Jericho M.

Lipana
BSLM 3A Attorney De Guzman

Criminal Law
Case Digests

People vs. Gaffud, Jr.

(G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008)

Facts:
On March 31, 2005 the Court of Appeals sentenced the accused appellant
Bernardino Gaffud Jr. to death for being guilty of a complex crime of double murder,
affirming he decision made by the RTC on August 28,2002.

The accused was found guilty for the murder of Manuel Salvador and his daughter
Analyn Salvador by shooting and burning the victims. The prosecution presented six
witnesses which through their testimonies and autopsy report, solidify evidence against
the accused:

1.) On the night of the dreadful even of May 10,1994, Orly Salvador, while on his
way to his uncle Manuel Salvador, heard two gunshots and saw his uncle’s house
burning. He then saw three persons in a rush to leave the burning house. He
further states that one of them was holding a flashlight in which he recognized as
Bernardino Gaffud Jr.
2.) Barangay Captain Potado Ballang on the fateful day at around 6:30 pm, he saw
the accused a few meters away from the house of Manuel Salvador. He asked the
accused what he was doing but the accused said that he was looking for his boat,
which the captain knew that never existed in the accused’s possession in the first
place
3.) Dan dangpal, who is a neighbor of the deceased, was on his house that night on
8:00pm when he heard successive gunshots and when he went outside his house
he saw the burning house, 200 meters away from him. He then claims that he also
saw three people leaving the burning house in which one of them is holding a
flashlight but could not identify them
4.) Dominga Salvador, husband of the deceased Manuel Salvador testified that the
accused was their neighbor and that she went in his house in the morning of the
fateful day regarding his husband’s share in the construction of the barangay hall
in which was contracted to the accused. The accused told her that later that
afternoon he is going to visit her house to introduce her in law Balbino Bravo to
her husband. Dominga Salvador further states that she had earlier filed a
complaint against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering their pig
Issues:
1.) Whether or not Conspiracy existed
2.) Whether or not the accused-appellant should be held liable for two counts of
murder or for the complex crime for double murder

Ruling:

1.) No, On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove
conspiracy in this case is not fatal. The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the
direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be
established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. In the case
at bar, however, we hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of
the victims, Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance is not
essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.

2.) No, The Supreme Court ruled that, in a complex crime, although two or more crimes
are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in
the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.

The United States vs Carson Taylor

(G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914)

Facts:
On September 25, 1913 Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, publisher and printer in the city of Manila, Philippines in the
newspaper known as “ The Manila Bulletin” which was circulated around the
Philippines, United States and other countries which the English and Spanish language is
spoken and written. In the supervision of Carson Taylor, it contained a newspaper issue
in which attacked the reputation of Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the
Philippine Islands and as a private individual which exposes him into public hatred. They
alleged that the said composed article contained false and malicious defamation and libel
in the English language. In the title of the article, it was written that, “ Owners fired
building to collect insurance, criminal charges follow civil suit”. The article further states
that, there was a conspiracy to defraud the insurance company, the building was fired in
order to collect the amount of insurance, the movable furniture of value was removed
before the fire, the full amount of insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a
success. Ramon Sotelo filed a complaint and charged Taylor with conspiracy and fraud.
Taylor was then arrested and after trial was found guilty of the crimes charged and
sentenced to pay the fine of P200. He then later appealed and made the following
assignment of errors, the court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and
guilty of the alleged libel, the court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was
libelous, the court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there
was no malice, the court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to
attorney Ramon Sotelo, and that the court erred in finding that Sotelo was attorney for the
plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published.

Issue:
Whether or not Carson Taylor was guilty of libel?

Ruling:
No, The Supreme court ruled that, " From an examination of said Act No. 277,
we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words
contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he
were the author of the same.

" By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for
the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the punishment
of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof
shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the
newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable.

The United States vs. Andres Pablo

(G.R. No. L-11676, October 17, 1916)

Facts:
On October 21, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of Balanga was ordered by his
chief to raid a juteng game at barrio tuyo which according to information was being
conducted in that area. Before arriving in the area, the players, being informed that a raid
party was coming, left the premises. Upon arriving, Andres Pablo and the policemen
found no other people besides Fransisco Dato. Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo was
also seen leaving the area. After minutes of searching the premises, they found a tambiolo
and 37 balls which is material proof that the game was being played in that area prior
their arrival. Andres Pablo then proceeded to arrest Fransisco Dato. The chief of police
then filed a complain in the court of justice of the peace charging Dato, Ma;icsi and
Rodrigo with having gambled in violation of their municipal order. The accused were
arrested but were bailed not long after.
After the hearing of the case, only Dato was pleaded guilty and the others were acquitted.
It was the memorandum presented by the chief of police which stated the testimony of
Andres Pablo under oath that Fransisco Dato was the only one seen in the premises and
the other two were not. It was later found that before the trial began, Andres Pablo had a
conference with both accused, Rodrigo and Malicsi where he was instructed not to testify
in which he received the sum of P15. After preliminary investigation, Pablo was arrested
and charged with the crime perjury. He was found guilty and was later convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of perjury or of false testimony go unpunished, and is
there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime?

Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that, However, since the Penal Code went into
force, the crime of false testimony has been punished under the said articles of the said
Code, which as we have already said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act
No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere interpretation given
to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the
Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles
318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in
repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles
of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.

People of the Philippines vs. The Sandiganbayan and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
(G.R. No. 101724, July 3, 1992)

Facts:
On October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986, Trofilo Gelacio with the tanodbayan
filed two letter complaints. Gelacio is a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza. The
letter of complaints was filed after private respondent replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/
Provincial governor of Agusan del sur in March 1986. In Gelacio’s complaint questioned
the issuance to Governor Paredes, while he was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a
free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq.m in Rosario public
land subdivision in San Fransisco, Agusan del sur. On February 23, 1989, the City Fiscal
of Butuan city subpoenaed Governor Paredes, but was not received by Paredes because
the station commander of San Fransisco received it but did not served it to him. Paredes
was not given notice yet Fiscal Ernesto Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex
parte and recommended an information be filed in court which was approved by the
Tanodbayan who filed it on August 10, 1989 in the Sandiganbayan. A warrant was issued
by the Sandiganbayan,which arrested Paredes. Paredes claims that the warrant was void
for he was denied his right to a preliminary investigation. His wife filed a petition for
habeas corpus praying for Sandiganbayan to order his husband’s release, the petition she
filed was denied because the only remedy is for his husband to file a bail bond fixed by
Sandiganbayan. On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan “ An urgent
motion to quash information and to recall warrant of arrest”. Included in his motion is
that he is chared for an offense which has prescribed, he was not given notice of the
preliminary investigation thus making it invalid, his constitutional right to due process
had been violated by the long delay in in the termination of the preliminary investigation
On August 1, 1991 the motion was granted by Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether or not the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for
the commencement of the period of prescription?

Ruling:
Yes, the court ruled that, the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes'
application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to
recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's
complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late. In the absence of a special provision
otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run on the commission of an offense and no
t from the time when the offense is discovered or when the offender becomes known, or
it normally begins to run when the crime is complete.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano A.
Desierto
(G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008)

Facts:
Orlando L. Salvador filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the resolution
on September 3,1999, dismissing the criminal complaint filed against the private
respondents and the order dated, June 6, 2000 which denied its reconsideration. Atty.
Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an industrial loan from DBP. The loan application
was approved on August 6, 1980. Salvador alleged that prior to the approval of the loan,
ICPI obtained an interim loan to cover the project’s initial financing requirement. He
further states that ICPI’s industrial loan was under collateralized and ICPI was
undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted. By then, ICPI’s paid up capital was
only three million pesos while the appraised value of the machinery and equipment which
was offered as collaterals was only P 5,943,610.00. In his conclusion, ICPI was
undeserving of the concession given to it and the approval of the loan constitutes a
violation of Section 3(e) (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Atty. Salvador filed a Supplementary
Complaint Affidavit on March 13, 1996. Included in his complaint is ICPI’s interim loan
of P 1,786,000.00, which he claimed was granted with undue haste and without collateral.
He named Rafael Sison, Jose Tengco, Alice Reyes, and Casimiro Tanedo as the ones
responsible for the loan’s approval and thus be likewise charged alongside the officers
and directors of ICPI. The complaint was dismissed. The motion for reconsideration is
also denied by the Ombudsman.

Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of excess in jurisdiction in his ruling that
(1) The offenses subject to its criminal complaint had prescribed
(2) Administrative order No.13 and Memorandum order No.61 are ex post facto laws

Ruling:
(1) No, The court ruled that, The Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did
not specify the exact dates when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, the
records show that it was the Committee that discovered the same. As such, the discovery
could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was
created. The complaint was filed on February 17, 1995, less than three (3) years from the
presumptive date of discovery. Thus, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the
private respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed.

(2) No, he constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.

Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest
loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest
Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the
other hand, simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Simeon Ferrer

(G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)

Facts:
A criminal complaint was filed for violation of section 4 of the Anti Subversion
Act was filed against Feliciano Co on March 5,1970. A preliminary investigation was
conducted on March 10, 1970 and finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the
Government prosecutors to file a twice amended information. It is expressed in the
information that the accused feloniously became an officer of the illegal organization,
Communist party of the Philippines. In line with the commission of the offense, it
included the following aggravating circumstances (a) that the crime has been committed
in contempt of or with insult to public authorities (b) that the crime was committed by a
band; and afford impunity, (3) with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity. Co moved to quash on the ground that the said act is a bill of attainder. On May
25,1970, another criminal complaint was filed in the same Court , sharing the respondent
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. Tayag moved to quash on July 21,1970 on
the ground that it is vague, a bill of attainder, denied him of the equal protection of the
laws. The trial courd in its resolution on September 15,1970 declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard. The
government appealed

Issue:
Whether or not the Act is a bill of Attainder?

Ruling:
No, Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
or ex port facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by
the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of
the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its
existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines. By means
of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed
"judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the
accused can never hope to overthrow."

BOCEA vs. Hon. Margarito B. Teves

(G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011)

Facts:
R.A. No. 9335 was signed into law by former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
it was enacted in order to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC. The law provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board in order to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets. BOCEA contends that the enactment and implementation of the said act
Are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its
members. BOCEA directly filed the present petition against the respondents. BOCEA
argued that the members of BOC and its employees are in danger of losing their jobs in
case they failed to meet the required quota provided in the said act, which is in clear
violation of their constitutional rights. The Court declared section 12 of the said act as
unconstitutional and violative of the principle of the separation of powers. The Court
upheld the remaining provisions of R.A No. 9335. The Court also held until the contrary
is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335. Is presumed valid and effective even without the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in section 12.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of the members of
the BOCEA in terms of (1) equal protection of Laws, (2) security of tenure and (3) due
process?

2.) Wheter or not R.A. No. 9335 is a bil of attainder

Ruling:
1.) No, the court held that, the equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies.

Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side. BOCEA's apprehension of deprivation of due process
finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.

(2) No, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a

legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty the deprivation of
life or liberty or property not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative
fiat.

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds
for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional
rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.
 Rene V. Saguisag et. al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. 
(G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016).

Facts:
The constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States of America is being questioned in the petition. The
petitioners allege that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into the said agreement with the United
States. They stated that the said instrument violated counts of constitutional provisions.
The respondents in reply, argued that the petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To
solidify their claim that their actions are legal, they invoked the 1987 constitution,
treaties, and judicial precedents.

The Court lay down the constitutional powers and roles of the president and the senate
are the following: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the state and, in fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal
military or civil service. Included also is the power and duty to conduct foreign relations,
and the relationship between the two major presidential functions and the role of the
senate.

EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain “ Agreed Locations” in the country. According to the Philippine government, the
conclusion of EDCA was the result of intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the
course of almost two years. EDCA was ratified by former president Benigno S. Aquino
III on June 2014. Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA. They primariy argue that it should have been in the form of a
treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive agreement. Months after the oral
arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective memoranda.
The senate adopted a resolution, which in order for EDCA be valid and enffective, it
must first be submitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

Issues:
1.) Wheter or not the essential requisites for Judicial review are present
2.) Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as
well as with existing laws and treaties.

Ruling:

(1) Yes, the Court ruled that, this Court has indeed taken a liberal stance towards
the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed,
when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that
they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

While this Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this doctrine, we
emphasize that not every other case, however strong public interest may be, can qualify
as an issue of transcendental importance. Before it can be impelled to brush aside the
essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial review, it must at the very least
consider a number of factors: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party that has a more direct and specific interest in raising the
present questions.

An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the oral
arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional issues that
provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing. The
transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the Constitution itself.
Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter
mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in
the country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal
requirements of the Philippines have already been complied with. It behooves the Court
in this instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule on standing and to determine
forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive
Department.

(2) Yes, the Court ruled that, In order to keep the peace in its archipelago in this region of
the world, and to sustain itself at the same time against the destructive forces of nature,
the Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the friendships will take,
are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution itself
expressly prohibits. It appears that this overarching concern for balancing constitutional
requirements against the dictates of necessity was what led to EDCA.

As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains

consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.