T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary
T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary
T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary
October 2016
Article 3
Degrading punishment
Inhuman punishment
Facts – Following the Court’s judgment in László Magyar v. Hungary in May 2014 finding
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on the grounds that the presidential clemency
procedure for life prisoners did not meet the requirement set out in Vinter and Others
v. the United Kingdom [GC] that life sentences should be reducible, Hungary introduced
amending legislation* providing, as an additional remedy, for the automatic review of
whole life sentences after 40 years.
Both applicants in the instant case were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment with no
possibility of parole. In the Convention proceedings, they complained that their whole life
sentences remained de facto irreducible under the new clemency procedure, in breach of
Article 3.
Law – Article 3: The fact that the applicants could hope to have their progress towards
release reviewed only after serving 40 years of their life sentences was of itself sufficient
for the Court to conclude that the new legislation did not offer de facto reducibility of the
applicants’ whole life sentences. That period was significantly longer than the maximum
recommended period of 25 years before review established, on the basis of a consensus
in comparative and international law, by the Grand Chamber in Vinter and Others. (The
Court also noted that, unlike the position in Bodein v. France, there was no indication in
the present case that any period of pre-trial detention would be taken into account in
calculating the time-limit for review.)
The Court also had a number of concerns relating to the remainder of the procedure
provided by the new legislation. Firstly, although the general criteria to be taken into
account by the Clemency Board in deciding whether or not to recommend a life prisoner
for pardon were now clearly set out in a provision which satisfied the requirement for the
assessment to be based on objective, pre-established criteria, it did not appear that the
criteria equally applied to the President of the Republic, who had the last say as to a
possible pardon in each individual case. In other words, the new legislation did not oblige
the President to assess whether continued imprisonment was justified on legitimate
penological grounds. Furthermore, the new legislation failed to set a time-frame for the
President to decide the clemency application or to require reasons to be given for the
decision, even if it deviated from the recommendation of the Clemency Board.
2
Lastly, although life prisoners could seek presidential clemency in ordinary pardon
proceedings even before the expiry of the 40 year-period required for the mandatory
pardon procedure, the Court had already found in László Magyar that that avenue did
not provide de facto or de iure reducibility of a life sentence.
In sum, in view of the lengthy period the applicants were required to wait before the
commencement of the mandatory clemency procedure and the lack of sufficient
procedural safeguards in the second part of that procedure, the Court was not persuaded
that the applicants’ life sentences could be regarded as reducible for the purposes of
Article 3.
Article 41: finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any
non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.
(See László Magyar v. Hungary, 73593/10, 20 May 2014, Information Note 174; Vinter
and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013,
Information Note 165; and Bodein v. France, 40014/10, 13 November 2014, Information
Note 179; see also the Factsheet on Life imprisonment)
* Act no. LXXII of 2014 amending Act no. CCXL of 2013 on the Execution of
Punishments, Measures, Certain Coercive Measures and Confinement for Infractions.