (and perhaps earlier) the Mitanni had imposed
themselves as the new leaders of the Hurrian state. The name of the Mitanni
king, Paratarna, appears around 1480 BCE, by which time Mitannian
influence is already evident as far south as Qatna and Ugarit.
What did the Mitanni bring to the Hurrian society that permitted
them to rise to such heights of power and prestige? Two answers suggest
themselves. First, the Mitanni seem to have imposed themselves upon
the Hurrians relatively peacefully and to have adopted the culture of the
land they entered. Their main contribution seems to have been to intro-
duce a new form of political and social organization that was more effec-
tive at mobilizing and employing resources for war.27 The organizational
pattern was a familiar one among Indo-Aryans; that is, a strong king was
drawn from a great family and tied by blood to his vassals, who acted as
a council of advisers. This system also permitted a council of elders and
perhaps an assembly of free men (warriors) from the tribe to act as advis-
ers, and their consent may have been required for the king to undertake
certain tasks.28 The Mitannian system was not unlike that found earlier
among the Hittites, whose origins are, like those of the Mitanni, obscure
and involve the superimposition of a new warrior caste upon the then
extant Hatti society.
Second, the Mitanni were probably the first to truly exploit the
horse as an instrument of war, most particularly using it with the spoked-
wheel chariot as a combat vehicle. They did not, of course, introduce the
horse to Mesopotamia, where it had been known from at least the Sum-
erian period. During the Akkadian period the animal was known as sisu
in Akkadian.29 It is likely that the Hurrians first used the horse as a draft
animal for agricultural purposes, even before the migrations. What is clear,
however, is that the spoked-wheel war chariot made its first appearance
among the Mitanni sometime soon after the their arrival in the Hurrian
land, or about circa 1600 BCE. Almost simultaneously, the war chariot
appears in Kassite Babylonia, among the Hittites and the Hyksos, and
a short time later among the Egyptians. The validity of the Mitannian
claim as being the first to use this weapon can be deduced from the era’s
Hittite texts, which recount the story of Kikkuli of the Land of the Mitanni
whom the Hittite king hired to instruct his army in the breeding and use
of horses.30 H. M. F. Saags suggests the evidence is sufficient to award the
claim of this chariot’s first use, if not outright invention, to the Mitanni.31
Whatever the case, the war chariot’s appearance as a major weapon of war
in the Near East coincided closely with the arrival and emergence of the
Mitanni in the former Hurri states. While neither the horse nor the chariot
can be attributed to the Mitanni with certainty, it is highly probable that
the Mitanni were the inventors of and first to use the chariot system, an
innovation that changed the face of battle among the armies of the Near
East for the next thousand years.
Nubia
The land the Egyptians called Ta Nehesy from time immemorial extended
south from the First Cataract of the Nile near modern Aswan to the Fifth
Cataract, some four hundred miles as the crow flies but closer to six
hundred miles by boat. We know almost nothing certain about the ethnic
constitution of the country, its social structure, or its political order.32 All
that we can reasonably discern is that Nubian society seems to have been
made up of various small kingdoms ruled by local chiefdoms. From time
to time a high chief emerged who was able to assemble several of these
44 h Thutmose III
kingdoms into a larger political-military order and bring their combined

troops to bear against Egyptian incursions. But these larger entities usually
did not persist for very long. The country was not highly urbanized, and
even those areas closest to the Egyptian border had few towns of any size.
Egypt was originally attracted to Nubia for chiefly economic reasons,
and from the Twelfth Dynasty Period Egypt fortified and controlled
northern Lower Nubia (Wawat) and competed with the Kingdom of Kerma
for influence in Upper Nubia (Kush). The Egyptians built fortresses and
troop garrisons to exert their influence over the region. Nubia’s economic
resources included large amounts of alluvial land that supported extensive
farming and animal production, resources that permitted it to support
a relatively large population. Nubia’s eastern desert was the source of
substantial gold deposits, and the country was also the source of such
highly desired trade goods as ivory, ebony, and panther skins.33 The rich
grasslands south of the Third Cataract produced great quantities of grain
and other cereals. Later, under Egyptian occupation, Nubia became an
important source of wood, and there is evidence that the Nubians produced
ships for the Egyptians, although it is likely that these were small river
craft for moving trade goods rather than Egyptian naval vessels.34
While Egypt and Nubia had engaged in running skirmishes for
centuries, Nubia presented no strategic threat to Egyptian security until
the period of the Hyksos invasion. When the Hyksos began occupying
the Nile Delta in the north, a powerful new kingdom emerged below the
Third Cataract in the Dongola reach centered on the town of Kerma.35
Taking advantage of Egyptian weakness, the military forces of Kerma
moved north into Upper Egypt itself, destroying its temples, towns, and
forts.36 The Nubians established close ties with the Hyksos in the north,
squeezing Theban Egypt between them. When the Theban prince Kamose
mounted his attempt to eject the Hyksos from Egypt, the Hyksos appealed
to the Nubians to attack Thebes from the south. The Hyksos’ letter to the
Nubians was intercepted, and Kamose moved troops to close the eastern
desert caravan route around Thebes. The incident revealed the strategic
threat from Nubia, and before marching north against the Hyksos,
Kamose moved south to drive the Nubians back beyond the First Cataract.
Kamose likely moved his army overland through the desert rather than
up the Nile by boat and struck the Nubians’ position from the rear.37
2.4. Egypt and Nubia

46 h Thutmose III
The Egyptians marched south as far as Buhen, recaptured the fortress

there, and established a defensive line to contain any further Nubian
encroachments to the north. From this time on, Egypt always regarded
Nubia as a potential strategic threat as well as a region to be exploited
economically; consequently, wars and invasions occurred sporadically in
the area over the next eighty years.
When Ahmose succeeded his brother to the Theban throne, the situ-
ation in Nubia had already been stabilized. Ahmose turned his attention
to the task of driving the hated Hyksos from Egypt while Egyptian forces
in Nubia went over to the strategic defensive to prevent further incursions
into southern Egypt. In the later half of his second decade of rule, after
driving out the Hyksos, Ahmose moved against Nubia. He established
new political and economic institutions in Lower Nubia to incorporate
the area into southern Egypt proper. He then marched beyond Buhen
and reached the Second Cataract, defeating the Nubians as he went. With
this area pacified, Ahmose moved farther south and put down a series of
disturbances and revolts between the Second and Third cataracts.38
Amenhotep I, Ahmose’s son, continued to put pressure on Nubia
and invaded the land to extend Egypt’s boundaries. The problem he
encountered was the Kingdom of Kush. Amenhotep moved his army
overland instead of by boat, swung hard east, and then attacked Kush from
the rear.39 Thutmose I followed up with another major military incursion,
this time reaching as far south as the Fifth Cataract and chasing rebels and
hunting down desert raiders. The campaign was a combination of search-
and-destroy and clearing operations but extended too far from its base,
and no attempt was made to hold the land south of the Third Cataract.
Thutmose did manage to establish firm control over Upper Nubia and
divided the territory into five administrative regions, each controlled by
a local chief whose loyalty was sworn to Egypt. The system broke down
when some of the chiefs failed to prevent rebellions, and early in his
reign Thutmose II was forced to send an army into the area to put down
the disturbance. That the pharaoh himself did not lead the expedition,
however, suggests that the problem was not serious. Nonetheless,
Thutmose II imposed a new administrative structure on Nubia, so by the
end of his reign all of Upper and Lower Nubia had been amalgamated
into the Egyptian state and was now peacefully administered.40
Events in Nubia during the joint reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose

III are unclear, but it is likely that Hatshepsut was forced to send troops
into Nubia no fewer than four times to put down disturbances of one
sort or another.41 There is evidence that the queen herself accompanied
one of these forays, suggesting that the Egyptians regarded these events
as important.42 On one of these forays it is possible that Thutmose III
commanded the operation. Whatever the nature or extent of the Nubian
problem, by the time Thutmose III assumed his sole occupancy of the
Egyptian throne, the situation was sufficiently stabilized so that he could
turn his full attention to the problems facing Egypt in Canaan.
Later in his reign, Thutmose ordered the construction of many for-
tified settlements, temples, and forts in Nubia and imposed a regular
economic and administrative structure on it so that the country was thor-
oughly integrated into the Egyptian political and economic system. In
Thutmose’s regnal year 42, he led a demonstration of force expedition
down the Nile that reached the Fourth Cataract, where he erected the
famous Gebel Barkal stela. In regnal year 50, he led a large force farther
south and reached the Fifth Cataract. The Egyptians never fully controlled
the area south of Gebel Barkal, however; minor incidents occurred there
frequently. But from Gebel Barkal to the north, Nubia was strongly tied to
Egyptian power and culture, so much so that within a few hundred years,
the people of the area came to think of themselves as Egyptians. Anthony
J. Spalinger sums up Thutmose III’s achievements in Nubia correctly when
he says, “If Thutmose III is famous owing to his Asiatic warfare, he ought
to be equally renowned for effecting the final pacification of Nubia.”43

3
The Antagonists
Pharaoh’s Army
A definable military organization first emerged in Egypt during the
period of the Old Kingdom (2575–2150 BCE).1 Although united in a single
kingdom, Egypt’s political order was fragmented, and local nomarchs
remained sufficiently powerful to obstruct pharaonic power. The nomarchs
raised and maintained their own military forces and often controlled
strategic resources and important trade routes. The situation was similar
to feudal Europe, where the power of the king depended on his ability to
control his local barons.2
The national army arose from the pharaohs’ needs to defend the
state against Libyan and Nubian raiders and to deal with the nomarchs’
periodic revolts. Pharaoh’s army consisted of a small standing force of
several thousand regular troops organized in the manner of household
guards. Egypt introduced conscription, levying one man in ten to service
each year, but even then the nomarchs provided these troops.3 The best of
the conscripts went to the army, where the small force of regular officers
organized and trained them. Others were sent to labor battalions. Nubian
auxiliaries in the pay of the king augmented the standing armies.4
The army mostly comprised militia units organized under the local
nomarchs’ command. These barons were required to provide specific
troop levies to the pharaoh during times of emergency. In normal times,
however, the troops were raised, trained, and kept at the local level.
The political relationship between the king and the local rulers largely
49
50 h Thutmose III
determined if and how many troops would be made available for dealing
with national problems. A large number of conscript troops levied under
the system of national conscription did not go to regular combat units.
Instead, these soldiers received some military training and were used
to garrison the frontier forts and furnish corvée labor for public works
projects. It is unknown how long the term of service for conscript soldiers
was, but apparently soldiers remained with local militia units for some
time after completing their initial period of national service.
The organizational structure of the army of the Old Kingdom is
unclear, but it is evident that distinctions were made between regular
officers and men of other ranks. A number of military titles appear for the
first time, including those of specialists in desert travel, frontier and desert
warfare, garrison troops, frontier troops, quartermaster officers, and scribes
who seem to have functioned as senior noncommissioned officers.5 There
are also titles that refer to “overseers of arsenals,” “overseers of desert
blockhouses and royal fortresses,” and “caravan leaders.”6 The army’s size
remains a mystery. Weni, a commander in the army of the Sixth Dynasty
(2345 BCE), recorded that his army was many tens of thousands strong.7
A string of twenty mud brick fortresses was built around approximately
2200 BCE to guard the southern approaches to Egypt, each requiring up
to three thousand men to garrison. This number suggests an army of at
least sixty thousand in the frontier force alone.8 With Egypt’s population
approaching two million at this time, these force levels could have easily
been achieved.
The Egyptian armies of the Middle Kingdom (1975–1640 BCE)
became more structurally articulated as Egypt struggled through periods
of anarchy and the weakening of its centralized authority, which eventually
emboldened the Hyksos to invade and occupy the territory. This period
saw a constant tug and pull between the pharaohs and the nomarchs who
still controlled their feudal armies. The pharaohs retained their standing
armies, which were augmented by conscription, and still employed Nubian
auxiliaries. Then a clearer command structure emerged with the pharaoh
acting as a field commander on major campaigns and with general officers
in charge of safeguarding the frontiers and managing logistics. There were
also clearer distinctions among junior officer ranks and titles.9 Titles appear
for commanders of shock troops, recruits, instructors, and commanders of
The Antagonists h 51
retainers, or personal bodyguards of the king. The title of assault troop

commander appears for the first time. The progression in rank for junior
officers began with a command of a unit of seven men, then to a company
of sixty men, and finally to a unit of a hundred men.10
The proliferation of formal titles during this period implies that
the army’s administrative mechanisms had become more complex. For
the first time there is evidence of a military intelligence service, which is
reflected in the title Master of the Secrets of the King in the Army.11 The
army also seems to have organized troops on the basis of their experience
and age. Names and titles appear for companies and regiments, although
the strengths of these units are not known. Terms for bowmen, garrison
troops, police patrols, district officers, and military judges make their
appearance. While the army of the Middle Kingdom appears more for-
mally organized than that of its predecessor, it is difficult to determine to
what extent this difference may be a function of the survivability of their
records more than anything else.
By 1700 BCE the centralized government of Egypt began to lose
ground to the rebellious nomarchs, and the national army proved in-
sufficient to control them. Taking advantage of the disarray, the Hyksos
invaded Egypt sometime around 1650 BCE and established themselves
for more than a century as the rulers of Lower Egypt. One of the more
intriguing military mysteries of the Hyksos is how they were able to over-
whelm the Egyptians so quickly. Much of the answer lies in their ability
to bring effective military technology to bear on the battlefield, technol-
ogy that was unknown in Egypt at the time. The Egyptian army was an
infantry force organized into units of bowmen, spearmen, and axmen.
By contrast, the Hyksos army was an army of mobility and firepower.
The centerpiece of the Hyksos field army was the composite bow archer
mounted on the horse-drawn chariot, and their infantrymen were equipped
with helmets, body armor, sickle-swords, and socketed penetrating axes.12
These weapons conveyed a decisive military advantage, especially when
wielded by the Hyksos military professionals.
These new weapons must have terrified the Egyptian soldier. While
the Egyptians were forced to anchor their positions with exposed infantry
formations, the Hyksos archers could kill them from a distance with their
composite bows, whose range exceeded that of the Egyptians’ simple
52 h Thutmose III
bows by two hundred yards. Egyptian formations were immobile while

the Hyksos mounted chariot charges from all directions. The psychological
impact on the Egyptian soldiers of facing the horse must also have been
significant, for the horse was generally unknown in Egypt. The Egyptian
blade ax was no match for the killing power of the penetrating ax, and
without body armor the sickle-sword took a heavy toll in close combat.
The Hyksos established their capital at Avaris (modern Tanis) and
then captured the Egyptian capital of Memphis. For the next century they
controlled most of Lower Egypt while Upper Egypt remained largely in
the hands of the Theban princes.13
The wars of liberation Kamose and Ahmose waged brought pro-
found changes in Egyptian society and its governing institutions. For the
first time a truly professional military caste came into being. Amenhotep
I, Ahmose’s son, instituted the practice of awarding landed estates to his
battle-hardened officers and thus began a professional officer corps to lead
the national military establishment. These military families retained the
land grants from generation to generation only so long as they continued
to send at least one son into career military service.14 The army rid itself of
the local militias, reorganized its structure, and became a genuine national
force based in conscription. The local militias continued to exist, but the
nomarchs lost the ability to withhold troop levies from the king. Over the
next thirty years the Egyptian army completely changed its weapons and
tactics. First, all the weapons of the Hyksos—the chariot, composite bow,
penetrating ax, sickle-sword, helmets, and armor—were incorporated into
the Egyptian army. Great improvements in the chariot’s physical design
and the tactical doctrines that governed its use on the battlefield were also
implemented.15 The combination of the composite bow archer mounted
on the improved chariots produced one of the most important military
revolutions in ground warfare yet seen in the Near East. The result was
a modern fighting machine, which Thutmose III used to create the Egyp-
tian empire.
Modernizing the Egyptian military establishment took some fifty
years and could begin only after the Hyksos had been driven from the
country. Even then, it proceeded slowly. The Hyksos’ occupation of the
Nile Delta made it impossible for the Theban princes to adopt the superior
weapons and technologies of the occupiers.16 By controlling the trade
routes to Canaan and Syria, the Hyksos denied Egypt access to the sources
of strategic raw materials from which the new weapons and machines
were manufactured. Producing bronze weapons required expensive and
rare tin that had to be imported from merchants in Canaan and Syria,
and as long as the Hyksos controlled the Egyptian ports and overland
routes to Canaan, they could deprive the Theban princes of this precious
strategic material. Different woods required to manufacture chariots also
had to be imported. Ash for chariot frames, axles, and felloes; maple for
the floors; elm for the wheel spindles and yokes; and bark from the silver
birch to waterproof the glued joints and leather that held the machine
together all had to be imported from Syria and Anatolia. Composite bows
were also made from imported goods like ash and birch bark, which was
used to waterproof the laminations of the weapon.17 Further, while there
is some evidence that the horse was used in Egypt before the invasion,18
their presence in large numbers and their use as implements of war
resulted after the Hyksos’ invasion.19 With the Hyksos limiting overland
trade, however, they prevented the Egyptians from obtaining horses in
any significant numbers. To modernize its armed forces, Egypt would
first have to break the Hyksos’ stranglehold on Egyptian trade routes and
obtain access to important strategic materials.
The armies of Kamose and Ahmose that drove the Hyksos from
Egypt were not state-of-the-art military machines; instead, they were
the traditional infantry forces armed with the same weapons the armies
of the Middle Kingdom used. The next army, that of Amenhotep I, also
showed little change in its weaponry and no evidence of chariots, except
to mention them as vehicles for transporting the pharaoh. The same held
true for Thutmose I’s army, although he likely was the first pharaoh to
begin seriously reequipping the army with modern weapons and vehicles.
The process of acquiring and adopting new military technologies required
much more than simply gaining access to raw materials. It also required
a knowledge of their manufacturing methods; the availability of suitably
skilled craftsmen, which, in the case of the Egyptians, meant finding and
importing foreign craftsmen; a political or social need for the new tech-
nology; and a suitable strategic context that supported operational plans
and strategies within which the new technologies would be used.20 These
54 h Thutmose III
requirements were not immediately fulfilled in Egypt when the Hyksos

left, and they took considerable time to develop.21
The departure of the Hyksos did not likely immediately improve
Egyptian access to strategic raw materials, for instance. The Canaanite
city-states, some of which had maryannu elites imposed on them by the
retreating Hyksos, could hardly have seen it in their interests to supply
the Egyptian colossus with the materials and the technical knowledge
from which their own destruction might be fashioned. More likely it took
years before the needed materials made their way in sufficient quantities
to Egyptian military workshops. One of the reasons for Thutmose I’s raid
into Canaan and southern Syria may have been to demonstrate Egyptian
power and to stimulate the flow of strategic materials from the Canaanite
city-states. Moreover, Egypt had to find the monetary resources to pay
for these expensive materials. Perhaps gaining access to its gold mines
pressed the Egyptians to attack and occupy Nubia almost immediately
after they drove the Hyksos from Egypt. Without a new strategic vision
and operational doctrine that defined how the new weapons were to be
employed, the Egyptian military’s modernization would have also been
slowed.
Until Thutmose II’s reign, Egyptian strategy had been occupied first
with ejecting the Hyksos and second with reestablishing Egyptian control
of Nubia, both of which were accomplished with traditionally equipped
Egyptian armies. While it must have been obvious that bronze weapons,
armor, and the composite bow increased the Egyptian infantry’s combat
power, it was by no means clear that the chariot would do so as well.
Egypt proper was not particularly well suited to chariot warfare. Except
for a few places in the Nile Delta, there were no wide-open plains upon
which to maneuver as there were in Canaan and Syria.22 Once beyond the
narrow fertile belt, which was crisscrossed with streams, irrigation canals,
villages, and ditches, the Egyptians encountered mostly rocky plains and
desert. The same topography is found in Nubia. Military movement in
Egypt then was best accomplished via boat up and down the Nile and not
overland by oxcart or chariot. For millennia the Egyptians referred to their
navy as the army because it provided the army’s strategic and tactical
transport until the military services were separated under Thutmose I.23
It is always interesting to ask if technology follows a paradigm shift

or if the reverse is the case. By the reign of Thutmose II and his immediate
successor, Hatshepsut, the process of Egyptian military modernization was
still incomplete and unsupported by a new strategic doctrine to underpin
its implementation. As long as Egypt remained a strategically defensive
power, the relatively small existing military establishment, equipped
with bronze weapons but without large chariot squadrons, would suffice.
When Thutmose III came to power, he provided a new strategic vision and
shifted the Egyptian strategic paradigm from defense to offense.
In this new strategic perspective, Egypt’s defense required the mil-
itary and political subordination of the city-states of Canaan and Syria.
Given the nature of these enemy forces, which were equipped with bronze
weapons and armor; of their fortified cities; and of the open terrain, which
would require rapid movement and maneuverability to dominate it,
Thutmose also required a newly structured military force. To achieve its
strategic goals the new army would have to be larger, better equipped, and
better organized logistically to carry out expeditionary campaigns almost
without rest. Garrisons had to be constructed and manned, the professional
cadre expanded to organize and train large numbers of conscripts, and
new administrative roles had to be created and staffed. Transporting
Egyptian forces by sea also required expanding and modernizing the
navy, meaning Egypt needed new shipyards and a large shipbuilding
program. Egypt also had to secure the sources of important strategic
materials and establish thousands of new workshops manned with skilled
craftsmen to produce the necessary modern weapons and war machines
in substantial numbers. While the army’s restructuring program probably
began under Hatshepsut and incorporated previous improvements in
supplying new weapons, most of the credit is owed to “the military genius
of Thutmose III.”24
Thutmose III’s strategic vision brought about another important
development, the Egyptian imperial navy. Egypt could not hope to bring
Canaan and Syria under its control if it had to move its army overland
each time that control was threatened by a revolt. The overland march
had numerous disadvantages. It was 350 miles long, took a high toll on
the army’s men and machines, was difficult and expensive to support
logistically, conceded the tactical initiative to the enemy, and took too much
56 h Thutmose III
time, sacrificing any possibility of surprise. In addition, the transit time

through Canaan reduced the effective campaign season to such a degree
that the Egyptian army would be incapable of conducting sustained
operations against the Mitanni across the Euphrates.25 Maintaining per-
manent troop garrisons of sufficient strength in Syria was expensive and
probably not possible in terms of manpower. To achieve Egypt’s strategic
goals in Canaan and Syria, then, Thutmose had to find a way to move his
army quickly into the zone of operations and to do so at a low cost.
Thutmose’s solution was to transport his army by ship along the
Canaanite-Lebanon-Syrian coast, land it in secure harbors logistically
prepared in advance, and then strike inland against his adversary. Instead
of invasions, Thutmose planned to conduct rapid expeditionary operations.
The Egyptians had been sailors and shipbuilders from time immemorial
but only on the Nile and never on the open sea. The navy had been an
integral part of the army until Thutmose I and had considerable experience
in transporting troops and equipment over long distances up and down
the Nile. The wars against the Hyksos and the conquest of Nubia had
been successfully achieved with naval operations transporting troops to
the battle areas, sometimes over distances of more than a thousand miles.
To fulfill Thutmose’s mission, however, the navy had to construct more
and larger ships, to learn how to transport and unload horses, and, most
important, to learn how to sail upon the Mediterranean Sea.
Early in his reign, Thutmose ordered the expansion of the military’s
presence at the new town of Perunefer (literally, “good sailing” or “bon
voyage”), which was located on the western edge of the old Hyksos
capital of Avaris and on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile leading to the open
sea.26 A large army, logistics, and naval base was constructed there and
became the main operational base from which troops and equipment were
transported to carry out military operations in Asia.27 A large dockyard
for building ships was established, and the Egyptians began to construct
new and larger ships, including seagoing horse and troop transports.28 Six
years after Thutmose’s attack on Megiddo, he transported his army by
sea, landed on the Lebanon coast, and attacked Kadesh, conducting the
“first great amphibious operation in history.”29 Over the next three years
Thutmose gained control of numerous Lebanon port cities, converting
them into safe harbors and logistics bases for future expeditionary oper-
ations. From this time forward, Egypt had no rival for control of the coastal
Mediterranean region.30
The new Egyptian national army was raised by conscription, with
the levy being one man in ten instead of the traditional one man in a
hundred.31 It was trained by professional officers and noncommissioned
officers, and the pharaoh himself stood as commander in chief and per-
sonally led his troops in battle. The vizier operated as the minister of war,
and an army council served as a general staff. The field army was organ-
ized into divisions, each of which was a complete combined-arms corps
that included infantry, archers, and chariots. These divisions contained
approximately six thousand men, including logistics and support per-
sonnel, and each was named after one of the principle gods of Egypt.
Later Ramses II organized Egypt and the empire into thirty-four military
districts to facilitate conscription, training, and the supply of the army.32
The army’s administrative structure was also improved, with professional
schools established to train and test officers and scribes in the military arts.
The two major combat arms of the Egyptian army were chariotry and
infantry. The chariot corps was organized into squadrons of 25 machines,
each commanded by a charioteer of the residence, who was equal to a
modern company commander. Larger units of 50 and 150 vehicles could
be rapidly assembled and employed in concert with other forces.33 It was
common practice to assemble units whose size depended on the nature of
the mission and terrain, an example of the modern practice of tailoring a
unit to a specific function. Supporting the chariot corps logistically were
staffs to procure and train horses and craftsmen to maintain and repair
the machines. Egyptian divisions also had mobile chariot repair units to
ensure the vehicles’ operability when the army was in the field. That the
pharaoh was often portrayed as leading a chariot charge suggests that the
chariot forces were the status elite of the army, if not its primary combat
striking arm.
It is paradoxical that in an age of bronze the most innovative and
destructive weapons of the day, the chariot and the composite bow, were
made entirely of wood. The Egyptian chariot of the New Kingdom was
constructed of a light wooden frame, covered by stretched fabric or hide,
and weighed about seventy-five pounds.34 Two men could easily carry
the vehicle over streams and rough terrain. On the march, however, it
58 h Thutmose III
was common to remove the wheels and transport them on donkeys, and
human porters carried the much lighter chariot bodies. The chariot’s floor,
which supported the rider and archer, was made of stretched leather
thongs covered with hide or matting and fashioned in the shape of a D. A
surviving example of this floor matting was made from a special kind of
cloth involving a dense layer of long loops. The springiness of the looping
helped cushion the riders in the shaking vehicle.35 The cab was 1 meter
wide, 1.25 meters high, and 0.75 meters deep. Two horses, usually geldings,
pulled the vehicle, which was attached to a central yoke pole attached to
the horses by outer races and reins. The vehicle was capable of reaching
the speed of a galloping horse, or about twenty-five miles per hour, but at
that speed the chariot was an unstable firing platform for the archer. The
combat speed of the chariot was more likely in the range of eight to twelve
miles an hour, which was slow enough to provide the stability the archer
needed. Experiments have shown that at this speed the archer could hit
his targets more than 80 percent of the time.36 Belly bars and leg straps
helped steady the riders at high speed. Arrow and spear quivers and an ax
were attached to each side of the cab for easy access in battle.37
By the reign of Thutmose III the Egyptians had modified the char-
iot into the finest fighting vehicle in the ancient world.38 The chariot
workshop was probably the most complex manufacturing facility in
the ancient world because of the diversity of materials involved and the
wide range of technological skills required.39 Some of the manufacturing
techniques needed for chariot construction were already known in Egypt
before the Hyksos invasion. As far back as the Twelfth Dynasty, Egyptians
had learned how to steam and bend wood to make bows.40 They were
excellent carpenters and expert at lathe turning and using mortise and
tenon joints. Egyptians were also practiced leather-workers and weavers
of weft-loop textiles before the Hyksos arrived. The Egyptians’ familiarity
with these basic techniques may have reduced their learning curve when
constructing chariots and led to innovations in the machine’s design.
Three major innovations in chariot design may be credited to the
Egyptians: the position of the axle, the six-spoked wheel, and the U-joint
connecting the yoke pole to the chariot cab. They were the first to move
the axle to the far rear of the carrying platform, thereby increasing the
vehicle’s speed, stability, and maneuverability.41 They also introduced an
improved wheel. Hyksos chariot wheels had four spokes. As the wheel
rolled over the ground, the spaces between the rim and the spokes flexed at
the top and bottom-most positions, causing an inherent washboard effect
of up-and-down movement that was quite pronounced even on smooth
ground.42 This flexing increased the wear on the axle and hub that, in turn,
caused the wheel to slant outward. At speed, the four-spoked wheel had
a tendency to break under this side load.43 The chariot with four-spoked
wheels was neither very fast nor very maneuverable and did not provide
a stable platform for the archer when in motion.
We cannot be certain that the six-spoked wheel was an Egyptian in-
vention, but it seems likely.44 The six-spoked wheel reduced the washboard
effect considerably for having more spokes stabilized the wheel rim. Also,
by using spokes that were elliptically shaped (not round) and tapered
from the hub to the wheel rim, they were ideally oriented to resist the
bending movements of side loads, further reducing axle wear.45 A chariot
with six-spoked wheels was thus much more stable at speed and ran less
risk of having side loads collapse its wheel in a turn.46
Egyptian chariots’ U-shaped socket joint can be counted as one of the
great inventions of ancient engineers. The tail of the yoke pole bent under
the chariot body, where it was not firmly attached to anything but loosely
nested in a U-shaped socket joint. The socket permitted the screwdriver
blade–shaped end of the pole to slide back and forth and tip from side to
side. It always kept the pole centered on the axle and smoothed out the
roughness of the chariot’s horizontal motion by allowing the pole to key
the position of the axle to the position of the yoke.47 Thus, the axle was
held closely to the horizontal at all times by the pole’s flat blade even
when bouncing over rough ground. At the same time the U-socket helped
dampen the vehicle’s rotational displacements about its pole, greatly
reducing the machine’s tendency to roll over in a turn.
Taken together, these technical advances produced a vehicle that
was fast, stable, and highly maneuverable, and it required less frequent
repairs than the chariot bequeathed to Egypt by the Hyksos. If, as the
evidence suggests, these advances occurred during Thutmose III’s reign,
then the Egyptian chariots had a significant operational advantage over
the Canaanite-Syrian chariots, which lacked these advances during
Thutmose’s campaigns in Canaan and Syria. Originally the chariot was
60 h Thutmose III
3.1. Egyptian Chariot
little more than a slow-moving, fragile platform for archers. With the
Egyptian advances in chariot design, the vehicle acquired new tactical
functions. It could be used to engage the enemy with arrows at long range
while closing to deliver shock in massed formations. Once the enemy was
engaged at short range, axes and javelins were brought to bear. After the
enemy force was shattered, the chariot could be used in lethal pursuit,
and its archer could kill with the bow.48 The Egyptian chariot combined
the innovative dimensions of shock, lethality, and mobility, making this
weapon the only one in ancient armies that could participate in all phases
of the battle—the movement to contact, engagement, and pursuit—with
equal killing power.49
Egyptian infantry was organized into 50-man platoons commanded
by a “leader of 50.” A Sa, or company, contained 250 men in five platoons
plus a commander, quartermaster, and scribe. Each company was
identified by the type of weapon it carried: swords and spears, axes, and
bows.50 Units were further identified as being made up of recruits, trained
men, or elite shock troops. The next higher unit in the chain of command
was the regiment, commanded by a standard-bearer, although we are not
certain of its strength. Above the regiment was the Pedjet, or “brigade,”
composed of 1,000 men who were commanded by a captain of a troop.

This rank was also assigned to a fortress commander and may have been
a general officer or senior colonel rank. A typical Egyptian field division
was organized into five Pedjets, three heavy infantry brigades, and two
archer brigades.
Egyptian infantry regiments were organized into axmen, archers,
and sword and spear infantry (see illustration 3.2). The latter carried
shields and six-foot-long spears. Their task was to protect against and
3.2. three types of egyptian infantry
Egyptian axman
Egyptian archer
Egyptian heavy infantryman

62 h Thutmose III
disrupt hostile charges aimed at the chariot units. The infantry, the true
arm of decision in Egyptian tactical thinking, fought in formations five
men deep with a ten-man front in fifty-man platoons. These units could
quickly form marching columns ten men wide, providing a degree of
tactical flexibility in infantry employment. The division contained special
elite infantry units as well. The kenyt-nesu, or King’s Braves, appear to have
been the Egyptian equivalent of elite special operations units of heavy
infantry used especially for overcoming difficult positions. Like modern
special operations forces, the Braves were made up of hardened infantry
veterans who had distinguished themselves in battle. Membership was
by merit only.
Egyptian light infantry comprised mostly archer units called megau,
literally “shooters” and “slingers.”51 Egyptian archers and charioteers
carried the same composite bow. Constructed of a central wood core with
thin strips of horn and leather laminated at the belly and protected by
birch bark covering, the composite bow was 1.3 meters long and came
in two types, recurved and triangular.52 When drawn to the ear, it could
send a reed shaft fletched arrow with a bronze cast arrowhead through an
ingot of copper three fingers thick. The bow was powered by a string of
twisted gut and was a formidable weapon in the hands of trained infantry
or chariot-borne archers. Both archers and spearmen wore textile armor.
Elite infantry and charioteers wore body armor fashioned of 2-millimeter-
thin bronze plates sewn in overlapping patterns on a leather jerkin.53 The
bronze helmet that Canaanite and Mitannian soldiers favored does not
appear to have gained wide use in the Egyptian army probably because of
its weight and its tendency to get unbearably hot. Even Thutmose’s famed
Blue War Crown was not made of bronze.
The addition of 500 chariots organic to the field division brought the
Egyptian division to approximately 5,500 fighting men with a supporting
force of between 700 to 900 technicians, carpenters, quartermasters, scribes,
logisticians, intelligence officers, and so on for a total of more than 6,000
soldiers. To place the logistical burden of the chariot corps in perspective,
one need only consider that 500 chariots require 1,000 horses with 250
in reserve. A horse consumes twelve to fourteen pounds of hard fodder
(grain) and fourteen to sixteen pounds of green (grass) or dry (hay) fodder
a day. In addition, horses need between twenty and thirty-five quarts of
water per day and more in hot climates.54 The logistical requirement for a
single chariot brigade therefore was 13,000 to 15,000 pounds of grain and
fodder and 2,500 to 4,000 gallons of water a day to keep the animals in
fighting trim.
A royal prince or important retainer commanded a division, but it is
likely that the division’s day-to-day command and operations were in the
hands of a senior general called the lieutenant commander of the army.
This system is analogous to that used by the German army between 1860
and 1918. The organizational structure of an Egyptian division is portrayed
in illustration 3.3.
The Egyptian army’s well-developed tactics were supported by excel-
lent logistical functions. The use of store cities, depots, resupply by ship,
donkey pack trains, and human porters worked in concert to keep the
army well supplied in the field. Its tactical expertise was increased by a
3.3. Organization of an Egyptian Division in

the Eighteenth Dynasty
64 h Thutmose III
professionally trained officer corps experienced at maneuvering various

types of large units on the battlefield. With careful and integrated use of
field intelligence gathered through patrols and special collection units of
spies, scouts, translators, interrogators, and so on, the Egyptians were
adept at moving large armies over considerable distances and maneuver-
ing them on the battlefield. At Megiddo, for instance, Thutmose moved
his army three hundred miles and arrived outside his objective without
being detected. In his war against the Mitanni, he transported scores of
raft-like landing craft on carts more than three hundred miles and used
them to cross the Euphrates and surprise his enemy. Egyptians also used
counterintelligence and deception to gain maximum surprise. Prior to
the final formulation of battle plans, Egyptians used the commander’s
conference in which officers were urged to criticize the proposed strategy
and offer frank advice. It resulted in sound battle plans.
On the battlefield Egyptian forces usually deployed chariot units to
act as screens for infantry and to cover their maneuver during a movement
to contact. Engaging the enemy with the long-range composite bow, the
chariot archers began killing at a distance as they closed with the enemy.
Archer units deployed ahead of the infantry, firing as it moved to contact.
Once the enemy was close, the archer units retired through the infantry’s
ranks or to its flanks and continued to deliver indirect plunging fire into
the main body of the enemy’s formations. The infantry then closed at a
dead run to maximize shock, and a general melee resulted. Chariot units
engaged the enemy at any exposed point, sometimes dismounting and
fighting as infantry once in contact or using their axes and javelins from
aboard their chariot platforms. If the enemy gave ground, chariots could
be committed to exploit the weakness. The chariot’s mobility allowed the
use of mobile reserves that could be committed at a propitious moment to
turn a flank or exploit a breakthrough. It offered a military capability that
had never existed before in military history. If the enemy broke and a rout
began, chariot archers could engage in rapid pursuit with devastating
effectiveness. If tactical surprise had been achieved, chariot units could
engage an enemy not yet fully deployed for battle. If something went
wrong, chariots could then be used to rescue a desperate situation.55
The Egyptian army lacked cavalry formations, an innovation the
Assyrian army would introduce six hundred years later. Egyptian units
did make use of mounted riders as scouts, but they were not used in
battle.56 With the exception of cavalry, however, the warrior pharaohs’
armies of the Egyptian imperial era were in every respect modern armies
capable of conducting operations in a modern manner and on a modern
scale, including mounting seaborne invasions and using naval forces in
conjunction with ground forces for supply and logistics. In its day the army
of imperial Egypt was the largest, best-equipped, and most successful
fighting force in the world, and it was Thutmose III who developed it and
bequeathed it to his successors.
The Mitannian Army

Most of our information concerning the military organization of the
Mitanni is derived from two sources. The first and most detailed is the
famous Nuzi archives. Nuzi was the capital of the province of Arrapha
situated on the eastern fringe of the Mitannian Empire, which was
strategically located between Assyria and Kassite Babylonia. The second
source is the rendering of Mitannian chariots and troops that appears
on the sides of the Thutmose IV’s war chariot. The Mitannian state’s
political structure, noted earlier as probably an innovation of the Mitanni
superimposed on the old Hurrian social order, seems to have been im-
posed as well on Mitannian vassal states, turning them into principalities
whose governance and military administration were strongly influenced
from the center. One result was a confusion of names when referring to
the Mitannian state. Thus, in the Nuzi archives there are references to a
“man of the lands” of Hanigalbat, Arrapha, Mitanni, and Naharin, im-
plying that the Mitannian state was a confederacy of powerful sub-kings
linked by fealty and kinship to a central great king, or that the Mitan-
nian kingdom was made up of a central kingdom and a confederacy of
foreign vassal states.57 Usually when different names for the Mitanni are
found in ancient texts, they are used by different countries and may have
been derived from the regions of the Mitannian Empire with which those
countries had most frequent contact. So, for example, the Assyrians called
the Mitanni Hanigalbat in their own language while the Kassites of lower
Babylonia referred to them as Arrapha. The Hittites called them Mitanni,
and the Egyptians Naharin. If the assumption is correct, it is likely that
66 h Thutmose III
Arrapha’s administrative structure described in the Nuzi texts was the

same as found in the other provinces or vassal states of the Mitannian
Empire.
The administrative structure of the Mitannian province reveals a
concern for war as well as for the government. Each province was divided
into districts (halsu), and each of these halsu possessed a fortified capital
and armory. Smaller towns (alu) throughout the district were also walled
for defense. A royal governor (halsuhlu or shakin mati) administered the
province for the king. Originally these governors would have been the
king’s blood kin; however, later they were probably replaced by men
of competence tied to the king by an oath of fealty. A mayor (hazannu)
administered the towns of the district. The countryside was divided into
large estates (dimati) worked by tenants (ashshabu) and owned by a lord (bel
dimtu). The warrior ethos of the Mitanni is reflected again in the fact that
these estates were composed of a few villages and a fortified manor house
or keep for defense.58 The hazannu appears to have had military duties as
well and was responsible for the security of his district. Whether he also
served as a field commander is unknown. Clearly, however, cities, towns,
and estates were required to raise militia forces while the larger cities and
more strategic border towns were often garrisoned by professional troops
of the royal army.
The centerpiece of the Mitannian army was the warrior caste (nakhu-
shshu) of military professionals who were bound by oaths of loyalty to the
king and served at his bequest. The oath was called the isharu (literally the
word of the man of arrows) or ilku. Soldiers were called alik ilku, or “those
who perform the ilku duty.” The elite corps of the professional army
comprised the chariot warriors known as maryanna. The term maryannu
itself means “noble chariot warrior” and derives from the Indo-European
word related to Sanskrit marya, meaning “youth” or “hero.”59 As one might
expect in a country of fortified feudal fiefdoms, the elite chariot warriors
held large estates granted by the king in return for their military service
(not unlike the later European feudal system), although some maryannu
seem to have had a hereditary claim to these estates. There seems to have
been more than one rank of maryannu status tied to military service,
and one suspects that a system of subvassals pledged to the high lord by
oaths of military service sometimes were referred to as maryannu as well.
The term seems also to have been applied to both chariot and nonchariot
warriors and to professional and militia troops.
The organization of the Mitannian army remains unclear. We are cer-
tain that the king possessed a bodyguard of chariotry known as shepi sharri
(literally, the feet of the king), consisting of ten chariots. This bodyguard
originally had its roots in the coterie of the tribal chief’s best warriors
who accompanied him in battle. Later, however, it probably comprised
the country’s leading nobles and advisers rather than necessarily its best
warriors. Much of the army was made up of charioteers, known as alik
seri (campaigners). There must also have been a central force of maryannu
chariotry, for we read of such units being sent to four towns to reinforce
local garrisons. Infantry units (shukuthlu) made up of both spearmen
and archers equipped with swords, daggers, leather armor, and helmets
existed, but we know nothing of their organization or quality except that
the ashshabu were also permitted to serve in their ranks.
Chariot units (emanti) of five or ten vehicles were commanded by an
officer called an emanthuhlu. These units could be grouped into larger units
based on multiples of six (the old Sumerian-Assyrian system) and com-
manded by a “chief” emanthuhlu, who was also responsible for supplying
rations to his men. One of these chiefs is also described as commanding
a garrison, so it is possible that the emanthuhlu applied to infantry com-
manders as well. Other texts refer to officers called rab with the decimal
number of men under their command appearing next to the title. Thus,
rab (5), rab (10), and rab (12) refer to officers in command of units of these
respective sizes. A confusing aspect of the Mitannian military organiza-
tion is that it appears to have used no consistent numerical system as its
base. Thus there are textual references to 3,000 alik ilki (perhaps combined
units of chariots and archers), 536 charioteers, 82 archers, 55 bowmen,
and so on.
There are references to “tablets of the left” and “brothers of the right,”
suggesting that the army had right and left wings, but such a conclusion
is speculation.60 Further compounding the problem of organizational
definition is that estates, towns, and cities were required to raise levies
of militia troops at the king’s request. If the feudal period of later Europe
is any guide, these numbers became meaningless in a practical sense in
that the strength and organization of militia units were rarely standard or
68 h Thutmose III
recorded. That the Mitannian army was well organized can be deduced
from the fact that all its armor, helmets, and weapons were manufactured
in royal arsenals as state industries and issued to the troops in a systematic
manner. When military equipment was worn out or broken, it was turned
in and replaced and repaired at royal expense.61
With the Mitannian army’s chariot corps composed of nobility
and established as the combat arm of decision, it is not surprising that
the Nuzi texts provide more information on this branch of the army than
on any other. Regarding the Mitannian chariot, for instance, the texts say
it was constructed of light wood and hides. One text notes that twelve
goatskins were required to cover a chariot frame and between nine and
eleven sheepskins to cover the floor. This detail suggests, albeit roughly,
that the Mitannian chariot was somewhat larger and heavier than the
Egyptian machine but not as large as the Hittite chariot. Seals depict the
Mitannian chariot with wheels of four, six, and even eight spokes, again
suggesting that some Mitannian machines were quite heavy.62 It was also
regular practice to oil the spokes to prevent the wheels from warping.
A particularly interesting aspect of the Mitannian chariot was that some
of them appear to have been armored with metal scales (sariam). One
inventory mentions a unit of a hundred chariots equipped with scale
armor protection. The depiction of the Mitannian chariots taken from the
cab of Thutmose IV’s war chariot also shows them with armored cabs.
Given that a suit of Mitannian body armor consisting of five hundred
scales weighs approximately thirty-five pounds and calculating the area
of a Mitannian chariot cab to be almost twice the area required to cover
the human torso in scale armor, the cab armor added about seventy-five
to eighty pounds to the chariot’s weight. It was a Mitannian practice to
armor their chariot horses as well. Horse armor (parashshamu) consisted
of a textile coat of thickly woven felt or hair about three centimeters thick
that extended from the withers of the horse to the loins. Sometimes this
textile coat was covered with a leather, copper, or bronze scale overcoat.
A coat of bronze horse armor would easily have weighed more than a
hundred pounds. Add to the cab’s weight the Mitannian chariot warrior’s
usual scale armor suit of approximately thirty-five to forty pounds and his
bronze helmet at another eight to ten pounds, and the load on the Mitan-
nian chariot was considerable. While the Mitannian chariot was far heavier
than the Egyptian machine, it was still lighter than the Hittite vehicle.
What this point suggests is that the Mitannian machine’s design
might have been a compromise forced by two factors: the variable terrain
in which the machine was required to operate and the multiple tactical
roles it had to play depending on the capabilities of the enemy chariots,
Hittite or Egyptian, it had to engage. The Mitannian Empire encompassed
very different types of terrain. To the east, where the Assyrians and
Kassites had to be dealt with, the ground was flat, open, and grassy—
conditions that placed a premium on speed and maneuverability. To the
north and northwest, in Armenia and Anatolia, the terrain was uneven,
mountainous, and forested—conditions that favored the short-distance
attack from an ambush position. In northern Syria as well as farther
south in the Beqqa Valley and Lebanon, the terrain was mixed, requiring
a machine that could serve either role depending on the circumstances.
With each type of terrain came a different enemy whose own chariots
reflected their respective tactical doctrines. The Hittite machine, for
example, was very heavy, carried a crew of three spearmen, and was
designed for short-distance ambush. The Egyptian chariot, by contrast,
was fast, highly maneuverable, and perfectly suited for flat, open ground.
3.4. Mitannian Chariot

70 h Thutmose III
The Mitanni needed a chariot to fight in different types of terrain and to

perform multiple tactical roles, resulting in a machine that was both heavy
and light enough to permit it to perform adequately in all types of terrain
but was probably not able to excel in any of them.
The chariot’s middling performance may have been the reason why
both Mitannian charioteers and their horses wore heavy armor. Their armor
and weapons—two composite bows, two quivers of arrows, a shield, and a
lance—suggest strongly that the tactical role of the Mitannian chariot was
not to fight at close quarters as the Hittites did. Both the bow and lance
were to be used either from afar, as in a movement to contact, or en passant
if closely engaged. Firepower and passing engagement, then, were the two
tactical roles afforded by a moderately heavy Mitannian chariot carrying a
well-armored charioteer. These capabilities could be adequately employed
against the heavy chariot the Hittites used as a mounted infantry platform
fighting in uneven terrain. When fighting Egyptian chariots, the Mitannian
machine gave its charioteer an equal capability in firepower since both the
Egyptians and the Mitanni were armed with the same composite bow.
While the Egyptian machine held advantages in speed and mobility,
the Syrian terrain did not offer many opportunities for battle on flat,
even plains. The heavier Mitannian vehicle, with its far better protected
charioteer, offered greater advantages in delivering shock and increasing
the archer’s survivability both when engaged at close range en passant
and when employed on uneven terrain, which itself could neutralize the
Egyptians’ advantage in speed and maneuverability.
As with any weapon of war, the trick was to employ it properly. In
the hands of an able field commander the Mitannian battle chariot afforded
considerable advantages against different types of enemies, provided one
used the vehicle with proper consideration for the terrain upon which
the battle was fought and the tactical objectives for which the machine
was being employed. Some validity may be lent to the above analysis by
noting that of all the people of the Canaanite-Syrian land bridge, the group
whose chariot was most strongly influenced by the Mitannian design was
the Canaanites. An examination of the various types of terrain in which
the Canaanites had to fight suggests they chose the Mitannian design
for the same reasons as the Mitanni did, that is, its ability to function well
on different types of terrain.
Our knowledge of the Mitannian charioteer comes largely from the

Nuzi archives, and these texts refer to the Mitannian armor as the armor
of Hanigalbat. Scale and lamellar armor appear to have been a Hurrian
invention of about the seventeenth century BCE, and the Mitanni and
everyone else seem to have adopted them in the Near East in a relatively
short time. Evidence for this theory lies in the fact that all the people of
the Near East at this time used terms for armor that were derived from
the Hurrian sharyani (coat of mail).63 This word appeared in Akkadian as
sariam, as saryannni in Hittite, shiryon in Hebrew, and tiryana in Ugaritic
and Egyptian.64
The Mitannian charioteer’s armor consisted of a mail coat with
sleeves and a long skirt covered with individual bronze scale plates
called kursimetu, after the Akkadian kursindu (snake), an analogy to the
reptile’s overlapping scales. The scaled coat and skirt required almost a
thousand scales to fabricate, with the sleeves of the coat requiring another
two hundred scales. Two hundred smaller scales sewed over a leather
cap served as a helmet (gurpisu). Sometimes these helmets had a crest
of plaited leather. The most common helmet found among the Mitanni
and throughout the Near East was the bronze helmet (gurpisu siparri).
Sometimes charioteers shaved their heads and wore a linen or leather cap
beneath the helmet to tighten the fit. The most elaborate helmets were
the great bronze scale helmets (gurpisu siparri kursimetu), which offered
more protection than either the leather or sheet bronze models did.65 The
charioteer’s neck was protected by a high, thick bronze or leather collar,
a typical feature of the suits of armor of this period. A thick leather belt
protected the charioteer’s abdomen and helped him bear the armor’s
weight. The charioteer carried a long dagger (patru) in his belt for self-
defense should he be forced from his machine.
In contrast to both Hittite and Egyptian practice, the Mitannian
chariot driver was equally well equipped with scale armor and helmet.
The driver carried a small shield (aritu) made of wood and sometimes
covered with beaten bronze. Chariot shields seem to have had a double
grip—one could be held in the hand, and another consisted of a pair of
leather straps through which the driver could slip his arms, permitting
him some protection while guiding the horses.
72 h Thutmose III
3.5. Mitannian Chariot Archer
Chariot horses were prized and expensive military assets, and there
was an organized system for acquiring, breeding, and training horses, a
surmise supported by the fact that the term for reserve horses (matru) has
come down to us. Horses began training with the chariot when they were
a year old and began pulling chariots by their third year. By their fourth
year they became proper chariot horses and served until they were nine
or ten years old.66 Cavalry was unknown, but there is some evidence that
messengers (mar shipri) traveled by horseback. The term for “horseman”
was rakib susi, suggesting at least that riding horses was not entirely un-
known. There is no evidence, however, of horsemen having been put to
military use.
We know next to nothing about the Mitannian infantry. We can be
fairly certain that there were shukuthlu infantry units and units of archers
and spearmen as well. Beyond that, we can say only that the infantry was
equipped with swords or long dirks for protection and that they wore
leather helmets. We have no idea how they were tactically employed. The
chariot’s primary role in Mitannian tactical doctrine suggests that the
Mitanni may have employed their infantry in a manner similar to that of
the Hittites; that is, they were primarily used as a platform of maneuver
designed to engage the enemy and fix his position until the chariotry
could strike him at a vulnerable point. As in other armies of the period,
archer units provided covering fire for the infantry during its movement
to contact and, once the infantry was engaged, played a supporting role
by directing plunging arrow fire against the enemy’s rear formations or
flanks. Beyond these obvious and general observations, little else is known
about Mitannian infantry tactical doctrine.
Although the Mitannian Empire was short lived, its innovations in
warfare were significant. Most important was its introduction, if not the
invention, of the horse-drawn war chariot to the other armies of the Near
East and, perhaps, the first use of the spoked wheel in war. Mounting an
archer on the chariot gave new flexibility and lethality to a weapon whose
impact to this point had been only marginal. The chariot’s range, mobility,
and speed wrought a revolution in tactical thinking in the Near East.
One has only to recall, for example, the devastating defeats the chariot-
equipped Hyksos had inflicted on the Egyptian army to appreciate the
quantum leap in tactics and lethality that the Mitannian war chariot
generated. Within a few short years, however, every major power of the
region had equipped its armed forces with this latest weapon, and a new
era of mobile warfare commenced.
The Armies of the Canaanites

In Thutmose’s day, the military capabilities of the Canaanite city-states’
armies were substantial. Each city-state raised and trained its own armed
forces, most of which were similar in weapons and organization. There
74 h Thutmose III
was no unified national command because no high king ruled over all
Canaan. But in time of war, the city-states were capable of acting in concert
and coordinating the movement and deployment of their forces, as they
did when such a coalition fought Thutmose at Megiddo. The term resuti
(subordinate ally) has come down to us from the Ugarit texts, suggesting
that within the military coalitions, princes permitted their forces to act
under the command of a central commander. The king of the Ugarit city-
state usually took the field as commander in chief, but it was not unusual
for military command to be delegated to trusted generals. Regular, fully
equipped troops (sabu nagib) were distinguished from militia or irregulars,
and the term was applied to both infantry and chariotry, suggesting that
regular infantry units existed. Field commanders were called muru-u, but
we do not know the size of the units they commanded. It is likely, however,
that the decimal system of unit strength was employed just as it commonly
was elsewhere. Ugarit was among the largest, richest, and most powerful
Canaanite states, and its military organization was probably typical of the
other states’ forces.
The primary striking arm of the Canaanite armies was the elite
chariot corps manned by the social elite of feudal nobles called maryanna
(chariot warriors). Each maryannu was a professional warrior who, at
least originally, maintained his chariot, horses, grooms, driver, runners,
and equipment at his own expense. The maryannu’s wealth was derived
from his holding of a fief, which, although the king originally conferred it,
seems over time to have become hereditary.67 Among the general warrior
caste of maryanna was an inner elite of “picked men”(na’arun). These elite
units comprised infantry as well as chariotry, with the latter commanded
by a chief of chariotry (akil narkabti). A smaller battle guard called the
Maryanna of the King also existed.
The Canaanite chariot, much like the Mitannian chariot, was heavier
than the Egyptian vehicle but lighter than the Hittite machine. Yigael
Yadin suggests that this variation was a result of the increased Egyptian
influence in Canaanite affairs,68 but this explanation is unconvincing. Both
the Egyptian chariot’s mission and the terrain upon which it maneuvered
were quite different from what the Canaanites had to consider when
developing their vehicle. Canaan offered few smooth plains, where the
opportunity for wide-ranging maneuver and speed provided dividends.
Instead, its terrain was similar to that of northern Syria and the land of
the Mitanni and featured rocky ground, hills and mountains, forests and
glens—conditions that put a premium on surprise, ambush, and shock.
The Canaanite chariot was heavier than the Egyptian model because of
its four- or six-spoked wheels. Also, after moving the axle to the center
of the platform to take the weight off the animals, it accommodated a
larger carrying platform whose floor was fashioned of wood for strength.
This increased weight caused the machine to lose a good part of its
maneuverability in a turn and compromised the animals’ endurance to
some degree.69
The Canaanite chariot warrior, like his Mitannian counterpart, was
heavily protected by a mail coat of scale armor. His horse, too, wore a textile
or bronze scale coat. These devices were designed to protect the horse and
crew from the enemies’ arrows as they closed to engage. There is no hard
evidence that the driver wore armor, but given the Mitannian influence
on Canaanite chariotry, it is likely that he did. The primary weapons of
the Canaanite charioteer were the composite bow, a heavy spear, and a
club, the latter to be used only in the direst emergency should the warrior
find himself afoot.70 Depending on the tactical mission, the Canaanite
chariot was capable of carrying a three-man crew, a fact suggested by the
3.6. canaanite Chariot

76 h Thutmose III
portrayal of the machine with javelin cases. Michael Grant believes that
Canaanite chariots had leather tires and, perhaps, cab armor fashioned of
bronze scales.71
Canaanite infantry (hupshu) was made up of both militia and
regular units. Most of the infantry were semi-trained militia (khepetj) or
conscripted and corvée peasantry, who were lightly armed with bows
and spears. Canaanite tradition dating from tribal days dictated that
the infantrymen supplied their own equipment, but we are uncertain if
this tradition persisted into biblical times. The Amarna letters refer to
different types of infantry distinguished by their weapons, namely, bows
and spears.72 Canaanite regular infantry were probably well-trained pro-
fessionals who were heavily armed. These units wore armored corselets
and helmets and carried a sword, a shield, and the socket ax. The Canaan-
ite infantry’s shield used a Hittite design. Shaped like a figure eight with
a narrow waist, this shield allowed the soldier to have a greater field of
view of his opponent in close combat and to wield the sickle-sword or
ax more flexibly. With the Sea People’s arrival in the twelfth century, the
Canaanites adopted the round shield and outfitted their infantry with
the spear. At the same time, however, the Canaanites replaced the sickle-
sword with the straight sword. Scale armor for the regular infantry also
became commonplace.73
The king chose elite units of heavy infantry for their loyalty and
bravery to serve as the palace guard of the Canaanite kings. The Ugaritic
texts mention these na’arun as composing an inner elite of the general
maryannu warrior caste. Most likely there were special elite chariot units
as well. At the battle of Kadesh in 1274 BCE, Ramses II was rescued in
the nick of time by a unit of these elite shock troops, which fell upon the
Hittite flank and broke the encirclement. These particular na’arun were
Canaanite mercenaries in the service of the Egyptians. A relief of the battle
portrays the Canaanites attacking in phalanx formation—line abreast in
ten rows, ten men deep—and armed with spears and shields, suggesting
that they were elite heavy infantry.74
The Canaanite kings supplemented their forces with hired free-
booters called Apiru. This class of outcasts, debtors, outlaws, and restless
nomads formed wandering groups of raiders and often hired themselves
out to princes and kings as mercenaries. Often called bandits (habbatu) or
3.7. three types of canaanite Infantry
Spearman Archer Sword infantry
Dusty Ones, these wandering brigands posed a serious threat and often
had to be brought to heel by the Canaanite princes by force of arms. One of
Israel’s great generals, David, was an Apiru whose reputation as a soldier
brought him to the attention of King Saul. When forced to leave Saul’s
court, David returned to his old mercenary occupation by raising a force
of six hundred “discontented men” and hiring his soldiers out to one of
the Philistine kings.75 The size and military sophistication of these brigand
groups could present a considerable threat to public order. A record from
Alalakh tells of a band of Apiru comprising 1,436 men, 80 of which were
charioteers and 1,006 were shananu (probably archers). Another text records
the capture of the town of Allul by a Habiru force of 2,000 Apiru.76
The Canaanites’ military tactics were similar to those of the Mitanni
in that the army relied on its chariot units to strike the enemy from ambush,
catching him while still in column of march or while deploying for battle.
For instance, the Canaanites’ precise plan at the battle of Megiddo was to
set an ambush for Thutmose III’s army along the Aruna road and hit the
Egyptian column as it moved onto the Plain of Esdraelon. If surprise was
78 h Thutmose III
not possible, Canaanite generals used the chariot to deliver shock against
enemy infantry formations. This tactic required that “chariot runners,”
or infantry, accompany the chariots. The Canaanite charioteer engaged
the enemy from close range, firing his bow and hurling javelins, while
relying on his heavy armor to protect him from enemy fire. In this tactical
application, infantry phalanxes of spearmen supported by archers acted
in support or, if on the defensive, held their positions and provided the
chariots with a platform of maneuver.
The primary role of the Canaanite chariot, however, was as a strategic
weapon. They were mobile, sufficiently heavy, and well-armored vehicles
that could range far from their bases to protect the cities from being
besieged. Defending the cities was at the center of Canaanite strategic
thinking, and the chariots were the key element in achieving this mission.
Chariots could intercept armies long before they reached the city walls,
forcing the enemy to fight on terrain and at a time not of its choosing.
Chariots were ideal for ambushing enemy patrols, harassing the enemy’s
route of march, keeping communication lines open, and chasing down
hired mercenary Apiru. No infantry force could achieve such a mix of
tactical and strategic flexibility. Chariots, of course, were expensive, and
their crews required extensive training and permanent maintenance at
royal expense. The expense was worth it, however, for the chariot allowed
the Canaanite kings to erect a strategic defense in depth based on flexible
and mobile tactics.
The system of mobile defense worked well for more than two cen-
turies, but Canaan’s wealth and strategic position made it a tempting
target for the national predators who wished to control the land bridge.
Over time the encroachments, immigrations, settlements, and aggressions
of the Egyptians, Aramaeans, Sea People, and Israelites took their toll,
with the result that by the time of King David of Israel, the Canaanites
had been deprived of three-quarters of their land area and 90 percent
of their grain-growing land.77 All that remained of these proud warrior
people’s land was the central Phoenician coastal strip and its immediate
hinterlands. But at the time of Thutmose III, the Canaanite city-states were
still a formidable military force with which he had to contend frequently.
Canaan’s legacy lived on into the modern era. It was the Canaanites,
for example, who first performed the extraordinary feat of dissecting the
sounds of human speech into thirty basic sounds, thus giving the world its
first true alphabet.78 They also were the first to set their language to music.
The Canaanites, in turn, taught the Hebrews how to set their poetry to
music, giving the world one of the great gifts of civilization—song.
Nubian Armies
We know very little about the armies of Nubia. From the Middle King-
dom through Kamose’s intervention in Nubia during the Hyksos period,
the weaponry and organization of Nubian military units appear indis-
tinguishable from that found in Egypt at the same time.79 Nubian soldiers
portrayed in tomb models, paintings, and bas reliefs are armed with the
mace and short throwing javelins with either stone or copper tips, and
they carried hide-covered, pointed-top shields, the same weapons
found in contemporary Egyptian armies. The Nubians did not appear to
use the long infantry spear, however. The archers of both armies carried
the same recurved bow and fired arrows with sharpened fire-hardened
tips. There is no evidence that either army had bronze swords, arrow-
heads, or socketed spear blades. While Nubia had copper, it lacked tin
to manufacture bronze weapons and armor. No mention of the horse in
Nubian warfare is found.80
The Egyptian incursions that followed the expulsion of the Hyksos
produced some leakage in Egyptian military technology to Nubia. The
famed Medjay desert tribes had fought on the Egyptians’ side during
the Nubian incursion into Upper Egypt in support of the Hyksos, and
the Medjay became loyal Egyptian allies for years. They were later
constituted into elite units in service to the pharaoh. Reliefs from this
period show the Medjay armed with bronze penetrating axes. Other
loyal Nubian units are shown equipped with the long infantry spear with
socketed, bronze spear blades. Beyond this example, however, there is
no evidence of the widespread use of bronze weapons or their technical
manufacture in Nubia. Having acquired the new bronze weapons from
the Hyksos, the Egyptians seem to have copied the Hyksos policy of
denying bronze technology to others and applied it to Nubia by blocking
the export of tin to the country.81 The result was that the lethal bronze
weaponry never became widely available in Nubia.
80 h Thutmose III
From time to time, Nubian rebels could still raise sufficient man-
power and carry out raids against Egyptian towns and forts using obsolete
weapons. But in a set-piece battle, Nubian rebels always found themselves
at a significant disadvantage. With the Egyptian army’s incorporation
of the chariot and composite bow, the disparity in weapons and their
lethality between the Egyptian occupiers and the Nubian rebels increased.
By Thutmose III’s reign, the occasional rebellions in Upper Nubia ceased
to be a problem. Egyptian troops dealt with them easily.
4
The Battle of Megiddo
The battle of Megiddo is the first battle in history for which we have a name
and a sufficient account of events from which to reconstruct a portrait
of the strategy and tactics employed by the antagonists. In this sense it
can be said that the battle of Megiddo is the starting point for the study
of military history. Moreover, Megiddo was one of the most important
battles of antiquity. In the same way that Scipio Africanus’s victory at
Zama set Rome on the path to empire, Thutmose III’s victory at Megiddo
was the first step in the creation of an Egyptian empire that lasted for half
a millennium. Thutmose III’s establishment of that empire marks him as
one of the greatest military commanders in history.
The conflict between Egypt and a coalition of Asiatic kingdoms that
occurred at Megiddo in May 1481 BCE had its roots in a strategic power
shift that was taking place further to the north on the Great Bend of the
Euphrates River.1 For a century prior to the battle, Indo-European invaders
had been consolidating their hold on the former territory of Hurri-Land,
transforming it into a new warrior kingdom called Mitanni. The period of
Queen Hatshepsut and Thutmose III’s joint rule in Egypt coincided with
this period of Mitannian consolidation and expansion into northern Syria.
The city-sate of Kadesh on the Orontes River rose rapidly under Mitannian
protection and gained influence over the states of Canaan as far south as
the city of Megiddo that controlled the Esdraelon Plain in the Galilee.2
At the same time another Mitannian ally, the city of Tunip, increased its
power by establishing control of the vital Eleutheros Valley connecting
coastal Syria with the interior.3
81
82 h Thutmose III
Queen Hatshepsut seems to have been less than resolute in protect-

ing Egyptian influence in Canaan and lower Syria and resisting Mitanni
encroachments there. The lack of Egyptian response encouraged the
Mitanni and their allies to press their influence farther south,4 and Egyptian
troops were forced to suppress revolts instigated by Asiatic enticements in
Sharuhen and Gaza. In the winter of 1482 Queen Hatshepsut may have
died, and the throne fell to Thutmose in his own right. Thutmose regarded
the new Mitannian power configuration and its extension into Canaan as
a strategic threat aimed at Egypt. Since the expulsion of the Hyksos, the
Egyptians had regarded the Syrians and Canaanites as the heirs of these
dreaded invaders. Thutmose saw the Syrian-Mitannian alliance as the
prelude to an invasion of Egypt itself.5
Hatshepsut’s death probably accelerated Asiatic plans for the in-
vasion. Gathering an army of troop contingents from thirty-one Asiatic
chiefdoms, some from as far away as the Euphrates and others “from as
far away as Naharin” (the Egyptian name for Mitanni), suggests that the
purpose of this large force was not to deal with some local concern.6 The
enormous harvests obtainable around Megiddo were needed to sustain
the invasion force on its march to Egypt.7 The commander of the Asiatic
coalition was the chief of Kadesh.
Egyptian defenses against such an invasion force were less than
ideal. If the Asiatics crossed the Carmel Ridge from Megiddo and gained
the southern Canaanite plain, few Egyptian forces were there to stop
them before they reached Gaza and Sharuhen.8 Once beyond Gaza, there
were no natural fortifications from which Egyptian troops could mount
a defense of the Egyptian homeland. Thutmose concluded that the only
way to defend Egypt was to prevent the Asiatic coalition from marching
on Egypt in the first place and bring battle to it before it could cross the
Carmel Mountains. To this end, he assembled his army and prepared to
advance into Canaan, cross the Carmel Mountains, and attack the Asiatics
at their marshaling point at Megiddo.
Thutmose used the winter to plan his campaign and assemble his
troops at a base in Sile. Located some ten kilometers north-northeast
of modern Qantara, Sile was on the coastal road near the mouth of the
Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Called the Wall of Princes, the area had been
fortified since Middle Kingdom times. The original fortifications were
The Battle of Megiddo h 83
a series of forts that controlled the roads to Canaan and south to Sinai.
These fortresses were rectangular enclosures of mud brick surrounded by
moat ditches. Entry to the forts was through a single narrow gate, and the
high walls were equipped with watchtowers.9 The forts were manned by
archers and spear infantry who were capable of mounting only a static
defense.
Under the New Kingdom, perhaps beginning with Thutmose I, the
design of these forts changed. The Egyptians enlarged them, making them
some three hundred meters on a side, with walls sloping backward from
the front toward the interior like a trapezoid. The front and side walls
were nine meters high while the back walls were only about four meters.
They replaced the single narrow front gate with two wider side gates,
each of which was nine meters across. The design of these New Kingdom
fortresses reflected their changed tactical role after the chariot emerged as
an important combat arm in Egyptian armies. The old forts were designed
to ward off infantry attacks while the new ones were large cantonments
containing maneuverable chariot units that could engage in an elastic
defense. The high walls remained a formidable obstacle to infantry assault,
and the large side gates allowed two chariots abreast to rush through
and engage enemy infantry on open ground. The enemy might even be
allowed to commit against the front walls, at which point chariots rushed
from the side gates and crushed the enemy against the wall. It is unknown
if the forts at Taru, for instance, were all of this later type by Thutmose’s
time, but it is probable that at least some of them were.
Thutmose’s Army
Nowhere in the Annals are we told the size of Thutmose’s army when it
left Sile.10 Estimates range from as many as 20,000 to as few as 5,000 or
6,000 troops.11 This said, a fair guess might still be ventured. The Annals
of the battle tell us that as the Egyptian army’s van reached the battlefield
over a narrow road through the Carmel Mountains, its rearguard was still
in camp. The road distance between the camp and the van was 9 miles. If
these facts are true, it is possible to estimate the size of the Egyptian army.
The proportion of troops to animals in the armies of antiquity was about
the same as for a U.S. Army infantry brigade during World War I, or on
average 1 donkey or mule for every 5 men. An American infantry brigade
84 h Thutmose III
comprised 6,310 men and 1,021 animals and occupied a road space of 8,385
yards, or approximately 4.8 miles.12 Thus, an Egyptian army occupying
a road space of 9 miles would have numbered in the neighborhood of
12,000 men.
If the estimate is correct, then the Egyptian army comprised two
combined-arms corps with each having 5,000 infantry and a chariot
brigade of 500 vehicles that could be tailored into units of 10-vehicle
platoons, 25-vehicle companies, or 50-vehicle battalions depending on
their tactical requirements. The references to horses in the Annals make
clear that Thutmose’s army had its chariots at Megiddo. Thutmose would
have known that Asiatic armies possessed large complements of chariots
as a matter of course and that Megiddo was located on the Esdraelon
Plain, ideal chariot country. It is unlikely, then, that Thutmose would have
left his chariots behind, and there is no reason to believe that the Egyptian
chariot brigades were at other than full strength.
The report of an Egyptian officer named Henu, who led an expedi-
tion to Punt (Somalia) during the Middle Kingdom, left us a description
of the Egyptian infantryman’s military kit. Henu says, “I went forth with
an army of 3,000. I made a river and the Red Land a stretch of field, for
I gave a leathern bottle, a carrying pole, jars of water, and twenty loaves
to each among them every day. The asses were laden with sandals.” The
leathern bottles are water canteens, and the carrying pole was a forked
stick carried over the shoulder hobo-style to which other equipment and
weapons were lashed. This military equipment was still in use during the
New Kingdom. The “loaves” were flat unleavened bread similar to naan
or pita bread and common throughout the Middle East. An example of a
military field pack has survived,13 but it is unclear if it was carried over the
shoulder with straps or, like the Roman soldier’s pack, lashed to a carrying
pole. Tents made of linen or leather seemed to have been reserved for
officers,14 while common soldiers slept on reed mats that could be rolled
up and tied atop the field pack. The Egyptian soldier’s spear was lashed to
the carrying pole while his sword was stuck under his broad leather belt.
Reliefs show Egyptian soldiers carrying ox hide shields on their backs that
were strapped over their shoulders. By Thutmose’s day, the old sandals of
woven reed soles appear to have given way to much sturdier leather-soled
sandals. Later, a strap was added that held the heel to the sole, making it
possible for the soldier to run without losing his footgear. The importance
of the new footgear to the army’s military capability can be implied from
the fact that Thutmose was the first pharaoh to have himself portrayed
wearing sandals in his statues and reliefs.
Protecting the soldier from heat and sun was vital to keeping the
army in fighting trim. The Egyptian soldier wore a short kilt (shendo’ot) and
a sleeveless upper body shirt to protect him from the sun. Because of the
heat, the bronze helmet the Asiatics and Mitanni favored was never widely
used in Egypt. Instead, soldiers wore nemes, or a folded cloth of heavy
breathable linen that could be soaked with water to cool the head. Other
tighter-fitting caps of leather or cloth were also worn, probably depending
on the climate where the soldiers were stationed. Later, a military-style
wig came into use. The hair beneath all these head coverings was worn
short. The Egyptian soldier used vegetable and animal oil to keep his skin
moist and to prevent sunburn. Just as modern soldiers do, Egyptian troops
used a wet cloth tied around the mouth and nose to protect against dust
inhalation in the desert environment.
The staple of the Egyptian military diet was emmer cereal grain
fashioned into a flat thin bread.15 A ten-day supply of bread, eighty small
loaves, could easily be carried in the soldier’s backpack. It could also be
baked on the march. Flattened into a patty, the moist dough stuck to the
side of a three-foot, heated, cone-shaped stove, which was made of dried
mud, and fell off the stove’s side when fully baked. Supplying an army
with firewood to cook rations was a major logistical problem for all armies
of antiquity,16 but the Egyptians did not use firewood for cooking. Instead,
they used dried animal dung—cow dung for civilian use and horse and
mule dung in the military camp—as their basic fuel.17 The animals in the
baggage train kept the army sufficiently supplied with cooking fuel while
on the march. Egyptian field rations included smoked goose flesh, beef
jerky, and smoked or salted fish. A favorite staple of the Egyptian soldier
was beer, often provided by traveling breweries. Milk was sometimes
provided, and in one account a recruit complains that all he was given
to eat was sour milk, salted fish, and hard bread. Egyptian soldiers ate
onions, cucumbers, beans, lentils, chickpeas, and cabbage, along with
their bread. They also commonly ate radishes since they were believed to
prevent stomach illness.18
86 h Thutmose III
Rations and equipment not carried by the soldier himself were trans-
ported in the logistics train.19 Egyptian armies of the period used mules
and donkeys equipped with panniers to transport food and equipment.
Human porters also provided a significant proportion of the army’s
transport capacity. The four-wheeled cart was unknown in Egypt during
Thutmose’s day. All carts portrayed in reliefs are two-wheeled vehicles,
little more than covered chariots pulled by donkeys and mules. The
Egyptian armies did not use the ox-drawn cart until Ramses II introduced
it. Even then this cart had only two wheels and seems to have been identical
to the large two-wheeled oxcart of the Hittites and Philistines.
Supplying the Egyptian army with water while it crossed the Sinai
presented a problem. The wells along the coastal route of march were
weak and sometimes brackish. While they sufficed for small garrisons,
they were inadequate to supply Thutmose’s large army.20 Thus, the Egyp-
tians had to store water at several points along the route. In the desert
environment, a soldier needs eight to nine pints of water a day to survive,
with the animals requiring considerably more. Once the army reached
Gaza, however, supplying it with water would have been less of a
problem. Gaza and other coastal cities of Canaan depended mostly on
cisterns for their water supply. By mid-May, the winter rains would have
already filled these cisterns to capacity. April and May are also the months
when the harvest is ready in Egypt and southern Canaan, so the granaries
of the cities and towns along Thutmose’s route would also have been full
and able to supply the army’s needs.
Under the best of conditions, however, an ancient army on the
march was a medical disaster. An army of 10,000 men could expect to lose
3 to 4 percent of its force, or about 400 men, to heatstroke, exhaustion,
dust inhalation, and other respiratory problems. Another 1,700 men, or
17 percent of the force, were lost to routine injuries: broken limbs, sprains,
cuts, falls, and accidents.21 As soldiers marched in column, dust choked
their lungs, dried out their sinuses, produced chronic coughing, blinding
headaches, severe nosebleeds, and eye irritations. Many soldiers suffered
injuries to their feet, which were unprotected except for the sole of the
sandal. Without arch or side support, ankle injuries were common. The
animals accompanying the army also caused damage by kicking or
stepping on soldiers, and accidents with wheeled vehicles led to broken

bones and other serious wounds. Blisters, lacerations, and abrasions were
endemic.22 The incidence of these injuries increased when an army moved
quickly and with little rest or when it moved over irregular terrain, as did
Thutmose’s army once it left Egypt.
The Advance to Yehem

In April 1481 BCE the Egyptian army marched out of Sile along the
coastal road toward Gaza. Its advance to Megiddo was divided into four
operational phases, each influenced by time, terrain, and the enemy’s
reaction. First, Thutmose had to move his army from Egypt to Gaza. The
army covered the 125 miles from Sile to Gaza in ten days, a rate of march
of about 12 miles a day.23 It is of great importance that Thutmose reached
Gaza on the anniversary of his accession to the throne, that is, on the first
day of the new regnal year. This day was normally an occasion of great
celebration and feasting, but he had no celebration that year. Thutmose
remained in Gaza only overnight, ordering the army back on the march
the next day.24
The second phase required traversing the terrain from Gaza to Yehem
(modern Yemma), a distance of eighty miles, much of it across the open
southern Sharon Plain, perfect terrain for an Asiatic chariot attack. Yehem
was a key road junction controlling the entrance to the Wadi Ara and the
Aruna (iron) road that led over the Carmel Mountains to Megiddo and
the Esdraelon Plain, the classical Greek name for the Jezreel Valley. The
danger in the army’s movement from Gaza to Yehem lay in the possibility
of discovery by Asiatic reconnaissance units or even a collision with the
advance units of the Asiatic main force making its way across the Sharon
Plain en route to attack Egypt. Under these circumstances, security of the
Egyptian force was paramount, and Thutmose covered the eighty miles
in about nine days, a slower rate of march than his journey to Gaza took.
When the Egyptian army arrived at Yehem, it had been on the march for
nineteen straight days.25
The third phase required the army to move over the Carmel Moun-
tains and gain the open plain next to the ridge upon which Megiddo sat
without being attacked, worn down by enemy harassment along the way,
or, worse, ambushed as it exited the mountains and moved to the plain.
88 h Thutmose III
4.1. thutmose’s Route to Megiddo
Only after Thutmose’s army forced the exits and gained the Esdraelon
Plain could it bring the enemy to battle in phase four.
The logical point of Asiatic resistance to the Egyptian advance would
have been to engage Thutmose south of Gaza, where the terrain favored
the Asiatic chariots and provided no natural defenses for the Egyptians.
At a minimum, medium-size chariot forces could have been used to harass
the Egyptians as they marched from Gaza to Yehem. Had this been done,
the Asiatics could have maintained contact with Thutmose’s army and
remained aware of its location as it moved toward the Carmel Mountains.
Even a small screening force falling back before the Egyptians’ advance
could have accomplished this basic mission. Knowing where the Egyptian
army was at all times would have permitted the Asiatics to deploy forces
at points of resistance south of the Carmel range. Asiatic infantry could
have been easily blocked the entrance to the mountains at Wadi Ara, but
the Asiatic commander undertook none of these operations. Instead, he
allowed Thutmose’s army to move unhindered into the Carmel Mountains,

where it could attempt the crossing to reach Megiddo itself.
The failure of the Asiatic commander to discover Thutmose’s army,
monitor its movements, and prevent its seizing the Wadi Ara appears to
be a case of gross military incompetence. But the charge is not completely
warranted. The armies of the Canaanite and Syrian principalities were
made up mostly of professional warriors led by a professional warrior
elite. Their commanders were battle-hardened veterans for whom war
was a profession and an obligation of their social status. Why, then did
the Asiatic commander make such obvious tactical errors? The answer is
that the Asiatics were so strategically focused on preparing for the coming
offensive against Egypt that the possibility of a preemptive attack by the
Egyptians was beyond their imagination. They entirely neglected the
possibility of an Egyptian preemptive strike.
The Asiatic armies assembling at Megiddo were instead preparing to
invade Egypt.26 There was no other event or set of circumstances that would
have otherwise justified the military cooperation of more than thirty-one
leaders of different kingdoms, including the leaders of kingdoms as far
away as northern Syria and Mitanni. An invasion of Egypt would require
a very large force, somewhere in the vicinity of fifteen thousand to twenty
thousand men and numerous chariot squadrons. This military capability
was quite beyond the capacity of any single state and was possible only by
assembling a large coalition. An invasion of Egypt made sound strategic
sense in the eyes of the Mitanni, whose policy of drang nach süden (to the
south) aimed at weakening Egypt and gaining influence in Canaan.
Megiddo was a logical place to assemble the invasion force. It
controlled the Esdraelon Plain and sat astride the highways connecting
southern Canaan and the coastal plain to Egypt. Megiddo also influenced
the trade along the coastal plain to the north, since this trade flowed around
Mount Carmel, down through the valley, and up the road to Damascus and
on to the Euphrates River. Twenty miles behind Megiddo lay the fortress
of Hazor, blocking the route to the Euphrates. Command of Megiddo
was vital to controlling the communications routes through Canaan and
was the strategic key to Egyptian influence in the Syrian zone. Without
Megiddo, Egypt lost the ability to mount preemptory operations against
the northern Asiatic states and to monitor and prevent the emergence of
90 h Thutmose III
hostile political and military coalitions in an area defined as strategically

vital to Egypt’s defense.
Megiddo was also the most important fortified city in central
Canaan. When Thutmose exhorted his troops to fight well against the city,
he said, “The taking of Megiddo was the taking of a thousand towns.”
He was giving voice to the strategic truth that Megiddo’s location was
the key to further Egyptian expansion beyond the coastlands of southern
Canaan and into the areas of Phoenicia, Syria, and, ultimately, beyond the
Euphrates.27 The strategic importance of the area around Megiddo, then
and now, is evident in that over the last four thousand years, at least thirty-
four battles have been fought in this small valley, with the last having
occurred in 1967.
The city’s walls were 325 meters long by 230 meters wide, enclosing
an area of approximately 13 square acres and accommodating a popula-
tion of approximately 3,100 residents.28 The city’s walls were 10 meters
high and 6 meters thick and had only one gate to the south. Located on
a steep hill overlooking the Esdraelon Plain, the steepness of the slope
itself made an approach from the north, east, and west difficult. Although
Megiddo had no moat, it had a long sloping glacis facing south to
compensate for the shallowness of the hill’s grade there that reduced the
height of the walls.29 The glacis was designed to prevent the use of scaling
ladders. This description of Megiddo’s fortifications must be accepted
with some caution, however. It is not completely clear which of the twenty
settlements layered one on top of the other at the excavation site belong
to the period when Thutmose besieged and captured the city. There is
also no evidence for the existence of a massive city wall around
Megiddo at this time. It is possible, but not certain, that the earlier walls
constructed during the Middle Bronze Age period were still in use when
Thutmose attacked the city, and it its these walls that archaeologists have
measured.30
The chief of Megiddo was an important person, and scores of smaller
towns and hamlets depended on him for protection and commerce.
Megiddo had an abundant water supply connected by an underground
tunnel to a spring outside the walls. But its greatest asset for supporting
an invasion of Egypt was its control of vast agricultural fields near and
beyond the city that produced enormous harvests of grain. This harvest
was needed to feed the invasion force as it moved over the Carmel
Mountains, to the Canaanite plain, and attacked Egypt.
Unlike Egypt and southern Canaan, where the harvest is ready in
mid-April to early May, the harvest at Megiddo is not ready until June.31
Accordingly, the Asiatic invasion force could not assemble at Megiddo
until at least mid-June, when the harvest would be available to feed and
supply the armies for the march across the Carmel Ridge. Until then, the
bulk of the Asiatic army had to remain in their home garrisons within
their respective kingdoms. Harold Nelson walked the ground at Megiddo
at the same time of year that Thutmose arrived and offers a description of
what he, and possibly the Egyptian troops, observed at the plain around
Megiddo: “What they saw before them was the wide expanse of level
land, probably covered with ripening harvests, stretching for half a mile
to the banks of the Kina.” 32 The description of the harvests as “ripening”
confirms that the crops would still have been in the field and not ready for
harvesting for at least another three to four weeks. If so, then the Asiatic
army could not have been already assembled in force at Megiddo when
Thutmose arrived because there would have been no way to feed it.
The terrain in the Esdraelon Valley around Megiddo also made it
unlikely that the Asiatic armies were already assembled at the city when
Thutmose arrived. The Kishon River and its many tributaries crisscross
the valley floor and its environs. From the winter rains the surrounding
mountains give rise to numerous streams that empty upon the valley floor.
Poor drainage further contributes to the swampy conditions in the flat
plain around Megiddo for much of the year. Except for the driest summer
months, beginning in June, the area is a muddy morass that would hinder
troop movement.33 Many of the Asiatic contingents marching to Megiddo
from the north would have been forced to traverse the flood plain of
the Kishon River on the Acco Plain, which would have been almost
impassible for months after the seasonal rains. These conditions would
have made the Asiatic armies’ march to Megiddo and their encampment
there difficult until the ground firmed up sometime in early June. Thus,
the Asiatic armies had not yet assembled around the city when Thutmose
arrived because they were also still waiting for the ground to dry.
Whatever troops were at Megiddo when Thutmose arrived could
not have been the fully assembled Asiatic force of 15,000 to 20,000 men
92 h Thutmose III
and chariots needed to carry out the strategic mission of attacking Egypt.
In the Annals we are told that after the battle Thutmose captured 924
enemy chariots, 340 prisoners of war, and 200 corselets of armor. Enemy
casualties amounted to only 83 dead.34 By contrast, Merneptah’s battle
against the Libyans killed 3,410 men while Ramses III’s later Libyan
campaign inflicted 12,000 dead. The battle at Megiddo seems to have been
little more than a skirmish by comparison.35
This point is controversial for it has been assumed in other accounts
of the battle that the Asiatic coalition was very large and already in place
around Megiddo when the Egyptians arrived. Nelson’s account says, “The
Asiatics certainly did not outnumber the Egyptians, and we therefore
place the contending forces at between 10,000 and 15,000 men each.”36
Written in 1913, Nelson’s version was one of the earliest accounts of the
battle. He based his analysis on having walked the ground, thus lending
his work great import. His description of the battle became a basic source
document that was incorporated into later accounts, often without critical
analysis. No evidence supports Nelson’s or anyone else’s estimate of the
size of the Asiatic force at Megiddo. The only information available to us
is circumstantial, and what appears in the Annals are lists of the numbers
of Asiatic prisoners and dead. The Annals do not give the strength of the
enemy force. If there were 15,000 to 20,000 men in the Asiatic army at
Megiddo, one is entitled to ask where they went after the battle.
The impression taken from the texts that the Asiatic army had
already formed in large numbers at Megiddo may be the result of a textual
mistranslation. Hans Goedicke suggests that the Egyptian word translated
as “armies” in previous accounts should really be translated as “heavy
fighters,” which were the mercenaries or the personal battle guards that
accompanied the chiefs of Asiatic kingdoms.37 Goedicke discerns from
the texts that three types of soldiers accompanied the chiefs to Megiddo:
maryanna, or chariot warriors; “fighters,” which he defines as heavy
infantry; and light infantry, probably including archers.38 What the texts
describe at Megiddo, then, is not an assembling of armies but a gathering
of chiefs accompanied by their personal military retinues in advance of
their armies, which would arrive later, when the harvest was ready and
the ground was dry. Since only the chiefs of Kadesh and Megiddo are
mentioned, we might rightly infer that the remainder of the coalition

chiefs had also not yet arrived.
Any attempt to determine the size of the Asiatic force is an exercise
in speculation. Each of the 892 chariots captured from “the vile army”
would have required a driver and a maryannu archer-charioteer. The
chariot team entered battle accompanied by at least one and sometimes
two runners, or infantrymen whose task it was to protect the chariot
team and the horses from infantry attack. A groom also accompanied the
chariot team and tended the horses. In a pinch he, too, might be pressed
into service as light infantry. Taken together, then, the Asiatic chariot force
of drivers, charioteers, and runners numbered some 2,676 combatants.
Additional runners and the grooms might have added another 1,500 or
so troops. The heavy infantry mentioned in the texts made up the chiefs’
battle guards and could not have amounted to more than 150 to 300 men,
depending on how many local vassals of the chief of Megiddo were
present but not mentioned in the texts. Any archer contingents would, of
necessity, be quite small. Perhaps another 30 to 40 archers could be added,
bringing the total to approximately a maximum 4,500 combatants. The
chief of Megiddo would have provided most of the men after requiring
the full mobilization of the military resources available to his local vassals.
Without the additional chariot runners and grooms, though, the Asiatic
force would have numbered no more than 3,000 combatants.
After nineteen days on the march, on May 14 the Egyptian army
arrived at Yehem, where it encamped and rested for the anticipated cross-
ing of the Carmel Mountains. The name of the town, coming from the root
meaning to watch or protect, indicates its strategic location protecting the
opening to the Wadi Ara and the Aruna road running over the mountains
to Megiddo.39 Thutmose spent three days at Yehem, during which time his
reconnaissance units explored the prospective routes leading to Megiddo
and attempted to learn the disposition of the Asiatic force.
The Egyptian intelligence service traced its origins to the Middle
Kingdom Period, when the title of Master of the Secrets of the King in
the Army is first found.40 The intelligence service had kept an analytical
eye on the Canaanite-Syrian area of operations for centuries, employing
spies, commercial agents, and diplomatic contacts to assess political and
military developments in the area. It was probably the intelligence service
94 h Thutmose III
that discovered the Asiatics’ intention to assemble the military coalition

to invade Egypt. Egypt’s extensive and long-standing commercial rela-
tions with Canaan provided the intelligence service with knowledge of
the terrain, routes of advance, fortifications, natural obstacles, locations
of wells, villages, crop fields and their yields, and other information
important to Egyptian military planners in the theater of operations.
This data also covered the Aruna road leading to Megiddo. A surviving
intelligence report notes that an important official serving in Canaan was
expected to be familiar with the Aruna route and to know the locations on
the road that were conducive to setting ambushes.41 It is likely, then, that
as part of the campaign planning process before he left Egypt, Thutmose
was briefed by his intelligence officers on all the relevant information
concerning the Megiddo campaign, including the terrain and routes of
advance over the Carmel Mountains. This operational brief would surely
have addressed the state of the Asiatic forces’ mobilization and the ability
of the assembly area around Megiddo to support them logistically. Only
the disposition of the Asiatic force around Megiddo remained unknown,
and Thutmose’s reconnaissance units quickly determined that once they
reached Wadi Ara.
On May 16 Thutmose called his field commanders together to dis-
cuss the operational plan. After noting that the chief of Kadesh and some
other units were in Megiddo, Thutmose ordered his commanders, “Tell
me what you think about it [the operational plan].”42 It is important to
note that Thutmose did not explain the plan to his generals before asking
for their opinion. This detail suggests that all the conference participants
were aware of some previous plan, perhaps the same one presented in the
campaign’s operational briefing before they left Egypt in which the route
over the Carmel Mountains had already been discussed.
It is not unusual for a commander’s subordinates to disagree with
elements of his operational plan. The Egyptian generals argued that of the
three roads leading to Megiddo, two of them—the one leading to Ta’anach
to the south and the other to Djefty to the north—were wider and easier
to negotiate than the Aruna road, which led from the village of Aruna to
the Esdraelon Plain. The Aruna road was narrow and winding, forcing
troops to march in single file in some places and reducing their pace. The
slower rate of march would force the van of the army to exit near Megiddo
4.2. three roads to Megiddo
while its rearguard was still in camp at Aruna.43 Presumably all parties
to the discussion had access to whatever new information the army’s
reconnaissance units had obtained over the last three days of patrolling.
Citing the new intelligence, the generals note that “it is reported that the
enemy are standing outside [where the Aruna and Ta’anach roads exit the
mountains and run to the plain] and that they have become numerous.”44
96 h Thutmose III
From these reports we may surmise that the Asiatics had discovered the
presence of the Egyptian army and deployed their troops to block the
Ta’anach and Aruna exits leading to the Esdraelon Plain.
It is clear from the Annals that the Egyptian reconnaissance units
had discovered the Asiatic troop dispositions before the army left Yehem.
Thutmose broke camp and left Yehem on May 18. On that day, the annalist
tells us, “Now they [the Asiatics] were already drawn up in numerous
squadrons but the enemy was isolated: their southern flank was at Ta’anach
in the hills, the northern flank was at the southern corner of the valley of
Qina.”45 Nelson suggests that the Asiatic units guarding the Aruna and
Ta’anach exits were detached force components and that the Asiatics had
deployed the bulk of their army as a central reserve between the two
blocking forces.46 This reasonable conclusion is based on the assumption
that the Asiatic army was at full combat strength when it took the field,
but, as I have tried to show, that proposition is questionable. No evidence
supports Nelson’s assertion. Nor does his argument address why the
Asiatic commander failed to cover the exit at Djefty.
The Annals inform us that Thutmose decided to proceed down the
Aruna road but tell us nothing about why he chose that route. It may be
that he decided to keep to the original plan he made before leaving Egypt.
It may also be that his reconnaissance units had discovered another route
leading from the Aruna road to Megiddo that exited the mountains at a
place where his army could avoid the Asiatic force blocking the exit, and
for the time being he may have kept this knowledge to himself. We cannot
know Thutmose’s reasoning, but we can summarize what he knew at the
time he made his decision to cross the Carmel Ridge. Thus, he knew that
both the Ta’anach road and the Aruna road debouched from the mountains
onto the open plains around Megiddo. He understood that the Asiatics
had already moved units to block both roads’ exits. He was aware that
the northern road to Djefty, the longest of the three, joined the road to
Megiddo about five kilometers northwest of the city and that apparently
the Djefty exit was unguarded.47 Thutmose realized that the Aruna road
offered the shortest distance to the objective, but because of its narrow
and winding nature, it would take longer to traverse than the Ta’anach
road. Thutmose also determined that the Asiatic force waiting for him was
of only marginal strength and that the Egyptian army outnumbered it in
infantry while being relatively equal in chariots.48 Given this knowledge,

it is difficult to discern what military advantage Thutmose might have
seen in taking the Aruna route.
Thutmose also knew that a Syrian-Canaanite army would be chariot
heavy and light on infantry. The Egyptian army had its normal complement
of two chariot brigades of five hundred vehicles each. The rest of the army,
or some ten thousand men, was infantry, the Egyptian combat arm of
decision. If Thutmose entered the plain at either Djefty or Ta’anach, both
about five kilometers from the city, his infantry would have had to force
the pass and suffer considerable casualties at the hands of the maryannu
chariot archers. After accomplishing this step, he would have still had to
fight a chariot battle on the open plain in order to advance on Megiddo
itself. The result would have been a battle that played to the Asiatic
strength. To avoid this battle Thutmose planned not to use the Aruna road
exit and move straight at Megiddo, exiting the mountains closer to the city
on ground favorable to his infantry. But where was this area, and how did
Thutmose get there?
The March to Megiddo

On May 18, Thutmose’s army left Yehem, entered the Wadi Ara connecting
to the Aruna road, marched the thirteen miles to the village of Aruna, and
encamped.49 Nelson’s review of the land in 1910 found it to have adequate
space and water to accommodate the large army.50 Aruna sits on the
southern side of the Carmel Ridge, some three miles short of the highest
elevation at Mismus. The distance from Aruna to Megiddo is seven miles;
from Mismus to Megiddo is four miles. Camping below the highest point
of the ridge effectively concealed the army and its cooking fires and
prevented patrols covering the Aruna exit or camped on the Esdraelon
Plain from discovering it.
Much is made in the Annals about the narrowness of the Aruna road
and the need for the army to go “horse after horse”—that is, in single
file—with all that implies for the army’s rate of march.51 In fact, the Aruna
road was no mere path but one of the main commercial roads over the
Carmel Mountains, and it is difficult to believe that a much traveled road
over the mountains would be so narrow as to require an army to move
in single file. Marching four abreast in column requires a space of only
98 h Thutmose III
four meters across. A commercial road unable to accommodate at least

this distance would have been useless. When the comments in the texts
concerning the Aruna road are examined in context, it is clear that the
concern of Thutmose’s generals was not about the narrowness of the road
and its impact on the army’s rate of march. The generals were apprehensive
about the narrowness of the road’s exit to the Esdraelon Plain. Thus, they
asked Pharaoh, “In what fashion shall we go forth from this path, which
tends to be narrow?”52 The generals were concerned that if the army could
not assemble into battle units before entering upon the plain, the chariot
forces waiting at the exits would massacre them.
The Aruna road was a perfectly usable military road, and the annal-
ist might have emphasized its narrowness in the texts for dramatic effect.
Thus, we are told that the army moved in single file from Yehem to Aruna
when there was no geographic need to do so. Again, it reads, “And then
His Majesty caused that to go forth in front. His army itself was caused
that it spreads out in its order of marching single file, while His majesty
was the first of his army.” Pharaoh usually is presented as riding his war
chariot. Was Thutmose in his chariot when he led the army down the
Aruna road? If so, how narrow could it have been?
The problem with the Aruna road from a tactical perspective was
not that it was narrow and slowed the army’s rate of march but that it led
to a death trap. An Asiatic chariot task force of perhaps three hundred
vehicles covered the Aruna exit to the Esdraelon Plain while a larger force
of perhaps six hundred to seven hundred chariots guarded the exit from
Ta’anach.53 The two forces were only four miles apart and could quickly
come to one another’s support once Thutmose’s army appeared at one of
the exits. There was no place large enough near the Aruna exit in which the
Egyptian army could assemble before it came out of the pass. If Thutmose
attempted to force the narrow exit by means of his superior numbers, he
would be forced to feed his infantry piecemeal onto the open plain, and
his men would not be in their battle formations. Moreover, the Egyptian
infantry could not expect any support from their chariots once exposed
because the chariots had been disassembled and carried by porters on the
march through the mountains. The chariot teams would need time and a
place to reassemble their vehicles and get themselves in fighting condition,
but the exit from the Aruna road did not have the necessary space.
Thus, if Thutmose had tried to force the Aruna exit, he would have
had to fight without his chariots against a professional force of maryannu
chariot warriors deployed on an open plain that provided no defensive
terrain for the Egyptian infantry to cling to. Otherwise, he would have had
to try to assemble his vehicles and horse teams on the open plain while
under attack from the northern task force. If the southern task force had
rushed to join the battle, it would have caught Thutmose’s army in the rear,
trapping it between the two forces. It was an impossible tactical situation
and one in which the Egyptian army might easily have been destroyed.
Various accounts of the battle have attempted to explain away the
military realities surrounding Thutmose’s exit from the Aruna road and
have offered solutions that are largely unconvincing. It has been argued,
for example, that battles in antiquity were arranged in advance as to time
and place, so the Asiatic chariot units deployed at the road exits were there
only to determine that the Egyptians had arrived on the battlefield and not
to bring them to battle.54 Another argument holds that the Asiatics were
simply “too supine” to attempt an attack, even though they possessed all
the advantages for successfully accomplishing it.55 Still another explanation
asserts the chariot force guarding the Aruna exit had been transferred to
the task force protecting the Ta’anach exit before Thutmose arrived at the
Aruna exit.56 And finally, another claims the Asiatic commander must
have been incompetent in not taking full advantage of his military forces
to attack the Egyptians at the Aruna exit.57 The Annals do not support
any of these explanations, and all violate the most basic rules of tactics.
What these accounts have in common, however, is their failure to consider
the obvious—that is, Thutmose and his army did not exit the Carmel
Mountains through the Aruna road and indeed had taken another route.
The assumption that Thutmose exited at the Aruna pass is not sup-
ported by the texts. The Annals tell us that Thutmose’s army came out of
the mountains not at the Aruna exit, but at a place called the Kina Valley.
We are told, “Lo, the rear of the army of His Majesty had come out from
the mountain of Aruna [the highest elevation on the Aruna road] while
the vanguard had come forth towards the Valley of Kina—and after they
filled the plain of this valley.”58 Referring to the arrival of the Egyptian
army, the texts say that “the vanguard had come forth toward the Valley
100 h Thutmose III
of Kina.”59 The texts also tell us that Thutmose himself “arrived at the
south of Megiddo at the edge of the Kina valley, when the 7th hour was
turning in the day.”60 And finally, “behold, now that his Majesty has come
forth together with his troop of nhtw [elite troops, or probably Pharaoh’s
battle guard] and they have seized the valley.”61 The Kina Valley, therefore,
should be distinguished from the Esdraelon Plain upon which the Aruna
road exits. There does not appear to be a text reference that supports the
assumption that the Egyptian army debouched from the Aruna road on
to the Esdraelon Plain. The evidence points instead to Thutmose and his
army arriving at the Kina Valley.
Illustration 4.3 depicts the important terrain features around Me-
giddo relevant to our understanding of Thutmose’s movements to the
battlefield. The Kina Valley is a narrow strip of flat flood plain approxi-
mately 254 meters at its widest and 82 meters at its narrowest point. It
begins at the mountains’ edge in the south, runs north a little longer than
a mile, and ends in an exit on the plateau sitting about a mile in front
of Megiddo. The area within the valley affords sufficient space to accom-
modate an army of ten thousand men.62 From its source in the mountains
the Kina brook runs the length of the valley to the flat land, where it
crosses the top edge of the Esdraelon Plain and eventually empties into
the Kishon River. Low forested hills run along both sides of the valley,
presenting an obstacle to attack from the flanks. The Asiatic chariot task
force blocking the Aruna exit would have had at least one mile of hills
and forest between them and the Kina Valley route, making it impossible
to see, hear, or intercept the Egyptian army moving toward Megiddo
through the valley.
Approaching the Megiddo plateau along this route, the Egyptian
army could have easily moved straight ahead, crossed the Kina brook,
and deployed on the plateau. When Nelson reconnoitered the terrain, he
found the stream at the Kina bend to be fifteen to twenty feet deep and
enclosed by almost perpendicular banks.63 The Egyptian army did not,
therefore, cross at the Kina bend but at a place a short distance back down
the valley, where the valley floor was separated from the raised plateau
by a shoe-shaped low hill. Crossing over the “instep” of the shoe, the
Egyptian army could have gained the plateau in front of Megiddo with
little effort. Advancing through the Kina Valley, Thutmose would have
4.3. Megiddo and its Environs
arrived behind both chariot task forces guarding the road exits at Ta’anach
and Aruna and could have assembled his army on the plateau without
opposition.
Before outlining Thutmose’s route to the Kina Valley, a word of
caution is in order. The locations of roads in antiquity, especially roads
that traversed plains and agricultural areas, usually cannot be determined
102 h Thutmose III
with any confidence. These roads’ locations shifted over time, mostly in
response to the rise and fall of new towns and changes in commerce. Only
those roads that traversed mountains might be located with some certainty.
Roads that crossed mountains in antiquity followed courses marked
out by nature, and the wadis and passes that existed then still exist.64 In
determining the route Thutmose used to cross the mountains and arrive
at the Kina Valley, we may be fairly certain that he followed the wadis
and paths that may be found today with the aid of aerial and satellite
photographs.65
By rejoining Thutmose at his camp at Aruna in the middle of the
Carmel Mountains, we may trace his route to the Kina Valley. The high-
est point on the Aruna road is at modern Mismus, or about three miles’
distance from the Egyptian camp at Aruna. At Mismus, a wide wadi
branches off to the left and may be followed for less than a mile before
it branches into another wadi that debouches on the banks of the far
southern end of the Kina brook. The distance from this intersection to
the Kina brook is about a half mile. The total distance from Mismus to
the Kina brook is two miles, and when added to the distance from the
Egyptian camp to Mismus, the total distance from the Aruna camp to the
brook is about five miles. The drop in elevation from Mismus (944 feet) to
the Kina brook (650 feet) is such that most of the journey is downhill. The
width of the wadi varies from 18 to 22 feet, sufficient to accommodate a
troop column moving four abreast at route step. The route along the Kina
brook to the Kina Valley’s southern end varies in width from 45 meters to
88 meters, and with the brook running through it, the troops were forced
to march along the flood plain on either side of the stream.66 The distance
from where the army first gained the Kina brook to the valley’s south
end, where Thutmose assembled his army, is just a little more than a mile.
Thus, the total marching distance from the Aruna camp to the assembly
area in the Kina Valley is approximately six miles. At a rate of two miles an
hour downhill, it would have taken the Egyptian army about three hours
to cover the distance.
The texts tell us that Pharaoh was awakened early on the morning
of May 19, suggesting that the army also began its march very early in the
day.67 Sometime around 9:00 a.m., with Thutmose leading it, the Egyp-
tian army’s advanced guard arrived at the Kina Valley’s far southern end.
4.4. thutmose’s route to the kina valley
“Behold, now that his Majesty has come forth together with his troop of
nhtw and they have seized the valley.”68 The rest of the army was still
on the road “bound for the path of Aruna while the vanguard had come
forth toward the valley of Kina.”69 The reference to the path of Aruna
seems not to be to the Aruna road but to the path that led from the road
to the Kina brook.
104 h Thutmose III
When the army’s units began arriving at the southern end of the
valley, Thutmose’s generals became concerned that the king might move
precipitously and enter the plateau in front of Megiddo before the entire
army was assembled. They pleaded with him to wait until the rest of the
army arrived.70 Thus, “lo . . . he [Pharaoh] sat on a stool there awaiting the
last of his troops.”71 The texts are precise as to when the army’s rearguard
completed the march and reached the assembly area. The texts tell us, “Lo,
the last of the arrears was coming forth from this path when the shadow
turned.”72 The reference is to the shadow clock the Egyptians used to
tell time, and the reference to the turning of the shadow is to the noon
meridian, or high noon. The rear of the army arrived in the Kina Valley six
hours after the vanguard began its march.
By noon of May 19, Thutmose’s army had reached the Kina Valley
undetected and was only a mile away from the opening leading to the
Megiddo plateau. Thutmose must have begun preparing his army for
battle in case he had to fight his way onto the plateau. The texts are silent
on the details, but certainly he would have assembled his army into their
combat formations. He would also have directed some of his chariot units
to screen the army’s movement onto the plateau. Elite heavy infantry units,
either the King’s Braves or the strong-arm boys, probably led the column
to protect against attack. None of this movement should have taken more
than a few hours, so that by 3:00 p.m. Thutmose would have been ready
to cover the last mile from the assembly area to the plateau upon which he
planned to debouch his army, establish his camp, and fight the battle the
next morning.
That Thutmose gained the plateau without opposition is clear
from the texts: “At the coming forth by His Majesty [against that enemy]
who was readied with numerous battle units, he did not find a single
enemy. Behold, the [Asiatic] southern attack force was [still] at Ta’anach,
while the northern attack force was stationed at the southern shoulder
[corner] of the territory of Megiddo.” Although the northern task force
had anchored its flank on the southern corner of the brook, it failed to
detect Thutmose’s passage onto the plateau. It probably missed him
because when the Egyptians crossed the “instep” of the low hills farther
down the valley from its opening near the brook, the hills and thick forest
screened his route from the Asiatic position. Moreover, the Kina brook ran
between the plateau and the Esdraelon Plain. Its depth and steep banks
at the southern corner effectively turned the stream into an obstacle to
chariot movement from the plain to the plateau. Had the Egyptians been
discovered debouching upon the plateau, the northern task force would
not have been able to mount an attack.
Thutmose established his camp on the plateau about a mile from the
city.73 He had more than three hours of daylight to arrange his camp and
make his preparations for the following day.74 The Egyptian armies of the
New Kingdom regularly established a fortified camp on campaign and
especially so on the eve of battle. The Egyptian camp was rectangular in
shape and surrounded by a ditch deep enough to disrupt a chariot attack.
Entry to the camp was over a bridge traversing the ditch and ran through
a single gate. The earth from the ditch was piled up to form a berm upon
which a wall of the infantry’s shields was constructed.75 The shields were
strapped to the soldiers’ spears or held to the spears by passing the shafts
through the shields’ handgrips.76 The spear was then driven into the
ground, holding the shield upright. Since disarmed soldiers are of little
use in warding off an attack, each soldier slept on his reed mat behind his
shield and spear so he could react quickly in the event of an attack. Inside
the wall, the camp was arranged around Pharaoh’s war tent, which was
located in the middle of the compound.77 The tent’s entrance was oriented
to the east, the direction of the rising sun god, Ra. Pharaoh’s chariot and
elite infantry battle guard surrounded the king’s tent. All other units,
animals, tents, and other equipment were positioned for handy access.
The texts do not tell us when the Asiatics became aware of the
Egyptians’ presence, but it must have been shortly after they began to
debouch on the plateau. There is no information concerning the Asiatics’
reaction. One can reasonably imagine, however, that messengers were
dispatched to the units guarding the Ta’anach exit with orders to redeploy
to Megiddo. The units guarding the Aruna exit must have redeployed
as well. There is no evidence of any contact between the opposing
forces; however, it is reasonable to assume that the Asiatics conducted
reconnaissance. The Asiatic forces reassembled at their battle camp
located close to the walls on the city’s south side. It was dark by the time
all the Asiatic forces and commanders could be gathered together in the
camp, and the evening must have been spent deliberating how to deal
106 h Thutmose III
with the formidable Egyptian army that sat on the plateau only a mile
from Megiddo’s gate.
Although he had achieved strategic surprise, Thutmose’s position
was by no means free of danger. His army was tired, and the falling dark-
ness raised the specter of a night attack. Although he held the numerical
advantage, Thutmose had no way of knowing if other Asiatic chiefs and
their armed contingents were closing on Megiddo to join the planned
invasion force. If they were en route and arrived soon, Thutmose would
lose his advantage and be forced to fight against a numerically superior
foe. The only way to reduce this risk was to attack quickly before addi-
tional Asiatic forces arrived. As darkness enveloped the Egyptian camp,
Thutmose ordered his troops to be fed and provided food from his own
stores for his men. The officers were treated to a mess dinner with their
commander. Sentries were posted around the camp and ordered to be
steadfast and watchful. The officers went through the ranks, ordering the
men, “Prepare yourself! Ready your weapons!” They had to be ready to
fight in the morning.78
The Battle
The texts do not provide a complete account of the battle. Thus, the historian
is forced to glean clues from an analysis of the terrain, the nature of the
combatants, and the basic principles of tactics the armies used during the
period. This said, it is still possible to construct a reasonable account of
the battle consistent with all the information available.
The battle took place on May 20, the twenty-eighth day after the
Egyptian army set out from its base at Sile and the day after completing its
crossing of the Carmel Mountains. Thutmose was awakened early, and his
commanders immediately briefed him. Pharaoh was told that “the desert
is well, and that the northern and southern troops are safe also.”79 This
report has led some to suggest that the two wings of the Egyptian army
had already been deployed during the night and had established their
forward battle positions to the north and south of Megiddo. Moving large
bodies of troops in the dark, however, would have been unprecedented
for armies of the period and is not plausible. More probably, Thutmose’s
officers told him that the army had not suffered any attacks during the
night and was safe in camp. The phrase “the desert is well” is probably
best rendered as “all is well” or even “we have the good ground.” The
king was assured the army was in good shape and ready to be deployed
for battle.
Thutmose gave “instructions for the entire army to be spread out for
fighting, while His Majesty will proceed on a chariot of fine gold furnished
with his battle-gear, like Horus strong-of-arms.” The army was ordered to
break camp and assemble in two wings, which they called horns, and to
begin moving into position for the attack. “The southern wing of the army
of His Majesty [is deployed] towards the southeastern tower over the
edge of the Kina; the northern wing towards the northeast of Megiddo.”80
Pharaoh himself led the chariot force in the center.81 “And then His Majesty
was entirely powerful at the head of his army.”82 From this point forward,
the Annals offer no further details about the battle.
Thutmose’s goal of capturing Megiddo could not have been achieved
without first defeating the Asiatic army defending it. In antiquity, two
factors largely determined tactical deployment: the relative numbers of
the combatants and the terrain upon which the battle was fought. By
gathering his forces beneath the city’s walls, the Asiatic commander
had already chosen the terrain for the battle. Once his plan to stop the
Egyptians at the Aruna and Ta’anach passes had failed and the Egyptian
army had deployed on the plateau, the Asiatic commander had no choice
but to pull his forces back and assume a defensive position. The Asiatic
armies’ strength and composition also influenced its tactical deployment.
The Asiatic force was chariot heavy and supported by chariot runners
and small contingents of infantry. As noted earlier, this force comprised
some 1,000 chariots, about the same number of chariot runners, and 150
to 300 or so heavy infantrymen. The chariot grooms could also have been
pressed into service, but they would have been largely ineffective in battle.
The Egyptian army numbered between 10,000 and 12,000 trained troops,
including archers, light and heavy infantry, and two 500-vehicle chariot
brigades. Although the chariot forces of both combatants were equal, the
Egyptians possessed an advantage in infantry. Whereas the Asiatic army’s
combat arm of decision was chariotry, the Egyptians’ arm of decision was
infantry. It was to be expected, then, that Thutmose would rely heavily on
his infantry while the Asiatic commander relied on his chariotry.
108 h Thutmose III
Considering that chariots are unstable when used on uneven ground

and useless in steep or wooded terrain, the terrain around Megiddo
severely limited the Asiatic commander’s tactical options. Megiddo lies at
the far end of a south-north elongated ridge. The terrain to the city’s rear
and east is very steep. While the terrain is less steep to the west, it is still
too steep for chariots.83 Chariots can be usefully employed on only one
place on the ridge, and that is to the south along the gently sloping ground
leading down from the ridge to the plateau upon which the Egyptian army
was encamped. The distance from the city to where the lip of the plateau
reaches the beginning of the incline is approximately one mile. The slight
downward slope, for a drop of thirty-three yards over one mile, provided
a small advantage to the Asiatic chariots in that it forced the Egyptians to
fight uphill.
The battle was fought within a tactical box approximately one mile
long from north to south and 460 yards wide from west to east. The
western edge of the battlefield was bordered by a row of low hills. Two
hills marked the boundary to the east, but they presented no obstacle to
infantry maneuver. Along the battlefield’s eastern edge, beginning on the
lower plateau and running farther to the east, was the Kina brook. An
infantry force moving north along the eastern boundary of the tactical
box could sweep its flank along the brook for a few hundred yards before
the brook meandered away from the battlefield and became useless as a
tactical obstacle.
A 460-yard-wide tactical box becomes a very small place when
attempting to deploy 2,000 chariots and 8,000 infantry within it. Two
chariots arranged abreast attacking in line occupy 9 yards of space. Thus,
100 chariots arranged in line would have required 900 yards, or twice the
width of the Megiddo battlefield. This does not take into account the
space required for the Egyptian infantry to occupy both flanks. The Asiatic
camp, therefore, was forced close to the city’s walls out of necessity. There
was little space to place it anywhere else. The battle space at Megiddo was
so small that it deprived both commanders of any ability to maneuver
tactically. The battle must have quickly turned into an intense, close-
order chariot-infantry melee. In this kind of combat, numbers convey
an advantage and the intensity of the battle can quickly overwhelm the
soldiers’ psychological endurance, leading to rapid collapse and a rout.
The terrain and the Asiatic troop deployment forced Thutmose to

deploy his chariots in the center and his two infantry wings on the flanks.
It is possible that the Egyptians shortened their infantry line by thickening
the depth of their formations, thereby gaining greater room to maneuver
to their front. Thutmose would have sent chariot units to act in concert
with his infantry to counter the arrow fire of the Asiatic chariots operating
laterally across the Egyptian infantry’s front. Chariot tactics are often
misunderstood. It is commonly believed that they attacked in long lines,
almost wheel to hub, with the purpose of delivering shock by colliding
with the opposing chariot line or with infantry formations. This was rarely
if ever the case.84
The chariot’s combat speed was no faster than a trot or canter.
Anything faster risked exhausting the horses and overturning the vehicle.
Chariots usually attacked in small packets or squadrons of ten to fifty
vehicles, depending on the tactical circumstances. Against enemy chariots,
the idea was to get close to the enemy vehicle and take down the horse,
driver, or archer with bows or javelins as the vehicles moved en passant.
Once the chariot lines passed through each other, they wheeled about
and engaged in individual combats. Thus, a chariot attack resembled a
polo match in which the horses trotted to the point of contact and then
wheeled about, putting on great bursts of speed for short distances to
gain an advantage on the adversary.85 Chariots could not shatter infantry
formations by crashing into them. Horses will not drive headlong into a
body of troops, especially when the troops are pointing their spears or
shields at the animals’ eyes. Instead, chariots attacked infantry formations
by riding parallel to them at a safe distance, twenty or thirty yards, while
placing aimed-shot arrow fire into the infantry’s ranks. Infantry archers
returned fire while the ranks moved forward to close the gap between
them and the chariots and used their spears to strike the charioteers or
horses or to thrust between the spokes of the chariot wheels. Once the
infantry closed with the chariots, a melee ensued as the chariot runners
tried to defend their vehicles and animals and the charioteers dismounted
to join the fight.
Given the confines of the battle space and his numerical disadvan-
tage, the Asiatic commander probably divided his chariot force into three
elements, using the greatest number of machines to contain the Egyptian
110 h Thutmose III
4.5. tactical disposition of forces at megiddo
Megiddo
Asiatic
Camp
Asiatic
Chariots
Egy an
Inf ptian g y pti y
ant E antr
ry Inf
Egyptian
Chariots
Egyptian
Camp
infantry. The narrowness of the tactical box meant, however, that only one
side could deploy a small number of chariots along the center axis at one
time, giving neither force a numerical advantage. If we assume that a third
of the Asiatic chariot force, or some three hundred vehicles, was deployed
to the front, some six hundred vehicles could be employed against the
Egyptian infantry. All things considered, the Egyptian infantry was the
greater menace because of its numbers and position on the flanks, where
it threatened to envelop the Asiatic chariots attacking in the center.
The tactical challenge for the Asiatic commander was how to stop the
Egyptian infantry from moving inward in the battle space and gradually
compressing the area in which the Asiatic chariots could operate. Three
hundred machines in, say, companies of fifty each employed against the
Egyptian infantry on each flank were capable of delivering continuous
withering arrow fire against the enemy only as long as the chariots re-
mained at a safe distance as they rode, company after company, across
the Egyptian front. If the Egyptian infantry advanced too far into the
tactical box, the distance between the infantry and chariots diminished on
both sides of the battle space until the chariots were unable to maneuver
and found themselves awash in a sea of Egyptian spear and ax-carrying
infantry.
Thutmose sent some squadrons of chariots to support his infantry
wings. The mission of these detached units was to engage the Asiatic
chariots attacking the infantry and disrupt the rhythm of their attack, thus
allowing the Egyptian infantry to advance deeper into the battle space. Like
the Asiatic commander, Thutmose could deploy only a limited number of
chariots along the central front at one time. He could, however, hold some
in reserve, a capability the Asiatic commander did not have because of his
smaller numbers. As the battle space contracted, the Asiatic chariot units
in the center risked being cut off as the infantry closed in behind them.
Unable to contain the infantry advance, the Asiatic charioteers attacking
in the center would have been forced to turn back to save themselves,
creating an opportunity for Thutmose to increase the pressure on the
Asiatic front by committing his reserve chariots to the fight.
It is not difficult to imagine that when the Asiatic charioteers, strug-
gling to hold the flanks, saw their comrades racing to the rear, they
broke contact and attempted to flee to the safety of the city. Goedicke’s
rendering of the texts suggests that the Asiatic force commanders became
overwhelmed and took flight first, abandoning their troops.86 He argues
that the commanders must have panicked because they left such valuable
items as their horses and chariots behind.87
112 h Thutmose III
With the enemy falling back, Thutmose had an opportunity for great
slaughter. The charioteers who fled to the northwest had to make their
way down the steep banks behind the city. This terrain was so steep that
they were forced to abandon their chariots and horses and make their
way on foot. Others fled directly west into the valley and safety. Those
who retreated toward the city were trapped between the Egyptians and
the city walls. The Egyptians might have made quick and deadly work
of them had they not stopped to plunder the Asiatic camp.88 This loot-
ing allowed the fleeing troops time to be lifted to safety by the city’s
inhabitants, who pulled them up on the glacis that protected the city’s
southern approaches. By the time Egyptian troop discipline was restored,
the remnants of the Asiatic army had reached safety, and the chance to
crush the enemy on the battlefield was lost. The small numbers of dead
(83) and captured (340) suggest that the battle, while intense owing to
the disparity in numbers and the small battle space, did not last long and
that most of the charioteers escaped. Many of the dead were probably
infantry, and the 83 killed in action amounted to almost one-third of the
engaged infantry troops.89
The Siege
Thutmose was furious at having been denied a battlefield victory because
his professionally trained and led army suffered a lack of discipline.
Without capturing Megiddo, the strategic situation in Canaan remained
unchanged insofar as Egypt had not established itself as the dominant
power in Canaan. Thutmose knew his failure to bring the rebels to heel
would further lay bare Egypt’s weakness and tempt the Mitanni to
encourage other insurrections among the Canaanite principalities. If the
Egyptian military effort was going to be a strategic success, Megiddo had
to be taken. Thutmose tells us his reasons for wanting to capture the city:
“Lo . . . all the rebellious chiefs of all the northern towns are in it and the
capture of a thousand towns is the capture of Megiddo.”90
Why not storm the city then? The Egyptians had already taken cities
by storm during the wars against the Hyksos and constructed and demol-
ished fortifications in Nubia. Egyptian pry bars and primitive battering
rams worked well enough against mud brick walls, and Egyptian soldiers,
with their shields strapped to their backs like turtle shells for protection,
knew how to overcome walls with scaling ladders.91 But Megiddo’s case-
ment walls were faced with stone, rendering the Egyptians’ tools useless.
The city’s geography also made an assault difficult. Megiddo was located
on an elongated ridge that narrowed at its northern end to a point totally
occupied by the city. The west, east, and north sides of the city sat directly
over the steep slopes of the ridge, forming an additional natural defense.
The city could be assaulted only from the open flat plain to the south.
The key to storming a city successfully is having the numerically
superior attacking force mount simultaneous assaults against the city’s
walls at multiple points, making it impossible for the defender to quickly
shift sufficient forces against the many points of attack. Megiddo’s geo-
graphy permitted an assault only against the southern wall, thereby negat-
ing the Egyptian attackers’ numerical advantage. To capture Megiddo,
Thutmose would have to do it by siege.
Laying siege to Megiddo made sense on other grounds as well. First,
Megiddo was a rich city in a strategic location and held several vassal
towns in its orbit. Destroying it would only require the Egyptians to
rebuild it later and would weaken its hold on the vassal towns. Better
to take it intact and thus preserve its political influence along with its
fortifications. Second, Megiddo’s harvest was still in the fields, so the
city’s inhabitants were forced to live off the diminished stores left over
from winter. Thutmose could, therefore, reasonably plan on the siege
being short, as indeed it turned out to last only thirty-seven days.92 Third,
Megiddo’s formidable geography could be turned against it. The city’s
high walls, built closely on the steep drops on three sides, made it unlikely
that the city’s defenders could escape or mount combat sorties from any
direction except through the south gate. There was no need then to waste
the army’s time and hard physical labor in constructing a wall around
the entire city. Thutmose had only to build a wall to seal off the southern
gate. The small effort needed to isolate the city gave the army time to
confiscate the harvest, terrorize nearby towns into submission, and take
sheep, cattle, goats, and horses as war booty from the surrounding vassal
towns. Finally, Thutmose had no way of knowing if an Asiatic relief force
was converging on Megiddo. With only a small part of his army needed
to enforce the siege, he had sufficient manpower remaining to conduct
reconnaissance and deal with any relief force that appeared.
114 h Thutmose III
While the siege continued, Thutmose and some troop contingents

pillaged three other towns in the area whose chiefs had supported the
chief of Megiddo. The Annals identify the towns as Yenoam, Nuges,
and Herenkeru, but their locations cannot be identified with certainty.93
The Annals do not record any fighting in capturing these towns, and it
is likely that with Megiddo’s fate all but sealed, they threw open their
gates to the Egyptians. Thutmose’s troops took what they wished, and he
personally received oaths of loyalty from the chiefs of all the towns. The
Egyptians imposed a system in which the towns were to supply tribute
to Egypt on a regular basis. “Now the arable land was made into fields
and entrusted to controllers of the king’s house to reap their harvest.”
Pharaoh’s bailiffs would oversee the lands and give a portion of the
harvest to Egypt each year. This or some similar system of oversight was
imposed on Megiddo’s former vassals, who were now vassals to Pharaoh.
The Egyptian army recorded the grain and livestock it took from Megiddo
and its vassal towns. The list of captured items includes 2,250 horses, 1,929
head of cattle, 2,000 small goats, and 20,500 sheep along with 27,500 sacks
of grain.94 The army consumed much of these items during its forty-day
operation in and around Megiddo.
Megiddo surrendered on June 27, sixty-six days after the Egyptian
army had left its base at Sile. Besides the chief of Megiddo, the surrender
mentions only a specific group of people called “the hill-dwellers of
Retenu.” Retenu (not to be confused with Retjenu) is the Egyptian name
for the Canaanite hinterlands, probably including the upper part of the
Jordan Valley but not the Beqqa Valley.95 These chiefs were the minor
vassals of Megiddo’s chief and surely not the powerful chiefs of the major
principalities of Syria and their large troop contingents who had not yet
arrived when Thutmose attacked Megiddo. The minor status of these
vassals is further indicated by the fact that after pledging their loyalty to
Thutmose, they were permitted to return to their old positions and lands.96
The texts do not mention what happened to the chief of Kadesh, except
that some royal furniture ostensibly belonging to him was confiscated. If
the leader of such a powerful city-state as Kadesh had been taken prisoner,
it would have been a major event that would surely have been recorded in
the official Annals. If the enemy chief had been captured, he would have
been shipped back to Egypt as a great prize of war and, in due course,
executed. Thus, just as the other powerful Syrian chiefs, apparently the
chief of Kadesh had not arrived at Megiddo in time to take part in the
battle.
Local vassals approached Thutmose before he left Megiddo and
begged him to establish a garrison in the area “to control the nomads.” The
most likely place for a garrison near Megiddo to quell the desert nomads’
raids was at Beth Shean. This town later became the strategic linchpin
to Egypt’s control of the Galilee and the King’s Highway interior road
to Syria. It was probably Thutmose who first established this important
town as an Egyptian garrison.97
The capture of Megiddo placed authority over the key communi-
cations routes from Egypt to Canaan, Syria, and Mesopotamia firmly in
Egyptian hands. The victory also resulted in the submission of other
towns in the Syrian-Canaanite zone. Thus, Kadesh and Tunip had to be
concerned about the presence of Egyptian power within striking range of
their cities. By extending the frontier of the Egyptian sphere of influence
northward and by demonstrating Egypt’s willingness to use force to in-
sure its interests, Thutmose III tied the towns of southern Canaan more
closely to Egyptian security interests, just as they once had been during the
Thutmose I’s reign. There would be no more revolts in Sharuhen or Gaza.
Thutmose’s defeat of the incipient coalition of would-be invaders
at Megiddo was the first step in reversing the serious decline in Egypt’s
influence and prestige that had taken place during the reigns of Thutmose
II and Queen Hatshepsut. The new Egyptian king had served notice to the
Syrian princes and their Mitannian masters that Egypt considered Canaan
to be within its own proper sphere of influence and that it intended to
remain the dominant power on the Canaanite-Syrian land bridge. The
Egyptian hold on Canaan was still tenuous, however, and Egypt had
much to do before it could safely turn its back on its new vassals. The
Mitannian attempt to extend its influence within the Egyptian security
zone had been prevented, but Egypt remained on the strategic defensive
for the time being.
5
The Campaign in Canaan
The surrender of Megiddo in June found Thutmose’s army healthy, un-

diminished by casualties or hard labor, and in fighting condition. Much
of the campaign season was still available for further military operations.
The foodstuffs taken as booty after the battle were more than sufficient to
sustain the army for weeks. The harvest was now available in northern
Canaan and southern Lebanon, so logistically the Egyptians could easily
support any extension of the Megiddo campaign by living off the land.
Moreover, because Megiddo’s harvest was vital to feeding the Canaanite
cities, which were not usually agriculturally self-sufficient, Thutmose
could seize the harvest and be in a position to starve the recalcitrant towns
into submission once winter set in.1 Thutmose possessed the right military
instrument in the right place at precisely the right time to continue the war
against his enemies. He did exactly that.
Thutmose was an excellent strategist, and he realized that the in-
surgencies the Syrian chiefs and their Mitannian supporters instigated
would not end with his victory at Megiddo. An immediate Egyptian
withdrawal from Canaan would only allow the antagonists to fill the
vacuum and encourage more rebellions. The former Canaanite vassals
of Megiddo who had sworn their loyalty to Thutmose were weak reeds
and could not yet be depended upon to resist renewed pressure from the
Syrian city-states once the Egyptians left. Finally, numerous Canaanite
chiefs who had supported the Syrian cause still had to be convinced that
their interests lay with a new loyalty to Egypt. Whatever Thutmose chose
to do, the one thing he could not do was to return to Egypt.
117
118 h Thutmose III
Thutmose was facing these problems because of Egypt’s past stra-

tegic failures. Thutmose I, the king’s grandfather, had once succeeded in
establishing Egyptian influence all the way to the Euphrates River, where
he defeated a Mitannian army and erected a victory stela on the banks of
the great river. But the king had failed to establish garrisons in the newly
acquired areas. Instead, he left commercial agents to represent Egyptian
power. During his successors’ reigns, Thutmose II and Hatshepsut paid
little attention to maintaining Egyptian power and prestige in Canaan and
Syria. Those Canaanite chiefs who remained loyal to Thebes saw their
entreaties for help against Syrian encroachments go ignored. As the new
Mitannian state grew in power, it gradually pressed its influence south-
ward, using the Syrian city-states as cat’s-paws and finally precipitating
the crisis with which Thutmose III was then forced to deal. The young
king did not intend to make the same mistake his grandfather had. Egypt
had once more come to the land of Canaan. This time, however, it intended
to stay.
From Megiddo, Thutmose turned his army northwest and marched
on upper Canaan and southern Lebanon, the land of Retjenu. He covered
seventy-five miles in a week and approached the seaward bend of the Litani
River and the southern border of ancient Phoenicia.2 The Litani River’s
headwaters arise west of the city of Baalbek in the fertile Beqqa Valley,
where they are fed by mountain springs. As the Orontes River flows north
from the nearby great springs of Labweh on the east side of the Beqqa,
the Litani flows south, trapped in a deep gorge along the eastern ridge of
the Lebanon Mountains, until it suddenly turns due west at right angles
and pours into the sea some eighty-five miles from its source. It was at the
westward bend that Thutmose aimed his army. At key points along the
river bend sat the towns of Yenoam, Nuges, and Herenkeru.3 The towns
formed a tripolis, or a group of three towns under the control of a single
chief. Thutmose hurled the might of his army at them and overwhelmed
them all.
Their geographical location may have recommended them to Thut-
mose as targets. The towns were clustered within ten miles of the key port
of Tyre. While Tyre was not an ally of Egypt’s and had to play a cagey
game to keep the Syrians and Mitanni at a distance, the city had long been
a friendly trading partner of Egypt’s. Its port was a valuable place to land
troops should that be necessary in the future. By striking at the three towns,
The Campaign in Canaan h 119
5.1. zone of egyptian operations in syria

120 h Thutmose III
Thutmose was also weakening the city of Kadesh’s influence in the area.
The towns were within the city’s orbit to the north and had supported the
Syrian adventure at Megiddo. In addition, the narrow, swift branch of the
Litani River that flows west to the sea constitutes a significant obstacle
to troop movement. By controlling the bend of the river, Thutmose also
controlled the river crossings and the axis of advance leading north from
Canaan to Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos.
No account of the battle for the three towns has survived, but the
list of plunder taken includes the chief’s furniture, suggesting that there
was some resistance. The Annals tell us that some “non-combatants who
surrendered because of famine” were also taken, which suggests a siege.4
Perhaps one or two of the less defended towns were overtaken quickly, and
the chief and nobility held out longer in the capital. In all, 2,505 individuals,
including 87 children of the chief and the nobility, were taken.5 In a quick
encore to Megiddo, Thutmose had struck at some of Kadesh’s allies in its
own backyard. Kadesh could not have failed to receive the message.
To make his point even more clearly, Thutmose established a “fortress
in the land of Retjenu . . . which his majesty built in his victories among the
chiefs of Lebanon, the name of which is: Menkeheperre [Thutmose III]-is-
the-Binder-of-the-Barbarians.”6 The Egyptians had regularly applied this
title to the Hyksos. The location of this fortress is uncertain, but it was
probably close to Tyre or Sidon.7 We have no information concerning the
garrisons Thutmose left behind at Beth Shean and Megiddo, but they were
probably similar to those he established later throughout the empire and
patterned after those the Egyptians used to control Nubia. These garrisons
were usually small and sometimes doubled as supply depots. The troops
within them often had commercial representatives, scribes, and, we may be
sure, intelligence officers living among them. The garrisons were primarily
listening posts and symbols of Egypt’s willingness to come to their troops’
aid if attacked, for they lacked the manpower to defend themselves against
a concerted assault. These kinds of permanent garrisons had permitted
Egypt to turn its sphere of influence in Nubia into something resembling
an imperial administrative structure responsible for collecting taxes and
enforcing the loyalty of the local chiefs to Egypt.8
The Egyptians kept a firm grip on the political structure of the oc-
cupied chiefdoms in which the garrisons were located. Some of the local
rulers were permitted to retain their title of kings, and others were called
only village chiefs or headmen. Upon the death of a local ruler, a successor
was chosen from the royal house, and Pharaoh sent the oil of anointing
or a ring confirming his investiture of the new chief. A council of elders
hemmed in the local chief’s authority. An Egyptian official called a resident
often played the council off against the chief while keeping all local officials
in check. The resident also fixed the annual tax owed to Pharaoh and acted
as a court of appeal in settling local disputes. His chief duty, however,
was to see to it that the chiefs remained loyal and responsive to Egyptian
wishes.9 The resident had the support of the local Egyptian troop garrison.
With garrisons established on the bend of the Litani River, at Megiddo,
and at Beth Shean, Thutmose had created a trip wire extending from the
sea to the Jordan Valley. Staffed by observers, overseers, military officers,
and messengers, the garrisons’ personnel could keep a close eye on the
danger to the north and provide a warning of any Syrian or Mitannian
movement.
It is evident from later events that Thutmose intended to implement
a new strategic doctrine as part of an innovative Egyptian national defense
strategy aimed at securing the Egyptian homeland by controlling political
and military events far to the north in the Syrian zone of operations. In
Thutmose’s view, the defense of the Nile began at least at the Litani River
and, as events developed, even at the west bank of the Euphrates River.
Egypt had pursued commercial interests in the Syrian zone for centuries,
mostly through trade. For most of its history, Egyptian imperialism had
been confined to expansion in Nubia, with Asia remaining only of com-
mercial concern. The Egyptians’ view changed with the Hyksos invasion.
Expelling the Hyksos in the early Eighteenth Dynasty forced Egypt to be
concerned with events in Asia. Thutmose I had expressed this concern in
an aggressive foreign policy of military operations and punitive expedi-
tions into Syria and as far north as the Mitannian border on the Euphrates.
His successors discontinued this policy, however, with almost catastro-
phic results for Egyptian security. Now, Thutmose III had revived and
extended the thrust of his grandfather’s policy in a new national security
doctrine.
His strategic paradigm was rooted in the same assumptions that
underpinned Thutmose I’s strategic doctrine. The first premise was Egypt’s
122 h Thutmose III
need to develop a capacity to maintain and deploy large military forces

over long distances. Thutmose I first recognized that Egypt required a
larger and more professional army in the wake of the Hyksos expulsion.
Thus, once those improvements were made, Thutmose I himself led the
army on a long-distance expedition to Asia and marched six hundred miles
to the banks of the Euphrates. Thutmose I also introduced the strategic
concept of projecting Egyptian national power over great distances. The
second premise of Thutmose I’s security doctrine was its articulation of
Egypt’s main national security threat as originating from Mitanni and
Syria, both new areas of strategic concern for Egypt. The consolidation of
Mitannian power on the Euphrates and its extension southward became
the dominant strategic rationale for defining Egyptian security interests
and determining Egypt’s responses in Asia. Egypt’s view of the Mitanni
was not dissimilar to how the United States came to see the Soviet Union
as the main threat to its national security during the Cold War.
Thutmose I abandoned the old, defensive national security doctrine
in favor of a new, proactive emphasis on expanding Egyptian influence
and power far beyond the frontiers of Egypt itself as a means of preventing
the formation of Syrian-Mitannian strategic threats in the Asian theater
of operations. While Thutmose I saw the need for expanding Egypt’s
borders to the east, he did not live to carry it out. His successors neglected
to follow through on the new strategy, permitting Egypt to once more rely
on its old defensive doctrine of national security policy.
After Megiddo, and perhaps even before he became king in his own
right,10 Thutmose III was determined to pursue his grandfather’s strategic
vision and be successful. He adopted the same strategic template and
introduced new methods for executing it. Once a city or town had been
taken, Thutmose might replace the chief with someone more compliant or
permit the chief to remain, requiring of him a public oath of submission.
The oath required the chief to renounce his previous loyalty and make
a “request for breath” in which the chief swore a new oath of loyalty in
return for which Pharaoh presumably granted him his life.11 Part of the
ceremony involved delivering the chief’s children before Pharaoh, who
then chose the chief’s sons and other important relatives for deportation
to Egypt, where they were held as hostages.
The first example of this practice appears in an inscription in the

temple at Karnak that lists the cities Thutmose captured in Retjenu during
his first campaign.12 The practice of hostage taking is not mentioned in the
account of the battle of Megiddo, and it is probable that the inscriptions
relate to the early campaigns in southern Lebanon undertaken immedi-
ately after Megiddo. Thus, taking children as hostages may have first
occurred when Thutmose captured the three towns on the Litani River,
although we cannot be certain.13 Later in the Annals we are told the purpose
of this practice: “Behold, the children of the chiefs and their brothers were
brought to be in strongholds in Egypt. Now, whosoever died among
these chiefs, his majesty would cause his son to stand in his place.”14 It is
important to note that Thutmose took the chief’s brothers as well as his
sons, both of which represented the family pool out of which future chiefs
might come. As long as Thutmose controlled this pool of royal heirs, there
was little chance of hostile governance except by outright insurrection.15
As to whether the hostages were kept in strongholds or castles in
Egypt, clearly there would have been no point in replacing a dead, executed,
or recalcitrant chief with a son or brother who had been maltreated while
in Egypt. Part of the purpose of holding the sons in Egypt was to expose
them to the superior Egyptian culture and convince them of the benefits of
remaining loyal to Pharaoh. It does not help our understanding, however,
that the Egyptian hieroglyph used in the texts to identify where the
hostage sons were kept is Swhn m Y p’t, which can mean either a castle or a
prison!16 In whatever manner it was accomplished, the taking of hostages
clearly indicated that Thutmose was thinking strategically about how the
townspeople’s loyalty might be secured over the long term. Thutmose’s
victories were the means to the greater goal of establishing a permanent
Egyptian presence in the lands he conquered.
Mindful of his grandfather’s failure to adequately demonstrate the
Egyptians’ presence, power, and prestige by willingly resorting to force
when necessary, Thutmose undertook regular inspection tours of his
holdings in Canaan and Syria. At first these tours were conducted with
Pharaoh himself in command of a military contingent that could be used
to discipline a recalcitrant chief or punish any failure to comply with
Egyptian wishes. Once Egyptian resolve was established, however, these
demonstrations of Egyptian presence became an annual routine in which
124 h Thutmose III
a senior officer and a small armed contingent made the rounds. One func-
tion of these tours was also to ensure that Pharaoh’s annual tribute was
paid completely and on time.
One of Thutmose’s more innovative methods of controlling the sub-
dued population was to extend the tax system that the Egyptians had
established in Nubia to Egyptian possessions in Asia. Egyptian accountants
established regular tax payments that had to be delivered to Egyptian
agents on a scheduled basis. Much of this in-kind payment went to sup-
port the army, the administrative structure, and the local garrisons, and
the rest was sent to Egypt. At the height of Egyptian rule, the area of
Retjenu alone paid nearly nine thousand pounds of gold annually into the
Egyptian treasury.17 Metalworkers, shipwrights, artisans, wheelwrights,
carpenters, and other skilled craftsmen were also deported to Egypt,
where they found work in military or temple workshops.
Most onerous for the conquered people was the tribute in men. At
the end of each campaign, large numbers of captives were brought back
to Egypt, where they were set to work as corvée laborers in Thutmose’s
prodigious building programs. Thutmose III carried off more than 7,300
Canaanite captives. It is no coincidence that the peak of Thutmose’s public
works building program coincided with his military victories.18
The Second,Third, and Fourth Expeditions

By October, Thutmose and the army were back in Thebes, where a great
celebration and feast was held to commemorate Pharaoh’s victory at Me-
giddo. The situation in Canaan and southern Lebanon remained unstable,
and in the spring (regnal year 24) Thutmose undertook a second campaign
in Canaan and Syria.19 That Thutmose had to put down rebellions in
Gaza and Sharuhen before marching to Megiddo suggests that many
of the Canaanite chiefs had supported the Syrian adventure or at least
were prepared to join it had it shown signs of succeeding. Egypt had to
reestablish control over these disloyal chiefdoms before it could turn its
attention to Syria proper. In the spring of 1480 BCE, Thutmose and his
army marched through Canaan and southern Lebanon in a show of force
and to deal with the disloyal chiefs.
The Annals do not tell us the size of Pharaoh’s army, but we might
reasonably surmise that it was considerable. Not knowing what he might
find, Thutmose probably erred on the side of caution in order to deal
with any eventuality that might arise. A combined-arms division of five
thousand men and a brigade of five hundred chariots would probably
have been sufficient. There is only scant evidence of fighting. But in at least
one instance Thutmose may have fought a set-piece battle against a people
called the Fenkhu in which he “overthrew the foreigners.”20 Evidence
also shows that Thutmose dismantled some towns’ fortifications.21 The
Egyptians would have destroyed the most formidable fortifications,
particularly those situated in the highlands and those that controlled
strategic passes. There is considerable evidence that this destruction was
widespread and forced the Canaanite population out of the hills and into
the valleys and settlements on the coast.22 This was a traditional method of
rendering a fortified town vulnerable to future punishment. For the most
part, however, it is likely that the Canaanite chiefs saw an opportunity to
switch sides and retain their kingdoms by opening the gates of their cities
and pledging loyalty to Egypt.
The price of Egyptian “protection” did not come cheap, however.
Thutmose levied a heavy burden of tribute upon the chiefs. The campaign’s
records show that “the tribute of the chiefs of Retjenu” amounted to
“103 horses, 5 chariots, wrought with gold with poles of gold; 5 chariots
wrought with electrum, with poles of gold; total 10; 45 bullocks and
calves, 749 bulls, 5,703 small cattle [sheep]; flat dishes of gold; flat dishes
of silver . . . 823 jars of incense; 1,718 jars of honeyed wine.”23 The gold-
and electrum-covered chariots were the prized personal transports of the
chiefs, and taking them was no doubt fraught with symbolism regarding
who was to be master in the future. Thutmose may have left small garrisons
in the larger towns along with scribes and accountants to enforce the new
Egyptian tax system. Some of these towns were turned into supply depots
so that the Egyptian army might draw on them whenever it was required
to take the field in the area.
For each of the following two years Thutmose and an Egyptian mil-
itary contingent marched through Canaan and southern Lebanon, rein-
forcing the Egyptian presence and bringing other chiefs under Egyptian
control. There are no detailed records of his third (regnal year 25) and
126 h Thutmose III
fourth (regnal year 26) campaigns. That problems continued to arise

seems evident from the texts, which note, “His Majesty proceeded to
Upper Retjenu to subdue all the countries according to the command of
his father, Amun, who put them beneath his sandals.”24 Yet other areas
of Canaan were sufficiently secure so that Thutmose could entrust the
task of leading the military contingent and collecting the annual tribute
to others rather than lead it himself.25 Still, it is significant that Pharaoh is
described as leading these campaigns in person, a clear indication of their
importance to the cause of Egyptian security.
It seems to have required three years of successive demonstrations
of wielding military power and threats, dismantling fortifications, taking
hostages, levying heavy tributes, and instituting enforced loyalty oaths
for Thutmose to bring all of Canaan and parts of southern Lebanon under
effective Egyptian control following the victory at Megiddo. Over the
next two years the new system of Egyptian hegemony was reinforced by
regular military visits—albeit with generals, not Pharaoh, leading smaller
contingents—and the imposition of small military and commercial
garrisons that oversaw the operation of the tax system. That such an effort
was required over five years to pacify Canaan and southern Lebanon
implies that many of the Canaanite chiefs had been in league with the
Syrians and accomplices in their attempt to invade Egypt. This broad
support also indicates how weak the Egyptians’ influence had become
in Canaan during Hatshepsut’s reign. With substantial support from the
Canaanite chiefs, the attempt to conquer Egypt might well have succeeded
had not Thutmose III clearly grasped the grave nature of the threat and
moved quickly to destroy it at Megiddo.
The Fifth Campaign

The Annals are silent on Thutmose’s activities from regnal years 26
through 28, but it is reasonably certain that he continued to strengthen
Egypt’s hold on Canaan. As we shall see, Egypt was also occupied with
building its first seagoing navy, which was to play such an important role
in Thutmose’s later campaigns. In regnal year 29, Thutmose embarked on
a major military expedition deep into Lebanon, the first advance beyond
the northern limits of the initial campaign at Megiddo. The years of effort
to win over the cities and towns of Canaan now paid dividends in that
Thutmose could move north with little concern about revolts occurring
across his line of communications. Moreover, the newly established
supply depots made it possible to support the army logistically on its long
march from Egypt to southern Lebanon, a distance of more than three
hundred miles. Troop contingents from the garrisons stationed in Canaan
were added to the army as it marched toward its objective. The size of
Thutmose’s expeditionary force is not recorded, but it must have been
considerable. The expedition took Egyptian forces deep into Retjenu and
engaged allies of the Mitanni—namely, Kadesh and Tunip—that were of
particular concern since they maintained substantial forces and were close
to Thutmose’s zone of operations in Retjenu. It is unlikely that Thutmose
would have risked an operation in such a hostile environment without
substantial forces at his disposal. The Egyptian army may well have
numbered around ten thousand troops.
The immediate cause of the Egyptian incursion was a change in the
status quo in the vicinity of Byblos, a major port on the Lebanon coast.
The Annals portray the events as a revolt against Egypt occurring in Zahi,
the Egyptian name for coastal Lebanon.26 In Egyptian thinking, any sort of
disorder anywhere was considered a revolt against Pharaoh, who, as the
divine son of Amun, was responsible for keeping order in the universe.27
In fact, Egypt did not control the coastal plain, and the revolt was nothing
of the sort. The crisis arose when the city-state of Tunip, located inland
from the coast and just west of the Orontes River, sent troops to establish
garrisons at Wahlia and Ullaza, two towns located at the western mouth
of the Eleutheros Valley north of Tripoli and about thirty miles north of
Byblos. In addition, Tunip concluded an agreement with the local Apiru
to serve as mercenaries in support of these garrisons.28 The result was
that Tunip was now in a position to control the coastal entrance to the
Eleutheros Valley. Its coastal garrisons were daggers pointed at the key
port of Byblos.
Byblos had been an important strategic port for Egypt since at
least the Middle Kingdom and perhaps before. It was an absolutely vital
commercial source of Egypt’s strategic materials. It was through Byblos
that Egypt secured the Lebanese cedar and Syrian pine that it needed for
its ships, chariots, temples, and fortresses, and Byblos was the main source
of imported tin, the all-important strategic metal needed to manufacture
128 h Thutmose III
5.2. locations and distances in the canaanite-syrian

Zone of Egyptian military operations
Sile to Megiddo: 230 miles

Sile to Gaza: 125 miles
Gaza to Yehem: 80 miles
Yehem to Canaan Border: 43 miles
Canaan Border to Tyre: 14 miles
Tyre to Sidon: 22 miles
Sidon to Beirut: 25 miles
Canaan Border to Byblos: 82 miles
Byblos to Eleutheros Valley: 30 miles
Ullaza/Simyra: Controls Western
Mouth of Eleutheros Valley
Arvad: 62 miles north
of Byblos
Arka Plain to Kadesh: 40 miles
Tunip to Arka Plain: 30 miles
bronze weapons. The port was also a key diplomatic and commercial
listening post from which Egypt could keep watch on the city-states of
Kadesh, Tunip, Qatna, and the Mitanni to the north.
Also of important strategic and commercial concern was that the
Eleutheros Valley connected the interior trade and military routes along
the Orontes to the Lebanon coast.29 Through this valley ran the Great River
(the modern Nahr al-Kabir, or the Eleutheros River of classical times)
that began as a tributary of the Orontes and exited in the sea between
Ullaza and Simyra on the coast. The Great River ran through the Arka
Plain, watering one of the most fertile agricultural areas of Lebanon and
providing an avenue upon which to transport the plain’s agricultural
products to the coastal ports.30 Without access to the Eleutheros Valley,
Egypt was cut off from its supply of cedar, which grew in abundance
in the Lebanon Mountains. Moreover, the valley offered an ideal route
for the armies of Kadesh, Tunip, and Mitanni to quickly reach the coast
from the interior, threatening Egyptian interests in the area.
In the event of war with the Mitanni, Egyptian avenues of advance
through the interior of Lebanon were already hindered by Kadesh, which
controlled the exit from the Beqqa Valley along with the routes leading
north from Canaan to the Euphrates. Before the Egyptian victory at Me-
giddo, Kadesh had controlled this route from its base on the Upper
Orontes as far south as the Esdraelon Valley in Canaan. The Egyptian
victory at Megiddo had reopened the land route through the Beqqa Valley,
but it was blocked farther north by the fortress city of Kadesh itself. This
situation placed a premium on the route that ran along the Lebanon coast
and connected to the Syrian interior via the Eleutheros Valley, whose
eastern exit debouched close to Kadesh. Tunip’s deployment of troops to
Ullaza and Wahlia had effectively blocked access to both the coastal road
and the Eleutheros Valley and brought the Arka Plain and its enormous
agricultural production under Tunip’s influence. The forward deployment
of Tunip’s troops along the coast also threatened Byblos itself. These cir-
cumstances constituted a significant shift in the strategic power equation
on the Lebanon coast, one that Egypt could not accept. In the spring of
Thutmose’s twenty-ninth regnal year, he led his army out of Egypt toward
southern Lebanon with the goal of reversing the situation.
Thutmose’s expedition was fraught with risk. Ullaza and Wahlia
were closely tied to Tunip, and Tunip and Kadesh were allied with the
Mitanni, who had a significant interest in keeping Egypt out of Syria and
Lebanon. Thutmose was forced to gamble that his confrontation with the
Mitannian client-states would not provoke a larger confrontation with the
Mitanni themselves. If he was wrong, the young king would find himself
caught at the end of a long supply line in a battle with a major power.
Thutmose proved to be a gambler and moved to protect Byblos and
130 h Thutmose III
Egyptian interests on the Lebanon coast. He accepted the risk of engaging

the Mitanni and pressed ahead daringly.
Once more we have no idea what size army Thutmose employed,
but again it was probably considerable given the strength of the forces
it might be forced to confront if Kadesh, Tunip, or even the Mitanni
became involved. The 330-mile journey from Egypt to Byblos at 10 miles a
day—and they stopped every seventh day to rest the animals and prevent
injury to their backs and to permit them to graze—took the Egyptian army
thirty-eight days to complete.31 The Egyptians moved up the coastal road
along the Way of Horus. The road was easily traveled until they reached
the area south of modern Caesarea. There, five small rivers flowed onto
the Sharon Plain,32 creating a great swamp and forcing the army to move
inland and climb the ridge near modern Zichron Ya’kov to bypass the
obstacle.33 Once back on the coastal road, the route passed the ancient city
of Dor and around the Antelope’s Nose, where the Carmel Mountains
drop precipitously toward the sea, leaving a passage barely a hundred
meters wide between the water and the mountains. From there the road
rises toward Lebanon, crosses the border at a place the Bible calls Jacob’s
Ladder, and finally gains the plateau near the Litani River. The Egyptian
garrison at the tripolis controlled the narrow Litani River crossing, which
the army traversed with little difficulty. It marched the remaining 75 miles
to Byblos without incident.
Thutmose’s objective was to capture Wahlia and Ullaza, the two
towns guarding the mouth of the Eleutheros Valley 30 miles north of
Byblos. Between Byblos and the objective, however, was the town of
Ardata guarding the Cold River crossing. The Annals are confusing in that
they portray the attack on Wahlia and Ullaza as occurring before Thutmose
attacked a town called Arvad.34 A scribe who was unfamiliar with the
area’s geography may have made this error and confused Arvad with
Thutmose’s other goal, Ardata. Arvad lies 62 miles north of Byblos and is
a small port obstructed by a series of offshore reefs; therefore, it cannot be
the rich agricultural area that the texts described as having been pillaged
by Thutmose’s army.35 With this confusion out of the way, we may now
attempt to reconstruct Thutmose’s campaign on the Lebanon coast.
Having replenished and rested his army at Byblos, Thutmose
moved straight at Ardata, seizing it and the Cold River crossing. It was
harvesttime, and “behold, there were found [the products] of all Zahi
[coastal Lebanon]. Their gardens were filled with their fruit, their wines
were found remaining in their presses as water flows, their grain on the
terraces [which] was more plentiful than the sand of the shore.”36 For
whatever reason Thutmose decided to punish Ardata. The texts tell us that
he ordered “the cutting down of all its pleasant [fruit-bearing] trees . . .
and the army was overwhelmed with their portions. . . . Behold, the army
of his Majesty was drunk and anointed with oil every day as at a feast in
Egypt.”37 One can only imagine what outrages may have been committed
against the civilian population by the Egyptian army when it was allowed
to run amok in the town. Thutmose could hardly leave Ardata across
his line of communication as he moved north, and perhaps the town’s
punishment and the Egyptian garrison left behind were designed to
ensure that Ardata would present no difficulties once the Egyptian army
moved on.
Thutmose now moved against his primary objective, the two towns
that contained Tunip troop garrisons and controlled the western mouth
of the Eleutheros Valley. The garrisons comprised troops from Tunip
itself (“the infantry of that foe of Tunip”),38 local Apiru who had cast their
lot with Tunip,39 and what the texts describe as T-h-r warriors, or Hittite
mercenaries.40 Thus, the Egyptians encountered largely professional
enemy soldiers. It is difficult to believe that the towns were taken without
fierce resistance, although no account of the fighting is preserved in the
Annals. A. T. Olmstead, relying on a restored lacuna in the inscriptions,
suggests that in the capture of Wahlia, “its chief and 329 inhabitants
[troops?] were taken and sacrifices offered to Amun.”41 Whatever the level
of resistance, Thutmose succeeded in capturing the two towns and their
troops’ garrisons.
The Arka Plain is one of the most productive agricultural areas in all
Lebanon. Thutmose ordered the entire harvest and much of the livestock
seized. Thus, we are told that the loot included “51 slaves, male and female;
30 horses; 10 flat dishes of silver; incense oil, 470 jars of honey, 6,428 jars of
wine, copper, lead, lapis lazuli, green feldspar, 616 large cattle, 3,636 small
cattle [sheep].”42 Most significant was that all the “clean grain in kernel and
ground” (raw cereals and those already milled) was confiscated.43 Once
again, “the army of his Majesty was drunk.” Whatever of the booty the
army did not consume while it sat in Lebanon or was needed for supplies
132 h Thutmose III
on its return march was loaded on ships confiscated in either the port of
Simyra or Byblos and sent back to Egypt. Pharaoh took ship and sailed
for home as well. That Thutmose could entrust his army to a subordinate
to lead it safely back to Egypt reveals how much the Egyptian policy had
pacified southern Lebanon and Canaan. The Egyptians no longer had
anything to fear from disloyal chiefs.
Thutmose’s gamble had paid off. Neither Kadesh nor the Mitanni
had come to Tunip’s aid, and Tunip accepted the defeat of its proxy forces
without any reaction. Thutmose had enjoyed six years of military suc-
cesses; however, he had yet to engage a major military opponent. But the
Egyptian military expeditions were costly, took up much of each year’s
campaign season, and wore the army, its equipment, and its animals to the
nub. Egypt’s most dangerous enemy, the Mitanni, lay behind the Euphrates,
safely beyond the Egyptian army’s operational reach. Even expeditions
against the heavily fortified cities of Kadesh, Tunip, and Qatna could not
be undertaken except at the end of a very long and easily disrupted supply
line. Either Thutmose would have to find some way to extend the range
over which his army could project force without inordinate risk, or he
would have to abandon the strategic objective of weakening the Mitanni
and creating an Egyptian strategic buffer zone in Syria.
Two capabilities were required to increase the Egyptian army’s
operational range. First, it needed a large forward logistics base that could
sustain the army in the field as it conducted operations in the interior zone
of Syria and, eventually, several hundred miles farther northeast against
the Mitanni on the west bank of the Euphrates. The situation was similar
to what the Romans and Scipio Africanus later faced in their campaign
against the Carthaginians in Spain during the Second Punic War (218–201
BCE). Rome easily reduced Carthaginian power north of the Ebro River
but could not strike at Carthage’s center of gravity in Spain without first
obtaining a large logistics base to support Roman operations farther south
and in the interior. Scipio Africanus solved the problem by attacking New
Carthage, the largest Carthaginian logistics base in all Spain. With New
Carthage in his hands, Scipio launched a series of offensives to the south
that eventually drove the Carthaginians from the country.
Thutmose’s coastal campaign had driven Tunip from the mouth of
the Eleutheros Valley, opening the invasion route from the coast to the
interior. Of greater importance, the Egyptians’ success had gained them

access to the Arka Plain. Full of fertile fields, small towns, and livestock
and situated close to port facilities, the Arka Plain could provide all
the logistics support the Egyptian army required to conduct sustained
operations in the Syrian interior and north to the Euphrates. When the
Egyptians returned to the land of Retjenu, the first thing they did was
seize the Arka Plain and turn it into a huge supply depot.
But inadequate logistics were only part of Thutmose’s problem. To
engage the Mitanni near the Euphrates required a march of more than five
hundred miles from Egypt. Even assuming sufficient logistics, the wear
and tear on the army could considerably reduce its combat power by the
time it had to go into action against the enemy. At ten miles a day with
the required rest stops for the animals, the Egyptian army would need
at least sixty days to reach the Euphrates. It would be impossible for the
Egyptians to achieve strategic or tactical surprise, and they would have
only a short time for campaigning before the army would have to turn
for home in order to arrive before the season ended. All along the way,
the army would be exposed to insurgent attacks by Mitannian allies and
Apiru mercenaries. Thutmose needed a faster, cheaper, and more efficient
way of transporting his army into the area of operations. His solution was
the Egyptian navy.
6
The Campaign for the Lebanon Coast
From the time of Thutmose I, Egyptian national security policy in Asia

was concerned with two geographic areas, Canaan and Syria. Egyptian
interests in Canaan were centered about the country’s proximity to Egypt
and potential use as a strategic platform for invasion. Although Canaan
possessed few goods or materials that Egypt required, the trade routes
that ran through the country were important to Egyptian commerce.
Even before the Hyksos invasion, Egypt had undertaken periodic raids
into Canaan to disrupt the formation of Canaanite coalitions that might
prove hostile to Egypt. These raids were preemptive or punitive search-
and-destroy expeditions, and the Egyptians made no attempt to garrison
Canaan or to bring it within their political-economic orbit. With regard
to Syria, particularly coastal Syria (modern Lebanon), Egyptian concerns
were largely economic insofar as the coastal ports were the sources of
important strategic materials (cedar, various woods, and tin) and outlets
for Egyptian goods.1 No pharaoh before Thutmose I had regarded Syria
as a strategic threat to Egypt itself. But the rise of the Mitanni and their
continued interference and growing influence in Syria forced Egypt for
the first time to regard Syria as a danger.
The Sixth Campaign

Thutmose III came to the throne determined to reduce the danger of the
Asian threat by imposing Egyptian political and economic control on
Canaan and bringing the full weight of Egyptian military power to bear
135
136 h Thutmose III
against those Syrian states he regarded as dangerous to Egyptian security

interests. He spent almost six years imposing Egyptian control on Canaan.
That done, in his twenty-ninth regnal year he took an army to the Lebanon
coast to protect Egypt’s supplies of strategic raw materials and keep open
the ports and ground routes to the Syrian interior. This campaign served
as a valuable reconnaissance in preparation for his next move. Thutmose
was then prepared to deal with the Syrian threat in earnest. In his thirtieth
regnal year, he attacked the Lebanon coast with the goal of transforming
the area west of the Lebanon Mountains into a strategic platform for
conducting further military operations.
Several tasks had to be accomplished before coastal Lebanon could
be turned into an Egyptian strategic platform. First, Thutmose intended to
come by sea to avoid the debilitating land march across Canaan. Thus, he
would need a seagoing navy and control of Canaan’s and Lebanon’s ports
for use as stopping points along the way. The Lebanon ports had to be
captured and garrisoned to ensure their availability to Egyptian seaborne
armies. Second, he had to establish political control over the Arka Plain
and the coastal agricultural regions to obtain the necessary food and
supplies to support the army’s operations in the interior. Once taken, the
ports and towns along the coast had to be transformed into supply depots.
Third, Thutmose had to gain control of the Eleutheros Valley, the vital
land route from the coast through the Lebanon Mountains to the Syrian
interior. This attempt would inevitably bring Egypt into conflict with the
powerful city-state of Kadesh, which guarded the valley’s eastern exit. It
also risked engaging Tunip and Qatna and, eventually, the Mitanni.
Capturing the coastal agricultural towns presented few difficulties
for the large Egyptian army. The residents of these towns were commercial
and trading people whom history would later come to know as the
Phoenicians. They were unlike the fierce warrior people who populated
Syria’s interior. The agricultural towns were not well fortified, and their
social structures were made up of farmers and merchants who lacked a
warrior tradition and experience in war. The governing structure was
weak and constructed around small palace economies.2 The govern-
ments comprised a headman or chief, a council of advisers, a semi-free
peasantry, and a small military contingent, which often represented only
a handful of professional maryannu mercenaries who served as the
The Campaign for the Lebanon Coast h 137
chief’s personal bodyguards.3 Neither the leadership nor the citizenry

were likely to mount much resistance to an Egyptian invasion, especially
since only their political loyalty and not their existence, trade, or freedom
was at stake.
The ports were also vulnerable to a determined Egyptian attack.
In antiquity, few harbors possessed any notable port facilities. Piers and
artificial breakwaters were rare.4 Instead, ships pulled up to open stretches
of beach on the shore, and men unloaded their cargoes in the surf. All the
Lebanon coastal towns had areas of open shoreline where an amphibious
force could easily come ashore and seize the port. Most of the port towns
were unfortified, and only a few possessed a defensive citadel of sorts.
Once an invading army was ashore, it readily controlled the key assets of
the town, that is, the landing area itself and the nearby storage facilities.
Under these circumstances, the town had little left to defend, and surrender
and some sort of accommodation usually followed.
Thutmose’s army could not expect to have such an easy time, how-
ever, when it came to capturing the towns in the interior of Syria. The
inland city-states had long been occupied and controlled by a fierce
warrior people who were, perhaps, the same people who had once invaded
Egypt and whom the Egyptians called the Hyksos. Certainly in Egyptian
eyes they were the same people. The interior towns were larger than the
coastal towns, had larger populations, and were governed by a nobility of
professional maryannu warriors whose skill and experience at war was
surely equal to that of the Egyptians and probably greater. These towns
were like fortified camps, and warrior nobility originally constructed
some of them as military camps to control the local inhabitants and the
countryside.5
Qatna provides a typical example. Qatna lay three days’ journey
from Kadesh, about halfway between Aleppo and Damascus, and was one
of the largest Bronze Age cities in Syria. Constructed on a small stream that
flowed into the nearby Orontes River, its rectangular defensive enclosure
measured longer than a thousand yards on each side. A three-hundred-
foot-wide ditch surrounded the town. The distance from the bottom of the
ditch to the top of the walls was sixty-five feet. Each of the four walls had
a fortified tower protecting a wide main gate through which chariot forces
could sally forth to engage an attacking enemy. The gates themselves and
138 h Thutmose III
the surrounding walls were made of limestone blocks. A single narrow

bridge crossed the moat ditch and passed below projecting walls from
which defenders could sweep the bridge with arrow fire.6 These fortified
Syrian cities were almost impossible for the Egyptians to take by storm.
If they were to be taken at all, it would have to be by siege. Given the
Egyptians’ lack of siege machinery that could defeat stone walls, any
siege would amount to little more than a campaign of waiting until the
defenders’ food ran out and forcing them to surrender.
The Egyptian Navy

To carry out his campaign against the Lebanon coast, Thutmose introduced
one of the most remarkable innovations in warfare and became the first
commander in history to conduct large-scale amphibious operations
on the open sea.7 Egypt was a river state, and its only practical way of
transporting troops and supplies was by boat on the Nile. By the Third
Dynasty, Egyptians were building boats that were 100 cubits long (1
cubit=1.7 feet) and 30 cubits wide8 and capable of carrying eighty to a
hundred tons of cargo.9 The Egyptians first used their navy in support of
ground operations in the Fifth Dynasty (2480 BCE), when Pharaoh Sahure
transported troops to the Syrian coast. In the Sixth Dynasty (2340 BCE) a
troop commander, Weni, conveyed Egyptian troops in “travel ships” to
the Antelope’s Nose (at the end of the Carmel Mountain ridge) near Haifa
to deal with a revolt of the Sand People.10 These naval operations on the
open sea were small expeditions in support of raids and not sustained
campaigns. Further, they were not repeated until Thutmose III conducted
the “first great amphibious operations in history.”11
Egyptian naval operations had been traditionally confined to
the Nile, where they played an important role in the wars of liberation
against the Hyksos. Kamose’s victory stela tells us how he transported
his army aboard ship to battle with the occupiers. The king sailed up and
down the river, using his fleet as a mobile base from which to deploy his
troops. Ahmose I, his successor, used ships to bring the Hyksos capital
of Avaris under siege. His attempt to retake Nubia could not have been
accomplished without the river navy to transport troops and to push the
southern frontier to Buhen. His successor, Amenhotep I, used the navy
to extend Egyptian control farther south beyond the Second Cataract to
Semneh. Thutmose I carried his troops in ships past the Second and Third
cataracts, crushing Nubian resistance as far south as Kerma. With Nubia
once more under control, the Egyptians dug canals to bypass the cataracts
and carry out heavy naval and commercial traffic over long distances on
a regular basis.
The Egyptian navy was an integral branch of the army and not a
separate military service. Its importance, however, was evident in that
many naval officers were drawn from the Egyptian nobility.12 Under
Thutmose I, the focus of Egyptian military operations shifted away from
Nubia toward Asia, and the need for a land warfare capability became
paramount. Then the navy became an independent branch of service and
was relegated to a minor role whose mission was to keep the Nile River’s
traffic open to Nubia. Neither Thutmose II nor Hatshepsut showed any
interest in the Egyptian naval arm, and the construction of naval ships
declined considerably. The once important Egyptian navy fell into decay.
Thutmose III rebuilt the Egyptian navy and ordered the construction
of a large dockyard and military base on the site of the old Hyksos capital at
Avaris, turning it into a major port city on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile.13
Just when Thutmose completed the construction of the Perunefer base is
unclear, but it may have been near the end of his campaigns in Canaan. It
is not impossible, however, that the old dockyards at Memphis remained
the main supplier of ships and the major port of military debarkation
for Thutmose’s earlier campaigns in Syria, and it may have been during
his later campaign against the Mitanni that the new facility became fully
operational. A lord of the Egyptian Admiralty, Nebamun, was appointed
fairly early in Thutmose’s reign, and some high-ranking army officers
were transferred to naval commands, perhaps indicating that the higher
ranks of the old navy had fallen into poor condition.14 The importance
that Thutmose attached to the new naval facility can be judged by his
appointment of his son, Amenhotep II, to command the dockyard and
troops stationed at Perunefer.15
With the Memphis dockyard working overtime to supply the new
navy’s expanded needs, Thutmose had to acquire additional skilled sailors
and craftsmen from outside Egypt. Syria and the ports of Canaan were full
of experienced shipwrights, rope makers, and sailors who could be hired
away with the promise of steady work and Egyptian gold. Most Egyptian
140 h Thutmose III
boat captains only had experience sailing on the Nile, and Thutmose’s
navy intended to sail upon the open sea. Attracting captains with seafaring
experience must have been a priority. Compared to Canaan, life in Egypt
was good. The country was peaceful and food plentiful, and recruiting
people with the necessary skills could not have been much of a problem.
Thutmose’s intention to use the navy in support of his overseas
campaigns in Syria explains why he moved so rapidly in his fifth campaign
in regnal year 29 to stop Tunip’s encroachment on Wahlia and Ullaza and
the threat it presented to Byblos. Control of the Eleutheros Valley was
vital to Byblos’s ability to access the cedars of the Lebanon Mountains.
The straight, long-running lengths of cedar timber were essential in
constructing large Egyptian transport ships. These timbers formed the
long central strakes that replaced the keels of the carvel-built Egyptian
ships. Cedar timbers were also needed for supporting deck beams, tall
masts, and strong steering oars.16 Any threat to Egypt’s ability to obtain
these cedar timber supplies jeopardized Egyptian naval power at its root.
Having already decided he would use the navy to transport his armies for
his next campaign in Syria, Thutmose moved quickly to reverse Tunip’s
encroachment and restore access to the vital timber supplies that flowed
through Byblos.
Thutmose’s revival of Egyptian naval power in the eastern Medi-
terranean reveals the broad sweep of his strategic thinking. Commercial
trade among Egypt, Canaan, and Lebanon required ships to make frequent
stops along the route. In daylight, ships could make between fifty and
seventy miles in ten hours with favorable winds. They did not usually
sail on the open sea at night, so ships put in to the beach every evening.
Thus, whoever controlled the stopping points along the coast could also
control commercial shipping. Thutmose must have realized the coastal
Lebanon ports were vulnerable to an Egyptian assault from the sea. One
of his primary reasons for rebuilding the Egyptian navy was to carry out
these assaults. Once the Lebanon ports were under his control, he knew no
other port cities in Lebanon or Canaan were powerful enough to mount
a serious threat to Egyptian shipping. Thutmose would then be able to
move his troops and supplies by sea without fear of coastal interdiction.
While a brisk commercial sea trade existed between Egypt and Syria,
it is unclear how much of it was actually carried on Egyptian ships. Much
of the trade seems to have been carried in Syrian hulls. If Egypt could take
over the Lebanon ports, then a great deal of commercial shipping would
have to be carried in Egyptian ships. As soon as Thutmose gained control
of the Lebanon ports, he ordered that all shipping of cedar timber must
be carried on Egyptian ships.17 Thus, the new Egyptian navy provided
commercial as well as security benefits. The major strategic consequence
of Thutmose’s revival of Egyptian naval power was to establish effective
Egyptian control of the eastern Mediterranean coast, which Egypt would
not relinquish for more than two centuries.
The ancient Egyptians were among the oldest civilized societies on
the planet and were perhaps the first people to construct genuine ships.
King Snefru of the Third Dynasty built ships that were 40, 60, and 100
cubits long (58, 102, and 170 feet, respectively) for use on the Nile. The
first example of a seagoing ship, or menesh ship, in Egypt dates from the
reign of King Sahure of the Fifth Dynasty circa 2480 BCE.18 By Thutmose
I’s reign, ships of 100 cubits were commonplace.19 Queen Hatshepsut had
an enormous ship constructed to carry her obelisks from the quarry to
Karnak. According to William Edgerton, “Mr. Francis Elgar, the Director
of Naval Construction to the British Government, calculated that the two
great obelisks of Karnak, each ninety-seven feet, six inches long, could
be carried on a boat about 220 feet long and 69 feet of beam, upon a draft
of water of about 4 feet, 6 inches, or not exceeding 5 feet.”20 Egyptian
ship design, size, speed, and carrying capacity reached their peak during
Hatshepsut’s reign, a development that Thutmose was able to exploit in
his program to expand Egypt’s navy.21
Most ships of antiquity were built on the foundation of a keel to
provide the vessel its longitudinal strength and stability. Ribs or frames
sprang up and outward from the keel at close intervals to support the hull’s
sides, which were further strengthened by deck beams that interlocked
with the ribs. Sometimes deck beams ran through the hull and were
attached to the outside. Modern ships are constructed in much the same
manner. Egyptian ship construction was radically different, however.
Lacking long timbers for keels, ribs, and deck beams forced Egyptian
shipwrights to invent a unique method of shipbuilding. Herodotus re-
corded that Egyptian ships were made of “thorn tree wood,” or acacia, and
were built “brick fashion” in the same way that one would build a wall.22
142 h Thutmose III
Egyptian ships did not have keels and were carvel built as a shell
of planking attached to ribs at comparatively wide intervals. Deck beams
did not interlock with the rib frames in the modern manner but were
secured to the planking of the hull.23 The deck was laid over the beams.
The Egyptians had no nails or screws, so they invented an ingenious
method for joining the planks of the ship’s hull together with dowels
along the edges where one plank joined another. The ends were similarly
held together with dowels. On the inside of the hull, flat double-tongued
mortices overlapped the plank edges, pulling them tightly together and
giving them vertical strength. The planks of the hulls were staggered and
stepped similar to how a mason would build a brick wall so that there
were no continuous seams. The lateral seams of the hull planks were
caulked with papyrus to make them watertight.24
A ship constructed without a keel in the manner described lacked
sufficient longitudinal rigidity to sail upon the open sea. In a rough sea,
the waves would pitch the boat up and down from bow to stern, breaking
the vessel’s back. To prevent this, the Egyptians invented the girt rope
and hog-truss. The girt rope was a papyrus cable wrapped around the
ship’s bow and stern, tightly holding the ends of the hull in place. These
cables also served as anchors for the hog-truss. The hog-truss was a
strong cable that ran longitudinally across the entire length of the hull
and was anchored at each end of the ship. The truss passed over two
“crutches” near each end of the ship, raising the cable off the deck. The
cable was wrapped around a stout pole located between the crutches and
was tightened to maintain tension on the truss cable itself. The hog-truss
provided sufficient longitudinal stability to allow the ship to sail in heavy
seas without risk of breaking in two.25
By Thutmose’s day, Egyptian seagoing ships had evolved stream-
lined hulls; were longer, wider, and deeper than the old Nile ships; 26
and were “comparable to a modern [i.e., present-day] racing craft” in
efficiency.27 At sea, propulsion was by sail, and huge rectangular sails,
wider than they were tall, caught the wind atop masts ranging in height
from six to seventeen meters depending on the size of the ship.28 The mast
was located amidships, was stepped—that is, it could be lowered—and
was held in place with side supports and ropes. The thick linen sails were
controlled by ropes and yards at the base of the sail that allowed the ship
to reach and tack into the wind.29 Steering was accomplished by two aft
steering oars connected to a steering post attached to the loom of the
oars.30 When entering or departing harbors, the ship’s oarsmen managed
the propulsion. They also augmented the ship’s movement in light wind.
A hundred-foot-long ship might have had as many as forty oarsmen.31
Unlike the Nile boats, seagoing ships did not have deckhouses.
The Egyptians developed a standard design and scale for construct-
ing their seagoing vessels that called for a ship to be three times as long as
its beam. Crew strengths were calculated at one crew member per cubit
of length.32 Egyptian ships were transports of various types and were not
built as naval combatants to fight other ships on the open sea. That concept
did not dawn on the military minds of antiquity until late in the New
Kingdom. The first use of naval combatants to fight other ships occurred
during the reign of Ramses III (1186–1154 BCE), who, in the eighth year
of his reign, fought what appears to have been the world’s first saltwater
naval battle against the marauding Sea People at the mouth of the Nile.33
In the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the best time for sailing is from
the end of May through mid-September, when the seas are undisturbed
by storms and the winds are generally favorable from the north and
west at not more than twenty-five knots.34 Under these conditions a ship
could make between four to six knots, or five to seven miles an hour.35
In unfavorable conditions, the speed dropped to between two and three
miles an hour.36 In antiquity, ships put into shore each night for the crews
to eat and sleep. Ports were little more than stretches of beach protected
to some degree by the natural contour of the shoreline.37 Illustration 6.1
shows the sailing distances between the ports Thutmose’s invasion fleet
used in transporting his army across the 340 miles of open sea between
the Nile Delta and Byblos. Where an overland march would have taken
almost six weeks, the sea journey required slightly more than a week to
complete. A sea voyage also avoided the wear and tear on the army that
inevitably accompanied an overland march, so Thutmose’s army arrived
reasonably rested and ready to fight.
Thutmose’s Invasion Force

The logistics of transporting Thutmose’s army of 10,000 infantry and a
brigade of 500 chariots and their 1,000 horses plus another 250 in reserve
144 h Thutmose III
6.1. sailing distances between ports on the

canaanite-lebanon coasts
FFFFF
Sile to Byblos: 340 miles

Sile to El Arish: 67 miles
El Arish to Gaza: 58 miles
Gaza to Yafo: 47 miles
Yafo to the Antelope’s
Nose (Carmel): 55 miles
Antelope’s Nose to Sidon: 33 miles
Sidon to Beirut: 47 miles
Sidon to Byblos: 63 miles
FFFFF
are interesting. If we accept an average Egyptian transport to be 60 cubits

(102 feet) long and 20 cubits (34 feet) wide, we arrive at a ship that is
comparable in size, speed, cargo space, and tons burden to the average
transport used in Roman Republican times.38 These ships could carry
between 80 to 100 tons of cargo and drew about 2 feet of water in draft,
which was shallow enough to permit easy beaching and pushing off.39
These ships could be configured to carry cargo, troops, or horses.40 Using
some basic calculations, we can arrive at a description of Thutmose’s
transports.
The average soldier in antiquity weighed about 145 pounds and
was 5 feet 8 inches tall.41 The Egyptian soldier’s equipment, including ten
days’ rations carried in his knapsack, hide shield, spear, sickle-sword, and
thick leather belt, weighed approximately 60 pounds. Thus, a troopship
had to carry about 210 pounds per passenger. A 100-foot-long and 34-foot-
wide ship could accommodate forty-eight benches arranged front to back
like church pews with a 1-foot aisle running lengthwise between the bench
rows. A bench 20 inches deep afforded sufficient room for an average
soldier to sit with 5 inches of legroom to spare. Allowing a shoulder width
of 24 inches left the soldier 2 inches on either side from the man next to
him. Under these conditions, each bench could accommodate fifteen
soldiers in the two aisles of forty-eight rows, or a total of 720 men per
transport. With their knapsacks stowed beneath the benches and their
equipment stored in boxes on deck, the troops and their equipment
weighed 75 tons, easily within the burden capacity of the ship.
If we make allowances for somewhat more commodious accom-
modations and assume that each ship was required to carry only three
companies of 200 men each—the size of a typical Sa, or company of
Egyptian infantry—then each ship would have to carry only 600 men,
leaving sufficient room for the crew, large quantities of food and water,
and equipment. Under these conditions, the ship’s burden would be only
63 tons. Seventeen troop transports would have been required to transport
Thutmose’s army of 10,000 infantrymen.
We do not know if Egyptian troop transports were decked as their
usual cargo ships were or if they were open-decked barge-like boats in
which men and animals were exposed to the elements during the voyage.
By Roman times both types were in evidence, and the Egyptian ships’
design would not have prohibited the construction of open-decked vessels.
Given the short sailing distances required—no more than a day’s sail
between ports—both types of ships offered advantages and disadvantages.
The main advantage of the open-deck barge was that it presented less
difficulty in loading and off-loading horses, donkeys, and mules. While
146 h Thutmose III
aboard ship, the small loaves of bread, beef jerky, smoked goose flesh or
pork, pressed or dried fruit, cheese, onions, and radishes that the soldier
carried in his knapsack were sufficient to sustain him for the seven- to ten-
day voyage. Water in the soldier’s canteen could be regularly replenished
from the ship’s water casks. As in troopships used in modern wars, the
soldiers took turns being allowed on deck for fresh air and sun. In the
evening, the troops had an opportunity to stretch their legs on shore,
eat, and get some sleep on their reed mats. One attraction would have
been plenty of beer, which was dispensed to keep the troops hydrated
and happy during the voyage.42 Military transports were sometimes
accompanied by small onboard breweries to supply the troops’ beverages.
Except for having to use buckets for sanitary needs, the circumstances of
the Egyptian soldier aboard ship were not much different from those of
soldiers on troopships during World War I.
Horse transports were another matter, however. Horses need a
firm, flat surface upon which to stand, so the internal deck of the horse
transport had to be flat. Thus, the carpenters would have constructed an
inner deck platform in the cargo hold. The obvious difficulties involved in
trying to force a horse into the hold of a decked ship suggests either that
the Egyptians used open-decked vessels to transport their horses or that
the animals were enclosed in railed pens on the cargo ships’ decks. An
average horse is approximately 90 to 115 inches long and 34 inches wide
and weighs about 1,000 pounds.43 The deck or cargo space of an open-
decked boat 100 feet long and 34 feet wide permitted the construction of
90 horse stalls, each 9 feet long and 3 feet wide. A rope and linen sling in
each stall supported the animal and kept it from falling as the boat pitched
in the sea. A rope barrier separated each stall from the one in front of it.
Ninety horses weighed some 45 tons.
It is unlikely, however, that the transports carried this many animals at
a time and still had sufficient space and tonnage for the crew and supplies.
If we assume a load of fifty horses, these animals would have consumed
750 pounds of hay or green fodder, 275 pounds of hard fodder (barley or
oats), and 375 gallons of water per day.44 During a ten-day voyage, 7,500
pounds of hay and 2,750 pounds of hard fodder were required to feed the
animals. It is unlikely that the 3,750 gallons of water (or 15 tons!) needed to
sustain the animals for ten days were carried aboard ship. Certainly some
water was stored aboard to meet the animals’ short-term needs. But when
the ships put into shore each evening, the men had to carry water from an
onshore source to the animals remaining on the boat to ensure that they
were sufficiently watered.
Thutmose could have transported the 1,250 horses needed to outfit
his 500-vehicle chariot brigade in only twenty-five ships and even fewer
if he was willing to load the ships to their full capacity. A chariot brigade
of 500 vehicles included 1,000 soldiers (drivers and charioteers), 500
grooms to handle the horses, and approximately another 400 smiths and
carpenters to keep the brigade fit for combat. Five ships were required to
transport the disassembled chariots and the troops and technicians of the
chariot brigade.45
The greatest danger in transporting horses, mules, and donkeys by
boat was the injury incurred when the animals were being loaded and
unloaded from the boat. A horse’s legs are very fragile and are easily
broken if the animal stumbles. Great care had to be taken, especially so
when unloading the animals from a beached transport or from a transport
swaying in the surf. Equal care had to be taken in off-loading the army’s
2,000 mules and donkeys. The animals required thirty-three ships to
transport them, the largest number of ships for any contingent of the
invasion force. The Egyptians were experienced in transporting animals
by ship, having moved them regularly up and down the Nile. In addition,
the Egyptians’ ability to transport heavy loads, such as limestone and
granite for their construction projects, was unsurpassed.46 It would have
been to Thutmose’s great advantage, however, to be able to assemble large
numbers of these animals in the supply depots once he took possession
of Lebanon’s ports and avoid having to transport them for use in future
campaigns.
Taken together, the invasion force that Thutmose brought against
the Lebanon coast required that approximately 12,000 troops, 500 chariots,
1,250 horses, and 2,000 pack animals be transported by sea. After leaving
Egypt it took some 80 ships, making eight stops along the coasts of Canaan
and Lebanon, a little over a week to reach the port of Byblos 340 miles
distant. Unlike Thutmose’s previous incursion into Lebanon, he undertook
this full-scale invasion to establish the logistics infrastructure to support
further expeditions into the Syrian interior.47
148 h Thutmose III
Invasion
The previous year Thutmose had marched up the Lebanon coast to re-
move the threat to Byblos after Tunip seized and garrisoned Ullaza and
Wahlia in an attempt to choke off Egypt’s access to the Eleutheros Valley
and the cedar supply. Thutmose captured both towns as well as the
agricultural town of Ardata to the south. Having captured the towns’ troop
garrisons, Thutmose seems to have returned home without establishing
his own garrisons at either Ullaza or Wahlia. This oversight proved to be
a mistake.
In his thirtieth regnal year, Thutmose attacked the Lebanon coast in
earnest, mounting an amphibious invasion. He left Egypt in early June and
arrived in Lebanon a week later. Although the Annals do not tell us where
he landed, the most logical place was the port city of Simyra, located about
thirty miles by sea from the friendly port of Byblos. Lying just south of
Ullaza, Simyra was the closest port to the mouth of the Eleutheros Valley.48
Thutmose had to land his troops in daylight, so the staging area from which
to launch the invasion’s final phase had to be no more than half a day’s
sail from where the invasion force would eventually come ashore. Staging
from Byblos at dawn, the invasion force would reach Simyra around noon
or 1:00 p.m., leaving six to seven hours of daylight to off-load their ships,
move inland, and establish a defensive perimeter around the beachhead.
Satellite photos of the coast around Simyra reveal a long and gradually
inclined coastline that must have been perfect for beaching the shallow-
draft Egyptian transports. Eighty transports separated from one another
by fifty yards required just more than a mile of open beach to land and
discharge their cargoes. Simyra’s beach provided more than the necessary
landing area.
The troops were awakened early at Byblos, fed, and loaded on the
transports where their weapons and equipment were distributed. As the
troopships approached the beach, companies of soldiers left their benches
in the ship’s belly and made their way to the deck, where they could
jump overboard in the surf. Others followed as quickly as they could.
Once the infantry had secured the beach, the ships carrying the chariots
and horses began to unload. Elite chariot units unloaded their vehicles,
assembled their horse teams, and formed their units before moving inland
with the infantry. The mission of these advanced units was to deal with
any resistance and to locate a suitable site for establishing a field camp.
The Egyptians met no resistance, and the landing and encampment went
smoothly. By dark, the army was ashore and safely established behind
their field camp’s shield wall. The first phase of Thutmose’s campaign had
gone off flawlessly.
If the texts present an accurate chronology, Thutmose’s first combat
operation was to move against the city of Kadesh, the source of much
of the troublemaking in Asia over the years. It took several days for the
army to get organized before Thutmose could begin his march to Arka,
the largest agricultural town in the heart of the Eleutheros Valley. There he
rested and prepared his army for the march to Kadesh, which lay about
five miles to the south of the far eastern end of the valley, or about forty
miles or four days’ march from the coast. As Thutmose’s army marched
through the valley, it was well supplied from the produce of the Arka Plain
and the harvests from the valley’s farms.
According to the Annals, Thutmose “arrived at the city of Kadesh,
overthrew it, cut down its groves, and harvested its grain.”49 The tomb
inscriptions of Amenemhab, an officer who fought in Thutmose’s army
during the Asiatic campaigns, support this account. Regarding the action
around Kadesh, Amenemhab’s inscription tells us, “Again I beheld his
bravery, while I was among his followers. He [Thutmose] captured the
city of Kadesh, I was not absent from the place where he was; I brought off
two men, lords as living prisoners; I set them before the king, the Lord of
the Two Lands, Thutmose [III], living forever. He gave to me gold because
of bravery, before the whole people.”50 Amenemhab’s account certainly
suggests that there was a battle of some magnitude at Kadesh. His
reference to his prisoners as “lords” also implies that chariots took part in
the battle, for the term lord refers to the maryannu nobility who served as
chariot warriors. That Amenemhab performed well in battle is clear from
his being decorated by Pharaoh himself before the entire army (“before
the whole people”). The question remains, however, whether Thutmose
actually “overwhelmed” the city of Kadesh.
It does not seem likely that Kadesh fell to Egyptian arms. The city was
well fortified and had a substantial population and professional warrior
class to defend it. According to Olmstead’s archeological research, Kadesh
was located on “a tongue of land between the Orontes and an affluent, and
150 h Thutmose III
protected on the third side by a ditch.”51 The city walls formed a square
400 yards on a side. The ramparts of the walls were nearly fifty feet high
constructed with the earth taken from the surrounding ditch, which was
fifteen feet deep and sixty-five feet across. Towers protected the corners of
the walls.52 The walls enclosed some thirty-four acres. Using Yadin’s metric
of 240 persons per square urban acre to estimate the population of Bronze
Age cities, we arrive at a population of approximately 8,000 to 9,000 people
for Kadesh.53 Relying upon Yadin once more to calculate the percentage
of the population that could be put to its defense, Kadesh’s population
could muster about 2,200 people to fend off an attack.54 In addition, there
would have been a significant contingent of maryannu chariot warriors
to participate in the city’s defense. Kadesh’s defenders could deploy 1.3
men for every meter of wall, a more-than-adequate number to offer stiff
resistance should Thutmose attempt to storm the city.55
To the northwest of Kadesh, where the Eleutheros Valley exits the
Lebanon range, a broad open plain runs to the foot of the city itself. It
was here that Thutmose’s army debouched from its march. The terrain is
ideal for chariots,56 and it is likely that the battle Amenemhab described
was fought here. It may have been that the enemy was surprised by the
appearance of an Egyptian army almost under the walls of Kadesh itself
and hastily sent forth its chariots to block Thutmose’s advance. If so, it
was a tactical mistake. On open ground, Thutmose’s chariots supported
by his large infantry contingent would have had the advantage over the
maryannu charioteers, who would have had only a small number of
infantry in support. If we are to believe Amenemhab, the Egyptians got
the better of the fight, and several enemy charioteers were taken prisoner.
When the maryanna were driven from the field, they sought refuge
behind Kadesh’s walls. Thutmose was then free to “punish” the city in the
traditional fashion by cutting down its fruit trees and seizing its recently
harvested grain.
The Annals’ reference to Thutmose having “overthrown” Kadesh
is probably to his defeat of Kadesh’s maryanna and not to his having
captured the city itself. Had Kadesh been taken, it could have been taken
only by siege, and there is no mention of one having occurred. If we can
trust Amenemhab once more, Thutmose moved north toward Tunip and
Qatna almost immediately after the skirmish at Kadesh, thereby making
it very unlikely that he took Kadesh under siege. Moreover, the capture of
Kadesh would have been an enormous victory and would have merited
much more extensive narration in the Annals than it received. The tribute
lists would also have reflected much greater quantities of booty than they
do. The capture of Kadesh would have certainly resulted in the transfer
of its “vile prince” to Egypt amid great fanfare, and some record of his
execution would almost certainly exist. Nevertheless, Thutmose had still
been able to demonstrate that the main perpetrator of Egypt’s troubles in
Syria was no longer beyond the Egyptian army’s operational reach.
What followed suggests that intimidation, not conquest, was the
purpose of Thutmose’s march into the Syrian interior. Having made his
point at Kadesh, Thutmose turned north and marched up the Orontes. The
Annals tell us that he “came to the land of Senzar.”57 Senzar is probably the
Zinzar of the Amarna texts and is located on the Orontes close to modern
Hamah.58 The march took him through the territories of the powerful city-
states of Qatna and Tunip, and Thutmose put on a dramatic demonstration
of Egyptian military might and his willingness to confront the Syrian cities
on their own ground. Thutmose was playing a psychological game.
Marching almost under the city walls of Qatna and Tunip was risky
business indeed. Thutmose must have been prepared to fight if forced to
and settle the issue of who would control southern Syria and the Lebanon
coast then rather than later. But neither city’s army sallied forth to confront
Pharaoh and his army as it passed. To ensure that the Syrians understood
the scope of Egyptian power and Thutmose’s willingness to use it, he fell
upon the town of Senzar. Located only a few miles north of Tunip, Senzar
was close enough to have been one of Tunip’s vassals, and Thutmose’s
attack was a direct challenge to Tunip to come to its aid. Amenemhab
describes the battle at Senzar: “I beheld the royal victories of the King
Menkheperre [Thutmose III], given life, in the country of Senzar when
he made a great slaughter among them. I fought hand to hand before the
king, I brought off a hand there.59 He gave to me the gold of honor.”60 The
town seems to have been destroyed, and the “great slaughter” may have
been a deliberately bloody lesson to Tunip that it might meet a similar fate.
Tunip made no effort to help its vassal.
Thutmose had taken the measure of the rulers of Kadesh, Qatna,
and Tunip, and he found it wanting. The success of his campaign of
152 h Thutmose III
intimidation can be seen in the fact that after the destruction of Senzar,
Thutmose turned his army around and marched back down the Orontes,
once more passing through the territories of the three city-states. He
presented a direct challenge to them to do battle. It had been at least two
weeks since Thutmose’s army had passed through their territory, more
than enough time for the rulers to prepare their militaries to respond. The
rulers of the Syrian cities should have reasonably assumed that Thutmose
would reverse his course and try to move through the Eleutheros Valley
on his way home. Any other route would have required him to cross
the Lebanon Mountains overland or march hundreds of miles around
the mountains to gain the coast. Again the cities offered no resistance to
Thutmose’s return passage through their territories. He turned west into
the Eleutheros Valley and marched back to his base at Simyra.61
The expedition had been a risky venture, but Thutmose showed
a superb strategic and psychological ability to analyze his enemies and
exploit their lack of resolve. The most powerful city-states in southern
Syria now realized that they were no longer invulnerable to Egyptian
attack. This lesson was not likely lost on the Mitanni, either, who were
watching the events from a distance with growing alarm.
The Egyptian army had been on the march or conducting combat
operations for almost a month by the time it returned to Simyra. After a
few weeks’ rest, Thutmose ordered the army back into action. This time the
target was the port of Arvad, twenty-six miles north of Simyra. The Annals
do not tell us why Thutmose moved against Arvad. Clearly Thutmose
intended to control all the Lebanon ports. The ports to the south of Simyra
either were already in Egyptian hands or, like Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre,
had been on friendly terms with Egypt for years. To the north, Egyptian
control stopped at modern Tripoli. Arvad lay north of Tripoli and was the
last remaining major port in Lebanon outside Egyptian control. Sometime
in late July or early August, Thutmose moved to capture Arvad.
Arvad was located in the center of a north-south line of reefs two and
one-half miles offshore opposite the site of modern Tartus. The island was
only a half mile long and a quarter mile wide, and its surface rose only a
few feet above the waves.62 Arvad was well protected by both natural and
man-made defenses. Submerged reefs and rocks that only the local pilots
could navigate surrounded the island on three sides. Walls of natural rock
that had massive blocks, some as much as fifteen feet in length, enclosed
the perimeter. In some places the rock itself was so large that it had been
hewn to become a part of the wall. To the west and south rose a great
seawall above a natural moat. The island’s water supply was stored in
cisterns. Only on its eastern side, that closest to the mainland coast, was
Arvad vulnerable. Two semicircular harbors separated by a jetty afforded
the only seaborne access to the island.63
Arvad could be approached only by sea, so Thutmose took it by
amphibious assault. His ships and troops were assembled at Simyra, and
it was but half a day’s sail up the coast to Arvad. The city’s small size could
hardly sustain a population of more than a thousand souls, insufficient
to mount significant resistance. A small contingent of five troopships
carrying three thousand men would have been a sufficient force to take
the island. With no other place to land, the Egyptians came ashore at the
island’s two eastern harbors. Resistance would have been futile, and none
was recorded in the texts. The island’s palatine government saw that its
interest now rested with swearing allegiance to Egypt in order to keep its
freedom and maintain its lucrative trade.
After capturing Arvad, Thutmose embarked on an inspection tour
of all the cities and towns from Simyra north to Arvad and west past Arka
and into the Eleutheros Valley to accept oaths of loyalty from the rulers
who now recognized Thutmose as their sovereign and whom he accepted
as vassals. The texts tell us that the rulers of thirty-six principalities swore
oaths of allegiance to their new king.64 But Thutmose was too realistic a
politician to rely upon their oaths alone. As he had done in his earlier
campaigns, Thutmose took some chiefs’ sons as hostages. Thus, the texts
say, “Behold, the children of the chiefs and their brothers were brought
to be in strongholds [castles?] in Egypt.”65 As time passed and the old
rulers died, their sons were returned from Egypt and succeeded them
with the expectation that they would support Egyptian interests. No
doubt Thutmose intended that Egypt would control the Lebanon coast
for a long time.66
The sixth campaign had been a success. Thutmose had shown the
world how to conduct a large-scale amphibious invasion, a military cap-
ability heretofore unknown in antiquity. His invasion of the Lebanon coast
gave Egypt a new military advantage that greatly increased its ability to
154 h Thutmose III
project its power throughout the Levant. The Egyptians could now respond
more rapidly to any rebellion or crisis and deploy large numbers of troops
in ready fighting condition hundreds of miles from Egypt’s shores. He
expanded on the new amphibious capability by demonstrating his ability
to move inland and operate far from his coastal base. He thus overcame
the strategic barrier of distance behind which the powerful city-states of
Tunip, Kadesh, and Qatna had once relied for their protection against
Egyptian retaliation after their mischief in Lebanon and Canaan. With
their Syrian cat’s-paws now vulnerable to Egyptian attack, the Mitanni
must have realized that it was only a matter of time before Egyptian power
would be directed at them.
Capturing the fertile Arka Plain, the western mouth of the Eleutheros
Valley, and the northern port of Arvad and maintaining good relations with
the major ports of Byblos, Tyre, and Sidon made establishing Egyptian
garrisons possible in some of these places. The Egyptians also constructed
storage facilities and filled them with food and other materials that the
army would need to sustain itself during future inland operations. The
tribute list for the sixth campaign is remarkable for its brevity, listing only
181 slaves, 188 horses, and 40 chariots.67 Noticeably absent is any mention
of large quantities of agricultural products to be shipped to Egypt. Instead,
the in-kind tax levied upon Egypt’s new vassals was retained and stored
in military-controlled depots for the army’s future use. A small garrison,
say a typical Egyptian platoon of fifty soldiers, would have been adequate
to the task of overseeing the collection and storage of the supplies for any
one town. Assuming that some forty towns had submitted to Thutmose
during the campaign, a stay-behind force of only two thousand soldiers
would have been needed to insure the Egyptian supply base. Although the
texts are silent, Thutmose would have been wise to also leave behind part
of his animal pack train, which included some two thousand mules and
donkeys, and to supplement their numbers from local sources. With the
army’s logistical capability to support ground operations now in place in
Lebanon, the eighty ships Thutmose had needed to transport his Egyptian
army of twelve thousand men and their equipment could be reduced to
some thirty-eight ships.
Thutmose’s sixth campaign in regnal year 30 was really an effort to
prepare for the future. The successful Egyptian military operations had
begun to transform the area of coastal Lebanon into a strategic platform

for further operations. More work lay ahead for Egypt to complete the
transformation, to prepare for operations against the states of the Syrian
interior, and ultimately to carry Egyptian might against the Mitanni, the
great power that the Egyptians saw as their ultimate strategic threat.
The Seventh Campaign

In 1473 BCE (year 31), Thutmose returned to the Lebanon coast and once
more came by sea. It is not clear where he landed, but there appears no good
reason why he would not have landed at Simyra, which had served him
well the year before and by now had been turned into an Egyptian supply
depot. Moreover, Simyra was close to Ullaza, which had broken into open
revolt. Two years earlier Thutmose had attacked Ullaza and captured the
garrison the prince of Tunip had installed there. Ullaza was still under
Egyptian control at the end of the previous year’s campaign season. But
for whatever reason either an Egyptian garrison was not established there
or, if it was, it was small enough to be easily overcome. Perhaps Ullaza’s
proximity to the large Simyra garrison made it seem unnecessary to place
a garrison there.
Sometime during the winter or early spring, the prince of Tunip
had sent a sizable troop contingent to seize Ullaza again, refortify it, and
occupy the town. Tunip’s motives are unclear, but they must have been
important if he risked angering the Egyptians. The Annals note that
the prince of Tunip’s son was placed in command of the operation and
remained in Ullaza to direct its occupation and defense.68 Having suffered
the humiliation of watching Egyptian troops march unopposed across its
territory the year before, Tunip’s ruler may have concluded that it was
only a matter of time before the Egyptians attacked Tunip itself, perhaps
during the present campaign season. If so, he may have seized Ullaza to
use it as a base to block the Egyptians’ access to the Eleutheros Valley or,
alternatively, to sit astride the Egyptian line of communication and present
a threat to any Egyptian march to the interior. With Ullaza in hostile hands,
the Egyptians’ main base at Simyra was also vulnerable. Whatever the
purpose of the Ullaza garrison, it was substantial, comprising some five
hundred soldiers (mostly infantry) and thirteen chariots and maryannu
charioteers.69
156 h Thutmose III
Thutmose returned to the Lebanon coast to conduct an inspection

tour of the ports and inland agricultural towns that had sworn loyalty to
him the year before and to ensure that his garrison had made progress in
establishing supply depots in some of them and collecting the necessary
stores. He apparently did not plan to engage in any major military
operations, so the force that he brought with him from Egypt was probably
not very large, perhaps only a few thousand troops. This force could be
augmented, however, from the garrisons left behind the previous year
should the need arise. Thutmose probably learned about the situation in
Ullaza upon his arrival, and he moved quickly to deal with it.
Two years earlier Thutmose had reduced Ullaza’s fortifications,
and in the short time the Tunip garrison had occupied the town, it is
unlikely that the fortifications had been improved significantly. Thutmose
assembled his army and moved quickly against the town. The Annals
tell us, “Verily, his majesty captured this city in a short hour.”70 It is also
interesting that the garrison seems to have been captured intact, with
“some 490 living captives.”71 These circumstances suggest that the town
was betrayed from within, taken by some ruse, or simply taken by surprise
so suddenly that the defenders surrendered without much of a fight. The
garrison’s commander, who was the prince of Tunip’s son, was captured
alive and delivered to Pharaoh. However the town fell, Thutmose knew
that the eyes of his other new vassals were upon him, anxious to see how
he would deal with Ullaza’s treachery. He turned the town over to his
army for pillage, “and all its property was spoil.” An Egyptian garrison
was then stationed in the town.72 Thutmose showed the other towns what
they could expect should they break their oath to Pharaoh.
Thutmose next set out on an inspection tour of the ports’ supply
depots. “Now, at every harbor at which his majesty arrived was supplied
with loaves and with assorted loaves, with oil, incense, wine, honey, fruit
. . . abundant were they beyond everything beyond the knowledge of his
majesty’s army.”73 Apparently, the rulers of the vassal towns had done what
was expected of them and filled their storehouses with supplies for the
Egyptian army’s use. That Egyptian officers were in charge of the depots
is clear from the texts’ statement that the supplies “remain in the daily
register of the palace.”74 Thutmose seems to have sailed from port to port
on his inspection tour rather than travel overland. Pharaoh was becoming
accustomed to the sea, and he would resort to this mode of travel again
and again to transport his troops when dealing with rebellions in Syria
and northern Canaan.75
Not all of Thutmose’s vassal towns were on the coast. Most of
them were inland and were the sources of the supplies that he ordered
stockpiled in the ports. The ports were chosen as storage facilities because
they were the first and easiest towns for the Egyptian army to reach when
coming by sea. Also, the Lebanon coastal ports were not usually attacked.
The major inland states had seen it in their interest to leave them alone
and continued to use them as a source of trade goods. To be sure, they
may have had second thoughts as they watched Thutmose turn the coast
into an enormous Egyptian logistical base, and they had few illusions that
sooner or later Thutmose would use these port facilities and depots to
support his armies in a campaign against them.
The inland towns were thus very important elements in Thutmose’s
plan, and he made a separate inspection tour of these places. He was
pleased to find that “the harvest of the land of Retjenu was reported,
consisting of much clean grain, grain in the kernel, barley, incense, green
oil, wine, fruit, every pleasing thing of the country.”76 That a specified
portion of this harvest went to the Egyptian supply depots as an impost
against each town is clear from the texts.77 During this inspection, the
“princes of Retjenu came to do obeisance to the soul of his majesty in
this year.”78 During this time, taxes and imposts were delivered, oaths
renewed, and gifts exchanged. This visit, however, Thutmose added
another requirement. Perhaps mindful of the rebellion at Ullaza and
fearing future trouble across his line of communications once his armies
were in the field in the interior, Thutmose ordered the vassal towns be
disarmed. Thus, the chiefs of the inland towns were required to relinquish
“the equipment of their weapons of war.”79 This order included “nineteen
chariots wrought with silver,” that is, the expensive personal chariots of
the rulers themselves. Thutmose was taking no chances.
It had required three military expeditions in as many years, but
Thutmose had achieved his strategic objective of controlling the Lebanon
ports and transforming the coast and the immediate hinterlands into a
strategic platform from which he could launch military operations into
the interior of Syria. He was now prepared to confront the Mitanni, the
158 h Thutmose III
primary strategic threat to Egyptian security. The rigor, scope, intensity,

and duration of Thutmose’s military operations were unprecedented for
Egypt in Asia. They had, however, been directed at a traditional sphere
of influence, Canaan and Lebanon, that had long been of commercial and
strategic concern to Egypt. Had Thutmose stopped there, it would have
been a great achievement but one accomplished along traditional lines.
Only the brief foray into the territory of Kadesh, Qatna, and Tunip was a
departure from the norm. It was a harbinger of what was to come.80
7
The Euphrates Campaign
Thutmose had spent the last decade reestablishing Egyptian control of

Canaan and extending Egyptian influence to the coast of Lebanon. He led
a prodigious and successful effort to reverse the half century of Egyptian
decline that had occurred in those areas during the reigns of Thutmose II
and Queen Hatshepsut. To achieve his objectives, Thutmose had mounted
seven military expeditions in nine years, the last three coming one after
another in quick and effective succession. Although restoring Egypt’s
power in the Levant was dramatic, in Thutmose’s strategic plan the decade
of military operations was only a prelude to his larger goal of confronting
and defeating the Mitanni, the great power that Egypt saw as the source of
its troubles in Syria and as the major strategic threat to Egyptian national
security. In 1471 BCE, in his thirty-third regnal year, Thutmose was ready
to deal with the Mitanni.
Thutmose returned from Lebanon in the fall of 1473 BCE after en-
suring that his vassals had delivered their harvests and supplies and stored
them in the port city depots. By September of his thirty-first regnal year,
he was back in Egypt. Thutmose’s eighth campaign began in the spring of
his thirty-third regnal year, eighteen months after his previous campaign.
It is intriguing to ask what Thutmose, having mounted three consecutive
campaigns, did during those intervening eighteen months.
Apparently, he was rebuilding the Egyptian army and preparing for
the upcoming Euphrates campaign.1 The rigors of the previous campaigns
had taken their toll on the Egyptian army, and manpower was strained by
159
160 h Thutmose III
losses to casualties, disease, injury, and the expiration of conscript tours of

duty. Large numbers of soldiers were needed to occupy the garrisons in
Nubia and along the Egyptian borders with Libya and Asia. Thutmose’s
victories in Canaan and Lebanon had created new garrisons that also had
to be manned. The new dockyard at Perunefer was now fully operational,
and more sailors and workers were needed to staff the expanding navy.
Thutmose’s extensive program of public works construction was ex-
panding, requiring more manpower for corvée labor that would other-
wise have been available for military service. Thutmose needed the
eighteen months to recruit, equip, and train the large number of troops he
needed for his campaign against the Mitanni.
Thutmose’s campaign plan required a much larger army than he
had heretofore taken into the field. The only practical route of advance to
his objective required the army to pass within striking distance of several
powerful city-states allied with the Mitanni. These had to be dealt with
in some manner before he could engage his primary adversary beyond
the Euphrates. The problem’s complexity lent itself to a partial solution if
Thutmose could muster sufficient forces at each point of potential conflict,
that is, each time he was forced to deal with a Mitannian ally along his
route of march. Unlike the terrain of the earlier campaigns in Lebanon, the
terrain near some of the city-states he might be forced to fight was well
suited to his opponents’ chariot armies. The terrain along the Euphrates
was also chariot country. His own chariot arm, therefore, had to be
substantial and well supported by large numbers of infantry.
His campaign plan called for the Egyptian army to deploy over a
distance of six hundred miles from its base in Egypt and to maintain itself
in the field for more than five months. During that time it would have to
fight its way to the main objective, cross the Euphrates River, engage and
defeat the Mitannian army, and then return by overland march, passing
again within striking distance of the military forces of the city-states it had
encountered on its way out. Only an army of significant size with well-
balanced logistics and military capabilities could hope to succeed at such
an effort given the forces and geographical factors arrayed against it.
The size of Thutmose’s army was not recorded, but a reasonable
estimate is that it required at least three infantry divisions of five thousand
infantry each. At least two brigades of five hundred chariots gave the army
The Euphrates Campaign h 161
a combat capability of a thousand vehicles. Besides its service as a combat

arm, the chariots had a vital role to play in conducting reconnaissance,
establishing security, and locating wells and food supplies for the army.
Two chariot brigades required two thousand horses and another five
hundred in reserve to compensate for losses to disease, lameness, and
combat actions. Two thousand drivers and charioteers made up the combat
personnel complement of the two brigades. Another thousand groomsmen
were along to care for the horses. The army needed four thousand mules
and donkeys to provide ground transport and six hundred smiths and
carpenters for maintaining the army’s equipment.2 Another thousand or
so human porters and other hangers-on who usually accompanied the
armies of antiquity brought the number of personnel in Thutmose’s army
to almost twenty thousand and the number of animals to almost seven
thousand. It was the largest army that Egypt had ever put in the field.
It is an axiom of sound military thinking that political realities
determine a commander’s strategic vision, that strategy determines the
campaign plan, and that the campaign plan determines the operational plan
that the field force will execute. Just as in modern times, this dynamic was
at work in Thutmose’s Euphrates campaign. The political configuration of
the Mitannian system of alliances imposed significant limits on the way
any Egyptian campaign could be waged against it. The Egyptians referred
to the Mitanni as “the lands of the Mitanni,” out of recognition of the fact
that the kingdom of the Mitanni was a composite and not a national state.
The lands east of the Euphrates, roughly equivalent to the geographic area
of modern Kurdistan, constituted the central kingdom, and its capital was
located at Washukkanni in the Khabur River Valley not far from modern
Mosul. West of the Euphrates, extending into northern and west-central
Syria, were “the lands of the Mitanni.” These vassal states, some with
Mitannian garrisons, were loyal to the king of the Mitanni. Among them
was Alalakh, a prominent member of the Mitannian confederation bound
by treaty to the king.3 Two of Alalakh’s subvassals, Niya and Kissuwadna,
were similarly pledged. The powerful city of Aleppo to the north was also
under strong Mitannian influence, as were the mid-Syrian city-states of
Qatna, Tunip, and Kadesh, which controlled the Orontes River Valley.4
Each of these states occupied an important location, control of which
could seriously hinder the Egyptian advance. Alalakh blocked the route
162 h Thutmose III
through northern Lebanon to the Syrian interior, and Aleppo guarded

the route across the steppe leading to Carchemish and the Euphrates. Of
immediate importance to Thutmose’s campaign plan were the cities of
Qatna, Tunip, and Kadesh. The most direct route to northeast Syria ran
along the Orontes River Valley, and all three cities sat directly astride the
route of the Egyptians’ advance. Kadesh was in a strong position to block
the Egyptian advance through the Eleutheros Valley, and Qatna controlled
the important ford over the Orontes River that made movement along the
high east bank possible. Denied the ability to cross the river, Thutmose
would be forced to make his way up the marshy west bank of the river
and to pass almost under the walls of Tunip, whose resistance could be
formidable.
None of these cities could be easily bypassed, and Thutmose did not
have the means to take them by storm or siege and still have sufficient time
in the campaign season to reach the Euphrates and engage the Mitannian
main force. From a military perspective, then, Thutmose had only two
options: either intimidate the cities’ rulers with his army’s size and power
and hope they would let him pass unhindered or use his numerical
advantage to quickly defeat the enemy if it chose to fight on open ground.
If the enemy chose to fight and then retreat behind its walls, however,
there was little Thutmose could do.
But even in antiquity, military force was often the handmaiden of
politics. It seems likely that while he was preparing his army, Thutmose
may have used diplomacy to attempt to reduce the threats the Syrian
city-states posed. As events turned out, he seems to have been successful.
Tunip’s neutrality was somehow purchased, one suspects, by returning
the king’s son, who had been taken prisoner more than a year earlier, after
the Egyptians had recaptured Ullaza. Qatna, too, found it in its interest for
some reason to loosen the ties that bound it to the Mitanni. The texts tell
us that “His Majesty was in the district of Qatna on the Eighth Campaign,
close to the bank,”5 and that Thutmose stopped at Qatna to visit a
workshop that manufactured bows, suggesting that Qatna was already
in the Egyptian camp prior to the campaign.6 While the details of the
respective bargains with Qatna and Tunip remain unknown, Thutmose
seems to have achieved by diplomacy what would have required great
effort to achieve by force. Diplomacy had gained him unhindered access
to the Orontes River crossing as well as an unimpeded axis of advance to

the north along the east bank of the river.
We do not know if Thutmose proposed a bargain with Kadesh. If he
did, nothing seems to have come of it. There is no indication that Kadesh
remained anything but closely tied to its Mitannian ally and hostile to
Egyptian interests. Kadesh was ideally situated to block the Egyptian
advance through the Eleutheros Valley by meeting the Egyptians in open
battle on the plain at the valley’s exit just north of the city. Alternatively, it
could keep its forces in reserve and fall upon Thutmose’s rear once his army
turned north to reach the Orontes ford. If Thutmose permitted himself to
be drawn into an attempt to storm Kadesh, he would almost certainly
be forced to abandon his plans to reach the Euphrates by the end of the
campaign season. His only other option was to hope that Kadesh could be
intimidated by his army’s size and power and think better of interfering
with it on its way north. One way or another, however, Thutmose would
have to deal with Kadesh.
The March to the Euphrates

Thutmose had no intention of undertaking an overland march of more
than six hundred miles to reach his objective. In mid-April, a somewhat
earlier-than-usual departure time that perhaps was intended to extend
the campaign season by at least two weeks, the Egyptian army of 20,000
men and 6,500 animals sailed from the new port city and dockyard at
Perunefer to the Lebanon coast. Thutmose needed approximately 170
ships to transport the army. The texts suggest that the invasion force
landed “in the neighborhood of Byblos.”7 It would have been difficult for
a single port to handle the unloading, encampment, and supply of such
a large force; thus, the Egyptian ships probably landed at more than one
port, most likely Simyra and Ullaza to the north, which were closer to the
entrance to the Eleutheros Valley.
The texts tell us, “My Majesty sailed to the northern border of Asia.”8
This statement has led some to believe Thutmose avoided the route to the
interior that ran through the Eleutheros Valley that he had taken during
an earlier campaign. Instead, some have suggested, the Egyptians must
have landed not at Byblos but farther north, perhaps at Arvad and Ugarit.
From there, they could have crossed the Lebanon Mountains, arrived from
164 h Thutmose III
the west outside of Qatna, and taken that city. This northern route avoided
the Eleutheros Valley and the city of Kadesh entirely.9 This explanation
fails on several grounds. First, Arvad’s port was too small to handle such a
large fleet. Second, no evidence exists that Ugarit was within the Egyptian
sphere of influence at this time, and it is not mentioned as one of the port
cities that Thutmose captured and turned into supply depots. Third, no
easy passage runs through the Lebanon Mountains from Arvad to Qatna.
The same texts tell us that the Egyptian army was encumbered by wagons;
therefore, it is unlikely that Thutmose would have chosen a much more
difficult route for his army to follow than the one through the Eleutheros
Valley. Fourth, the theory ignores the fact that Qatna was already within
Egyptian control, if only diplomatically, and did not have to be captured
to gain access to the Orontes River crossing. More likely the phrase “the
northern border of Asia” is only the scribe’s idea of where Lebanon was
located and not the precise geographic location of where the Egyptian
army landed.
Once ashore on the Lebanon coast, the texts say, “My Majesty ordered
that many ships be built from cedar from the mountains of God’s Land
and in the neighborhood of the Mistress of Byblos. They were placed on
chariots and towed by bulls. They traveled ahead of my Majesty to ferry
across the river that is between this foreign land and Naharin.”10 Here is
evidence of Thutmose’s brilliant military mind at work. He ordered the
construction of landing craft to ferry his army across the Euphrates so he
could carry the battle to the Mitanni. It is operational planning at its best.
The Euphrates is a formidable barrier and is almost two miles wide in
some places where it touches northeastern Syria. Without boats to cross
this mighty barrier, the campaign against the Mitanni would not have
been possible.
What kind of boats could be built and transported 270 miles
overland “on chariots towed by bulls”? Obviously a boat of sufficient size
to be useful in ferrying troops would be far too heavy to be transported
overland. Instead, R. O. Faulkner suggests, the boats might have been built
in sections that were then transported to the Euphrates, where they were
reassembled for use.11 How these craft were constructed, disassembled,
and then reassembled is not immediately clear in light of several factors,
not the least of which is that the nail and screw were not in wide use (and
not at all in Egypt). More likely, what Thutmose had constructed in Byblos
were rafts and not proper boats as such. It would have been a far easier
task to fell the long cedar logs from the Lebanon Mountains; mill them
flat on one side; notch and drill the holes that would fasten them together
with wooden dowels, pegs, and papyrus rope; load the prepared logs on
wagons; and then assemble them when the army reached the Euphrates.
A raft thirty feet long and twenty feet wide, enough to hold seventy troops
and their equipment, could easily have been constructed and transported
in this manner. They could even have been equipped with steering oars
and small stepped masts and sails, assuming that Thutmose intended to
use them to sail down the Euphrates.
How were the rafts transported overland? When the texts say, “They
were placed on chariots towed by bulls,” it means that the rafts were placed
on wagons towed by oxen.12 This observation is interesting since the four-
wheeled wagon was unknown to the Egyptians at this time. Two-wheeled
carts that resembled chariots with a carrying box where the cab was
usually located were the Egyptian army’s primary means of mechanical
military transport. Given that it is impossible for a two-wheeled cart to
carry twenty- and thirty-foot logs, it is likely that four-wheeled wagons
were used to transport the rafts. Not having seen these contraptions before,
the Egyptians had no word for them and called them by the familiar name
of chariots, which, to some degree, they resembled. The Hittites appear
to have used the four-wheeled wagon at the time, and it probably came
to Syria from the north.13 Thutmose’s use of wagons during his campaign
is the first use of four-wheeled wagons in Egyptian military history. Yet,
Egyptian armies did appear to have adopted the vehicle generally for later
military use. They are not in evidence, for example, in the camp of Ramses
II at the battle of Kadesh a century later.14
The decision to transport the rafts overland using ox-drawn wagons
had significant implications for Thutmose’s rate of march. Mules, horses,
and donkeys can easily march twenty miles a day with full pack loads,
even while towing a two-wheeled cart. The yoke and collar used to tether
oxen in antiquity pressed hard upon the animals’ windpipe, increasing
the rate at which the animals became exhausted.15 Furthermore, oxen
move more slowly than mules do. A mule-drawn wagon can easily make
nineteen miles a day, whereas an ox-drawn wagon can average only eight
166 h Thutmose III
to ten miles a day.16 Unencumbered by oxcarts, the Egyptian army could

have moved twelve to fifteen miles a day, covering almost a third more
distance. Assuming no further impediments, however, Thutmose’s army
and its wagons would take thirty-five days to reach the Euphrates.
Determining Thutmose’s route of march through Syria to the Eu-
phrates is complicated by a lingering academic debate regarding the
source materials. In fact, Thutmose’s march route can be deduced only
from a single source, Amenemhab’s tomb inscriptions. They describe a
series of battles and skirmishes in which he claims to have participated
during the Euphrates campaign.17 One side of the debate argues that the
events Amenemhab described are arranged chronologically so that the
route of march follows the sequence of events as it evolves in the tomb
inscriptions. The other side suggests that the sequence is not chronological
at all but thematic. Thus, the route of march cannot be deduced from the
order of events portrayed in the inscriptions.18 There is, however, a third
possibility. When the events and locations described in the Amenemhab
inscriptions are placed next to a map of the theater of operations, military
logic and operational necessity can be used to suggest a route of march
and order of events that, while it conflicts with the claims of both sides of
the academic debate, seem to make practical military sense and fall within
the Egyptian army’s operational capabilities, namely, its rates of march,
distances, human endurance, geography, logistics, and so on. Map 7.1
depicts the deductions about Thutmose’s route of march.
The most direct axis of advance from the debarkation ports on the
Lebanon coast to the Orontes River Valley to northeast Syria was through
the Eleutheros Valley. Thutmose was already in control of the valley’s
entrance, the Arka Plain, and some of the inland agricultural towns in the
valley itself. The Egyptian troops that landed at Simyra were closer to the
valley’s entrance than those units that landed at Byblos. It would have
taken a few days for those troops and the log-laden wagons to cover the
thirty miles from Byblos to the army’s final line of departure at the mouth
of the Eleutheros Valley. It is almost forty miles from the line of departure
to where the valley exits the mountains five miles north of Kadesh on the
open plain, or a five-day march. Assuming an eight-day journey by boat to
the Lebanon coast, another twenty days to off-load the army and cut and
mill the timber for the rafts, and another five days’ march to the Kadesh
7.1. thutmose’s route of march to the euphrates river

168 h Thutmose III
Plain, Thutmose’s army had already been in the field longer than a month
before he reached the Orontes Valley.
The Orontes arises in the east of the Beqqa Valley from natural
springs. From there it runs due north, falling two thousand feet through
a great gorge until emptying in the Lake of Homs. Beyond is a broad
valley of rich farmland upon which stood the cities of Qatna, on the east
bank, and Tunip, on the west bank. Farther to the north, just beyond the
agricultural region of modern Hamah, stood the city of Niya, probably
the Apamea of classical times. The Orontes is largely non-navigable, and
the river’s historical importance lies in the convenient axis of advance it
has provided for armies throughout antiquity. The battles of Kadesh (1275
BCE) and Qarqar (853 BCE) were fought on its banks.
When the van of the Egyptian army approached the plain around
Kadesh, its body stretched back for ten to twelve miles.19 Thutmose
had to consider the possibility that Kadesh would offer resistance to
his passage and probably prepared for an attack by sending his chariot
squadrons forward in considerable strength to clear the valley’s exit.
Only an incompetent enemy commander would not have employed his
reconnaissance units to keep watch on the Egyptians as they approached
the valley exit, and the Egyptian army must have been an impressive
sight as it emerged upon the plain. The size of the Egyptian force was
larger by several orders of magnitude than anything Kadesh could put
in the field, and the silence of the texts is probably an accurate indication
that the prince of Kadesh thought discretion the better part of valor and
kept his main force inside the city walls. Thutmose and the grand army
of Egypt passed through the plain of Kadesh and into the Orontes River
Valley without incident. That night when the army camped downstream,
its rearguard was still in the Eleutheros Valley.
Thutmose’s route of march took him next to the vicinity of Qatna,
where, if we can believe the texts, he remained for two or three days and
toured a workshop that manufactured bows.20 Qatna was located twelve
miles northeast of Homs near the end of the road connecting the middle
Euphrates Valley to the Mediterranean and was some thirty-five miles
from the Eleutheros Valley exit, or four days’ march. Three days after
leaving Qatna, the Egyptian army reached Tunip, which was twenty-
six miles distant from Qatna.21 We might reasonably surmise that it was
here that Thutmose returned the son of the king of Tunip whom he had
captured at Ullaza. From there Thutmose marched to Aleppo sixty miles
away, a journey that took eight days.
Thutmose’s route of march through the Orontes Valley shows him
to have been a superb logistician. The route along the river ensured his
army and its large number of animals would have a sufficient supply of
water. All the towns and settlements that the Egyptians passed through
were located in the fertile agricultural belt of the Orontes. It was mid-
June and the harvest was coming in, so the army could replenish its food
stores from the agricultural towns along the route.22 As with most later
armies and those of classical antiquity, the Egyptian army could carry
only enough supplies to last about ten days before the supplies had to be
replenished.23 Thutmose’s line of march was planned so that each location
where he could replenish the army’s supplies was no more than ten days’
march from the previous stop. The longest march across the steppe, from
Aleppo to Carchemish, was only seventy miles or just under ten days.
By a shrewd combination of diplomacy and intimidation, Thutmose
had moved his army from the Lebanon coast to Aleppo’s outskirts
without having to fight a single battle. Along the way his army had been
well supplied with food and water, and except for the wastage of men
and animals that inevitably took its toll on any army on the march, the
Egyptian army was in good fighting condition.24 It fought its first battle of
the campaign at the Height of W’an just west of Aleppo.
Geography, politics, and logistics made some sort of skirmish around
Aleppo inevitable. Aleppo was a key ally of the Mitanni and the last allied
state between the Egyptians and the Mitannian homeland. It was also the
final military obstacle to Thutmose’s advance. Aleppo was on the edge of
the last agricultural region before the barren steppe that separated the city
from the Euphrates. An army seeking to gain the steppe from the Orontes
basin had to pass almost under Aleppo’s walls. Thutmose needed access
to the region’s food supplies to sustain his army while crossing the steppe.
The Egyptians could not bypass the city to the east because close to the
city the ground was marshy and wet. To avoid the marshes by marching
farther east would have forced the Egyptians to march into the rocky
desert and to attempt the steppe’s crossing without replenishing their food
supplies. Moreover, the eastern route left Aleppo on the Egyptians’ flank
170 h Thutmose III
with all the possibilities that implied for an attack. The Egyptian army had
already been on the march for almost eight days since leaving Tunip, and
most of their field rations were already gone. Thutmose ordered his army
to march west of Aleppo, plundering the countryside for the supplies he
needed to cross the steppe and march on Carchemish.
Amenemhab records that he took part in some sort of skirmish
before the battle at the Height of W’an near Aleppo.25 He tells us, “When
his Majesty came to Naharin, I brought off three men from the fight there;
I set them before thy Majesty as living prisoners.”26 Then later he tells us,
“Again I fought hand-to-hand on that expedition in the land of the Height
of W’an on the west of Aleppo. I brought off thirteen Asiatics as living
prisoners; 13 men, 70 living donkeys, 13 bronze spears, the bronze was
wrought with gold.”27 We learn later from Amenemhab’s tomb inscriptions
that he was a member of the King’s Braves, an elite infantry unit.
Amenemhab’s capture of living prisoners and living donkeys
suggests that the action he participated in was not against Aleppo’s regular
forces, or one would have expected him to have produced “hands,” that
is, the severed hands of those he killed. Rather, it is likely that the incident
Amenemhab recorded was one of scores like it that occurred when
Thutmose’s army began to plunder the countryside and confiscate food
supplies and anything else of value the army needed. If so, the fight would
have been against small contingents of militia or coteries of local vassals
defending their farms. The rulers of Aleppo surely knew that the Egyptian
army lacked the siege technology to overcome a city fortified with rock
walls and probably sealed themselves up inside their fortifications until
the Egyptian storm passed. No doubt this situation suited Thutmose well
for he had no interest in attempting to overcome Aleppo. Seizing its food
supply and intimidating its rulers into inaction were sufficient. Thutmose
observed one of the basic principles of the operational art of war by
maintaining the strategic direction of his army.
Crossing the steppe between Aleppo and Carchemish occurred
without incident. Pastoral nomads sparsely settled the area, thus there
were few settlements from which opposition might have been mounted.
The Egyptians’ next engagement occurred outside of Carchemish.
Amenemhab tells us that “again I fought on that expedition in the land
of Carchemish.”28 Thutmose made no attempt to attack Carchemish itself,
and as with the other cities that Thutmose passed, the rulers of Carchemish
closed their gates and waited for the Egyptians to pass. The engagement of
which Amenemhab speaks, again, was probably no more than a skirmish,
perhaps with the militia forces of some agricultural manor or town in the
fertile region along the Euphrates’ banks.
The Battle
The army rested a few days and replenished its supplies from the stores
confiscated from the farms on the river’s west bank. The four-mile-wide
area around Carchemish, which the Egyptians called Karakamisha, was
a rich agricultural region stretching three miles north and six miles south
of the city itself on the Euphrates’ west bank. A larger fertile area almost
eight miles wide and running south for thirteen miles occupied the east
bank of the river.29 Carchemish guarded the place where the Euphrates
narrows into two streams and is separated by a number of large islands
that serve to narrow the river’s width and weaken its current as well.
The distance from the west bank to the largest island is only seventy-five
meters. The island itself is about three hundred meters wide. The second
stream on the far side of the island is one hundred meters wide. It was
here, using the islands as a midpoint on the river, that Thutmose probably
crossed the Euphrates.
The texts tell us, however, that Thutmose’s army crossed the Eu-
phrates at the place called the Great Bend: “Thutmose III crossed the
Great Bend of Naharin with might and with victory at the head of his
army.”30 The geography of the area disputes this notion. The Great Bend is
some eighty miles south of Carchemish along a route that passes through
rocky desert for most of the distance. Once at the Great Bend, the river
cuts through limestone cliffs and ledges, creating high banks that make
access to the river’s edge very difficult. At the center point of the Great
Bend, the width of the Euphrates is almost five miles. Most important,
however, is that Thutmose had no good military reason to cross at the
Great Bend. Except for the town of Emar, which seems to have been little
more than a donkey caravan stop, there were insufficient food and water
supplies in the area to restock his army, no agricultural settlements to
draw stores from, and no enemy armies to engage. It is likely that the
texts’ claim that Thutmose crossed at the Great Bend is an exaggeration.
172 h Thutmose III
The Egyptians were a river people, and crossing the narrow

streams of the Euphrates near Carchemish presented no problem. The
pre-milled, predrilled, and pre-notched timbers carried on the wagons
were easily assembled by driving wooden pegs into the holes and lashing
the timbers together with papyrus rope. One imagines that the rafts had
railings around the edges to prevent the soldiers and animals from falling
overboard during the crossing. A long length of papyrus rope tied to each
end of the raft and held by gangs of men on each shore allowed the raft to
be floated and guided to a landing point on the opposite shore. The empty
raft could then be pulled back across the river, reloaded, and floated across
once more.
A raft thirty feet long and twenty feet wide could accommodate about
16,200 pounds of weight before sinking. Thus, it could safely transport
seventy soldiers and their equipment across the river. It would have taken
a single raft no more than three trips to transport an Egyptian infantry
company of two hundred men. The same size raft could accommodate
fifteen horses or thirty donkeys and mules per trip. We do not know how
many rafts Thutmose hauled overland to the Euphrates, but assuming four
wagons could carry a single raft, a column of only forty wagons would
have easily transported ten rafts.31 Using ten rafts to make the crossing,
each raft would have had to make only 21 trips, or 214 trips total, to move
the entire infantry contingent of fifteen thousand men across the river. A
total of 167 trips was required to transport the 2,500 chariot horses. Since
Thutmose did not intend to move deep into Mitannian territory, we may
safely assume that the donkeys and mules were left on the west bank.
With each raft making about twelve trips a day, Thutmose would have
been able to transport his combat army across the Euphrates in about
three days.
How much of the army needed to cross the river depended on
Thutmose’s intentions. The most likely surmise is that he intended to
meet the Mitannian army in battle with the goal of destroying it. Crossing
the river was designed to draw the enemy to him, forcing it to fight on
the borders of its territory and distant from its supply bases. The land
between the Euphrates and the cities of the Mitannian interior was sparse
and afforded few opportunities for an invader to live off the land, making
it unlikely that Thutmose thought driving inland and attacking the capital
were possible. Thus, to fight a decisive battle, Thutmose needed his entire
combat army on the east bank.
The Gebel Barkal stela tells of a great battle between the Egyptians
and the Mitanni that took place on the east bank of the Euphrates in which
“the numerous army of the Mitanni was cast down in one hour. They
have disappeared completely as those who never were, like an end of the
Devourer, by act of the arms of the great good god, strong in battle, who
causes slaughter among everyone.”32 Ostensibly the battle was with the
Mitannian king,33 but the list of booty taken from the defeated army belies
the claim that a great battle was fought. The booty consisted of 3 chiefs,
30 of their wives and children, 606 male and female servants and their
children, and 80 men at arms.34 These are hardly the numbers and items
we would expect if a major armed force had met defeat on the plain of the
Euphrates. The texts do not mention any captured arms, armor, chariots,
horses, prisoners, and, above all, enemy hands. At best, the Egyptians seem
to have defeated only a local garrison of Mitannian troops and certainly
not the king’s main army.
There must, however, have been some sort of engagement because
the texts tell of Thutmose chasing an enemy force that fled before him.
The Annals indicate that Thutmose “pursued them after for an iter, and
not one looked behind him, but fled headlong like herds of game, for their
horses bolted.”35 An iter is a measure of length or distance between two
and ten kilometers long.36 The term occurs in the inscription along with
the word Skdwt, which means “as boats travel.” 37 Skdwt is an idiomatic
phrase properly taken to mean something similar to “as the crow flies”
rather than to imply that Thutmose sailed down the Euphrates in pursuit
of his enemy. To have done so would have made no military sense.
Ten miles downstream from Carchemish the land turns to rocky desert
with insufficient arable land to support agriculture or a retreating army.
Whatever force engaged Thutmose on the east bank would have logically
retreated due east toward the capital of Washukkanni about 140 miles
away. The soldiers would have withdrawn farther into the interior of
their homeland, where troops, garrisons, and walled towns could have
come to their aid. It appears unlikely that Thutmose would have sailed
downstream on the Euphrates. More likely he would have marched down
the east bank through the agricultural region for about ten kilometers
174 h Thutmose III
until he met the desert, at which point he would have turned back toward
Carchemish.
The texts suggest that is exactly what happened: “Behold, his
Majesty went north capturing the towns and laying waste the settlements
of that foe of wretched Naharin.”38 At some point as Thutmose ravaged
the countryside, a small force of hastily formed militia troops from three
towns turned out to fight the Egyptians but were quickly crushed.39 The
Mitannian regulars were nowhere to be found, “having fled pell-mell,
like herds of wild game.”40 The texts reveal in great detail the destruction
Thutmose wrought on the land of the Mitanni:
I destroyed his cities and his settlements and I set fire to them.
My Majesty turned them into ruins, so that they could not be re-
built. I captured all their people who were carried off as prison-
ers, and the cattle thereof without bound, and likewise their
property. I took their grain, I tore out their barley, I felled their
trees, all their fruit trees. Their region was killed, my Majesty des-
troyed it. It has become a burnt place where there are no trees.41
Years before, Thutmose’s grandfather, Thutmose I, had led a military

expedition to the Euphrates and later erected a victory stela on the river’s
east bank. Now his grandson did the same thing. According to the Annals,
“He set up a tablet east of this water [Euphrates River]; he set up another
beside the tablet of his father, the king of Upper and Lower Egypt,
Okheperkere [Thutmose I].”42 Thutmose’s stela was probably set up on the
heights north of Carchemish and was either inscribed on a quarried stone
or on the face of a natural rock there. Just when Thutmose erected the stela
remains a mystery. The Gebel Barkal stela says he erected it following the
defeat and flight of the Mitannian king while the Armant stela tells us it
was erected after he conducted the river crossing and plundered the river
towns. The Annals, however, claim the stela was put in place immediately
before the Egyptians left on the return march to Syria. The last alternative
makes the most sense.
Placing a victory stela on the heights of Carchemish had great
symbolic importance in the Egyptians’ eyes. To Egyptians, the stela
marked the new boundary of Egyptian influence and power. Its erection
on the territory of the Mitanni signified that the Mitanni were now a client
state of Egypt and subject to Pharaoh’s rule.43 In reality, of course, it was
not true. Thutmose’s raid had not changed the balance of power between
the antagonists at all, and the Mitanni remained a great power for another
fifty years. But in the Egyptians’ eyes, Thutmose had utterly defeated the
great power to the east.
The Euphrates campaign had an unanticipated political conse-
quence that fell to Egypt’s advantage. After Thutmose returned to Egypt,
the king of the Hittites sent an emissary to Pharaoh bearing gifts of silver,
wood, and precious stone. Presumably the mission’s purpose was to
open diplomatic relations between the two countries. In its march west
of Aleppo on its way to Carchemish, the Egyptian army had passed close
to the Syrian Gates, the mountain pass that led to the Hittites’ territory.
The size of the Egyptian army and its ability to project military force over
such great distances must have caused the Hittites to worry that one day
Egyptian power would be aimed at them. And, indeed, they were right.
Over the next century, the area of northwest Syria and the Syrian Gates,
the area the Hittites called the land of Amaru, became the arena of conflict
between the two powers. Thutmose’s demonstration of Egyptian military
might led the Hittites to conclude that they should open diplomatic contacts
with Egypt. The mention of the Hittite diplomatic mission in Egyptian
texts is the first appearance of the Hittites in the historical record.44
The Attack on Kadesh

Thutmose and his army did not linger for more than a week or so while
replenishing their supplies from the agricultural area around Carchemish
to sustain them on their return march. A recently discovered inscribed
block in the Egyptian Museum of Cairo tells the story of Thutmose’s
return march through the steppe between Aleppo and the Euphrates: “My
Majesty commanded to bring it outside for me. Then in order to tread the
roads of this country . . . His Majesty commanded to have organized . . .
Then His Majesty dispatched the army and the chariotry to plunder this
settlement. Then . . . these towns were set afire.”45 The term town used
in the inscription indicates rural settlements, the type commonly found
on the steppe, and not fortified urban centers. This description suggests
176 h Thutmose III
that Thutmose was destroying those settlements in the region that were
allied with Aleppo and the Mitanni.46 Presumably Thutmose had left these
settlements unmolested on his outward march in order to save time and
to conserve his army’s combat power and had planned to deal with them
on his return.
One of the objectives of the Euphrates campaign was to place under
Egyptian control the area south and west of Aleppo and the Orontes
Valley as far south as the river’s headwaters at modern Baalbek. Egyptian
diplomacy had neutralized the power of Tunip and Qatna, if only
temporarily, and the march to the Euphrates had isolated Aleppo. The
Egyptians had demonstrated how the latter’s agricultural regions could be
ravaged at will even though the city itself had not been captured. Kadesh
was now the only remaining obstacle to Egyptian success. The Egyptian
army had been in the field for almost three months, and if Thutmose had
plans to deal with Kadesh he first had to rest and replenish his army. After
a march of more than a hundred miles from the Euphrates’ banks, the
Egyptian army had arrived at Niya, where it rested to regain its strength.
The Annals do not offer any record of Thutmose’s return march;
instead, they jump from setting up the boundary stela directly to marking
the king’s arrival at the town of Niya. “His Majesty arrived at the city of
Niya, going southward, when his Majesty returned [from the Euphrates]
having set up his tablet in Naharin, extending the boundaries of Egypt.”47
Niya was probably located on the west bank of the Orontes overlooking
the Ghab Valley, some thirty miles northwest of modern Hamah, and
between Aleppo to the north and Kadesh to the south. It is probably the
biblical Shepham and the Apamea of classical times. The area affords good
supplies of food and water.
Thutmose rested the army at Niya for only a week or so, during
which time he took part in an elephant hunt. His grandfather had stopped
once at Niya too and had hunted elephants while returning from his
Euphrates campaign. His grandfather’s example seems to have been very
much in Thutmose’s mind. He tells us, “He granted me another brave
deed by the sea of Niya. He made me drive together a herd of elephants.
My Majesty fought them, they being a herd of 120 elephants.”48
Amenemhab’s account of the elephant hunt is more dramatic:
7.2. thutmose’s return route from carchemish to egypt

178 h Thutmose III
Again I beheld another excellent deed which the Lord of the

Two Lands did in Niya. He hunted 120 elephants, for the sake of
their tusks and . . . I engaged the largest which was among them,
which fought against his Majesty; I cut off his hand [the animal’s
trunk] while he was alive before his Majesty, while I stood in the
water between the rocks. He gave me joy, it filled my body with
rejoicing, he endued my limbs.49
An elephant hunt was no doubt dangerous business, and Amenemhab is

not shy about screaming his own praises in his tomb inscriptions, which
were meant to last for eternity.50
With the army now replenished, Thutmose ordered it to move south
toward Kadesh, sixty-five miles away. His route took him back over the
Orontes River and to the hard ground of the east bank. Traveling on the
east bank permitted Thutmose to bypass Tunip and avoid disrupting
the fragile relationship he had arranged a few months earlier by returning
the king’s captured son. The Egyptians arrived at Qatna, where they
remained for a day or two to prepare the army for its assault on Kadesh.
The Annals are silent about the attack on Kadesh, forcing an un-
comfortable reliance once more on the venerable Amenemhab’s account.
Even here, however, we have a problem. Amenemhab records a chariot
battle and an attack on Kadesh’s walls. The question is whether the events
are part of the same campaign or, as Henry James Breasted believes, are
parts of two separate campaigns against Kadesh. If Donald B. Redford is
correct that Thutmose never captured Kadesh either in this campaign or
later in regnal year 42, we might reasonably see the two tales as different
phases of the same campaign against Kadesh, first a battle of chariots in
the open field and then an Egyptian infantry attempt to storm the city.
It must have been early August when Thutmose moved against
Kadesh, allowing himself about a month to contend with it before he had
to turn for home. The march from Kadesh to Egypt would take some thirty-
seven days, bringing Thutmose back to Egypt around late September
or early October. Consequently, Thutmose did not have enough time
to overcome Kadesh by siege, which, given the Egyptians’ lack of siege
technology, meant starving out the defenders in any case. The harvest
was already in, and the city’s stores were sufficient to last the winter.
If Thutmose was going to capture Kadesh, he would have to entice its

defenders into a battle on open ground or take the city by storm.
The terrain around the city is ideal chariot country, and it seems
likely that some sort of chariot battle or at least a skirmish took place
there. Kadesh’s army was a chariot-heavy force of maryannu warriors,
and logically they would have tried to engage the Egyptian chariots on
familiar ground. Amenemhab’s tomb inscriptions begin by noting, “The
prince of Kadesh sent forth a mare before the army; in order to [disrupt]
them, she entered among the army.”51 The implication is that two chariot
forces were arrayed before each other in a set-piece battle. Amenemhab
goes on to tell how he “pursued after her on foot, with my sword, and
I ripped open her belly; I cut off her tail, I set it before the king; while
there was thanksgiving to god for it!”52 Amenemhab seems to be taking
credit for saving the army from disorganization by killing the mare before
its scent could excite the Egyptian chariot horses to unruly behavior.
Unfortunately, he tells us nothing more about the battle.
The tale of the mare leads one to suspect that Amenemhab, an
infantry officer and not a chariot officer, knew little about horses.
Chariot horses were not stallions but geldings and would not have been
interested in the scent of a mare in season.53 Stallions, which are fiercely
competitive with other stallions, are castrated because geldings possess
a calmer temperament that allows trainers to work them together and
stable them side by side.54 Egyptian booty lists often make distinctions
between captured horses and stallions, suggesting that stallions were not
usually used as war horses but kept for stud.55 The ancients were well
aware of the association of stallions with traits of courage and virility, and
kings were eager to associate themselves with these characteristics. It is
not impossible, then, that the horses of the king and other high-ranking
officers might have been stallions. Certainly the war art of Egypt and
other countries in the Bronze Age seems to have gone to great lengths
to convince people that their leaders’ horses were stallions. Scores of bas
reliefs and other portrayals of warhorses show them as animals with intact
genitalia. A closer examination of these portrayals, however, reveals that
the placement of the genitalia is anatomically incorrect, that is, located
farther toward the center of the horse than normal in order to make
180 h Thutmose III
them more visible than they would appear in reality.56 In this way, kings
portrayed their gelded war horses as true stallions.
Amenemhab’s tale is questionable on other counts. First, it is unclear
how he would have caught up with the mare on foot. Second, his claim
that “with my sword I ripped open her belly; I cut off her tail” seems
disingenuous. The basic weapon of the Egyptian infantry was the curved
sickle-sword, a weapon completely unsuited for stabbing. Even assuming
Amenemhab could muster the force a somewhat dull bronze blade would
require to bring down a horse, it is unclear how he would have landed
the blow on an animal that was quite a bit taller than he was. Killing a
horse is no easy matter. A thousand-pound horse has some one hundred
pints of blood; it can lose 30 percent of it and live. Horses have excellent
hemostatic systems that cause blood vessels to retract into the tissues and
seal themselves off. Even when an artery is cut, a horse takes hours to
bleed to death.57 The only certain way he could have brought down the
horse was to strike it between the eyes with an ax. Finally, Amenemhab’s
paucity of knowledge of horses is revealed further in that killing the mare
would not have eliminated her scent or its effects on the stallions. Since
the mare’s scent would have affected the horses of Kadesh as well as those
of the Egyptians, presumably the noses of the Canaanite stallions were
swabbed with some potent-smelling salve to mask the mare’s smell.58
Whatever skirmish or battle was fought on the plain of Kadesh,
it must have been inconclusive, with the maryanna retiring behind the
safety of the city’s walls. Thutmose then mounted an attack on the city by
storm. Given the Egyptians’ advantage in manpower, the most appropriate
method of attack was for the archers to lay down heavy covering fire to
keep the defenders off the battlements while assault troops rushed the
walls and tried to reach the top using scaling ladders. Thutmose’s elite
infantry, the King’s Braves, of which Amenemhab was a member, was
renowned for being the first to attack a city’s walls. The Egyptian shield,
with the shoulder strap attached to its inner surface, was well suited to the
task of protecting the soldiers during the assault. Slung over the soldier’s
back in the fashion of a turtle’s shell, it protected his body while leaving
his hands free to make the climb and fight once over the walls.
Simultaneous with the attack on the walls, other troops attacked the
gates. With their shields covering their backs, assault troops armed with
axes hacked at the gate’s bolts and hinges in order to bring it down. Both
of these operations required brave and disciplined troops. Amenemhab
numbered himself among them. He tells us, “His Majesty sent forth every
valiant man of his army, in order to pierce the wall for the first time, which
Kadesh had made. I was the one who pierced it, being the first of all the
valiant; no other before me did it. I went forth, I brought off [captured] two
men as prisoners.”59 Amenemhab’s use of the word pierced might suggest
that he was among those attacking the gate rather than those trying to
scale the walls.
Although Thutmose must have repeatedly attempted to storm the
city, in the end Kadesh’s defenses held and the city did not fall.60 The
Annals are ominously silent regarding the outcome of Thutmose’s attack
against Kadesh, and even the boastful Amenemhab does not claim that
they captured the city. If they had, there would have been no need for
Thutmose to attack it again in regnal year 42. That attack, too, failed. The
repeated Egyptian attacks undoubtedly produced high casualties, and
after several failed attempts Thutmose may have thought better of it and
simply withdrew. It is also possible that events elsewhere needed his
attention.
Two tomb inscriptions, one from Amenemhab and the other from
one Minmose the Engineer, suggest that some sort of trouble had broken
out in the land of Takhsy and may have forced Thutmose to break off
the attack on Kadesh to quell it. Just southeast of Kadesh, Takhsy lay
between northern Canaan and Damascus, not more than two days’ march
away. In the area of the northern Beqqa Valley, Takhsy was well within
the Egyptians’ sphere of influence in Canaan. It was a land of Asiatic
bedouins and Sashu, who, along with the Apiru, sometimes resorted to
banditry. The texts do not reveal the nature of the problem, but it may be
suspected that some of the towns in the area had fallen prey to bedouin
banditry. With the assault on Kadesh meeting stiff resistance, Thutmose
may have taken the news of the problem in Takhsy as an opportunity to
break off the attack without losing royal prestige. It may also account for
why the Annals are silent regarding the Kadesh operation.
The fighting in Takhsy must have been significant. Amenemhab tells
us, “I fought hand-to-hand therein before the king. I brought off Asiatics,
three men as living prisoners.”61 Minmose’s tomb inscription conveys some
182 h Thutmose III
additional details: “I saw how the arm of His Majesty waxed strong when
he took to fighting, plundering thirty towns within the region of Takhsy
whence their chiefs, chattels, and cattle were brought off.”62 Minmose’s
reference to towns is to be understood as bedouin villages or camps
and, perhaps, small agricultural settlements. The number of settlements
involved, however, suggests that Thutmose’s operations in Takhsy were
extensive. Perhaps they were part of a search-and-destroy campaign to
punish the perpetrators and raze their logistical base.
Assuming operations in Takhsy required two weeks to complete, it
was then late August, and Thutmose turned for home by overland march.
From his position in the northern Beqqa Valley, the Egyptian army could
have easily reached the main base at Megiddo in a few days. From there
Thutmose reversed the route he had taken to Megiddo, marching up the
Aruna road and across the Carmel Range to Yehem. From there it was an
easy march to Gaza, then to the frontier forts at Sile, and on to Perunefer,
where Thutmose boarded a boat and sailed south to Thebes, arriving in
time for the October festival. The journey would have taken a little longer
than a month.
It had been almost two months since Thutmose had arrived on the
coast of Lebanon by sea until he reached the Euphrates. His return march
took him through country that was politically hostile and past city-states
that were sworn allies of the Mitannian king. One would have thought
that Mitannian agents and diplomats assigned to these allies would have
sent their couriers to inform their superiors that Thutmose was on the
move. Why, then, was the king of the Mitanni caught by surprise? Why
did the Egyptians not encounter any opposition to their river crossing?
Why was there no Mitannian army to meet Thutmose in battle after the
Egyptians had crossed?
The answer lies in Thutmose’s brilliant use of strategic deception.
Except for the occupation of the Lebanon ports, Thutmose’s previous cam-
paigns in Syria had only involved raids designed to march into an area,
damage the countryside, take away what booty the Egyptian army could
carry, and force the local chiefs to acknowledge him as their sovereign.
These chevauchée raids were not intended to destroy the Syrian city-states
or occupy their territory.63 No Egyptian garrisons had been left behind in
the Orontes Valley following any of the Egyptian raids. Until the time that
Thutmose skirmished outside Aleppo, which had heretofore been immune

from Egyptian raids, the Mitanni might have reasonably concluded that
Thutmose’s most recent incursion was just another raid.
Once Thutmose bypassed Aleppo and began moving east, however,
it was simply too late for the Mitanni to assemble their army in time to
oppose the Egyptian crossing of the Euphrates. It is also possible that
the Mitanni failed to assemble the army because they believed that the
Euphrates itself presented too formidable an obstacle for the Egyptians. If
so, the Egyptians might then ravage the countryside around Carchemish
and withdraw. The Mitanni surely understood that the Egyptians could not
long remain at the end of their extensive line of communications without
incurring serious risks to their rear areas. Even if Thutmose crossed the
Euphrates, the Mitanni may have reasoned, he lacked the combat power
and logistics to march inland and attack their capital. This sound strategic
thinking turned out to be correct.
Although Thutmose failed to take Kadesh, when reviewed as an
exercise in military technique, the Euphrates campaign was a success. It
represented a brilliant example of strategic deception by psychologically
conditioning the Mitanni into thinking they knew the Egyptians’ inten-
tions. Thutmose’s previous military expeditions had convinced the
Mitanni that he harbored no strategic interests beyond southern Syria.
Their assumptions permitted him to move his army to within ten days’
march of the Euphrates without arousing Mitannian suspicions. By the
time he arrived, however, it was too late for the Mitanni to react. Thut-
mose’s use of the sea, the construction of river rafts, and their transport
overland with four-wheeled wagons, a military technology heretofore
unknown to the Egyptians, all combined perfectly to inflict strategic
surprise upon the enemy and represents an excellent operational example
of the projection of force in which all elements of the campaign plan were
executed perfectly. The military expertise required to move an Egyptian
force of 20,000 men and 6,500 animals first by sea for more than 300
miles and then overland for another 275 miles to reach the objective,
without being detected, resulted in what surely stands as one of the most
outstanding military feats of the Bronze Age.
And yet, when considered from a strategic perspective, the Eu-
phrates campaign was a failure. The campaign did not achieve the strategic
184 h Thutmose III
7.3. chronology of thutmose’s euphrates campaign
Sea journey from Perunefer to Byblos 7–8 days

Cutting timber/making prefabricated rafts 15–20 days
March from Byblos to Eleutheros Valley 4 days
March through the Eleutheros Valley 5 days
March from Eleutheros Valley to Qatna 4 days
March from Qatna to Tunip 3 days
March from Tunip to Aleppo 8 days
Skirmishing and foraging at Aleppo 3 days
March from Aleppo to Carchemish 9 days
River crossing 3 days
Ravaging the Euphrates towns/carving stela 10 days
March to Niya/plundering Nukhashshe 15–20 days
Replenishing the army at Niya 7 days
March from Niya to Kadesh 8 days
Attack on Kadesh 4–6 days
Operations in Takhsy 14 days
Return march to Egypt 37 days
Total Time: 166 days
goal of bringing the army of the Mitanni to battle and destroying it. For all
the effort, the Egyptians failed to alter the strategic power of the Mitanni
or the strategic balance between the two great powers. The ability of the
Mitanni to use their Syrian cat’s-paws—Aleppo, Alalakh, Tunip, Qatna,
and Kadesh—to foster trouble and instigate revolts in southern Syria was
undiminished. It would not be long before Egypt would have to deal with
these rebellions.
Although Qatna and Tunip had been neutralized by diplomacy, in
the absence of Egyptian garrisons none but the most optimistic observers
reasonably expected the peace agreements to hold for very long once
Egyptian troops had withdrawn. Aleppo and Alalakh remained strong and
loyal allies of the Mitanni, and Thutmose’s ravaging of their agricultural
areas only strengthened this alliance. The reality was that Egyptian security
goals in Syria and the concomitant decline in Mitannian influence there
could not be achieved as long as the powerful Syrian city-states could not
be captured and garrisoned with Egyptian troops. Thutmose could launch
one chevauchée after another, ravaging the cities’ agricultural areas as he
went, but in the end Egypt lacked the military technology to successfully
overcome the stone walls and other defenses of the Syrian cities. Without
a siege capability, the Egyptians could make the farmers and vassals of
the Syrian rulers suffer from time to time, but the Syrian rulers themselves
and their military garrisons remained safe behind the city walls, willing
and able to defy the Egyptians’ control once their armies left.
In short, Egypt lacked the national power to bring about a strategic
decision in southern Syria. At the end of the Euphrates campaign, the
sphere of Egyptian influence was pretty much as it had been before the
campaign began, that is, mostly confined to Canaan and coastal Lebanon.
The Euphrates campaign remains, however, a classic example of the
failure, repeated throughout history, to recognize that military force is
effective only when it aims at achievable strategic goals. Otherwise, it
becomes merely an exercise in technique from which little of strategic
value is likely to result. Thutmose’s experience in the Euphrates campaign
is but the first example in history in which we see the truth of Carl von
Clausewitz’s later famous dictum that “war is the continuation of policy
by other means.”
8
The Counterinsurgency Campaign
Thutmose had spent more than a decade carving out an Egyptian sphere
of imperial influence in Asia by force of arms. Now he faced the problem
of maintaining it. He clearly intended to annex the area of southern Syria
at least as far north as Niya and to transform it into an area of Egyptian
control, tying it tightly to Egypt perhaps in a manner similar to Nubia.
Integrating Syria into the Egyptian realm presented far more difficulties,
however, than did Nubia. The military capabilities of the Syrian city-states
and principalities were far more formidable than those in Nubia. The key
city-states were ruled by professional maryannu warrior castes that had
imposed themselves upon the locals more than a century earlier during the
Mitannian-Hurrian sweep through Canaan and Egypt. After the warrior
pharaohs drove them out of Egypt, some maryannu warrior castes settled
in northern Canaan and southern Syria.1 These warrior castes were capable
fighters and unwilling to submit to Egyptian rule.
Lacking a powerful ally willing to support the Nubians’ resistance
to Egyptian rule facilitated the Egyptians’ exertion of control over Nubia.
The Syrian city-states and their vassals, however, had the strong support
of the Mitanni, a great power that was also geographically contiguous
with the Syrian arena of conflict and could be relied on to back a Syrian
insurgency. The Mitanni regarded its vassals in Syria as important geo-
political assets to its own national security strategy. These vassal states
were located far forward of the Mitannian homeland and made up a stra-
tegic buffer zone within which the Mitanni could intercept and engage
187
188 h Thutmose III
any attempts from the west by Egypt, and later by the Hittites, to attack
the homeland itself. The Syrians knew they could rely on the Mitanni to
resist the Egyptians’ efforts to establish a sphere of influence in Syria at
every opportunity, including encouraging revolts and sending troops to
support its Syrian vassals.
Thutmose’s efforts to control Syria were further hampered by
other factors. The Egyptian army does not appear to have made any im-
provements in its siege capability that would permit it to quickly reduce
the defenses of the major Syrian cities. This shortcoming was not unique
among the armies of the day, and not until the Assyrians introduced the
battering ram some six centuries later would armies be able to easily defeat
the stone-faced casement walls characteristic of Syrian cities.2 Egypt’s
ineffectual siege capability meant that the major Syrian city-states were
practically invulnerable to Egyptian attacks. The Egyptians could ravage
the countryside at will, but they could not crack the cities themselves.
Moreover, no matter how many times Thutmose put down a Syrian
revolt or defeated an allied force of the Mitanni in the field, the arena of
conflict remained limited to southern Syria. Egypt was unable to project
sufficient forces over long distances to invade and defeat the Mitanni
in their own homeland. No matter how many expeditions Thutmose
undertook, the insurgents knew that at the end of the campaign season the
Egyptians would leave and the insurgents would remain to fight another
day. Thutmose could fight and defeat the insurgents again and again, but
he lacked the means to bring about a strategic decision by defeating the
fortified cities or the Mitanni in a decisive manner.
Thutmose’s Euphrates campaign did produce some significant
diplomatic results, however. The other major states in the region that had
strategic security concerns with the Mitanni were quick to normalize or
open diplomatic relations with Egypt after its expedition to the Euphrates.
Babylon, Assyria, and the Hittites saw the Euphrates campaign as a
significant projection of force by a new power in the regional political game,
a power that could be used, perhaps, to counter the Mitannian threat. In the
short run at least, these states were of no military consequence to Egyptian
efforts, although their political support helped legitimize Egyptian control
of its possessions in Syria. In the long run, however, the Hittites’ support
of Egyptian ambitions proved decisive in weakening the Mitanni.
The Counterinsurgency Campaign h 189
The Strategy
Unable to deliver a strategic blow to the Mitanni, Thutmose embarked
on a Syrian policy that today we would call a counterinsurgency strategy.
The first goal of Egypt’s operational design was to isolate the Syrian city-
states from their Mitannian allies, a policy intended to deprive them of the
Mitannian political and military support they had been receiving for years.
At the same time, Egypt conducted military expeditions in the Mitanni
border zone that were intended to keep the Mitanni off balance and force
them to guard against the possibility of another military strike at the
Euphrates border and perhaps beyond into the homeland itself. The second
element of Thutmose’s Syrian policy was to conduct frequent military
incursions into Syria to demonstrate the Egyptians’ willingness to retain
their position in the country and to intimidate the Syrian principalities
into a grudging acceptance of Egyptian control. This plan involved formal
meetings with assembled Syrian rulers, who were obliged to present their
tribute to Pharaoh. Whenever a city or town became so reckless as to rise
in open revolt, Thutmose moved quickly to crush it. Thutmose intended to
convince the rulers of the Syrian principalities that they faced the dilemma
of a single alternative; that is, there was no alternative to Egyptian rule.
In 1470 BCE, the year after the Euphrates campaign, Thutmose put
his new policy into effect and led an expeditionary force into Syria. The
texts tell us that “all the harbors of His Majesty were stocked with every
good thing,” suggesting that the Egyptians came by sea and still controlled
the coastal ports. The expedition’s size is not recorded, but it was certainly
much smaller than the army of the Euphrates campaign. Perhaps it
included a single infantry division and a few companies of chariots, or a
force of some five thousand to six thousand men. The Egyptians marched
through the Eleutheros Valley; past Kadesh, which they had attacked the
year before; and down the Orontes River to Qatna, where they crossed the
river and entered the region known as Nukhashshe.
Nukhashshe was a triangle-shaped district formed by a line running
north from Qatna and northeast of Aleppo (92 miles), then directly east to
Emar (which the Egyptians called Donkey-town) on the western edge of
the Great Bend of the Euphrates (46 miles), and back southwest to Qatna
(100 miles).3 The area is mostly a steppe and is inhabited by nomadic
and pastoral people who are organized into clans and tribes with no
190 h Thutmose III
other higher form of political organization. The Egyptians called the area
a district instead of a foreign land, and although the texts refer to the
sheikhs as kings, they were in fact little more than clan or tribal leaders.
Nukhashshe’s value to the Egyptians was purely geographic.
The triangle-shaped steppe served as a barrier to the Mitannian
military’s travel and their diplomatic and commercial intercourse with
the states of southern Syria, especially those along the Orontes River.
Periodically making their military presence felt in the district, the Egyptians
intended to keep the Mitanni off balance and force them to deal with the
possibility of an Egyptian attack on their borderlands. The distance to the
Euphrates through Nukhashshe was much shorter than the western route
around Aleppo that Thutmose had taken during the previous Euphrates
campaign. Part of the Egyptian plan was to assemble a friendly coalition
of tribal sheikhs to serve as Egyptian allies and intelligence sources in the
region. In Nukhashshe, Thutmose sacked three towns and carried off a
small amount of plunder, mostly sheep, cattle, and donkeys.4
Thutmose was back the next year, this time in force. Having met
no opposition to his previous encroachment, it is likely that Thutmose’s
army was larger this time to render his threat of an invasion of the Mitanni
more credible. The Mitanni had once made the mistake of ignoring an
Egyptian army as it marched into northern Syria only to see it continue its
march to the Euphrates and attack the homeland. The size and direction
of Thutmose’s march, to the north and east of Aleppo, along with the
Mitanni intelligence efforts, convinced them that Thutmose intended to
undertake yet another march on their country. They moved quickly to
prevent it.
The two armies met at the town of Ar’anu. The location of this town
is unknown, but it may have been some twenty miles east of Aleppo
and only thirty or so miles from the Euphrates.5 The texts record, “Now
His Majesty arrived at the town of Ar’anu and that vile doomed one of
Naharin had collected horses with their people and . . . their armies . . .
of the ends of the earth. . . . They were more numerous than the sands
of the seashore . . . intent on fighting His Majesty.”6 The texts imply that
the Mitanni were already in position and that some allied units, perhaps
from Aleppo, which was the closest city to the battlefield, had taken the
field with them. The combined force was substantial and comprised
infantry and chariots. If the Mitanni had been watching the Egyptians’
advance to the north, as seems likely, they would have known the size and
composition of the Egyptian army and deployed an army of their own of
sufficient size to meet it.
The texts describe the battle at Ar’anu as follows:
Then His Majesty closed with them; and then the army of His
Majesty performed the charging maneuver with the cry, “Let’s go
get ’em!” Then His Majesty overpowered these foreigners through
the power of his father Amun and made a great slaughter among
those doomed ones of Naharin. They proceeded to flee, stumbling
one upon the other, in front of His Majesty.7
This particular text is one of the few Egyptian records that describes a
tactical maneuver.
The list of equipment taken after the battle clearly suggests that
Thutmose got the better of the fight. The captured equipment includes
bronze helmets, suits of mail, composite bows, 180 horses, and 60
chariots. Ten prisoners were also taken.8 The numbers are relatively small,
however, and there is no mention of the number of enemy dead. This
omission suggests that the battle went off quickly and that perhaps the
text is accurate when it suggests that some sort of charge, either infantry
or chariotry, may have shattered elements of the enemy formation and
then touched off a general rout. Under these conditions, it would not be
unusual for the numbers of dead and captured to be small. The horses
and chariots may have been confiscated in the rear areas, having been left
behind as the enemy fled.
Thutmose did not press farther toward the Euphrates. In all likeli-
hood his intention was never to mount an assault on the Mitannian
homeland; instead, he may have wanted to deploy a significantly large
army as a reconnaissance in force to determine if the Mitanni would react.
If they did not, he may have reasonably concluded that he had a free hand
in Nukhashshe, that his policy of isolating the Mitanni was succeeding,
and that geographic control of the Nukhashshe district had driven a wedge
between the Mitanni and its Syrian clients. The reaction of the Mitanni
made it clear, however, that they still had a strong presence in the district.
192 h Thutmose III
Moreover, they continued to play an important role in encouraging and

supporting Syrian insurgencies for years to come.
The records for the years 1471 and 1470 BCE are mostly lost, but
surviving fragments imply that Thutmose was once again in the field in
Nukhashshe, trying to encourage the friendly tribes and clans to forge
a coalition and support Egyptian interests there. At one point Thutmose
went so far as to attempt to create some sort of polity in the region by
installing a clan chief named Takuwa as king of the district. In a reversal of
the usual order of obligations between lord and vassal, Thutmose promised
to come to the vassal king’s aid if he was attacked.9 If Thutmose was trying
to establish some sort of political entity that could act as an Egyptian cat’s-
paw in the area—perhaps to serve as a base, a source of manpower, and
a source of intelligence—the fragmented social structure of the nomadic
peoples in Nukhashshe almost guaranteed failure. As it was, nothing of
significance seems to have come from the Egyptian’s effort.
Presumably during this time the other principalities of southern
Syria remained calm, and there is no record of revolts or other difficulties
with them. The Lebanon ports also remained secure and well supplied.
Thutmose’s expeditions in Nukhashshe required him to cross the Orontes
River at Qatna, indicating that Qatna, which had come over to the Egyptians
before the Euphrates campaign, remained friendly. In 1469 BCE Thutmose
mounted another raid during which “His Majesty destroyed the towns . . .
which were in the district of Nukhashshe.”10 Once again Thutmose was
showing the flag and keeping the Mitanni focused on his movements in
Nukhashshe. The most important event of the year’s expedition, however,
came when the chief of Alalakh sent gifts to Pharaoh.11 Alalakh was located
near the Syrian coast north and west of Aleppo and had been a loyal ally
of the Mitanni. Of all the Mitannian allies in Syria, Alalakh was among
the farthest from the border with the Mitanni. Its location may have
made it vulnerable to Egyptian pressure, especially in light of Thutmose’s
willingness to mount annual military expeditions into Syria. The rulers of
Alalakh may have been hedging their bets in the event that the Egyptian
policy succeeded.
One indication that Alalakh’s ties with the Mitanni had weakened
was that the principality of Niya, formerly a vassal of Alalakh, was
detached and transformed into an independent principality, probably at
Egyptian insistence. Yet another indication of the Egyptians’ success in

this arena was the stationing of an Egyptian garrison for the first time
in the important coastal city of Ugarit.12 Until then Ugarit had remained
neutral, relying on its trade and commercial value to avoid being drawn
into the great power conflict between Egypt and the Mitanni. Now it
had been clearly drawn into the Egyptian orbit. The Egyptian policy of
isolating the Syrian principalities from their Mitannian supporters and
encouraging them through political means to accommodate themselves
to Egyptian dominance of the region, a seduction certainly backed by the
threat of force, seemed to be working.
In Thutmose’s thirty-ninth regnal year, 1465 BCE, “His Majesty was
in the land of Retjenu on the fourteenth victorious expedition, after this
going to defeat the fallen ones of Shasu.”13 This text refers to a raid against
the Shasu bedouin that probably occurred not in Syria but in northern
Canaan. Although the text is missing, it is generally agreed that in the
next year, regnal year 40, Thutmose mounted yet another expedition in
northern Canaan.14 In regnal year 41 he was again in the field, but we are
not certain whether he ventured to Canaan or Syria. All that the texts tell
us is that “His Majesty was in the land of . . . on his fifteenth victorious
campaign. Then His Majesty sacked the town of . . .”15 Once more Pharaoh
collected tribute from the chiefs of Retjenu, and once more it is noted that
his coastal harbor depots were well supplied.
Mounting eight consecutive military expeditions in as many years is
testimony to Thutmose’s relentless desire to pacify Syria and turn it into
an Egyptian province. More evidence of his strong interest is reflected in
the fact that Thutmose led each of these expeditions personally, receiving
the tribute of the Syrian rulers each year to remind them that their fate was
closely tied to their obedience to Egypt. His willingness to show the flag in
person as well as to use force against recalcitrants, whether in Nukhashshe
or Canaan, was designed to convince the local rulers of their vulnerability
to Egyptian power. Thutmose’s counterinsurgency policy was intended
to instill a sense of political and military inevitability in Syria’s rulers
that Egypt was not going to leave and that it was in their interests to
accommodate themselves to this reality. By 1462 BCE, Thutmose’s forty-
second regnal year, his many years of Egyptian political and military effort
seemed to have paid off.
194 h Thutmose III
Revolt and Suppression

In that same year, however, a number of cities and towns in southern
Syria suddenly exploded into open revolt. The rebellion was widespread
and included the major city-states of Tunip and Kadesh as well as some
of their vassals. That the Mitanni were involved seems clear in that the
Egyptians were forced to fight Mitannian troops occupying towns around
Kadesh that had been sent to support the rebellion. Other garrisons of the
Mitanni may have been sent in support of other towns as well, but we
have no evidence. That so many towns and two major city-states were
involved in the fighting also suggests that the rebellion was a coordinated
effort and not some spontaneous outbreak. There does not seem to have
been a single precipitating event for the revolt. It may have been that the
three previous Egyptian expeditions had been small-scale operations and
had been conducted in northern Canaan and not in Syria itself. This set of
circumstances may have led the Mitanni and their allies to conclude both
that the Egyptians’ power and will were weakening and that the time to
challenge Egyptian control had come.
The rebellion seems to have caught the Egyptians by surprise, forcing
Thutmose to react quickly and with a force capable of suppressing the large-
scale revolt. The 350-mile overland march from Egypt to Lebanon would
have taken more than a month to accomplish. Since Egypt still controlled
the harbors on the Lebanon coast, it is not surprising that Thutmose again
decided to travel by sea as he had done so many times before.16 The texts
tell us as much: “Regnal year 42. Now His Majesty ferried over to the
lands of Fenkhu.” The size of the Egyptian army is not recorded, however.
Given the extent of the revolt and the involvement of the major city-states
of Tunip and Kadesh as well as of the Mitanni, it would have to have
been quite large to suppress the outbreak. A force of ten thousand men
and at least one brigade of chariots would have been required. It would
have taken at least two months to assemble and transport the army to the
Lebanon ports, so Thutmose probably landed sometime in mid-May.
Thutmose most likely landed at Simyra, an Egyptian-controlled port
city close to the Eleutheros Valley, from which he could easily attack the
towns on the Arka Plain that had gone over to the rebels. The texts tell us,
“Now His Majesty was upon the coastal road with the intent of destroying
the town of Irkatu together with the towns which were in its district.”17
Breasted notes that Irkatu is the same town as Irkata of the Amarna texts
and was located twelve miles inland southeast from Sumur, across the
Great River in the Eleutheros Valley on the Arka Plain.18 It was not far
from Simyra, and the texts’ reference to the “coastal road” most likely
refers to Thutmose’s march up the coast from Simyra to the mouth of the
valley before turning inland to attack the towns.
Thutmose attacked Irkata and destroyed it, also laying waste to
the agricultural settlements “in this district” before moving on to attack
another town on the Arka Plain. The name of this second town is lost; only
part of its name, “—kana,” has survived. But the text is clear in noting
that Thutmose “destroyed this town together with its district.”19 The term
destroyed suggests that Thutmose punished the rebel towns by fire and
sword, ravaging their farms, orchards, and crops.
Having regained control of the Arka Plain, Thutmose then moved
against Tunip, one of the two major city-states that had broken into open
revolt. Tunip had been brought under Egyptian influence during the
Euphrates campaign. Thutmose had purchased its loyalty by returning
the ruler’s son, whom Thutmose had captured at Ullaza earlier. Its loyalty
had never been secure, and it is not difficult to imagine the king of Tunip
had waited for the opportunity to slip the humiliating Egyptian leash.
Thutmose’s decision to attack Tunip is interesting. Kadesh was only
four days’ march down the Eleutheros Valley. Why not strike at Kadesh
first? Thutmose had at least two reasons. First, the fortifications of Kadesh
were more substantial than those at Tunip. Thutmose had attempted
but failed to breach Kadesh’s walls a few years earlier upon his return
march from the Euphrates. Moreover, he could hardly afford to get caught
up in a siege of Kadesh while the rest of Syria simmered with rebellion
and resentment. If his campaign of suppression was to succeed, it had
to be done quickly, and Tunip was the easier nut to crack. Second, most
certainly the Egyptian intelligence service had detected the presence of
Mitannian troop garrisons in and around the defenses of Kadesh. Indeed,
it might have been the establishment of these garrisons in the first place
that signaled the Syrian revolt. These professional warriors could be
expected to put up a stout fight, presenting the risk of bogging down the
Egyptian army and inflicting high casualties upon it. For these reasons, if
Thutmose planned to attack Kadesh, he would have to do so at the end of
196 h Thutmose III
the campaign, not at the beginning, and only after the other rebel towns
had been brought to heel.
To attack Tunip and avoid a confrontation with Kadesh and the
Mitannian garrisons near the city, Thutmose could not advance on Tunip
by the usual route of marching through the Eleutheros Valley, turning
north on the Kadesh Plain, and following the Orontes River. Instead, he
had to take the alternative route to Tunip: march north across the Arka
Plain, turn inland to follow the valleys across the mountains, and debouch
on the Orontes flood plain through the gap where the Crusaders would
later build the fortress of Krak des Chevaliers southwest of modern Homs.
It was thirty miles from the Arka Plain to the gap. From there, a march of
thirty-seven miles would bring the Egyptian army outside the walls of
Tunip without having to deal with Kadesh.
The texts say that Thutmose “arrived at Tunip; destroying the town,
uprooting its grain and chopping down its orchards.” The fact that the
grain was still in the ground suggests that the attack came sometime in
mid-June when the harvest was not yet in. On the one hand, if we take
the text literally, we may conclude that the Egyptians had captured Tunip
for the first time. There is some supposition that Thutmose himself even
occupied the city and that he used it as his headquarters while his troops
were ravaging the countryside.20 On the other hand, there is nothing
to suggest the Egyptians had made any improvements in their siege
capabilities, which in turn would lead us to believe that Tunip’s defenses
were overcome and the city itself destroyed. The assertion that Egypt
destroyed Tunip is unaccompanied by a booty list of casualties, prisoners,
and the usual captured war paraphernalia of horses, armor, weapons, and
chariots, suggesting that the claim may be an exaggeration. There is no
doubt, however, that the Egyptians ravaged the countryside, destroying
farms, orchards, and livestock as well as the settlements and towns in the
larger district. One way or another, Tunip was made to pay heavily for its
treachery.
Thutmose next marched south and upstream along the Orontes River,
destroying any town, settlement, or farm that had dared to join the revolt.
The texts’ tone suggests his attack upon these places demonstrated a level
of ferociousness that is unusual in Egyptian military accounts. The scribe
who composed the accounts used the verb sksk to describe the manner in
which the towns were attacked, and the term implies an unusual degree
of ferocity and slaughter.21 Some towns seem to have been turned over
to the army to do with them as it wished. In these instances, the troops
were allowed to keep whatever they could loot and carry. Thutmose was
outraged by the Syrian rebellion. He was determined to subdue it with
a deliberate vengeance both to punish those who had participated in it
and to send a strong message to others that they would suffer a similar
fate should they oppose Egypt’s will. By rendering terrible destruction as
he marched, Thutmose conducted a psychological warfare campaign to
weaken the will of the towns that still lay before him.
Leaving a trail of blood and fire in his wake, Thutmose arrived
outside Kadesh. The garrisons of the Mitanni were deployed in three
towns guarding the approaches to the city. Thutmose immediately attacked
them. The texts say, “Coming in safety; arrival at the district of Kadesh;
plundering three towns therein.”22 The Egyptians stormed the towns
and captured their Mitannian garrisons, or “troops of vile Naharin who
(functioned) as garrison troops.”23 Twenty-nine enemy soldiers were killed
and 691 taken prisoner. They also captured forty-eight horses and sixteen
chariots. It is noteworthy that the texts do not claim that Kadesh itself
was captured, a claim that surely would have been included in the official
Annals and recorded on the walls of Karnak had such an important prize
been taken. Amenemhab’s claim in his tomb inscriptions that Thutmose
captured Kadesh refers to the previous campaign in regnal year 30, if it is
true at all. Again, Redford is probably correct when he asserts that there is
no convincing evidence that Thutmose ever captured Kadesh at any time
during his Syrian campaigns.24
It was probably around the second week of July when the Egyptian
army reached the walls of Kadesh. Thutmose had plenty of time left in the
campaign season to lay siege to the city. Given the importance Kadesh held
in the Egyptians’ eyes as the primary fomenter of their troubles in Syria, it
is curious that the official records make no mention of an Egyptian attempt
to capture the city by storm or siege. Certainly the harvest was already
in, making it unlikely that the city could be starved into submission, and
taking the city by storm, with its defenses and garrisons intact and at full
strength, would be a difficult task. Lacking siege capabilities, Thutmose
had attempted to take the city once before and failed.
198 h Thutmose III
There are no records to tell us why Thutmose did not attack Kadesh,
how long he remained in Syria, and what he did for the remainder of
the campaign season. The record simply ends with the usual notation
that “the harbors were stocked with everything in accordance with their
tax quota and in accordance with their yearly custom, and the labor of
Lebanon in accordance with their yearly custom.”25 Thutmose seems to
have marched away from Kadesh and back through the Eleutheros Valley
to reach the Lebanon coast, where he made his annual inspection of the
supply depots as he had done at the end of every previous expedition.
This work accomplished, he boarded a ship and sailed for home.
9
Epilogue
On each of his seventeen campaigns Thutmose was accompanied by an

official scribe named Thaneni who recorded the accounts of the king’s
battles and victories in Canaan and Syria. “I followed King Menkhepperre
[Thutmose III] and witnessed the victories which he won in every country.
He brought the princes of Syria as living prisoners to Egypt, he captured
all their cities, and cut down their groves. . . . I recorded the victories,
putting them in writing according to the facts.”1 At the end of his Syrian
campaigns in his forty-second regnal year, Thaneni wrote, “Behold His
Majesty commanded to record the victories which he won from the year
twenty-three until the year forty-two, when this inscription was recorded
upon this sanctuary, that he might be given life forever.”2 The battle diaries
of Thutmose’s campaigns were inscribed on the walls of the great temple
of Amun at Karnak, which also contained the leather scroll upon which
Thaneni had written the accounts of the king’s military adventures.
Thutmose lived for another twelve years, but there are no further
accounts of his military activities recorded in the Annals. Why did the
king’s battle diaries stop at year 42? The answer may be that following
almost twenty years of continuous military activity, Thutmose had
succeeded in establishing an effective Egyptian security zone in Canaan
and Syria to provide sufficient strategic depth and warning time for Egypt
to defend its eastern border from any future attack. The ultimate goal of
Thutmose’s national defense policy was to protect Egypt from another
Hyksos invasion. As long as Egypt controlled the Lebanon coast, southern
199
200 h Thutmose III
Syria, and Canaan, any attempt by the Mitanni or a coalition of Syrian

maryannu princes to mount an invasion could be intercepted in ample
time and at sufficient distance to shift the odds of success significantly in
Egypt’s favor. After the successful counterinsurgency campaign in Syria of
year 42, Egyptian policy shifted from the offensive, designed to establish
control over the important choke points in the forward areas of its defense
zone, to the defensive, designed to maintain this control and meet any
attack as far forward of the Egyptian border as possible.
Final Years
Thutmose himself no longer led military expeditions into Canaan and Syria
after regnal year 42 because such expeditions were no longer necessary
to maintain control in these forward areas. It is, however, unrealistic to
think that once Egypt had established its position in southern Syria that it
withdrew and left the area hostage to Mitannian and insurgent intentions.
Rather than Thutmose himself, senior generals led Egyptian military
activities after year 42. The Egyptians continued to follow the same policies
in Syria that they had pursued for two decades with success in Canaan.
As they had done in Canaan, Egyptian military expeditions con-
tinued to destroy any fortifications that might be used against them in
the future or that hindered movement over important terrain. They had
instituted this policy at Ullaza a few years earlier and, if we can believe the
texts, had done significant damage to some temporary walls constructed
outside Kadesh. Certainly the towns attacked during the insurgency
campaign had their fortifications reduced, and perhaps even some of
Tunip’s fortifications were rendered useless. As long as Egyptian sappers
and miners confined their activities to areas under Egyptian control, the
policy of destroying fortifications would have proceeded without much
difficulty.
Thutmose’s practice of securing the loyalty of Syrian chiefs by
taking their sons and brothers hostage also continued, as did the practice
of replacing recalcitrant rulers with Egyptian favorites who, in the normal
course of things, would then witness their own children taken hostage.
In Canaan, Egyptian officers oversaw the collection and transport of the
harvests of the area’s grain-producing lands to Egypt. In Syria, in-kind
taxes, including grain, were levied and collected annually. The collection
Epilogue h 201
of these annual imposts would have of necessity required the presence of

Egyptian authorities to ensure the specified items’ delivery. It is unlikely
that these authorities, scribes, and accountants would have arrived
unaccompanied by military units to ensure compliance.
For almost twenty years Thutmose had kept the Canaanite and
Syrian chiefs in line with annual military campaigns, with the last cam-
paign accompanied by widespread destruction and terror. Then the
annual arrival of Egyptian tax collectors, accompanied by contingents of
troops, was sufficient to demonstrate the Egyptians’ willingness to resort
to force once more should events require it. Thus, although Thutmose no
longer accompanied the army to Canaan and Syria each year, his policies
continued very much in force. The result was twelve years of peace in the
Egyptian security zone as even the Mitanni, now more concerned with
the developing Hittite threat on its western border, withdrew from direct
confrontation with Egypt in Syria.
After regnal year 42, Thutmose was occupied with numerous major
construction projects undertaken at Karnak, Deir el-Bihari, Medinet Habu,
Elkab, Heliopolis, and in Nubia.3 It was also during this time that he began
his program of erasing Hatshepsut’s memory from all texts and public
monuments in Egypt. Both programs were extensive and time consuming,
and their success speaks to Thutmose’s competence as an administrator.
It was not until regnal year 47 that we find Thutmose once again engaged
in military activities.
In that year Thutmose led a military force of unknown size into
Nubia. At a place called Gebel Barkal (modern Napata) he erected a massive
stela. Gebel Barkal is located some 240 miles north of Khartoum on a large
bend in the Nile and was the southern boundary of Egyptian control
in the south.4 The stela describes in heroic terms many of the victories
that Thutmose won over the Syrians and the Mitanni, often stressing the
destruction he laid upon the lands of his enemies. The text’s tone is that
of a powerful oration delivered by a mighty warrior as a warning to those
who might dare defy Pharaoh’s will. It is probable that Egypt had seen
some recent difficulties in Nubia, perhaps even revolts or refusals of the
annual tribute by some recalcitrant chiefs, and that Thutmose had come
to Nubia to show the flag and issue a dire warning of things to follow if
circumstances did not improve.
202 h Thutmose III
That the stela was intended as a warning can be seen from two
elements within its text. First, the text is clearly addressed to the chiefs
of Nubia when it begins, “Listen, people of the southern land, which is
by the Gebel Barkal. . . . Oh, you shall learn of this miracle of Amen-Re.”
Second, the text goes on to tell of a dream that Thutmose had in which
“a star appeared to the south [Nubia]. Never had the like happened. It
shone exactly towards them.” The star’s light is a metaphor for Pharaoh’s
power. The text then describes what happened to the people who had
been exposed to the light: “None withstood there. I killed them like those
who had never been, they lay in their blood, enemies in heaps. . . . Their
horse teams were no more, they had bolted in the desert.” Lest anyone
miss the intent of the violence, the text goes on to say, “[All this I did] in
order to make that all inhabitants of foreign lands see the might of My
Majesty. . . . He [Amun] instilled fear of me among all the inhabitants of
foreign lands. They fled before me. Everything on which the sun shines is
bound under my soles.”5
Thutmose had not visited Nubia for more than twenty years when
he made this visit to Gebel Barkal. The inscriptions at Karnak record
regular tribute payments from Wawat (Lower Nubia) and Kush (Upper
Nubia) during that period, but there is nothing in the records that tells us
what may have prompted Thutmose to return to Nubia after such a long
absence. Perhaps the prolonged absence itself was the reason for the royal
visit. Thutmose may have wanted a tour of inspection to reinvigorate the
local magistrates or to ensure that the Nile canals around the cataracts
were in working order and that the construction projects he had ordered
were proceeding accordingly. Still, the construction of the stela and the
tone of the text lead one to suspect that there may have been difficulties of
some sort in Nubia that required Pharaoh’s attention.
Three years later, in regnal year 50, Thutmose was back in Nubia,
this time at the head of an army. He left Thebes in September, the time
of year when Egyptian armies usually set out for Nubia because it was
the season of the flood and the cataracts were most easily navigable. He
remained in Nubia for eight months before returning to Egypt in April.
On the way back, he found the canal around the First Cataract blocked by
stones and ordered it dredged. “His Majesty ordered the dredging of the
channel, after he had found it blocked up with stones, so that no ship could
Epilogue h 203
sail upon it. He then sailed downstream upon it gladness of heart, having
destroyed his enemies.”6 This last phrase clearly implies that Thutmose
had been engaged in some sort of military campaign during his stay in
Nubia.7 The length of time in the field—eight months—and the fact that the
king had personally led the army suggest a serious military undertaking.
Unfortunately, we have no information as to what it involved.
That the situation in Nubia was unsettled during Thutmose’s
final years seems clear from other evidence. Near the end of his reign,
perhaps in the final two years of his life, Thutmose appointed his son
Amenhotep II co-regent. Amenhotep was born in regnal year 35 and
was probably eighteen years old when he became co-regent.8 Sometime
shortly thereafter, perhaps in Thutmose’s final year of life, a revolt broke
out in northern Canaan, and Amenhotep led an army to suppress it. He
pacified Canaan with great brutality. Then, “after His Majesty came back
from Upper Retenu . . . having slain with his own mace the seven chiefs
who were in the district of Takhsy . . . [he] had the other doomed one
taken south to Nubia and hung on the wall of Napata.”9 He exacted this
punishment no doubt as a warning of what horrors might follow should
events in Nubia become intolerable. A few years after his father’s death,
Amenhotep led an army into Nubia 650 miles upstream from Elephan-
tine, where he put down a rebellion and established Egyptian control as
far south as the Fourth Cataract.10
Thutmose III, Egypt’s greatest warrior pharaoh, died on the thirtieth
day of the seventh month of the year—March 17, 1450 BCE—or one month
and four days short of concluding his fifty-fourth regnal year.11 His death
seems to have precipitated a revolt among some of the Syrian principal-
ities, and Amenhotep again moved quickly and brutally to put it down.
Over the next decade, Amenhotep led other punitive expeditions into
Syria to control the violence. On one of these campaigns, probably in regnal
year 9, Amenhotep tells us that he uprooted and deported 15,070 people
from the district of Nukhashshe alone.12 Whether the Mitanni supported
these revolts as a way of testing the new Egyptian king is not clear. It is
likely, however, that Amenhotep’s speed and fierceness in suppressing the
revolts along with the growing concern regarding the Hittites’ intentions
led the Mitanni to send a delegation to Egypt and offer a peace agreement.
The king of the Mitanni, probably Saussatar, sent a delegation to Egypt
204 h Thutmose III
“with proposals of brotherhood,” that is, an alliance and a renunciation

of hostilities. A treaty was eventually concluded between the two states a
short time later.
Legacy
Thutmose III left behind a legacy of greatness. He had taken an isolated,
defeated, and fearful nation and made it a true imperial power that
continued to play a central role in the politics and wars of the Levant
for more than five centuries. His national defense strategy guided the
foreign policy of Egypt’s rulers for five hundred years after his death. In
this time, no foreign army trod the black earth of the Egyptian homeland.
Thutmose had also constructed a professional and technologically well-
equipped military force from what had been only a militia army, forged
and tempered it in the crucible of war for more than two decades, and
then bequeathed it to his successors to be used as the primary instrument
of Egypt’s defense. He had restored Egyptian national power and prestige,
and he himself became the personification of the nation and its power.
From his time forward, every pharaoh regarded himself as a warrior king
whose primary responsibility, to protect the nation, was bestowed upon
him in trust by his divine father, Amun.
It is no exaggeration to say that Thutmose established the Egyptian
Empire. From the Libyan border in the west, south to the Second Cataract,
and in Syria as far north as the Great River of the Eleutheros Valley and
east to the Beqqa Valley, no foreign power challenged Egyptian control
of its realm for four centuries. It was Thutmose who first established the
rudiments of a genuine imperial administration in the conquered territo-
ries, often appointing old comrades to oversee the operations of govern-
ment in the very lands they had helped subdue. Thus, he opened Egypt
to the world, with the result that new cultural forces from all over the
region began to flow into Egypt, expanding the horizons of its craftsmen,
artists, and architects. Thutmose III was the greatest warrior king that
Egypt had ever known or ever was to know in its long and varied history
on this earth.
Notes
1. Warrior Pharaoh
1. Dennis Forbes, “Menkheperre Djehutymes: Thutmose III, a Pharaoh’s
Pharaoh,” KMT 9, no. 4 (Winter 1998–99): 63.
2. Ibid., 62.
3. R. B. Partridge, Faces of Pharaohs: Royal Mummies and Coffins from Ancient Thebes
(London: Rubicon Press, 1994), 77–80.
4. Ibid.
5. David O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” in Thutmose III: A
New Biography, ed. Eric Cline and David O’Connor (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2008), 5–6.
6. Ibid.
7. Donald B. Redford, “The Northern Wars of Thutmose III,” in Cline and
O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New Biography, 325.
8. Arielle P. Kozloff, “The Artistic Production of the Reign of Thutmose III,” in
Cline and O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New Biography, 292.
9. Dimitri Laboury, “Royal Portrait and Ideology: Evolution and Signification
of the Statuary of Thutmose III,” in Cline and O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New
Biography, 261.
10. Kozloff, “The Artistic Production of the Reign of Thutmose III,” 294.
11. Dennis Forbes, “Menkheperure Djehutymes: The Fourth and Final Thutmose,”
KMT 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 74.
12. Donald B. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt:
Seven Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 85.
13. Kozloff, “The Artistic Production of the Reign of Thutmose III,” 317.
14. Forbes, “Menkheperre Djehutymes,” 183.
15. Ibid., 54.
16. Piotr Laskowski, “Monumental Architecture and the Royal Building Program
of Thutmose III,” in Cline and O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New Biography, 229.
See also in the same volume, Catharine H. Roehrig, “The Building Activities
of Thutmose III in the Valley of the Kings,” 238–59.
205
206 h Notes
17. R. J. Forbes, Studies in Ancient Technology (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1964),
214.
18. Betsy M. Bryan, “Administration in the Reign of Thutmose III,” in Cline and
O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New Biography, 69.
19. Ibid., 113.
20. See S. R. Morcos and W. R. Morcos, “Diets in Ancient Egypt,” Progress in Food
and Nutrition Science 2 (1977): 457–71; they give six million to eight million
people as Egypt’s population in antiquity. Both of these researchers are staf-
fers at the National Research Center in the Food Science and Nutrition Depart-
ment in Cairo. O’Connor, citing K. W. Butzer, Early Hydraulic Civilization in
Egypt: A Study in Cultural Ecology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976),
83, says the population was between four million and five million people.
21. I have accepted the dates of 1505–1451 BCE as those of Thutmose III’s life,
relying upon Redford even though the issue is far from settled among
Egyptologists. Cline and O’Conner’s book features the most recent research
regarding Thutmose III and place his dates at 1479–1425. Other regnal dates
suggested by other analyses are 1490–1436, 1483–1429, 1479–1425, and 1504–
1450 BCE.
22. See the classic work by Adolf Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, trans. H. M. Tirard
(New York: Dover Books Reprint, 1971), especially chapter 14, “Learning,”
328–68, for an examination of ancient Egypt’s educational system. Also of
interest in this regard is Barbara Mertz, Red Land, Black Land: Daily Life in
Ancient Egypt (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1990), chapter 7.
23. Some idea as to how extensive the temples’ libraries were can be gained from
the example of Manetho, the high priest of Ptah at Memphis. When Ptolemy
assumed control of Egypt in the wake of Alexander’s conquests, he asked
Manetho to produce a history of Egypt. In a few short months he was able
to produce a comprehensive account of Egyptian history, reaching back to
the third millennium BCE, by drawing on the historical records in the temple
library.
24. See Richard A. Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2003), 129–31, for circumcision as a military ritual. See also James
B. Pritchard, ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 326, for an Egyptian letter
dating to 2300 BCE that suggests that the ritual was carried out on groups of
recruits entering military service.
25. William Petty, “Hatshepsut and Thutmose III Reconsidered,” KMT 8, no. 1
(Spring 1997): 47.
26. O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 20–21; and Dennis Forbes,
“Akheperenre Djehutymes: The All-But-Forgotten Second Thutmose,” KMT
11, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 75.
27. Peter F. Dorman, “The Early Reign of Thutmose III: An Unorthodox Mantle of
Coregency,” in Cline and O’Connor, Thutmose III: A New Biography, 39–68.
28. O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 5.
29. Petty, “Hatshepsut and Thutmose III Reconsidered,” 46–48.
30. Ibid., 47.
31. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt, 81.
Notes h 207
32. Ibid., 60.

33. Petty, “Hatshepsut and Thutmose III Reconsidered,” 48.
34. Ibid.
36. Petty, “Hatshepsut and Thutmose III Reconsidered,” 48.
37. Dorman, “The Early Reign of Thutmose III,” 58.
38. The contributions of Egyptian religious thought to the main Western religions
of Judaism and Christianity are discussed at length in Richard A. Gabriel,
Gods of Our Fathers: The Memory of Egypt in Judaism and Christianity (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
39. Redford, “The Northern Wars of Thutmose III,” 325.
40. Ibid.
41. For the tactical roles of infantry and cavalry in the armies of Philip and
Alexander, see Richard A. Gabriel, Empires at War: A Chronological Encyclopedia,
vol. 1, From Sumer to the Persian Empire (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005),
325–29.
42. For more on the Egyptian navy in the New Kingdom, see chapter 3 of this
book.
43. An analysis of the successor armies after Alexander can be found in Gabriel,
Empires at War, vol. 2, From Carthage to the Normans, chapter 13.
44. Anthony J. Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 62.
45. The Egyptianizing of the Ptolemaic Greeks is discussed at length in Richard
A. Gabriel, Jesus the Egyptian: The Origins of Christianity and the Psychology of
Christ (New York: Universe, 2005), chapter 3.
47. Forbes, “Menkheperre Djehutymes,” 62.
48. O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 33–34. See also Kozloff,
“The Artistic Production of the Reign of Thutmose III,” 292–324.
49. Donald B. Redford, “The Coregency of Thutmose III and Amenophis II,”
Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 51 (1965): 107–22.
2. Strategic Setting
1. Robert J. Wenke, Patterns in Prehistory: Mankind’s First Three Million Years (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 468.
2. Yigael Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in Light of Archaeological Study,
trans. M. Pearlman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 2:313–28.
3. Ibid., 1:150–51.
4. For an examination of Egyptian religion from 4000 BCE through the period of
the Greek conquests, see Gabriel, Gods of Our Fathers, 202.
5. See page xx in Eliezer D. Oren, ed., The Hyksos: New Historical and Archaeological
Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum Press, 1997),
for an understanding of the term Hyksos.
6. Ibid., 48, for the date of the Hyksos invasion.
7. Some Egyptologists argue that the Hyksos occupation of the Nile Delta was
accomplished not by armed invasion but by peaceful infiltration. For this
view see ibid., xxii. I agree with Redford that the evidence is overwhelming
in support of a violent invasion. For this view see Donald B. Redford, Egypt,
208 h Notes
Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1992), 101–10.
8. See page 48 of David O’Connor, “The Hyksos Period in Egypt,” in Oren, The
Hyksos, for the length of the Hyksos occupation at 108 years.
9. See ibid., 62, on the psychological impact of the Hyksos occupation.
10. Alan H. Gardiner, “The Defeat of the Hyksos by Kamose: The Carnarvon
Tablet, No. 1,” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 3 (1916): 102.
11. A good account of the campaigns of Kamose and Ahmose I in driving out the
Hyksos appears in Omar Zuhdi, “A Tale of Two Ahmoses or How to Begin an
Empire,” KMT 11, no. 4 (Winter 2000–2001): 50–61.
12. Michael Grant, The History of Ancient Israel (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1984), 13.
13. Nigel Stillman and Nigel Tallis, Armies of the Ancient Near East, 3000 BC–539
BC (Sussex, UK: Flexiprint Ltd., 1984), 33.
14. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:79.
15. Grant, The History of Ancient Israel, 16.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 17.
18. Georges Roux, Ancient Iraq (New York: Penguin, 1986), 235.
19. Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1973), 2, part 2:3.
20. See Richard A. Gabriel and Donald W. Boose, Jr., “Megiddo,” in Great Battles
of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide to Great Battles That Shaped the
Development of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), chapter 2, for an
explanation of Mitannian influence in Syria during the time of Thutmose III.
21. See Betsy M. Bryan, “The Egyptian Perspective on the Mitanni,” in Armana
Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations, ed. Raymond Cohen and
Raymond Westbrook (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002),
71–84, for an overview of Egyptian-Mitannian relations from Thutmose I to
Thutmose III.
22. H. W. F. Saggs, The Might That Was Assyria (London: Sidgwick and Jackson,
1984), 38.
23. Roux, Ancient Iraq, 217.
24. Ibid.
25. Cambridge Ancient History, 2, part 2:1.
26. Ibid., 873; Saggs, The Might That Was Assyria, 39; and Roux, Ancient Iraq, 218.
28. Ibid., 874.
29. Roux, Ancient Iraq, 230.
30. O. R. Gurney, The Hittites (London: Penguin, 1990), 86.
31. Saggs, The Might That Was Assyria, 196.
32. Anthony J. Spalinger, “Covetous Eyes South: The Background to Egypt’s
Domination of Nubia by the Reign of Thutmose III,” in Cline and O’Connor,
Thutmose III: A New Biography, 357.
33. David O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 10. See also S. T.
Smith, Askut in Nubia: The Economics and Ideology of Egyptian Imperialism in the
Second Millennium BC (London: Keegan Paul, 1995).
Notes h 209
34. Spalinger, “Covetous Eyes South,” 361.

35. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times, 111.
36. Ibid., 112.
38. Ibid., 348.
39. Ibid., 349.
40. Ibid., 352.
42. Ibid., 57–64.
3. The Antagonists
1. Egyptologists still disagree regarding the proper chronology of events in
ancient Egypt. When all is said and done, one is forced to choose a chronology
and stick to it. Thus, all relevant dates in this chapter are taken from Donald B.
Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III (Boston: Brill, 2003).
2. Much of the historical material in this chapter is drawn from my earlier
research. Rather than clutter up the manuscript with innumerable footnotes,
I have cited those works here so that the reader can refer to the relevant
chapters. The later footnotes in the chapter refer to the most recent research.
See Gabriel and Donald J. Boose, Jr., The Great Battles of Antiquity. Also see
Gabriel, The Great Armies of Antiquity (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002);
Great Captains of Antiquity (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001); The Military
History of Ancient Israel; and all three volumes of Empires at War.
3. This point should not be understood to mean that one man of every ten men
of military age was conscripted into the army. Rather, one man of every ten
at every farm, temple, or workshop was subject to conscription, resulting
in a rather much smaller number. A parallel system was used in ancient
Israel, where a fixed number of men were conscripted from every eleph, or a
subdivision of the clans within the tribes.
4. Leonard Cottrell, The Warrior Pharaohs (New York: Dutton, 1969), 51.
5. Ibid., 18–19.
6. An excellent work on military titles in the army of ancient Egypt is Alan R.
Schulman, Military Rank, Title, and Organization in the Egyptian New Kingdom
(Berlin: Bruno Hessling Verlag, 1964), 30–86.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Cottrell, The Warrior Pharaohs, 51.
10. R. O. Faulkner, “Egyptian Military Organization,” Journal of Egyptian
Archaeology 39 (1953): 32–47.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Cottrell, The Warrior Pharaohs, 55–56.
15. B. I. Sandor, “Tutankhamun’s Chariots: Secret Treasures of Engineering
Mechanics,” in Fatigue and Fracture of Engineering Materials and Structures 27,
no. 7 (2004): 637–46.
210 h Notes
16. Ian Shaw, “Egyptians, Hyksos, and Military Technology: Causes, Effects, or
Catalysts?” in The Social Context of Technological Change: Egypt and the Near
East, 1650–1550, ed. Andrew J. Shortland (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 2001),
59–71.
17. Ibid., 63–66.
18. Ibid., 65. See also S. Dalley, “Foreign Chariotry and Cavalry in the Armies of
Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II,” Iraq 47 (1985): 31–48.
19. Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, 8–9.
20. Shaw, “Egyptians, Hyksos, and Military Technology,” 62.
21. Hatshepsut claimed that “my troops which were formerly unequipped are now
well paid since I appeared as king,” suggesting that she was still upgrading
the army at this time. Redford, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty
of Egypt, 81.
22. Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, 4–5.
23. Ibid., 3.
24. Faulkner, “Egyptian Military Organization,” 42.
25. “Ancient Egyptian Joint Operations in the Lebanon under Thutmose III
(1451–1438 BCE),” Semaphore: Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre of Australia
16 (August 2006): 1. A march from Egypt to the Euphrates would have taken
more than two months to complete.
26. Manfred Bietak, “The Thutmoside Stronghold of Perunefer,” Egyptian
Archaeology 26 (Spring 2005): 13–14.
27. Torgny Save-Soderbergh, The Navy of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty (Uppsala,
Sweden: Uppsala University Press, 1946), 39.
28. For more on Egyptian ships and shipbuilding see ibid.; R. O. Faulkner,
“Egyptian Seagoing Ships,” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 16 (1940): 3–17;
Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, chapter 19; and John Baines and Jaromir Malek,
Atlas of Ancient Egypt (Oxford, UK: Andromeda Books, 1980), 67–69.
29. Save-Soderbergh, The Navy of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty, 34.
30. Ibid., 42.
31. Raymond W. Baker, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “History of Egyptian
Civilization.”
32. Schulman, Military Rank, Title, and Organization in the Egyptian New Kingdom, 54.
33. Ibid.
34. Sandor, “Tutankhamun’s Chariots,” 639.
35. Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, “Textiles,” in Ancient Egyptian Materials and
Technology, ed. P. T. Nicholson and Ian Shaw (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 292.
36. See the experiments with chariots and archers conducted by Richard A.
Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, From Sumer to Rome: The Military Capabilities of
Ancient Armies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 78–79.
37. Gabriel, Great Captains of Antiquity, 28.
38. For an analysis of the Egyptian modifications of the chariot, see Sandor,
“Tutankhamun’s Chariots,” 637–46.
39. Rosemarie Drenkhahn, Die Handwerker und ihre Tatigkeiten im alten Agypten
(Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1976), 130.
Notes h 211
41. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:87–89.

42. Sandor, “Tutankhamun’s Chariots,” 642.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 638.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 639.
48. Gabriel and Metz, From Sumer to Rome, 77.
49. For an excellent analysis of chariot tactics see Steven Weingartner, “In the
Near Eastern Bronze Age, Chariot Tactics Were More Sophisticated Than
Previously Supposed,” Military Heritage (August 2002): 18–22, 79. One of
the best analyses of the chariot horse in battle is found in Deborah Cantrell,
“Horsemen of Israel: Horses and Chariotry in Monarchic Israel” (Ph.D. diss.,
Vanderbilt University, 2008).
50. Richard A. Gabriel, “Egypt: Empire of the Sun,” in Empires at War, 1:73.
54. See Jonathan P. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War: 264 BC–AD 235
(Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1999), 62; and Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt,
35, for a different estimate.
55. Weingartner, “In the Near Eastern Bronze Age, Chariot Tactics,” 19–22. See
also Nic Fields’s Bronze Age War Chariots (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing,
2006) for more on chariot tactics.
56. For more on the horse in Egypt see Mertz, Red Land, Black Land, 144; Spalinger,
War in Ancient Egypt, 11; and Catherine Rommelaere, Les Chevaux du Nouvel
Empire Egyptien: Origines, Races, Harnachement (Brussels: Connaissance de
l’Egypte Pharaonique, 1991).
57. Stillman and Tallis, Armies of the Ancient Near East, 24.
58. Ibid.
59. Steven Weingartner, “Chariots Changed Forever the Way Warfare Was Fought,
Strategy Conceived, and Empires Built,” Military Heritage (August 1999): 26.
61. Ibid., 139.
62. Ibid., 141.
63. Ibid., 139.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., 141.
66. Ibid., 25.
67. Ibid., 35.
69. Ibid.
71. Michael Grant, The History of Ancient Israel (New York: Charles Scriber, 1984), 19.
73. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:79–84.
74. Ibid., 2:108.
212 h Notes
75. Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel, 234–37.

77. Grant, The History of Ancient Israel, 81.
78. Ibid., 21.
79. A good selection of models, paintings, and reliefs of Nubian soldiers can
be found in Dietrich Wildung, Sudan: Ancient Kingdoms of the Nile (Paris:
Flammarion, 1997).
80. Shaw, “Egyptians, Hyksos, and Military Technology,” 65; and Dalley, “Foreign
Chariotry and Cavalry,” 70.
81. Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, 62.
4. The Battle of Megiddo

1. There is disagreement among Egyptologists as to when the battle of Megiddo
occurred. The traditional date of 1479 BCE is taken from Harold Nelson’s
work, the first systematic treatment of the battle published in 1913. See Harold
Hayden Nelson, The Battle of Megiddo (Chicago: University of Chicago Library,
1913), 38. Since then, other Egyptologists, Donald Redford most prominent
among them, have adjusted the date to 1481 BCE. If, as Redford maintains,
Hatshepsut died in the winter of 1482, then the battle of Megiddo took place
the following spring of 1481.
3. Ibid.
5. Wolfgang Helck, Geschichte des Alten Agypten (HdO, I, 3: 1968), 154. For the
contrary view, see Hans Goedicke, The Battle of Megiddo (Baltimore: Halgo
Inc., 2000), 137.
6. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 14.
8. During Hatshepsut’s reign it had become the practice for Egypt to station
only small numbers of troops and commercial and diplomatic representatives
in foreign kingdoms with which Egypt had relations. These Egyptian envoys
mostly dealt with trade.
9. Betty Winkelman, “Buhen: Blueprints of an Egyptian Fortress,” KMT 6, no. 2
(Summer 1995): 72–83. See also Troy Fox, “Siege Warfare in Ancient Egypt,”
Tour Egypt! (http://www.touregypt.net/featurestories/siegewarfare.htm);
and Fox’s “Military Architecture of Ancient Egypt” (http://www.touregypt
.net/featurestories/fortresses.htm).
10. I have relied on the following translations and commentaries of the Annals
and the Gebel Barkal stela, which contain the original Egyptian record of
the Megiddo campaign. These translations include Redford’s, in The Wars
in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, and Goedicke’s, in The Battle of Megiddo.
In addition I have consulted and utilized the classic translations by James
Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, vol. 2, The Eighteenth Dynasty (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2001); and K. Sethe, Urkunden der 18. Dynastie:
Urkunden des Agyptischen Altertums, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1927–30).
Notes h 213
11. Redford estimates the size of the army at ten thousand troops. Spalinger, in
War in Ancient Egypt, 86, says that estimate is too high and suggests a figure
of around five thousand men. Goedicke argues that both sides could not
together have deployed more than a thousand men.
12. Capt. Glen R. Townsend, “The First Battle of History” (thesis, Command
and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1935), 28. For similar
figures as they relate to the British army of the same period, see Peter Barker,
“Crossing the Hellespont: A Study in Ancient Logistics,” paper delivered at
the VI Classics Colloquium, Classical Association of South Africa (CASA)
Conference, February 2005, 8. See also General F. Maurice, “The Size of the
Army of Xerxes in the Invasion of Greece, 480 BC,” Journal of Hellenic Studies
50, part 2 (1930): 229.
14. James K. Hoffmeier, “Tents in Egypt and the Ancient Near East,” Toronto
Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities (SSEA) Journal 7, no. 3 (1977):
13–28, for Egyptian tents. See also Mordechai Gichon, “Military Camps on
Egyptian and Syrian Reliefs,” Assaph: Studies in Honor of Asher Ovadiah (Tel
Aviv: Department of Art History, Tel Aviv University, 2005), 569–93.
15. The Romans brought wheat to Egypt.
16. Barker, “Crossing the Hellespont,” 2.
17. References in Egyptian literature note that the military camp had a particularly
pungent smell from the horse dung used in its cooking fires. I built fires using
horse dung and cow dung, the cooking fuel of Egyptian civilians, and sure
enough, horse dung has an irritating, pungent smell while cow dung has a
pleasant, sweet smell.
18. Radishes were used medicinally in Egypt from ancient times. Public works
crews were fed radishes to ward off illness and infection. In 1948 biochemists
isolated a substance called raphanin from an extract of radish seeds. Raphanin
is an effective antibiotic against a number of bacteria, including cocci and coli.
See Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine, vol. 1,
From Ancient Times to the Middle Ages (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 82.
19. For more on the rations of ancient armies, see Richard A. Gabriel, “Rations,”
in Soldiers’ Lives through History: Antiquity (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
2007), chapter 5.
20. A four-gallon bucket lowered into a well and raised every fifteen seconds
for twenty-four hours would remove only 23,040 gallons of water a day,
assuming the well did not play out, or about just enough water to supply
Thutmose’s army for a single day. On average, mules and horses require
about eight times as much water as soldiers do.
21. Gabriel and Metz, From Sumer to Rome, 108.
22. M. Kerstein, M. Mager, R. Hubbard, and J. Connelly “Heat-Related Problems
in the Desert: The Environment Can Be the Enemy,” Military Medicine 149
(December 1984): 650–56.
23. R. O. Faulkner, “The Battle of Megiddo,” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 28
(1942): 2.
24. Ibid., 6.
214 h Notes
25. “It is an inescapable fact of equine life that ridden or loaded horses and pack
animals cannot travel more than seven consecutive days without a rest day,
otherwise their backs are damaged.” Barker, “Crossing the Hellespont,” 6.
26. See Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times, 155; and Helck,
Geschichte des Alten Agypten, 154.
27. Israel Finkelstein, David Ussishkin, and Baruch Halpern, eds., Megiddo III:
The 1992–1996 Seasons, vol. 2, The Finds (Tel Aviv: Emery and Claire Yass
Publications in Archaeology, Institute of Archaeology, Tel Aviv University,
2000), 540.
28. The population estimate of Megiddo is based on Yadin’s calculations of 240
people per urban acre in Canaanite cities during this period. See Yadin, The
Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 2:20.
29. Until the New Kingdom, the Egyptians were able to construct walls and
buildings only on flat land. The Canaanites, by contrast, could build walls and
buildings to follow the contour of the land, and the walls did so at Megiddo.
30. Eric H. Cline, The Battles of Armageddon: Megiddo and the Jezreel Valley from
the Bronze Age to the Nuclear Age (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2000), 22.
31. Goedicke, The Battle of Megiddo, 108.
32. Nelson, The Battle of Megiddo, 38.
33. Cline, The Battles of Armageddon, 10. These conditions are well attested from
Roman times to the present. The biblical story of Deborah’s victory over Sisera
in the Kishon Valley—she tricked him into leaving the heights, and entering
upon the plain, his troops and chariots became stuck in the mud—suggests
that these same conditions obtained in the Late Bronze Age as well.
34. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 34–35.
36. Ibid., 6; and Townsend, “The First Battle in History,” 18, citing James Henry
Breasted.
38. Ibid., 32 and 128.
40. Faulkner, “Egyptian Military Organization,” 32–47. See also Schulman,
Military Rank, Title, and Organization, 292.
41. Finkelstein, Ussishkin, and Halpern, Megiddo III, 2:535.
42. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 14; Faulkner, “The
Battle of Megiddo,” 3.
44. Faulkner, “The Battle of Megiddo,” 3.
47. The obvious question, then, is why didn’t Thutmose take the Djefty road?
The usual answer is that it was too long and that it would have exposed his
army’s rear to attack. This answer is unconvincing. If the Aruna road was too
narrow to permit Thutmose to move his army on it in anything but single file,
then it is difficult to see how an Asiatic force attacking up the road from the
mountains’ exit could have moved its army in strength up the same road.
Notes h 215
48. The assumption is, of course, that Thutmose’s reconnaissance teams would
have observed the Asiatic task forces on the plain. But even if they did not,
the Egyptians were thoroughly familiar with the organization and equipment
of the Canaanite armies and would surely have known that they were chariot
heavy.
49. Modern Ar’arah is probably the site of ancient Aruna.
50. Nelson, The Battle of Megiddo, 32. Unfortunately, Nelson offers no details.
52. Ibid., 33.
53. This estimate is purely hypothetical but seems reasonable in light of the
assumption that the Asiatics expected the Egyptians to come down the widest
and easiest road through Jenin on to Ta’anach.
54. Goedicke, The Battle of Megiddo, 51–52.
57. Townsend, “The First Battle in History,” 26.
59. Ibid., 57.
60. Ibid., 50.
61. Ibid., 57.
62. A force of ten thousand men requires just less than two square miles of ground
upon which to encamp. See Maurice, “The Size of the Army of Xerxes,” 214.
64. Ibid., 26. The early American railway routes also followed the natural course
of rivers and streams through mountainous terrain.
65. Besides using maps and Google Earth satellite photos, I have twice walked
the ground in and around Megiddo.
66. The ground on either side of the stream is flat and bare. During the rainy
season, this wide path serves as the Kina’s flood plain. But by June, the brook
is back in its banks, and the land on either side is firm and dry.
68. Ibid., 57.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 60.
73. Goedicke’s location of the Egyptian camp as being close to the bend of the
Kina brook cannot be correct. The area he identifies as the camp is only 360
feet by 1,340 feet, not nearly large enough to accommodate an army of ten
thousand men, horses, chariots, and so forth. They would require at least two
square miles upon which to encamp.
74. In May, the sun sets in Megiddo around 7:00 p.m.
75. The only portrayals of Egyptian military camps are those of Ramses II at the
battle of Kadesh. There is no good reason to think that Thutmose’s camp was
any different. See Gichon, “Military Camps in Egyptian and Syrian Reliefs.”
76. Egyptian shields of this period appear to have a non-Argive-like grip; that is,
the handle in back of the shield runs horizontally, not vertically. The first reliefs
216 h Notes
of Argive-like grips in Egypt seem to appear on the Shardanna guardsmen’s

shields during the reign of Ramses II.
77. It is interesting to note that the design of the desert tabernacle described in
Exodus 26–27 and 36–38 is nearly an exact copy of Ramses’s war tent at the
battle of Kadesh and is portrayed in the reliefs found on the wall of the Great
Hall of Abu Simbel. The famous Old Testament scholar Hugo Grossman first
made this observation in 1913. See Michael M. Homan, “The Divine Warrior
in His Tent: A Military Model for Yahweh’s Tabernacle,” Bible Review 16, no. 6
(December 2000): 55; and Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel, 95–98.
79. Faulkner (“The Battle of Megiddo,” 11) and Goedicke (The Battle of Megiddo,
67) differ on the meaning of this phrase.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., 71.
83. Townsend, “The First Battle in History,” 29.
84. Weingartner, “Chariots Changed Forever the Way Warfare Was Fought,” 18–
26; and by the same author, “In the Near Eastern Bronze Age, Chariot Tactics,”
18–22, 79. Weingartner’s book Chariots as a Whirlwind (Westport, CT: Praeger,
forthcoming 2009) promises to be the definitive work on chariot tactics.
85. I am indebted to Steve Weingartner for the idea that horse movements in a
chariot battle were much like those in a polo match.
87. Their panic did not lead them to abandon their chariots on the battlefield,
which, of course, would have been suicidal. The Asiatics fled in their chariots
toward the city. As the charioteers scrambled over the city’s walls, they
abandoned the chariots, which the Egyptians gathered up later.
88. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 30; and Goedicke, The
Battle of Megiddo, 72.
89. This conclusion is based on a study of the nature and type of casualties suffered
in the infantry-chariot melee in Ramses II’s camp at the battle of Kadesh. It
seems that the poor bloody infantry always gets the worst of it! See Gonzalo
M. Sanchez, “Injuries in the Battle of Kadesh,” KMT 14, no. 1 (Spring 2003):
58–65.
92. See Goedicke, The Battle of Megiddo, 91 and 128, for the problems associated
with determining the length of the siege.
93. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 37–39; and Spalinger,
War in Ancient Egypt, 95. The problem of the location of these towns is dealt
with in chapter 5. As Breasted notes, they have been misidentified as being
located in north Jordan when in fact they are located near the Litani River in
south Lebanon. As chapter 5 makes clear, Thutmose captured these towns
during his incursion into Lebanon later that summer.
96. Ibid., 96.
Notes h 217
97. Since the story of the town’s establishment appears only on the Gebel Barkal
stela it cannot be taken as certain. See ibid., 123. Some sort of town and cultic
center had existed at or near Beth Shean probably for millennia. Thutmose
may have turned the site into a fortified town for the Egyptian military’s use.
5. The Campaign in Canaan

2. A. T. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 76. I have relied on this classic work
for its description of the geography of Lebanon and Syria and for its analysis
of the archaeological evidence for the descriptions of the ancient cities of
Kadesh and Qatna.
3. Petrie’s claim that these cities were first encountered by Thutmose near
Megiddo and that they must therefore have been in the Jordan Valley is
incorrect. See Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:187; and Nicolas Grimal, A
History of Ancient Egypt, trans. Ian Shaw (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1988), 213.
4. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 188. I have relied on Breasted’s work for
the translation of the original inscriptions. He was the first to publish these
translations in 1906. Most of the footnotes from this source that appear herein
are references to the original texts.
5. Ibid., 186.
6. Ibid., 220.
8. Ibid., 195.
9. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest, 144.
10. It is interesting to speculate where Thutmose III might have learned about his
grandfather’s exploits and, more specifically, his strategic thinking. He may
have listened to tales about the old man from Thutmose I’s former generals
and even from Hatshepsut herself. She seems to have idolized her father, even
going so far as to have his sarcophagus moved into her tomb. The Egyptians
were well aware of their history and kept historical records. Thutmose would
have had access to the temple library when he was sent there to learn to read
and write and become a priest of Amun.
13. This is Olmstead’s view of the matter. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria
to the Macedonian Conquest, 135.
14. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 198.
16. Ibid., 170.
18. Ibid. See also Laskowski, “Monumental Architecture and the Royal Building
Program of Thutmose III,” 183–237.
19. The use of regnal years to chronicle events is sometimes confusing. Pharaohs
counted their reigns as beginning from the year in which they actually came
to the throne. Thutmose’s father had died when Thutmose was an infant, so
he officially assumed the throne then even though Hatshepsut ruled as regent.
218 h Notes
Thus, when he assumed the throne in his own right, it was in his twenty-third
regnal year.
20. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 131, 214. The “lands of
Fenkhu” are generally identified with the Phoenician coast, most particularly
the coast north of Carmel.
21. Ibid.
22. T. L. Thompson, The Settlement of Palestine in the Late Bronze Age (Wiesbaden,
Germany, 1979), 59.
23. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 191–92.
24. Ibid., 193.
25. Ibid.
26. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest, 135–36; and
Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 195.
27. See Gabriel, “The Dawn of Conscience,” in Gods of Our Fathers, chapter 1, for
Pharaoh’s role in maintaining universal order. See also James Henry Breasted,
Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt: Lectures Delivered on the
Morse Foundation at Union Theological Seminary (New York: Charles Scriber’s
Sons, 1912), chapter 6.
29. The name of Eleutheros Valley is taken from Strabo, Histories, xvi, 2, 12,
and was used throughout classical times. The name appears in the Bible
(Maccabees 11:7 and 12:30), but we do not know by what name it was known
to the Egyptians.
30. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest, 73–74.
31. Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 155.
32. Two of those rivers, the Crocodile and the Gihon, still flow through the area.
The Crocodile River has provided water to Caesarea since Roman times.
33. The swamp remained a major obstacle until Roman times when it was drained
and turned into farmland. After the Arab conquest, the drainage system was
allowed to decay and the swamp once more covered the land until the Israelis
repaired the drainage system in the 1950s.
35. “Arvad [is] a bare rock in the center of a north and south line of reefs, two and
a half miles from shore. A half mile long and quarter mile wide, its surface
rose but a few feet above the waves. . . . On all sides but the east were reefs
whose dangers only the local pilots knew. The bare rocks were leveled off
with stones and concrete, and to west and south rose a great seawall above
the moat.” Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest,
137. It was very close to the modern port of Tartus.
37. Ibid., 196–97.
38. Ibid.
Notes h 219

43. Ibid.
6. The Campaign for the Lebanon Coast

2. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 218. The term palatine
cities refers to the fact that these small towns were based on small palace
economies.
3. Ibid.
4. George W. Houston, “Ports in Perspective: Some Comparative Material on
Roman Merchant Ships and Ports,” American Journal of Archaeology 92, no.
4 (1988): 559. See also Avner Raban, “Minoan and Canaanite Harbours,”
Aegaeum 7 (1991): 129–46.
6. Ibid. More recent archaeological research carried out by a Syrian-Italian team
at Qatna in 2008 confirms the dimensions of the city that Olmstead had noted
in his earlier work.
8. Faulkner, “Egyptian Seagoing Ships,” 3.
9. Richard A. Gabriel, Scipio Africanus: Rome’s Greatest General (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2008), 152; and Houston, “Ports in Perspective,” 559.
13. Bietak, “The Thutmoside Stronghold of Perunefer,” 13–17.
15. Ibid., 37.
16. James Hornell, “Naval Activity in the Days of Solomon and Ramses III,”
Antiquity 21 (1947): 66.
18. Faulkner, “Egyptian Seagoing Ships,” 4. The dates are taken from Sir Alan H.
Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961),
434–35.
19. William F. Edgerton, “Ancient Egyptian Ships and Shipping,” American Journal
of Semitic Languages and Literature 39, no. 2 (January 1923): 116–17.
20. William F. Edgerton, “Dimensions of Ancient Egyptian Ships,” American
Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature 46, no. 3 (April 1930): 146.
21. Faulkner, “Egyptian Seagoing Ships,” 7–8.
22. Edgerton, “Ancient Egyptian Ships and Shipping,” 121.
24. Edgerton, “Dimensions of Ancient Egyptian Ships,” 146.
25. Faulkner, “Egyptian Seagoing Ships,” 3–4.
28. Ibid.
29. Edgerton, “Dimensions of Ancient Egyptian Ships,” 149.
220 h Notes
30. William F. Edgerton, “Ancient Egyptian Steering Gear,” American Journal of

Semitic Languages and Literature 43, no. 4 (July 1927): 255–65.
31. Edgerton, “Ancient Egyptian Ships and Shipping,” 116.
33. Gabriel, Empires at War, 1:88.
34. Lionel Casson, “Seasons and Winds, Sailing, Rowing Speed,” in Ships and
Seamanship in the Ancient World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1971), 270.
35. Ibid. See also H. Koster, Das antike Seewesen (Berlin, 1923), 125.
36. Koster, Das antike Seewesen, 125; and Connie Lambrou-Phillipson, “Seafaring
in the Bronze Age Mediterranean,” Aegaeum 7 (1999): 11–19.
37. Raban, “Minoan and Canaanite Harbours,” 129–46; and Houston, “Ports in
Perspective,” 559.
38. Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 205. See also R. P.
Duncan-Jones, “Giant Cargo Ships in Antiquity,” Classical Quarterly 27, no. 2
(1977): 331–36.
39. An approximate model of a Roman era transport of eighty to a hundred tons
burden can be found in the entrepot vessels that plied the New England coast
in the 1870s. These vessels were ninety feet long, sixteen feet wide, and fourteen
feet deep from keel to deck. They were shallow-draft boats drawing less than
two feet of water when empty and were capable of carrying a hundred tons of
firewood, lumber, or coal. My thanks to Paul Rollins of York, Maine, a naval
architect and shipbuilder, for the information on New England entrepots.
40. The name of one of these transports was The Stable, clearly suggesting it was
a horse transport. Save-Soderbergh, The Navy of the Eighteenth Egyptian
Dynasty, 42.
41. Gabriel, Soldiers’ Lives through History, 10. See also Roth, The Logistics of the
Roman Army at War, 9.
42. Alcohol served the important purpose of calming the nerves of the soldiers,
many of whom had never seen the sea and had surely never sailed on it.
43. I owe a debt of gratitude to Ms. Alison Galliardi of Maine, an accomplished
horsewoman, for these figures. Those interested in more information about
the horse in ancient Egypt should see Spalinger, War in Ancient Egypt, 8–11.
44. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 66–67.
45. Gabriel, The Military History of Ancient Israel, 120.
46. For example, the complete sarcophagus for the burial of the sacred Apis bull
was quarried of black Aswan granite and weighed twenty-five tons. Egyptian
sailors transported the sarcophagus from Aswan to Memphis, a distance of
six hundred miles, by boat.
47. Although Egyptians were constructing ships for millennia before Roman
times, there persisted an impression in modern scholarship that they were not
a seafaring people. In “Ancient Egyptian Ships and Shipping,” 134, Edgerton
notes, “At some time between the 18th Dynasty and the period represented by
the oldest surviving Greek traditions, Egyptian shipping disappeared from
the sea and has never been revived; we still have to combat the myth that the
ancient Egyptians were never a sea-faring people.” The reasons for the demise
Notes h 221
of Egyptian shipping are complex but include the gradual weakening of

Egyptian authority in Asia during the Amarna period and the shift to ground
warfare in Asia, which did not require an amphibious capability. It is now
clear from recent research that the Egyptians designed and constructed ships
that were later used by the Phoenicians. See Mertz, Red Land, Black Land, 231.
49. Ibid., 198.
50. Ibid., 232.
51. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria in the Macedonian Conquest, 118.
52. Ibid., 119.
54. Ibid.
55. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times, 158. Redford agrees that
Thutmose probably did not capture Kadesh.
56. Indeed, it was on this plain that Ramses II fought the Hittites at the battle of
Kadesh in 1275 BCE.
58. Ibid., 232.
59. It was the Egyptian practice to cut off the hand of an enemy as proof that
one had killed the adversary in battle. This practice sometimes produced
problems wherein the hands of the enemy wounded as well as the hands of
Egyptian dead were severed and presented to superiors for rewards.
61. Ibid., 198.
62. This location presented no problem since the Mediterranean is essentially
tideless; however, it was more difficult to push a boat off the sand once it had
been beached to off-load its troops or cargo.
63. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria in the Macedonian Conquest, 137.
66. The Egyptians symbolized their intention to remain in Arvad by erecting an
obelisk on the island; it still stands. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria in
the Macedonian Conquest, 138.
68. Ibid., 199, for “the son of that foe of Tunip”; and Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and
Israel in Ancient Times, 158.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 204. The military supplies were collected as impost—that is, a direct
levy—and are to be distinguished from tribute.
222 h Notes

79. Ibid.
7. The Euphrates Campaign

2. See Forbes, Studies in Ancient Technology, 37, for the calculations regarding the
number of smiths required for an army of twenty thousand troops. Forbes
bases his calculations on information found in the writings of Livy, Dionysius,
and Cicero.
4. Ibid., 232.
5. Ibid., 123.
6. Ibid.
7. The version of the Gebel Barkal stela used herein is taken from Sethe, Urkunden
der 18. Dynastie, Bd. 2: Historisch-biographishce Urkunden, Heft 4, S. 1227-
1243, and appears online at http://www.terraflex.co.il/ad/egypt/napata_
stela.htm.
8. Ibid.
10. Gebel Barkal stela, 4, in Sethe, Urkunden der 18. Dynastie.
11. R. O. Faulkner, “The Euphrates Campaign of Thutmose III,” Journal of Egyptian
Archaeology 32 (1947): 40.
12. Ibid.
14. Gichon, “Military Camps on Egyptian and Assyrian Reliefs,” Assaph: Studies
in Honor of Asher Ovadiah (Tel Aviv: Department of Art History, Tel Aviv
University, 2005–6), 571.
15. Gabriel, Soldiers’ Lives through History, 102. See also Animal Management
(London: British Army Veterinary Department, 1908), 299.
16. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,”
in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West, ed. Bernard S. Bachrach
(Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1993), 717.
17. See Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:227–34, for Amenemhab’s biography.
18. See Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 222–23, for the
thematic argument.
19. An army of twenty thousand troops marching four abreast forms a column
seven miles long. Add to this number the 6,500 animals and the wagons, and
an estimate of ten miles for the length of Thutmose’s column seems reasonable.
See Maurice, “The Size of the Army of Xerxes,” 229.
21. The exact location of Tunip is unknown.
22. It is not unreasonable to suspect that part of the arrangements Thutmose made
with Tunip and Qatna may also have included an agreement for the cities to
provide some supplies for the Egyptian army. The alternative they faced was
that Thutmose would simply plunder the agricultural countryside around the
cities. Armies, after all, have to be fed.
Notes h 223
23. R. S. Bagnall, Egypt in Late Antiquity (Princeton: NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1993), 39. A thousand donkeys could transport 150,000 pounds of food
and other supplies. See also Gabriel, “Logistics,” in Soldiers’ Lives, 107–10, for
the logistics of ancient armies.
24. British staff officers in World War I invented the term wastage to describe the
number of soldiers who became unfit for a variety of reasons each day.
25. Breasted suggests that modern Gebel Sim, a ridge 2,700 feet high that is
located north and west of Aleppo, might have been the location of the battle.
Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 231.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. For a description of the agricultural region around the area of Carchemish and
the west bank of the Euphrates in antiquity, see Irene J. Winter, “Carchemish,”
Anatolian Studies 33 (1983): 177–97; T. J. Wilkinson, E. Peltenburg, A. McCarthy,
E. B. Wilkinson, and M. Brown, Archaeology in the Land of Carchemish: Landscape
Surveys in the Area of Jerablus Tahtani, 2006 (London: Council for British Research
Inside the Levant, 2007), 213–47; and Tony J. Wilkinson, On the Margin of the
Euphrates: Settlement and Land Use at Tell Es-Sweyhat and in the Upper Land Area,
Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Oriental Institute Publications, 2004),
124:79
31. A 30-foot-long, 9.8-inch-diameter modern telephone pole made from cedar
weighs about 428 pounds. Twenty-four of these poles would be sufficient to
fashion a raft 20 feet wide. A wagon carrying eight poles would have a load
burden of 3,424 pounds. Three wagons could carry enough logs for one raft. A
fourth wagon could carry the five cross poles, pegs, dowels, and papyrus rope.
Thus, four wagons could carry all the materials needed to construct one raft.
My thanks to Ms. Phyllis Sipe, regional manager for Koppers Incorporated,
the largest supplier of telephone polls in the United States, and to Professor
Jeff Schnick, chairman of the Department of Physics at Saint Anselm College,
for his calculations regarding the load-carrying capacity of the rafts.
33. The king of the Mitanni may have been Barratarna. See Redford, The Wars in
Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 231.
34. Ibid., 74.
35. Faulkner, “The Euphrates Campaign of Thutmose III,” 40.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 74.
43. It is for this reason—the conquered country became part of Pharaoh’s realm—
that the texts frequently portray the military expeditions of the Egyptian king
as “extending the boundaries of Egypt.”
224 h Notes

46. Ibid., 225.
50. For a fictional account of Thutmose’s elephant hunt at Niya see my novel, Lion
of the Sun (New York: iUniverse, 2001).
52. Ibid.
53. Cantrell, “The Horsemen of Israel” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 2008),
34. See also Ann Hyland, Equus: The Horse in the Roman World (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 81.
54. Cantrell, “The Horsemen of Israel,” 33–34.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 32.
57. Ibid., 42.
58. Ibid., 31.
63. The term chauvechée was first used by the French during the Hundred Years
War to describe the English practice of landing an army on French soil and
marching inland, plundering and looting as they went, only to return to their
ships, leave, and make no attempt to occupy the territory they had ravaged.
8. The Counterinsurgency Campaign

1. A. T. Olmstead, History of Palestine and Syria (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1972), 118–22, notes that many of the maryanna-dominated cities of Syria had
military camps and fortifications outside them, remnants of the days when
the maryanna first imposed themselves upon the cities.
2. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:70, disagrees, noting that there
are illustrations showing Egyptian troops using a number of siege engines,
including the battering ram, long before Thutmose III’s reign. O’Connor, in
“Thutmose III: A Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 31, argues that the successful Egyptian
assaults against the Hyksos capital at Avaris and Sharuhen argue for the
presence of Egyptian siege capability. The problem is that except for Megiddo,
there is no claim in the texts that any major Syrian city was taken by siege.
The Egyptians did have the capability to attack defensive walls but only if
they were fashioned of mud brick. The walls of the Syrian cities were stone
casement walls, which were another matter entirely.
3. Some researchers have included Ebla and even Niya in the Nukhashshe area.
This information seems to be erroneous.
4. “Regnal year 34. Now His Majesty was in Djahy . . . his . . . capitulating to
His Majesty completely and abjectly. Tally of the towns plundered in this
year: two towns. Towns which capitulated in the region of Nukhashshe.” See
Notes h 225
Redford, The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 79.

5. Wolfgang Helck, in Die Beziehungen Aegyptens und Vorderasiens zur Agais bis
7. Jahrhundert von Chr. (Darmstadt, Germany, 1979), 153, places Ar’anu to the
west of Aleppo.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 234.
10. Ibid., 87.
11. Ibid., 89.
12. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times, 160–61.
13. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:211.
14. Ibid., 212. Breasted argues that the spacing on Pylon VI indicates that there
was probably an additional text addressing some campaign in year 40, but all
that has survived are the tribute lists from Cyprus and the imposts of Kush
and Wawat.
16. Redford disagrees, suggesting that the mention of the road indicates an
overland march. I am convinced that Breasted is correct on this point. Redford,
The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III, 95.
17. Ibid.
18. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:214. See also H. Klengel, Syria 3000 to 300
B.C.: A Handbook of Political History (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 162.
22. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:215–16.
24. Ibid., 240.
25. Ibid., 75.
9. Epilogue
1. Arthur Weigall, A History of the Pharaohs (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1927), 2:385.
2. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 2:217.
5. Sethe, Urkunden der 18. Dynastie, S. 1227-1243, for the complete translation of
the Napata stela.
6. Weigall, A History of the Pharaohs, 2:394.
7. O’Connor, “Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh,” 31; and Salinger, “Covetous
Eyes South,” 355, support the contention that Thutmose led an expedition
into Nubia in regnal year 50.
8. Redford, “The Coregency of Thutmose III and Amenophis II,” 122.
9. Ibid., 243.
10. Weigall, A History of the Pharaohs, 2:394.
11. The regnal year of a new pharaoh usually began when the new king assumed
the throne. Thus, a king who assumed the throne at age twenty would mark
226 h Notes
that year as his first regnal year. In the case of Thutmose III, the question of
when to begin his regnal years remains unsettled. If his father died when
Thutmose was still an infant, as seems the case, then his regnal years would
begin then, even though his stepmother-aunt, Hatshepsut, ruled as regent. If,
as some maintain, his father died when Thutmose was age six or seven, then
at his first regnal year he would have been age six or seven. Thus, it is possible
that Thutmose was either fifty-four or sixty years of age when he died.
12. Redford, in Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times, 163, cites Peter der
Manuelian, Studies in the Reign of Amenophis II (Leiden, the Netherlands:
Hildesheim, 1987), 56.
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Index
acacia, 141 Annals, 5, 120, 123–127, 130, 148–152,

Afghanistan, 22 173, 174, 176, 178, 181, 197, 199
Agrapha, 65 Antelope’s Nose, 130, 138
Ahhotep, 14 Antioch, 41
Ahmose I, 1, 3, 10, 14, 32–34, 46, 52, Apamea, 168, 176
53, 138 Apiru, 16, 76, 77, 78, 131, 133, 181
Akhenaten, 41 Aramaeans, 78
akil narkabti, 74 Ar’anu, 190
Alalakh, 41, 77, 161, 184, 185, 192 Arbela, 22
Aleppo, 40, 41, 137, 169, 170, 175, 176, Ardata, 130, 131, 148
183, 184, 185, 189, 190, 192 aritu, 71
Alexander the Great, 2, 7, 17, 21–24 Arka, 149, 143
alik ilku, 67 Arka Plain, 129, 131, 133, 136, 149, 154,
alik seri, 67 166, 194, 195, 196
Allul, 77 Armenia, 40, 41, 69
alu, 66 armor of Hanigalbat, 71
Amarna letters, 41, 76, 151 Aruna road, 77, 95–99, 101, 102, 103,
Amaru, 175 105
Amenemhab, 6, 150, 166, 170, 171, Arvad, 130, 152, 153, 154, 163, 164
176–181 Aryans, 41
Amenenhet, 25 ashshabu, 66
Amenhotep I, 2, 10, 34, 46, 52, 53, 138 Asiatics, 31, 32
Amenhotep II, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 19, 25, 26, Assyria, 40, 42, 65; army of, 64
41, 139, 203 Assyrian army, 64
Amenhotep III, 3 Assyrians, 39, 69, 188
amphibious assault, 153 Aswan, 43
amphibious operations, 138 Avaris, 31, 32, 36, 37, 52, 56, 138, 139
Amun, 10, 126, 127, 131, 202;
priesthood, 9, 16; temple of, 199 Baalbek, 118, 176
Anatolia, 39, 40, 69 Babylon, 188
233
234 h Index
Baket, 25 Carmel Range, 182

basilica, 8 Carmel Mountains, 130
beer, 146 Carthage, 24
bel dimtu, 66 Carthaginians, 132
belly bar, 58 carvel-built ships, 140–141
Beqqa Valley, 36, 69, 118, 129, 168, 181, cataracts of the Nile, 28
182, 204 cavalry, 64
Beth Shean, 39, 120, 121 cedar, 129, 136, 141, 148
Bible, 41, 130 chariot, 36, 42, 52, 53, 57; Egyptian
Binder of the Barbarians, 120 innovations, 58–60; New Kingdom,
Black Land, 18 57–60
Blue War Crown, 3, 62 chariot archer, 64, 65
body armor, 31, 36 chariot brigade, 147, 161
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 2, 7 chariot runners, 78
Botanical Garden, 7 chariot system, 43
Breasted, James Henry, 2, 178, 195 chevauchée, 182
brick fashion, 141 Cilician Gates, 40
bronze helmet, 62, 71, 191 circumcision, 11
bronze spear blades, 79 Clausewitz, Carl von, 185
bronze scale overcoat, 68 coat of mail, 36
bronze swords, 79 Cold War, 122, 123, 130
bronze plates, 62, 137, 150, 179, 183 collar, 165
bronze weapons, 53, 55, 128 combined-arms corps, 57
brothers of the right, 67 commander’s conference, 64
bull-hide shield, 12 composite bow, 13, 31, 36, 51–57, 62,
Buren, 5, 46, 138 64, 75, 80, 190
Byblos, 120, 127, 129, 130, 132, 140, 143, conscription, 52, 57
148, 152, 154, 163, 164, 165 corvée labor, 8, 50, 160
counterinsurgency strategy, 189
Caesarea, 130 crutches, 142
Cairo, 175 Cynoscephalae, battle of, 24
Canaan, 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 28, 30, 34, 47, 53,
55, 56, 59, 74, 81, 120, 123–129, 132, Damascus, 39, 137, 181
135, 136, 140, 147, 160, 187, 193, 194; David, King, 77, 78
land of, 35–39 deck beams, 140, 141
Canaanite army, 73–79; chariot corps; deckhouses, 143
74–76; infantry, 76–78 Deir el-Bihari, 201
Canaanite chariot, 59, 75; chariot dimati, 66
warrior, 75–76 dja, 12
Canaanite chiefs, 126 Dongola, 44
Canaanite military fortifications, 36–38 Donkey-town, 189
Canaanite system of mobile defense, Dor, 130
78–79 Dusty Ones, 76–77
Canaanite tactics, 77
Canaanites, 30, 70 Early Dynastic Period, 27
caravan leaders, 50 Ebla, 37
Carchemish, 37, 162, 169, 170–175 Ebro River, 132
Index h 235
Edgerton, William, 141 Fourth Expedition, 124–126

Egyptian army: Eighteen Dynasty, frames, 141, 142
34; field division, 61–64; infantry,
60–65; Middle Kingdom, 50–52; New Gaur, 41
Kingdom, 57–64; Old Kingdom, Gaza, 3, 15, 16, 22, 36, 41, 124, 182
49–50; tactics, 64–65 Gebel Barkal stela, 47, 173, 174, 201,
Egyptian Empire, 34, 40, 204 202
Egyptian navy, 126, 133, 136, 138–143, geldings, 179, 180
155 general staff, 57
Eighteenth Dynasty, 1, 2, 22, 121 Genesis, 41
elephants, 176 Gezer, 39
Eleutheros Valley, 127–132, 136, 140, Ghab Valley, 176
148–153, 155, 162, 163, 166, 168, 189, girt rope, 142
194, 195, 196, 198, 204 glacis, 37
Elgar, Francis, 141 goat’s-leg, 12
Elkab, 201 gold of honor, 6
emanthuhlu, 67 Gomorrah, 36
emanti, 67 Granicus, 22
Emar, 171, 189 Grant, Michael, 76
Esdraelon Plain, 81, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, Great Bend of the Euphrates, 35,
94, 96, 97, 98, 105, 129 171, 189
Euphrates River, 1, 36, 39, 42, 56, 64, Great Green, 28
118, 121, 122, 129, 132, 133, 160–165, Great River, 128, 129, 195, 204
169–173, 182, 183; campaign, 10, 159, gurpisu, 71
161, 175, 176, 183, 185, 188, 189, 195; gurpisu siparri, 71
plain of, 39 gurpisu siparri kursimetu, 71
European Middle Ages, 27
habbatu, 76
Faulkner, R. O., 164 Habiru, 77
Fenkhu, 125, 194 Halicarnassus, 22
Fertile Crescent, 41 halsu, 66
Festival Hall at Karnak, 5, 7 halsuhlu, 66
field rations, 85 Hamah, 151, 168
Fifth Campaign, 126–133 Hanigalbat, 39, 42, 65
Fifth Cataract, 43, 46, 47 Hatshepsut, 5, 9, 10, 12–17, 25, 35, 47,
Fifth Dynasty, 138, 141 55, 118, 126, 139, 141, 159, 201
figure-eight shield, 76 hazannu, 66
fire-hardened arrow tips, 79 Hazor, 39
First Cataract, 30, 31, 34, 43, 202 heavy spear, 75
fletched arrow, 13, 62 Hebrews, 79
flint knife, 11 Height of W’an, 169
Fly of Valor, 21 Heliopolis, 201
fosse, 37 Hellenistic Age, 24
four-spoke wheel, 59 helmet, 31, 51, 52, 68, 71, 76
four-wheeled wagon, 165 henkhu, 36
Fourth Cataract, 47, 203 Heqau Khasut, 31
236 h Index
Herenkeru, 118 154, 158, 161–166, 176–181, 183, 184,

Herodotus, 141 194–198, 200; battle of, 76, 168, 169;
hide shield, 145 plain of, 80, 180, 196
hieratic script, 10 Kamose, 32, 44, 52, 53, 79, 138
Hittites, 19, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 73, Karakamisha, 171
165, 175, 188, 201, 203; chariot, 68 Karnak, 10, 11, 16, 99, 123, 141, 201, 202
hog-truss, 142 Kassite Babylonia, 43, 65
Homs, 168, 196 Kassites, 69
Hor-Aha, 27 kedjen-tepy, 14
Horites, 41 keel, 141, 142
horse transports, 146 Kemit, 18
Horus, 5 kenyt-nesu, 13, 62
Horus Lock, 10, 11 Kerma, 44, 139
House of Life, 10 Khabur River, 40, 161
human porters, 161 Khartoum, 201
hupshu, 76 khepetj, 76
Hurrians, 41; social order, 65–66 khupshu, 37
Hydaspes River, 22, 23 Kikkuli, 43
Hyksos, 1, 4, 7, 8, 31, 32–36, 43, 44, 46, King’s Braves, 13, 62, 180
50–59, 73, 79, 120, 132, 138; expulsion Kissuwadna, 161
of, 122; invasion, 18, 51, 52, 121, knapsack, 145
136, 199; military equipment, 52; kopesh, 12
revolution in agriculture, 9 Kozloff, Arielle P., 4
Krak des Chevaliers, 196
ilku, 67
Kurdistan, 40, 161
India, 22
kursimetu, 71
Indo-Aryans, 42
kursindu, 71
Indo-Europeans, 41, 42
Kush, 44, 46, 202
Indo-Iranian dynasts, 41
Irkata, 194, 195
Lake of Homs, 168
Isis, 9, 25
lamellar armor, 71
Israel, 78
landing craft, 164,
Israelites, 78
Lebanese cedar, 127
Issus, 22
Isthmus of Suez, 29 Lebanon, 19, 26, 28, 30, 36, 39, 117,
iter, 173 120–130, 136, 140, 147, 152, 154, 155,
158, 160, 166, 198; coast of, 56, 129,
Jacob’s Ladder, 130 130, 136, 138, 140, 147, 148, 155–160,
Jerusalem, 39 163, 164, 166, 169, 182, 185, 197, 198;
Jezreel Valley, 36, 39 mountains, 5, 118, 129, 136, 150, 152,
Jordan, 39 163, 164, 165; ports, 192
Jordan plain, 39 leg strap, 58
Jordan Valley, 121, 128 lethal pursuit, 60
Judah, 36 Levant, 1, 21, 154, 159, 160, 204
Libya, 160
Kadesh, 19, 35, 36, 40, 56, 120, 127, 128, Libyan desert, 28
129, 130, 132, 136, 137, 149, 150, 151, Liddell Hart, B. H., 2
Index h 237
linen sails, 142 71–73; infantry, 73; organization, 66,

Litani River, 35, 40, 41, 118, 120, 121, 67; tactical doctrine, 70–73
123, 130 Mitannian Empire, 65–66, 69
loom of the oars, 143 Mitannian king, 182
Lower Egypt, 27, 52 Mitanni-Hurrians, 36, 37, 187
Lower Nubia, 44, 46, 202 moat ditch, 137
mobile chariot repair units, 57
Magnesia, battle of, 24 mobile reserves, 64
man of the lands, 65 Montu, 3, 5
mar shipri, 72 mule-drawn wagon, 165
marshes of Niya, 7 mummy, 2, 5
marya, 66 Museum of Egyptian Antiquities, 1
maryanna, 37, 54, 74, 76, 136, 137, 149,
150, 155, 179, 180, 187 na’arun, 74, 76
Maryannu of the King, 74 Naharin, 42, 65, 164, 170, 171, 174,
Master of the Secrets of the King in the 190, 197
Army, 51 Nahr al-Kabir, 128
matru, 72 nakhtu-aa, 12
Mattiwaza, 42 nakhushshu, 66
Medinet Habu, 201 Napata, 201, 203
Mediterranean Sea, 28, 39, 56, 143, 168 Narmer, 27
Medjay, 79 Nebamun, 139
megau, 13 Nefertari, 25
Neferure, 9, 25
Megiddo, 19, 20, 33, 39, 40, 56, 64, 74,
New Carthage, 132
77, 117, 120–126, 129, 182; battle of,
New Kingdom, 8, 21, 143
106–112; siege of, 112–114
nhrn, 42
melik, 36
Nile Delta, 36, 44, 52, 54, 143
Memphis, 27, 52, 139
Nile River, 19, 26, 35, 47, 56, 121, 138–
Menes, 27
143, 147, 201
menesh, 141
Niya, 161, 168, 176, 187, 192
Meryetamun, 25
nomarchs, 27, 33, 49, 51, 52
Meryetre-Hatshepsut, 25
Nubia, 1, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 28, 31, 32,
Mesopotamia, 28, 29, 39, 41, 43
33, 43–47, 54, 56, 79, 120, 121, 124,
Middle Kingdom, 30, 53, 59, 79, 127 138, 139, 160, 187, 201, 202, 203;
Miletus, 22 army, 79–80; auxiliaries, 49, 50;
military caste, 52 society, 43–44
military ritual of induction, 11 Nuges, 118
Minmose the Engineer, 181, 182 Nukhashshe, 189, 190–193, 203
Mitanni, 9, 19, 20, 35, 39–43, 56, 64, Nuzi, 41, 65; archives, 65, 71; texts,
65, 70, 71, 73, 75, 118, 122, 127–133, 66, 68
136, 139, 152, 155, 157, 159, 160, 164,
175, 176, 183–192, 194, 197, 200, 201; October Festival, 182
administrative structure, 66; social Okheperkere, 174
organization, 42 Old Kingdom, 28, 29, 30, 50
Mitannian army, 65–73, 118, 172; Olmstead, A. T., 131, 149
chariot corps, 68–70; charioteer, open-deck barge, 145, 146
238 h Index
Orontes River, 41, 118, 127, 128, 129, Retjenu, 118, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127,
135, 137, 151, 161–164, 166, 169, 176, 133, 193
178, 189, 190, 192, 196 ribs, 141, 142
Orontes Valley, 168, 169, 176, 182 Roman Republic, 144
overseers of arsenals, 50 Romans, 132
overseers of desert blockhouses, 50 Rome, 24
ox carts, 166 Rosetta stone, 7
ox-drawn wagons, 165 royal arsenals, 68
oxen, 165
Sa, 60, 145
palatine government, 153 sabu nagib, 74
papyrus, 142; papyrus rope, 165, 172 Saggs, H. M. F., 43
parashshamu, 68 Sahure, King, 138, 141
patru, 71 Salinger, Anthony J., 47
Pedjet, 60 Samaria, 30, 36
Pelusiac branch of the Nile, 56, 139 Sand People, 28, 138
penetrating socket ax, 12, 31, 79 sandals, 126
Persia, 22, 23 sariam, 68
Persian Empire, 24 saryanni, 71
Perunefer, 139, 156, 160, 163, 182 Sashu, 181
Philip of Macedon, 21, 22, 23 Satiah, Queen, 25
Philistines, 77 Saul, King, 77
Phoenicia, 22, 78, 118, 136 Saussatar, 203
Porus, 23 scale armor, 71, 75, 76
Pratarna, 42 Scipio Africanus, 132
Ptolemies of Egypt, 24 Sea People, 19, 143, 76, 78
Punt, 16 seagoing ship, 141
Pydna, battle of, 24 Second Cataract, 31, 46, 138, 139, 204
Second Expedition, 124–125
Qarqar, battle of, 168 Second Punic War, 132
Qatna, 35, 42, 54, 128, 132, 136, 137, Sekenenre, 1
150, 151, 158, 161, 162, 164, 168, 176, Semneh, 139
178, 184, 185, 189, 192 Senzar, 151
Seventeenth Dynasty, 15
rab alik ilki, 67 shadoof, 9
radishes, 146 shakin mati, 66
rakib susi, 73 Sharon Plain, 130
Ramses II, 19, 57, 76, 143, 165 Sharuhen, 124
Ramses III, 19, 143 sharyani, 71
Raphia, battle of, 24 Shasu, 193
recurved bow, 79 Shechem, 39
Redford, Donald B., 178, 197 Shepham, 176
request for breath, 122 shepi sharri, 67
reserve horses, 72 shield wall, 149
resuti, 74 shipyards, 55
Retenu, 114 shiron, 71
Index h 239
shukuthlu, 73 Ta Nehesy, 43
sickle-sword, 4, 12, 36, 51, 52, 145, 180 ta-agsu, 12
Sidon, 120, 152, 154 tablets of the left, 67
Sile, 182 Takhsy, 181, 182
Simyra, 129, 132, 148, 152, 153, 155, Tanis, 31, 52
163, 166, 194 Tao, 15, 25
Sinai, 28, 34 Taurus Mountains, 40
Sinuwe, 36 textile armor, 62
sisu, 43 Thaneni, 199
six-spoked wheel, 58, 59 Theban god of war, 5
Sixth Dynasty, 50, 138 Theban princes, 32, 52
skdwt, 173 Thebes, 5, 2, 31, 34, 118, 124, 202
sksk, 196 theocratic state, 28
Smith, G. Elliot, 2 Third Cataract, 44, 139
Snefru, King, 141 Third Dynasty, 138, 141
socket ax, 36, 51, 52, 76 Third Expedition, 124
socketed spear blades, 79 thorn tree wood, 141
Sodom, 36 T-h-r warriors, 131
Somalia, 16 Thutmose I, 5, 8, 9, 10, 46, 53, 54, 56,
Soviet Union, 122 118, 121, 122, 135, 139, 141, 174
Spain, 132 Thutmose II, 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 54, 55,
spoked-wheel chariot, 43 118, 139
springs of Labweh, 118 Thutmose III, 1, 2, 3, 34, 46, 47, 59, 65,
77, 78, 80, 118, 121, 122, 125, 127,
Stable for Military Education, 12
129, 132, 138, 141, 149, 151, 157, 159,
stallions, 179, 180
165, 171, 192, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199,
star knife, 11
202; accession, 16–17; administrative
state bureaucracy, 28
ability, 8–9; builder, 7–8; congenital
steering oar, 140, 143, 165
skin disease, 4–5; early years, 9–12;
steering post, 143
education, 10; final years, 199–204;
stepped mast, 165
intellectual interests, 7, 8; invasion
straight sword, 76
force, 143–147; legacy, 204; military
strategic deception, 182, 183
equipment, 52, 53; military training,
strong-arm boys, 12
12–14; national security vision, 55,
suits of mail, 190 56; personality, 19–21; portraits of, 4,
Sumer, 28, 41 5; as priest of Amun, 5, 11; seventh
Sunusret II, 36 campaign, 115–158; sixth campaign,
supply depots, 127 135; strategic vision, 55–56;strategist,
Swhn m Y p’t, 123 22–26; succession, 24–26; tomb of, 6
Syria, 7, 8, 9, 19, 23, 26, 30, 34–40, 53, Thutmose IV, 41, 65, 68
55, 56, 59, 69, 75, 118, 122, 129, 132, Tigris River, 39, 40, 41
137, 139, 157, tin, 53, 79, 127, 136
159, 164, 165, 174, 184, 187, 188, 190, tiryana, 71
192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201 Toth, 10
Syrian chiefs, 117 Transjordan, 39
Syrian Gates, 175 Tripoli, 118, 127, 130, 152
Syrian pine, 127 troop transports, 145
240 h Index
Tukuwa, 192 victory stela, 174

Tunip, 35, 40, 127–132, 136, 140, 148, vizier, 57
150–156, 158, 161, 162, 168, 169, 170,
176, 178, 184, 185, 194, 195, 196 Wadi Ara, 94, 97
Turkey, 39 Wahlia, 127, 129, 130, 140, 148
Tushrata, 42 Wall of Princes, 29, 30
Twelfth Dynasty, 58 warhorses, 179, 180
Tyre, 22, 118, 120, 152, 154 Washukkanni, 40, 161, 173
Wawat, 44, 202
Ugarit, 36, 74, 163, 164, 193 Way of Horus, 39, 130
Ugaritic texts, 76 weft-loop textiles, 58
U-joint, 58, 59 Weni, 50, 138
Ullaza, 127, 129, 130, 140, 148, 155, 156, windpipe, 165
157, 162, 163, 169, 195, 200 wooden dowels, 165
United States, 122 wooden plough, 9
Upper Egypt, 27, 52
Upper Nubia, 44, 46, 80, 202 Yadin, Yigael, 74, 150
Upper Orontes, 129 Yehem, 87, 88, 93, 97, 98, 182
Upper Retenu, 126, 203 Yenoam, 118
Urartu, 40, 41 yoke, 165
Urgarit, 71 yoke pole, 58, 59
Ushshukana, 40
Zahi, 127
Valley of the Kings, 6, 16, 25 Zichron Ya’kov, 130
Via Maris, 39 Zinzar, 151
About the Author
Richard A. Gabriel is a distinguished adjunct professor in the Depart-

ment of History and War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada
in Kingston, Ontario, and the Department of Security Studies at the
Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He was a professor of history and
politics at the U.S. Army War College and held the Visiting Chair in Ethics
at the Marine Corps University. He is a retired U.S. Army officer and
the author of forty-four books and eighty published articles on military
history and other subjects. His books have been the subject of a number
of television programs on the History Channel, most recently the eight-
part series Battles B.C. and The Art of War, a study of Sun Tzu’s principles
applied to modern war. Dr. Gabriel’s most recent books are Subotai the
Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General (2006), Muhammad: Islam’s First Great
General (2007), and Scipio Africanus: Rome’s Greatest General (2008). He lives
in New Hampshire, where he flies his antique open-cockpit airplane.
241

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Other books by Richard A. Gabriel

With Donald W. Boose, Jr.

With Karen S. Metz

Potomac Books, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Potomac Books, Inc.

“Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem

4 The Battle of Megiddo 81

5 The Campaign in Canaan 117

6 The Campaign for the Lebanon Coast 135

7 The Euphrates Campaign 159

8 The Counterinsurgency Campaign 187

2.1. The Ancient Near East 29

him to reason clearly. He was a brilliant strategic thinker. To him Egypt

At this time also a new symbol of pharaonic authority was intro-

mummification process is not known.11 Interestingly, a mummy that was

was Thutmose who introduced the basilica as an architectural form to

sister of his predecessor, Amenhotep I, who had left no surviving male

We do not know exactly when Thutmose completed his temple

The Rise to Power

The question of Hatshepsut’s motives has puzzled scholars for

Thutmose’s command to put down a revolt in Nubia. This campaign took

elopments in Canaan, Lebanon, and Syria. The goal of Egyptian policy

innovation is the mark of a stable, self-confident personality, one who

we have records, Thutmose is portrayed as always participating fully in

The Egyptian Alexander

projection in the hands of his immediate successors throughout the rest

satrapies of the Persian Empire—surrendered to Alexander without a

Alexander’s victories permitted Greek rule to be imposed on what

Lo, the king completed his lifetime of many years, splendid in

2.1. The Ancient Near East

reduce the garrisons of the Asiatics. They made no attempts, however, to

Let me understand what this strength of mine is for! One prince

2.2. Geopolitical Situation in Egypt during the Hyksos Period

These circumstances, when taken together, meant that the armies of

The Land of Canaan

of Senusret II (1897–1878 BCE) tell of a previous era when a number of

2.3. Canaan: Strategic Passes, Roads, and Fortifications

and neutralize an enemy threat. Hazor, the largest of Canaanite cities

Iraq, or approximately the area corresponding to Kurdistan. Its capital,

Thutmose III’s policy of expanding Egyptian power to the Orontes

became a new aristocracy in command of war and the government.25 By

kingdoms into a larger political-military order and bring their combined

2.4. Egypt and Nubia

The Egyptians marched south as far as Buhen, recaptured the fortress

Events in Nubia during the joint reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose

retainers, or personal bodyguards of the king. The title of assault troop

bows by two hundred yards. Egyptian formations were immobile while

requirements were not immediately fulfilled in Egypt when the Hyksos

It is always interesting to ask if technology follows a paradigm shift

time, sacrificing any possibility of surprise. In addition, the transit time

3.1. Egyptian Chariot

composed of 1,000 men who were commanded by a captain of a troop.

3.2. three types of egyptian infantry

Egyptian heavy infantryman

3.3. Organization of an Egyptian Division in

professionally trained officer corps experienced at maneuvering various

The Mitannian Army