Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25, 1994

ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ, assisted by Enriqueta R. de la Cruz, EDELINE CUISON, assisted by Estrella
Cuison, ANA MARIA CRUZ, assisted by Nieves Cruz and LOLITA SANTIAGO, assisted by Epifania del
Rosario, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.

DECISION1

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a case of a judge being made to account for his acquittal of an accused on reasonable doubt.

Respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, is
administratively indicted for gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for acquitting
the accused who was charged before his court with acts of lasciviousness. Parenthetically, respondent is not
accused of rendering an erroneous judgment spawned in bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption; much less is
immorality imputed to him.

Complainants Eliza Ratilla de la Cruz, 13, Edeline Cuison, 11, Ana Maria Cruz, 12, and Lolita Santiago, 12,2 alleged
before the trial court that they were summoned by their coach, accused Loreto Estrella, Jr., together with other
volleyball players, to his classroom at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 16 November 1988. He told them that he
had to inspect their private parts for the presence of public hair as required by MEC (now DECS) memorandum
circulars. In three (3) groups, two (2) of threes and one (1) of two, their coach told them to enter the "health corner
room" where they removed their shorts and panties and showed their private parts to him which he touched and
stroked.

Eliza, Edeline, Ana Maria and Lolita, with the assistance of their guardians, charged their coach in four (4) separate
criminal complaints commonly alleging that he —

. . . . being a public school teacher and in relation to the discharge of his duties as the coach of the
girls volleyball team of Bustos Central School, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd designs, commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of (complainant) by then and
there touching her private parts against the latter's will and by means of force.

In the joint trial that ensued, the four (4) girls testified almost identically that upon instruction of the accused they
reluctantly pulled down their shorts and panties and when their private parts were already uncovered, the accused in
kneeling or squatting position touched their exposed private parts. They described on the witness stand the
expression on the face of the accused while allegedly stroking their private parts several times which lasted for
about five minutes each as that of elation, "with his eyes wide open in wild excitement."

1
The accused on his part admitted having examined the pubic hair of the girls, particularly to be sure that as
members of his volleyball team not one of them was above 13 in strict compliance with specific school directives
and guidelines. He however denied that he touched their private parts and threatened them afterwards.

Upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, respondent Judge observed that the girls consented, without any
force employed upon them, to strip themselves from waist down although with understandable reluctance because
of their desire to be in the team considering that according to MEC Regional Memorandum No. 90, Series of 1981,
in relation to MEC Order No. 66, Series of 1979, failure to submit to physical examination would automatically
disqualify a candidate from the volleyball team. Respondent Judge was convicted that —

. . . what he (accused) did touch was only what is called the mons veneris or that part of the
female sexual organ where pubic hair could grow. No one of these complainants said that
accused also touched the inner part or genital orifice of their private parts. If he did, it is
inconceivable that not one of them made any outcry from that health corner room where they
were inspected inside in groups of three or two, one group at a time. The Court also refuses
to believe that accused touched each one of them several times for about five minutes. That
is very unlikely and improbable, not to mention that they never said that before in the police
investigation, as well as what they now say the wild excitement on the face of accused while
touching them.

To better understand and appreciate the rationale of respondent's decision in the light of the charges hurled against
him, i.e., gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it is imperative to quote from his
decision which we find exhaustively argued —

Understandably, the accused now denies touching the private parts of the four private
complainants. That touching is the very accusation of lascivious act imputed against him. He
could have very well said that, no matter how improper and humiliating for the girls it would
seem to be, it was part of the necessary inspection he was assigned to do as their coach by
the guidelines provided by the then Ministry of Education and Culture Order No. 66, Series of
1979 (Exh. "1"), and its implementing rules and guidelines (Exhs. "2" to "8"), in determining
the age eligibility and qualification of would-be young athletes to participate in the
forthcoming provincial sports event, taking into consideration, among other things, "breast
enlargement" and "presence of pubic hair." Growing pubic hair on young girls just above 13
years of age might still be hardly traceable and accused could probably say that he had to
feel it with his fingers to be sure that his very eyes were not deceiving him, but he should
have used his better sense of propriety and kind consideration to save the girls from the
anguish and humiliation of being touched on the most delicate parts of their bodies. There
seemed to be no urgency for that in the fulfillment of his duty as a coach and in obedience to
the MEC directive, to see to it that ineligible over-aged players are not allowed to play in the
athletic meet then forthcoming, lest he be found responsible and "be suspended from athletic
meets throughout his life, without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against him
even after the athletic meet is over" (Exh. "3-A").

To repeat, the Court is inclined to entertain doubt if the act of accused complained of was a
manifestation of his lewd designs and not just his repulsive way of following the silly MEC
guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective young athletes which did not
even discriminate that female athletes should be inspected for the presence of pubic hair or
enlarged breasts by a female coach. First of all, if his real motivation was just to satisfy his
lust it was unnatural for him to do that by inspecting the girls eight in all of their private parts
one group of three at a time, the last of which was a group of two. In other words, he did not
inspect any of the girls alone in the secrecy of the health corner room inside his classroom,
in which situation he could have taken liberties with the girl(s) unwitnessed by a third person.
Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other
part of her body, like her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts.

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 The act of the accused subject of the present accusation seems to the Court not the product
of a criminal mind, so much so that he deserves to be exonerated from the charge in each of
the four informations. However, for such act of indiscretion, though not felonious but still
wrongful, which directly resulted to the mental anguish and humiliation of each of the four
young complainants in these cases, the accused must answer for such moral damages they
suffered.

A careful analysis of the decision of respondent Judge fails to persuade us that for rendering such well-reasoned
verdict he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In Revita v.
Rimando 3 we said —

. . . . ( i )t may be argued that the respondent committed an error of judgment in dismissing

However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a conscious and deliberate intent
to perpetrate an injustice (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA
107, 119). "As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous" (48 C.J.S. 974).

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of
his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not
even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished
under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and, (d) the judge knows that his
judgment is unjust. 4 The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad
faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. 5

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an
unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well settled that a judicial
officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits,
provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully
knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and
prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. 6 As interpreted by Spanish courts,
the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. 7 Mere error
therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.

The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal
charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a
judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge,
greed, or some other similar motive. In the case at bench, the motive of respondent Judge is not even alleged.

May it be asked: Of what law was respondent Judge grossly ignorant when he acquitted the accused? Corollarily,
did he knowingly render an unjust judgment when he extensively discussed and satisfactorily explained his
decision?

If we hold respondent guilty as charged, then we might be telegraphing the wrong signals to our trial judges. For
then, where administrative sanctions are imposed on them for rendering judgments of acquittal based on reasonable
doubt or on difficult questions of law, they would be inclined, and not without practical reason, to hand down verdicts
of conviction, in case of doubt. For that course would be safer for them to pursue since, after all, erroneous
3
convictions may still be corrected on appeal. But that would be disregarding the true concept and judicial implication
of "reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, under which judges are directed according to the Rules of Court to render a
judgment of acquittal. 8 Reasonable doubt is —

. . . . that state of the case which, after full consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds
of the jurors in such a condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. Every person is presumed to be innocent until he
is proved guilty. If, upon such proof, there is reasonable doubt remaining, the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of it by acquittal. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a
strong one, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than otherwise, but the evidence
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and, in order to find the defendant guilty, the
evidence must be such as to exclude every single reasonable hypothesis, except that of the
guilt of the defendant. In other words, all of the facts proved must be consistent with, and
point to, the guilt of the defendant, not only, but the facts must be inconsistent with her
innocence. It matters not how clearly the circumstances point to guilt, still, if they are
reasonably explainable on a theory which excludes guilt, then it cannot be said that the facts
in the case are sufficient to satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the
defendant, and in that event she should be acquitted. If, after consideration of the whole
case, any one of the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it
is the duty of such juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty, and if after a consideration of the
whole case, fully, carefully, and honestly made after comparison, still one of the jury should
entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it would then be the duty of such
juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty.9

If for every error of a judge — although we do not find any in the case of respondent — he should be punished, then
perhaps no judge, however good, competent and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judicial
service without a tarnished image. Somehow along the way he may commit mistakes, however honest. This does
not exclude members of appellate courts who are not always in agreement in their views. Any one belonging to the
minority opinion may generally be considered in error, and yet, he is not punished because each one is entitled to
express himself. This privilege should extend to trial judges so long as the error is not motivated by fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, 10 or any other evil motive.

Ordinarily, the act of a man in touching and stroking the private parts of a woman is, by itself, lewd for no hand of a
man would wander or venture near her manzanas prohibidas if not for a lascivious motivation. But even if the
accused stroked and touched the girls on their montes veneris, 11 respondent nevertheless absolved the accused of
criminal liability on the theory that the complained acts may no longer be considered lascivious in view of the
directives and implementing rules and guidelines of the then Ministry (now Department) of Education, Culture and
Sports which imposed on the coaches of boys' and girls' volleyball teams the responsibility of excluding overaged
players from their teams using as one of the criteria the presence of pubic hair. In other words, since the complained
acts may be considered lawful under MECS orders, rules and guidelines, respondent Judge may have had reason
to conclude that lewdness could no longer be merely presumed.

Although we are not supposed to pass upon the merits of the case, a cursory discussion thereon is deemed
necessary for the purpose of establishing that respondent, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, did not disregard,
much less violate, any law or known jurisprudence. In People v. Balbar 12 we ruled that the presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. This supports
our conviction that in the case at bench the accused did not have a criminal mind at all, hence, his acquittal by the
respondent. After all, in the face of two plausible self-sustaining theories, albeit contradictory, one for conviction and
the other for acquittal, the latter prevails under the constitutional presumption of innocence, applying as our
parameter the test spelled out in the preceding paragraphs.

4
We reiterate that "mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and
immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him." 13 In Ad Hoc Committee Report re Judge Silverio S. Tayao,
RTC, Branch 143, Makati, and Morada v. Judge Tayao, 14 this Court through Mr. Justice Feliciano incisively and
appropriately explained—

. . . . By its nature, judicial discretion involves the exercise of judgment on the part of the
judge. The judge must be allowed a reasonable latitude for the operation of his own
individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the
applicable law on the matter. Judicial discretion is, of course, not unlimited; it must be guided
and controlled by well-known rules and principles . . . .

If Judge Tayao committed any error at all, it was an error of judgment and it is important to
recall the firmly established principle that a judge may not be administratively charged for
mere errors of judgment, in the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose:

"A Judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith (In re: Petition for the Dismissal from
Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, 173 SCRA 719 [1989]).

1. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous (Revita vs. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]; Ubongon vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30
[1980]; Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 [1986]; Abad vs. Bleza, 145 SCRA 1
[1986]; Heirs of Julio Rosas vs. Reyes, 188 SCRA 236 [1990]; Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-
Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1990]).

Mere errors in the appreciation of such evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce
an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust
decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. No one,
called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can be
infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules prescribed to
ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and
bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds established, with
only his conscience and knowledge of the law to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly
(Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran, 39 SCRA 430 [1971])."

Pertinently, it may be mentioned that on 26 February 1992, or almost a year before respondent Judge handed down
his subject decision on 8 January 1993, then Judge Narciso T. Atienza of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 16, likewise acquitted the same accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness committed
on one Sarah Jane Lapuz, an aspirant to the track and field team coached by the accused. His decision was never
questioned. Incidentally, Judge Atienza was later elevated to the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the administrative charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 12, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

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 Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., dissenting:

I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby
exonerating him from any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished
colleagues subscribing to the finding of respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the
accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-
89.

The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its
Report that the "respondent judge in his decision defied human logic because by complying with the supposed
DECS order, there was no need to touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the
accused did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the
accused had over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the free exercise of their will, such dominating
compulsion directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation. The OCA recommended
a P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.

The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a
repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the
girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an
aspiring athlete than the tactile?

Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated:
"Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like
her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay,
the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation pales into insignificance.

To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his
lust and inflict his lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he
dons and who is regarded in the community as an upright, moral and just man.

That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female
aspirant to the track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is
strongly indicative of the propensity of said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such
morally perverse officials from whom the public would expect a higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand
as guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have received more than just a figurative
slap on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the opportunity to mete out a
penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher. Sad to
say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one
who by virtue of his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We
can only lament the fact that both share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future
crop of prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the
questionable moral scruples of respondent.

6
# Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., dissenting:

I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby
exonerating him from any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished
colleagues subscribing to the finding of respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the
accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-
89.

The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its
Report that the "respondent judge in his decision defined human logic because by complying with the supposed
DECS order, there was no need to touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the
accused did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the
accused had over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the free exercise of their will, such dominating
compulsion directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation. The OCA recommended
a P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.

The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a
repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the
girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an
aspiring athlete than the tactile?

Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated:
"Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like
her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay,
the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation pales into insignificance.

To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his
lust and inflict his lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he
dons and who is regarded in the community as an upright, moral and just man.

That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female
aspirant to the track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is
strongly indicative of the propensity of said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such
morally perverse officials from whom the public would expect a higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand
as guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have received more than just a figurative
slap on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the opportunity to mete out a
penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher. Sad to
say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one
who by virtue of his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We
can only lament the fact that both share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future
crop of prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the
questionable moral scruples of respondent.

#Footnotes

1. Originally a dissenting opinion.

2. Crim. Case Nos. 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-89, respectively.

3. Adm. Matter No. 1439-M J, 22 July 1980, 98 SCRA 619, 624.

7
4. Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code (1977), Bk. II, p. 340.

5. Annotation: Malfeasance and Misfeasance of Judges (Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment), 55

6. IV Viada, Codigo Penal, 305.

7. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 1884 and January 10, 1900, cited in
Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, p. 418.

8. Sec. 2, Rule 133, The Revised Rules of Court.

9. Words and Phrases, v. 36, p. 536, citing Chadwick v. U.S. 141 F. 225, 228, 72 C.C.A. 343.

10. Same standard was used in Pilos v. Honrado, A.M. No. 1230-CFI, 23 November 1981, 109
SCRA 338; Abad v. Bleza, A. M. Nos. R- 227-RTJ, R-561-RTJ and 5249-Ret, 13 October 1986, 145
SCRA 1; Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991, 199 SCRA 48; Lim v. Domagas,
A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, 15 October 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263; Chan v. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-93-
1089, 27 June 1994.

11. Plural of mons veneris, that part of the female genitalia where pubic hair grows after the age of
13.

12. Nos. L-20216-17, 29 November 1967, 21 SCRA 1119, 1124.

13. Balayon, Jr. v. Ocampo, A.M. No. MTJ-91-619, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 13, 24-25, citing
Vda. de Zabala v. Pamaran, Adm. Case No. 200-J, 39 SCRA 430 (1971), which was also cited in
Ramirez v. Corpus-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, 144 SCRA 462 (1986); see also Ubungen v.
Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, 6 August 1980, 99 SCRA 30, 34, citing Vda. de Zabala v.
Pamaran, supra; Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992, 216
SCRA 121, 131, citing Miranda v. Manalastas, A.M. No. MTJ-88-159, 21 December 1989; Negado v.
Autajay, A.M. No. R-710-RTJ, 21 May 1993, 22 SCRA 295, 298 citing Ramirez v. Corpus-
Macandog, supra.

14. A.M. Nos. 93-8-1204-RTC and RTJ-93-978, respectively, 7 February 1994, pp. 9, 15-16.