Introduction

The world economic recession of 2008 began in the Subpolar Iceland and became a national
issue in October 2008 when their Prime Minister Geir Haarde told them that Iceland was on
the verge of bankruptcy. It came out as shock to the local entrepreneurs, New Vikings, who
had welcomed globalism by buying a lot of brands and assets in Europe, England’s West
Ham United Soccer Club, supermarkets in US and many more. Icelanders started calling this
crisis “Kreppa” as it led to severe economic depression and political unrest (​Boyes​, 2009).
In this report we highlight the causes that led to the Icelandic crisis in 2008. Next we talk
about the impact this collapse had on different markets and the people of Iceland and abroad.
Then we describe how the collapse reverberated through stops and derivatives markets.
Finally we highlight the role speculators had before and after the crisis.
What caused the market shock and what markets did it influence?
All this started in the beginning of the 20th century when the elected Prime Minister of
Iceland, David Oddison, initiated the privatization and liberalization of the state-owned
enterprises, including the banking sector. Soon Iceland became a market-based economy with
the launch of software and biotechnology companies, foreign mergers and acquisitions, and a
rapid development of the country’s financial system. Iceland’s financial system consisted of
three commercial banks, investment banks, leasing companies, Housing Financing Fund
(HFF), some saving banks, and mortgage credit institutions. The three commercial banks
Landsbanki, Kaupthing and Glitnir started multiplying in size over 2000-2006 period and the
country’s low size made the banks to look for businesses overseas by turning to the
international market (​SIC, 2010, ​chap. 21)They grew 10 times to the size of their economy by
offering high interest rates to the people overseas. Some banks used their shares as collateral
and others took large loans from their own banks and started buying shares of other related
banks or their own banks. This way both the banks share prices started rising resulting in the
inflation of the share prices without any new money coming in.
In 2003 the government liberalized the housing loan standards allowing 90% loans. Which
further created a property bubble in the economy. At the same time income tax and VAT
rates were also lowered to make Iceland a low –tax International Financial Centre (​Boyes,
2009). In order to reduce the inflation Iceland’s central bank began to tighten its monetary
policies by increasing the interest rate. Between 2004-2007 the short –term interest rates were
raised by the banks from 5% to 15% (​Graham, Peltomäki and Sturludóttir, ​2015). However,
the HFF did not increase its interest rates on the mortgages, due to which demand for housing
which in turn increased the prices for homes in Iceland. Also, the bond issues in krona
attracted the foreign investors due to higher domestic interest rates as they could borrow
abroad at low interest rates and invest in Iceland, which pushed the value of krona and
worsened the trade deficit. Due to this the Iceland stock market increased by 900%, as shown
in Fig 1 (​Jackson, ​2010). But, bankers and the management started spending this new wealth
on overvalued investments. Banks started giving away loans without any collateral. Exista,
which was the biggest shareholder of Kaupthing Bank, was given authority to take cash of
over 14 billion ISK from the bank as loan, which was done to increase Exista’s liquidity (​SIC,
2010, chap. 21).
However, this unstable and unstoppable growth started coming into notice of the international
watchdogs. Several negative reports started to come out based on the high-risk strategy of
Iceland consisting of strong currency to borrow from abroad, maintain low import prices and
high interest rates to persuade foreign capital, and a huge amount of investments in foreign
countries. The reports highlighting the weakness of Icelandic banks started to evade the trusts
of investors in Iceland’s economy and financial stability because worries about the stability
of these banks were expressed because it was observed that banks were having difficulties
raising funds in the short term money market. Iceland's current account deficit peaked at
almost 25 % of GDP (​Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir, ​2012)
Fig 1 : The development of the Icelandic market indices (2004 - 2010).

Data Source : ​https://www.investing.com/indices/omx-iceland-all-share-historical-data

On February 21, 2006 Fitch changed its outlook for Iceland to negative. This led to an
immediate slump in the Krona by 30% against the international currencies and a 25% fall in
the stock exchange. Danske bank of Copenhagen described Iceland ‘geyser economy’ on the
verge of exploding (​Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir, ​2012). The Icelandic banks responded to the
criticism leveled at them in various ways. They sought to improve transparency in their
operations, improve their liquidity positions and capital ratios. Even though they survived the
2006 mini crisis, the banks still had problems in raising money to fund their asset purchases
and repaying the existing debts.
During the Geyser crisis in 2006, the banks were in desperate need to raise funds. And due to
restricted access in wholesale international market funding, they needed alternative funding
to pay their asset purchases. Both Landsbanki and Kaupthing came up with high-interest
internet-based retail deposit schemes. Landsbanki already had a subsidiary in the UK as
Heritable Bank. It bypassed its subsidiary and opened an online savings account brand owned
and operated by the private Landsbanki bank. Since it was a branch of Landsbanki, it was
under surveillance in the home country of the bank and not the host country which was the
UK. Icesave operated in the UK from October 2006 and in the Netherlands from May 2008.
There were three types of Icesave accounts offered in the UK which were an
immediate-access savings account, Cash Individual Savings Account and a range of
fixed-rate bonds (​Bergmann, ​2017). The interest rates on all these accounts was over 6
percent which was more than what any other online bank was offering in the UK at that time.
In the Netherlands, Icesave offered a single type of savings account: an immediate-access
savings account offering 5.25% interest rate (​Bergmann, ​2017). By the end of September
2008, Landsbanki had over 300,000 Icesave customers in the UK, with deposits of over £4
billion. In the Netherlands by that time, Icesave had more than 125,000 customers with
deposits of €1.7 billion (​Bergmann, ​2017). Like Landsbanki, Kaupthing Bank opened a high
yielding online savings brand, Kaupthing Edge. The difference between Icesave and
Kaupthing Edge was that Kaupthing Edge was operated by Kaupthing subsidiary, Kaupthing
Singer & Friedlander.
Another solution to their money raising difficulties was to get more liquidity without
sacrificing their real assets as collateral. These banks issued bonds to its branches which used
them as collateral to obtain funds from central banks. They even did this in the foreign
market by borrowing from Luxembourg and European Central Banks. These bonds were
known as ‘love letters’ i.e. mere promises.
Fig 2 : Exchange rate of Euro to ISK (2004-2009)

Data Source: ​European Central Bank

In the year of the collapse the investment firms were having huge and continuous losses. The
size of Iceland's banking sector grew 10 times of their GDP and there was not enough
liquidity. The prices of the stock market started to fall. The international view of the Icelandic
banks started to worsen due to its high-risk exposures and negative global financial outlook.
Krona started depreciating (Fig 2), interest rate differentials started to decrease, foreign
investors started to withdraw their investments and refused to continue their Credit default
swap agreements as their pricings were totally altered and the trust in Icelandic banks was
evading ​(​SIC, 2010, chap. 21)​ ​. Between February and April 2008 1 billion pounds were
withdrawn from Landsbanki ​(​SIC, ​2010, chap. 21)​.
On September15 2008 Lehman brothers went bankrupt. This event hit the global financial
markets very hard. Confidence in the banking sector and economy started evading. All
Iceland banks started protecting their assets and liquidity, and reduced lending and
investments. The foreign currency reserve of the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) was
inadequate to cover the banks’ operations abroad due to their huge number of short-term
debts (Fig 3), low liquidity and enormous size. Hence it was impossible for the CBI to rescue
these banks (​Case Study: Iceland’s Banking Crisis, ​2017).

Fig 3 : Iceland’s Government’s Debt (2003-2012)

Data Source: ​ https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm

What knock on effects did the panic create?
Glitnir was the first bank to require assistance. It had an ISK 90 billion payment due on
October 15, 2008 against the bonds it had issued (​Centonze, ​2011). Since no banks or lenders
were willing to accept the mortgages of denominated Krona, they did not have the option to
borrow the needed funds, even CBI did not have enough resources to act as a lender of last
resort to rescue Glitnir. On September 29, 2008 the government announced it would buy 75%
shares of Glitnir at a price of EUR 600 million. Due to the government's investment in the
bank the rating agencies lowered the debt ratings of Glitnir as well as of Kaupthing and
Landsbanki (​SIC, 2​ 010).
On 29th September 2008, when nationalization of Iceland’s bank Glitnir was announced,
depositors started withdrawing their savings (​Bergmann, 2​ 017). When this news travelled to
the UK, 300,000 depositors of UK’s Landsbanki’s branch went online and started
withdrawing their money from Icesave accounts. Similarly, the Kaupthing Edge depositors
started withdrawing their deposits, even though Edge accounts were protected by the UK's
Depositors Guarantee Scheme (​Baldursson and Portes, ​2013). By 3rd October 2008, British
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) demanded £400 million from Iceland to cover the
Icesave accounts. The run on Icesave in the UK grew so strong that by 4th October, the
Icesave website stopped honoring withdrawals.

​On October 7th the government nationalized Landsbanki and On 8th October, the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer released the order to freeze the assets of Landsbanki in the UK
made under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (​The Landsbanki Freezing
Order, 2​ 008). This order passed by the British Treasury led to an estimated freeze of ISK
690.4bn (€4.0bn) of British assets of Landsbanki branches in Britain. The UK also seized the
assets of Kaupthing and its British subsidiaries and transferred these assets to the Dutch bank
ING (​Bergmann, ​2017).
Fig 4 : Iceland’s Unemployment Rate (2000 - 2010)

Data Source: ​Federal Reserve Economic Data

 Due to the unusual market conditions all trading on the exchange was frozen for two days by
the order of FME to control the spread of panic throughout the country’s financial markets
(​FME - Temporary suspension from trading, ​2008). The share prices fell by 30% from the
start of the Month. The National currency fell sharply in value. Unemployment tripled in late
2008 with around 7,000 job seekers registered compared to just 2,136 at the start of 2008 (Fig
4) (​Interest in jobs abroad, ​2008). Almost every business went bankrupt. Housing prices
dropped and mortgage costs doubled. Protesters were out on the street. Foreign investors
withdrew their money out of the country. (Table 1) The credit rating agencies lowered their
credit ratings during the crisis to negative (​Centonze, ​2011). Due to currency depreciation
inflation rate increased rapidly. In January 2009 inflation rate was 18.6% (Fig 5). Iceland's
bankrupt economy caused the government to collapse in 2009. As Iceland’s banks had
expanded their retail services in Europe, Iceland's economic collapse affected Europe as well
(​Centonze, ​2011).
Fig 5 : Iceland’s Inflation Rate (2000 - 2010)

Data Source: ​Central Bank of Iceland

Table 1 : Credit Ratings of 3 banks 2006-2008.

2006 2007 2008

Glitnir Kaupthing Landsbanki Glitnir Kaupthing Landsbanki Glitnir Kaupthing Landsbanki
Moodys Long Term Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 Caa1 Baa3 Caa1
Short Term P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 NP P3 NP
Individual C C C C C C E D+ E

S&P Long Term A- n/a n/a A- n/a n/a CCC n/a n/a
Short Term A-2 n/a n/a A-2 n/a n/a CCC n/a n/a

Fitch Long Term A A A A A A CCC CCC D

Short Term F1 F1 F1 F1 F1 F1 D C D

Source :​ Reuters, Central Bank of Iceland, S&P, Fitch, Moodys

 Did the market shock/panic reverberate through spot and derivatives markets in an
equitable fashion or did any particular abnormalities occur?

The Icelandic financial crash of 2008 unfolded within the derivatives markets in a
conventional manner in the build up to and the initial outset of the collapse. However, it soon
became evident that the shock had an unprecedented adverse effect on derivative markets in
Iceland, particularly on OTC derivatives in the foreign exchange market that lead to cross
market contagion of systemic defaults (​Barrera,​ 2019). Further disturbances in the
derivatives markets came about as a result of crucial decisions undertaken by key associative
stakeholders such as European central bankers, the US Federal Reserve Board, the UK
Government (​UOI,​ 2018) along with responses from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in their attempt to reinvigorate Iceland's economy post crisis.
On October 8 of 2008, conditions worsened after the British Government enacted an
Anti-terrorism Legislation Act against Iceland, essentially freezing an approximate €4 billion
worth of assets held in Landsbanki subsidiaries in the UK. This move forced Iceland to seek
immediate assistance from Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
transferring loans to Iceland amounting to a total of €1.8 billion in the form of currency
swaps (​Centonze,​ 2011). A report conducted in 2018 for the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs by the University of Iceland presents in detail a case for the Icelandic
banks, whereby had the ECB, the US Fed and the Bank of England in conjunction with the
three Scandinavian countries supported the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) by processing its
currency swap deals, the financial collapse could have been restricted to one of a lesser
magnitude. It would have given Iceland the chance to recover in a way similar to market
economies in Hong Kong in 1998 or to Sweden in the 1992 financial crisis. Instead Iceland
was met by a pre-planned ambush on its hedge funds whereby any assistance to the CBI was
denied. The Federal Reserve Board believed any liquidity assistance would have proven
insufficient due to just how large the Icelandic banking sector had become (​UOI,​ 2018).
Whereas the British and Dutch governments were more concerned about retrieving the assets
of their depositors in the wake of the crash, which after the CBI being unable to insure, led to
the 'Icesave dispute' (​Johnson​, 2010). This tension between the Icelandic government and the
European and Dutch banks was appeased over a 14 year payback period through the issuance
of compensatory bonds by the three newly formed banks in Iceland.
As the market shock unravelled through the economy, it became clear to the Icelandic
government to take drastic measures by implementing capital controls with the aid of the
IMF. The focus was to try and restore the value of Icelandic króna currency as the majority of
the country's funding relied heavily on international trade, which after the crash was
temporarily being facilitated through daily currency auctions (​Jackson,​ 2010). Further
stabilization involved freezing the currency flow out of Iceland, repatriating any foreign
currency, as well as reinvesting returns from króna bonds into other króna denominated
instruments (​Centonze,​ 2011). In their report for the Financial Stability Institute, Baudino et
al. (2020) highlighted that the use of capital controls under the IMF programme was an
unconventional method for Iceland to implement in its recovery. However, given Iceland's
situation where the majority of financial loans were designated under foreign currency that
had facilitated carry trade transactions, it was imperative for the government to restore its
foreign exchange market, prevent further depreciation of the króna and establish a fiscal
policy aimed at lowering the country's long term debt (​Fridriksson,​ 2009). Anderson (2008)
also elaborates that had the IMF not intervened, both the corporate and housing financing
sectors would have seen further deterioration as both their loans and mortgages were fixed
within the foreign exchange market.

Figures 6. and 7. illustrate the relationship between bond yields and government debt, where
a rise in borrowing by CBI due to a severe shortage in liquidity during the financial crisis
directly resulted in interest rate spikes, thus lowering the value of bonds (​Pettinger​, 2015).
These movements in combination with a declining ISK exchange rate reflected the risk
aversion of foreign creditors as they followed through with their demands of repayment in
their home currencies from Icelandic banks (​Zeisslar et al.,​ 2019). The banks were obviously
unable to meet these repayments due to having had 75% of their funding facilitated through
short-term interbank markets (​Jackson​, 2010). The scale of this vicious cycle and its
implications for the derivatives exchange in Iceland was of historical significance for
observers anywhere else during the GFC in 2008 and still to the present day.

Fig 6: Iceland Government Bond Yields% (2000 - 2020)

.
Data Source: ​Trading Economics
 Fig 7: Iceland External Debt (2006-2012)

Data Source: ​CEIC Data

Once the market panic/crisis occurred, have you identified as to what role speculators
had during the entire episode?
During the period of 2004 and 2005, when Icelandic banks started to grow rapidly and
received inflow from international markets, Iceland came into the notice of Hedge Funds.
Herleif Håvik, which is the Petroleum Fund of Norway, decided to bet against Kaupthing by
buying Credit Default Swap (CDS) which, at that point of time, was a costless short (​The
2008 Icelandic Bank Collapse: Foreign Factors, 2018)​ . During the Geyser crisis in 2006, the
spread of the CDS widened. During March, 2006, hedge funds started shorting against
Icelandic krona, which was soon joined by Scandinavian Banks in April. In March 2008,
British Press started to report negative images of Landsbanki's Icesave and Kaupthing's Edge
online accounts, as a result of which some London's hedge funds started to short the Icelandic
banks (​The 2008 Icelandic Bank Collapse: Foreign Factors, 2018)​ .
After the crisis, when the major Icelandic banks were not able to refinance, government
intervention was needed at that time, Glitner was the first bank to get the required assistance.
The government investment in Glitner led the rating agencies to lower the bank’s rating along
with the ratings of Landsbanki and Kaupthing. Announcement of the banking crisis
motivated the speculator to make money and they started betting against the krona and its
value depreciated over 3% against the euro (​The 2008 Icelandic Bank Collapse: Foreign
Factors, 2018​).
Fig : 6 Value of Icelandic Krona Against Euro

The strong hit of the crisis led the sentiment in Iceland inclined toward joining the EU and
EMU. Other than joining, the other option was to either single-handedly adopt the euro or
else pin the krona to the euro. In that case, sufficient foreign exchange reserves were required
to handle another wave of speculative attacks.
The report, reported by Icelandic Business Weekly​ ​(​Vi›skiptabla›i›,​ 2008)​ ​on October15, 2008
said​ ​“All the Vultures of the world are getting together in Reykjavik to buy the assets at
record low prices and make money for after retirement” these were the words of an
undisclosed Icelandic Businessman. The article also claimed that nearly 100 Venture
Capitalists had stepped on the island the day before, with the intent of extracting assets out of
the just-fallen Banks at lowest Sales prices.
When the crisis occurred, one of the earliest arrivals to Reykjavik was the British retail
Fashion tycoon and the Top Shop founder Sir Philip Green, who was looking to buy the debt
of Baugur Investment Group (​Davey,​ 2008). Baugur, whose chief owner was Jon Asgeir
Johannesson, was the biggest Icelandic holding company, and it had large indirect holdings in
Glitnir through its associated companies. Baugur was having more debts than equity, and it
was all clear that whoever owned its debt would control it (​Wood,​ 2008). For Sir Philip, this
presented the opportunity to read out Baugur’s retail assets and fit them into his empire. His
bid to buy the debts at a 95 % discount received a prompt rejection. Iceland's injured financial
community viewed Sir Philip's appearance and his indecent proposal as an insult after injury.
Other venture capitalists were soon to arrive in Reykjavik. After grasp of the whole scenario
private equity funds from the USA – such as Alchemy and TPG – arrived a few days later to
make deals.
Conclusion
In this report we highlight the dramatic rise and fall of the Icelandic economy. The Iceland's
banking system was a big bubble that had grown immensely to the point where it needed a
slight touch from a needle to burst, and this was provided by the global recession starting
with the fall of Lehman Brothers. High interest rates, which led to large inflow of foreign
investment, and not enough liquidity, causing huge debts. And finally when the inflows dried,
neither the banks nor the government was able to clear the debts and save Iceland from the
crisis.
References
Allir hrægammar heimsins safnast saman í Reykjavík. (All the vultures of the world
congregating on Reykjavik)​. (2008, October 15). Vi›skiptabla›i›. Available at:
http://vb.is/frettir/allir-hrgammar-heimsinssafnast-saman-i-reykjavik/12451/

Anderson, C. (2008)​ I​ MF Survey: Iceland Gets Help to Recover From Historic Crisis. ​Available
at:​https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/soint111908a
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

Baldursson, F. M. and Portes, R. (2013) Gambling for Resurrection in Iceland: The Rise and Fall of
the Banks. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2361098. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2361098.

Barrera, L. (2019) ​Physiology of the Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market and Post-Crisis
Reform. A​ vailable at: ​https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387707
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

Bergmann, E. (2017) ‘The Icesave Dispute: A Case Study into the Crisis of Diplomacy
during the Credit Crunch’, ​Nordicum-Mediterraneum,​ 12. doi: 10.33112/nm.12.1.1.

Boyes, R. (2009) ​Meltdown Iceland,​ ​Bloomsbury Publishing​. Available at:

https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/meltdown-iceland-9781408803080/​.

Case Study: Iceland’s Banking Crisis​ (2017) ​Seven Pillars Institute.​ Available at:
https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-study-icelands-banking-crisis/ .

CEIC (2020) ​Iceland External Debt: % of GDP. A ​ vailable

at:​https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/iceland/external-debt--of-nominal-gdp
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

Centonze, A. L. (2011) ‘Case Study: Iceland’s Financial Meltdown’, ​Journal of Financial

Education​, 37(1/2), pp. 131–166.

Congressional Research Service (2010) ​Iceland's Financial Crisis.

Available at:
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100311_RS22988_679e069b9e413ded0558b7b0aa5
557434c73d0de.pdf

Davey, James. (2008, October 11).​ Philip Green in talks to take on Baugur debt​. Reuters.
Available at:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-financial-iceland-green-idUKTRE49A0GO20081011

External (no date) ‘Interest in jobs abroad | IceNews - Daily News’. Available at:
https://www.icenews.is/2008/11/22/interest-in-jobs-abroad/​.

Financial Stability Institute (2020) ​The banking crisis in Iceland.

Available at: ​https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsicms1.pdf​ (Accessed: 20 November 2020).
FME - Temporary suspension from trading​ (2008). Available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20081211141800/http://www.fme.is/?PageID=581&NewsID=32
8​.

Graham, M., Peltomäki, J. and Sturludóttir, H. (2015) ‘Do capital controls affect stock market
efficiency? Lessons from Iceland’, ​International Review of Financial Analysis​, 41, pp. 82–88.
doi: 10.1016/j.irfa.2015.05.009.

Jackson, J. K. (2010) ​Iceland’s Financial Crisis​. CRS-RS22988. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. Available at:
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA516392​.

​ vailable at:
Fridriksson, I. (2009) ​The banking crisis in Iceland in 2008. A
https://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=6795
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

​ vailable
Pettinger, T. (2015) ​Financial Crisis and Bond Market. A
at:​https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/1968/economics/financial-crisis-and-bond-market/
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

SIC (2010) ​Causes of the collapse of the Icelandic Banks – Responsibility, Mistake and
Negligence. Report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC). By Páll Hreinsson,
Tryggvi Gunnarsson, and Sigríður Benediktsdóttir.​ Althingi, p. ch21

The 2008 Icelandic Bank Collapse: Foreign Factors​ (2018). Reykjavik: University of
Iceland. Available at:
https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=29cca5ac-c0c6-11e8-942c-005056bc
530c​.

The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008​ (2008). Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament.
Available at: ​https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/2668/made​.

Trading Economics (2020) ​Iceland Government Bond 10yr. ​Available at:

https://tradingeconomics.com/iceland/government-bond-yield
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).

University of Iceland (2018) ​The 2008 Icelandic Bank Collapse: Foreign Factors.
Available at:
https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=29cca5ac-c0c6-11e8-942c-005056bc
530c​.
Wade, R. H. and Sigurgeirsdottir, S. (2012) ‘Iceland’s rise, fall, stabilisation and beyond’,
Cambridge Journal of Economics,​ 36(1), pp. 127–144. doi: 10.1093/cje/ber038.

Wood, Zoe. (2008, October 12). ​From hero to size zero: the Baugur crisis.​ The Guardian
online. Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/12/iceland-baugur-philip-green

Zeissler, A.; Ikeda, D.; and Metrick, A. (2019) 'Ireland and Iceland in Crisis D: Similarities
and Differences', ​Journal of Financial Crises,​ Vol. 1 : Iss. 3, 44-56. Available at:
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol1/iss3/4
(Accessed: 20 November 2020).